No More Learning

With the two armies thus in presence and so near to each other, one
would have believed them, by their attitude, animated with the same
courage, and offering the combat under equal conditions; but, when we
consider the defensive strength of the position of the Gauls, we are
soon convinced that the firmness of the latter was only one of
ostentation. The Romans, indignant at being thus braved, demanded the
order to fight; but Cæsar represented to them that the victory would
cost the lives of too many brave men, and that the more they were bent
upon daring everything for his glory, the more blamable would it be in
him to sacrifice them. These words calmed their impatience, and the same
day he led them back to the siege operations.

Vercingetorix, on his return to his army, was accused of treason, for
having placed his camp nearer to that of the Romans, taken away with him
all the cavalry, left his infantry without a head, and facilitated, by
his departure, the sudden and so well-calculated arrival of the enemy.
“All these incidents,” they said, “could not be the effect of chance;
evidently Vercingetorix preferred owing the empire of Gaul to Cæsar than
to his fellow-citizens. ” As the improvised chief of a popular movement,
Vercingetorix had to expect one of those fickle demonstrations of the
multitude, who are rendered fanatical by successes, and unjust by
reverses. But, strong in his patriotism and in his conduct, he justified
easily to his followers the dispositions he had taken. “The scarcity of
forage only has decided him, at their entreaties, to change the position
of his camp; he has chosen a new position, which is impregnable; he has
employed the cavalry, which is useless in a marshy place, to advantage.
He has transferred the command to nobody, for fear that a new chief, to
please bands without discipline, incapable of supporting the fatigues of
war, might let himself be persuaded to give battle. Whether it were
chance or treason which had brought the Romans before them, they ought
to thank Fortune for it, since they had retired with disgrace. He has no
desire to obtain the supreme authority from Cæsar at the price of a
guilty defection: victory will soon give it him. It is now no longer
doubtful. As to himself, he is ready to lay down an authority which
would be only a vain honour, and not a means of delivery;” and, to prove
the sincerity of his hopes, he brought forward slaves who had been made
prisoners, whom he represents as legionaries, and who, at his
instigation, declare that in three days the Romans will be obliged by
want of provisions to raise the siege. His discourse is received by the
acclamations of the army, and all signify their applause by the clang of
their arms, according to the Gaulish manner. It is agreed to send 10,000
men to Avaricum, taken among the different contingents, so that the
Bituriges alone should not have the glory of saving a town upon which
depended in a great measure the fate of the war.

The Gauls, endowed with the genius of imitation, struggled by all means
possible against the wonderful perseverance of the Roman soldiers. They
turned away the rams with pointed heads (_falces_)[474] by means of
nooses, and, when they had once caught hold of them, they dragged them
up by means of machines. [475] Accustomed to work in the iron mines, and
to the construction of subterranean galleries, they skilfully
countermined the terrace, and also provided their walls with towers of
several stories, covered with leather. Day and night they made sallies,
and set fire to the works of the besiegers. As the daily increase of the
terrace heightened the level of the towers, the besieged raised theirs
to the same height by means of scaffoldings; they stopped the progress
of the subterranean galleries, prevented them from being advanced to the
walls by trying to break them open with pointed stakes hardened in the
fire (_apertos cuniculos prœusta ac prœacuta materia . . .
morabantur_),[476] and by throwing molten pitch and blocks of stone.

The Gauls constructed their walls in this manner: beams were placed
horizontally on the ground, in a direction perpendicular to the line of
the enclosure,[477] at intervals of two feet from each other; they were
bound together on the side of the town; by cross-beams, usually of forty
feet in length, firmly fixed in the ground, and the whole covered with a
great quantity of earth, except on the exterior side, where the
intervals were furnished with large blocks of rock, and formed a facing.
After this first layer had been well fixed and rendered compact, they
raised upon it a second, absolutely similar, taking care that the beams
were not exactly above each other, but corresponded with the intervals
filled in with stones, in which they were, as it were, enchased. The
work was thus continued until the wall had attained the required height.
These successive layers, in which the beams and stones alternated
regularly, offered, by their very variety, an agreeable appearance to
the eye. This construction had great advantages for the defence of
places: the stone preserved it from fire, and the wood from the ram;
held together by the cross-beams, the beams could be neither torn down
nor driven in. (_See Plate 20. _)

Notwithstanding the obstinacy of the defence, and the cold and continual
rains, the Roman soldiers surmounted all obstacles, and raised in
twenty-five days a terrace 330 feet wide by 80 feet high. It already
nearly touched the town wall, when, towards the third watch (midnight),
clouds of smoke were seen issuing from it. It was the moment when Cæsar,
according to his custom, was inspecting the works, and encouraging the
soldiers at their labour; the Gauls had set the terrace on fire from the
gallery of a mine. At the same instant cries arose from the whole extent
of the rampart, and the besieged, rushing out by two gates, made a sally
on the two sides where the towers were; from the top of the walls some
threw dry wood and torches on the terrace, others pitch and various
inflammable materials; nobody knew whither to run nor where to give
help. As two legions, however, generally passed the night under arms in
front of the camp, whilst the others relieved each other alternately for
the work, they were soon able to face the enemy; meanwhile some drew
back the towers, and others cut the terrace to intercept the fire; the
whole army, in fact, hurried to put out the latter.

When day broke, they were still fighting on every point; the besieged
had the more hope of conquering, as the penthouses which protected the
approaches to the towers were burnt (_deustos pluteos turrium_),[478]
and as then the Romans, compelled to march without cover, could with
difficulty arrive at the burning works. Persuaded that the salvation of
Gaul depended on this critical moment, they replaced incessantly the
troops which were weary. Then happened a fact worthy of notice: before
the gate of the _oppidum_ there was a Gaul who threw balls of grease and
pitch into the fire opposite a Roman tower; a dart shot from a
_scorpion_[479] struck him in the right side and killed him. The next
man immediately takes his place, and perishes in the same manner; a
third succeeds him, then a fourth, and the post is only abandoned after
the extinction of the fire and the retreat of the assailants.

After so many fruitless efforts, the Gauls resolved next day to obey the
order of Vercingetorix, and evacuate the place. His camp not being far
off, they hoped, by favour of the night, to escape without great loss,
reckoning on a continuous marsh to protect their flight. But the women,
in despair, struggle to retain them, and, seeing that their
supplications had no effect, to such an extent does fear extinguish
pity, they give warning to the Romans by their cries, and thus compel
the Gauls to renounce their intended flight.

The day following Cæsar caused a tower to be advanced, and the works to
be prosecuted with vigour; an abundant rain, and the negligence of the
enemy in guarding the wall, engaged him to attempt an assault. He
thereupon ordered the work to be slackened without entirely stopping it,
in order not to awaken suspicions, assembled his legions under arms,
sheltered behind the covered galleries (_vineas_), and informed them
that they were going to reap the fruit of so many fatigues. He promised
rewards to those who should be first to scale the wall of the town, and
gave the signal. The Romans at once rushed forward from every side, and
reached the top of the ramparts.

The enemies, terrified by this unexpected attack, and thrown down from
the tops of the walls and towers, sought refuge in the public places,
and formed in wedges, so as to offer a resistance on all sides; but when
they saw that the Romans, instead of descending into the town, went
round it on the ramparts, they were afraid of being shut in, and threw
down their arms and fled towards the other extremity of the _oppidum_
(where are at present the faubourgs Taillegrain and Saint-Privé). (_See
Plate 20. _) Most of them were killed near the gates, the narrow passage
of which they blocked up; the others by the cavalry outside the town. No
one among the Roman soldiers thought of plunder. Irritated by the
remembrance of the massacre of Genabum, and by the fatigues of the
siege, they spared neither old men, women, nor children. Of about 40,000
combatants, scarcely 800 fugitives were able to join Vercingetorix. He,
fearing that their presence, if they came in a body, might excite a
mutiny, had, in the middle of the night, sent trusty men and the
principal chiefs a long way out, to distribute them in fractions among
the camps belonging to the different tribes.

The next day Vercingetorix sought, in a general assembly, to revive the
courage of his countrymen, by ascribing the success of the Romans to
their superiority in the art of sieges, which was unknown to the Gauls.
He told them that this reverse ought not to dishearten them; that his
advice, they well knew, had never been to defend Avaricum; that a signal
revenge would soon console them; that, through his care, the countries
separated from the common cause would enter into his alliance, animate
Gaul with the one thought, and cement a union capable of resisting the
whole world. Then this fearless defender of the national independence
shows his genius in taking advantage even of a misfortune to subject his
ill-disciplined troops to the rough labours of war, and succeeds in
convincing them of the necessity of retrenching their camp in the manner
of the Romans, so as to protect it from surprise.

The constancy of Vercingetorix, after so great a reverse, and the
foresight which he had shown in recommending, from the beginning of the
war, to burn, and afterwards to abandon Avaricum, increased his
influence. So the Gauls, for the first time, fortified their camp, and
their courage was so much confirmed, that they were ready to undergo all
trials.

Vercingetorix, true to his engagements, exerted himself to the utmost to
gain over to his cause the other states of Gaul, and to seduce the
chiefs by presents and promises; and, for this purpose, he sent to them
zealous and intelligent agents. He caused the men who had fled from
Avaricum to be clothed and armed anew, and, in order to repair his
losses, he required from the divers states a contingent at a stated
period, and archers, who were very numerous in Gaul. At the same time
Teutomatus, son of Ollovico, King of the Nitiobriges, whose father had
received from the Senate the title of friend, came to join him with a
numerous corps of cavalry, raised in his own country and in Aquitaine.
Cæsar remained some time in Avaricum, where he found great store of
provisions, and where the army recovered from its fatigues. [480]


[Sidenote: Arrival of Cæsar at Decetia, and March towards Auvergne. ]

V. The winter was drawing to a close, and the season was propitious for
the continuation of military operations. As Cæsar prepared to march
against the enemy, either in order to draw him from the woods and
marshes, or to shut him up in them, the _principes_ of the Ædui came to
request him to put an end to dissensions among them which threatened to
degenerate into civil war. “The situation was most critical. In fact,
according to ancient customs, the supreme authority was only granted to
a single magistrate, named for a year. At that moment, however, there
were two, each claiming to have been legally elected. The first was
Convictolitavis, a young man of illustrious birth; the second, Cotus,
sprung from a very ancient family, powerful also by his personal
influence, his alliances, and whose brother, Valetiacus, had the year
before filled the same office. The country was in arms, the Senate
divided like the people, each of the pretenders at the head of his
clients. The authority of Cæsar alone could prevent civil war. ”

The Roman general considered it essential to prevent troubles from
arising in an important state, closely attached to the Republic, and
where the weakest party would not fail to call in the aid of
Vercingetorix. Consequently, notwithstanding the inconvenience of
suspending the military operations and moving from the enemy, he
resolved to repair to the Ædui, whose first magistrate, according to the
laws, could not leave the territory. Having thus aimed at proving to
them the respect which he entertained for their institutions, he arrived
at Decetia (_Decize, in the Nivernais_), where he called before him the
Senate and the two pretenders. [481] Nearly the whole nation came
thither. Cæsar, having acquired the conviction that the nomination of
Cotus was the result of an intrigue of the minority, obliged him to
resign, and maintained Convictolitavis, who had been chosen by the
priests, according to the legal forms and customs of the country.

After this decision, he engaged the Ædui to forget their quarrels, and
to devote themselves entirely to the war; Gaul once subjected, he would
recompense them for their sacrifices. He exacted from them all their
cavalry and 10,000 infantry, intending to distribute them in such a
manner as to ensure the regularity of the victualling department. He
next divided his army into two bodies. Labienus, detached with two
legions and part of the cavalry, had instructions to take at Sens the
two other legions which Cæsar had left there, and to repair, at the head
of those four legions, to the country of the Parisii, who had been drawn
by Vercingetorix into the revolt.

On his part, Cæsar resolved, with the six other legions and the rest of
the cavalry, to invade the country of the Arverni themselves, the focus
of the insurrection. He started from Decetia, and directed his march
upon Gergovia, the principal _oppidum_ of that people.

After the capture of Avaricum, Vercingetorix, suspecting Cæsar’s
ulterior designs, had moved towards the Allier, which the Romans were
obliged to pass in order to reach Gergovia; and, on the news of their
march, he had caused all the bridges to be destroyed.

Cæsar, having arrived on the banks of the Allier, towards Moulins (_see
Plate 19_), followed its downward course, on the right bank.
Vercingetorix, on his part, marched along the opposite bank. The two
armies were within sight of each other, the camps nearly opposite, and
the Gaulish scouts, who watched the left bank, prevented the Romans from
establishing a bridge. The position of the latter was difficult, for the
Allier, which is fordable in the autumn only, might delay their passage
a long time. [482] In order to surmount this obstacle, Cæsar had recourse
to a stratagem: he fixed his camp in a place covered with wood, opposite
the remains of one of the bridges which Vercingetorix had caused to be
destroyed (probably at Varennes). There he remained hidden the following
day with two legions, and made the rest of the troops, as well as the
baggage, proceed in the usual order. But, that they might present to the
enemy the appearance of six legions, he had divided into six corps the
forty cohorts or four legions which he sent forward. [483] They received
the order to march as long as possible, in order to attract
Vercingetorix, and, at the time Cæsar presumed that they had arrived at
their camp, he caused the bridge to be rebuilt on the old piles, the
lower part of which remained untouched. The work being soon completed,
the legions which remained with him passed the river, and, after having
chosen a favourable position, he recalled the mass of his army, which
rejoined him during the night. [484] When Vercingetorix was informed of
this manœuvre, fearing lest he should be compelled to fight against
his will, he took the start and marched in great haste to occupy the
_oppidum_ of the Arverni.

From the place he occupied, which we believe to have been Varennes,[485]
Cæsar reached Gergovia in five days; on the very day of his arrival,
after a slight skirmish of cavalry, he reconnoitred the position of the
town. As it was built on a very high mountain of difficult access, he
considered it impossible to take it by assault; he therefore resolved to
blockade it, and not to begin investing it until he had assured his
provisions. (_See Plate 21. _)


[Sidenote: Blockade of Gergovia. ]

VI. The _oppidum_ of the Arverni was situated at a distance of six
kilomètres to the south of Clermont-Ferrand, on the mountain which has
preserved the name of Gergovia. Its summit, elevated about 740 mètres
above the level of the sea, and 380 above the plain, forms a plateau of
1,500 mètres in length by more than 500 mètres in breadth. The northern
and eastern slopes present such abrupt declivities that they defy the
escalade. The southern slope presents a very different character: it may
be compared to an immense staircase, the steps of which would be vast
terraces with very little inclination, and a breadth which in some
places extends to as much as 150 mètres.

On the western side, the mountain of Gergovia is attached by a narrow
defile of 120 mètres in width, called the _Goules_ (_see Plate 21, C_),
to the heights of Risolles, an irregular mass, the plateau of which is
at a mean depth of about 30 mètres beneath that of Gergovia. To the west
are the detached mountains of Montrognon and Le Puy-Giroux. This latter
is separated from that of Risolles by a rather deep gorge, in which the
village of Opme is built. Opposite the southern slope of Gergovia, at
the very foot of the mountain, rises a very steep hill, called the Roche
Blanche. Its culminating point is at about 108 mètres below the plateau.
Two brooks, the Auzon and the Artières,[486] tributaries of the Allier,
flow, one to the south, the other to the north of Gergovia. Lastly, a
low tract of ground, situated to the east, indicates the site of the
ancient marsh of Sarlièves, which has been dry since the seventeenth
century.

Cæsar established his camp near the Auzon, on the undulations of the
ground which extend to the north-west of the village of Orcet, and as
far as the ancient marsh of Sarlièves. These undulations form a natural
_glacis_ towards the plain, above which they rise about thirty mètres;
on the side of the stream of the Auzon they terminate in almost
imperceptible slopes. The camp occupied a part of the table-land and of
the northern slope. [487] (_See Plate 21. _)

Vercingetorix had arranged the contingents of each country separately,
at small intervals, on the southern slopes of the mountain of Gergovia
and the mountain mass of Risolles which look towards the Auzun; they
covered all the heights attached to the principal mountain, and
presented, in the space which the eye could embrace, a formidable
aspect. [488] His principal camps were situated between the outer wall of
the _oppidum_ and a wall of large stones, six feet high, which ran along
the bend of the hill.

Every day, at sunrise, the chiefs who composed the council of
Vercingetorix repaired to him in order to make their reports or to
receive his orders. Every day, also, he tried in slight engagements[489]
the courage of his cavalry mixed with archers. The Gauls occupied, as an
advanced post, but by a weak garrison, La Roche-Blanche, which, scarped
on three sides, presented an extremely strong position; Cæsar judged
that, by taking possession of this hill, he would deprive the Gauls
almost entirely of forage and water, for they could no longer descend to
the Auzon, the only considerable stream in the neighbourhood. He started
from the camp in the silence of the night, drove away this post before
it could be succoured from the town, took the position, and placed two
legions upon it. The Roche-Blanche became his smaller camp;[490] it was
joined to the larger one by a double ditch of twelve feet, which
allowed the troops to communicate in safety, even singly, without fear
of being surprised by the enemy. (_See Plate 22. _)

During this time, the Æduan Convictolitavis, who, as we have seen, owed
the supreme magistracy to Cæsar, seduced by the money of the Arverni,
resolved to abandon the party of the Romans, and entered into
communication with several young men, at whose head was Litavicus and
his brothers, descended from an illustrious family. He shares with them
the price of his treason; exhorts them to remember that, born free, they
are made to command in their country; proves to them that the
lukewarmness of the Ædui alone delayed the general insurrection; and
that they ought to value above everything the independence of their
country. Seduced by such discourses and by the bait of gold, those young
men occupy themselves only with the means of executing their project;
yet, mistrusting the inclination of the people to be drawn into war,
they decide that Litavicus shall take the command of the 10,000 men who
were to join the Roman army, and induce them to revolt on the road,
whilst his brothers go before them to Cæsar.

Litavicus began his march. At thirty miles from Gergovia (probably at
Serbannes), he halts his troops, assembles them, and, spreading the
report that Cæsar has caused the Æduan nobility and knights who were in
his pay to be massacred, among others Eporedorix and Viridomarus, he
easily persuades them to go and join the Arverni at Gergovia, instead of
proceeding to the Roman camp. But, before taking this determination, he
gives up to plunder the convoy of provisions which marched under his
guard, causes the Romans who conducted it to be put to death with
tortures, and then sends messengers to raise the whole country of the
Ædui, by means of the same imposture. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, whose
death he had falsely announced, were with Cæsar, who, by special favour,
had raised Viridomarus from a very low to a high dignity. The former,
informed of the design of Litavicus, came in the middle of the night to
acquaint the proconsul with it, imploring him not to allow the folly of
a few young men to detach his country from the Roman alliance. It would
be too late when so many thousands of men had embraced the contrary
party.

Cæsar, more affected by this news as he had always favoured the Ædui,
takes immediately four legions, without baggage, and all the cavalry; he
waits not even to contract the compass of the two camps, for everything
depends upon celerity. His lieutenant, C. Fabius, is left to guard them,
with two legions. He orders the brothers of Litavicus to be placed under
arrest, and learns that they have just passed over to the enemy. His
soldiers, encouraged to support the fatigues of the march, follow him
with ardour, and at about twenty-five miles from Gergovia (near Randan,
on the road which Litavicus had to follow to join Vercingetorix) they
meet the Ædui. The cavalry, sent in advance, have orders to stop them
without using their arms. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, who had been
reported as dead, step forth from the ranks, speak to their
fellow-citizens, and are recognised. As soon as the deception practised
by Litavicus is discovered, the Ædui throw down their arms, ask for
pardon, and obtain it. Litavicus flies to Gergovia, with his clients,
who, in Gaul, never abandoned their patrons, not even in their worst
fortunes.

Cæsar sent to the Ædui to represent to them how generously he had acted
towards men whom the laws of war authorised him to put to death; and,
after having given his army three hours’ rest during the night, he
returned to his quarters before Gergovia. Half-way, horsemen came to
inform him of the perilous position of Fabius. The camps had been
attacked by troops which were unceasingly renewed. The Romans were
exhausted by unceasing labour, for the great extent of the enclosure
obliged them to remain continually on the _vallum_. The arrows and
missiles of all sorts thrown by the barbarians had wounded a great
number; but, on the other hand, the machines had been of great help in
supporting the defence. After the retreat of the enemies, Fabius,
expecting to be again attacked next day, had hastened to block up the
gates of the great camp, with the exception of two, and to add a
palisade to the _vallum_. On receiving this information, Cæsar hurried
his march, and, seconded by the ardour of his soldiers, arrived at the
camp before sunrise (having thus performed fifty miles, or seventy-four
kilomètres, in twenty-four hours). [491]

While these events were taking place at Gergovia, the Ædui, also
deceived by the news which Litavicus had spread, fall upon the Roman
citizens, plunder their goods, kill some, and drag others to prison. It
is Convictolitavis, also, who prompts these violences. The military
tribune M. Aristius, who was on his way to join his legion, as well as
the foreign merchants who resided in the country, are compelled to leave
Cabillonum (_Châlon-sur-Sâone_). An escort is promised to protect them;
but they have hardly started when they are attacked and stripped. They
defend themselves, and their resistance, which lasts during twenty-four
hours, calls a greater multitude to arms. However, as soon as the Ædui
hear of the new submission of their troops, they exert themselves to the
utmost to obtain their pardon; they have recourse to Aristius, throw the
blame of the outbreak upon a few, order the plundered goods to be
collected, and confiscate those of Litavicus and his brothers. They send
deputies to Cæsar to excuse themselves. Their object, in acting thus,
was to obtain the free disposal of their troops, for the consciousness
of their treason and the fear of punishment made them, at the same time,
conspire in secret with the neighbouring states.

Although informed of these secret plots, Cæsar received their deputies
with kindness, declaring that he did not hold the nation responsible for
the fault of some individuals, and that his feelings towards the Ædui
were not changed. Nevertheless, as he foresaw a general insurrection of
Gaul, which would surround him on all sides, he entertained serious
thoughts of abandoning Gergovia, and again effecting the concentration
of his whole army; but it was of importance that his retreat, caused by
the sole fear of a general defection, should not appear to be a flight.

In the midst of these cares, the besieged offered him a favourable
chance, of which he sought to take advantage. As he was visiting the
little camp to inspect the works, he perceived that a hill (no doubt the
hill marked _A_, which forms part of the mountain mass of Rissoles, _see
Plate 21_), which was almost hidden from sight by the masses of enemies
on the previous days, was clear of troops. Astonished at this change, he
inquired the cause of the deserters, who came every day in crowds to
surrender to him. All agreed in saying, as his scouts had already
reported to him, that the mountain ridge to which this hill belonged
(the top of the heights of Risolles) was almost flat, was connected with
the town, and gave access to it by a narrow and wooded defile. (_See
Plates 21 and 22. _) This point caused particular anxiety to the enemy;
for if the Romans, already masters of La Roche-Blanche, gained
possession of the mountain mass of Risolles, the Gauls would be almost
entirely invested, and could neither escape nor go to forage. This was
the reason why Vercingetorix had decided upon fortifying these heights,
and had called thither all his troops. [492]

In accordance with this information, Cæsar sends in this direction,
towards the middle of the night, several detachments of cavalry, with
orders to scour with great noise the country in every direction at the
foot of the heights of Risolles. At break of day, he sends out of the
great camp many horses and mules without pack-saddles, and causes the
muleteers to mount them, who put on helmets, so as to assume the
appearance of mounted troopers. He enjoins them to wind round the hills,
and a few cavalry who are joined with them have orders to spread wide
over the country, so as to increase the illusion. Finally, they are all,
by a long circuit, to move towards the spots which have just been
mentioned. These movements were perceived from the town, which
overlooked the camp, but at too great a distance to distinguish objects
accurately. Cæsar sends towards the same mountain mass one legion, who,
after having marched for a short distance, halt in a hollow, and pretend
to hide in the woods (towards Chanonat), so as to feign a surprise. The
suspicions of the Gauls increase; they take all their forces to the spot
threatened. Cæsar, seeing the enemy’s camp deserted, orders the military
ensigns (plumes, shields, &c. ) to be covered, the standards to be
lowered, and the troops to pass in small detachments from the great to
the little camp, behind the epaulment of the double fosse of
communication, so that they cannot be perceived from the _oppidum_. [493]
He communicates his intentions to the lieutenants placed at the heads of
the legions, recommends them to take care to prevent the soldiers from
allowing themselves to be carried away by the ardour of the combat or
the hope of plunder, and draws their attention to the difficulties of
the ground. “Celerity alone,” he says, “can enable us to overcome them;
in fact, it is to be an attack by surprise, and not a fight. ” Having
communicated these directions, he gives the signal, and, at the same
time, sends the Ædui out of the great camp, with orders to climb the
eastern slopes of the mountain of Gergovia, to effect a diversion to the
right. (_See Plate 21. _)

The distance from the wall of the _oppidum_ to the foot of the mountain,
where the ground is almost flat, was 1,200 paces (1,780 mètres) in the
most direct line; but the way was longer, on account of the circuits it
was necessary to make to break the steepness. [494] Towards the middle of
the southern slope, in the direction of its length, the Gauls, taking
advantage of the character of the ground, had, as we have said, built a
wall of large stones, six feet high, a serious obstacle in case of
attack. The lower part of the slopes had remained free; but the upper
part, up to the wall of the _oppidum_, was occupied with camps placed
very near together. When the signal is given, the Romans reach rapidly
the wall, scale it, and take three camps with such promptitude, that
Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges, surprised in his tent where he was
taking his repose in the middle of the day, fled half naked; his horse
was wounded, and he escaped with difficulty from the hands of the
assailants.

Cæsar, satisfied with this success, ordered the retreat to be sounded,
and made the tenth legion, which accompanied him, halt (from an
examination of the ground, the spot where Cæsar stood is the knoll which
rises to the west of the village of Merdogne). (_See Plate 21_, first
position of the tenth legion. ) But the soldiers of the other legions,
separated from him by a rather wide ravine, did not hear the trumpet.
Although the tribunes and the lieutenants did all they could to restrain
them, excited by the hope of an easy victory, and by the recollection of
their past successes, they thought nothing was insurmountable to their
courage, and persisted in the pursuit of the enemy up to the walls and
gates of the _oppidum_.

Then an immense cry arises in the town. The inhabitants of the most
remote quarters believe that it is invaded, and rush out of the walls.
The matrons throw from the top of the walls their precious objects to
the Romans, and, with breasts bare and hands extended in supplication,
implore them not to massacre the women and children, as at Avaricum.
Several even, letting themselves down from the walls, surrender to the
soldiers. L. Fabius, centurion of the 8th legion, excited by the rewards
given at Avaricum, had sworn to be the first to mount to the assault; he
is lifted up by three soldiers of his company, reaches the top of the
wall, and, in his turn, helps them to mount one after the other.

Meanwhile the Gauls, who, as we have seen, had proceeded to the west of
Gergovia to raise retrenchments, hear the cries from the town; repeated
messages announce the capture of the _oppidum_. They immediately hurry
towards it, sending their cavalry before them. As they arrive, each man
takes his stand under the wall and joins the combatants, and their
number increases every moment; while the same women who just before
implored the pity of the besiegers, now excite against them the
defenders of Gergovia, displaying their dishevelled hair and showing
their children. The place as well as the numbers rendered the struggle
unequal; the Romans, fatigued with their run and the length of the
combat, resisted with difficulty troops which were still fresh.

This critical state of things inspired Cæsar with alarm; he ordered T.
Sextius, who had been left to guard the little camp, to bring out the
cohorts quickly, and take a position at the foot of the mountain of
Gergovia, on the right of the Gauls, so as to support the Romans if they
were repulsed, and check the enemy’s pursuit. He himself, drawing the
10th legion a little back[495] from the place where he had posted it,
awaited the issue of the engagement. (_See Plate 21_, second position of
the 10th legion. )

When the struggle was most obstinate, suddenly the Ædui, who had been
sent to divert the attention of the enemy by an attack from another
side, appeared on the right flank of the Romans.
The resemblance of
their arms to those of the Gauls caused a great alarm; and although they
had their right shoulders bare (_dextris humeris exsertis_), the
ordinary mark of the allied troops, it was taken for a stratagem of the
enemy. At the same moment, the centurion L. Fabius, and those who had
followed him, are surrounded and thrown down from the top of the wall.
M. Petronius, centurion of the same legion, overwhelmed by numbers in
his attempt to burst the gates, sacrifices himself for the safety of his
soldiers, and meets his death in order to give them time to join their
ensigns. Pressed on all sides, the Romans are driven back from the
heights, after having lost forty-six centurions; nevertheless, the 10th
legion, placed in reserve on more level ground (_see Plate 21_, third
position), arrests the enemies, who are too eager in their pursuit. It
is supported by the cohorts of the 13th, who had just taken position on
a commanding post (_Le Puy-de-Marmant_), under the command of the
lieutenant T. Sextius. As soon as the Romans had reached the plain, they
rallied, and formed front against the enemy. But Vercingetorix, once
arrived at the foot of the mountain, ventured no further, but led back
his troops within the retrenchments. This day cost Cæsar nearly 700
men. [496]

Next day, Cæsar assembled his troops, and reprimanded them for their
rashness and for their thirst for plunder. He reproached them with
having “wished to judge for themselves of the object to be attained, and
of the means of attack, and not listening either to the signal of
retreat or to the exhortations of the tribunes and lieutenants. He
pointed out to them all the importance of the difficulties caused by the
inequalities of the ground; and reminded them of his conduct at
Avaricum, where, in presence of an enemy without chief and without
cavalry, he had renounced a certain victory rather than expose himself
to loss, though slight, in a disadvantageous position. Much as he
admired their bravery, which had been checked neither by the
retrenchments, nor by the steepness of the ground, nor by the walls, he
blamed no less their disobedience and their presumption in believing
themselves capable of judging of the chances of success and calculating
the issue of the undertaking better than their general. He demanded of
the soldiers submission and discipline, no less than firmness and
bravery; and, to revive their courage, he added that their want of
success was to be attributed to the difficulties of the ground much more
than to the valour of the enemy. ”[497]


[Sidenote: Observations. ]

VII. In the foregoing account, which is taken almost literally from the
“Commentaries,” Cæsar skilfully disguises a defeat. It is evident that
he hoped to take Gergovia by a sudden assault, before the Gauls, drawn
by a false attack to the west of the town, had time to come back to its
defence. Deceived in his expectation, he ordered the retreat to be
sounded, but too late to be executed in good order. Cæsar does not
appear to be sincere when he declares that he had attained his object
the moment his soldiers reached the foot of the wall. This could not
have been the case, for what use could it be to him to take camps almost
without troops in them, if the consequence was not to be the surrender
of the town itself? The defeat appears to have been complete, and,
according to some, Cæsar was for a moment a prisoner in the hands of the
Gauls; according to others, he had only lost his sword. Servius, indeed,
relates the following rather incomprehensible anecdote: when Cæsar was
taken away prisoner by the Gauls, one of them began to cry out _Cæsar_,
which signifies in Gaulish _let him go_, and thus he escaped. [498]
Plutarch gives another version: “The Arverni,” he says, “still show a
sword hung up in one of their temples, which they pretend to be a spoil
taken from Cæsar. He saw it there himself subsequently, and only laughed
at it. His friends engaged him to take it away, but he refused,
pretending that it had become a sacred object. ”[499] This tradition
proves that he was sufficiently great to bear the recollection of a
defeat, in which he was very different from Cicero, whom we have seen
stealthily taking away from the Capitol the brass plate on which was
engraved the law of his banishment.


[Sidenote: Cæsar leaves Gergovia in order to join Labienus. ]

VIII. Cæsar, after the check he had suffered before Gergovia, persisted
all the more in his intentions of departure; but, not to have the
appearance of flight, he drew out his legions, and placed them in order
of battle on an advantageous ground. Vercingetorix did not allow himself
to be drawn into the plain; the cavalry only fought, and the combat was
favourable to the Romans, who afterwards returned to their camp. The
next day the same manœvre was repeated with the same success.
Thinking that he had done enough to abate the boasting of the Gauls, as
well as to strengthen the courage of his men, Cæsar left Gergovia, and
took his way towards the country of the Ædui.

His withdrawal did not draw out the enemies in pursuit; and he arrived
on the third day (that is, his second day’s march, reckoning from the
assault on Gergovia) on the banks of the Allier, rebuilt one of the
bridges, no doubt that of Vichy, and crossed the river in haste, in
order to place it between him and Vercingetorix.

There Viridomarus and Eporedorix urged upon him the necessity of their
presence among the Ædui, in order to maintain the country in obedience,
and to be beforehand with Litavicus, who had gone thither with all the
cavalry to excite a revolt. Notwithstanding the numerous proofs of their
perfidy, and the suspicion that the departure of those two chiefs would
hasten the revolt, he did not think proper to detain them, as he wished
to avoid even the appearance of violence or of fear. He confined himself
to reminding them of the services which he had rendered to their
country, and of the state of dependence and abasement from which he had
drawn them, to raise them to a high degree of power and prosperity, and
then dismissed them; and they proceeded to Noviodunum (_Nevers_). This
town of the Ædui was situated on the banks of the Loire, in a favourable
position. It contained all the hostages of Gaul, the stores, the public
treasury, nearly all the baggage of the general and the army, and,
lastly, a considerable number of horses bought in Italy and Spain.
Eporedorix and Viridomarus heard there, on their arrival, of the revolt
of the country, of the reception of Litavicus in the important town of
Bibracte by Convictolitavis and a great part of the Senate, as well as
of the steps taken to draw their fellow-citizens into the cause of
Vercingetorix. The occasion appears favourable to them: they massacre
the guards of the dépôt of Noviodunum and the Roman merchants, share
amongst themselves the horses and the money, burn the town, send the
hostages to Bibracte, load boats with all the grain they can take away,
and destroy the rest by water and fire; then they collect troops in the
neighbourhood, place posts along the Loire, spread their cavalry
everywhere in order to intimidate the Romans, to cut off their supply of
provisions, and to compel them through famine to retire into the
Narbonnese--a hope which was so much the better founded, as the Loire,
swollen by the melting of the snow, appeared to be nowhere fordable.

Cæsar was informed of these events during his march from the Allier
towards the Loire. His position had never been more critical. Suffering
under a severe defeat, separated from Labienus by a distance of more
than eighty leagues, and by countries in revolt, he was surrounded on
all sides by the insurrection: he had on his rear the Arverni, elated
with their recent success at Gergovia; on his left the Bituriges,
irritated by the sack of Avaricum; before him the Ædui, ready to dispute
the passage of the Loire. Was he to persevere in his design, or
retrograde towards the Province? He could not resolve on this latter
course, for not only would this retreat have been disgraceful, and the
passage of the Cévennes full of difficulties, but, above all, he felt
the greatest anxiety for Labienus and the legions which he had entrusted
to him. He therefore persevered in his first resolutions; and in order
to be able, in case of need, to build a bridge across the Loire before
the forces of the enemies were increased, he proceeded towards that
river by forced marches day and night, and arrived unexpectedly at
Bourbon-Lancy. [500] The cavalry soon discovered a ford which necessity
made them consider practicable, although the soldiers had only above
water their shoulders and their arms to carry their weapons. The cavalry
was placed up the stream, in order to break the current, and the army
passed without accident before the enemy had time to recover from his
first surprise. Cæsar found the country covered with the harvest and
with cattle, with which the army was largely provisioned, and he marched
towards the land of the Senones. [501]


[Sidenote: Expedition of Labienus against the Parisii. ]

IX. Whilst the centre of Gaul was the scene of these events, Labienus
had marched with four legions towards Lutetia, a town situated on an
island in the Seine, the _oppidum_ of the Parisii. After leaving his
baggage at Agedincum (_Sens_)[502] under the guard of the troops
recently arrived from Italy to fill up the voids, he followed the left
bank of the Yonne and of the Seine, wishing to avoid all important
streams and considerable towns. [503] At the news of his approach, the
enemy assembled in great numbers from the neighbouring countries. The
command was entrusted to Aulercus Camulogenus, who was elevated to this
honour, notwithstanding his great age, on account of his rare ability in
the art of war. This chief, having remarked that a very extensive marsh
sloped towards the Seine, and rendered impracticable all that part of
the country which is watered by the Essonne, established his troops
along the side of this marsh, in order to defend the passage. (_See
Plate 23. _)

When Labienus arrived on the opposite bank, he ordered covered galleries
to be pushed forward, and sought, by means of hurdles and earth, to
establish a road across the marsh; but, meeting with too many
difficulties, he formed the project of surprising the passage of the
Seine at Melodunum (_Melun_), and, when once on the right bank, of
advancing towards Lutetia by stealing a march upon the enemy. He
therefore left his camp in silence, at the third watch (midnight), and,
retracing his steps, arrived at Melun, an _oppidum_ of the Senones,
situated, like Lutetia, on an island in the Seine. He seized about fifty
boats, joined them together, filled them with soldiers, and entered into
the place without striking a blow. Terrified at this sudden attack, the
inhabitants, a great part of whom had answered to the appeal of
Camulogenus, offered no resistance. A few days before, they had cut the
bridge which united the island with the right bank; Labienus restored
it, led his troops over it, and proceeded towards Lutetia, where he
arrived before Camulogenus. He took a position near the place where
Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois now stands. Camulogenus, informed by those who
had fled from Melun, quits his position on the Essonne, returns to
Lutetia, gives orders to burn it and to cut the bridges, and establishes
his camp on the left bank of the Seine, in front of the _oppidum_, that
is, on the present site of the Hotel de Cluny.

It was already rumoured that Cæsar had raised the siege of Gergovia; the
news of the defection of the Ædui, and of the progress of the
insurrection, had begun already to spread. The Gauls repeated
incessantly that Cæsar, arrested in his march by the Loire, had been
compelled, by want of provisions, to retire towards the Roman province.
The Bellovaci, whose fidelity was doubtful, had no sooner heard of the
revolt of the Ædui, than they collected troops and prepared openly for
war.

At the news of so many unfavourable events, Labienus felt all the
difficulties of his situation. Placed on the right bank of the Seine, he
was threatened on one side by the Bellovaci, who had only to cross the
Oise to fall upon him; on the other by Camulogenus, at the head of a
well-trained army, ready to give battle; lastly, a large river, which he
had crossed at Melun, separated him from Sens, where he had his dépôts
and baggage. To escape from this perilous position, he thought it
advisable to change his plans: he renounced all offensive movements, and
resolved to return to his point of departure by an act of daring.
Fearing that, if he went by the road on which he had advanced, he should
not be able to cross the Seine at Melun, because his boats would not
have re-mounted the river without difficulty, he decided on surprising
the passage of the Seine below Paris, and returning to Sens by the left
bank, marching over the body of the Gaulish army. Towards evening he
convoked a council, and urged on his officers the punctual execution of
his orders. He entrusted the boats he had brought from Melun to the
Roman knights, with orders to descend the river at the end of the first
watch (ten o’clock), to advance in silence for the space of four miles
(six kilomètres), which would bring them as far down as the village of
Point-du-Joir, and to wait for him. The five cohorts which had least
experience were left in charge of the camp, and the five others of the
same legion received orders to re-ascend on the right bank of the river
in the middle of the night, with all their baggage, and attract by their
tumult the attention of the enemy. Boats were sent in the same
direction, which were rowed with great noise. He himself, a little
after, left in silence with the three remaining legions, and, proceeding
down the river, repaired to the spot where the first boats waited for
him.

When he arrived there, a violent storm enabled him to carry by surprise
the Gaulish posts placed along the whole bank. The legions and cavalry
had soon passed the Seine with the assistance of the knights. Day began
to appear, when the enemy learnt, almost at the same instant, first,
that an unusual agitation prevailed in the Roman camp, that a
considerable column of troops was ascending the river, and that in the
same direction a great noise of oars was heard; lastly, that lower down
the stream the troops were crossing the Seine in boats. This news made
the Gauls believe that the legions intended to cross it on three points,
and that, perplexed by the defection of the Ædui, they had decided on
forcing the road by the left bank. [504] Camulogenus divided also his
forces into three corps: he left one opposite the Roman camp; sent the
second, less numerous, in the direction of Melodunum,[505] with
instructions to regulate its march according to the progress of the
enemy’s boats which re-ascended the Seine; and, at the head of the
third, went to meet Labienus.

At sunrise the Roman troops had crossed the river, and the enemy’s army
appeared drawn up in order of battle. Labienus exhorts his soldiers to
recall to mind their ancient valour, and so many glorious exploits, and,
as they marched to the combat, to consider themselves under the eye of
Cæsar, who had led them so often to victory: he then gives the signal.
At the first shock the 7th legion, placed on the right wing, routs the
enemy; but on the left wing, although the 12th legion had transpierced
the first ranks with their _pila_, the Gauls defend themselves
obstinately, and not one dreams of flight. Camulogenus, in the midst of
them, excites their ardour. The victory was still doubtful, when the
tribunes of the 7th legion, informed of the critical position of the
left wing, lead their soldiers to the back of the enemies, and take them
in the rear. The barbarians are surrounded, yet not one yields a step;
all die fighting, and Camulogenus perishes with the rest. The Gaulish
troops left opposite the camp of Labienus had hurried forward at the
first news of the combat, and had taken possession of a hill (probably
that of Vaugirard); but they did not sustain the attack of the
victorious Romans, and were hurried along in the general rout; all who
would not find refuge in the woods and on the heights were cut to pieces
by the cavalry.

After this battle Labienus returned to Agedincum; thence he marched with
all his troops, and went to join Cæsar. [506]


[Sidenote: The Gauls assume the offensive. ]

X. The desertion of the Ædui gave the war a greater development.
Deputies are sent in all directions: credit, authority, money,
everything is put in activity to excite the other states to revolt.
Masters of the hostages whom Cæsar had entrusted to them, the Ædui
threaten to put to death those who belong to the nations which hesitate.
In a general assembly of Gaul, convoked at Bibracte, at which the Remi,
the Lingones, and the Treviri only were absent, the supreme command is
conferred on Vercingetorix, in spite of the opposition of the Ædui, who
claim it, and who, seeing themselves rejected, begin to regret the
favours they had received from Cæsar. But they had pronounced for the
war, and no longer dare to separate themselves from the common cause.
Eporedorix and Viridomarus, young men of great promise, obey
Vercingetorix unwillingly. The latter begins by exacting from the other
states hostages to be delivered on a fixed day; orders that the cavalry,
amounting to 15,000 men, shall be gathered round his person; declares he
has infantry enough at Bibracte, for his intention is not to offer a
pitched battle to the Romans, but, with a numerous cavalry, to intercept
their convoys of grain and forage. He exhorts the Gauls to set fire
with a common accord to their habitations and crops, which are only
small sacrifices in comparison to their liberty. These measures having
been decided, he demands from the Ædui and the Segusiavi, who bordered
upon the Roman province, 10,000 foot soldiers, sends them 800 horse, and
gives the command of these troops to the brother of Eporedorix, with
orders to carry the war into the country of the Allobroges. On another
side, he orders the Gabali and the neighbouring cantons of the Arverni
to march against the Helvii, and sends the Ruteni and the Cadurci to lay
waste the country of the Volcæ Arecomici. At the same time, he labours
secretly to gain the Allobroges, in the hope that the remembrance of
their ancient struggles against the Romans is not yet effaced. He
promises money to their chiefs, and to their country the sovereignty
over the whole Narbonnese.

To meet these dangers, twenty-two cohorts, raised in the province, and
commanded by the lieutenant Lucius Cæsar,[507] had to face the enemy on
every side. The Helvii, faithful to the Romans, by their own impulse,
attacked their neighbours in the open field; but repulsed with loss, and
having to deplore the death of their chiefs, among others that of C.
Valerius Donnotaurus, they ventured no more outside their walls. As to
the Allobroges, they defended their territory with energy, by placing a
great number of posts along the Rhone. The superiority of the enemy in
cavalry, the interruption of the communications, the impossibility of
drawing succour from Italy or the province, decided Cæsar on demanding
from the German peoples on the other side of the Rhine, subdued the year
before, cavalry and light infantry accustomed to fight intermingled. On
their arrival, finding that the cavalry were not sufficiently well
mounted, he distributed amongst them the horses of the tribunes, and
even those of the Roman knights and the volunteers (_evocati_). [508]


[Sidenote: Junction of Cæsar and Labienus. Battle of the Vingeanne. ]

XI. The line of march followed by Cæsar after he had crossed the Loire
has been the subject of numerous controversies. Yet the “Commentaries”
appear to us to furnish sufficient data to determine it with precision.
On leaving Gergovia, Cæsar’s object was, as he tells us himself, to
effect a junction with Labienus; with this view, he marched towards the
land of the Senones, after having crossed the Loire at Bourbon-Lancy. On
his part, Labienus, after returning to Sens, having advanced to meet
Cæsar, their junction must necessarily have taken place on a point of
the line from Bourbon-Lancy to Sens; this point, in our opinion, is
Joigny. (_See Plate 19. _) Encamped not far from the confluence of the
Armançon and the Yonne, Cæsar could easily receive the contingent which
he expected from Germany.

The Roman army was composed of eleven legions: the 1st, lent by Pompey,
and the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th. [509]
The effective force of each of them varied from 4,000 to 5,000 men;
for, if we see (lib. V. 49) that on the return from Britain two legions
reckoned together only 7,000 men, their effective force was soon
increased by considerable re-enforcements which came to the army of Gaul
in 702;[510] the legion lent by Pompey was of 6,000 men;[511] and the
13th, at the breaking out of the civil war, had in its ranks 5,000
soldiers. [512] Cæsar had then at his disposal, during the campaigns
which ended with the taking of Alesia, 50,000 legionaries, and perhaps
20,000 Numidian or Cretan archers, and 5,000 or 6,000 cavalry, a
thousand of whom were Germans, making a total of about 75,000 men,
without counting the valets, who were always very numerous.

When the junction of the troops had been effected, Cæsar sought above
all to approach the Roman province, in order to carry succour to it with
more ease; he could not think of taking the most direct road, which
would have led him into the country of the Ædui, one of the centres of
the insurrection; he was, therefore, obliged to pass through the
territory of the Lingones, who had remained faithful to him, and to
proceed into Sequania, where Besançon offered an important place of
arms. (_See Plate 19. _) He started from Joigny, following the road which
he had taken when he marched to meet Ariovistus (696),[513] and the
winter before, when he moved from Vienne to Sens. After reaching the
Aube at Dancevoir, he proceeded towards the little river Vingeanne,
crossing, as the “Commentaries” say, the extreme part of the territory
of the Lingones (_per extremos Lingonum fines_). [514] His intention was,
no doubt, to cross the Saône, either at Gray, or at Pontailler.

Whilst the Romans abandoned that part of Gaul which had revolted, in
order to approach nearer to the province, Vercingetorix had assembled
his army, amounting to more than 80,000 men, at Bibracte; it had come in
great part from the country of the Arverni, and counted in its ranks the
cavalry furnished by all the states. Having been informed of Cæsar’s
march, he started at the head of his troops, to bar the road through
Sequania. Passing, as we believe, by Arnay-le-Duc, Sombernon, Dijon, and
Thil-Châtel, he arrived at the heights of Occey, Sacquenay, and
Montormentier, where he formed three camps, at a distance of 10,000
paces (fifteen kilomètres) from the Roman army. (_See Plate 24. _) In
this position Vercingetorix intercepted the three roads which Cæsar
could have taken towards the Saône, either at Gray, or at Pontailler, or
at Chalon. [515] Resolved on risking a battle, he convoked the chiefs of
the cavalry. “The moment of victory,” he told them, “has arrived; the
Romans fly into their province, and abandon Gaul. If this retreat
delivers us for the present, it ensures neither peace nor rest for the
future; they will return with greater forces, and the war will be
endless. We must attack them, therefore, in the disorder of their march;
for if the legions stop to defend their long convoy, they will not be
able to continue their road; or if, which is more probable, they abandon
their baggage in order to secure their own safety, they will lose what
is indispensable to them, and, at the same time, their prestige. As to
their cavalry, they will surely not dare to move away from the column;
that of the Gauls must show so much the more ardour, as the infantry,
ranged before the camp, will be there to intimidate the enemy. ” Then,
the cavalry exclaimed, “Let every one swear, by a solemn oath, never to
return to the home of his forefathers, his wife, or his children, if he
has not ridden twice through the ranks of the enemy! ” This proposition
was received with enthusiasm, and all took the oath.

The day on which Vercingetorix arrived on the heights of Sacquenay,[516]
Cæsar, as we have seen, encamped on the Vingeanne, near Longeau.
Ignorant of the presence of the Gauls, he started next day, in marching
column, the legions at a great distance from each other, separated by
their baggage. When his vanguard arrived near Dommarien, it could
perceive the hostile army. Vercingetorix was watching the moment they
(the Romans) debouched, to attack. He had divided his cavalry in three
bodies, and his infantry had descended from the heights of Sacquenay in
order to take a position along the Vingeanne and the Badin. (_See Plate
24. _) As soon as the vanguard of the enemy appears, Vercingetorix bars
its way with one of the bodies of cavalry, while the two others show
themselves in order of battle on the two wings of the Romans. Taken
unexpectedly, Cæsar divides his cavalry also into three bodies, and
opposes them to the enemy. The combat engages on all sides; the column
of the Roman army halts; the legions are brought into line, and the
baggage placed in the intervals. This order, in which the legions were,
no doubt, in column of three deep, was easy to execute, and presented
the advantages of a square. Wherever the cavalry gives way or is too
hotly pressed, Cæsar sends to its support the cohorts, which he draws
from the main body to range them in order of battle. [517] By this
manœuvre he renders the attacks less vigorous, and increases the
confidence of the Romans, who are assured of support. Finally, the
German auxiliaries, having gained, to the right of the Roman army, the
summit of a height (the hill of Montsaugeon), drive the enemies from it,
and pursue the fugitives as far as the river, where Vercingetorix stood
with his infantry. At the sight of this rout, the rest of the Gaulish
cavalry fear to be surrounded, and take to flight. From this time the
battle became a mere carnage. Three Ædui of distinction are taken and
brought to Cæsar: Cotus, chief of the cavalry, who, at the last
election, had contended with Convictolitavis for the sovereign
magistracy; Cavarillus, who, since the defection of Litavicus, commanded
the infantry; and Eporedorix, whom the Ædui had for chief in their war
against the Sequani, before the arrival of Cæsar in Gaul. [518]


[Sidenote: Blockade of Alesia. ]

XII. Vercingetorix, after the defeat of his cavalry, decided on a
retreat; taking his infantry with him, without returning to his camp, he
marched immediately towards Alesia, the _oppidum_ of the Mandubii. The
baggage, withdrawn from the camp, followed him without delay. [519] Cæsar
ordered his baggage to be carried to a neighbouring hill, under the
guard of two legions, pursued the enemies as long as daylight permitted,
killed about 3,000 men of their rear-guard, and established his camp,
two days afterwards, before Alesia. [520] After having reconnoitred the
position of the town, and taking advantage of the disorder of the enemy,
who had placed his principal confidence in his cavalry, which was thrown
into consternation by its defeat, he resolved to invest Alesia, and
exhorted his soldiers to support the labours and fatigues of a siege
with constancy.

Alise-Sainte-Reine, in the department of the Côte-d’Or, is, undoubtedly,
the Alesia of the “Commentaries. ” The examination of the strategic
reasons which determined the march of Cæsar, the correct interpretation
of the text, and, lastly, the excavations lately made, all combine to
prove it. [521]

Ancient Alesia occupied the summit of the mountain now called Mont
Auxois; on the western slope is built the village of Alise-Sainte-Reine.
(_See Plates 25 and 26_. ) It is an entirely isolated mountain, which
rises 150 to 160 mètres above the surrounding valleys (_erat oppidum
Alesia in colle summo, admodum edito loco . . . _). Two rivers bathe the
foot of the mountain on two opposite sides: they are the Ose and the
Oserain (_cujus collis radices duo duabus ex partibus flumina
subluebant_). To the west of Mont Auxois the plain of Laumes extends,
the greatest dimension of which, between the village of Laumes and that
of Pouillenay, is 3,000 paces or 4,400 mètres (_ante oppidum planities
circiter millia passuum III in longitudinem patebat_). On all other
sides, at a distance varying from 1,100 to 1,600 mètres, rises a belt of
hills, the plateaux of which are at the same height (_reliquis ex
omnibus partibus colles, mediocri interjecto spatio, pari altitudinis
fastigio oppidum cingebant_).

The summit of Mont Auxois has the form of an ellipse, 2,100 mètres in
length, and 800 mètres broad in its greatest diameter. Including the
first spurs which surround the principal mass, it is found to contain a
superficies of 1,400,000 square mètres, 973,100 mètres of which for the
upper plateau and 400,000 mètres for the terraces and spurs. (_See Plate
25_. ) The town appears to have crowned the whole of the plateau, which
was protected by scarped rocks against all attack. [522]

This _oppidum_ could, apparently, only be reduced by a complete
investment. The Gaulish troops covered, at the foot of the wall, all the
slopes of the eastern part of the mountain; they were there protected by
a fosse and by a wall of unhewn stones six feet high. Cæsar established
his camps in favourable positions, the infantry on the heights, the
cavalry near the watercourses. These camps, and twenty-three redoubts or
blockhouses,[523] formed a line of investment of 11,000 paces (sixteen
kilomètres). [524] The redoubts were occupied in the day by small posts,
to prevent any surprise; by night, strong detachments bivouacked in
them.

The works were hardly begun, when a cavalry engagement took place in the
plain of Laumes. The combat was very hot on both sides. The Romans were
giving way, when Cæsar sent the Germans to their assistance, and ranged
the legions in order of battle in front of the camps, so that the
enemy’s infantry, kept in awe, should not come to the assistance of the
cavalry. That of the Romans recovered confidence on seeing that they
were supported by the legions. The Gauls, obliged to fly, became
embarrassed by their own numbers, and rushed to the openings left in the
wall of unhewn stones, which were too narrow for the occasion. Pursued
with fury by the Germans up to the fortifications, some were slain, and
others, abandoning their horses, attempted to cross the fosse and climb
over the wall. Cæsar then ordered the legions, who were drawn up before
his retrenchments, to advance a little. This movement carried disorder
into the Gaulish camp. The troops within feared a serious attack, and
the cry to arms rose on all sides. Some, struck with terror, threw
themselves into the _oppidum_; Vercingetorix was obliged to order the
gates to be closed, for fear the camp should be abandoned. The Germans
retired, after having killed a great number of the cavalry, and taken a
great number of horses.

Vercingetorix resolved to send away all his cavalry by night, before the
Romans had completed the investment. He urges the cavalry, on their
departure, to return each to his country, and recruit the men able to
carry arms; he reminds them of his services, and implores them to think
of his safety, and not to deliver him as a prey to the enemies, him who
has done so much for the general liberty: their indifference would
entail with his loss that of 80,000 picked men. On an exact calculation,
he has only provisions for one month; by husbanding them carefully, he
may hold out some time longer. After these recommendations, he causes
his cavalry to leave in silence, at the second watch (nine o’clock). It
is probable that they escaped by ascending the valleys of the Ose and
the Oserain.