No More Learning

I shall be satisfied with showing that none of these forms can be employed or imitated in philosophy in the sense in which they are understood by mathematicians ; and that the geometrician, if he employs his method in philosophy, will succeed only in building card-castles, while the employment of the philosophical method in mathema tics, can result in nothing but mere verbiage. The essential business of philosophy, indeed, is to mark out the limits of the science ; and even the mathematician, unless his talent is naturally circumscribed and limited to this particular depart ment of knowledge, cannot turn a deaf ear to the warnings of philosophy, or set himself above its direction.
1. Of Definitions. -- A definition as the term itself indi cates, the representation, upon primary grounds, of the complete conception of a thing within its own limits. * Accordingly, an empirical conception cannot be defined, can only be explained. For, as there are in such conception only certain number of marks or signs, which denote certain class of sensuous objects, we can never be sure that we do not cogitate under the word which indicates the same object, at one time greater, at another smaller number of signs. Thus, one person may cogitate in his conception of gold, in addition to its properties of weight, colour, malleability, that of resisting rust, while another person may be ignorant of this quality. We employ certain signs only so long as we require them for the sake of distinction new observations abstract some and add new ones, so that an empirical conception never remains within permanent limits. It is, in fact, useless to define conception of this kind. If, for example, we are speaking of water and its properties, we do not stop at what we actually think by the word water, but proceed to observa
tion and experiment; and the word, with the few signs
The definition must describe the conception complete! )/, that omit none of the marks or signs of which composed within ill own limitt, that must be precise, and enumerate no more higus than belong to the conception and on primary ground*, that to say, the limitation of the bounds of the conception must not be deduced from other concep tions, as in this case proof vould be necessary, and the so-called definition would be incapable of taking its place at the head of all the judgments we have to form regarding an object.
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attached to more properly designation than concep tion of the thing. definition in this case, would evidently" be nothing more than determination, of the word. In the second place, no priori conception, such as those of sub stance, cause, right, fitness, and so on, can be defined. For
can never be sure, that the clear representation of given conception (which given in confused state) has been fully developed, until know that the representation adequate with its object. But, inasmuch as the conception, as presented to the mind, may contain number of obscure representations, which we do not observe our analysis, although we employ them in our application of the concep tion, can never be sure that my analysis complete, while examples may make this probable, although they can never demonstrate the fact. Instead of the word definition, should rather employ the term exposition -- more modest expression, which the critic may accept without surrendering his doubt* as to the completeness
tion. As, therefore, neither empirical nor a priori concep tions are capable of definition, we have to see whether the only other kind of conceptions -- arbitrary conceptions -- can
? be subjected to this mental operation. Such conception can always be defined for must know thoroughly what wished to cogitate as was who created and was not given to my mind either the nature of my understand ing or experience. At the same time, cannot say that,
such definition, have defined real object. If the
based upon empirical conditions, for example, have conception of clock for ship, this arbitrary con
ception does not rssnre me of the existence or even of the possibility of the object. My definition of uch conception would with more propriety be termed declaration of pro ject than definition of an object. There are no other
which can bear definition, except those which contain an arbitrary synthesis, which can be constructed a priori. Consequently, the science of mathematics alone possesses definitions. For the object here thought pre sented a priori in intuition and thus can never contain more or less than the conception, because the conception
the object has been given by the definition -- and primarily, that '"ithout deriving the definition from any other source
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Philosophical definitions are, therefore, merely expositions of given conceptions, while mathematical definitions are con structions of conceptions originally formed by the mind itself; the former are produced by analysis, the completeness of which is never demonstratively certain, the latter by a syn thesis. In a mathematical definition the conception is formed, in a philosophical definition it is only explained. From this it follows :
a. That we must not imitate, in philosophy, the mathe matical usage of commencing with definitions --except by way of hypothesis or experiment. For, as all so-called philoso phical definitions are merely analyses of given conceptions, these conceptions, although only in a confused form, must precede the analysis ; and the incomplete exposition must pre cede the complete, so that we may be able to draw certain in ferences from the characteristics which an incomplete analysis has enabled us to discover, before we attain to the complete exposition or definition of the conception. In one word, a full and clear definition ought, in philosophy, rather to form the conclusion than the commencement of our labours. * In mathematics, on the contrary, we cannot have a conception
prior to the definition ; it is the definition which gives us the conception, and it must for this reason form the commence ment of every chain of mathematical reasoning.
b. Mathematical definitions cannot be erroneous. For the conception is given only in and through the definition, and thus it contains only what has been cogitated in the definition. But although a definition cannot be incorrect, as regards its content, an error may sometimes, although seldom, creep into the form. This error consists in a want of precision. Thus the common definition of a circle -- that it is a curved line, every point in which is equally distant from another
* Philosophy abounds in faulty definitions, especially such as contain some of the elements requisite to form a complete definition. If a con ception could not be employed in reasoning before it had been defined, it would fare ill with all philosophical thought. But, as incompletely defined conceptions may always be employed without detriment to truth, so far as our analysis of the elements contained in them proceeds, imperfect defi nitions, that is, propositions which are properly not definitions, but merely approximations thereto, may be used with great advantage. In ma thematics, definition belongs ad ate, in philosophy ad meliut em. It is a difficult task to construct a proper definition. Jurists are still withoof
a complete definition of the idea of right.
? ? ? ? 446 TllAKSCENDXNTAI, DOCTRINE OF METHOD.
point called the centre -- is faulty, from the fact that the determination indicated by the word curved is superfluous. For there ought to be a particular theorem, which may be easily proved from the definition, to the effect that every line, which has all its points at equal distances from another point, must be a curved line -- that that not even the smallest part of can be straight. Analytical definitions, on the other hand, may be erroneous in many respects, either the in troduction of signs which do not actually exist in the concep tion, or by wanting in that completeness which forms the es sential of definition. In the latter case, the definition necessarily defective, because we can never be fully certain the completeness of our analysis. For these reasons, the me thod of definition employed mathematics cannot be imitated in philosophy.
'1. Of Axioms. These, in so far as they are immediately
certain, are priori synthetical principles. Now, one con
ception cannot be connected synthetically and yet immediately with another because, we wish to proceed out of and beyond
? third mediating cognition necessary. And, as philosophy cognition of reason the aid of concep tions alone, there to be found in no principle which de
conception,
serves to be called an axiom. Mathematics, on the other hand, may possess axioms, because can always connect the pre dicates of an object priori, and without any mediating term, by means of the construction of conceptions in intuition. Such
the case with the proposition, three points can always plane. On the other hand, no synthetical principle
lie
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certain, (for example, the proposition, Everything that hap pens has cause), because require mediating term to con nect the two conceptions of event and cause --namely, the con dition of time-determination in an experience, and cannot cognize any such principle immediately and from conceptions alone. Discursive principles are, accordingly, very different from intuitive principles or axioms. The former always re quire deduction, which in the case of the latter may be alto gether dispensed with. Axioms are, for this reason, nlways self-evident, while philosophical principles, whatever may b<< the degree of certainty they possess, cannot lay any claim to
such distinction. No synthetical proposition of pur>> trans
based upon conceptions, can ever be immediately
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eendenta] reason can be so evident, as is often rashly enough declared, as the statement, twice two are four. It is true that in the Analytic I introduced into the list of principles of the pure understanding, certain axioms of intuition ; but the prin ciple there discussed was not itself an axiom, but served merely to present the principle of the possibility of axioms in general, while it was really nothing more than a principle based upon conceptions. For it is one part of the duty of transcendental philosophy to establish the possibility of mathematics itself. Philosophy possesses, then, no axioms, and has no right tc impose its a priori principles upon thought, until it has established their authority and validity by a thorough-going deduction.
3. Of Demonstrations. Only an apodeictic proof, based upon intuition, can be termed a demonstration. Experience
teaches us what but cannot convince us that
have been otherwise. Hence proof upon empirical grounds cannot be apodeictic. priori conceptions, in discursive cogni tion, can never produce intuitive certainty or evidence, however certain the judgment they present may be. Mathematics alone, therefore, contains demonstrations, because does not deduce its cognition from conceptions, but from the construction of conceptions, that from intuition, which can be given a priori in accordance with conceptions. The method of algebra, in
equations, from which the correct answer deduced duction, kind of construction --not geometrical, but symbols -- in which all conceptions, especially those of the re
lations of quantities, are represented in intuition signs and thus the conclusions that science are secured from errors the fact that every proof submitted to ocular evidence.
Philosophical cognition does not possess this advantage, being required to consider the general always in abstracto (by means of conceptions), while mathematics can always consider
? in eonereto (in an individual intuition), and at the same time means of priori representation, whereby all errors are ren
dered manifest to the senses. The former -- discursive proofs --ought to be termed aeroamatic* proofs, rather than demon strations, as only words are employed in them, while demon strations proper, as the term itself indicates, always require reference to the intuition of the object.
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It follows from nil these considerations, that it is not coo- sonant with the nature of philosophy, especially in the sphere of pure reason, to employ the dogmatical method, and to adorn itself with the titles and insignia of mathematical science. It does not belong to that order, and can only hope for a fraternal union with that science. Its attempts at ma thematical evidence are vain pretensions, which can only keep it back from its true aim, which is to detect the illusory pro cedure of reason when transgressing its proper limits, and by fully explaining and analysing our conceptions, to conduct us from the dim regions of speculation, to the clear region of modest self-knowledge. Reason must not, therefore, in its transcendental endeavours, look forward with such confidence,
ns if the path it is pursuing led straight to its aim, nor reckon with such security upon its premises, as to consider it un necessary to take a step back, or to keep a strict watch for errors, which, overlooked in the principles, may be detected in the arguments themselves --in which case it may be requisite either to determine these principles with greater strictness, or to change them entirely.
I divide all apodeictic propositions, whether demonstrable or immediately certain, into dogmata and maihemata. A direct synthetical proposition, based on conceptions, is a dogma ; a proposition of the same kind, based on the con struction of conceptions, isamathema. Analytical judgments do not teach us any more about an object, than what was con tained in the conception we had of it ; because they do not extend our cognition beyond our conception of an object, they merely elucidate the conception. They cannot there fore be with propriety termed dogmas. Of the two kinds of a priori synthetical propositions above-mentioned, only those which are employed iu philosophy can, according to the ge neral mode of speech, bear this name; those of arithmetic or
? would not be rightly bo denominated. Thus the
geometry
customary mode of speaking confirms the explanation given above, and the conclusion arrived at, that only those judg
ments which are based upon couceptions, not on the construe* tion of conceptions, can be termed dogmatical.
Thus, pure reason, in the sphere of speculation, does not contain a eingle direct synthetical judgment based npon con ceptions. By means of ideas, it as we have showa, in
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? THE DISCIPLINE OT PUBE BEA8OK. 449
capable of producing synthetical judgments, which are ob jectively valid ; by means of the conceptions of the under standing, it establishes certain indubitable principles, not, however, directly on the basis of conceptions, but only indi rectly by means of the relation of these conceptions to some thing of a purely contingent nature, namely, possible experi ence. When experience is presupposed, these principles are apodeictically certain, but in themselves, and directly, they cannot even be cognized a priori. Thus the given concep tions of cause and event will not be sufficient for the demon stration of the proposition, every event has a cause. For this reason, it is not a dogma ; although from another point of . view -- that of experience, it is capable of being proved to demonstration. The proper term for suclT~a proposition is principle, and not theorem (although it does require to be proved), because it possesses the remarkable peculiarity of being the condition of the possibility of its own ground of pooof, that is, experience, and of forming a necessary presup position in all empirical observation.
? If then, in the speculative sphere of pure reason, no dog mata are to be found ; all dogmatical methods, whether bor rowed from mathematics, or invented by philosophical thinkers, are alike inappropriate and inefficient. They only serve (o conceal errors and fallacies, and to deceive philosophy, whose duty it is to see that reason pursues a safe and straight path. A philosophical method may, however, be systematical. For our reason subjectively considered, itself system, and, in the sphere of mere conceptions, system of investigation ac cording to principles of unity, the material being supplied experience alone. But this not the proper place for discuss ing the peculiar method of transcendental philosophy, as our present task simply to examine whether our faculties art capable of erecting an edifice on the basis of pure reason, and how far they may proceed with the materials at their command.
CHAPTER FIRST.
Sbctio* Secohd.
The Discxphne of Pure Reason in Polemui.
Kcason must be subject, in all its operations, to criticism,
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which must always be permitted to exercise its functions with out restraint ; otherwise its interests are imperilled, and its in fluence obnoxious to suspicion. There is nothing, howevei useful, however sacred it may be, that can claim exemption from the searching examination of this supreme tribunal, which has no respect of persons. The very existence of reason depends upon this freedom ; for the voice of reason is not that of a dictatorial and despotic power, it is rather like the vote of the citizen of a free state, every member of which must have the privilege of giving free expression to his doubts, %nd possess even the right of veto.
But while reason can never decline to submit itself to the tribunal of criticism, it has not always cause to dread the judgment of this court. Pure reason, however, when engaged in the sphere of dogmatism, is not so thoroughly conscious of a strict observance of its highest laws, as to appear before a
higher judicial reason with perfect confidence. On the con trary, it must renounce its magnificent dogmatical pretensions in philosophy.
? Very different is the case, when it has to defend itself, not before a judge, but against an equal. If dogmatical assertions are advanced on the negative side, in opposition to those made by reason on the positive side, its justification xar avfourro, is complete, although the proof of its propositions is xar' dXriQuav unsatisfactory.
By the polemic of pure reason I mean the defence of its propositions made by reason, in opposition to the dogmatical counter-propositions advanced by other parties. Tbe question here is not whether its own statements may not also be false ; it merely regards the fact that reason proves that the oppo site cannot be established with demonstrative certainty, nor even asserted with a higher degree of probability. Reason does not hold her possessions upon sufferauce ; for, although she ca-not show a perfectly satisfactory title to them, no one can prove that she is not the rightful possessor.
It is a melancholy reflection, that reason, in its highest exer cise, falls into an antithetic ; and that the supreme tribunal for the settlement of differences, should not be at union with itself. It is true that we had to discuss the question of an apparent antithetic, but we found that it was based upon a
misconception. In conformity with the common prejudice,
? ? ? THE DISCIPLINE OF PUBS BBABON. 451
phenomena were regarded as things in themselves, and thus an absolute completeness in their synthesis was required in the one mode or in the other, was shown to be impossible in both) demand entirely out of place in regard to pheno mena. There was, then, no real self-contradiction of reason
the propositions -- the series of phenomena given in them
selves has an absolutely first beginning, and, this series abso
lutely and in itself without beginning. The two propositions
me perfectly consistent with each other, because phenomena
as phenomena, are in themselves nothing, and consequently the hypothesis that they are things in themselves, must lead to
self-contradictory inferences.
But there are cases in which similar misunderstanding can
not be provided against, and the dispute must remain unsettled. Take, fo example, the theislic proposition There Supreme Being and on the other hand, the atheistic counter-statement
There exists no Supreme Being or, in psychology Every thing that thinks, possesses the attribute of absolute and
permanent unity, which utterly different from the transitory unity of material phenomena and the counter proposition The soul not an immaterial unity, and its nature transi
tory, like that of phenomena. The objects of these questions contain no heterogeneous or contradictory elements, for they relate to things in themselves, and not to phenomena. There would arise indeed, real contradiction, reason came for
ward with statement on the negative side of these ques tions alone. As regards the criticism to which the grounds of proof on the affirmative side must be subjected, may be freely admitted, without necessitating the surrender of the affirmative propositions, which have, at least, the interest of reason in their favour --an advantage which the opposite party cannot lay claim to.
cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable think ers-- Sulzer among the rest -- that in spite of the weakness of the arguments hitherto in use, we may hope, one day, to see sufficient demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of pure reason -- the existence of Supreme Being, and the
? immortality of the soul. this will never be the case.
am certain, on the contrary, that For on what ground can reason base such synthetical propositions, which do not relate to the
objects of experience and their internal possibility --But
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is also demonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to maintain the contrary with the least show of probability. For, as he can attempt such a proof solely upon the basis of pure reason, he is bound to prove that a Supreme Being, and a thinking subject in the character of a pure intelligence, are
impotsible. But where will he find the knowledge which can enable him to enounce synthetical judgments in regard to things which transcend the region of experience ? We may, Iherefore, rest assured that the opposite never will be demon strated. We need not, then, have recourse to scholastic argu ments ; we may always admit the truth of those propositions which are consistent with the speculative interests of reasor in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover, the only
means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest. Our opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic solely, we can be ready to meet with a non liquet which can not fail to disconcert him ; while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have on our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of reason, and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with calm in difference.
From this point of view, there is properly no antithetic of pure reason. For the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field of pure theology and psychology ; but on this ground there can appear no combatant whom we need to fear. Ridicule and boasting can be his only weapons ; and these may be laughed at, as mere child's play. This consi deration restores to Reason her courage ; for what source of confidence could be found, if she, whose vocation it is to de
stroy error, were at variance with herself and without any reasonable hope of ever reaching a state of permanent repose ?
Everything in nature is good for some purpose. Even poisons are serviceable ; ffrey destroy the evil effects of other poisons generated in our system, and must always find a place in every complete pharmacopoeia. The objections raised against the fallacies and sophistries of speculative reason, are
objections given by the nature of this reason itself, and must therefore have a destination and purpose which can only be for the good of humanity. For what purpose has Providence raised many objects, in which we have the deepest interest, so far above us, that we vainly try to cognize them with cei>>
? ? ? ? THE DISCIPLINE OF PTJBE nEASOH. 453
tainty, and our powers of mental vision are rather excited than satisfied by the glimpses we may chance to seize ? It is very doubtful whether it is for our benefit to advance bold affirmations regarding subjects involved in such obscurity ; perhaps it would even De detrimental to our best interests. But it is undoubtedly always beneficial to leave the investi gating, aa well as the critical reason, in perfect freedom, and permit it to take charge of its own interests, which are ad vanced as much by its limitation, as by its extension of its views, and which always suffer by the interference of foreign powers forcing against its natural tendencies, to bend to cer tain pre-conceived designs.
Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, and combat him only with the weapons of reason. Have no anx iety for the practical interests of humanity--these are never imperilled in purely speculative dispute. Such dispute serves merely to disclose the antinomy of reason, which, as has its source in the nature of reason, ought to be thoroughly
? Reason benefited the examination of subject on both sides, and its judgments are corrected
being limited. not the matter that may give occasion to dispute, but the manner. For perfectly permissible to
investigated.
employ, in the presence of reason, the language of firmly- rooted faith, even after we have been obliged to renounce all pretensions to knowledge.
Ifwe were to ask the dispassionate Davi>l Hume-- phi losopher endowed, degree that few are, with well- balanced judgment What motive induced you to spend so much labour and thought in undermining the consoling and beneficial persuasion that Reason capable of assuring us of the existence, and presenting us with determinate conception of Supreme Being?
-- His answer would be: Nothing but the desire of teaching Reason to know its own powers better,
and, at the same time, dislike of the procedure by which
that faculty was compelled to support foregone conclusions, and prevented from confessing the internal weaknesses which
cannot but feel when enters upon rigid self-examina tion. If, on the other hand, we were to ask Priestley---% philosopher who had no taste for transcendental speculation, but was entirely devoted to the principles of empiricism --what
his motives were for overturning those two main pillars
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religion--the doctrines of the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul (in his view the hope of a future life is but the expectation of the miracle of resurrection,) -- this philosopher, himself a zealous and pious teacher of religion,
I acted in the interest of reason, which always suffers, when certain objects are ex
could give no other answer than this :
plained and judged by a reference to other supposed laws than those of material nature --the only laws which we know in a determinate manner. It would be unfair to decry the latter philosopher, who endeavoured to harmonize his para doxical opinions with the interests of religion, and to under value an honest and reflecting man, because he finds himself it a loss the moment he has left the field of natural science. The same grace must be accorded to Hume, a man not less well-disposed, and quite as blameless in his moral character,
and who pushed his abstract speculations to an extreme length, because, as he rightly believed, the object of them lies en tirely beyond the bounds of natural science, and within the sphere of pure ideas.
What is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in the present case to menace the best interests of hu manity ? The course to be pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain and natural one. Let each thinker pursue his own path ; if he shews talent, if he gives evidence of profound thought, in one word, if he shows that he pos sesses the power of reasoning, --reason is always the gainer. If you have recourse to other means, if you attempt to coerce reason, if you raise the cry of treason to humanity, if . you excite the feelings of the crowd, which can neither understand nor sympathise with such subtle speculations, --you will only
make yourselves ridiculous. For the question does not con cern the advantage or disadvantage which we are expected to reap from such inquiries ; the question is merely, how far reason can advance in the field of speculation, apart from all kinds of interest, and whether we may depend upon the exer tions of speculative reason, or must renounce all reliance on it. Instead of joining the combatants, it is your part to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle --a laborious struggle for the parties engaged, but attended, in its progress as well as in its result, with the most advantageous consequences for the interests of thought and knowledge. It is absurd to expect
? ? ? ? TIIE DISCIPLINE OF PUHE REASON. 455
to be enlightened by Reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the question she must adopt. Moreover, reason is sufficiently held in check by its own power, the limits imposed on it by its own nature are sufficient ; it is un necessary for you to place over it addition*! guards, as if its power were dangerous to the constitution of the intellectual state. In the dialectic of reason there is no victory gained, which needs in the least disturb your tranquillity.
The strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason, and we can not but wish that it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect freedom which ought to be its essential condition. In this case, we should have had at an earlier period a ma tured and profound criticism, which must have put an end to all dialectical disputes, by exposing the illusions and preju dices in which they originated. --
There is in human nature an unworthy propensity
pensity which, like everything that springs from nature, must in its final purpose be conducive to the good of humanity-- to conceal our real sentiments, and to give expression only to certain received opinions, which are regarded as at once safe and promotive of the common good. It is true, this ten dency, not only to conceal our real sentiments, but to profess those which may gain us favour in the eyes of society, has not only civilized, but, in a certain measure, moralized us ; as no one can break through the outward covering of re spectability, honour, and morality, and thus the seemingly- good examples which we see around us, form an excellent school for moral improvement, so long as our belief in their
remains unshaken. But this disposition to re present ourselves as better than we are, and to utter opinions which are not our own, can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary arrangement of nature to lead us from the rude ness of an uncivilised state, and to teach us how to assume at least the appearance and manner of the good we see. But when true principles have been developed, and have obtained b sure foundation in our habit of thought, this convention alism must be attacked with earnest vigour, otherwise it cor rupts the heart, and checks the growth of good dispositions with the mischievous weed of fair appearances.
I am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresenta tion and hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion,
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where there is less temptation to restrain the free expression of thought. For what can be more prejudicial to the interests of intelligence, than to falsify our real sentiments, to conceal the doubts which we feel in regard to our statements, or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof which we well know to be insufficient ? So long as mere personal vanity is the source of these unworthy artifices, --and this is generally the case in speculative discussions, which are mostly destitute of
practical interest, and are incapable of complete demonstra tion, --the vanity of the opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side ; and thus the result is the same, although it is not brought about so soon as if the dispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright spirit. But where the mass entertains the notion that the aim of certain snbtle
speculators is nothing less than to shake the very founda tions of public welfare and morality, -- it seems not only prudent, but even praiseworthy, to maintain the good cause by illusory arguments, rather than to give to our supposed opponents the advantage of lowering our declarations to the moderate tone of a merely practical conviction, and of com pelling us to confess our inability to attain to apodeictic cer tainty in speculative subjects. But we ought to reflect that there is nothing in the world more fatal to the maintenance of a good cause than deceit, misrepresentation, and falsehood. That the strictest laws of honesty should be observed in the discussion of a purely speculative subject, is the least require ment that can be made. If we could reckon with security
even upon bo little, the conflict of speculative reason regarding the important questions of God, immortality, and freedom, would have been either decided long ago, or would very soon be brought to a conclusion. But, in general, the uprightness of the defence stands in an inverse ratio to the goodness of the cause ; and perhaps more honesty and fairness are shown by those who deny, than by those who uphold these doc
trines.
I shall persuade myself, then, that I have readers who do
not wish to see a righteous cause defended by unfair argu ments. Such will now recognise the fact that, according to the principles of this Critique, if we consider not what but what ought to be the case, there can be really no polemic of pure reason. For how can two persons dispute about thing.
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the reality of which neither can present in actual or even in
possible experience ? Each adopts the plan of meditating on his idea for the purpose of drawing from the idea, if he can, what is more than the idea, that is, the reality of the object which it indicates. How shall they settle the dispute, since neither is able to make his assertions directly comprehensible and cer tain, but must restrict himself to attacking and confutiug those of his opponent? All statements enounced by pure reason transcend the conditions of possible experience, beyond the sphere of which we can discover no criterion of truth, while they are at the same time framed in accordance with the laws of the understanding, which are applicable only to experience ; and thus it is the fate of all such speculative dis cussions, that while the one party attacks the weaker side of his opponent, he infallibly lays open his own weaknesses.
The critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest tribunal for all speculative disputes ; for it is not involved in these disputes, which have an immediate relation to certain ob jects and not to the laws of the mind, but is instituted for the purpose of determining the rights and limits of reason.
Without the control of criticism reason as were, in
state of nature, and can only establish its claims and assertions
? by war. Criticism, on the contrary, deciding all questions according to the fundamental laws of its own institution, secures to us the peace of law and order, and enables us to discuss all differences in the more tranquil manner of
legal victory, hollow armistice in the latter, by sentence, which, as strikes
process. In the former case, disputes are ended which both sides may claim, and which followed
at the root of all speculative differences, ensures to all con
cerned lasting peace. The endless disputes of dog matising reason compel us to look for some mode of arriving at settled decision critical investigation of reason itself; just as Hobbes maintains that the state of nature state of injustice and violence, and that we must leave and submit ourselves to the constraint of law, which indeed limits indi vidual freedom, but only that may consist with the freedom of others and with the common good of all.
This freedom will, among other things, permit of our openly stating the difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves un able to solve, without being decried on that accouut as tut*
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buleut and dangerous citizens. This privilege forms part of the native rights of human reason, which recognises no other judge than the universal reason of humanity ; and as this reason is the source of all progress and improvement, such a privilege is to be held sacred and inviolable. It is unwise, moreover, to denounce as dangerous, any bold assertions against, or rash attacks upon, an opinion which is held by the largest and most moral class of the community ; for that would be giving them an importance which they do not de serve. When I hear that the freedom of the will, the hope of a future life, and the existence of God have been over thrown by the arguments of some able writer, I feel a strong desire to read his book ; for I expect that he will add to my knowledge, and impart greater clearness and distinctness to my views by the argumentative power shown in his writings.
But I am perfectly certain, even before I have opened the book, that he has not succeeded in a single point, not because I believe I am in possession of irrefutable demonstrations of these important propositions, but because this transcendental critique, which has disclosed to me the power and the limits of pure reason, has fully convinced me that, as it is insuffi cient to establish the affirmative, it is as powerless, and even more so, to assure us of the truth of the negative answer to these questions. From what source does this free-thinker derive his knowledge that there for example, no Supreme
Being? This proposition lies out of the field of possible ex perience, and, therefore, beyond the limits of human cogni tion. But would not read at all the answer which the dog- mntical maintainer of the good cause makes to his opponent, because know well beforehand, that lie wdl merely attack the fallacious grounds of his adversary, without being able to establish his own assertions. Besides, a new illusory argu ment, in the construction of which talent and acuteness are shown, suggestive of new ideas and new trains of reasoning,
and in this respect the old and every-day sophistries are quite useless. Again, the dogmatical opponent of religion gives
? to criticism, and enables us to test and correct its principles, while there no occasion for anxiety in regard to the influence and results of his reasoning.
But, will be said, must we not warn the youth entrust to academical care against such writings, must we not p. <<
employment
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? TBE DlSCIPI. tNK OF PUBS SEASON. 459
serve tliem from the knowledge of these dangerous assertions, ontil their judgment is ripened, or rather until the doctrines which we wish to inculcate are so firmly rooted in their minds as to withstand all attempts at instilling the contrary dogmas, from whatever quarter they may come ?
If we are to confine ourselves to the dogmatical procedure in the sphere of pure reason, and find ourselves unable to settle such disputes otherwise than by becoming a party in them, and setting counter-assertions against the statements advanced by our opponents, there is certainly no plan more advisable tor the moment, but, at the same time, none more absurd and inefficient for the future, than this retaining of the youthful mind under guardianship for a time, and thus preserving it
? --for so long at least--from seduction into error. But when, at a later period, either curiosity, or the prevalent fashion of thought, places such writings in their hands, will the so-called convictions of their youth stand firm ? The young thinker, who has in his armory none but dogmatical weapons with which to resist the attacks of his opponent, and who cannot detect the latent dialectic which lies in his own opinions as well as in those of the opposite party, sees the advance of illusory arguments and grounds of proof which have the advantage of novelty, against as illusory grounds of proof destitute of this advantage, and which, perhaps, excite the suspicion that the natural credulity of his youth lias been abused by his instructors. He thinks he can find no better means of shewing that he has outgrown the discipline of his minority, than by despising those well-meant warnings, and,
knowing no system of thought but that of dogmatism, he drinks deep draughts of the poison that is to sap the principles in which his early years were trained.
Exactly the opposite of the system here recommended ought to be pursued in academical instruction. This can only be effected, however, by a thorough training in the critical investigation of pure reason. For, in order to bring the prin ciples of this critique into exercise as soon as possible, and to demonstrate their perfect sufficiency, even in the presence of the highest degree of dialectical illusion, the student ought t<<
the assertions made on both sides of speculative
examine
Jutesctainonost be a difficult task for him to show the fallacies
step by step, and to test them by these principles,
? ? ? 460 TRAK8CEXDE5TAT, DOCTRIKI OF METHOD.
inherent in these propositions, and thus he begins early tc
feel his own power of securing himself against the influence
of such sophistical arguments, which must finally lose, for him, all their illusory power. And, although the same blows which overturn the edifice of his opponent are as fatal to his own speculative structures, if such he has wished to rear ; he need not feel any sorrow in regard to this seeming misfortune, as he has now before him afair prospect into the practical region, in which he may reasonably hope to find a more secure foun
dation for a rational system.
There accordingly, no proper polemic the sphere of pure reason. Both parties beat the air and fight with their own shadows, as they pass beyond the limits of nature, and can find no tangible point of attack --no firm footing for their dogmatical conflict. Fight as vigorously as they may, the shadows which they hew down, immediately start up again, like the heroes in Walhalla, and renew the bloodless and un ceasing contest.
But neither can we admit that there any proper sceptical employment of pure reason, such as might be based upon the principle of neutrality in all speculative disputes. To excite reason against itself, to place weapons the hands of the party on the one side as well as those of the other, and to remain an undisturbed and sarcastic spectator of the fierce btruggle that ensues, seems, from the dogmatical point of view,
to be part fitting only malevolent disposition. But, when the sophist evidences an invincible obstinacy and blindness, and pride which no criticism can moderate, there no other practicable course than to oppose to this pride and obstinacy similar feelings and pretensions on the other side, equally well or ill founded, so that reason, staggered the reflections thus forced upon finds necessary to moderate its con fidence in such pretensions, and to listen to the advices criticism. But we cannot stop at these doubts, much less regard the conviction of our ignorance, not only as cure for the conceit natural to dogmatism, but as the settlement of the disputes in which reason involved with itself. On the con trary, scepticism merely means of awakening reason from its dogmatic dreams, and exciting to more careful investi gation into its own powers and pretensions. But, as scepticism
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appears to be the shortesi road to a permanent peace in the domain of philosophy, and as it is the track pursued by the many who aim at giving a philosophical colouring to their
dislike of all inquiries of this kind, I think it necessary to present to my readers this mode of thought in its true light.
contemptuous
Scepticism not a Permanent State for Human Reason.
The consciousness of ignorance --unless this ignorance is recognized to be absolutely necessary --ought, instead of form ing the conclusion of my inquiries, to be the strongest motive to the pursuit of them. All ignorance is either ignorance of things, or of the limits of knowledge. If my ignorance
is accidental and not necessary, it m"st incite me, in the first case, to a dogmatical inquiry regarding the objects of which I am ignorant ; in the second, to a critical investigation into the bounds of all possible knowledge. But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary and unavoidable, and that it
? absolves from the duty of all farther investiga tion, is a fact which cannot be made out upon empirical grounds -- from observation, but upon critical grounds alone, that thorough-going investigation into the primary sources of cognition. It follows that the determination
the bounds of reason can be made only on a priori grounds while the empirical limitation of reason, which merely an
indeterminate cognition of an ignorance that can never be com pletely removed, can take place only posteriori. In other words, our empirical knowledge limited by that which yet remains for us to know. The former cognition of our ignorance, which possible only on a rational basis, science the latter merely perception, and we cannot say how far the inferences drawn from may extend. If regard the earth, as really appears to my senses, as flat surface, am igno
rant how far this surface extends. But experience teaches me that, how far soever go, nlwaj see before me a space in which can proceed farther and thus know the limits-- merely visual --of my actual knowledge of the earth, although
am ignorant of the limits of the earth itself. But have get so far as to know that the earth sphere, and that its surface spherical, can cognize a prion and determine upon principles, from my knowledge of small part of this
consequently
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? 462 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTBnJE OT METHOD.
surface-- say to the extent of a degree -- the diameter nnd cir cumference of the earth ; and although I am ignorant of the objects which this surface contains, I have a perfect know ledge of its limits and extent.
The sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us to be a level surface, with an apparent horizon-- that which forms the limit of its extent, and which has been termed by us the idea of unconditioned totality. To reach tins limit by empirical means is impossible, and all attempts to determine it a priori according to a principle, are alike in vain. But all the questions raised by pure reason relate to that which lies beyond this horizon, or, at least, in its boundary line.
The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers
of human reason who believe that they have given a sufficient
answer to all such questions, by declaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our knowledge --a horizon which, however, Hume was unable to determine. His attention especially was directed to the principle of causality ; and he remarked with perfect justice, that the truth of this principle, and even the objective validity of the conception of a cause, was not commonly based upon clear height, that upon priori cognition. Hence he concluded that this law does not derive its authority from its universality and necessity, but merely from its general appli cability in the course of experience, and kind of subjective necessity thence arising, which he termed habit. From the inability of reason to establish this principle as necessary law for the acquisition of all experience, he inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason to pass the region of the empirical.
This procedure, of subjecting the facta of reason to exami
nation, and, necessary, to disapproval, may be termed the censura of reason. This Centura must inevitably lead ns to doubts regarding all transcendent employment of principles. But this only the second step in our inquiry. The first step in regard to the subjects of pure reason, and which marks the infancy of that faculty, that of dogmatism. The second, which we have just mentioned, that of scepticism, and gives evidence that our judgment has been improved by experience. But third step necessary --indicative of the maturity and manhood of the judgment, which now lays firm
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foundation upon universal and necessary principles. This is the period of criticism, in which we do not examine the facta of reason, but reason itself, in the whole extent of its powers, and in regard to its capability of a priori cognition ; and thus we determine not merely the empirical and ever-shifting bounds of our knowledge, but its necessary and eternal limits. We demonstrate from indubitable principles, not merely our ignorance in respect to this or that subject, but in regard to all possible questions of a certain class. Thus scepticism is a resting-place for reason, in which it may reflect on its dog matical wanderings, and gain some knowledge of the region in which it happens to be, that it may pursue its way with greater certainty ; but it cannot be its permanent dwelling- place. It must take up its abode only in the region of com plete certitude, whether this relates to the cognition of objects themselves, or to the limits which bound all our cognition.
Raoson is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane, of the bounds of which we have only a general know ledge ; it ought rather to be compared to a sphere, the radius of which may be found from the curvature of its surface -- that the nature of priori synthetical propositions -- and, consequently, its circumference and extent. Beyond the sphere of experience there are no objects which can cognize
nay, even questions regarding such supposititious objects relate only to the subjective principles of complete determination of the relations which exist between the understanding-con ceptions which lie within this sphere.
We are actually in possession of a priori synthetical cog nitions, as proved by the" existence of the principles of the understanding, which anticipate experience. If any one cannot comprehend the possibility of these principles, he may have some reason to doubt whether they are really a priori but he cannot on this account declare them to be impossible, and affirm the nullity of the steps which reason may have taken under their guidance. He can only say we perceived their origin and their authenticity, we should be able to determine the extent and limits of reason but, till we can do this, all
regarding the latter are mere random assertions. In this view, the doubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy, which proceeds without the guidance of criticism, well
but we cannot therefore deny to reason the ability
? propositions grounded
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to construct a sound philosophy, when the way has been prepared by a thorough critical investigation. All the con ceptions produced, and all the questions raised, by pure reason, do not lie in the sphere of experience, but in that of leason itself, and hence they must be solved, and shown to be either valid or inadmissible, by that faculty. We have no right to decline the solution of such problems, on the ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of things, and under pretence of the limitation of human facul ties, for reason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is therefore bound either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature.
The polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist, who erects a system of philosophy without having examined the fundamental objective principles on which it is basod, for the purpose of evidencing the futility of his designs, and thus bringing him to a knowledge of his own powers. But, in itself, scepticism does not give us any certain informa tion in regard to the bounds of our knowledge. All unsuccess ful dogmatical attempts of reason are facta, which it is always useful to submit to Hie censure of the sceptic. But this can not help us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason cherishes of better success in future endeavours ; the
investigations of scepticism cannot, therefore, settle the dispute regarding the rights and powers of human reason.
Hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of nll scep tical philosophers, and his writings have, undoubtedly, ex erted the most powerful influence in awakening reason to ?
? into its own powers. It will, therefore, well repay our labours to consider for a little the course of
out on the path of truth and
Hume was probably awnre, although he never clearly de veloped the notion, that we proceed in judgments of a certain class beyond our conception of the object. I have termed this kind of judgments synthetical. As regards the manner in which I pass beyond my conception by the aid of experience, no doubts can be entertained. Experience is itself a synthesis
of perceptions ; and it employs perceptions to increment the conception, which I obtain by means of another perception
thorough investigation
which he followed, and the errors into which he
reasoning
strayed, although setting certitude.
? ? ? tflfc lHSCtfLtiTB O* FT/RE BEABO*.
105
But we feel persuaded that we are able to proceed beyoud a Conception, and to extend our cognition a priori. We attempt this in two ways -- either, through the pure un derstanding, in relation to that which may become an object of experience, or, through pure reason, in relation to such properties of things, or of the existence of things, as can never he presented in any experience. This sceptical philosopher did not distinguish these two kinds of judgments, as he ought to have done, but regarded this augmentation of conceptions and, if we may so express ourselves, the spontaneous gene ration of understanding and reason, independently of the impregnation of experience, as altogether impossible. The so-called a priori principles of these faculties he consequently held to be invalid and imaginary, and regarded them as nothing but subjective habits of thought originating in ex- perience, and therefore purely empirical and contingent rules, to which we attribute a spurious necessity and universality. In support of this strange assertion, he referred us to the generally acknowledged principle of the relation between cause and effect. No faculty of the mind can conduct us from the conception of a thing to the existence of something else ; and hence lie believed he could infer that, without experience, we possess no source from which we can augment a conception, and no ground sufficient to justify us in framing a judgment that is to extend our cognition a priori. That the light of the sun, which shines upon a piece of wax, at the same time melts
while hardens clay, no power of the understanding could infer from the conceptions which we previously possessed of these substances much less there any a priori law that could conduct us to such conclusion, which experience alone can certify. On the other hand, we have seen in our discussion of Transcendental Logic, that, although we can never proceed immediately beyond the content of the conception which given us, we can always cognize completely priori -- in rela tion, however, to third term, namely, possible experience --the law of its connection with other things. For example, ob serve that piece of wax melts, can cognize priori that there must have been something (the sun's heat) preceding, which this effect follows according to fixed law although, without the aid of experience, could not cognize priori and in de
terminate manner, either the cause from the effect, or the effect
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firoiu the cause. Hume was therefore wrong in inferring, from the contingency of the determination according to law, the contingency of tht law itself ; and the passing beyond the conception of a thing to possible experience (which is an a priori proceeding, constituting the objective realitv of the conception), he confounded with our synthesis of objects in actual experience, which is always, of course, empirical. Thus, too, he regarded the principle of affinity, which, has its seat in the understanding and indicates a necessary connection, ns a mere rule of association, lying in the imitative faculty of imagination, which can present only contingent, and not ob jective connections.
The sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose
principally from a defect, which was common to him with the
dogmatists, namely, that he had never made a systematic review of all the different kinds of a priori synthesis performed by the understanding. Had he done so, he would have found, to take one example among many, that the principle of per manence was of this character, and that as well as the principle of causality, anticipates experience. In this way he might have been able to describe the determinate limits of the
priori operations of understanding and reason. But he merely declared the understanding to be limited, instead of showing what its limits were he created general mistrust
the power of our faculties, without giving us any determi nate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and unavoidable ignorance he examined and condemned some of the princi ples of the understanding, without investigating all its powers with the completeness necessary to criticism. He denies, with truth, certain powers to the understanding, but he goes further, and declares to be utterly inadequate to the a priori
extension of knowledge, although he has not fully examined all the powers which reside in the faculty and thus the fate which always overtakes scepticism meets him too. That to say, his own declarations are doubted, for his objections were based upon facta, which are contingent, and not upon prin ciples, which can alone demonstrate the necessary invalidity of all dogmatical assertions.
As Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason, agniDit which, however, his attacks arc mainly directed.