2 Whatever may be the explanation of the
development of the theory of absolute monarchy in the cen-
turies from the sixteenth to the eighteenth, this theory was
wholly alien to the Middle Ages.
development of the theory of absolute monarchy in the cen-
turies from the sixteenth to the eighteenth, this theory was
wholly alien to the Middle Ages.
Thomas Carlyle
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? 94
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
that it would not be probable that he should become a
tyrant; and secondly, that his authority should be so re-
strained (temperatur) that he could not easily fall into
tyranny. St Thomas evidently intended to deal with the
matter further in this treatise; unhappily he never com-
pleted the work. 1
He has however fortunately, in the ' Summa Theologica,'
indicated very clearly what he thought about the best form
of constitution, and we may conjecture that, if he had com-
pleted the ' De Eegimine,' it would have been under similar
terms that he would have explained what he meant when,
in the passage just cited, he says that the power of the king
should be restrained. In the ' Summa Theologica ' he gives
as his own opinion that in a good government it is in the
first place important that all should have some share in
authority. This tends to the peace of the people, for all men
love and maintain such an order; in the second place, the
best constitution is that when one man is set over all on
account of his virtue, and others govern under him also on
account of their virtue. Such a constitution belongs to all,
for the rulers can be elected from all, and are elected by all.
Such a mixed constitution combines the character of a
kingdom, for it has one head; of an aristocracy, for many
have their part in authority on account of their virtue; and
of a democracy--that is, of the authority of the people, for
the rulers can be elected from the people, and their election
belongs to the people. This, he adds, was the form of govern-
ment instituted by the Divine law, for Moses and his suc-
cessors ruled as kings, while the council of the elders repre-
sented the aristocracy, and as these were elected from and by
1 Id. id. , i. 6: " Quia ergo unius
regimen preeligendum est, quod est
optimum, et contingit ipsum in tyran-
nidem converti, quod est pessimum,
ut ex dictis patet; laborandum est
diligenti studio, ut sic multitudini
provideatur de rege ut non incidat
in tyrannum. Primum autem est
necessarium, ut talis conditionis homo
flb fllis ad quos hoo spectat officium
promoveatur in regem, quod non sit
probabile in tyrannidem declinare. . . .
Deinde sic disponenda est regum guber-
natio, ut regi jam instituto tyrannidis
subtrahatur occasio. Simul etiam sic
ejus temperatur potestas ut in tyran-
nidem de facili declinare non possit.
Quse quidem, ut fiant, in sequentibus
considerandum erit. "
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? CHAP. VII. ] THE AUTHORITY OP THE RULER.
95
the whole people, they also represented the principle of
democracy. 1
This passage indicates very clearly what it was that St
Thomas meant by a kingdom in which the authority of the
king should be moderated or restrained; St Thomas clearly
preferred a mixed or constitutional state. It is noticeable
that, although we cannot say that he anywhere shows any
special acquaintance with the actual constitutional movements
of his time, in his treatment of the representative principle
and the elective method of creating this representation, he
comes very near to that constitutional development of which
we shall have to speak in a later chapter.
The best form of government, then, in the judgment of
St Thomas is a constitutional monarchy, and it is by means
of the restraints belonging to such a constitution that the
king may be prevented from becoming a tyrant. It still
remains to consider what St Thomas thought should be done
1 Id. , ' Summa Theologies,' 1. 2,
105, 1 : " Respondeo dicendum, quod
circa bonam ordinationem principum
in aliqua civitate vel gente, duo sunt
attendenda. Quorum unum est, ut
omnes aliquam partem habeant in
principatu ; per hoc enim conservatur
pax populi, et omnes talem ordina-
tionem amant et oustodiunt, ut dicitur
in H. Polit. ; aliud est, quod attenditur
secundum speciem regiminis, vel ordi-
nstionis principatuum : cujus quum
sint diverse species, ut Philos. tradit
in HI. Polit. ; prsecipuse tamen est
unum regimen in quo unus principatur
secundum virtutem; et aristocratia,
id est potestas optimorum, in qua
aliqui pauci principantur secundum
virtutem; unde optima ordinatio
principum est in aliqua civitate, vel
regno, in quo unus prseneitur secundum
virtutem, qui omnibus prsesit; et sub
ipso sunt aliqui principantes secundum
virtutem ; et tamen talis principatus
ad omnes pertinet; tum quia ex
omnibus eligi possunt; turn quia
etiam ab omnibus eliguntur. Talis
vero est omnis politia bene commixta
ex regno, in quantum unus prseest, et
aristocratia, in quantum multi princi-
pantur secundum virtutem, et ex
domocratia, id est, potestate populi,
in quantum ex popularibus possunt
eligi principes ; et ad populum pertinet
electio principum ; et hoc fuit insti-
tutum secundum legem divinam. Nam
Moyses, et ejus successores gubernabant
populum, quasi singulariter omnibus
principantes, quod est qusedam species
regni. Eligebantur autem septuaginta
duo seniores secundum virtutom:
dicitur enim Deut. i. * Tuli de vestris
tribubus viros sapientes et nobiles,
et constitui eos principes* : et hoc
erat aristocraticum: sed democra-
ticum erat, quod isti de omni populo
eligebantur : dicitur enim Exod. 18 :
' Provide de omni plebe viros sapientes,'
&c, et etiam quod populus eos elige-
bat; unde dicitur Deut. i. : ' Data
? ? ex vobis viros sapientes '; unde patet
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? 96
[PABT I,
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
if the king, in spite of all precautions, should become a tyrant.
It is this question with which he deals in detail in the sixth
chapter of the ' De Eegimine Principum. ' In the first place,
he urges that unless the tyranny is very grievous, it may be
better to endure it for a time, lest matters should only be
made worse. Some, he says, have contended that if the
tyranny is intolerable, it belongs to the virtue of brave men
to slay the tyrant, and to run the risk of death in order to set
the people free, but this is not in accordance with the apostolic
teaching; St Peter said that we should be subject not only
to the good, but also to the forward rulers, and St Thomas
points out that the Christians did not resist the tyrannical
persecutions of the Eoman emperors. It would be dangerous
not only to the rulers but to the people if it were to be deter-
mined by private judgment whether a ruler should be killed,
for wicked men find the rule of a king as burdensome to them
as that of a tyrant.
St Thomas, therefore, contends that the king who has
become a tyrant should be dealt with by public authority.
If it belongs to the lawful right (jus) of the people to appoint
the king, it is right and just that the king whom they have
created, if he has tyrannically abused the royal power, should
be deposed by them, or that they should limit his power.
The people are not violating their faith in deposing the tyrant,
even if they had conferred upon him a perpetual authority,
for he has deserved that the contract (or agreement, pactum)
which was made to him by his subjects should not be kept,
inasmuch as he had not kept his faith in the government of
the people. St Thomas cites the expulsion of the Tarquins
and the destruction of Domitian by the Eoman Senate as
examples of such constitutional action. If, however, the
right of appointing the king belongs to some superior
authority, recourse should be made to it. If there is no
human help against the tyrant, men must turn to God, who
is the king of all, and their helper in tribulation. 1 It is thus
1 ' De Kegimine Principum,' i. 6: oocurri. Et quidom si non fuerit
" Demum vero curandum est, si rex excessUs tyrannidis, utilius est remis-
in tyrannidem diverteret, qualiter possit sam tyrannidem tolerare ad tempus,
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? CHAP. TO. ] THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER.
97
clear what are the general principles of St Thomas with
regard to the nature of the authority of the ruler, and the
limitations upon that authority; it is, indeed, clear that
his conception of a good constitution is that of a monarchy
limited by the authority of an aristocracy elected by and
representative of the community. 1
We can now consider this principle of the limitation of the
royal authority in other writers. It may be well to begin
by warning our readers against the misconception which
might arise from the occasional use, especially by the Civilians
or other writers who were familiar with the Eoman Law, of
the phrase that the emperor or prince is "legibus solutus. "
Civilians like Odofridus and Boncompagni cite the words, but
add those of the rescript of Theodosius and Valutinian (' Cod. ,'
i. 14, 4) that it is right that the emperor should acknowledge
that he is bound by the laws,2 and Vincent of Beauvais, in
words which are plainly reminiscent of John of Salisbury,
says that the prince is "legis nexibus . . . absolutus," not
quam contra tyrannum agendo multis
implicate periculis, quse sunt graviora
ipsa tyrannide. . . . Et si sit intolera-
bilia excessus tyrannidis, quibusdam
visum fuit, ut ad fortium virorum
virtutem pertineat tyrannum interi-
mere, seque pro liberations multitudinis
exponere periculis mortis: cujus rei
exemplum etiam in vetere Testamento
habetur. . . . Sed hoo Apostolicse doc-
trine non congruit. Docet enim nos
Petrus, non bonis tantum et modestis,
verum etiam discolis dominis reverenter
subditos esse (1 Pet. ii. 18). . . . Esset
autem hoc multitudini periculosum et
ejus rectoribus, si privata presump-
tione aliqui attentarent presidentium
necem, etiam tyrannorum. . . . Malis
autem solet esset grave dominium non
minus regum quam tyrannorum. . . .
Videtur autem magis contra tyran-
norum ssevitiam non privata presump-
tione aliquorum, sed auctoritate pubica
procedendum. Primo quidem, si ad
jus multitudinis alicujus pertineat, sibi
VOL. V.
providere de rege, non injuste ab
eadem, rex institutus potest destitui
(destrui), vel refrenari ejus potestas
si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur.
Nec putanda est talis multitudo inflde.
liter agere tyrannum destituens, etiam
si eidem in perpetuo se ante subjecerat:
quia hoo ipse meruit, in multitudinis
regimine se non fideliter gerens, ut
exigit regis officium, quod ei pactum
a subditis non reservetur . . .
Si vero ad jus alicujus superioris per-
tineat multitudini providere de rege,
expectandum est ab eo remodium contra
tyranni nequitiam . . . .
Quod si omnino contra tyrannum
auxilium humanum habere non potest,
recurrendum est ad re gem omnium
Deum, qui est adjutor in opportune -
tatibus in tribulatione. "
1 See Appendix, I.
* Odofridus, ' Comm. on Dig. ,' i. 3,
31 ; Boncompagni, ' Rhetorics Novis-
? ? sima,' ix. 5.
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? 98
[PABT L
Political principles.
because he can act unjustly, but because he should be a man
of such a character that he pursues equity not from the fear
of punishment, but from love of justice, for in public matters
he may not desire anything but that which law or equity
and the public good requires. 1
We may compare the treatment of the relation of the
king to the law, as it is expressed in the Spanish law-books
of Alfonso X. He describes the office of the king in the highest
terms ; he is the vicar of God to keep his people in justice
and truth in temporal matters,2 but he also maintains that
he is specially bound to obey the laws, and this for three
reasons : the first, because it is by the laws that he is honoured
and protected; the second, because it is the laws which help
him to fulfil justice and right; the third, because it is the
king who made the laws, and it is right (derecho) that those
who made the laws should be the first to obey them. 3 Alfonso
does not hesitate to say in another place that not only the
1 Vincent of Beauvais, ' Speculum,'
ii. 7, 23: " Princeps autom legis
nexibus dicitur absolutus, non quia
iniqua ei liceant, sed quia is debet
esse, qui non timore prense sed amore
justitie equitatem colat. Nam in
negociis publicis nil ei vello licet, nisi
quod lex aut sequitas persuadet, aut
ratio communis utilitatis inducit. "
Cf. John of Salisbury, ' Policraticus,'
iv. 2.
Cf. vol. iii. p. 139. (Notioe, however,
that the section in Vincent begins
with a reference to " Laurentius Medio-
lanensis Episcopus," writing about
" Publici Exactores. ")
2 * Siete Partidas, * ii. 1, 5 : " Vicarios
de Dios son los reyes cada uno en su
regno puestos sobre las gentes para
mantenerlas en justicia et en verdad
quanto en lo temporal, bien asi como
el emperador en su empen? o . . . et
los santos dixeron que el rey es scn? or
puesto en la tierra en lugar de Dios
para complir la justicia et dar a cada
uno su derecho. "
Cf. ' Especulo,' ii. 1, 5.
3 ' Especulo,' i. 1, 9 : " Todos los
omes deven seer tenidos de obedecer
las leyes, et mayormiente los reyes por
estas razones. La primera porque
son por las leyes honrados et guar-
dados. La segunda porque los ayudan
a complir justicia et derecho, lo que
ellos son tenudos de fazer. La tercera
porque ellos son fazedores dellas, et
es derecho que pues que las ellos
fazen, que ellas las o bed oscan pri-
meriamente. Cf. ' Siete Partidas,'
1, 1, 16.
" Guardar debe el rey las leyes como
a su fechura et a? su honra, porque
recibe poder et razon para facer jus-
ticia. Ca si e? l non las guardase, vernia
contra su fecho, et desatario el bien,
et venirle hie ende dos dan? os: el
primero en desatar tan buena cosa
como esta que hobiese fecho, ol otro
que se tornari? a en dan? o communal-
? ? mente de todo el pueblo. Et por este
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? CHAP, vn. ] THE AUTHORITY OP THE RULER.
99
king who has obtained his kingdom by force, fraud, or treason,
but even the king who has obtained his authority by lawful
means, if he misuses his power and turns his lordship from
right to wrong, is a tyrant. 1
The truth is that the conception that the prince might
or should govern according to his own will or pleasure was
a purely academic conception, and had no relation to the
principles of government in the Middle Ages, at least till the
close of the thirteenth century. The normal conception of
that time was really that of Bracton, to which we have so
frequently referred, that the king was under the law as well
as under God.
2 Whatever may be the explanation of the
development of the theory of absolute monarchy in the cen-
turies from the sixteenth to the eighteenth, this theory was
wholly alien to the Middle Ages.
It was alien, as we think, to the whole constitutional tradi-
tion of the earlier Middle Ages,3 but even if this had not been
the case, it is obvious that the development of feudalism in
the centuries from the tenth to the thirteenth would have
rendered it not merely impossible, but to the men of that time
unintelligible. For the fundamental character of feudalism
is to be found in the principle that it was a system of mutual
and fixed obligations. The obligations of the lord, and the
mediseval king was a lord, whatever else he might be, were
not the same in all respects as those of the vassal, but they
were equally fixed and binding; the rights also of the feudal
lord were not the same in all respects as those of the vassal,
but they were just as clearly and definitely limited as those
1 * Siete Partidas,' ii. 1, 10 : " Tirano
tanto quiere decir como <<en? or cruel que
es apoderado en algun regno o? tierra por
fuerza, o? por engan? o o? por traicion :
et estos tales son de tal natura, que
despues que son bien apoderados en
la tierra, aman mas de facer su pro,
maguer sea a? dan? o de la tierra, que la
pro comunal de todos, porque siempre
viven u? mala sospecha de la perder. . . .
Otro sidecimos que maguer alguno
hobiese ganado sen? ori? o de regno por
alguna de las derechas razones que
deximos en las leyes ante desta, que
si e? l usase mal de su poderi? o en las
maneras que dixiemos en esta ley, quel
puedan decir las gentes tirano, ca to? r-
nase el sen? ori? o que era derecho en
torticero, asi como dixo Ari? sto? tiles en
el libro que tabla del regimento de las
cibdades et de los regnos. "
a Cf. vol. iii. p. 38.
* Cf. vol. i. chap. 18.
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? 100
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
of the vassal. We have dealt -with this subject at length
in the third volume of the work,1 and only add here a few
further illustrations.
Martin Silimani, one of the Bologna Jurists of the later
thirteenth century, who, like some other Civilians, also wrote
on feudal law, discusses in one place the conditions under
which a vassal would be liberated from the obligations of fealty.
If a lord were to commit an act of " fellonia " of such a
kind that, if the vassal were to commit it he would lose his
fief, the lord would lose his property. Again, if the lord were
to require of the vassal something dishonourable or base or
unlawful, the vassal would be freed from his obedience. 2
Andrew of Isernia, as we have pointed out, in his com-
mentary on the Neapolitan Constitutions, clearly holds that
this principle applied to the king and his vassals just as much
as to other cases. If the king attempts unjustly to seize and
ill-treat a vassal, the vassal is not bound to obey the king's
summons, for in such action the king is no king, and the lord
loses his property in the fief, just as the vassal would lose his
fief if he did not render justice to his lord. 3
Alfonso X. sets out the same principles of the feudal rela-
tions in the ' Siete Partidas '; the mutual obligations of lord
and vassal, and also the results of a violation, on either side,
of these obligations. The vassal owes to his lord love, honour,
protection, and loyal service, but the lord has the same kind
of obligations to his vassal. The vassal will lose his fief if he
fails to carry out his obligations to his lord, if he kills his
1 Cf. vol. iii. part i. chaps. 2 and 4.
* Martin Silimani,' De Feudis,' fol. 9.
Rub. "In quibus casibus vasallus a
fidelitate domini liberetur " : " Item
si dominus commisit felloniam contra
vassallum, talem qualem si vassallus
commisisset, feodum perderet, tunc
dominus proprietatem rei perdet. . . .
Item liberatur ab obedientia domini,
ut ei obedire non cogatur, ut si jubeat
vassallo aliquid inhonestum . . . vel
turpe, vel illicitum. "
9 Andreas of Isernia, ' Peregrina,'
fol. 38, v. : " Unde et si constet quod
vassallum velit rex contra justitiam
cape re et male tractare, dixerat enim
ei hoc rex notificando suam volun-
tatem per ea quod dicuntur in glo. . . .
iuste timebit ire timens capi de facto
et occidi . . . tunc non est inobediens
regi, quia in tali actu non est rex. . . .
Talis actus et tale delictum regium,
omnem honorem excludit. Item et
tuno dominus privatur proprietate
vasalli, sicut vasallus feudo, quum non
facit justitiam domino. "
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? CHAP. VII. ] THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER.
101
lord's brother, or son, or grandson, or seduces his wife, or
daughter, or daughter-in-law, but also, if the lord does any
of these things to his vassal, the lord will lose his property
in the fief. 1 The ' Siete Partidas ' distinguishes, indeed, be-
tween the feudal relations and those which it describes under
the term "naturaleza"--that is, as we understand it, the
natural relations in which a man stands to the lord of the land
in which he lives,--but it emphatically asserts that this relation
also is terminated by the wrongdoing either of the " natural "
(the natural subject) or by that of the lord of the land. 2
The rights of the mediseval prince were then fixed rights,
limited and restrained by the law, and it is from this point
1 ' Siete Partidas,' iv. 25, 6 : " Deb-
dos muy grandes son los que han los
vasallos con sus sen? ores; ca de? benlos
amar, et honrar, et guardar et adelan-
tar su pro, et desviarlos su dan? o en
todas las maneras quo podieren, et
de? benlos servir bien et lealmente por
el bienfecho que dellos resciben.
Otrosi decimos que el sen? or debe amar,
et honrar et guardar sus vasallos, et
facerles bien et merced, et desviarlos
de dan? o et de deshonra : et quando
estos debdos son bien guardados, face
cada uno lo que debe, et cresoe et dura
el amor verdadero entre ellos. "
Id. , 4, 26, 8: " Perder puede el
feudo en su vida el vasallo si non
compliese al sen? or o? a? sus fijos el
servicio quel prometio? de facer por
razon del. "
Id. , 4, 26, 9 : " Matando el vasallo
al hermano, o? al fijo o? al nieto de su
sen? or, debe perder por ende el feudo :
otrosi decimos que si el vasallo yace
con la muger de su sen? or, o? con su fija
o? con su nuera, que debe perder el
feudo ; eso mesmo serie si se trabajase
en alguna manera de rescebir a alguna
dellas para traerla a? facerle tal
deshonra. Por todas estas cosas sobre-
dichas et por cada una dellas que
deximos en la ley ante desta por quel
vasallo debe perder el feudo quando
la feciere, por esas meemas pierde el
sen? or la propriedat del feudo, si feciere
alguna dellas contra la persona del
vasallo, o? de su muger, o? de sus fijos,
o? de sus fijas, o? de sus nueras, et finca
despues deso la propriedat del feudo
al vasallo para siempre por juro de
heredat. "
* Id-, iv. 24, 6 : " Desnaturar segunt
lenguage de Espan? a tanto quiere decir
como salir homo de la naturaleza que
ha con su sen? or, o con la tierra en que
vive. Et porque esto como debdo de
natura non se puede desatar sinon per
alguna derecha razon : et las derechas
razones porque los naturales pueden
esto faoer son quatro : la una es por
culpa del natural, et las tres por culpa
del sen? or : et esto serie como quando
el natural feciere traycion al sen? or 5
a? la tierra, que solamiento por el fecho
es desnaturado de los bienes et de las
? ? honras del sen? or et de la tierra. Et
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? 102
[PABT L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
of view that we shall best understand the origin and signifi-
cance of the principle of the limitation of the rights of the
king over the property of the subject, and the constitutional
principle of the limitation of his rights of taxation.
We have pointed out in the second volume that there had
been considerable discussion among the Bologna Civilians
about the rights of the emperor over private property, and
we have referred to Savigny as having put together the
traditions as to the differences among them when they were
consulted by Frederick Barbarossa on the matter. 1 The doc-
trine that the emperor was the owner of all private property
had been traditionally ascribed especially to Martinus; and
it is noteworthy that Odofridus, the most important Civilian
of the later thirteenth century, emphatically repudiates the
doctrine. The emperor, he says, is " Dominus,'' " non quoad
proprietatem sed quoad protectionem. " Andrew of Isernia,
who was learned in Eoman law as well as in feudal, in his
commentary on the Neapolitan Constitution, with equal
emphasis maintains, as we have said before, that the prince
cannot deprive a man of his property against his will, unless
he has been guilty of some crime, and adds that to maintain
that the prince could do this was to fall back into the error
of Martin, who said that the prince was the owner of all
things, " quoad proprietatem. " 2 John of Paris, in the course
of a discussion of the relation of the Pope especially to Church
property, to which we shall have occasion to return, lays down
dogmatically the principle that lay property belongs to indi-
viduals who have full power of disposing of it, and that there-
1 Cf. vol. ii. pp. 72-74, and Savigny,
' Geschichte des Romischen Rechts ira
Mittelalter,' chap, xxviii. 3.
2 Odofridus, ' Comm. on Digest,' fol.
2, v. ; * Prima Constiiution ii. 5:
** Dixit dominus Martinus quod im-
perator non solum est dominus
eorum que sunt imperii: immo est
dominus proprietatis omnium re rum
eingulorum hominum . . . .
bene est dioendum quod imperator
est dominus proprietatis omnium rer-
um que sunt imperii, et rerum singu-
lorum hominum est dominus non
quoad proprietatem ; sed quoad pro-
tectionem. "
Andreas of Isernia, * Peregrina. ' fol.
4: " Sed etiam princeps non potest
statuere, quod debet ille solvam ego,
quia re mea me invito sine mea culpa
me privare non potest. . . . Alias
reinciderem in errorem Martini qui
dicit omnia esse principie quoad pro-
prietatem. "
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? CHAP. VII. ] THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER. 103
fore neither the Pope nor the prince has " dominium vel
dispensationem " in such things. 1 It is even more significant
that Alfonso X. in the ' Siete Pallidas,' after setting out in
the highest terms the dignity and authority of the emperor,
adds that when the Eomans gave him this authority, they
did not intend to make him the lord of men's property in
such a sense that he could dispose of it at his capricious will. 2
It is evident that there had been some uncertainty among
the Civilians about this matter, and it is possible that we
have here one source of later theories about the authority
of the absolute monarch in taxation. It is, however, also
clear that in the later thirteenth century even those who were
acquainted with the Eoman law were controlled by the general
conception of the legal limitations upon the rights of the lord,
which were an essential characteristic of the feudal system.
The property of the vassal was liable to certain demands
on the part of the lord. In addition to other obligations of
service he was bound to render monetary help in certain cases,
and these were pretty much the same everywhere in Western
Europe, but beyond these he was not normally bound. This
is the significance of the clause of Magna Carta which lays
down the rule that no scutage or aid should be levied in
the kingdom except in the three cases, of the redemption
of the king from captivity, the knighting of the king's eldest
son, and the marriage of his eldest daughter, except by the
common council of the kingdom. This is not a mere incident
of a factious conflict, but the enunciation as a rule of the
national constitution of England of that which was the
common principle of mediseval society. 3
1 John of Paris, ' Tractatus de potes-
tate regia et papali,' vii. : " Et ideo
nec princepa nec Papa habet dominium
vel dispensationem in talibus. "
2 'Siete Partidas,' ii. 1, 2: "Ca
maguer los Romanes, que antigua-
mente ganaron con su poder el se&orio
del mundo ficiesen emperador et otor-
gasen todo el poder et el senorio que
habien sobre las gentes para mantener
et defender derechamente el pro
comunal de todos, con todo eso non
fue su entendimiento del facer sefior
de las cosas de cada uno, de manera
que las podiese tomar a su voluntad,
sinon tan solamente por alguna de las
razones que desuso son dichas. "
8 ' Magna Carta,' xii.
? 94
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
that it would not be probable that he should become a
tyrant; and secondly, that his authority should be so re-
strained (temperatur) that he could not easily fall into
tyranny. St Thomas evidently intended to deal with the
matter further in this treatise; unhappily he never com-
pleted the work. 1
He has however fortunately, in the ' Summa Theologica,'
indicated very clearly what he thought about the best form
of constitution, and we may conjecture that, if he had com-
pleted the ' De Eegimine,' it would have been under similar
terms that he would have explained what he meant when,
in the passage just cited, he says that the power of the king
should be restrained. In the ' Summa Theologica ' he gives
as his own opinion that in a good government it is in the
first place important that all should have some share in
authority. This tends to the peace of the people, for all men
love and maintain such an order; in the second place, the
best constitution is that when one man is set over all on
account of his virtue, and others govern under him also on
account of their virtue. Such a constitution belongs to all,
for the rulers can be elected from all, and are elected by all.
Such a mixed constitution combines the character of a
kingdom, for it has one head; of an aristocracy, for many
have their part in authority on account of their virtue; and
of a democracy--that is, of the authority of the people, for
the rulers can be elected from the people, and their election
belongs to the people. This, he adds, was the form of govern-
ment instituted by the Divine law, for Moses and his suc-
cessors ruled as kings, while the council of the elders repre-
sented the aristocracy, and as these were elected from and by
1 Id. id. , i. 6: " Quia ergo unius
regimen preeligendum est, quod est
optimum, et contingit ipsum in tyran-
nidem converti, quod est pessimum,
ut ex dictis patet; laborandum est
diligenti studio, ut sic multitudini
provideatur de rege ut non incidat
in tyrannum. Primum autem est
necessarium, ut talis conditionis homo
flb fllis ad quos hoo spectat officium
promoveatur in regem, quod non sit
probabile in tyrannidem declinare. . . .
Deinde sic disponenda est regum guber-
natio, ut regi jam instituto tyrannidis
subtrahatur occasio. Simul etiam sic
ejus temperatur potestas ut in tyran-
nidem de facili declinare non possit.
Quse quidem, ut fiant, in sequentibus
considerandum erit. "
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? CHAP. VII. ] THE AUTHORITY OP THE RULER.
95
the whole people, they also represented the principle of
democracy. 1
This passage indicates very clearly what it was that St
Thomas meant by a kingdom in which the authority of the
king should be moderated or restrained; St Thomas clearly
preferred a mixed or constitutional state. It is noticeable
that, although we cannot say that he anywhere shows any
special acquaintance with the actual constitutional movements
of his time, in his treatment of the representative principle
and the elective method of creating this representation, he
comes very near to that constitutional development of which
we shall have to speak in a later chapter.
The best form of government, then, in the judgment of
St Thomas is a constitutional monarchy, and it is by means
of the restraints belonging to such a constitution that the
king may be prevented from becoming a tyrant. It still
remains to consider what St Thomas thought should be done
1 Id. , ' Summa Theologies,' 1. 2,
105, 1 : " Respondeo dicendum, quod
circa bonam ordinationem principum
in aliqua civitate vel gente, duo sunt
attendenda. Quorum unum est, ut
omnes aliquam partem habeant in
principatu ; per hoc enim conservatur
pax populi, et omnes talem ordina-
tionem amant et oustodiunt, ut dicitur
in H. Polit. ; aliud est, quod attenditur
secundum speciem regiminis, vel ordi-
nstionis principatuum : cujus quum
sint diverse species, ut Philos. tradit
in HI. Polit. ; prsecipuse tamen est
unum regimen in quo unus principatur
secundum virtutem; et aristocratia,
id est potestas optimorum, in qua
aliqui pauci principantur secundum
virtutem; unde optima ordinatio
principum est in aliqua civitate, vel
regno, in quo unus prseneitur secundum
virtutem, qui omnibus prsesit; et sub
ipso sunt aliqui principantes secundum
virtutem ; et tamen talis principatus
ad omnes pertinet; tum quia ex
omnibus eligi possunt; turn quia
etiam ab omnibus eliguntur. Talis
vero est omnis politia bene commixta
ex regno, in quantum unus prseest, et
aristocratia, in quantum multi princi-
pantur secundum virtutem, et ex
domocratia, id est, potestate populi,
in quantum ex popularibus possunt
eligi principes ; et ad populum pertinet
electio principum ; et hoc fuit insti-
tutum secundum legem divinam. Nam
Moyses, et ejus successores gubernabant
populum, quasi singulariter omnibus
principantes, quod est qusedam species
regni. Eligebantur autem septuaginta
duo seniores secundum virtutom:
dicitur enim Deut. i. * Tuli de vestris
tribubus viros sapientes et nobiles,
et constitui eos principes* : et hoc
erat aristocraticum: sed democra-
ticum erat, quod isti de omni populo
eligebantur : dicitur enim Exod. 18 :
' Provide de omni plebe viros sapientes,'
&c, et etiam quod populus eos elige-
bat; unde dicitur Deut. i. : ' Data
? ? ex vobis viros sapientes '; unde patet
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? 96
[PABT I,
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
if the king, in spite of all precautions, should become a tyrant.
It is this question with which he deals in detail in the sixth
chapter of the ' De Eegimine Principum. ' In the first place,
he urges that unless the tyranny is very grievous, it may be
better to endure it for a time, lest matters should only be
made worse. Some, he says, have contended that if the
tyranny is intolerable, it belongs to the virtue of brave men
to slay the tyrant, and to run the risk of death in order to set
the people free, but this is not in accordance with the apostolic
teaching; St Peter said that we should be subject not only
to the good, but also to the forward rulers, and St Thomas
points out that the Christians did not resist the tyrannical
persecutions of the Eoman emperors. It would be dangerous
not only to the rulers but to the people if it were to be deter-
mined by private judgment whether a ruler should be killed,
for wicked men find the rule of a king as burdensome to them
as that of a tyrant.
St Thomas, therefore, contends that the king who has
become a tyrant should be dealt with by public authority.
If it belongs to the lawful right (jus) of the people to appoint
the king, it is right and just that the king whom they have
created, if he has tyrannically abused the royal power, should
be deposed by them, or that they should limit his power.
The people are not violating their faith in deposing the tyrant,
even if they had conferred upon him a perpetual authority,
for he has deserved that the contract (or agreement, pactum)
which was made to him by his subjects should not be kept,
inasmuch as he had not kept his faith in the government of
the people. St Thomas cites the expulsion of the Tarquins
and the destruction of Domitian by the Eoman Senate as
examples of such constitutional action. If, however, the
right of appointing the king belongs to some superior
authority, recourse should be made to it. If there is no
human help against the tyrant, men must turn to God, who
is the king of all, and their helper in tribulation. 1 It is thus
1 ' De Kegimine Principum,' i. 6: oocurri. Et quidom si non fuerit
" Demum vero curandum est, si rex excessUs tyrannidis, utilius est remis-
in tyrannidem diverteret, qualiter possit sam tyrannidem tolerare ad tempus,
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? CHAP. TO. ] THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER.
97
clear what are the general principles of St Thomas with
regard to the nature of the authority of the ruler, and the
limitations upon that authority; it is, indeed, clear that
his conception of a good constitution is that of a monarchy
limited by the authority of an aristocracy elected by and
representative of the community. 1
We can now consider this principle of the limitation of the
royal authority in other writers. It may be well to begin
by warning our readers against the misconception which
might arise from the occasional use, especially by the Civilians
or other writers who were familiar with the Eoman Law, of
the phrase that the emperor or prince is "legibus solutus. "
Civilians like Odofridus and Boncompagni cite the words, but
add those of the rescript of Theodosius and Valutinian (' Cod. ,'
i. 14, 4) that it is right that the emperor should acknowledge
that he is bound by the laws,2 and Vincent of Beauvais, in
words which are plainly reminiscent of John of Salisbury,
says that the prince is "legis nexibus . . . absolutus," not
quam contra tyrannum agendo multis
implicate periculis, quse sunt graviora
ipsa tyrannide. . . . Et si sit intolera-
bilia excessus tyrannidis, quibusdam
visum fuit, ut ad fortium virorum
virtutem pertineat tyrannum interi-
mere, seque pro liberations multitudinis
exponere periculis mortis: cujus rei
exemplum etiam in vetere Testamento
habetur. . . . Sed hoo Apostolicse doc-
trine non congruit. Docet enim nos
Petrus, non bonis tantum et modestis,
verum etiam discolis dominis reverenter
subditos esse (1 Pet. ii. 18). . . . Esset
autem hoc multitudini periculosum et
ejus rectoribus, si privata presump-
tione aliqui attentarent presidentium
necem, etiam tyrannorum. . . . Malis
autem solet esset grave dominium non
minus regum quam tyrannorum. . . .
Videtur autem magis contra tyran-
norum ssevitiam non privata presump-
tione aliquorum, sed auctoritate pubica
procedendum. Primo quidem, si ad
jus multitudinis alicujus pertineat, sibi
VOL. V.
providere de rege, non injuste ab
eadem, rex institutus potest destitui
(destrui), vel refrenari ejus potestas
si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur.
Nec putanda est talis multitudo inflde.
liter agere tyrannum destituens, etiam
si eidem in perpetuo se ante subjecerat:
quia hoo ipse meruit, in multitudinis
regimine se non fideliter gerens, ut
exigit regis officium, quod ei pactum
a subditis non reservetur . . .
Si vero ad jus alicujus superioris per-
tineat multitudini providere de rege,
expectandum est ab eo remodium contra
tyranni nequitiam . . . .
Quod si omnino contra tyrannum
auxilium humanum habere non potest,
recurrendum est ad re gem omnium
Deum, qui est adjutor in opportune -
tatibus in tribulatione. "
1 See Appendix, I.
* Odofridus, ' Comm. on Dig. ,' i. 3,
31 ; Boncompagni, ' Rhetorics Novis-
? ? sima,' ix. 5.
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? 98
[PABT L
Political principles.
because he can act unjustly, but because he should be a man
of such a character that he pursues equity not from the fear
of punishment, but from love of justice, for in public matters
he may not desire anything but that which law or equity
and the public good requires. 1
We may compare the treatment of the relation of the
king to the law, as it is expressed in the Spanish law-books
of Alfonso X. He describes the office of the king in the highest
terms ; he is the vicar of God to keep his people in justice
and truth in temporal matters,2 but he also maintains that
he is specially bound to obey the laws, and this for three
reasons : the first, because it is by the laws that he is honoured
and protected; the second, because it is the laws which help
him to fulfil justice and right; the third, because it is the
king who made the laws, and it is right (derecho) that those
who made the laws should be the first to obey them. 3 Alfonso
does not hesitate to say in another place that not only the
1 Vincent of Beauvais, ' Speculum,'
ii. 7, 23: " Princeps autom legis
nexibus dicitur absolutus, non quia
iniqua ei liceant, sed quia is debet
esse, qui non timore prense sed amore
justitie equitatem colat. Nam in
negociis publicis nil ei vello licet, nisi
quod lex aut sequitas persuadet, aut
ratio communis utilitatis inducit. "
Cf. John of Salisbury, ' Policraticus,'
iv. 2.
Cf. vol. iii. p. 139. (Notioe, however,
that the section in Vincent begins
with a reference to " Laurentius Medio-
lanensis Episcopus," writing about
" Publici Exactores. ")
2 * Siete Partidas, * ii. 1, 5 : " Vicarios
de Dios son los reyes cada uno en su
regno puestos sobre las gentes para
mantenerlas en justicia et en verdad
quanto en lo temporal, bien asi como
el emperador en su empen? o . . . et
los santos dixeron que el rey es scn? or
puesto en la tierra en lugar de Dios
para complir la justicia et dar a cada
uno su derecho. "
Cf. ' Especulo,' ii. 1, 5.
3 ' Especulo,' i. 1, 9 : " Todos los
omes deven seer tenidos de obedecer
las leyes, et mayormiente los reyes por
estas razones. La primera porque
son por las leyes honrados et guar-
dados. La segunda porque los ayudan
a complir justicia et derecho, lo que
ellos son tenudos de fazer. La tercera
porque ellos son fazedores dellas, et
es derecho que pues que las ellos
fazen, que ellas las o bed oscan pri-
meriamente. Cf. ' Siete Partidas,'
1, 1, 16.
" Guardar debe el rey las leyes como
a su fechura et a? su honra, porque
recibe poder et razon para facer jus-
ticia. Ca si e? l non las guardase, vernia
contra su fecho, et desatario el bien,
et venirle hie ende dos dan? os: el
primero en desatar tan buena cosa
como esta que hobiese fecho, ol otro
que se tornari? a en dan? o communal-
? ? mente de todo el pueblo. Et por este
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? CHAP, vn. ] THE AUTHORITY OP THE RULER.
99
king who has obtained his kingdom by force, fraud, or treason,
but even the king who has obtained his authority by lawful
means, if he misuses his power and turns his lordship from
right to wrong, is a tyrant. 1
The truth is that the conception that the prince might
or should govern according to his own will or pleasure was
a purely academic conception, and had no relation to the
principles of government in the Middle Ages, at least till the
close of the thirteenth century. The normal conception of
that time was really that of Bracton, to which we have so
frequently referred, that the king was under the law as well
as under God.
2 Whatever may be the explanation of the
development of the theory of absolute monarchy in the cen-
turies from the sixteenth to the eighteenth, this theory was
wholly alien to the Middle Ages.
It was alien, as we think, to the whole constitutional tradi-
tion of the earlier Middle Ages,3 but even if this had not been
the case, it is obvious that the development of feudalism in
the centuries from the tenth to the thirteenth would have
rendered it not merely impossible, but to the men of that time
unintelligible. For the fundamental character of feudalism
is to be found in the principle that it was a system of mutual
and fixed obligations. The obligations of the lord, and the
mediseval king was a lord, whatever else he might be, were
not the same in all respects as those of the vassal, but they
were equally fixed and binding; the rights also of the feudal
lord were not the same in all respects as those of the vassal,
but they were just as clearly and definitely limited as those
1 * Siete Partidas,' ii. 1, 10 : " Tirano
tanto quiere decir como <<en? or cruel que
es apoderado en algun regno o? tierra por
fuerza, o? por engan? o o? por traicion :
et estos tales son de tal natura, que
despues que son bien apoderados en
la tierra, aman mas de facer su pro,
maguer sea a? dan? o de la tierra, que la
pro comunal de todos, porque siempre
viven u? mala sospecha de la perder. . . .
Otro sidecimos que maguer alguno
hobiese ganado sen? ori? o de regno por
alguna de las derechas razones que
deximos en las leyes ante desta, que
si e? l usase mal de su poderi? o en las
maneras que dixiemos en esta ley, quel
puedan decir las gentes tirano, ca to? r-
nase el sen? ori? o que era derecho en
torticero, asi como dixo Ari? sto? tiles en
el libro que tabla del regimento de las
cibdades et de los regnos. "
a Cf. vol. iii. p. 38.
* Cf. vol. i. chap. 18.
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? 100
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
of the vassal. We have dealt -with this subject at length
in the third volume of the work,1 and only add here a few
further illustrations.
Martin Silimani, one of the Bologna Jurists of the later
thirteenth century, who, like some other Civilians, also wrote
on feudal law, discusses in one place the conditions under
which a vassal would be liberated from the obligations of fealty.
If a lord were to commit an act of " fellonia " of such a
kind that, if the vassal were to commit it he would lose his
fief, the lord would lose his property. Again, if the lord were
to require of the vassal something dishonourable or base or
unlawful, the vassal would be freed from his obedience. 2
Andrew of Isernia, as we have pointed out, in his com-
mentary on the Neapolitan Constitutions, clearly holds that
this principle applied to the king and his vassals just as much
as to other cases. If the king attempts unjustly to seize and
ill-treat a vassal, the vassal is not bound to obey the king's
summons, for in such action the king is no king, and the lord
loses his property in the fief, just as the vassal would lose his
fief if he did not render justice to his lord. 3
Alfonso X. sets out the same principles of the feudal rela-
tions in the ' Siete Partidas '; the mutual obligations of lord
and vassal, and also the results of a violation, on either side,
of these obligations. The vassal owes to his lord love, honour,
protection, and loyal service, but the lord has the same kind
of obligations to his vassal. The vassal will lose his fief if he
fails to carry out his obligations to his lord, if he kills his
1 Cf. vol. iii. part i. chaps. 2 and 4.
* Martin Silimani,' De Feudis,' fol. 9.
Rub. "In quibus casibus vasallus a
fidelitate domini liberetur " : " Item
si dominus commisit felloniam contra
vassallum, talem qualem si vassallus
commisisset, feodum perderet, tunc
dominus proprietatem rei perdet. . . .
Item liberatur ab obedientia domini,
ut ei obedire non cogatur, ut si jubeat
vassallo aliquid inhonestum . . . vel
turpe, vel illicitum. "
9 Andreas of Isernia, ' Peregrina,'
fol. 38, v. : " Unde et si constet quod
vassallum velit rex contra justitiam
cape re et male tractare, dixerat enim
ei hoc rex notificando suam volun-
tatem per ea quod dicuntur in glo. . . .
iuste timebit ire timens capi de facto
et occidi . . . tunc non est inobediens
regi, quia in tali actu non est rex. . . .
Talis actus et tale delictum regium,
omnem honorem excludit. Item et
tuno dominus privatur proprietate
vasalli, sicut vasallus feudo, quum non
facit justitiam domino. "
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? CHAP. VII. ] THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER.
101
lord's brother, or son, or grandson, or seduces his wife, or
daughter, or daughter-in-law, but also, if the lord does any
of these things to his vassal, the lord will lose his property
in the fief. 1 The ' Siete Partidas ' distinguishes, indeed, be-
tween the feudal relations and those which it describes under
the term "naturaleza"--that is, as we understand it, the
natural relations in which a man stands to the lord of the land
in which he lives,--but it emphatically asserts that this relation
also is terminated by the wrongdoing either of the " natural "
(the natural subject) or by that of the lord of the land. 2
The rights of the mediseval prince were then fixed rights,
limited and restrained by the law, and it is from this point
1 ' Siete Partidas,' iv. 25, 6 : " Deb-
dos muy grandes son los que han los
vasallos con sus sen? ores; ca de? benlos
amar, et honrar, et guardar et adelan-
tar su pro, et desviarlos su dan? o en
todas las maneras quo podieren, et
de? benlos servir bien et lealmente por
el bienfecho que dellos resciben.
Otrosi decimos que el sen? or debe amar,
et honrar et guardar sus vasallos, et
facerles bien et merced, et desviarlos
de dan? o et de deshonra : et quando
estos debdos son bien guardados, face
cada uno lo que debe, et cresoe et dura
el amor verdadero entre ellos. "
Id. , 4, 26, 8: " Perder puede el
feudo en su vida el vasallo si non
compliese al sen? or o? a? sus fijos el
servicio quel prometio? de facer por
razon del. "
Id. , 4, 26, 9 : " Matando el vasallo
al hermano, o? al fijo o? al nieto de su
sen? or, debe perder por ende el feudo :
otrosi decimos que si el vasallo yace
con la muger de su sen? or, o? con su fija
o? con su nuera, que debe perder el
feudo ; eso mesmo serie si se trabajase
en alguna manera de rescebir a alguna
dellas para traerla a? facerle tal
deshonra. Por todas estas cosas sobre-
dichas et por cada una dellas que
deximos en la ley ante desta por quel
vasallo debe perder el feudo quando
la feciere, por esas meemas pierde el
sen? or la propriedat del feudo, si feciere
alguna dellas contra la persona del
vasallo, o? de su muger, o? de sus fijos,
o? de sus fijas, o? de sus nueras, et finca
despues deso la propriedat del feudo
al vasallo para siempre por juro de
heredat. "
* Id-, iv. 24, 6 : " Desnaturar segunt
lenguage de Espan? a tanto quiere decir
como salir homo de la naturaleza que
ha con su sen? or, o con la tierra en que
vive. Et porque esto como debdo de
natura non se puede desatar sinon per
alguna derecha razon : et las derechas
razones porque los naturales pueden
esto faoer son quatro : la una es por
culpa del natural, et las tres por culpa
del sen? or : et esto serie como quando
el natural feciere traycion al sen? or 5
a? la tierra, que solamiento por el fecho
es desnaturado de los bienes et de las
? ? honras del sen? or et de la tierra. Et
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? 102
[PABT L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
of view that we shall best understand the origin and signifi-
cance of the principle of the limitation of the rights of the
king over the property of the subject, and the constitutional
principle of the limitation of his rights of taxation.
We have pointed out in the second volume that there had
been considerable discussion among the Bologna Civilians
about the rights of the emperor over private property, and
we have referred to Savigny as having put together the
traditions as to the differences among them when they were
consulted by Frederick Barbarossa on the matter. 1 The doc-
trine that the emperor was the owner of all private property
had been traditionally ascribed especially to Martinus; and
it is noteworthy that Odofridus, the most important Civilian
of the later thirteenth century, emphatically repudiates the
doctrine. The emperor, he says, is " Dominus,'' " non quoad
proprietatem sed quoad protectionem. " Andrew of Isernia,
who was learned in Eoman law as well as in feudal, in his
commentary on the Neapolitan Constitution, with equal
emphasis maintains, as we have said before, that the prince
cannot deprive a man of his property against his will, unless
he has been guilty of some crime, and adds that to maintain
that the prince could do this was to fall back into the error
of Martin, who said that the prince was the owner of all
things, " quoad proprietatem. " 2 John of Paris, in the course
of a discussion of the relation of the Pope especially to Church
property, to which we shall have occasion to return, lays down
dogmatically the principle that lay property belongs to indi-
viduals who have full power of disposing of it, and that there-
1 Cf. vol. ii. pp. 72-74, and Savigny,
' Geschichte des Romischen Rechts ira
Mittelalter,' chap, xxviii. 3.
2 Odofridus, ' Comm. on Digest,' fol.
2, v. ; * Prima Constiiution ii. 5:
** Dixit dominus Martinus quod im-
perator non solum est dominus
eorum que sunt imperii: immo est
dominus proprietatis omnium re rum
eingulorum hominum . . . .
bene est dioendum quod imperator
est dominus proprietatis omnium rer-
um que sunt imperii, et rerum singu-
lorum hominum est dominus non
quoad proprietatem ; sed quoad pro-
tectionem. "
Andreas of Isernia, * Peregrina. ' fol.
4: " Sed etiam princeps non potest
statuere, quod debet ille solvam ego,
quia re mea me invito sine mea culpa
me privare non potest. . . . Alias
reinciderem in errorem Martini qui
dicit omnia esse principie quoad pro-
prietatem. "
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? CHAP. VII. ] THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER. 103
fore neither the Pope nor the prince has " dominium vel
dispensationem " in such things. 1 It is even more significant
that Alfonso X. in the ' Siete Pallidas,' after setting out in
the highest terms the dignity and authority of the emperor,
adds that when the Eomans gave him this authority, they
did not intend to make him the lord of men's property in
such a sense that he could dispose of it at his capricious will. 2
It is evident that there had been some uncertainty among
the Civilians about this matter, and it is possible that we
have here one source of later theories about the authority
of the absolute monarch in taxation. It is, however, also
clear that in the later thirteenth century even those who were
acquainted with the Eoman law were controlled by the general
conception of the legal limitations upon the rights of the lord,
which were an essential characteristic of the feudal system.
The property of the vassal was liable to certain demands
on the part of the lord. In addition to other obligations of
service he was bound to render monetary help in certain cases,
and these were pretty much the same everywhere in Western
Europe, but beyond these he was not normally bound. This
is the significance of the clause of Magna Carta which lays
down the rule that no scutage or aid should be levied in
the kingdom except in the three cases, of the redemption
of the king from captivity, the knighting of the king's eldest
son, and the marriage of his eldest daughter, except by the
common council of the kingdom. This is not a mere incident
of a factious conflict, but the enunciation as a rule of the
national constitution of England of that which was the
common principle of mediseval society. 3
1 John of Paris, ' Tractatus de potes-
tate regia et papali,' vii. : " Et ideo
nec princepa nec Papa habet dominium
vel dispensationem in talibus. "
2 'Siete Partidas,' ii. 1, 2: "Ca
maguer los Romanes, que antigua-
mente ganaron con su poder el se&orio
del mundo ficiesen emperador et otor-
gasen todo el poder et el senorio que
habien sobre las gentes para mantener
et defender derechamente el pro
comunal de todos, con todo eso non
fue su entendimiento del facer sefior
de las cosas de cada uno, de manera
que las podiese tomar a su voluntad,
sinon tan solamente por alguna de las
razones que desuso son dichas. "
8 ' Magna Carta,' xii.
