As soon as Lytton heard of his
appearance, he had directed Lepel Griffin (the English political agent
at Kabul) to send him conciliatory messages, and, in spite of sus-
picions natural against one who had been long connected with
Russians, it was decided to enter into negotiations with him.
appearance, he had directed Lepel Griffin (the English political agent
at Kabul) to send him conciliatory messages, and, in spite of sus-
picions natural against one who had been long connected with
Russians, it was decided to enter into negotiations with him.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
Papers, 1881, xcvm, 350).
2 Idem, 351; cf. Roberts, Forty-one Years in India, 11, 248.
3 Abd-ur-rahman, op. cit. 1, 149.
* Parl. Papers, 1878, LXXXI, 584, 591.
5 Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 247. 6 Roberts, op. cit. II, 110.
? Vide p. 405, supra:
& Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 603.
• Roberts's report based on Yakub's information (Roberts, op. cit. 11, 469).
10 Parl. Papers, 1881, XCVIII, 350.
27
CHIVI
## p. 418 (#456) ############################################
418
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
» 2
3
tember Neville Chamberlain, the envoy whom Lytton had chosen, was
prevented by threats of violence from passing Ali Masjid. 1 Sher 'Ali
had accepted Stolietoff's advice and resolved to defy the Government
of India.
"The amir's policy”, Lytton wrote, “was to make fools of us in the sight of all
Central Asia and all India without affording us any pretext for active resentment,
My policy was naturally to force the amir either to change his policy or to reveal
it in such a manner as must make the public a partner with the government in the
duty of counteracting it. ” ?
Lytton has generally been represented as taking an over-serious
view of the situation. But the problem was twofold. It was not
merely that of a possible invasion of India. It also included the results
of a widespread belief in its likelihood. Salisbury might scout the
possibility, advise the use of large-scale maps, and point to the essential
weakness of Russia, but an invasion of India was “a common topic
of conversation in every assemblage of chiefs between Tabriz and
Peshawur”. 4 The fundamental weakness of past policy had been that
it had left Russia free to advance so that the day was visibly threatening
when the spheres of interest of the two empires would meet, not at a
convenient distance from, but actually on the Indian frontier. “It
may be very convenient", wrote Frere with great truth, “to say we
will be guided by circumstances; but that is not the sort of policy
which wins friends and deters enemies. "
In the dispatch of the mission Lytton had overrun the wishes of
Beaconsfield and Salisbury. Both were extremely anxious to see the
Russian forces withdrawn from Turkish territory, and feared lest a
sudden flare-up of Afghan difficulties might endanger the execution
of the Treaty of Berlin. They would have preferred to see the Afghan
trouble smoothed over or at all events put off for a twelvemonth; but
Beaconsfield's language and views seem to have varied from day to
day, with the result that the instructions sent to Lytton by the India
Office were not so clear and specific as was expected. It had been
desired that the mission to the amir should proceed not by the Khyber
Pass, where it was expected and likely to be stopped, but by way of
the Bolan and Kandahar where opposition would have been more
difficult and unlikely. ” But the choice of routes seems to have been
left to Lytton, who chose the more provocative. On 25 and 30 October
stormy meetings of the cabinet took place. Salisbury and the Lord
Chancellor severely attacked Lytton's conduct and urged the ex-
pediency of curbing his future proceedings. Cranbrook, the secretary
of state for India, strongly defended the governor-general. In the
interests of cabinet unity Beaconsfield proposed that Lytton should
• Forrest, Life of Sir Neville Chamberlain, pp. 479. 999;
: Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 285.
Cf. Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 128, 142.
• Frere, Letter to Durand, p. 44.
• Martineau, op. cit. 1, 239.
• Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli, vi, 380 599.
' Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 341.
## p. 419 (#457) ############################################
THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR
419
2
be authorised to occupy the Kurram valley, not as an act of war
but as the taking of a "material guarantee” for the granting of the
English demands. But when it seemed likely that this would be
adopted, Cranbrook refused to have anything to do with so half-
hearted a measure. At last Lytton's and Cranbrook's views prevailed. 1
On 2 November an ultimatum, expiring on the 20th, was dispatched
to Sher 'Ali. The amir had already applied to Kaufmann for assistance
in view of the threatening English attitude, which he rightly ascribed
to the arrival of the Russian mission. 2 Kaufmann advised Sher 'Ali
to make peace if he could. In fact the Russian agents had fallen into
the pit which they had dug for others. Reckoning too hopefully on
the approach of an Anglo-Russian war, they had led Sher 'Ali into
relying on their support, at the moment when they found themselves
unable to accord it. Lytton and Cranbrook were right in seizing this
precise moment to re-establish British ascendancy at Kabul, when
Sher 'Ali's hostility was manifest, when Russian intervention would
have involved tearing up the agreement reached so lately at Berlin,
and when Russian resources, financial and military, were depleted
by the recent war.
The campaign which began with the invasion of Afghan territory
on 20 November was skilfully conducted and speedily successful. *
Two columns advanced by the Kurram and the Khyber passes. On
22 December Sher 'Ali issued a farman in which, after recounting his
numerous triumphs over the invaders, he announced his retirement
into Russian territory. " He died early in 1879, and negotiations were
opened with his son' Yakub leading to the Treaty of Gandammak,
signed 26 May, 1879, before the British forces had entered Kabul.
By this agreement the new amir assigned the districts of Kurram,
Pishin and Sibi to the British Government; he agreed to conduct his
relations with foreign states in accordance with the advice of the
governor-general; and he agreed to accept a permanent British re-
presentative, who was to be stationed at Kabul. s Every object which
had been sought thus seemed to have been secured.
The doubtful point was whether Amir Yakub would succeed in
maintaining his position. Cavagnari, the political agent who had
conducted the negotiations, had not been much impressed by his
talent and character, reporting him as the best of his family, but fickle
of purpose, ignorant of business, and weak of mind. ' The estimate
was not unjust. Roberts noted his shifty eye, retreating forehead, and
lack of vigour. 10 His weakness had already been displayed. Lytton
Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit. VI, 386; Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 342.
: Parl. Papers, 1881, XCVII, 353.
• The best account is probably to be found in Roberts, op. cit. chaps. xlv 599.
• Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 702.
• Idem, 355.
• Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 313.
' Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 691.
• Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 691; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 326 sqq.
• Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 322.
10 Roberts, op. cit. 11, 202.
.
27-2
## p. 420 (#458) ############################################
420
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
3
had strongly desired the establishment of a British mission, but had
contemplated its residence at Herat, not at Kabul. Yakub, however,
had himself proposed Kabul, willing to run any risk provided he
could secure the support of the British army. The proposal was
accepted with some misgivings. Cavagnari, resolute and forceful,
was named resident-an admirable man in a crisis, but less suited for
a position of delicacy. He reached Kabul on 24 July. He was well
received with an Afghan rendering of God save the Queen. On
3 September he was murdered in the course of a real or pretended
mutiny of unpaid troops. Roberts's opinion, probably correct, was
that Yakub intended a demonstration which should show his inability
to protect the mission and so obtain its withdrawal. * Events had
shown that Lytton had been unlucky in finding himself virtually
obliged to adopt Yakub as Sher 'Ali's successor, and unwise in
agreeing to the mission's being placed at Kabul and in selecting
Cavagnari as his agent there.
This misfortune led necessarily to a renewal of the campaign.
Roberts advanced by the Kurram Pass and occupied Kabul on
7 October. Yakub had joined him on the march, declaring that he
would rather be a grass-cutter with the English than attempt to rule
the Afghans. Roberts's swift movement disconcerted the tribesmen,
and though his cantonments were attacked, he had small difficulty
in holding his position through the following winter. Meanwhile the
political problem demanded solution. All agreed that Yakub should
not be restored. He was removed to India, pensioned, and resided at
Dehra Dun till his death in 1923. As no suitable candidate for the
amirat could be found, both Lytton and the home government inclined
to a policy of disintegration. The Foreign Office even began negotia-
tions with Teheran about the terms on which Persia might be suffered
to occupy. Herat, while a representative of the old Sadozai house,
Wali Sher 'Ali Khan, was recognised as sardar of Kandahar. ? Since
this arrangement, together with the occupation of the territory assigned
by Yakub, would secure the line of advance upon Herat whenever
necessary, and outflank any hostile advance from Kabul towards
India, it was thought that it did not greatly matter who held Kabul. 8
These tentative arrangements, however, were quickly brought to an
end by an unexpected and very fortunate development. Ever since
Sher 'Ali's establishment in power in 1868, his nephew, Abd-ur-
rahman, had been living under Russian protection, mainly at
Samarkand. He was now a man of forty-short and stoutly built,
with bluff but pleasant manners and an easy smile, self-possessed,
i Lady B. Balfour, ор. p. 336.
2 Forrest, op. cit. p. 494.
: Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 342 599.
• Roberts, op. cit. 11, 254; cf. Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 375-6.
• Roberts, op. cit. 11, 192 599. ; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 361.
• Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 375.
? Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 376 sqq.
$ Cf. idem, p. 408.
cit.
## p. 421 (#459) ############################################
ABD-UR-RAHMAN
421
clear-minded. He looked the personification of watchful strength
moved by an inflexible will, and hadindeed inherited his grandfather's,
Dost Muhammad's, vigour, judgment and ferocity. In 1880, after
many discussions with the Russian governor-general, Abd-ur-rahman
obtained leave to return to Afghanistan, and set out from Tashkent
with a small party of men. Next day, as he was on the march, he
received, as he thought, a sign from God. As sometimes happens in
the Central Asian deserts,' he thought he heard a great cavalcade, to
the number of 20,000, draw level with him and gradually pass on
ahead. "By this I reasoned that God had cleared my way for me. "
Full of hope he entered Balkh, praying Allah either to overthrow the
English or to turn their hearts.
As soon as Lytton heard of his
appearance, he had directed Lepel Griffin (the English political agent
at Kabul) to send him conciliatory messages, and, in spite of sus-
picions natural against one who had been long connected with
Russians, it was decided to enter into negotiations with him. But at
this stage matters were interrupted by the arrival (8 June, 1880) of
a new governor-general, Lord Ripon.
In the previous spring a general election, in the course of which
Radical speakers had made great play with Lytton's conduct of the
Afghán question, had replaced Beaconsfield by Gladstone as prime
minister, Cranbrook by Hartington at the India Office, and Salisbury
by Granville at the Foreign Office. Northbrook, who took the
Admiralty in the new cabinet, was violently opposed to the policy to
which he had been sacrificed and loudly insisted on the instant need
of surrendering every post on the further side of the hills and returning
to the old frontier line. Accordingly the evacuation of Sibi and Pishin
was promised in the queen's speech in the opening session of 1881. 6
But the zealots for retreat met with unexpected opposition from their
governor-general. Ripon had, indeed, gone out to India with a strong
bias against Lytton and all his works. He had on arrival ransacked
the records of the political department in the hope of finding schemes
that would have blasted for ever the reputations of Lytton and
Beaconsfield. ? But in fact he had taken over the negotiations with
Abd-ur-rahman at the point where Lytton had laid them down and
conducted them to the conclusion at which Lytton had already aimed.
Under his orders Griffin reached an understanding with Abd-ur-
rahman by which Pishin and Sibi were retained, and by which the new
amirplaced the management of his foreign relations under the Govern-
ment of India, in return for which the Indian Government promised
to pay the amir an annual subsidy. 8 Abd-ur-rahman had already
1 Cf. Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 439; Sir Alfred Lyall, ap. Edinburgh Review, April, 1889;
Gray, At the Court of the Amir, p. 158.
· Cf. Marco Polo, Travels (ed. Yule and Cordier), 1, 197.
• Abd-ur-rahman, op. cit. 1, 155599.
• Idem, 1, 192, 194; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 412, 428 sqq.
• Wolf
, Life of Ripon, 11, 40, 48.
* Idem, 11, 12, 19.
• Memorandum of conversations, 31 July-1 August, 1880 (F. O. 65-1104).
• Idem, 1, 190.
## p. 421 (#460) ############################################
420
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
had strongly desired the establishment of a British mission, but had
contemplated its residence at Herat, not at Kabul. Yakub, however,
had himself proposed Kabul, willing to run any risk provided he
could secure the support of the British army. The proposal was
accepted with some misgivings. Cavagnari, resolute and forceful,
was named resident-an admirable man in a crisis, but less suited for
a position of delicacy. He reached Kabul on 24 July. He was well
received with an Afghan rendering of God save the Queen. On
3 September he was murdered in the course of a real or pretended
mutiny of unpaid troops. Roberts's opinion, probably correct, was
that Yakub intended a demonstration which should show his inability
to protect the mission and so obtain its withdrawal. Events had
shown that Lytton had been unlucky in finding himself virtually
obliged to adopt Yakub as Sher 'Ali's successor, and unwise in
agreeing to the mission's being placed at Kabul and in selecting
Cavagnari as his agent there.
This misfortune led necessarily to a renewal of the campaign.
Roberts advanced by the Kurram Pass and occupied Kabul on
7 October. Yakub had joined him on the march, declaring that he
would rather be a grass-cutter with the English than attempt to rule
the Afghans. Roberts's swift movement disconcerted the tribesmen,
and though his cantonments were attacked, he had small difficulty
in holding his position through the following winter. Meanwhile the
political problem demanded solution. All agreed that Yakub should
not be restored. He was removed to India, pensioned, and resided at
Dehra Dun till his death in 1923. As no suitable candidate for the
amirat could be found, both Lytton and the home government inclined
to a policy of disintegration. The Foreign Office even began negotia-
tions with Teheran about the terms on which Persia might be suffered
to occupy. Herat, while a representative of the old Sadozai house,
Wali Sher 'Ali Khan, was recognised as sardar of Kandahar. ? Since
this arrangement, together with the occupation of the territory assigned
by Yakub, would secure the line of advance upon Herat whenever
necessary, and outflank any hostile advance from Kabul towards
India, it was thought that it did not greatly matter who held Kabul. 8
These tentative arrangements, however, were quickly brought to an
end by an unexpected and very fortunate development. Ever since
Sher 'Ali's establishment in power in 1868, his nephew, Abd-ur-
rahman, had been living under Russian protection, mainly at
Samarkand. He was now a man of forty-short and stoutly built,
with bluff but pleasant manners and an easy smile, self-possessed,
1 Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 336.
2 Forrest, op. cit. p. 494.
3 Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 342 599.
• Roberts, op. cit. 11, 254; cf. Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 375-6.
• Roberts, op. cit. 11, 192 sqq. ; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 361.
o Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 375.
· Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 376 sqq.
$ Cf. idem, p. 408.
## p. 421 (#461) ############################################
ABD-UR-RAHMAN
421
clear-minded. He looked the personification of watchful strength
moved by an inflexible will, and had indeed inherited his grandfather's,
Dost Muhammad's, vigour, judgment and ferocity. In 1880, after
many discussions with the Russian governor-general, Abd-ur-rahman
obtained leave to return to Afghanistan, and set out from Tashkent
with a small party of men. Next day, as he was on the march, he
received, as he thought, a sign from God. As sometimes happens in
the Central Asian deserts, 2 he thought he heard a great cavalcade, to
the number of 20,000, draw level with him and gradually pass on
ahead. “By this I reasoned that God had cleared my way for me. "
Full of hope he entered Balkh, praying Allah either to overthrow the
English or to turn their hearts. •' As soon as Lytton heard of his
appearance, he had directed Lepel Griffin (the English political agent
at Kabul) to send him conciliatory messages, and, in spite of sus-
picions natural against one who had been long connected with
Russians, it was decided to enter into negotiations with him. But at
this stage matters were interrupted by the arrival (8 June, 1880) of
a new governor-general, Lord Ripon.
In the previous spring a general election, in the course of which
Radical speakers had made great play with Lytton's conduct of the
Afghán question, had replaced Beaconsfield by Gladstone as prime
minister, Cranbrook by Hartington at the India Office, and Salisbury
by Granville at the Foreign Office. Northbrook, who took the
Admiralty in the new cabinet, was violently opposed to the policy to
which he had been sacrificed and loudly insisted on the instant need
of surrendering every post on the further side of the hills and returning
to the old frontier line. Accordingly the evacuation of Sibi and Pishin
was promised in the queen's speech in the opening session of 1881. 6
But the zealots for retreat met with unexpected opposition from their
governor-general. Ripon had, indeed, gone out to India with a strong
bias against Lytton and all his works. He had on arrival ransacked
the records of the political department in the hope of finding schemes
that would have blasted for ever the reputations of Lytton and
Beaconsfield. ' But in fact he had taken over the negotiations with
Abd-ur-rahman at the point where Lytton had laid them down and
conducted them to the conclusion at which Lytton had already aimed.
Under his orders Griffin reached an understanding with Abd-ur-
rahman by which Pishin and Sibi were retained, and by which the new
amir placed the management of his foreign relations under the Govern-
ment of India, in return for which the Indian Government promised
to pay the amir an annual subsidy. 8 Abd-ur-rahman had already
1 Cf. Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 439; Sir Alfred Lyall, ap. Edinburgh Review, April, 1889;
Gray, At the Court of the Amir, p: 158.
: Cf. Marco Polo, Travels (ed. Yule and Cordier), 1, 197.
Abd-ur-rahman, op. cit. I, 155599.
• Idem, 1, 190.
• Idem, 1, 192, 194; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 412, 428 599.
• Wolf, Life of Ripon, 11, 40, 48.
° Idem, 11, 12, 19.
• Memorandum of conversations, 31 July-1 August, 1880 (F. O. 65-1104).
## p. 422 (#462) ############################################
422
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
given evidence of his real desire for English friendship. When in July,
1880, Ayub Khan, Sher 'Ali's son, had attacked Burrows, commanding
the English force at Kandahar, inflicting on him a severe defeat at
Maiwand, the amir had promptly dispatched letters to all the chiefs
on the route by which Roberts was to march from Kabul to retrieve
the situation, directing them to afford the English all possible as-
sistance; and this explains at least in part the case with which Roberts
effected his famous march from Kabul to Kandahar, leading to the
complete defeat of Ayub Khan's forces. When, therefore, Ripon was
called upon to give effect to the declared policy of the liberal cabinet,
he told Hartington bluntly that it would lead in ten years' time to
another Afghan war, and broadly hinted that he would rather resign
than overrule his council in order to carry out what he regarded as
a mistaken policy. The cabinet accordingly permitted its declara-
tions to fall into a convenient if dishonest oblivion.
The settlement thus reached brought to a close a most dangerous
phase of the Central Asian question. Lytton may be blamed for his
provocative handling of the proposal to establish an Afghan mission
and for his selection at a later time of a too sanguine agent to conduct
British relations with the amir Yakub. But he had inherited a position
of extreme difficulty. Argyll's decision of 1873 had already convinced
Sher 'Ali that he had nothing to hope for from the English; while he
fancied from their previous conduct that he had nothing to fear from
them either. Accordingly he had turned to Russia. Lytton had to
disabuse him of his error. Probably Lytton was right in thinking that
nothing short of war would do so. In any case war was made in-
evitable by the Russian action in the crisis of 1878. Stolietoff's
embassy imperatively demanded the submission or destruction of
Sher 'Ali. In view of the developments of the following ten years, the
policy adopted by Salisbury and Lytton was justified in its broad
outlines. Nor does the second Afghan War afford a parallel with the
first except in superficial aspects. Both, of course, illustrate the ease
with which Afghanistan may be occupied and the difficulty with
which it can be held. But the first ended with the mere restoration
of the ruler whom the British had dethroned, with no advantage
military or political or diplomatic. The second replaced a hostile by
a friendly amir; it brought to a decisive end the disastrous policy of
Lawrence and Argyll; and it provided India, for the first time since
the collapse of the Moghul Empire, with a position from which the
north-west frontier could easily be defended.
Up to this time the Russian frontier had not pressed too closely on
Afghanistan. But now Russia, taking advantage of the numerous
external difficulties of the Gladstone government, and fortified by a
1 Cf. Kabul Diary, week ending 8 August, 1880 (F. O. 65-1104).
2 Wolf, op. cit. II, 39;
: Cf. Davies, The North-West Frontier, pp. 10 599.
## p. 423 (#463) ############################################
RUSSIA AND GLADSTONE
423
secret treaty with Germany, thought the time had come for abandoning
intentions which had been the subject in the past of repeated declara-
tions. The Merv oasis afforded the first example. It is likely that the
strategic importance of this region had been greatly exaggerated by
persons suffering from what the Duke of Argyll (with school-boy
humour) was pleased to call "mervousness”. ? It was, however, in
disagreeable proximity to Herat, and on several occasions the British
Foreign Office had sought reassurances regarding its future. In 1882
these were repeated. De Giers assured the British ambassador in a
conversation, not once but repeatedly, that the mission of Russia was
one of peace and that she had no intention whatever of occupying
fresh territory3 Within three months British agents were possessed
of documents showing that the Russians were seeking the submission
of the Meiv chiefs, and in fact, at the moment when the Russian
foreign minister was soothing the British ambassador, the Merv
chieftains were being urged and bribed to submit. Finally, early in
1884, when Mr Gladstone was embarrassed by the Mahdi in the
Sudan, the chiefs were beguiled and coerced into tendering allegiance
to the emperor, while the War Office at St Petersburg prepared a map
showing the Merv boundaries stretching southwards and touching
the Hari-rud near Herat. As Curzon said, “the flame of diplomatic
protest blazed fiercely forth in England; but, after a momentary
combustion, was as usual extinguished by a flood of excuses from the
inexhaustible reservoirs of the Neva”. ?
This event created such general uneasiness that the liberal govern-
ment could not leave matters where they stood. Conversations,
which had been begun in London as early as 1882,8 led to a reference
to St Petersburg. ' But although the imperial government regarded
Gladstone with a singular benevolence, 10 the operation of that senti-
ment was certainly limited by the need of taking the utmost advantage
of his tenure of office. While, therefore, it was willing enough to approve
the idea of formally defining the northern boundary of Afghanistan,
it also began to refer casually to Panjdeh and the need of establishing
peace in that area. 11 Granville eagerly took up the idea of a joint
delimitation; an Indiaiofficial, Sir Peter Lumsden, was appointed
to conduct the British mission, the amir was invited to provide
qualified officers, and Granville proposed that the British and Russian
missions should meet at Saraks on 1 October, 1884. 12 He thus
assumed that Russia really intended to co-operate. But for that the
Russian leaders did not yet deem the time to be ripe. They certainly
1 Curzon, op. cit. p. 120.
2 The Eastern Question, II, 371.
• Parl. Papers, 1884, LXXXVII, 77.
• Idem, p. 95; cf. Baddeley, Russia in the Eighties, p.
2 Idem, 351; cf. Roberts, Forty-one Years in India, 11, 248.
3 Abd-ur-rahman, op. cit. 1, 149.
* Parl. Papers, 1878, LXXXI, 584, 591.
5 Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 247. 6 Roberts, op. cit. II, 110.
? Vide p. 405, supra:
& Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 603.
• Roberts's report based on Yakub's information (Roberts, op. cit. 11, 469).
10 Parl. Papers, 1881, XCVIII, 350.
27
CHIVI
## p. 418 (#456) ############################################
418
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
» 2
3
tember Neville Chamberlain, the envoy whom Lytton had chosen, was
prevented by threats of violence from passing Ali Masjid. 1 Sher 'Ali
had accepted Stolietoff's advice and resolved to defy the Government
of India.
"The amir's policy”, Lytton wrote, “was to make fools of us in the sight of all
Central Asia and all India without affording us any pretext for active resentment,
My policy was naturally to force the amir either to change his policy or to reveal
it in such a manner as must make the public a partner with the government in the
duty of counteracting it. ” ?
Lytton has generally been represented as taking an over-serious
view of the situation. But the problem was twofold. It was not
merely that of a possible invasion of India. It also included the results
of a widespread belief in its likelihood. Salisbury might scout the
possibility, advise the use of large-scale maps, and point to the essential
weakness of Russia, but an invasion of India was “a common topic
of conversation in every assemblage of chiefs between Tabriz and
Peshawur”. 4 The fundamental weakness of past policy had been that
it had left Russia free to advance so that the day was visibly threatening
when the spheres of interest of the two empires would meet, not at a
convenient distance from, but actually on the Indian frontier. “It
may be very convenient", wrote Frere with great truth, “to say we
will be guided by circumstances; but that is not the sort of policy
which wins friends and deters enemies. "
In the dispatch of the mission Lytton had overrun the wishes of
Beaconsfield and Salisbury. Both were extremely anxious to see the
Russian forces withdrawn from Turkish territory, and feared lest a
sudden flare-up of Afghan difficulties might endanger the execution
of the Treaty of Berlin. They would have preferred to see the Afghan
trouble smoothed over or at all events put off for a twelvemonth; but
Beaconsfield's language and views seem to have varied from day to
day, with the result that the instructions sent to Lytton by the India
Office were not so clear and specific as was expected. It had been
desired that the mission to the amir should proceed not by the Khyber
Pass, where it was expected and likely to be stopped, but by way of
the Bolan and Kandahar where opposition would have been more
difficult and unlikely. ” But the choice of routes seems to have been
left to Lytton, who chose the more provocative. On 25 and 30 October
stormy meetings of the cabinet took place. Salisbury and the Lord
Chancellor severely attacked Lytton's conduct and urged the ex-
pediency of curbing his future proceedings. Cranbrook, the secretary
of state for India, strongly defended the governor-general. In the
interests of cabinet unity Beaconsfield proposed that Lytton should
• Forrest, Life of Sir Neville Chamberlain, pp. 479. 999;
: Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 285.
Cf. Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 128, 142.
• Frere, Letter to Durand, p. 44.
• Martineau, op. cit. 1, 239.
• Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli, vi, 380 599.
' Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 341.
## p. 419 (#457) ############################################
THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR
419
2
be authorised to occupy the Kurram valley, not as an act of war
but as the taking of a "material guarantee” for the granting of the
English demands. But when it seemed likely that this would be
adopted, Cranbrook refused to have anything to do with so half-
hearted a measure. At last Lytton's and Cranbrook's views prevailed. 1
On 2 November an ultimatum, expiring on the 20th, was dispatched
to Sher 'Ali. The amir had already applied to Kaufmann for assistance
in view of the threatening English attitude, which he rightly ascribed
to the arrival of the Russian mission. 2 Kaufmann advised Sher 'Ali
to make peace if he could. In fact the Russian agents had fallen into
the pit which they had dug for others. Reckoning too hopefully on
the approach of an Anglo-Russian war, they had led Sher 'Ali into
relying on their support, at the moment when they found themselves
unable to accord it. Lytton and Cranbrook were right in seizing this
precise moment to re-establish British ascendancy at Kabul, when
Sher 'Ali's hostility was manifest, when Russian intervention would
have involved tearing up the agreement reached so lately at Berlin,
and when Russian resources, financial and military, were depleted
by the recent war.
The campaign which began with the invasion of Afghan territory
on 20 November was skilfully conducted and speedily successful. *
Two columns advanced by the Kurram and the Khyber passes. On
22 December Sher 'Ali issued a farman in which, after recounting his
numerous triumphs over the invaders, he announced his retirement
into Russian territory. " He died early in 1879, and negotiations were
opened with his son' Yakub leading to the Treaty of Gandammak,
signed 26 May, 1879, before the British forces had entered Kabul.
By this agreement the new amir assigned the districts of Kurram,
Pishin and Sibi to the British Government; he agreed to conduct his
relations with foreign states in accordance with the advice of the
governor-general; and he agreed to accept a permanent British re-
presentative, who was to be stationed at Kabul. s Every object which
had been sought thus seemed to have been secured.
The doubtful point was whether Amir Yakub would succeed in
maintaining his position. Cavagnari, the political agent who had
conducted the negotiations, had not been much impressed by his
talent and character, reporting him as the best of his family, but fickle
of purpose, ignorant of business, and weak of mind. ' The estimate
was not unjust. Roberts noted his shifty eye, retreating forehead, and
lack of vigour. 10 His weakness had already been displayed. Lytton
Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit. VI, 386; Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 342.
: Parl. Papers, 1881, XCVII, 353.
• The best account is probably to be found in Roberts, op. cit. chaps. xlv 599.
• Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 702.
• Idem, 355.
• Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 313.
' Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 691.
• Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 691; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 326 sqq.
• Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 322.
10 Roberts, op. cit. 11, 202.
.
27-2
## p. 420 (#458) ############################################
420
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
3
had strongly desired the establishment of a British mission, but had
contemplated its residence at Herat, not at Kabul. Yakub, however,
had himself proposed Kabul, willing to run any risk provided he
could secure the support of the British army. The proposal was
accepted with some misgivings. Cavagnari, resolute and forceful,
was named resident-an admirable man in a crisis, but less suited for
a position of delicacy. He reached Kabul on 24 July. He was well
received with an Afghan rendering of God save the Queen. On
3 September he was murdered in the course of a real or pretended
mutiny of unpaid troops. Roberts's opinion, probably correct, was
that Yakub intended a demonstration which should show his inability
to protect the mission and so obtain its withdrawal. * Events had
shown that Lytton had been unlucky in finding himself virtually
obliged to adopt Yakub as Sher 'Ali's successor, and unwise in
agreeing to the mission's being placed at Kabul and in selecting
Cavagnari as his agent there.
This misfortune led necessarily to a renewal of the campaign.
Roberts advanced by the Kurram Pass and occupied Kabul on
7 October. Yakub had joined him on the march, declaring that he
would rather be a grass-cutter with the English than attempt to rule
the Afghans. Roberts's swift movement disconcerted the tribesmen,
and though his cantonments were attacked, he had small difficulty
in holding his position through the following winter. Meanwhile the
political problem demanded solution. All agreed that Yakub should
not be restored. He was removed to India, pensioned, and resided at
Dehra Dun till his death in 1923. As no suitable candidate for the
amirat could be found, both Lytton and the home government inclined
to a policy of disintegration. The Foreign Office even began negotia-
tions with Teheran about the terms on which Persia might be suffered
to occupy. Herat, while a representative of the old Sadozai house,
Wali Sher 'Ali Khan, was recognised as sardar of Kandahar. ? Since
this arrangement, together with the occupation of the territory assigned
by Yakub, would secure the line of advance upon Herat whenever
necessary, and outflank any hostile advance from Kabul towards
India, it was thought that it did not greatly matter who held Kabul. 8
These tentative arrangements, however, were quickly brought to an
end by an unexpected and very fortunate development. Ever since
Sher 'Ali's establishment in power in 1868, his nephew, Abd-ur-
rahman, had been living under Russian protection, mainly at
Samarkand. He was now a man of forty-short and stoutly built,
with bluff but pleasant manners and an easy smile, self-possessed,
i Lady B. Balfour, ор. p. 336.
2 Forrest, op. cit. p. 494.
: Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 342 599.
• Roberts, op. cit. 11, 254; cf. Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 375-6.
• Roberts, op. cit. 11, 192 599. ; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 361.
• Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 375.
? Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 376 sqq.
$ Cf. idem, p. 408.
cit.
## p. 421 (#459) ############################################
ABD-UR-RAHMAN
421
clear-minded. He looked the personification of watchful strength
moved by an inflexible will, and hadindeed inherited his grandfather's,
Dost Muhammad's, vigour, judgment and ferocity. In 1880, after
many discussions with the Russian governor-general, Abd-ur-rahman
obtained leave to return to Afghanistan, and set out from Tashkent
with a small party of men. Next day, as he was on the march, he
received, as he thought, a sign from God. As sometimes happens in
the Central Asian deserts,' he thought he heard a great cavalcade, to
the number of 20,000, draw level with him and gradually pass on
ahead. "By this I reasoned that God had cleared my way for me. "
Full of hope he entered Balkh, praying Allah either to overthrow the
English or to turn their hearts.
As soon as Lytton heard of his
appearance, he had directed Lepel Griffin (the English political agent
at Kabul) to send him conciliatory messages, and, in spite of sus-
picions natural against one who had been long connected with
Russians, it was decided to enter into negotiations with him. But at
this stage matters were interrupted by the arrival (8 June, 1880) of
a new governor-general, Lord Ripon.
In the previous spring a general election, in the course of which
Radical speakers had made great play with Lytton's conduct of the
Afghán question, had replaced Beaconsfield by Gladstone as prime
minister, Cranbrook by Hartington at the India Office, and Salisbury
by Granville at the Foreign Office. Northbrook, who took the
Admiralty in the new cabinet, was violently opposed to the policy to
which he had been sacrificed and loudly insisted on the instant need
of surrendering every post on the further side of the hills and returning
to the old frontier line. Accordingly the evacuation of Sibi and Pishin
was promised in the queen's speech in the opening session of 1881. 6
But the zealots for retreat met with unexpected opposition from their
governor-general. Ripon had, indeed, gone out to India with a strong
bias against Lytton and all his works. He had on arrival ransacked
the records of the political department in the hope of finding schemes
that would have blasted for ever the reputations of Lytton and
Beaconsfield. ? But in fact he had taken over the negotiations with
Abd-ur-rahman at the point where Lytton had laid them down and
conducted them to the conclusion at which Lytton had already aimed.
Under his orders Griffin reached an understanding with Abd-ur-
rahman by which Pishin and Sibi were retained, and by which the new
amirplaced the management of his foreign relations under the Govern-
ment of India, in return for which the Indian Government promised
to pay the amir an annual subsidy. 8 Abd-ur-rahman had already
1 Cf. Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 439; Sir Alfred Lyall, ap. Edinburgh Review, April, 1889;
Gray, At the Court of the Amir, p. 158.
· Cf. Marco Polo, Travels (ed. Yule and Cordier), 1, 197.
• Abd-ur-rahman, op. cit. 1, 155599.
• Idem, 1, 192, 194; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 412, 428 sqq.
• Wolf
, Life of Ripon, 11, 40, 48.
* Idem, 11, 12, 19.
• Memorandum of conversations, 31 July-1 August, 1880 (F. O. 65-1104).
• Idem, 1, 190.
## p. 421 (#460) ############################################
420
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
had strongly desired the establishment of a British mission, but had
contemplated its residence at Herat, not at Kabul. Yakub, however,
had himself proposed Kabul, willing to run any risk provided he
could secure the support of the British army. The proposal was
accepted with some misgivings. Cavagnari, resolute and forceful,
was named resident-an admirable man in a crisis, but less suited for
a position of delicacy. He reached Kabul on 24 July. He was well
received with an Afghan rendering of God save the Queen. On
3 September he was murdered in the course of a real or pretended
mutiny of unpaid troops. Roberts's opinion, probably correct, was
that Yakub intended a demonstration which should show his inability
to protect the mission and so obtain its withdrawal. Events had
shown that Lytton had been unlucky in finding himself virtually
obliged to adopt Yakub as Sher 'Ali's successor, and unwise in
agreeing to the mission's being placed at Kabul and in selecting
Cavagnari as his agent there.
This misfortune led necessarily to a renewal of the campaign.
Roberts advanced by the Kurram Pass and occupied Kabul on
7 October. Yakub had joined him on the march, declaring that he
would rather be a grass-cutter with the English than attempt to rule
the Afghans. Roberts's swift movement disconcerted the tribesmen,
and though his cantonments were attacked, he had small difficulty
in holding his position through the following winter. Meanwhile the
political problem demanded solution. All agreed that Yakub should
not be restored. He was removed to India, pensioned, and resided at
Dehra Dun till his death in 1923. As no suitable candidate for the
amirat could be found, both Lytton and the home government inclined
to a policy of disintegration. The Foreign Office even began negotia-
tions with Teheran about the terms on which Persia might be suffered
to occupy. Herat, while a representative of the old Sadozai house,
Wali Sher 'Ali Khan, was recognised as sardar of Kandahar. ? Since
this arrangement, together with the occupation of the territory assigned
by Yakub, would secure the line of advance upon Herat whenever
necessary, and outflank any hostile advance from Kabul towards
India, it was thought that it did not greatly matter who held Kabul. 8
These tentative arrangements, however, were quickly brought to an
end by an unexpected and very fortunate development. Ever since
Sher 'Ali's establishment in power in 1868, his nephew, Abd-ur-
rahman, had been living under Russian protection, mainly at
Samarkand. He was now a man of forty-short and stoutly built,
with bluff but pleasant manners and an easy smile, self-possessed,
1 Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 336.
2 Forrest, op. cit. p. 494.
3 Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 342 599.
• Roberts, op. cit. 11, 254; cf. Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 375-6.
• Roberts, op. cit. 11, 192 sqq. ; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 361.
o Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 375.
· Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 376 sqq.
$ Cf. idem, p. 408.
## p. 421 (#461) ############################################
ABD-UR-RAHMAN
421
clear-minded. He looked the personification of watchful strength
moved by an inflexible will, and had indeed inherited his grandfather's,
Dost Muhammad's, vigour, judgment and ferocity. In 1880, after
many discussions with the Russian governor-general, Abd-ur-rahman
obtained leave to return to Afghanistan, and set out from Tashkent
with a small party of men. Next day, as he was on the march, he
received, as he thought, a sign from God. As sometimes happens in
the Central Asian deserts, 2 he thought he heard a great cavalcade, to
the number of 20,000, draw level with him and gradually pass on
ahead. “By this I reasoned that God had cleared my way for me. "
Full of hope he entered Balkh, praying Allah either to overthrow the
English or to turn their hearts. •' As soon as Lytton heard of his
appearance, he had directed Lepel Griffin (the English political agent
at Kabul) to send him conciliatory messages, and, in spite of sus-
picions natural against one who had been long connected with
Russians, it was decided to enter into negotiations with him. But at
this stage matters were interrupted by the arrival (8 June, 1880) of
a new governor-general, Lord Ripon.
In the previous spring a general election, in the course of which
Radical speakers had made great play with Lytton's conduct of the
Afghán question, had replaced Beaconsfield by Gladstone as prime
minister, Cranbrook by Hartington at the India Office, and Salisbury
by Granville at the Foreign Office. Northbrook, who took the
Admiralty in the new cabinet, was violently opposed to the policy to
which he had been sacrificed and loudly insisted on the instant need
of surrendering every post on the further side of the hills and returning
to the old frontier line. Accordingly the evacuation of Sibi and Pishin
was promised in the queen's speech in the opening session of 1881. 6
But the zealots for retreat met with unexpected opposition from their
governor-general. Ripon had, indeed, gone out to India with a strong
bias against Lytton and all his works. He had on arrival ransacked
the records of the political department in the hope of finding schemes
that would have blasted for ever the reputations of Lytton and
Beaconsfield. ' But in fact he had taken over the negotiations with
Abd-ur-rahman at the point where Lytton had laid them down and
conducted them to the conclusion at which Lytton had already aimed.
Under his orders Griffin reached an understanding with Abd-ur-
rahman by which Pishin and Sibi were retained, and by which the new
amir placed the management of his foreign relations under the Govern-
ment of India, in return for which the Indian Government promised
to pay the amir an annual subsidy. 8 Abd-ur-rahman had already
1 Cf. Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 439; Sir Alfred Lyall, ap. Edinburgh Review, April, 1889;
Gray, At the Court of the Amir, p: 158.
: Cf. Marco Polo, Travels (ed. Yule and Cordier), 1, 197.
Abd-ur-rahman, op. cit. I, 155599.
• Idem, 1, 190.
• Idem, 1, 192, 194; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 412, 428 599.
• Wolf, Life of Ripon, 11, 40, 48.
° Idem, 11, 12, 19.
• Memorandum of conversations, 31 July-1 August, 1880 (F. O. 65-1104).
## p. 422 (#462) ############################################
422
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
given evidence of his real desire for English friendship. When in July,
1880, Ayub Khan, Sher 'Ali's son, had attacked Burrows, commanding
the English force at Kandahar, inflicting on him a severe defeat at
Maiwand, the amir had promptly dispatched letters to all the chiefs
on the route by which Roberts was to march from Kabul to retrieve
the situation, directing them to afford the English all possible as-
sistance; and this explains at least in part the case with which Roberts
effected his famous march from Kabul to Kandahar, leading to the
complete defeat of Ayub Khan's forces. When, therefore, Ripon was
called upon to give effect to the declared policy of the liberal cabinet,
he told Hartington bluntly that it would lead in ten years' time to
another Afghan war, and broadly hinted that he would rather resign
than overrule his council in order to carry out what he regarded as
a mistaken policy. The cabinet accordingly permitted its declara-
tions to fall into a convenient if dishonest oblivion.
The settlement thus reached brought to a close a most dangerous
phase of the Central Asian question. Lytton may be blamed for his
provocative handling of the proposal to establish an Afghan mission
and for his selection at a later time of a too sanguine agent to conduct
British relations with the amir Yakub. But he had inherited a position
of extreme difficulty. Argyll's decision of 1873 had already convinced
Sher 'Ali that he had nothing to hope for from the English; while he
fancied from their previous conduct that he had nothing to fear from
them either. Accordingly he had turned to Russia. Lytton had to
disabuse him of his error. Probably Lytton was right in thinking that
nothing short of war would do so. In any case war was made in-
evitable by the Russian action in the crisis of 1878. Stolietoff's
embassy imperatively demanded the submission or destruction of
Sher 'Ali. In view of the developments of the following ten years, the
policy adopted by Salisbury and Lytton was justified in its broad
outlines. Nor does the second Afghan War afford a parallel with the
first except in superficial aspects. Both, of course, illustrate the ease
with which Afghanistan may be occupied and the difficulty with
which it can be held. But the first ended with the mere restoration
of the ruler whom the British had dethroned, with no advantage
military or political or diplomatic. The second replaced a hostile by
a friendly amir; it brought to a decisive end the disastrous policy of
Lawrence and Argyll; and it provided India, for the first time since
the collapse of the Moghul Empire, with a position from which the
north-west frontier could easily be defended.
Up to this time the Russian frontier had not pressed too closely on
Afghanistan. But now Russia, taking advantage of the numerous
external difficulties of the Gladstone government, and fortified by a
1 Cf. Kabul Diary, week ending 8 August, 1880 (F. O. 65-1104).
2 Wolf, op. cit. II, 39;
: Cf. Davies, The North-West Frontier, pp. 10 599.
## p. 423 (#463) ############################################
RUSSIA AND GLADSTONE
423
secret treaty with Germany, thought the time had come for abandoning
intentions which had been the subject in the past of repeated declara-
tions. The Merv oasis afforded the first example. It is likely that the
strategic importance of this region had been greatly exaggerated by
persons suffering from what the Duke of Argyll (with school-boy
humour) was pleased to call "mervousness”. ? It was, however, in
disagreeable proximity to Herat, and on several occasions the British
Foreign Office had sought reassurances regarding its future. In 1882
these were repeated. De Giers assured the British ambassador in a
conversation, not once but repeatedly, that the mission of Russia was
one of peace and that she had no intention whatever of occupying
fresh territory3 Within three months British agents were possessed
of documents showing that the Russians were seeking the submission
of the Meiv chiefs, and in fact, at the moment when the Russian
foreign minister was soothing the British ambassador, the Merv
chieftains were being urged and bribed to submit. Finally, early in
1884, when Mr Gladstone was embarrassed by the Mahdi in the
Sudan, the chiefs were beguiled and coerced into tendering allegiance
to the emperor, while the War Office at St Petersburg prepared a map
showing the Merv boundaries stretching southwards and touching
the Hari-rud near Herat. As Curzon said, “the flame of diplomatic
protest blazed fiercely forth in England; but, after a momentary
combustion, was as usual extinguished by a flood of excuses from the
inexhaustible reservoirs of the Neva”. ?
This event created such general uneasiness that the liberal govern-
ment could not leave matters where they stood. Conversations,
which had been begun in London as early as 1882,8 led to a reference
to St Petersburg. ' But although the imperial government regarded
Gladstone with a singular benevolence, 10 the operation of that senti-
ment was certainly limited by the need of taking the utmost advantage
of his tenure of office. While, therefore, it was willing enough to approve
the idea of formally defining the northern boundary of Afghanistan,
it also began to refer casually to Panjdeh and the need of establishing
peace in that area. 11 Granville eagerly took up the idea of a joint
delimitation; an Indiaiofficial, Sir Peter Lumsden, was appointed
to conduct the British mission, the amir was invited to provide
qualified officers, and Granville proposed that the British and Russian
missions should meet at Saraks on 1 October, 1884. 12 He thus
assumed that Russia really intended to co-operate. But for that the
Russian leaders did not yet deem the time to be ripe. They certainly
1 Curzon, op. cit. p. 120.
2 The Eastern Question, II, 371.
• Parl. Papers, 1884, LXXXVII, 77.
• Idem, p. 95; cf. Baddeley, Russia in the Eighties, p.
