No More Learning

Report states that Gaza also fell at this
time, but this simply means that Gaza was laid under contribution in
the same way that Hira had been before. The Patriarch Sophronius of
Jerusalem, in his Christmas sermon at the end of the year 634, describes
in moving terms the doleful condition of the country. Anarchy appears
to have ruled supreme. The Arabs dispersed themselves throughout the
country, and even pushed forward far towards the North; the temporary


## p. 342 (#374) ############################################

342 No longer Raids but Conquest [634—635
appearance of the Arabs before Emesa in January 635 is credibly
authenticated by a Syrian source.
During the six months following the battle of Ajnadain the tone of
public opinion must have undergone a considerable change. Men of the
rank of Khalid and 'Amr could not but perceive that they could not go
on with such planless raids; a systematic occupation of the country
appeared urgent. In addition to this the Caliph Abu Bakr died soon
after the battle of Ajnadain (634) and the energetic far-seeing Omar
had been nominated by him as his successor and recognised on all sides
without question. This new view was further supported both at the
front and at head-quarters by the continued pressing forward of the Arab
element from the south of the peninsula; after the termination of the
Ridda wars these people, incited by the unparalleled successes of the
- Medina people, also marched to Syria. These new arrivals did not
yiowever arrive in the form of organised troops, but advanced in tribes,
bringing their wives and children with them and hoping to find in the
; new land fertile residential areas. This process is very difficult to record
in detail, and doubtless extended over several years. It was only after
the battle of the Yarmuk that the Arabs really began seriously to take
in hand the administration of the country. But within six months of
the battle of Ajnadain there began a much more systematic progress of
the Arabs, who were now clearly placed under the supreme command of
Khalid. The last troops of Heraclius had now withdrawn to Damascus,
the defeated Theodorus had been recalled to Constantinople and the
conduct of further operations lay in the hands of Baanes, who con-
centrated his troops in the beginning of 635 at Fihl, a strategically
important position situated south of the Sea of Gennesareth and covering
the crossing of the Jordan and the route to Damascus. By cutting
dykes he endeavoured to prevent the advance of the Arabs. Impressed
however probably by their slowly changing conception of the task before
them and led by Khalid, the Muslims forced the position at Fihl (23 Jan.
635) and immediately afterwards took possession of Baisan (Bethshan).
They then pushed forward determinedly towards Damascus. Baanes again
opposed their advance at Marj as-Suffar (25 Feb. 635) but was defeated
and two weeks later the Muslims were before the gates of Damascus.
The Arabs were not in a position properly to lay siege to the town,
for they were quite ignorant of this kind of warfare. They were
compelled therefore to endeavour to isolate the town, and so to exasperate
the residents as to cause them to compel the garrison to surrender.
It was however not until the early autumn (Aug. —Sept. ) that the town
capitulated, after Heraclius had endeavoured in vain on several occasions
to relieve it; in one of the abortive attempts he had however inflicted on
the Arabs a rather serious reverse. The capitulation ensued at last
palpably through the treachery of the civil authorities, assisted by the
Bishop and the tax-collector. After the fall of Damascus the Arabs


## p. 343 (#375) ############################################

635-636] Battle of the Yarmuk 343
proceeded to the pacification of the conquered country, without giving
further heed to the Byzantines, from whom they did not consider they
had anything more to fear. The various leaders operated in Palestine
and the country east of the Jordan; Khalid himself pressed forward once
more against Emesa, and occupied this place at the close of the year 635.
A number of smaller towns hereupon opened their gates to the con-
querors whilst the larger fortresses such as Jerusalem, Caesarea and the
coastal towns, still held out in hope of rescue by Heraclius.
Heraclius certainly as yet had no intention of giving up the country
to the Arabs. He shewed a feverish activity in Antioch and Edessa.
Together with the customary Byzantine mercenaries, Armenians and
Arabs formed the main body of his new army, which he placed under the
command of Theodorus Trithurius, and in which Baanes had the control
of an independent division. The relief of Damascus not having been
effected, Heraclius permitted the winter months to pass, intending
when he was so much the better prepared to take the offensive and
strike a crushing blow against the Arabs. In the spring of 636 this new
army unexpectedly approached Emesa, where Khalid was on outpost
duty. He at once recognised his dangerous position. Hitherto the
Arabs had always fought against an inferior Byzantine force, but now
they were suddenly opposed by a powerful army which, even after
making all allowance for Arab exaggeration, must have amounted
to some 50,000 men. Khalid immediately relinquished not only Emesa
but even Damascus and caused all the Arab fighting forces to be concen-
trated at a point between the northern and southern positions of the
Arabs in the country east of the Jordan, to the south-east of the deep
Yarmuk valley, and to the north of what is now known as Der'at, a point
admirably adapted to his purpose. Here the Arabs were in the most
fertile part of Syria, where the most important highways crossed leading
to the southern portion of the country east of the Jordan and to Central
Palestine; they were moreover protected in the rear by the deeply
hollowed valleys of the Yarmuk tributaries. Should they be defeated
here a retreat was under all circumstances secured either into the desert or
to Medina. The hurried retirement of the Arabs to this district proves
how critical affairs appeared to them: against the huge advancing army of
the enemy, they could only oppose about 25,000, scarcely half the number.
The Roman army did not approach by way of Damascus but
through Coelesyria and across the Jordan, and probably took up
their position near Jillln, the Jillik of the sources. The two armies
must have remained confronting each other for a considerable period;
the Arabs were waiting for reinforcements, whilst the Byzantine
army was hampered by the petty jealousies of its leaders and by
insubordination in the ranks. Several battles were fought in which
Theodorus appears to have been at the outset defeated and Baanes was
then proclaimed emperor by the troops. The Arabian auxiliaries


## p. 344 (#376) ############################################

V
344 Abu 'Ubaida as Commander-in-chief [636-646
deserted, and under all these circumstances the Arabs had no longer
cause to fear the numerical superiority of their opponents. They
appear to have outflanked the Byzantines from the eastern side, cut
their line of communication with Damascus, and by occupying the
bridge over the Wadi-r-Rukkad frustrated also their chances of retreat
to the westward. Finally they forced them into the angle between the
Yarmuk and the Wadi-r-Rukkad. Those who were not killed here
plunged down into the steep and deeply cut beds of the rivers, and
those of the latter who had finally managed to escape across the rivers to
Jakutha were annihilated by the Arabs on the other side, as, by occu-
pying the bridge, they were enabled with ease to cross the Wadi-r-Rukkad.
The decisive stroke in these fights, extending over months, happened on
20 Aug. 636. With this terrible defeat of the Byzantines on the Yarmuk
the fate of Syria was permanently decided. The last troops of Heraclius,
collected with much trouble, had been thus completely destroyed, and
the immediate advance of the Arabs on Damascus rendered impossible
every attempt to collect others. Thus Damascus was occupied a second
time by the Arabs in the autumn of the same year, and this time finally*.
The government of Medina had, as we have already seen, attempted
for about the space of a year to introduce a systematic occupation of the
country in place of the former planless raids. This policy made it
necessary that the army of occupation should have a supreme com-
mandant, who should at the same time act as vicegerent of the Caliph.
At the outset Khalid, who on account of his qualities had acquired the
senior rank, was confirmed in this position, but in the brilliant general
there was entirely wanting the diplomatic art of a pacificator attaining
his ends by statesmanlike compromises. For this position one of the
foremost men of the theocracy was required, an absolute confidant of the
Caliph. Omar selected Abu 'Ubaida, one of the oldest and most esteemed
of his companions, of whom we know that, for instance at the death of
the prophet, he had played an important part. His task in face of the
autocratic army-leaders was a difficult one; he arrived in Syria just
before the battle of the Yarmuk, but was prudent enough to leave at
this critical stage the supreme command for this battle to Khalid, who
was so minutely acquainted with the conditions. Thereupon however
he himself intervened, distributed the various military commandants
throughout the entire land, and then personally advanced, in company
with Khalid, towards the North. Baalbek, Emesa, Aleppo, Antioch and
the Arabian tribes residing in the north of Syria, put no difficulties in
the way of the conquest. The town of Kinnasrin (Kalchis) alone was
less easily dealt with. From northern Syria 'Iyad ibn Ghanm was then
subsequently detached to the East, and he subjected Mesopotamia
(639-646) without meeting with much opposition. To the North, how-
ever, the Amanus formed for centuries the more or less constant
boundary of the Caliph's dominions.


## p. 345 (#377) ############################################

636-640] Capitulation of Jerusalem 345
In the meantime, i. e. , in the course of the years 636 and 637,
Shurahbil and Yazld had finally occupied the remainder of the interior,
and most of the towns on the coast. 'Amr was less fortunate, and
invested Jerusalem in vain. The stubborn Caesarea also remained for a
time closed to the Arabs. It is no matter of chance that just these
two strongly Hellenised towns should have held out. Their resistance
gives us a clue to explain the rapid successes of the Arabs. The
military power of the Emperor was certainly broken, and he lacked both
men and money; but it was of much greater moment that everywhere in
Syria, where Semites dwelt, the Byzantine rule was so deeply hated that
the Arabs were welcomed as deliverers, as soon as there was no need
further to fear Heraclius. To cover his enormous debts Heraclius had
been compelled to put on the fiscal screw to its utmost tension. In
addition to this domestic pressure there was added that of religion; the
church policy of Heraclius, the introduction of the Monotheletic
Irenicon, became a persecution of Monophysites and Jews. In addition
to this religious division there was now further the natural reaction
of the Semitic element against the foreign rule of the Greeks. In
the Muslims on the other hand the numerous Christian Arab tribes,
and even the Aramaeans too, welcomed blood relations; the tribute
moreover demanded by the Arabs was not heavy, and finally the Arabs
permitted complete religious freedom; in fact, for political reasons, they
rather encouraged heterodox tendencies. Thus, after the Arabs had
vanquished the tyrants, the land fell peacefully into their own possession.
The resistance of Jerusalem and Caesarea affords the test of this theory,
for both of these towns were entirely Hellenic and orthodox. Even
these towns however were unable to maintain their position for any
length of time, and Jerusalem capitulated as early as 638; Caesarea
did not fall until October 640 into the hands of Mu'awiya, and then only
through treachery.
Even before the fall of Jerusalem the Caliph Omar had paid a visit
to Syria. His appearance there was the result of the policy of
occupation followed by Medina. The head-quarters of the Muslim army
was at that time still at Jabiya, a little to the north of the Yarmuk
battle-field. To this spot Omar summoned all his military commanders,
presumably to support Abu 'Ubaida in his difficult task with the
authority of the Caliph. Apart from this however it was desired to lay
down uniform principles for the treatment of the subjected peoples, i. e. ,
to define the difficult problem which we of modern times call native
policy. Further, the disposition of the money coming in and the whole
administration needed an initial regulation, or rather sanction. Later
tradition considers Omar the founder of the theoretical system of the
ideal Muslim State, but incorrectly so, as will be shewn later. At
the same time an initial regulation then certainly took place. On the
termination of his work of reorganisation Omar visited Jerusalem,


## p. 346 (#378) ############################################

346 First battles against Persia [635-639
proceeding thence on his return journey to Medina. Abu 'Ubaida
remained in the country as Omar's representative, but was not destined
to remain in office much longer, for in the year 639, when many
thousands from the ranks of the victors succumbed to a fearful epidemic
of plague, Abu 'Ubaida was also carried off by it, as was also his successor
in office, Yazld, a short time later. Yazld's brother, Mu'awiya ibn Abl
Sufyan, was then nominated to the succession by Omar, and in him the
man appears at the head of Syria who was destined later in his own
person to transfer the Caliphate to Damascus, a development which in
its slow preparation is as clear as noonday.
m / The whole course of the Muslim expeditions in 'Irak shews that the
*\J policy of the Caliphs was entirely determined by consideration for Syria.
After the unfortunate battle of the Bridge not only the government but
also the tribes were still more cautious towards 'Irak expeditions. It
was only the eager efforts of Muthanna, of the Bakr tribe, that finally
succeeded in gaining the sanction of the Caliph to a new raid, and
then only after the first conquest of Damascus. But there was a dearth
of warriors; none cared much to proceed to 'Irak, and it was only
on the grant of special privileges that a few Yamanites consented
to prepare for the march. In the meantime the Persians, who for over
a year had not followed up their advantage in the battle of the Bridge,
had crossed the Euphrates under Mihran; but Muthanna, with his
auxiliaries from Medina, succeeded in defeating them at Buwaib (Oct. or
Nov. 635). With his weak forces he could not however think of following
up this small victory, and Omar at that time required all available
troops for Syria, where the great army of Heraclius was advancing
towards the battle of the Yarmuk. It was not until after this latter
decisive victory that the Caliph paid greater attention to the 'Irak.
Here also the first thing to be done was the despatch of a general
representative, or vicegerent, for which position Sa'd ibn Abl Wakkas
was selected. To get the necessary troops however for an energetic
attack was still attended with great difficulty. Sa'd took the whole of
the winter 636-637 to assemble a few thousand men around him. Of
the Arabian hordes, incited by religious enthusiasm, according to the
customary European traditions, we can find but little trace.
In the meantime the Persians, alarmed by their own defeat at Buwaib,
and still more by the terrible collapse of the Byzantine rule in Syria,
decided to take energetic steps against the Arabs. The administrator
of the kingdom, Rustam, assumed the command personally, and crossed
the Euphrates. On the borders of the cultivated land, at Kadisiya, Sa'd
and Rustam stood for a long time facing each other. Of the size of their
respective armies we know nothing positive; the Arabs were certainly
not more than 5—6000 strong, including Christians and heathens, and
the numerical superiority of the Persians cannot have been considerable.
More by chance than from any tactical initiative the two armies became


## p. 347 (#379) ############################################

637-641] Fall of Ctesiphon 347
engaged in combat, and in one day tl-e Persian army was routed, and its
leaders slain (May—June 637). \
And now the fertile black land (Sawad) of 'Irak lay open to the
Arabs. Conditions exactly similar to those in Syria caused the Aramaic
peasants to greet the Arabs as deliverers. Without meeting with any
noteworthy opposition the Saracens pushed on as far as the Tigris,
whither they were attracted by the rich treasures of the Persian capital
Ctesiphon, or as the Arabs called it the "city-complex" or Madtfin.
The right bank of the Tigris was abandoned and the floating bridges
broken up. A ford having been disclosed to the Arabs the residue
of the garrison followed in the wake of Yezdegerd and his court,
who immediately after the battle had sought the protection of the
Iranian mountains. The city opened its gates and fabulous booty fell
into the hands of the Arabs. After a few weeks of quiet and no doubt
somewhat barbaric enjoyment, they had again to make one more stand
on the fringe of the mountains at Jalula; this also ended victoriously
for them, and with that the whole of 'Irak was thus in their hands.
Here also it was no matter of chance that the expansion of the
Arabs first came to a standstill at the mountains, where the line was
drawn between the Semitic and the Aryan elements of the population.
Only the province of Khuzistan, the ancient Elam, caused some trouble
still. Hither the Arabs appear to have proceeded from the south of the
marsh district, when the insignificant raids of the boundary tribes there,
encouraged by Medina, assumed after the battle of Kadisiya a more
serious character, starting from the newly founded base at Basra. The
chief seat of government was not placed at Ctesiphon, but, by express
command of the Caliph, at Kfifa (near Hlra): and this was developed
into a great Arabian military camp, intended to form the main citadel
of Muslim Arabianism as against foreign Persian culture. Later the
ancient Basra attained an independent position alongside of Kufa. The
rivalry of the two places sets its impress both on the politics and on the
intellectual life of the following century.
It was not until after these stupendous victories of Yarmuk and
Kadisiya that the great Arabian migrations assumed their full develop-
ment, for now even those tribes who were but little disposed to Islam
were compelled to wander forth in order to seek their happiness in those
cultivated lands which as rumour told them were only to be compared
with Paradise itself. Now it was that the momentous change took place
to which reference has been made at the outset; now it was that Islam
no longer represented dependence on Medina, as it did in the time of
Mahomet and Abu Bakr, but from this time forward it represented
the ideal of the common universal empire of the Arabs. And at this
stage the further expeditions became systematic conquests, in which
usually whole tribes participated. A first step in this direction was to
round off the empire, combining the Syrian and 'Irak provinces by
OH. XI.


## p. 348 (#380) ############################################

348 Conquest of Persia [641-652
the conquest of Mesopotamia. Tfhe expedition, begun from Syria as
a starting-point, was completed ,rom 'Irak by the capture of Mausil
(Mosul) (641). ,;
A systematic conquest of this description was especially called for in
regard to 'Irak; for this province could not be regarded as secure as
long as its recovery might be attempted. And at this juncture a strong
reaction against the Arabs actually set in. The opposition which the
Basris in Khuzistan met with, and which only ceased on the conquest of
Tustar (641), was probably in connexion with the activity of the fleeing
Yezdegerd and his followers, who summoned the whole of the Iranians
to battle against the Arabs. The Basris and troops from Kufa had
already co-operated systematically in Khuzistan, and similar tactics
followed now on Persian soil, where the decisive battle was fought in the
year 641 at Nihawand in the neighbourhood of the ancient Ekbatana.
The Arabs gained a great victory; the dense garland of praise which
legendary lore has woven around it shews how much depended for the
Muslims on this victory. But even after this victory the Arabs were
not yet masters of the great Median towns, as Hamadhan, Rayy and
Ispahan; these were but slowly conquered during the next few years.
Here in fact, where they were not greeted as deliverers by kindred
Semites, the Arabs had to withstand a stubborn national opposition.
Yezdegerd himself certainly caused them no difficulties; after the battle
of Nihawand he had fled further and further away and had finally gone
from Istakhr to Marw in Khorasan. His satrap there was too narrow-
minded to support his fallen superior, and in fact he treated him as an
enemy, and in 651-652 the deserted and unfortunate potentate appears
to have been assassinated.
The Arabs did not reach Khorasan until the province of Fars, the
actual Persia, was conquered. Fare could be reached most conveniently
from the Persian Gulf. This expedition had therefore been undertaken,
with Bahrain as starting-point, soon after the battle of Kadislya. This
made the third base of attack, together with Ctesiphon (Kufa) and
Basra, from which the Arabs pushed forward into Iran. Later on the
conduct of this expedition passed into the hands of the troops coming
from Basra. But also in Fare the same stubborn resistance was met
with, which was not broken till after the conquest of Istakhr in the year
649-650 by 'Abdallah ibn 'Amir. Following this up 'Abdallah, especially
assisted by the Tamlm and Bakr tribes, began in the following year an
advance, the first successful one, towards Khorasan. This first and
incomplete conquest of Persia took therefore more than ten years,
whilst Syria and 'Irak fell in an astonishingly short time into the hands
of the Arabs. In Persia Arabianism has never become national, and,
"whilst a few centuries later the other countries spoke the Arabian tongue,
the Persian vernacular and the national traditions were still maintained
in Persia. The religion of Islam moreover underwent later in Persia a


## p. 349 (#381) ############################################

631-640] Egypt before the Conquest 349
development completely differing from the orthodox Islam. Even
to-day Persia is the land of the Shi'a.
By reason of the great conquests in Syria and 'Irak the capital,
Medina, was no longer the centre of the new empire. Byzantine Egypt
lay close by, and from Egypt a reconquest of Syria, even an attack on
Medina itself might be regarded as by no means impossible. Besides
Alexandria the town of Klysma (Kulzum, Suez) appears to have been a
strong naval port. Probably all Egypt was then an important base for
the fleet of the Byzantines and one of their principal dockyards; for the
Arabians of the earlier times it decidedly became such, and it appears not
improbable that their conquest of Egypt was connected with the recog-
nition that only the possession of a fleet would ensure the lasting
retention of the new acquisitions, the Syrian coast towns, for instance.
After the fruitless efforts to take Caesarea this recognition was a matter
of course. Apart from this Egypt, a land rich in corn, must have been
a more desirable land for the central government than the distant 'Irak
or Mesopotamia, for we find that soon after the conquest the growing
needs of Medina were supplied by regular imports of corn from Egypt.
It is therefore without doubt a non-historical conception, when an
Arabian source represents Egypt as having been conquered against the
wishes of the Caliph. The conquest of Egypt falls in a period during
which the occupation of new territories was carried out systematically,
instead of by the former more or less casual raids.
How much this undertaking was helped by the conditions in Egypt
at the time was probably scarcely imagined in the Muslim camp. After
the victories of Heraclius a strong Byzantine reaction had followed the
Persian rule, which had lasted about ten years. Heraclius needed money,
as we have already seen, and further, he hoped by means of a formula
of union to put an end to the perpetual sectarian discord between the
Monophysites and their opponents, and thereby to give to the reunited
kingdom one sole church. But the parties were already too strongly
embittered one against the other, and the religious division had already
been connected so closely with the political that the Irenicon remained
without effect. The Monophysite Egyptians probably never understood
the proposed Monothelete compromise at all, and always thought that it
was desired to force the hated Chalcedonian belief on them. It was
certainly no apostle of peace who brought the Irenicon to the Egyptians,
but a grand-inquisitor of the worst type. Soon after the re-occupation
of Egypt Heraclius, in the autumn of 631, sent Cyrus, the former bishop
of Phasis in the Caucasus, to Alexandria as Patriarch, and at the
same time as head of the entire civil administration. In a struggle
extending over ten years this man sought by the severest means to
convert the Coptic Church to the Irenicon; the Coptic form of worship
was forbidden, and its priests and organisations were cruelly persecuted.
As if that were not sufficient the same man, as a support of the financial


## p. 350 (#382) ############################################

360 The Mukaukis Problem [639-641
administration, was compelled to add considerably to the burden of
taxation, in order to assist in paying the debts of the Emperor already
referred to. It is no wonder that this dreaded imperial representative
and Patriarch appeared to later Coptic tradition to be the veritable
Antichrist. Most of all he was blamed for surrendering Egypt to the
Muslims. This Cyrus is in fact, if we are not greatly deceived, the actual
personage from whom the main traits of the figure of the Mukaukis, so
surrounded by legendary lore of Muslim tradition, are taken. The
problem of the Mukaukis is one of the most difficult ones in the whole
history of the conquest of Egypt, which is throughout studded with
problems. To the Arabians the Mukaukis represents the ruler of Egypt,
who concludes with them the capitulation treaties. This was however
without doubt Cyrus, for numerous other isolated statements in the
legend of the Mukaukis apply to him, although other historical
personages appear to have been confused with him. The study of Coptic
tradition first solved the problem in so far as it identified the Mukaukis
unhesitatingly with Cyrus. Whether in this obscure name a Byzantine
title, a nickname, or a designation of descent is hidden, must remain for
the present unelucidated.
The conqueror of Egypt was 'Amr ibn al-'As, already known to us
from the Syrian campaign, a man of great personal authority in the
theocracy, but by no means a sanctimonious man, and perhaps less a great
general, even if he gained his laurels, than an excellent organiser and a
Machiavellian politician, with strong traces of heathenism and of genuine
Arabian egotism. In December 639 'Amr appeared on the eastern
boundary, at that time rather denuded of troops, and about a month
later conquered Pelusium (Jan. 640) with only 3—4000 men. 'Amr was
unable to venture on a decisive battle until reinforcements to the number
of about 5000 had joined him under the leadership of Zubair, the
celebrated companion of the prophet. With these he defeated the
Byzantines, commanded by the Augustalis Theodorus, in the battle of
Heliopolis (July 640), this being followed up quickly by the occupation
of one of the suburbs of Babylon, not far distant from the Cairo of to-dav.
Babylon was not the capital of Egypt, it is true, but owing to its com-
manding position at the head of the delta leading towards Alexandria it
was the most important position in the country, and was correspondingly
well fortified. The citadel of Babylon held out accordingly for »
considerable time still. Cyrus, who appears to have been besieged there,
entered into negotiation with 'Amr, in spite of rather strong opposition to
this course in his own camp, and then quitted Egypt to obtain from the
Emperor a ratification of the provisional treaty agreed upon with 'Amr.
Heraclius was incensed to the utmost; and Cyrus was accused of treachery,
and banished. Shortly afterwards (11 Feb. 641), the Emperor died. The
relief of Babylon now appeared impossible: even before this the most
pernicious intrigues with the Muslims had been carried on in Egypt, and


## p. 351 (#383) ############################################

641-643] Conquest of Egypt 351
now it was plainly to be seen that the death of the Emperor would fan
into new life old passions—which in fact actually occurred. During the
next few years the idea of any strong advance against the Saracens
could not be entertained. Thus the citadel of Babylon capitulated in April
641. Therewith the eastern Delta and Upper Egypt lay in the hands of
'Amr. He thereupon crossed the Nile and, following the western branch of
the river, advanced slowly towards Alexandria, capturing on his way the
episcopal see of Nikiou, which capitulated on 13 May. Treachery and fear
smoothed the way for him, but nevertheless he appears to have met with
quite energetic opposition near Alexandria.
He was, it is true, able to
obtain possession temporarily of the vicinity of the town, but for the
time being there could be no idea of subduing the great, strong
Alexandria As to the slow extension of the Muslim power in the
remainder of Egypt we are not very well informed.
In the confusion following on the death of Heraclius the war party,
represented as regards Egypt by the Augustalis Theodoras, appears to
have gained the supremacy in Constantinople; then however, probably at
the instigation of the Empress Martina, who was weary of the perpetual
wars with the Saracens, Cyrus was again despatched to Egypt to arrange
a capitulation with 'Amr under the most favourable conditions. Cyrus
returned to Alexandria (14 Sept. 641) and his further policy is not quite
clear. In any case, contrary to his former actions, he was most compliant
to the Copts, and it is not improbable that he aimed at an Egyptian
primacy under Arabian suzerainty. In the autumn, without the know-
ledge of the Alexandrians, he concluded the definite treaty with 'Amr, in
accordance with which the city was to be evacuated by the Greeks not
later than 17 Sept. 642, but for a stipulated tribute the residents were
guaranteed their personal safety and the safety of their property, together
with full freedom in the exercise of their religion. The Patriarch
ran some risk of being lynched when this contract first became known,
but he then appears to have convinced the people of its expediency.
The Greeks quitted the town and it was actually given over to the
Saracens at the appointed date. Cyrus did not live to see this, for he
died previously (21 March 642). The capital of Egypt having fallen,
'Amr desired also to cover his flank; he therefore undertook in the
following winter 642-643 an expedition to the Pentapolis and occupied
Barka without striking a blow.
Alexandria was however no more selected as the seat of the new
government than Ctesiphon had previously been chosen for this purpose.
The policy of the Caliph was to isolate the Arabian element in the
foreign land, and the Saracens therefore built for themselves a city of
their own, near to the ancient Babylon, on the eastern bank of the Nile,
in a similar way to their procedure at Kufa and Basra; their camp was
called by the Greeks "fyoao-arov" i. e. , "the camp," which name was
transmuted in the Arabian idiom into "Fustat" (a tent). The list of
ch. zr.


## p. 352 (#384) ############################################

352 Alexandria rises and is retaken [642-662
the various quarters which has been transmitted to us affords a good idea
of the tribes taking part in the conquest of Egypt; for the most part
they were from South Arabia. We shall not be inaccurate if we date
the commencement of Fustat even before the evacuation of Alexandria
(642).
The conqueror of Egypt met the same fate as his great Syrian
colleague Khalid; Omar did not choose to allow his various lieutenants
to become too powerful, unless he was absolutely sure of them. He ap-
pears, therefore, shortly before his death to have transferred Upper Egypt
as an independent province to 'Abdallah ibn Sa'd ibn 'Abl Sarh. 'Abdallah
was probably more of a financier than a warrior; he remitted more to the
central exchequer, but had no personal authority with the troops. After
Omar's death Othman placed him also in authority over Lower Egypt,
and recalled 'Amr. When however, after the restoration of order in
Constantinople, a Byzantine fleet under the command of Manuel suddenly
appeared before Alexandria, and the town rose in rebellion (645),
'Abdallah was helpless. At the instigation of the troops Othman sent
back the tried and trusted 'Amr, who in a very short time drove the
Byzantines out of the country and retook Alexandria, this time by force,
in 646. Immediately after this success however he was compelled again
to relinquish the province to 'Abdallah, as he refused with scorn to retain
the military command without the civil administration. Personal
enrichment to some extent—and that has always been the principal aim
of the heroes of the conquest—was only possible by manipulation of the
taxes; and 'Abdallah was a foster-brother of the Caliph. Still it must
be admitted that 'Abdallah was not without merit, not only in regard to
the taxes, but also in the extension of the boundaries. Thus, for instance,
he regulated the conditions on the Upper Egyptian border by treaty
with the Nubians (April 652), and on the western side he advanced as
far as Tripolis. His greatest achievement however was the extension of
the fleet.
Here he joined the efforts of Mu'awiya in Syria, who himself built
ships. The main dockyard however appears to have been Alexandria,
and in all the great sea-fights we find a co-operation of Egyptian and
Syrian vessels. Arabian tradition neglects their maritime expeditions to
a surprising extent, but Western sources have always emphasised this
feature of the Arabian success in warfare. The intelligence gathered
from the papyri during the last few years shews that the care for the
building and manning of the fleet was, at all events in Egypt at the end
of the seventh century, one of the chief occupations of the administration.
Mu'awiya required the fleet first and foremost against Byzantium, for, as
long as the Greeks had command of the sea, no rest might be expected
in Syria and as little in Alexandria. The first task for Mu'awiya was to
seize from the Byzantines their naval base, Cyprus, which lay dangerously
near. The first marine expedition of the Arabs was against Cyprus in


## p. 353 (#385) ############################################

642-7ii] Wars in Armenia 353
the summer 649, and this was attended with success. Aradus, which lay
still nearer to Syria, was not taken till a year later. In 655 Mu'awiya
contemplated an expedition to Constantinople, in which Egyptian ships
in considerable numbers took part. On the Lycian coast near Phoenix,
the Dhat as-Sawari of the Arabs, a great battle ensued, the importance
of which is clear from the fact that the Byzantines were led in person by
the Emperor, Constans II. Either a certain Abu-1-A'war acted as admiral
of the Arab fleet, or, according to other reports, the Egyptian governor
'Abdallah. Trustworthy details are missing; in any case the battle
resulted in a catastrophe comparable with the defeat on the Yarmuk.
The powerful fleet of the Byzantines, supposed to be 500 ships strong,
was completely destroyed, and the Emperor sought refuge in flight. The
Arabs however seem also to -have sustained losses sufficient to prevent
them from following up their victory by advancing on Constantinople.
Fortunately for the Byzantines Othman was murdered shortly afterwards,
and thereupon began the struggle for the Caliphate which forced
Mu'awiya to conclude an ignominious peace with the Byzantjnes.
Later on Mu'awiya took up afresh this expedition against the
Byzantines, this time by water, and in Cilicia and Armenia. The
Byzantine Armenia had been visited as far back as 642 by an expedition
under Habib ibn Maslama, in connexion with the conquest of Mesopo-
tamia, and its capital Dwin, north of the Araxes, had been temporarily
occupied. Later expeditions were less fortunate, as an Armenian chief,
Theodore, the ruler of the Reshtunians, organised an energetic resist-
ance, and after his first success was supported by Byzantium with troops,
and also by the grant of the title Patricius. Later on Theodore
agreed with the Arabs and placed himself under their suzerainty. This
caused a reaction of the Byzantine party and thereupon a counter-demon-
stration of the Arabs, who pushed forward under Habib as far as the
Caucasus. He was supported by a contingent from the conquered land
of Persia, which advanced even beyond the Caucasus, but was there
destroyed by the Chazars. In Armenia also the Arabs could only hold
their own until the beginning of the civil war. After the reunion in the
empire sea and land enterprises, such as those already described, formed
part of the yearly recurring duties of the government during the whole
of the period of the Umayyads, and these enterprises were only dis-
continued during an occasional peace. From the papyri we know that
for the annual summer expeditions (Jaish, Kovpaov) special war taxes
in kind were levied. These regular expeditions were made in the Near
East in two directions; on the one hand to the west, to North Africa,
and from 711 onwards to Spain, as we shall illustrate more fully in
Chapter xn, and on the other hand to the north, embracing Asia
Elinor and Armenia.
The conquest of Constantinople was of course the goal which was
always present to the minds of the Arabs. More than once too they came
C. MED. H. VOL. II. CM. XI. 23


## p. 354 (#386) ############################################

354 Attacks on Constantinople [644-717
very near to the attainment of their plan; twice under Mu'awiya, the first
occasion being principally a land expedition under Fadala, who con-
quered Chalcedon (668), and from thence in the spring of 669, in
combination with the Caliph's son Yazid, who had advanced to his help,
besieged Constantinople. These land expeditions were in vain, and
equally so were the regular, so-called seven years' fights between the
fleets of the two powers, these lasting from 674 or even earlier until the
death of Mu'awiya (680), and taking place immediately before Constanti-
nople where the Arabs had secured for themselves a naval base. When
at a later date, after the termination of the civil wars, the second great
wave of expansion set in under the Caliph Walld, Constantinople again
appeared attainable to them. The remarkable siege of Constantinople,
which lasted at least a year (716-717), took place, it is true, afterwards
under Walld's successor, the Caliph Sulaiman. This also ended un-
successfully for the Arabs. The Arabian boundary remained as before
mainly the Amanus and the Caucasus, and beyond that the limits of
their dominion varied. But all these regular wars are connected in the
closest degree with the internal history of the Byzantine empire, and for
this reason they are treated in detail elsewhere. Saracens in this quarter
came rather early to the frontier which for a considerable time they were
destined not to cross.
The connexion of matters has compelled us whilst reviewing the
relations between the Saracens and the Byzantines to anticipate other
events in the dominions of the Caliphate. We now return to the reign
of the Caliph Omar, under whom and his successor the expansion reached
limits unchanged for a considerable time, for we cannot gain from the
delineation of the mere outward expansion of the Saracens any satis-
factory conception of the Arabian migration, which completely meta-
morphosed the political contour of the Mediterranean world. Even the
interest of the student, in the first instance directed to the West, must
not overlook the civil wars in the young Arabian world-empire, for they
are in even greater degree than either Byzantines or Franks responsible
for bringing to a standstill the movement which threatened Europe.
By doing so we at the same time notice the beginnings of Muslim civili-
sation. If we fail truly to estimate this the continuity postulated at
the commencement of our chapter becomes obscured, and the great
influence of the East on western countries in the Middle Ages remains
incomprehensible.
Omar died at the zenith of his life, unexpectedly struck down in the
midst of his own community by the dagger of a Persian slave (8 Nov.
644). While Abu Bakr had decreed him as his successor simply by will,
because the succession was felt on all sides to be evident, the dying Omar
did not venture to entrust any particular one of his fellow-companions
with the succession. This strict, conscientious and sincerely religious
man did not dare in the face of death to discriminate between the


## p. 355 (#387) ############################################

644-655] Othman 355
candidates, all of whom were more or less incompetent. He therefore
nominated a Board of Election (Shura), composed of six of the most
respected of his colleagues, with the instruction to select from their midst
the new Caliph. Ali, Othman, Zubair, Talha, Sa'd ibn Abi Wakkas and
'Abd-ar-Rahman ibn 'Auf had now to decide the fate of Islam. After long
hesitation they agreed on Othman, probably because he appeared to be
the weakest and most pliable, and each of them hoped to rule, first
through him and afterwards in succession to him. This choice looks
like a reaction; they had had enough of Omar's energetic and austere
government—for he upheld the autocratic power of the representative of
the prophet, even as against the proudest and most successful generals,
probably less from personal ambition than from religious and political
conviction. They speculated correctly, but they overlooked the fact
that in a race to profit by the weakness of Othman his own family
had a start which could not be overtaken. Othman was however an
Umayyad, i. e. , he belonged to the old Mecca aristocracy, who for a long
time were the chief opponents of the prophet, but who, after his victory,
had with fine political instinct seceded to his camp and had even migrated
to Medina, in order to emulate the new religious aristocracy created by
Mahomet. In this they succeeded only too well, for they counted among
them men of remarkable intelligence, with whom the short-sighted in-
triguers, the honest blusterers and the pious unpolitical members of the
circle of Companions could not keep up. They now induced Othman, who
had at once nominated his cousin Marwan ibn al-Hakam to be the omni-
potent Secretary of State, to fill all the positions of any importance or
of any value with Umayyads or their partisans.
Later on Othman was reproached on all sides with this nepotism,
which caused great discontent throughout the entire empire. To this
discontent there was added an increasing reaction against the system of
finance, founded by Omar and carried on without alteration by Othman.
The lust of booty had led the Arabs out to battle, and the spoils
belonged to them after deduction of the so-called prophet's fifth. But
what was to be done with the enormous landed property which victors in
such small numbers had acquired, and who was to receive the tribute
paid yearly by the subjected peoples? Payment of this money to the
respective conquerors of the individual territories would have been
the most logical method of dealing with it, but with the fluctuations
in the Arabian population this plan would have caused insuperable
difficulties, apart from which it would have been from a statesman's
point of view extremely unwise. Omar therefore founded a state
treasury. The residents of the newly formed military camps received a
fixed stipend; the surplus of the receipts flowed to Medina, where it was ]/
not indeed capitalised but utilised for state pensions, which the Caliph
decreed according to his own judgment to the members of the theocracy,
graduated according to rank and dignity. Under the impartial Omar
oh. xi. 23—2


## p. 356 (#388) ############################################

356 Death of Othman [655-656
this was not disagreeable to any, the more especially as at that time the
gains from the booty were still very large. But when under Othman
these gains dwindled and became ever smaller, this state treasury
appeared to the Arabian provincial tribes as an oppression of the
provinces. The nepotism of Othman increased the opposition, and it
finally found expression in open revolt. These fanatical partisans were
of opinion that Othman was the man against whom the real holy war
should be waged. The Kufa men were first to rebel against the
governor nominated by Othman (655); with unaccountable weakness
Othman immediately abandoned his representative. The Egyptians were
the most energetic in their protest, and started for Medina in April 655
to the number of about 500. The disquiet which was simmering on all
sides was secretly fomented by the disappointed Companions in Medina;
they were the real plotters who made use of the discontent of the
provincials. When after long discussion the Egyptians besieged Othman
in his own house these Companions looked on inactively, or at the most
excused themselves by a few pretended manoeuvres, but in fact they were
not displeased when the rebels stormed the house and slew the defence-
less old Caliph whilst at prayer (17 June 655).
From this time onward fate took its own course. Among the Medina
companions Ali was now doubtless the nearest claimant to the Caliphate,
and some even went so far as to render him homage. On the other hand,
would he not certainly appear to all the Umayyads, and especially to the
powerful governor of Syria, as the murderer of Othman? Mu'awiya was
firmly established in Syria, and was in a position to venture, under this pre-
text—to him probably more than a pretext—to dispute the Caliphate
even with the son-in-law of the prophet. The Umayyads moreover were
not the only enemies that Ali had to contend with. His former allies,
Zubair and Talha, who were at least as much to blame as he, roused the
people against him, and this was done even more determinedly by the
prophet's widow 'A'isha, who had always been opposed to him. They
were supported by the Basra tribes, whilst Ali sought support with the
Kufa people. Near Basra the quarrel came to a decision, in the so-
called Camel battle, which takes its name from the fact that 'A'isha, in
accordance with old Arabian custom, was present at the battle in *
camel-palanquin, as a sacred sign of war. Ali conquered and 'A'isha's
part was played out. Talha and Zubair were killed in the fight (9 Dec.
656). Ali was thus master of 'Irak, and Kufa became his residence.
Hereupon Arabia ceased to be the centre of the empire, and Medina
sank to the status of a provincial town, in which piety and easy-going
elegance had the necessary quiet for development. The history of
Nearer Asia however again resolved itself, as it did before Islam, into the
opposition between 'Irak and Syria. The two halves of the empire
armed themselves for the fight for supremacy, Muslims against Muslims.
At first the better discipline of the Syrians and their higher culture


## p. 357 (#389) ############################################

656-658] Ali and Mu'awiya 357
carried the day. The recollection however of the brief political
splendour of 'Irak formed the basis for a movement which was
destined to gain strength, which a century later swept away the rule of
the Umayyads. Once more was the capital of the latest Asiatic world-
power transferred to Babylon.
After the Camel battle Ali's position was thoroughly favourable, as
Mu'awiya could not take any energetic steps against him so long as Egypt
remained on Ali's side. Mu'awiya's main attention was therefore fixed on
Egypt; and in this view he was aided and abetted by 'Amr, the first
conqueror of Egypt, who had allied himself with Mu'awiya in the hope
of attaining through him the governorship of Egypt. For that reason
he rendered Mu'awiya most important services in the war against Ali,
and as Ali at this juncture advanced against Mu'awiya a battle extending
over several days ensued, after long delay, at Siffln on the Syrian border,
not far distant from Rakka (26-27 July 657). Ali's victory appeared
certain, when 'Amr conceived the idea of fastening copies of the Koran
to the points of the lances and calling on the holy book for a decision.
This trick succeeded, and much against his will Ali was forced to yield
to the pressure of the pious members of his army. A court of arbitra-
tion was thereupon agreed on. Mu'awiya's confidential representative was
of course 'Amr, whilst Ali had forced upon him in a like capacity Musa
al-Ash'ari, a man by no means thoroughly devoted to him. They had
scarcely parted when those same pious members of his army altered
their views, and now blamed Ali for having placed men, instead of God
and the sword, as judges over him. Several thousand men separated
from Ali and entered into a separate camp at Harura, whence they
were called Hariirites or secessionists, Kharijites. They resisted Ali by
force, and he was compelled to cut down most of them at Nahrawan
(7 July 658). Later on they split into innumerable small sects and
still gave much trouble to Ali and the Umayyads. The sense of
independence and the robber-knight ideas of the ancient Arabians lived
still in them, but under a religious cloak. Offshoots from these people,
the so-called Ibadites, exist even to-day in South Arabia and in East and
North Africa.
The information we have as to the result of the court of arbitration
is untrustworthy. In any case the clever 'Amr outwitted his coadjudicator
by persuading him also to deal with Ali and Mu'awiya as being on the
same footing, whilst of course Ali was the only one who had a Caliphate
to lose. Ali appears actually to have been divested of this dignity by
decree of the arbitration, but this decision did not induce him to abdicate.
This arbitration court was held at Adhruh in the year 658. Even more
painful for Ali than this failure was the loss of Egypt, which 'Amr
shortly afterwards reconquered for himself, and administered until his
death more as a viceroy than a governor. No definite decision was brought
about between Ali and Mu'awiya, as their forces were about equally


## p. 358 (#390) ############################################

358 Mu'awiya Caliph [66O-680
balanced. It was not until July 660 that Mu'Swiya caused himself to be
proclaimed Caliph at Jerusalem. Six months later Ali succumbed to the
dagger of an assassin (24 Jan. 661). Mu'awiya had to thank this
circumstance for his victory, for Ali's son and successor Hasan came to
terms with him in return for an allowance. Herewith began the
rule of the Umayyads, and Damascus became the capital of the empire.
This has been rightly termed the Arabian Empire, for it was founded
on a national basis, in marked contrast to the subsequent State of the
Abbasids, for which Islam served as a foundation. The first Caliphs
had striven after a theocracy, but, as all the members of the theocracy
were Arabs, an Arabian national empire was created. For a time the
migration of the tribes had more weight than religion. We see this
most clearly by the fact that no longer the pious companions, but the old
Arabian aristocracy, no longer Ansar and Muhajirun, but the Arabian
tribes of Syria and 'Irak, determined the destinies of the empire. The
great expansion however was only able to hold back religion for a time.
Religion soon served fo give authority to the government in power, but
at the same time provided a special motive for all kinds of opposition.
That is shewn by the domestic policy of the Umayyad State; in the first
place to force the discipline of the State on the ruling class, %je. , the
Arabs, without which no successful combined social life was possible, and
in the second place it was necessary to regulate their relations with the
non-Arabian subordinate class.
The fight for the supremacy in the State, which appeared to the 'Irak
after the days of Ali as the rule of the hated Syrians, formed the life-
task of all the great Caliphs of the house of Umayya. Mu'awiya had still
most of all the manners of an old Arabian prince; he appeared to the
Romaic element simply as the 7rpo>Tocrv/i/3ouXos of his governors,
<rvfi/3ov\oi. In Syria they had been accustomed to such things since the
days of the Ghassanids, and to that may be ascribed the better discipline
of the Syrian Arabs, who in all respects stood on a higher plane of
culture than those of 'Irak. Mu'awiya was a clever prince, and ruled by
wisdom over the tribes, whose naturally selfish rivalries supported the
structure of his State like the opposing spans of an arch. His rule was
so patriarchal, and his advisers had so much voice in the matter, that
some have thought to have found traces of parliamentary government
under Mu'awiya. Nevertheless Mu'awiya knew quite well how to carry
his point for the State, i. e. , for himself, though he avoided the
absolutist forms and the pomp of later Caliphs. The nepotism d
Othman was quite foreign to his rule; although his relatives did not
fare badly under him he nevertheless looked afte*- th° pricijjj^ ■pf Strtj
in preference to them. /He had a brilliant talent for winning important
\ men. On the same principles as the Caliph in Damascus, the Thakifite:
Ziyad, whom he had adopted as a brother, ruled as an independent viceroy
1 I. e. of the tribe of Thaklf- See p. 325.


## p. 359 (#391) ############################################

680-683] Murder of Husain at Karbala 369
over the eastern half of the kingdom. Mu'awiya's aspirations in state
policy were finally to found a dynasty. He proclaimed his son Yazid
as his successor, although this act was opposed not only to the ancient
common law based on usage but also to the mode of election of the
theocracy.
On Mu'awiya's death (18 April 680) Yazid was accordingly recognised
in the West and partially also in 'Irak. At once a double opposition
began to foment; that of the Ali party in 'Irak, which had already
begun to revive under Mu'awiya,and the theocratic opposition of the Hijaz.
Thejaidjeayour to transfer the central government once more, respectively
to 'Irak and to the Hijaz, probably underlay the opposition in both
cases. As regards 'Irak that theory is a certainty, for the families of
Kufa and Basra had not forgotten that in Ali's time they had been the
masters of the empire. Now however Ali's Shl'a (party) was thrust into
the background by the Syrians. They looked back to Ali, and their
ardent desire was a restoration of that golden period for Kufa. Their
enthusiasm for Ali and his kin is therefore nothing more than a
glorification of their own special province, of the one and only 'Irak Caliph.
This brilliant period they hoped after the death of the great Mu'awiya
to recover for themselves by selecting Husain, the second son of Ali.
Husain complied with the solicitations of the Kufa people. These how-
ever, unsteady and undisciplined as ever, shrank from rebellion and failed
him at the last moment. Husain and those remaining faithful to him
were cut down at Karbala (10 Oct. 680). Ali's son had thereby, like
others before him, fallen as a martyr to the cause of Shi'ism. Political
aspirations slowly assumed a religious tinge. The death of the prophet's
grandson in the cause of the Kufa people, their remorse on that account,
their faded hopes, their hatred of the Syrians, and, last but not least,
heterodox currents which now began to shew themselves, prepared the
way for the great Shiite insurrection a few years later under Mukhtar. Ali
is now no longer simply the companion and son-in-law of the prophet,
but has become the heir of his prophetic spirit, which then lives on in his
sons. The Ali dynasty—so at least say the legitimists—are the only true
priestly Imams, the only legal Caliphs. The struggle for the house of
the prophet, for the Banu Hashim, becomes more and more the watch-
word of the opposition party, who, after their political overthrow in 'Irak,
removed their sphere of operation to Persia. There however this
Arabian legitimism united with Iranian claims, and, in the fight for the
Banu Hashim, the Persians were arrayed against the Arabs.