For some time now, religious sensibilities have retreated into the
intimate
regions of the psyche and are regarded as the true pudenda of the moderns.
Sloterdijk-Rage
This transition necessarily once again affects the temporal structure of those potentials invested in individual projects.
Just as rage in its project form provides for a longer duration and allows for a pragmatic planning process, the bank form of rage requires that individual vengeful plans subject themselves to a superior perspective.
This perspective proudly bears the title of "history"--history, of course, in the singular.
Through the creation of a bank of rage (understood as a storage place for moral explosives and vengeful projects) individual vectors become part of a single project guided by a single administration, the demands of which do not always coincide with the rhythms of local actors and actions.
But now subjection becomes inevitable: countless histories of rage are finally united in one common history.
This transition marks the transformation from the projective to the historical form of rage. As soon as a collective that invests its rage poten- tials--as well as its hopes and ideals--forms itself into a common, enduring operation, "history" itself takes on the form of an enterprise of the highest ambition. Historical narration takes on the task of accounting for the deeds and sufferings of the significant collective of rage. To say it almost with the words from 1848 of two famous colleagues: all history is the history of rage applications.
Once the rage economy becomes elevated to the level of a bank, anar- chistic companies led by small rage owners and locally organized anger groups become the subjects of harsh criticism. At the same time that the level of organization of rage is increased, there is a rationalization of the vengeful energy: it passes from pure impulsivity through a selective attack to a conception of attacks against the state of the world as a whole. From the
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perspective of the rage bankers, the actions of local anger agencies are blind expenditures that almost never produce any appropriate return because the anarchic acting out of the forces of rage regularly provokes the intervention of security forces, which can easily neutralize individual eruptions of hatred and local revolt.
On this level, vengeful actions are usually persecuted as transgressions or punished as crimes. It is thus not helpful to destroy telephone boxes or to set cars on fire unless the act is meant to integrate the act of vandalism into a "historical" perspective. The anger of destroyers and arsonists consum- mates itself in its expression, and that it often regenerates itself through the harsh reactions of the police and the judiciary does not change its blindness. It is an attempt to smash fog with a stick. Even a mass movement like that of the slave leader Spartacus in the years 73 through 71 B. C. could not achieve more than a flaring-up of hatred across Italy against the domination of the Roman landowners. Even though the rebellious gladiators of Capua dealt multiple defeats to the Roman army, the final result of this revolt was the horror of 6,000 crucified rebels enduring several days of agony before dying. Its consequences were increased repression and deepened discouragement. The revitalization of the legend of Spartacus and its inclusion in the sym- bolic arsenal of modern class struggle tells us, however, that in the archives of rage one deals with a "heritage" that is millennia old. Remember: if one wants to cultivate and pass on rage, one needs to make one's offspring into a part of a history of victims who call for revenge.
An analysis of our historical experience shows without a doubt that the small craftsmanship of rage is condemned to exhaust itself in costly botch-ups. So long as the local assets for revolutionary zeal are not pooled at long-term collection points and remain unguided by a visionary leader- ship, they waste themselves in expressions of their growing unrest. Isolated anger quanta heat up in shabby dishes until they evaporate or leave behind burned sediments that cannot again be reheated. This is unmistakably revealed by the history of smaller protest parties. Only when discrete ener- gies are invested into superior projects and far-sighted, sufficiently calm, diabolic directors take care of administrating collective rage capacities is it possible for multiple, isolated fires to be transformed into one big power plant. This plant could provide the energy for coordinated actions, up to the level of "world politics. " Visionary slogans become necessary for this to occur, slogans that do not need merely to address the intense anger of human beings but to reach their inner feelings of bitterness and finally their
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hope and their pride. The coldest rage writes up its activity reports in the style of hot idealism.
Just like the monetary economy, the rage economy passes a critical marker once rage has advanced from local accumulation and selective explosion to the level of a systematic investment and cyclic increase. In the case of money, one calls this difference the transition from treasure hoard- ing to capital. For rage, the corresponding transformation is reached once the vengeful infliction of pain is transformed from revenge to revolution. Revolution cannot be a matter of the resentment of an isolated private person, although such affects are also instantiated in its decisive moment. Revolution rather implies the creation of a bank of rage whose investments should be considered in as precise detail as an army operation before a final battle, or actions of a multinational corporation before being taken over by a hostile competitor.
The concept of the coming "revolution," considered in light of the events of 1917, finalizes the transition from the actualism to the futurism of rage. It implies a complete dismissal of the principle of expression. Vengeful acts of expression mean nothing more than a narcissistic expenditure of energy. The professional revolutionary, who is working as an employee of a bank of rage, does not express individual tensions, he follows a plan. This presup- poses the complete subordination of revolutionary affects under the com- mercial strategy. It does not suffice anymore to "embellish the world with horrors," to use the sarcastic-lucid phrase uttered by Schiller's hero in the play The Robbers, which Karl Moor proffers to characterize the maxim of his revolt against injustice. Whoever intends to embellish the world in the future needs to go much further in making it ugly than the romanticism of rebels and assassins could ever dream. Individual flowers of evil are no longer sufficient--one needs a whole art of gardening.
THE TERRIFYING FORCE OF THE NEGATIVE
BY "REVOLUTION," WHICH STILL SOUNDS SOMEWHAT FASCINATING even if it turns out to be increasingly empty, I mean the concept or, bet- ter, the phantasm that Lenin and Mao Zedong, the most successful entre- preneurs of rage, had in mind. By "revolutions" they meant that, through disciplined acts of hatred, one day there could be so much additional pain, so much excessive horror, so much numbing self-doubt among the secu- rity forces that everything that existed would soon melt down during a
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day of mass rage. Once what exists has lost its eternal and firm hold, the rotten world can then be created anew through the fire of transformation. But for this to happen, the power of destruction needs to accomplish its work to the very end. Only when what is old is eradicated completely can the reconstruction of the true circumstances can be started on a totally level foundation.
What Hegel referred to as the terrifying force of the negative gains its most distinct contour in this religiously conditioned speculation. Human rage, gathered from all sources and through effective modes of organiza- tion, provides for the bizarre calculation of big rage bankers the energy for a new creation. Assuming that the terrible end is sufficiently terrible, it should accordingly pass over into an epochal beginning.
Through deliberations of this kind at the height of unblemished ruth- lessness, one can encounter a form of anxiety that would curdle the blood of motley rebels and local hate projects if they were capable of envisioning the great strategic perspectives. The apocalyptic entrepreneur of rage has to prevent the action of local cells from endangering the grand plan with premature activism. This commits him to an extreme ascetics that will also affect his followers. The world revolutionary must unfailingly plan against spontaneous feelings; he must tenaciously dismiss his first reactions. He knows that without the deepest asceticism in the here and now there will never be any reward in the beyond. The more that local outrage is in the right, the more it is wrong when seen from a global perspective. If one aims for the transformation of everything, one needs to curb the impatience of individual vengeful parties. It is much more necessary to commit all fac- tions waiting to explode to staying calm and prepared (In-Form-Bleiben) until the day of mature rage arrives.
The temporal structure of revolution thus needs to be conceived of as an all-inclusive advent. Whatever leads to revolution belongs to the meaning- ful time of real history. The course of this history is analogous to a burning fuse. A great historical experience and a dose of intuition are needed to be able to judge to what extent the fuse of rage has already burned up. If one possesses both, one is qualified to take a leadership role at the top of the rage bank. Such a boss is justified in dictating to his employees from his sovereign position that they should prepare and keep the dynamite dry; the first precondition for collecting rage as part of a political project of global significance is cold-bloodedness. On the one hand, this cold-bloodedness constantly needs to stir hatred and outrage. On the other hand, it is also
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necessary for securing restraint. This way Dasein, in pre-explosive times, is in the mood of waiting while remaining ready for the next fight.
WHERE CAN ONE STUDY THIS HIGHER ECONOMY? NO ONE BELIEVES that studying Heidegger academically will be sufficient for gaining such dan- gerous knowledge. As much as the affinities with the basic claims of Being and Time are obvious, the Master from Messkirch only approached the temporal structure of revolutionary resentment in a formalist way before, for a time, evading it for the black heaven of the "national revolution. " Hei- degger never fully understood the logical and systematic implications of the concept of revolution. He understood it just as little as he understood the connection between our historicity and Daseins ability to be resentful. His investigation of the temporal structures of the caring, projecting, and dying Dasein does not provide us with an appropriate conception of the deep nexus of rage and time. The birth of history out of the project form of rage and, even more, the totality of processes leading to the capitalization of resentment remain obscure in his work.
APART FROM HEIDEGGER, WE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO REFER TO Marx and Lenin as the authorities for the dynamism of prerevolutionary and revolutionary negativity. It is peculiar that studying these authors is currently next to impossible. The reason for this is not that the texts are impenetrable but that the wall of Zeitgeist barricades access to them in a way that even the most patient person cannot independently overcome. With the exception of some still citable "passages," the works of the Marxist classics have become practically unreadable for people with contemporary intellectual, moral, and aesthetic reflexes. They seem to be written in an illusionary foreign tongue. Obsolete polemics permeate them to a degree that, for the time being, the deterring effect outweighs even the most moti- vated investigatory curiosity. Furthermore, they illustrate a fidelity to con- cepts one usually only finds in fundamentalist sects. Although they appeal to the science of "society" and its "contradictions," many classic leftist texts (with the exception of a few technical primary texts such as Capital) can be read only as unintended parodies. Only thanks to a completely untimely ascetics would it be possible to deduce from the writings of Marx and Lenin the building blocks of a theory of the present. (Mao Zedong's works would
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have to be taken off the list of reasonable literature from the very begin- ning). Nonetheless, the works of these authors provide a massive compen- dium of rage insights. Without these, the tragedies of the twentieth century cannot be adequately depicted and explained. I will return to this sunken body of work in chapters 3 and 4 because they indirectly provide informa- tion about what lies ahead.
One of the last chances to get to know a little bit more about the unpop- ular strategies of the major rage economy is to draw on events in the West- ern world toward the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. In this morbid but equally glorious epoch, the thousand flowers of radicalism were in bloom as if for the last time. Then, it would have easily been pos- sible to assure oneself of Marx's remark that historical dramas regularly repeat themselves as farces after their first staging as tragedies. In this case, the farce consisted in the attempt to project the circumstances of the 1930s onto those of 1968 and afterward in order to derive the rules for "resis- tance" against the "ruling system. " Back then, one could often hear the doc- trine that patience should be the first virtue of the revolutionary. Words of advice like these mirrored a generational conflict in the radical left between the old school and the revolutionary youth. The late-Stalinist intelligentsia advised this youth that, although the revolution had already "begun" and in the future it would be necessary to always count "from now on," the manifest eruption of the revolution should, under no circumstances, be accelerated voluntaristically.
Only today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as the peace of real consumerism is threatened through what is in many places proclaimed as "return of history" (part of it being a return of left-fascist whispers at the margins of academia), do we find a new chance to understand what the praise of revolutionary virtues truly meant. Patience designated the attitude of the historical subject of rage. This subject had freed itself from its personal motives through a cold quasi-idealist ascetics. Once a private factor becomes part of the inevitable revenge against the status quo (or according to the jargon of the time, praxis), voluntarism and a premature expenditure are unavoidable consequences. They are the "teething troubles" of the growing revolution. Although such eruptive episodes might still seem justified from the perspective of the actors, from the perspective of a leading employee of the world bank of rage they are the worst thing that could happen before the day of decision. The leading functionaries are convinced that a pre- mature eruption will prevent the coming into being of this most intensive
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tension. Only this tension will allow the collection of globally dispersed assets of rage into one single and final action, which goes by the name of "world revolution. " The hostile acquisition of the "world" by those who are worse off presupposes that the various factions among the worse off refrain from wasting their powers in spontaneous and individual ventures.
The most famous examples of an anarchistic waste of rage deposits are the assassins who, on March 1, 1881, killed Czar Alexander II, the famous emancipator of the serfs. The immediate consequences consisted in the intensification of repression and the expansion of an omnipresent police system. Even more devastating was the senseless waste of hatred assets by the imitators of the assassins of 1881. These were a group of students of the University of St. Petersburg who were planning to kill the murdered czar's successor, Alexander III, on March 1,1886--as is well known, days of political rage follow a special calendar. Among the students was the twenty- one-year-old Alexander Ulyanov. The attempt was uncovered by the police before it could be carried out, and Alexander was imprisoned with four- teen other conspirators. He was sent to court and, in May 1887, hanged with four other insurgents who likewise were unable to feel remorse. The lives of the other ten were spared in line with the manners of a Russian autocracy famous for its acts of pardoning. Vladimir Ulyanov, the "brother of the hanged," subsequently underwent a process of change from which he emerged as "Lenin," the first wholehearted politician of rage in mod- ern times. In this capacity, he came to understand that the way to power can only lead through the conquest of the state apparatus, not through the merely symbolically relevant assassination of its representative.
The often cited phrase of the young Lenin, "we will not go this way," which was probably dated earlier or even invented, is rightly conceived of as the first sentence of the Russian Revolution. 8 With him begins the century of the big business of rage. Who can forgo the killing of the prince, can receive, as a bonus to the conquered power, the dead prince for free.
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THE DISCOVERY OF THE METAPHYSICAL REVENGE BANK
AT THE END OF THE INTRODUCTION I CLAIMED THAT THE psychopolitical constellation of rage and time (or rage and history) is antici- pated by the theological constellation of rage and eternity. What this means exactly at this point needs to be developed. Nontrivial insights concerning the function and architecture of monotheistic religions will surface in the course of this investigation.
That theology wants to be a political quantity, that it can, and that it indeed needs to be such follow from a simple diagnosis. The religions that were relevant for the course of occidental European history, that is, the Mes- opotamian as well as the Mediterranean religions, have always been politi- cal and will remain so as long as they survive. In these religions, gods are the transcendent party supporters of their peoples and protectors of their kingdoms. They exercise this function even at the risk of having to invent a people and a kingdom that suits them. This is especially true for the God of monotheism. This God had to travel a long geopolitical path, from his precarious Egyptian beginnings to his Roman and American triumphs. This is the case despite the assertions of those who worship him: he is not a mere
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god of empires (since empires are notoriously perishable structures) but the timeless and transpolitical creator and shepherd of all men. 1
In fact, the one and only God of Israel was initially a god without an empire. As an ally of a small people primarily concerned with their survival chances, he initially did not seem to be anything more than a provincial god. In time, however, he would transform himself into the most politically viru- lent god in the skies above Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. Although barely noticeable in the world, he was conscious of his omnipotence. He succeeded in offensively positioning himself against the pompously incar- nated imperial gods of the Near East and Rome, at the same time claiming clear superiority. As the claimant of an illustrious monopoly, he invited the ancient people of Israel to live far beyond their political means in matters of religion. He expected that they would trust him and thus hold their heads higher than the most powerful of emperors. He thus revealed himself as the deuspoliticus par excellence, as the party member of all party members, as the anchor of a sacred one-sidedness that manifested itself in the far-reaching concept of the Covenant. As during the blossoming of communism, when the dogma was spread around that Marxist science united in itself objec- tivity and partisanship, so the Jewish and Christian theologies, which were always blooming plants, have made it clear from the beginning that God's universal justice expresses itself in the preferential treatment of one of the two allied peoples.
We have to assume that there is a constitutive primary phase in the development of the management of rage with a global scope (called, from a modern perspective, the submission of politics to morality, the art of the possible under the art of what can be wished), an initial phase that extends for more than two millennia. In this phase a threatening and sublime con- ception is shaped, according to which an autonomously steering and judg- ing but also participating and excitable as well as "agitating" (eifernder) God constantly intervenes in the course of human conflicts, alias history. Because the history of humanity is to a large extent synonymous with that which upsets God, these interventions mostly happen in the mode of wrath. God rages against his own people no less than against their adversaries. He shows his rage by sending wars, epidemics, famines, and natural catastro- phes as servile spirits of punishment (technically speaking, these spirits are secondary causes on behalf of the majesty who is the primary cause). At a later point, it was said about this God that when the day of Last Judg- ment would come, he would impose eternal bodily and spiritual pain on
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those who missed the chance to repent during their lives on earth and thus avoided their just sentence.
The motive of the court of judgment originated in the conceptions of the beyond in Ancient Egypt and the Near East. During its culmination in the late Middle Ages and the baroque period, it advanced to become the most aston- ishing of visual illustrations. If one had to define the, historically speaking, exceptionalism of Christian intelligence, one could put it as follows: Christian thinking is (or was until very recently) that thinking that in its concern for salvation also conceives of its opposite, hell. Even in the twentieth century, the Catholic Irishman James Joyce depicted, with the shiniest and blackest of colors, the metaphysical horror of the experience of suffering for eternity. 2 In light of the influence of this idea, the concept of eternity became associated with a final penal and torture institution, based on a vast divine memory of injustice and corresponding rage competence. With the help of this set of ideas, anxiety became part of the spiritual history of Christianity. 3 It is prob- ably correct to assume that theology secretly dispensed with the unfavorable ballast of dogmatic conceptions of hell during the twentieth century. Insofar as traces of the idea of a wrathful God have seeped into our contemporary memory, it still conjures up the memory of the most Christian of hells.
If the wrath of God is translated back into historical time and taken up by a human, universal direction, "history" comes into being. It enters the scene with a revolutionary climax whose meaning consists in avenging the injustice that provokes rage against those who caused the injustice and, even more so, against its structural conditions. One could define modernity as the epoch in which the motives of rage and immanence become fused. This liaison generates the coming into existence of a globally operative rage agency. In the next chapter, I will describe as the embodiment of such an institution the party that is always in the right. Only a control center of such a scale could realize what Schiller referred to with his dictum that world his- tory is the world's court of justice. But first I want to examine not the trans- lation of Holy Wrath into secular history but its accumulation in eternity.
PRELUDE: THE WRATH OF GOD AGAINST THE SECULAR WORLD
IF IT IS CORRECT THAT THE GLOBALIZATION OF RAGE HAD TO PASS through an extended theological starting phase before it could be translated into secular control, we are faced with an essential difficulty of understanding.
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In the introduction to this work, I attempted to show why it is impossible for modern human beings to understand the rage of Achilles within the parameters of the age of Homer. What follows is an analogous demonstra- tion in regards to the prophetism of rage in the tradition of Judaism docu- mented in the Bible, as well as in the Christian tradition in the Scholastic and Puritan theology of rage. For our contemporaries it is impossible to appreciate the rage of the One God as it has been preached by the interpret- ers of triumphant monotheism at the highpoints of their self-confidence. It is fundamentally mistaken to believe that it would be possible to do with- out a reconsideration of the early history of the horror metaphysicus because contemporary Islamism provides an example. The wave of violence that is carried out by Islamists at most tells us something about the most recent performances of the well-known tropes of the wrathful God, as well as the agitating God known since the early days of Judaism. It does not help us to diagnose how it was ever possible that God could acquire the attribute ofwrathfulness.
To appreciate the authentic teaching concerning God's rage, two con- cepts are necessary, and their meaning is, if at all, only metaphorically understandable for us: glory and hell. The content of these terms, which formerly depicted the extremes of high and low in a world formed by God's presence, cannot be concretized by contemporaries. We cannot clarify them even given our best efforts. If a modern human being were to be capable of using these concepts according to their metaphysical meaning, he would have to affirm the most horrible sentence of world literature--he would have to agree to the inscription above the gates of Hell in Dante's Inferno, where we can read for eternity: "Divine power made me, / highest wisdom, and primal love. " The impossibility of deliberately agreeing to these words of terror provides an inkling of the complexity of the task that has to be solved. The solution can no longer be achieved. To see this difficulty means to enter into an investigation concerning the price paid for monotheism. This much needs to be said in advance: the price for monotheism had to be paid by two transactions, of which it is not easy to say which was the more deadly. One was the introduction of resentment into the teaching of last things, the other the internalization of terror into Christian psychagogy.
Before approaching these dangerous domains, we should attempt to ease the censorship of the Zeitgeist. Because of this censorship, that theological issues of all kinds are excluded from the domain of topics to be seriously discussed by enlightened human beings. "God talk" has been banned from
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European high society for more than 150 years. This is the case in spite of periodically circulating rumors of a return of religion. Flaubert's bon mot in his Dictionary of Received Ideas concerning "conversation"--that "poli- tics and religion are to be excluded from it"--is still an apt description of the state of affairs. 4 However often one speaks of a "revitalization" of the religious, the truth remains that simply because there is a widespread dis- satisfaction with the disenchanted world, this does not at all lead to a new belief in extra- or superworldly entities. When John Paul II often remarked in a melancholic tone that human beings in Europe live as if God does not exist, he revealed a better understanding of the real conditions than the subversive crypto-Catholics who publish in the culture sections of Ger- man newspapers, who would like it the most if they could elect the Lord in Heaven as the Person of the Year.
We can specifically say about the Christian message that it has not been admissible in the secular realm for a long time; it is no longer plausible. The only way to get a hold of its audience is through marginal means of communication, such as TV channels owned by certain sects. This remark will provoke the protest of one or another representative of the church who does not like to admit the possibility that belief in the Redeemer could be a hobby similar to enjoying horror movies or breeding fighting dogs. This reservation can be easily understood, yet it does not change the fact that the Christian cause survives only as a subculture. What is at issue here cannot anyhow be expressed by sociological or statistical data. The alienation of the public from the Gospel goes far beyond Paul's concession that God talk is a nuisance for Jews and a foolishness for Greeks. Apart from nuisance and foolishness, embarrassment is perhaps the best characterization of the contemporary mode of being of the religious.
For some time now, religious sensibilities have retreated into the intimate regions of the psyche and are regarded as the true pudenda of the moderns. After the Enlightenment, one has to cross a great threshold of embarrassment to still be touched by the question concerning a praiseworthy Higher Being. Theologians like to react to this situation with the profound remark that modern man still lives in the historical situation of a "distance" to God. However beautiful this phrase is, it is already mistaken. The problem that exists between God and us contemporaries is not that we are too far away from him. Rather, God would get too close if we were to take his offerings seriously. No quality of the God of the theologians reveals this better than the most embarrassing among them: God's wrath.
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This said, the following thesis should make sense: what seemed to be the clearest manifestation of a new weight of religion, of a new religiosity as such--the attention that was paid to the dying and death of Pope John Paul II and the choice of his successor, Benedict XVI, in April 2005--actually had little to do with the religious side of the changing of the guard in the Office of the Saint Peter. In fact, the fascination was exerted largely, if not exclusively, by the pompous Roman liturgies based on relics of the impe- rial Caesarian myth. Without being able to give themselves a clear account of what they were doing, the masses, as well as the media, felt during the course of events how the personal aura of the pope still radiates with the charisma of Caesar. To a diligent observer of the pontificate of John Paul II," it is clear that the papal cult, which the pope cleverly updated, was essen- tially characterized by a media Caesarism. In spite of all the assertions of the mystic intensity of the event, it was how the Christian message pro- vided a religious form to Caesarian content. Only because of the latter was it possible that Roma aeterna could appear as the most successful content
provider for all secular networks. But what else does this show than that the Church only wins the struggle for attention when it presents a program that can be misinterpreted in a secular, tragic, and spectacular way? Because Catholicism, at least in its Roman form, is in the last instance still more an empire--or, more specifically, a copy of an empire--than it is a church, the embarrassment of religious speech retreats into the background during its main events and completely cedes the floor to the pompous apparatus.
Once again: in a post-Enlightenment atmosphere "God" cannot be a topic under any circumstances, with the exception of special issues of elitist culture journals. A fortiori, a public discourse concerning the "attributes" of the impossible object remains unthinkable. Yet more impossible, if such a comparative form exists, would be the demand to conceive of a wrathful God or a God of rage in a time in which a friendly God is already an implau- sible hypothesis. But we precisely have to deal with this unpopular entity, which I will refer to from now on in a preliminary fashion as a "thought figure," in order to understand the emergence of the modern economy of rage. We have to trace the preliminary stages of its transformation into a formal banking system.
The most recent opportunity to witness the configuration of the con- cepts "God" and "rage" was the debate concerning the new forms of reli- gious and political fundamentalism, a debate more than usually visible in the late 1980s. A significant publication from that time was La revanche de
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Dieu (The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Juda- ism in the Modern World), which appeared in French in 1989. The French subtitle did not just mention an advance but, more straightforwardly, a ureconquete du monde"--this was of course reminiscent of the historical pattern of the Reconquista. The author of the book, Gilles Kepel, who has been one of the most important voices in matters of culture and politics in the Middle East since this publication, investigates the strategies of the radi- cal monotheist mobilization in various corners of the world. The oriental aspect of the topic seems to be couched in an ecumenical register of old and new fanaticisms.
The ironic tone of the term "revanche de Dieu' cannot be missed. The author makes it clear that he discusses his subject matter solely with the means available to a cultural scientist of his time. When he mentions the "vengeful God," he does not affirmatively refer to the theology of the wrath- ful God. At the center of the investigation is the return of militant religious groups onto the stage of world politics. In the meantime, we have become accustomed to interpreting the resurgence of these groups as "fundamental- ist reactions"--they are the expressions of revenge from a heated religious milieu against the dominant secular milieu. Chronologically, the return of fundamentalisms begins with the appearance of evangelical fundamental- ists in the United States and their adamant denunciation of the worldview of modern natural science as diabolic. For decades, these groups have been increasing their influence on American society. The trend is continued by the ultraorthodox Jews of Israel, whose agitations can no longer be ignored by any government and who would like to see their secular nation trans- formed, sooner rather than later, into a rabbi-ocracy; the trend finds its inevitable end in more recent Islamist phenomena. Although the Islamists, just like their Christian counterparts, reveal a tendency toward militant big- otry, particularly unmistakable are the similarities to the years of fighting and defiance of Roman Catholicism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; however, they add a new element to their political appearances. They draw on historical Islam as a "readymade" in order to arbitrarily instrumentalize it in a terrorist advertising campaign throughout the global public sphere. What Marcel Duchamp achieved for art history during the early twentieth century, Osama Bin Laden repeats with the sup- port of religious technicians for the Islam of the late twentieth century. The significance of the readymade procedure for the modern cultural economy has been laid out in the subde analyses of Boris Groys, and the effects of his
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work on contemporary cultural science have barely begun. 5 As a result of the subversive interpretation of the sacred tradition, we see that Islam, and in particular the traditional authority of the Ulema, the council of scholars and jurists, is undermined by the rebellious fascination of religious pirates.
This "revenge of God" is launched by the various political surrealists, ter- rorists, and fanatics through the media of Western entertainment societies, which are always hungry for events. This rage constitutes only a semicomi- cal, semimacabre spectacle compared with to the millennia-old theological traditions, in which mention of the wrath of God and his interventions in human affairs bears a tone of sympathetic seriousness. These interventions were conceived of in both historical and eschatological terms. The memory of this tradition is the first step of the descent into the catacombs of the his- tory of ideas.
THE KING OF RAGE
NATURALLY THE COUNTLESS REFERENCES TO THE FIGURE OF THE wrathful God in the Old Testament interest us here only in a limited man- ner. The source of the New Testament, as well as sources from later Catho- lic dogmatism, are only selective and should be consulted from a different point of view. The traces of these traditions in the Koran will be left out here completely because when measured against the bulk of Jewish and Chris- tian remarks they do not provide anything that would be genuinely new. In this chapter we can thus only pursue a few of those theological terms that have been important in the development of the one "God" and the corre- sponding transformation of God's people into memory devices. The other abundant references to the divine life of affects in the euphoric as well as the dysphoric sense do not concern us in this context.
For professionals as well as amateurs it is a trivial fact that the early depictions of Yahweh, the Lord of Israel, are marked by clear anthropomor- phisms (or better, anthropo-psychisms). Every reader of the Bible could make sure that the God of Exodus was still capable of combining the traits of a theatrical weather demon with those of a furious, unrestrained war- lord. What is decisive for what follows is, of course, the question of how the first signs of a superior moral view characterize this primitive and ener- getic, meteorological and military conception of God. Part of this change is the formation of a retention function, which is supposed to prevent the disappearance of the past into what is truly passe and, because of the lack
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of memory, was never real. Through the divine act of retention, the first project culminating in a "history" means more than the recurrence of the same; it also means more than an expression of megalomania and forget- ting, in which empires come and go. The historical progression culminating in the "omniscient God" runs for a long time parallel to the path leading to a god of good memory. 6 The emergence and gaining shape of a retaining, deferring, preserving, and recording activity in God signals the transforma- tion of his exercise of power away from the eruptive style to the habitus of a judge or a king. 7 Rage might have been a plausible but incidental attribute for a God who from time to time slips into the roller of thunders. For a God, however, who is supposed to be a royal judge and demands respect and fear in an aura of numinous majesty, the ability to rage becomes constitutive. About such a God we can say for the first time that sovereignty requires that one is believably threatening.
Through the account concerning the function of God as judge, the tem- poral profile of his actions change: while he used to be conceived of as a protector of his people, as an impulsive interventionist (one can think of the destruction of the Egyptian army at the Red Sea or the eradication of all of humankind with the exception of Noah during the flood), he initially distinguishes himself through his righteous upsurges--from a psychologi- cal perspective, one would speak of momentous decompensations. Between God's aggravation with sinful humanity and the downpour of deadly rain there is but a blink of an eye. The passage concerning the remorse that God felt after having created human beings points to a misunderstanding between expectation and fulfillment insofar as remorse implies a modifi- cation to the divine sense of time. The situation drastically changes if one takes into account the final scene of the great flood. Here God raises with the rainbow an important symbol of patience for both sides, a symbol that expresses his intention to never repeat such a destructive action, even though humanity does not significantly differ after the flood, at least in its moral character. Riidiger Safranski summarizes this fact with the fitting remark, which is respectfully unrespectful: that God transformed himself from a "fundamentalist to a realist. " The realist (der Realo) is the one who concedes that everything in need of improvement needs time--and which things are not in need of improvement? 8
As a result of the change of direction toward a conception of God as judge and avenger, the "retentional" qualities of the Lord in heaven increasingly became emphasized. Just as intentions aim at what is present, retentions
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aim at what is past, and pretentions at what is futural. The royal archival and judicial competences of God from now on become decisive character- istics. They include the abilities to remember what is just and what is unjust and to record violations of the law. But most important, they included the willingness to reserve judgment concerning the just sentence, including the right to pardon or leave the exact moment in which the sentence will be executed undetermined. Such conceptions can only occur in a culture that has for some time possessed two archetypes of "reserving" technologies. On the one hand, it has to possess a granary or, more generally, a stock of supplies. On the other hand, it requires a book or, more generally, writ- ten language and the collection of written works in libraries. These need to be complemented through judicial technologies that can determine what is right and what is wrong. The function of the archive is based on these basic patterns. The archive as an institution and in terms of its cultural function unfolds as soon as nervous systems interact with external storage spaces and recording devices, in other words, when it is necessary to organize the coop- eration between subjective and objective memories in formal procedures. The judging God is thus naturally the original registrar in the kingdom of ethical life. His office consists in holding on to the memory of controversial events so that they can be taken up again later. 9
Although the early immanent theology of the Bible tends to posit Yah- weh as existing beyond time and, in particular, beyond the fantasies of the permanent persistence and pompous genealogies of surrounding empires, as a judge and chairperson of a court for his own followers, he remains an agent who "breaks in" to the historical destinies of his followers and other peoples. For this reason, the Jewish God of judgment consistently needs to be envisaged as a ruling king, regardless of the empirical nonsense of a kingdom that is, in principal, invisible. Making God into a king introduces a tension to the temporal horizon of his interventions. Divine records of injustice and attempts to preserve rage allow for long distances between the moment of "transgression" and the moment of "revenge. " However, they still do not imply that punitive violence is postponed until the end of time or even transposed to eternity.
THE INTERRUPTION OF REVENGE
THE BOOK OF GENESIS MENTIONS A BREAK THAT CAUSED LASTING consequences for the organization of the human memory of rage. The
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report of the first murder, committed by the farmer Cain against his younger brother, Abel, the shepherd who had been favored by God, is also the oldest record on the secrets of injustice. In this history, God appears for the first time openly as the master of facticity: he looks on Abel's sac- rifice favorably while ignoring Cain's. For this difference, there is no trace of a motivation. The freedom to discriminate against whomever, wherever he wishes is part of the concept of God. The next, similarly far reaching example of this thesis is provided in the story of Esau and Jacob. Without any documented reason, God loves one and hates the other one, while the created is not allowed to ask his creator: "Why did you create me in such a way that you needed to reject me? " It is expected that the person who is discriminated against needs to master his affects of humiliation: "And the Lord said unto Cain, Why art thou wroth? And why is thy countenance fallen? If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door. And unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him" (Genesis 4:6-7). The meaning of this story, which has been inserted at front of the record of action, is obvious: the murder of the brother is not supposed to be misunderstood as a spontaneous impulsive act; it is supposed to count as a result of a suspension of the explicit and clear warning. The deed does not occur in the relative innocence of being overtaken by agitated feelings. In order to commit the deed, the perpetra- tor has to intentionally transgress a clearly drawn line--only such an act of transgression makes it into a case of true violation in the first place. One can hardly emphasize it enough: Cain does not abide by the law of grav- ity inhering in a strong affective action; he takes time for his action--he uses a pretense to lure his brother onto an open field in order to strike him dead. From this time on, he lives in the exceptional time of guilt; he is chained to his own dead: "You will be restless and uneasy on this earth," the lord speaks to him. "I will be restless and uneasy on this earth. Who- ever finds me will strike me down," the perpetrator responds (Genesis 4:12, 14). Thereupon God leaves Cain with a sign, "so that no one who finds him will strike him down. "
Historians of religion associate the sign of Cain with the warning symbol of an ancient oriental tribe in which strict blood feuds were common. It sig- nals that whoever raises the hand against the bearer of the symbol has to be aware that he will suffer from sevenfold revenge. The threat of revenge esca- lates among Cain's offspring in grotesque quantities. His great-great-grand- child Lamech announces heroically: "I will murder a man for a wound and
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a young boy for a bruise. If Cain will be avenged seven times, then Lamech will be avenged seven times seventy" (Genesis 4:23-24).
The exploding numbers express an ambivalent situation: although the sign of Cain can be interpreted as the symbol of a universal prohibi- tion against revenge, is this is violated, there exists the threat of excessive revenge. On the one hand, revenge is suspended, but, on the other hand, we can expect an extreme form of revenge if this commandment is not fol- lowed. This can only be understood as a symptom for the lack of an effec- tive monopoly over violence. Where there is no central penal authority, the revenge prohibition can only be experimentally instituted through the forceful threat of an excessive reaction. One needs to wait for the intro- duction of a stable juridical culture with a formal body of law before tali- onic equations can come into effect: "A life for a life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot, burn for a burn, a wound for a wound, a bruise for a bruise" (Exodus 21:23-25). The equality between the sides of these formulas show that justice is to be understood as appropriateness. The measure presupposes someone who enforces it, a role usually fulfilled by early forms of government as the guarantors of the law.
If the degree of the sentence is directly and materially deduced from the suffering of injustice committed, a concept of justice as a simple form of equivalence comes into being. The compulsion to enhance the amount of retribution can thus be dismissed. Instead of the outdated one-to-seven, or even one-to-seventy-seven, from now on the sublime and simple one-to- one will be exercised. To secure retribution, a strong judicial authority is necessary, which initially manifests itself only in the sovereignty of a king. It may be that modern observers will regard such a system as a form of economy of natural goods or, rather, a primitive and inhuman economy of horrors. However, the Mosaic commandments were an important step in the rationalization of strategies of retaliation. Additionally, equality between the value of injustice and that of retribution has an implicit tem- poral meaning, since order can be reestablished only after the equivalence of the suffering from deeds and the suffering from penalty has been reestab- lished. This waiting for justice comes to characterize the meaning of time. Through the equation of guilt and penalty, which has been effected by the judicial system, there is a dissolution of local vengeful tensions of the vic- tim or prosecutor, at least as considered from an ideal-typical perspective. When the sun comes up afterward, it still shines on just and unjust people;
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at the same time, this sunrise signals the new beginning for the parties who have paid their bills.
THE ORIGINAL ACCUMULATION OF RAGE
THE SITUATION JUST PRESENTED STARTS TO LOOK VERY DIFFERENT if suffering from injustice is accumulated only on one side, without those sacrificed to the injustice having an effective way to reestablish equality. In such situations, it is likely that strong and chronic tensions of rage will emerge and accumulate into a form of negative capacity. For this possibil- ity we can find at least two significant examples in the Old Testament. The first one is connected to the memories of Israel concerning the Babylonian captivity in the sixth century B. C. , to which the word "exile" refers with a richness of subtle connotations. The second example refers to the Jew- ish conception of apocalypse. Starting with the second century B. C. , this conception led to an intensification of propheticism that, through its exces- sive exaggeration, in turn led to the demand for the destructive rage of God against the incurably corrupt world as a whole.
The mental sediments of Israeli exile and the apocalyptic exaggerations of prophetic anti-imperialism (which initially turned against Hellenic and then Roman foreign rule) have left deep marks in the religious tradition of Western civilization. Both themes remain incomprehensible without assuming the creation of a treasury of rage. Its peculiar dynamic led to a structural transformation of the rage of victims into a lasting resentment. This transformation has a significance for the specific tuning of Western religion, metaphysics, and politics that can hardly be overestimated.
The books of the Old Testament provide ample evidence for the cre- ation of a treasury of rage during the Babylonian captivity and subse- quent epochs, in a sometimes sublime, sometimes more direct voice. An example for a sublime articulation of this development written during the age of Babylon and included in the Gospel only later is the narration of Genesis. It is mistaken to assume that Genesis necessarily constituted the beginning of the Jewish canon. In reality it is the result of a relatively late theological attempt to surpass the state of heteronomy. With this attempt the spiritual spokesmen of Israel claimed the cosmic superiority for their God over the gods of the dominant empire during the forced period of exile. What at first seems to be a casual report about last things is in real- ity the result of an editorial work on matters of competitive theology.
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The meaning of this endeavor consists in reinterpreting the God of the political losers as the a priori winner. Even if the heathen kings are able to rule over their territories and slave populations with the support of their polytheistic entourage, none of their decrees will even approximate the domain of the truly divine "It will be. " Through Genesis, Jewish theology was able to celebrate its most subtle victory over the teachings of the gods of the Mesopotamian empires.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE LESS SUBLIME BIBLICAL DEPICTIONS OF THE accumulation of rage can be limited to the infamous psalms of lamenta- tion and prayers for the sake of destroying the enemy. These can be found in the Psalms of the Old Testament, a collection of 150 exemplary hymns, praises, and invocations of God that have served the Jews, as well as Chris- tians, for more than a thousand years as the primary source of their prac- tices of prayer. This body of texts presents a spiritual treasury that can easily be compared to the most sublime documents of religious world literature. Although the individual pieces are consistently formulated in the mode of a prayer and thus in the habitus of a nontheoretical relationship to God, they present psychological, theological, and spiritual riches--as is proven by the great history of their reception, reaching from the Ennarrationes in Psalmos of Augustine to the studies of Hermann Gunkel and Arnold Stadler. Psalm 139, to take just one example, belongs to the most moving and substan- tive sources ever recorded. It addresses the being-surrounded of human existence by a creative milieu and the becoming-enveloped of human consciousness by a knowledge of a higher kind. With regards to its latent metaphysical and existential insights, this lyric text is not superior to any spiritual testimony, be it from India or China. Nonetheless, it is precisely this meditation that is torn apart by an appeal to revenge, the force of which is singular in the history of religious literature. Initially the praying person assures himself of his own creation:
My substance was not hidfromthee, when I was made in secret, and curi- ously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth.
Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being unperfect; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet
there was none of them.
(Psalms 139:15-16, AV)
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IMMEDIATELY AFTER, THE MEDITATION TURNS TO THE ENEMIES OF
the praying person. The pious one points his attention to them without interruption. He is subject to a double "compulsory relationship" because, on the one hand, he faces the enemy, the Babylonian oppressor, as an inevitable political opponent. On the other hand, the political enemy also embodies a religious opponent insofar as he enjoys the freedom to hold onto the gods or idols of his own culture and thus despise Jewish monola- try. Both aspects of this front are present when the prayer suddenly passes over into the harshest lamentations:
Surely thou wilt slay the wicked, O God: depart from me therefore, ye bloody men.
For they speak against thee wickedly, and thine enemies take thy name in vain.
Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee? and am not I grieved with those that rise up against thee?
I hate them with perfect hatred: I count them mine enemies. (19-22)
This poetic description of enemies would be completely misinterpreted as a spontaneous eruption of sentiments against domination. Such feelings are only one of many knots in a network of remembrance that records memories of abuse and humiliation. The same network stabilizes expres- sive impulses of revenge into repeatable forms. The initial formulation of Psalm 94, "God who is revenge appear" (cited according to the unrevised rendition of Luther) could be used as a leitmotiv and guide to a great part of the Psalms. It returns, in addition to many other places, in Psalm 44. There the following words are addressed to the God of the confederation: "With you we will throw down our oppressors. With your name we smash our opponents" (44:6). Then we read, "Wake up! Why do you sleep, my lord? Awake! Do not condemn us forever! " (24). The most massive inten- sification of this rhetoric is in Psalm 137, at the end of which we find the following lines:
O daughter of Babylon, who art to be destroyed; happy shall he be, that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us.
Happy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the
stones.
(8-9)
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THIS IS AN ARTIFICIAL FORM OF POLEMIC PRAYER THAT APPEARS foreign to the modern understanding of religion. Nevertheless, it can be understood once such formulations are translated (or better, retranslated) into what, in today's language, would be referred to as "psychological war- fare. " Because ancient Israel was for long periods in chronic situations of war, its religion was necessarily one at the front. Since warfare always devel- ops a psychosemantic dimension, its development and transcription is to be done by religious leaders, at least insofar as religion and psychoseman- tics converge. The harsh phrases of the Psalms are intended to compensate for the psychopolitical unlikelihood of the survival of Israel during a time of defeats.
This explains the initially disconcerting observation that prayers can also be polemics. Not less disconcerting, and yet psychodynamically plausible, is the fact that even meditation can be used as a means of propaganda. By turning inside themselves, those praying discover their hatred and thus entrust it to God so that he may draw the right consequences from it. These consequences should have been primarily violent, given the context. The autoplastic function of supplicatory prayer emerges most clearly when the praying group envisions itself in a destructive wish-image in which the oppressor has been overcome.
This transition marks the transformation from the projective to the historical form of rage. As soon as a collective that invests its rage poten- tials--as well as its hopes and ideals--forms itself into a common, enduring operation, "history" itself takes on the form of an enterprise of the highest ambition. Historical narration takes on the task of accounting for the deeds and sufferings of the significant collective of rage. To say it almost with the words from 1848 of two famous colleagues: all history is the history of rage applications.
Once the rage economy becomes elevated to the level of a bank, anar- chistic companies led by small rage owners and locally organized anger groups become the subjects of harsh criticism. At the same time that the level of organization of rage is increased, there is a rationalization of the vengeful energy: it passes from pure impulsivity through a selective attack to a conception of attacks against the state of the world as a whole. From the
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perspective of the rage bankers, the actions of local anger agencies are blind expenditures that almost never produce any appropriate return because the anarchic acting out of the forces of rage regularly provokes the intervention of security forces, which can easily neutralize individual eruptions of hatred and local revolt.
On this level, vengeful actions are usually persecuted as transgressions or punished as crimes. It is thus not helpful to destroy telephone boxes or to set cars on fire unless the act is meant to integrate the act of vandalism into a "historical" perspective. The anger of destroyers and arsonists consum- mates itself in its expression, and that it often regenerates itself through the harsh reactions of the police and the judiciary does not change its blindness. It is an attempt to smash fog with a stick. Even a mass movement like that of the slave leader Spartacus in the years 73 through 71 B. C. could not achieve more than a flaring-up of hatred across Italy against the domination of the Roman landowners. Even though the rebellious gladiators of Capua dealt multiple defeats to the Roman army, the final result of this revolt was the horror of 6,000 crucified rebels enduring several days of agony before dying. Its consequences were increased repression and deepened discouragement. The revitalization of the legend of Spartacus and its inclusion in the sym- bolic arsenal of modern class struggle tells us, however, that in the archives of rage one deals with a "heritage" that is millennia old. Remember: if one wants to cultivate and pass on rage, one needs to make one's offspring into a part of a history of victims who call for revenge.
An analysis of our historical experience shows without a doubt that the small craftsmanship of rage is condemned to exhaust itself in costly botch-ups. So long as the local assets for revolutionary zeal are not pooled at long-term collection points and remain unguided by a visionary leader- ship, they waste themselves in expressions of their growing unrest. Isolated anger quanta heat up in shabby dishes until they evaporate or leave behind burned sediments that cannot again be reheated. This is unmistakably revealed by the history of smaller protest parties. Only when discrete ener- gies are invested into superior projects and far-sighted, sufficiently calm, diabolic directors take care of administrating collective rage capacities is it possible for multiple, isolated fires to be transformed into one big power plant. This plant could provide the energy for coordinated actions, up to the level of "world politics. " Visionary slogans become necessary for this to occur, slogans that do not need merely to address the intense anger of human beings but to reach their inner feelings of bitterness and finally their
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hope and their pride. The coldest rage writes up its activity reports in the style of hot idealism.
Just like the monetary economy, the rage economy passes a critical marker once rage has advanced from local accumulation and selective explosion to the level of a systematic investment and cyclic increase. In the case of money, one calls this difference the transition from treasure hoard- ing to capital. For rage, the corresponding transformation is reached once the vengeful infliction of pain is transformed from revenge to revolution. Revolution cannot be a matter of the resentment of an isolated private person, although such affects are also instantiated in its decisive moment. Revolution rather implies the creation of a bank of rage whose investments should be considered in as precise detail as an army operation before a final battle, or actions of a multinational corporation before being taken over by a hostile competitor.
The concept of the coming "revolution," considered in light of the events of 1917, finalizes the transition from the actualism to the futurism of rage. It implies a complete dismissal of the principle of expression. Vengeful acts of expression mean nothing more than a narcissistic expenditure of energy. The professional revolutionary, who is working as an employee of a bank of rage, does not express individual tensions, he follows a plan. This presup- poses the complete subordination of revolutionary affects under the com- mercial strategy. It does not suffice anymore to "embellish the world with horrors," to use the sarcastic-lucid phrase uttered by Schiller's hero in the play The Robbers, which Karl Moor proffers to characterize the maxim of his revolt against injustice. Whoever intends to embellish the world in the future needs to go much further in making it ugly than the romanticism of rebels and assassins could ever dream. Individual flowers of evil are no longer sufficient--one needs a whole art of gardening.
THE TERRIFYING FORCE OF THE NEGATIVE
BY "REVOLUTION," WHICH STILL SOUNDS SOMEWHAT FASCINATING even if it turns out to be increasingly empty, I mean the concept or, bet- ter, the phantasm that Lenin and Mao Zedong, the most successful entre- preneurs of rage, had in mind. By "revolutions" they meant that, through disciplined acts of hatred, one day there could be so much additional pain, so much excessive horror, so much numbing self-doubt among the secu- rity forces that everything that existed would soon melt down during a
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day of mass rage. Once what exists has lost its eternal and firm hold, the rotten world can then be created anew through the fire of transformation. But for this to happen, the power of destruction needs to accomplish its work to the very end. Only when what is old is eradicated completely can the reconstruction of the true circumstances can be started on a totally level foundation.
What Hegel referred to as the terrifying force of the negative gains its most distinct contour in this religiously conditioned speculation. Human rage, gathered from all sources and through effective modes of organiza- tion, provides for the bizarre calculation of big rage bankers the energy for a new creation. Assuming that the terrible end is sufficiently terrible, it should accordingly pass over into an epochal beginning.
Through deliberations of this kind at the height of unblemished ruth- lessness, one can encounter a form of anxiety that would curdle the blood of motley rebels and local hate projects if they were capable of envisioning the great strategic perspectives. The apocalyptic entrepreneur of rage has to prevent the action of local cells from endangering the grand plan with premature activism. This commits him to an extreme ascetics that will also affect his followers. The world revolutionary must unfailingly plan against spontaneous feelings; he must tenaciously dismiss his first reactions. He knows that without the deepest asceticism in the here and now there will never be any reward in the beyond. The more that local outrage is in the right, the more it is wrong when seen from a global perspective. If one aims for the transformation of everything, one needs to curb the impatience of individual vengeful parties. It is much more necessary to commit all fac- tions waiting to explode to staying calm and prepared (In-Form-Bleiben) until the day of mature rage arrives.
The temporal structure of revolution thus needs to be conceived of as an all-inclusive advent. Whatever leads to revolution belongs to the meaning- ful time of real history. The course of this history is analogous to a burning fuse. A great historical experience and a dose of intuition are needed to be able to judge to what extent the fuse of rage has already burned up. If one possesses both, one is qualified to take a leadership role at the top of the rage bank. Such a boss is justified in dictating to his employees from his sovereign position that they should prepare and keep the dynamite dry; the first precondition for collecting rage as part of a political project of global significance is cold-bloodedness. On the one hand, this cold-bloodedness constantly needs to stir hatred and outrage. On the other hand, it is also
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necessary for securing restraint. This way Dasein, in pre-explosive times, is in the mood of waiting while remaining ready for the next fight.
WHERE CAN ONE STUDY THIS HIGHER ECONOMY? NO ONE BELIEVES that studying Heidegger academically will be sufficient for gaining such dan- gerous knowledge. As much as the affinities with the basic claims of Being and Time are obvious, the Master from Messkirch only approached the temporal structure of revolutionary resentment in a formalist way before, for a time, evading it for the black heaven of the "national revolution. " Hei- degger never fully understood the logical and systematic implications of the concept of revolution. He understood it just as little as he understood the connection between our historicity and Daseins ability to be resentful. His investigation of the temporal structures of the caring, projecting, and dying Dasein does not provide us with an appropriate conception of the deep nexus of rage and time. The birth of history out of the project form of rage and, even more, the totality of processes leading to the capitalization of resentment remain obscure in his work.
APART FROM HEIDEGGER, WE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO REFER TO Marx and Lenin as the authorities for the dynamism of prerevolutionary and revolutionary negativity. It is peculiar that studying these authors is currently next to impossible. The reason for this is not that the texts are impenetrable but that the wall of Zeitgeist barricades access to them in a way that even the most patient person cannot independently overcome. With the exception of some still citable "passages," the works of the Marxist classics have become practically unreadable for people with contemporary intellectual, moral, and aesthetic reflexes. They seem to be written in an illusionary foreign tongue. Obsolete polemics permeate them to a degree that, for the time being, the deterring effect outweighs even the most moti- vated investigatory curiosity. Furthermore, they illustrate a fidelity to con- cepts one usually only finds in fundamentalist sects. Although they appeal to the science of "society" and its "contradictions," many classic leftist texts (with the exception of a few technical primary texts such as Capital) can be read only as unintended parodies. Only thanks to a completely untimely ascetics would it be possible to deduce from the writings of Marx and Lenin the building blocks of a theory of the present. (Mao Zedong's works would
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have to be taken off the list of reasonable literature from the very begin- ning). Nonetheless, the works of these authors provide a massive compen- dium of rage insights. Without these, the tragedies of the twentieth century cannot be adequately depicted and explained. I will return to this sunken body of work in chapters 3 and 4 because they indirectly provide informa- tion about what lies ahead.
One of the last chances to get to know a little bit more about the unpop- ular strategies of the major rage economy is to draw on events in the West- ern world toward the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. In this morbid but equally glorious epoch, the thousand flowers of radicalism were in bloom as if for the last time. Then, it would have easily been pos- sible to assure oneself of Marx's remark that historical dramas regularly repeat themselves as farces after their first staging as tragedies. In this case, the farce consisted in the attempt to project the circumstances of the 1930s onto those of 1968 and afterward in order to derive the rules for "resis- tance" against the "ruling system. " Back then, one could often hear the doc- trine that patience should be the first virtue of the revolutionary. Words of advice like these mirrored a generational conflict in the radical left between the old school and the revolutionary youth. The late-Stalinist intelligentsia advised this youth that, although the revolution had already "begun" and in the future it would be necessary to always count "from now on," the manifest eruption of the revolution should, under no circumstances, be accelerated voluntaristically.
Only today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as the peace of real consumerism is threatened through what is in many places proclaimed as "return of history" (part of it being a return of left-fascist whispers at the margins of academia), do we find a new chance to understand what the praise of revolutionary virtues truly meant. Patience designated the attitude of the historical subject of rage. This subject had freed itself from its personal motives through a cold quasi-idealist ascetics. Once a private factor becomes part of the inevitable revenge against the status quo (or according to the jargon of the time, praxis), voluntarism and a premature expenditure are unavoidable consequences. They are the "teething troubles" of the growing revolution. Although such eruptive episodes might still seem justified from the perspective of the actors, from the perspective of a leading employee of the world bank of rage they are the worst thing that could happen before the day of decision. The leading functionaries are convinced that a pre- mature eruption will prevent the coming into being of this most intensive
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tension. Only this tension will allow the collection of globally dispersed assets of rage into one single and final action, which goes by the name of "world revolution. " The hostile acquisition of the "world" by those who are worse off presupposes that the various factions among the worse off refrain from wasting their powers in spontaneous and individual ventures.
The most famous examples of an anarchistic waste of rage deposits are the assassins who, on March 1, 1881, killed Czar Alexander II, the famous emancipator of the serfs. The immediate consequences consisted in the intensification of repression and the expansion of an omnipresent police system. Even more devastating was the senseless waste of hatred assets by the imitators of the assassins of 1881. These were a group of students of the University of St. Petersburg who were planning to kill the murdered czar's successor, Alexander III, on March 1,1886--as is well known, days of political rage follow a special calendar. Among the students was the twenty- one-year-old Alexander Ulyanov. The attempt was uncovered by the police before it could be carried out, and Alexander was imprisoned with four- teen other conspirators. He was sent to court and, in May 1887, hanged with four other insurgents who likewise were unable to feel remorse. The lives of the other ten were spared in line with the manners of a Russian autocracy famous for its acts of pardoning. Vladimir Ulyanov, the "brother of the hanged," subsequently underwent a process of change from which he emerged as "Lenin," the first wholehearted politician of rage in mod- ern times. In this capacity, he came to understand that the way to power can only lead through the conquest of the state apparatus, not through the merely symbolically relevant assassination of its representative.
The often cited phrase of the young Lenin, "we will not go this way," which was probably dated earlier or even invented, is rightly conceived of as the first sentence of the Russian Revolution. 8 With him begins the century of the big business of rage. Who can forgo the killing of the prince, can receive, as a bonus to the conquered power, the dead prince for free.
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THE DISCOVERY OF THE METAPHYSICAL REVENGE BANK
AT THE END OF THE INTRODUCTION I CLAIMED THAT THE psychopolitical constellation of rage and time (or rage and history) is antici- pated by the theological constellation of rage and eternity. What this means exactly at this point needs to be developed. Nontrivial insights concerning the function and architecture of monotheistic religions will surface in the course of this investigation.
That theology wants to be a political quantity, that it can, and that it indeed needs to be such follow from a simple diagnosis. The religions that were relevant for the course of occidental European history, that is, the Mes- opotamian as well as the Mediterranean religions, have always been politi- cal and will remain so as long as they survive. In these religions, gods are the transcendent party supporters of their peoples and protectors of their kingdoms. They exercise this function even at the risk of having to invent a people and a kingdom that suits them. This is especially true for the God of monotheism. This God had to travel a long geopolitical path, from his precarious Egyptian beginnings to his Roman and American triumphs. This is the case despite the assertions of those who worship him: he is not a mere
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god of empires (since empires are notoriously perishable structures) but the timeless and transpolitical creator and shepherd of all men. 1
In fact, the one and only God of Israel was initially a god without an empire. As an ally of a small people primarily concerned with their survival chances, he initially did not seem to be anything more than a provincial god. In time, however, he would transform himself into the most politically viru- lent god in the skies above Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. Although barely noticeable in the world, he was conscious of his omnipotence. He succeeded in offensively positioning himself against the pompously incar- nated imperial gods of the Near East and Rome, at the same time claiming clear superiority. As the claimant of an illustrious monopoly, he invited the ancient people of Israel to live far beyond their political means in matters of religion. He expected that they would trust him and thus hold their heads higher than the most powerful of emperors. He thus revealed himself as the deuspoliticus par excellence, as the party member of all party members, as the anchor of a sacred one-sidedness that manifested itself in the far-reaching concept of the Covenant. As during the blossoming of communism, when the dogma was spread around that Marxist science united in itself objec- tivity and partisanship, so the Jewish and Christian theologies, which were always blooming plants, have made it clear from the beginning that God's universal justice expresses itself in the preferential treatment of one of the two allied peoples.
We have to assume that there is a constitutive primary phase in the development of the management of rage with a global scope (called, from a modern perspective, the submission of politics to morality, the art of the possible under the art of what can be wished), an initial phase that extends for more than two millennia. In this phase a threatening and sublime con- ception is shaped, according to which an autonomously steering and judg- ing but also participating and excitable as well as "agitating" (eifernder) God constantly intervenes in the course of human conflicts, alias history. Because the history of humanity is to a large extent synonymous with that which upsets God, these interventions mostly happen in the mode of wrath. God rages against his own people no less than against their adversaries. He shows his rage by sending wars, epidemics, famines, and natural catastro- phes as servile spirits of punishment (technically speaking, these spirits are secondary causes on behalf of the majesty who is the primary cause). At a later point, it was said about this God that when the day of Last Judg- ment would come, he would impose eternal bodily and spiritual pain on
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those who missed the chance to repent during their lives on earth and thus avoided their just sentence.
The motive of the court of judgment originated in the conceptions of the beyond in Ancient Egypt and the Near East. During its culmination in the late Middle Ages and the baroque period, it advanced to become the most aston- ishing of visual illustrations. If one had to define the, historically speaking, exceptionalism of Christian intelligence, one could put it as follows: Christian thinking is (or was until very recently) that thinking that in its concern for salvation also conceives of its opposite, hell. Even in the twentieth century, the Catholic Irishman James Joyce depicted, with the shiniest and blackest of colors, the metaphysical horror of the experience of suffering for eternity. 2 In light of the influence of this idea, the concept of eternity became associated with a final penal and torture institution, based on a vast divine memory of injustice and corresponding rage competence. With the help of this set of ideas, anxiety became part of the spiritual history of Christianity. 3 It is prob- ably correct to assume that theology secretly dispensed with the unfavorable ballast of dogmatic conceptions of hell during the twentieth century. Insofar as traces of the idea of a wrathful God have seeped into our contemporary memory, it still conjures up the memory of the most Christian of hells.
If the wrath of God is translated back into historical time and taken up by a human, universal direction, "history" comes into being. It enters the scene with a revolutionary climax whose meaning consists in avenging the injustice that provokes rage against those who caused the injustice and, even more so, against its structural conditions. One could define modernity as the epoch in which the motives of rage and immanence become fused. This liaison generates the coming into existence of a globally operative rage agency. In the next chapter, I will describe as the embodiment of such an institution the party that is always in the right. Only a control center of such a scale could realize what Schiller referred to with his dictum that world his- tory is the world's court of justice. But first I want to examine not the trans- lation of Holy Wrath into secular history but its accumulation in eternity.
PRELUDE: THE WRATH OF GOD AGAINST THE SECULAR WORLD
IF IT IS CORRECT THAT THE GLOBALIZATION OF RAGE HAD TO PASS through an extended theological starting phase before it could be translated into secular control, we are faced with an essential difficulty of understanding.
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In the introduction to this work, I attempted to show why it is impossible for modern human beings to understand the rage of Achilles within the parameters of the age of Homer. What follows is an analogous demonstra- tion in regards to the prophetism of rage in the tradition of Judaism docu- mented in the Bible, as well as in the Christian tradition in the Scholastic and Puritan theology of rage. For our contemporaries it is impossible to appreciate the rage of the One God as it has been preached by the interpret- ers of triumphant monotheism at the highpoints of their self-confidence. It is fundamentally mistaken to believe that it would be possible to do with- out a reconsideration of the early history of the horror metaphysicus because contemporary Islamism provides an example. The wave of violence that is carried out by Islamists at most tells us something about the most recent performances of the well-known tropes of the wrathful God, as well as the agitating God known since the early days of Judaism. It does not help us to diagnose how it was ever possible that God could acquire the attribute ofwrathfulness.
To appreciate the authentic teaching concerning God's rage, two con- cepts are necessary, and their meaning is, if at all, only metaphorically understandable for us: glory and hell. The content of these terms, which formerly depicted the extremes of high and low in a world formed by God's presence, cannot be concretized by contemporaries. We cannot clarify them even given our best efforts. If a modern human being were to be capable of using these concepts according to their metaphysical meaning, he would have to affirm the most horrible sentence of world literature--he would have to agree to the inscription above the gates of Hell in Dante's Inferno, where we can read for eternity: "Divine power made me, / highest wisdom, and primal love. " The impossibility of deliberately agreeing to these words of terror provides an inkling of the complexity of the task that has to be solved. The solution can no longer be achieved. To see this difficulty means to enter into an investigation concerning the price paid for monotheism. This much needs to be said in advance: the price for monotheism had to be paid by two transactions, of which it is not easy to say which was the more deadly. One was the introduction of resentment into the teaching of last things, the other the internalization of terror into Christian psychagogy.
Before approaching these dangerous domains, we should attempt to ease the censorship of the Zeitgeist. Because of this censorship, that theological issues of all kinds are excluded from the domain of topics to be seriously discussed by enlightened human beings. "God talk" has been banned from
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European high society for more than 150 years. This is the case in spite of periodically circulating rumors of a return of religion. Flaubert's bon mot in his Dictionary of Received Ideas concerning "conversation"--that "poli- tics and religion are to be excluded from it"--is still an apt description of the state of affairs. 4 However often one speaks of a "revitalization" of the religious, the truth remains that simply because there is a widespread dis- satisfaction with the disenchanted world, this does not at all lead to a new belief in extra- or superworldly entities. When John Paul II often remarked in a melancholic tone that human beings in Europe live as if God does not exist, he revealed a better understanding of the real conditions than the subversive crypto-Catholics who publish in the culture sections of Ger- man newspapers, who would like it the most if they could elect the Lord in Heaven as the Person of the Year.
We can specifically say about the Christian message that it has not been admissible in the secular realm for a long time; it is no longer plausible. The only way to get a hold of its audience is through marginal means of communication, such as TV channels owned by certain sects. This remark will provoke the protest of one or another representative of the church who does not like to admit the possibility that belief in the Redeemer could be a hobby similar to enjoying horror movies or breeding fighting dogs. This reservation can be easily understood, yet it does not change the fact that the Christian cause survives only as a subculture. What is at issue here cannot anyhow be expressed by sociological or statistical data. The alienation of the public from the Gospel goes far beyond Paul's concession that God talk is a nuisance for Jews and a foolishness for Greeks. Apart from nuisance and foolishness, embarrassment is perhaps the best characterization of the contemporary mode of being of the religious.
For some time now, religious sensibilities have retreated into the intimate regions of the psyche and are regarded as the true pudenda of the moderns. After the Enlightenment, one has to cross a great threshold of embarrassment to still be touched by the question concerning a praiseworthy Higher Being. Theologians like to react to this situation with the profound remark that modern man still lives in the historical situation of a "distance" to God. However beautiful this phrase is, it is already mistaken. The problem that exists between God and us contemporaries is not that we are too far away from him. Rather, God would get too close if we were to take his offerings seriously. No quality of the God of the theologians reveals this better than the most embarrassing among them: God's wrath.
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This said, the following thesis should make sense: what seemed to be the clearest manifestation of a new weight of religion, of a new religiosity as such--the attention that was paid to the dying and death of Pope John Paul II and the choice of his successor, Benedict XVI, in April 2005--actually had little to do with the religious side of the changing of the guard in the Office of the Saint Peter. In fact, the fascination was exerted largely, if not exclusively, by the pompous Roman liturgies based on relics of the impe- rial Caesarian myth. Without being able to give themselves a clear account of what they were doing, the masses, as well as the media, felt during the course of events how the personal aura of the pope still radiates with the charisma of Caesar. To a diligent observer of the pontificate of John Paul II," it is clear that the papal cult, which the pope cleverly updated, was essen- tially characterized by a media Caesarism. In spite of all the assertions of the mystic intensity of the event, it was how the Christian message pro- vided a religious form to Caesarian content. Only because of the latter was it possible that Roma aeterna could appear as the most successful content
provider for all secular networks. But what else does this show than that the Church only wins the struggle for attention when it presents a program that can be misinterpreted in a secular, tragic, and spectacular way? Because Catholicism, at least in its Roman form, is in the last instance still more an empire--or, more specifically, a copy of an empire--than it is a church, the embarrassment of religious speech retreats into the background during its main events and completely cedes the floor to the pompous apparatus.
Once again: in a post-Enlightenment atmosphere "God" cannot be a topic under any circumstances, with the exception of special issues of elitist culture journals. A fortiori, a public discourse concerning the "attributes" of the impossible object remains unthinkable. Yet more impossible, if such a comparative form exists, would be the demand to conceive of a wrathful God or a God of rage in a time in which a friendly God is already an implau- sible hypothesis. But we precisely have to deal with this unpopular entity, which I will refer to from now on in a preliminary fashion as a "thought figure," in order to understand the emergence of the modern economy of rage. We have to trace the preliminary stages of its transformation into a formal banking system.
The most recent opportunity to witness the configuration of the con- cepts "God" and "rage" was the debate concerning the new forms of reli- gious and political fundamentalism, a debate more than usually visible in the late 1980s. A significant publication from that time was La revanche de
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Dieu (The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Juda- ism in the Modern World), which appeared in French in 1989. The French subtitle did not just mention an advance but, more straightforwardly, a ureconquete du monde"--this was of course reminiscent of the historical pattern of the Reconquista. The author of the book, Gilles Kepel, who has been one of the most important voices in matters of culture and politics in the Middle East since this publication, investigates the strategies of the radi- cal monotheist mobilization in various corners of the world. The oriental aspect of the topic seems to be couched in an ecumenical register of old and new fanaticisms.
The ironic tone of the term "revanche de Dieu' cannot be missed. The author makes it clear that he discusses his subject matter solely with the means available to a cultural scientist of his time. When he mentions the "vengeful God," he does not affirmatively refer to the theology of the wrath- ful God. At the center of the investigation is the return of militant religious groups onto the stage of world politics. In the meantime, we have become accustomed to interpreting the resurgence of these groups as "fundamental- ist reactions"--they are the expressions of revenge from a heated religious milieu against the dominant secular milieu. Chronologically, the return of fundamentalisms begins with the appearance of evangelical fundamental- ists in the United States and their adamant denunciation of the worldview of modern natural science as diabolic. For decades, these groups have been increasing their influence on American society. The trend is continued by the ultraorthodox Jews of Israel, whose agitations can no longer be ignored by any government and who would like to see their secular nation trans- formed, sooner rather than later, into a rabbi-ocracy; the trend finds its inevitable end in more recent Islamist phenomena. Although the Islamists, just like their Christian counterparts, reveal a tendency toward militant big- otry, particularly unmistakable are the similarities to the years of fighting and defiance of Roman Catholicism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; however, they add a new element to their political appearances. They draw on historical Islam as a "readymade" in order to arbitrarily instrumentalize it in a terrorist advertising campaign throughout the global public sphere. What Marcel Duchamp achieved for art history during the early twentieth century, Osama Bin Laden repeats with the sup- port of religious technicians for the Islam of the late twentieth century. The significance of the readymade procedure for the modern cultural economy has been laid out in the subde analyses of Boris Groys, and the effects of his
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work on contemporary cultural science have barely begun. 5 As a result of the subversive interpretation of the sacred tradition, we see that Islam, and in particular the traditional authority of the Ulema, the council of scholars and jurists, is undermined by the rebellious fascination of religious pirates.
This "revenge of God" is launched by the various political surrealists, ter- rorists, and fanatics through the media of Western entertainment societies, which are always hungry for events. This rage constitutes only a semicomi- cal, semimacabre spectacle compared with to the millennia-old theological traditions, in which mention of the wrath of God and his interventions in human affairs bears a tone of sympathetic seriousness. These interventions were conceived of in both historical and eschatological terms. The memory of this tradition is the first step of the descent into the catacombs of the his- tory of ideas.
THE KING OF RAGE
NATURALLY THE COUNTLESS REFERENCES TO THE FIGURE OF THE wrathful God in the Old Testament interest us here only in a limited man- ner. The source of the New Testament, as well as sources from later Catho- lic dogmatism, are only selective and should be consulted from a different point of view. The traces of these traditions in the Koran will be left out here completely because when measured against the bulk of Jewish and Chris- tian remarks they do not provide anything that would be genuinely new. In this chapter we can thus only pursue a few of those theological terms that have been important in the development of the one "God" and the corre- sponding transformation of God's people into memory devices. The other abundant references to the divine life of affects in the euphoric as well as the dysphoric sense do not concern us in this context.
For professionals as well as amateurs it is a trivial fact that the early depictions of Yahweh, the Lord of Israel, are marked by clear anthropomor- phisms (or better, anthropo-psychisms). Every reader of the Bible could make sure that the God of Exodus was still capable of combining the traits of a theatrical weather demon with those of a furious, unrestrained war- lord. What is decisive for what follows is, of course, the question of how the first signs of a superior moral view characterize this primitive and ener- getic, meteorological and military conception of God. Part of this change is the formation of a retention function, which is supposed to prevent the disappearance of the past into what is truly passe and, because of the lack
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of memory, was never real. Through the divine act of retention, the first project culminating in a "history" means more than the recurrence of the same; it also means more than an expression of megalomania and forget- ting, in which empires come and go. The historical progression culminating in the "omniscient God" runs for a long time parallel to the path leading to a god of good memory. 6 The emergence and gaining shape of a retaining, deferring, preserving, and recording activity in God signals the transforma- tion of his exercise of power away from the eruptive style to the habitus of a judge or a king. 7 Rage might have been a plausible but incidental attribute for a God who from time to time slips into the roller of thunders. For a God, however, who is supposed to be a royal judge and demands respect and fear in an aura of numinous majesty, the ability to rage becomes constitutive. About such a God we can say for the first time that sovereignty requires that one is believably threatening.
Through the account concerning the function of God as judge, the tem- poral profile of his actions change: while he used to be conceived of as a protector of his people, as an impulsive interventionist (one can think of the destruction of the Egyptian army at the Red Sea or the eradication of all of humankind with the exception of Noah during the flood), he initially distinguishes himself through his righteous upsurges--from a psychologi- cal perspective, one would speak of momentous decompensations. Between God's aggravation with sinful humanity and the downpour of deadly rain there is but a blink of an eye. The passage concerning the remorse that God felt after having created human beings points to a misunderstanding between expectation and fulfillment insofar as remorse implies a modifi- cation to the divine sense of time. The situation drastically changes if one takes into account the final scene of the great flood. Here God raises with the rainbow an important symbol of patience for both sides, a symbol that expresses his intention to never repeat such a destructive action, even though humanity does not significantly differ after the flood, at least in its moral character. Riidiger Safranski summarizes this fact with the fitting remark, which is respectfully unrespectful: that God transformed himself from a "fundamentalist to a realist. " The realist (der Realo) is the one who concedes that everything in need of improvement needs time--and which things are not in need of improvement? 8
As a result of the change of direction toward a conception of God as judge and avenger, the "retentional" qualities of the Lord in heaven increasingly became emphasized. Just as intentions aim at what is present, retentions
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aim at what is past, and pretentions at what is futural. The royal archival and judicial competences of God from now on become decisive character- istics. They include the abilities to remember what is just and what is unjust and to record violations of the law. But most important, they included the willingness to reserve judgment concerning the just sentence, including the right to pardon or leave the exact moment in which the sentence will be executed undetermined. Such conceptions can only occur in a culture that has for some time possessed two archetypes of "reserving" technologies. On the one hand, it has to possess a granary or, more generally, a stock of supplies. On the other hand, it requires a book or, more generally, writ- ten language and the collection of written works in libraries. These need to be complemented through judicial technologies that can determine what is right and what is wrong. The function of the archive is based on these basic patterns. The archive as an institution and in terms of its cultural function unfolds as soon as nervous systems interact with external storage spaces and recording devices, in other words, when it is necessary to organize the coop- eration between subjective and objective memories in formal procedures. The judging God is thus naturally the original registrar in the kingdom of ethical life. His office consists in holding on to the memory of controversial events so that they can be taken up again later. 9
Although the early immanent theology of the Bible tends to posit Yah- weh as existing beyond time and, in particular, beyond the fantasies of the permanent persistence and pompous genealogies of surrounding empires, as a judge and chairperson of a court for his own followers, he remains an agent who "breaks in" to the historical destinies of his followers and other peoples. For this reason, the Jewish God of judgment consistently needs to be envisaged as a ruling king, regardless of the empirical nonsense of a kingdom that is, in principal, invisible. Making God into a king introduces a tension to the temporal horizon of his interventions. Divine records of injustice and attempts to preserve rage allow for long distances between the moment of "transgression" and the moment of "revenge. " However, they still do not imply that punitive violence is postponed until the end of time or even transposed to eternity.
THE INTERRUPTION OF REVENGE
THE BOOK OF GENESIS MENTIONS A BREAK THAT CAUSED LASTING consequences for the organization of the human memory of rage. The
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report of the first murder, committed by the farmer Cain against his younger brother, Abel, the shepherd who had been favored by God, is also the oldest record on the secrets of injustice. In this history, God appears for the first time openly as the master of facticity: he looks on Abel's sac- rifice favorably while ignoring Cain's. For this difference, there is no trace of a motivation. The freedom to discriminate against whomever, wherever he wishes is part of the concept of God. The next, similarly far reaching example of this thesis is provided in the story of Esau and Jacob. Without any documented reason, God loves one and hates the other one, while the created is not allowed to ask his creator: "Why did you create me in such a way that you needed to reject me? " It is expected that the person who is discriminated against needs to master his affects of humiliation: "And the Lord said unto Cain, Why art thou wroth? And why is thy countenance fallen? If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door. And unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him" (Genesis 4:6-7). The meaning of this story, which has been inserted at front of the record of action, is obvious: the murder of the brother is not supposed to be misunderstood as a spontaneous impulsive act; it is supposed to count as a result of a suspension of the explicit and clear warning. The deed does not occur in the relative innocence of being overtaken by agitated feelings. In order to commit the deed, the perpetra- tor has to intentionally transgress a clearly drawn line--only such an act of transgression makes it into a case of true violation in the first place. One can hardly emphasize it enough: Cain does not abide by the law of grav- ity inhering in a strong affective action; he takes time for his action--he uses a pretense to lure his brother onto an open field in order to strike him dead. From this time on, he lives in the exceptional time of guilt; he is chained to his own dead: "You will be restless and uneasy on this earth," the lord speaks to him. "I will be restless and uneasy on this earth. Who- ever finds me will strike me down," the perpetrator responds (Genesis 4:12, 14). Thereupon God leaves Cain with a sign, "so that no one who finds him will strike him down. "
Historians of religion associate the sign of Cain with the warning symbol of an ancient oriental tribe in which strict blood feuds were common. It sig- nals that whoever raises the hand against the bearer of the symbol has to be aware that he will suffer from sevenfold revenge. The threat of revenge esca- lates among Cain's offspring in grotesque quantities. His great-great-grand- child Lamech announces heroically: "I will murder a man for a wound and
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a young boy for a bruise. If Cain will be avenged seven times, then Lamech will be avenged seven times seventy" (Genesis 4:23-24).
The exploding numbers express an ambivalent situation: although the sign of Cain can be interpreted as the symbol of a universal prohibi- tion against revenge, is this is violated, there exists the threat of excessive revenge. On the one hand, revenge is suspended, but, on the other hand, we can expect an extreme form of revenge if this commandment is not fol- lowed. This can only be understood as a symptom for the lack of an effec- tive monopoly over violence. Where there is no central penal authority, the revenge prohibition can only be experimentally instituted through the forceful threat of an excessive reaction. One needs to wait for the intro- duction of a stable juridical culture with a formal body of law before tali- onic equations can come into effect: "A life for a life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot, burn for a burn, a wound for a wound, a bruise for a bruise" (Exodus 21:23-25). The equality between the sides of these formulas show that justice is to be understood as appropriateness. The measure presupposes someone who enforces it, a role usually fulfilled by early forms of government as the guarantors of the law.
If the degree of the sentence is directly and materially deduced from the suffering of injustice committed, a concept of justice as a simple form of equivalence comes into being. The compulsion to enhance the amount of retribution can thus be dismissed. Instead of the outdated one-to-seven, or even one-to-seventy-seven, from now on the sublime and simple one-to- one will be exercised. To secure retribution, a strong judicial authority is necessary, which initially manifests itself only in the sovereignty of a king. It may be that modern observers will regard such a system as a form of economy of natural goods or, rather, a primitive and inhuman economy of horrors. However, the Mosaic commandments were an important step in the rationalization of strategies of retaliation. Additionally, equality between the value of injustice and that of retribution has an implicit tem- poral meaning, since order can be reestablished only after the equivalence of the suffering from deeds and the suffering from penalty has been reestab- lished. This waiting for justice comes to characterize the meaning of time. Through the equation of guilt and penalty, which has been effected by the judicial system, there is a dissolution of local vengeful tensions of the vic- tim or prosecutor, at least as considered from an ideal-typical perspective. When the sun comes up afterward, it still shines on just and unjust people;
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at the same time, this sunrise signals the new beginning for the parties who have paid their bills.
THE ORIGINAL ACCUMULATION OF RAGE
THE SITUATION JUST PRESENTED STARTS TO LOOK VERY DIFFERENT if suffering from injustice is accumulated only on one side, without those sacrificed to the injustice having an effective way to reestablish equality. In such situations, it is likely that strong and chronic tensions of rage will emerge and accumulate into a form of negative capacity. For this possibil- ity we can find at least two significant examples in the Old Testament. The first one is connected to the memories of Israel concerning the Babylonian captivity in the sixth century B. C. , to which the word "exile" refers with a richness of subtle connotations. The second example refers to the Jew- ish conception of apocalypse. Starting with the second century B. C. , this conception led to an intensification of propheticism that, through its exces- sive exaggeration, in turn led to the demand for the destructive rage of God against the incurably corrupt world as a whole.
The mental sediments of Israeli exile and the apocalyptic exaggerations of prophetic anti-imperialism (which initially turned against Hellenic and then Roman foreign rule) have left deep marks in the religious tradition of Western civilization. Both themes remain incomprehensible without assuming the creation of a treasury of rage. Its peculiar dynamic led to a structural transformation of the rage of victims into a lasting resentment. This transformation has a significance for the specific tuning of Western religion, metaphysics, and politics that can hardly be overestimated.
The books of the Old Testament provide ample evidence for the cre- ation of a treasury of rage during the Babylonian captivity and subse- quent epochs, in a sometimes sublime, sometimes more direct voice. An example for a sublime articulation of this development written during the age of Babylon and included in the Gospel only later is the narration of Genesis. It is mistaken to assume that Genesis necessarily constituted the beginning of the Jewish canon. In reality it is the result of a relatively late theological attempt to surpass the state of heteronomy. With this attempt the spiritual spokesmen of Israel claimed the cosmic superiority for their God over the gods of the dominant empire during the forced period of exile. What at first seems to be a casual report about last things is in real- ity the result of an editorial work on matters of competitive theology.
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The meaning of this endeavor consists in reinterpreting the God of the political losers as the a priori winner. Even if the heathen kings are able to rule over their territories and slave populations with the support of their polytheistic entourage, none of their decrees will even approximate the domain of the truly divine "It will be. " Through Genesis, Jewish theology was able to celebrate its most subtle victory over the teachings of the gods of the Mesopotamian empires.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE LESS SUBLIME BIBLICAL DEPICTIONS OF THE accumulation of rage can be limited to the infamous psalms of lamenta- tion and prayers for the sake of destroying the enemy. These can be found in the Psalms of the Old Testament, a collection of 150 exemplary hymns, praises, and invocations of God that have served the Jews, as well as Chris- tians, for more than a thousand years as the primary source of their prac- tices of prayer. This body of texts presents a spiritual treasury that can easily be compared to the most sublime documents of religious world literature. Although the individual pieces are consistently formulated in the mode of a prayer and thus in the habitus of a nontheoretical relationship to God, they present psychological, theological, and spiritual riches--as is proven by the great history of their reception, reaching from the Ennarrationes in Psalmos of Augustine to the studies of Hermann Gunkel and Arnold Stadler. Psalm 139, to take just one example, belongs to the most moving and substan- tive sources ever recorded. It addresses the being-surrounded of human existence by a creative milieu and the becoming-enveloped of human consciousness by a knowledge of a higher kind. With regards to its latent metaphysical and existential insights, this lyric text is not superior to any spiritual testimony, be it from India or China. Nonetheless, it is precisely this meditation that is torn apart by an appeal to revenge, the force of which is singular in the history of religious literature. Initially the praying person assures himself of his own creation:
My substance was not hidfromthee, when I was made in secret, and curi- ously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth.
Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being unperfect; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet
there was none of them.
(Psalms 139:15-16, AV)
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IMMEDIATELY AFTER, THE MEDITATION TURNS TO THE ENEMIES OF
the praying person. The pious one points his attention to them without interruption. He is subject to a double "compulsory relationship" because, on the one hand, he faces the enemy, the Babylonian oppressor, as an inevitable political opponent. On the other hand, the political enemy also embodies a religious opponent insofar as he enjoys the freedom to hold onto the gods or idols of his own culture and thus despise Jewish monola- try. Both aspects of this front are present when the prayer suddenly passes over into the harshest lamentations:
Surely thou wilt slay the wicked, O God: depart from me therefore, ye bloody men.
For they speak against thee wickedly, and thine enemies take thy name in vain.
Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee? and am not I grieved with those that rise up against thee?
I hate them with perfect hatred: I count them mine enemies. (19-22)
This poetic description of enemies would be completely misinterpreted as a spontaneous eruption of sentiments against domination. Such feelings are only one of many knots in a network of remembrance that records memories of abuse and humiliation. The same network stabilizes expres- sive impulses of revenge into repeatable forms. The initial formulation of Psalm 94, "God who is revenge appear" (cited according to the unrevised rendition of Luther) could be used as a leitmotiv and guide to a great part of the Psalms. It returns, in addition to many other places, in Psalm 44. There the following words are addressed to the God of the confederation: "With you we will throw down our oppressors. With your name we smash our opponents" (44:6). Then we read, "Wake up! Why do you sleep, my lord? Awake! Do not condemn us forever! " (24). The most massive inten- sification of this rhetoric is in Psalm 137, at the end of which we find the following lines:
O daughter of Babylon, who art to be destroyed; happy shall he be, that rewardeth thee as thou hast served us.
Happy shall he be, that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the
stones.
(8-9)
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? THE WRATHFUL GOD
THIS IS AN ARTIFICIAL FORM OF POLEMIC PRAYER THAT APPEARS foreign to the modern understanding of religion. Nevertheless, it can be understood once such formulations are translated (or better, retranslated) into what, in today's language, would be referred to as "psychological war- fare. " Because ancient Israel was for long periods in chronic situations of war, its religion was necessarily one at the front. Since warfare always devel- ops a psychosemantic dimension, its development and transcription is to be done by religious leaders, at least insofar as religion and psychoseman- tics converge. The harsh phrases of the Psalms are intended to compensate for the psychopolitical unlikelihood of the survival of Israel during a time of defeats.
This explains the initially disconcerting observation that prayers can also be polemics. Not less disconcerting, and yet psychodynamically plausible, is the fact that even meditation can be used as a means of propaganda. By turning inside themselves, those praying discover their hatred and thus entrust it to God so that he may draw the right consequences from it. These consequences should have been primarily violent, given the context. The autoplastic function of supplicatory prayer emerges most clearly when the praying group envisions itself in a destructive wish-image in which the oppressor has been overcome.
