was it, as Hohenlohe
suggests
in his Diary
(January 14, 1895, ii.
(January 14, 1895, ii.
Robertson - Bismarck
THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 489
the master's precepts or are driven to employ them in de-
stroying the master's work. One conclusion, however, will
be readily accepted by all, irrespective of creed or race.
No political figure ip the "'"pfHIth fXntnry J*"""** 1 TMnTM
indelible impression of force--of that inHpfinahle and
unanalysable union of brajn, wj11f and chariirtn--i trnn
Bismarck; and the closer he is studied, and the more
remorselessly the historical microscope is applied, the
more exigent and irrefutable is the impression. It is not
easy to be moderate in estimating the sum of his positive
achievement, for the Continent of Europe was his field,
and the map and the State-system testify to what he
wrought, and how he wrought it. But it is impossible
to be moderate in the estimate of his personality. The
force in the man himself surpassed the results that he
stamped on the world. From the age of Luther onwards
no other German political figure is his equal in titanic
power. In German history Bismarck is, and is likely to
remain, unique.
It is striking that like another Prussian genius--Frederick
the Great--with whom he has so often been compared,
Bismarck only seems to have grasped at the close of his life
that with himself an epoch had ended and a new age had
begun. Prince von Btilow, who can speak with authority,
writes in his Imperial Germany :1 'It was Bismarck himself
who pointed out the new way to us by bringing our old
policy to a close. . . . It is certain that he did not foresee
the course of this new development of Germany, nor the
details of the problems of this new epoch. . . . We seek
in vain in the conclusions of his practical policy for a justi-
fication of the steps which our international problems
exacts from us. ' And in a later chapter the ex-Chancellor
relates how Bismarck was taken in his eightieth year to
see the harbour of Hamburg. 'He stopped when he set
foot on a giant steamboat, looked at the ship for a long
time, at the many steamers lying in the vicinity, at the
docks and huge cranes, at the mighty picture presented
by the harbour, and said at last: "I am stirred and moved.
Yes, this is a new age--a new world. "'
1 The edition of 1913, not the amended war edition of 1916.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 49o
BISMARCK
It is always difficult for a man to recognise that the age
in which he has lived has reached a terminus, and that the
forces and ideas and ambitions which have made his world
have changed their character, volume, and direction; but
when the man himself has been the most puissant expres-
sion and manipulator of those forces, ideas, and ambitions,
the difficulty very nearly becomes an impossibility. The
eight years of life that remained for Bismarck after his
dismissal were not happy, nor did they add to his fame.
Bismarck took with him to Varzin and Friedrichsruhe the
profound sympathy, no less than the unstinted homage of
the German people. The nation felt justly that the dis-
missal by a young Emperor of the servant whose loyalty to
the Crown was beyond question, and whose services to the
House of Hohenzollern were unexampled in their fidelity
and magnitude, lacked both grace and gratitude. Bismarck
was entitled, it must be frankly conceded, to be bitter and
angry. But even his most unqualified admirers must
admit that his subsequent behaviour provided his severest
critics with material, ample and indisputable, for the
harshest interpretation of his character.
He was not helped by those about him, relatives or hench-
men. Love and loyalty forgot in the rancour of the
situation the highest duty and interest of the chief; and
Bismarck lent himself with a zeal and a readiness that
admit of no extenuation to the playing of a part wholly
unworthy of the claim that he had to the admiration and
affection of the nation and the place that he had made for
himself in his country's history. Of magnanimity, genero-
sity, reticence, charity, or self-respect he exhibited no trace,
and he seems almost to have rejoiced in exposing to the
world every unlovely frailty and defect, and to desire to
prove that he could only hate and neither forgive nor forget.
'Le roi me reverra,' he told Richter before he left Berlin;
but if he believed, as he probably did, that he was indis-
pensable and that he would be recalled on his own terms,
he did his best to break down all the bridges and to render
a return to office impossible. In this, and in this alone, he
succeeded. The Emperor, who after 1890 showed com-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 491
mendable self-restraint under intolerable provocation,
said all that needs to be said in this connection: 'It is
melancholy to think that such a man can sink so low. '
And when Prince Hohenlohe (June 22, 1892) said point-
blank, 'The only thing that people are afraid of is, that
Bismarck will return. ' 'They can make their minds easy,'
replied the Emperor with a laugh, 'he will not return. '
(Memoirs, ii. 432. )
For the first time Bismarck found himself at Varzin and
Friedrichsruhe unemployed; yet the absolute leisure for
which he had so often craved was framed in political iso-
lation, and proved to be a curse. Had he been thirty years
younger he could have flung himself, as he had often con-
templated, into the duties of a great landowner, and found
in Nature an outlet for his energies and an anodyne for the
savage pain that ceaselessly tore his heart. To many states-
men the opportunity, before the final call comes, to remake
the broken threads of intellectual interests and ambitions,
or simply to sift and test in serene reflection the criticism
of life matured by the golden sunshine of the ripening
years, has been the boon they have valued most. For them
old age, warmed by the recognition of a people's grati-
tude, has been a fruitful and satisfying climax. Through
Leisure with Dignity the men of action have often taught
their richest criticism of life. But Bismarck assuredly was
not one of these. At seventy-six he could neither resume
nor begin a contemplative and intellectual phase; and his
ebbing physical forces denied to him the power that he
demanded for the mastery of nature. To him life without
power and the contest for power lost all its savour. In his
love of Nature, with all its keen appreciation of beauty
--the dawn on dreaming woods, the blue witchery of
distant hills, sunset on lush pastures, a mighty river wave
--charmed by the earnest stars--can be detected from
his boyhood an unconscious craving to make the beauty
his own, and to bend the power it enshrined to his insur-
gent will. Nature now failed him, just because he was old
and Nature was young, and could yearly repeat the miracle
of renewing her youth. As he drove or walked on his
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 492
BISMARCK
estates, followed by his dogs as imperious and fierce as him-
self, Nature seemed to cry at every turn the mocking truth
that no longer could he find the healing rest or the balm
that had in the past always been the prelude to a mightier
toil. In one place, and one alone,--the Reichskanzler-
palais in the Wilhelmstrasse--was the power that would
satisfy. His favourite Goethe had said so truly that no
young man can be a master. Knowledge, judgment, ex-
perience, the secrets of the Higher Command--these were
not the prerogatives of youth but of a maturity, fired in the
furnace of a life passed in great affairs. Bismarck knew
that life had made him a master. Yet away there in Berlin
the mastery was torn from him by ingrates and incom-
petents, mere novices and apprentices, compared with
himself. The laceration of his heart poured out the
pent-up passion in the revelation of State secrets and
journalist denunciation.
It is not necessary here to follow the minute record.
When Caprivi fell from power (1895), it was Prince Hohen-
lohe, not Bismarck, who succeeded to the Chancellorship.
In 1892, when Herbert Bismarck was married and his
father made a triumphal progress to Vienna, via Berlin, the
German government was driven to forbid the German
ambassador to be present at the wedding. In 1893, when
Bismarck was seriously ill, there was, however, a temporary
reconciliation with the Emperor; and in 1895 when the
Reichstag refused to associate itself by vote with the
national rejoicing to celebrate his eightieth birthday, the
Emperor visited Friedrichsruhe, and repeated the visit in
December of the same year on the eve of the celebrations
for the ' silver wedding ' of . the Empire (January 18, 1896).
Bismarck, in the autumn of 1896, repaid the homage by
publishing (October 24) the article that revealed the
'Reinsurance Treaty' of 1887 and its non-renewal in
1890. He was entitled apparently to do with impunity
what had ' justified ' the destruction of Arnim.
In 1894 he had suffered in the death of his wife (Novem-
ber 27) the personal bereavement that completed the soli-
tude of these years of unquenchable resentment. The
princess was buried at Varzin--the home that he made
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
for her, and which was in itself a record of the achieve-
ment in which she had played a share, fully known only
to Bismarck himself. Johanna von Puttkamer had been
happy in the supreme gifts of love and life to a woman--
the right to be the wife and ally of the mightiest German
of her and his century; and of that personal union both
husband and wife could have said with truth that they had
lived with distinction between the torch of marriage and
the torch of death:
yiximus insignet inter utramque facem.
Varzin never beheld its bereaved master again, though to
this day the peasantry tell how in the glades that Bismarck
planted the lonely wayfarer in the dusk has suddenly been
confronted with the familiar figure, now on horseback,
now on foot--erect and superhuman in mien and stature,
galloping or striding with the effortless majesty of power
from one beloved haunt to another--and sometimes halting
to turn on the awed spectator the penetration of eyes, once
seen in life, never to be forgotten.
The end came on July 30, 1898, at Friedrichsruhe.
Nations that have beaten out their path through toil,
failure, controversy, revolution, and civil war to the golden
summits of victorious ambitions frequently anticipate the
verdict of posterity even in the lifetime of the leader and
in all the asphyxiating and blinding atmosphere of strife.
The Germany of 1890 had already placed Bismarck along
with the other three greatest of German figures since the
Renaissance, with Luther, Frederick the Great, and Goethe,
That first division of the first class, which nations in-
tuitively limit with an unerring and jealous severity,
Germany now opened to admit the Prussian statesman.
It was aware that Bismarck, in common with the other
three, had demonstrable and conspicuous defects. Canoni-
sation, however, by a people is a more exacting inquest
than canonisation by a church, for the duty assigned to the
Devil's Advocate, who is none other than the nation itself,
covers the vast field and infinite tests of that whole nation's
endeavour. Hard as it unquestionably may be, it is easier
to be a saint and to achieve a perfection of individual char-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 494
BISMARCK
acter and spirit than to sum up an epoch in a single per-
sonality, and thereby create an age in history. The title
to be the maker of a nation and an epoch is, and always
will remain, different from the accepted claims that dis-
tinguish the national saint or even the national hero. In
the sanctuaries of a nation's Valhalla there will be niches
without number for the heroes and the saints, and they
will be perpetual shrines of honour, virtue, and praise;
but the corner reserved for the Makers of the Nation will
be a scanty and awful plot. The few, the very few, who
lie there, because they cannot he in any other place,
have made their grave for themselves from the blood,
dust, passions, fears, hates, and dreams of their race,
and their race cannot refuse the privilege, if privilege it
be, in justice to itself rather than to them. Truth, not
honour or reverence or praise, is the Makers' meed, and to
such no tomb and no monument can pay the tribute of the
final judgment. Over what they did, the good that they
bequeathed and the evil that they wrought, men and
women will wrangle as long as the nation that gave them
birth retains its ambitions and can keep the flame of its
conscience burning. On the hearts of all who come after
is graven a testimony which words either falsify or mar,
and from which there is and can be no appeal. Of the
Makers the nation itself is the supreme judge. Germany
or Europe may sternly reject or acclaim with enthusiasm
Bismarck the man and Bismarck's achievement, but the
Prussia and the Germany remain to which he gave himself
with a passion and a loyalty that soar beyond all the
doubts and all the praise, and the German people of the
twentieth century faced the future as his memorial.
Bismarck himself knew it and was content. 'I do not,'
he commanded when he was dying,' I do not want a lying
official epitaph. Write on my tomb,' he added, 'that I
was the faithful servant of my master, the Emperor William,
King of Prussia. ' It was the bare truth. But something
more was required, if justice was to be done. The dead
Bismarck was happy in the felicity of those who made his
grave at Friedrichsruhe. Set in the oaks and the beeches
that he loved, far from the roaring Berlin that was for Ger-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 495
many but not for him the heart of the German Empire,
was placed a simple chamber, yet massive with Prussian
strength. On the slab that marks his resting-place, beside
the grave of his wife, 'who made him what he was,' is
engraved but one word--and that is enough--' Bismarck. '
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX A
THE EMS DISPATCH
The texts of (a) Abeken's dispatch to Bismarck, and (b) Bismarck's
syncopated version for publication are printed in parallel columns
below. It will be observed that the. King left to Bismarck's
discretion the public communication of his message, without
sending any instructions as to the form that publication should
take, should Bismarck decide upon this step.
Abeken to Bismarck
Ems, July 13, 1870.
3'40 p. m. Bismarck's Version for Publication
His Majesty writes to me: After the news of the renuncia-
'Count Benedetti spoke to me tion of the hereditary Prince of
on the promenade, in order to Hohenzollern had been officially
demand from me, finally in a communicated to the Imperial
very importunate manner, that government of France by the
I should authorise him to tele- Royal government of Spain, the
graph at once that I bound French Ambassador further de-
myself for all future time never manded of his Majesty, the
again to give my consent if the King, at Ems, that he would
Hohenzollerns should renew authorise him to telegraph to
their candidature. I refused Paris that his Majesty, the
at last somewhat sternly, as it King, bound himself for all time
is neither right nor possible to never again to give "his consent,
undertake engagements of this should the Hohenzollerns renew
kind a tout jamais. I told him their candidature. His Majesty,
that I had as yet received no the King, thereupon decided
news, and as he was earlier in- not to receive the French Am-
formed from Paris and Madrid bassador again, and sent the
than myself, he could see clearly aide-de-camp on duty to tell
that my government had no him that his Majesty had
more interest in the matter. ' nothing further to communi-
His Majesty has since received cate to the ambassador,
a letter from Prince Charles
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX
497
Anthony. His Majesty, having
told Count Benedetti that he
was awaiting news from the
Prince, has decided, with refer-
ence to the above demand, on
the suggestion of Count Eulen-
berg and myself, not to receive
Count Benedetti again, but only
to let him be informed through
an aide-de-camp: 'That his
Majesty has now received from
the Prince confirmation of the
news which Benedetti had al-
ready received from Paris, and
had nothing further to say to the
ambassador. ' His Majesty leaves
it to your Excellency to decide
whether Benedetti's fresh de-
mand and its rejection should be
at once communicated to both
our ambassadors, to foreign
nations, and to the Press.
at
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX B
THE REINSURANCE TREATIES OF 1884 AND 1887
The nature and contents of these secret undertakings, which -form
so decisive and interesting a feature of Bismarck's policy from
1883 to his dismissal in March 1890, still remain very obscure.
The texts have never been officially or unofficially published, and
inference from scattered and contradictory statements is all that
is possible. Certain points, however, are quite clear. In 1884
Germany concluded with Russia a specific arrangement; in 1887,
presumably because the arrangement of 1884 had terminated,
Germany concluded a fresh arrangement with Russia. In 1890
the arrangement of 1887 was not renewed by Chancellor Gaprivi.
The public of Europe would probably have never known of the
existence of 'the 1887 Compact' but for Bismarck's deliberate
revelation of its existence and non-renewal in the Hambu get
NachrichUn of October 24, 1896. It is noticeable that the revela-
tion caused much excitement in Germany and a storm of indignant
criticism in Austria. It was very embarrassing to the German
government; whether it was as great a surprise to the Foreign
Office in the Ball-Platz as it obviously was to the Austrian public is
one of the points in controversy, on which precise information is
still lacking. The Austrian public mind, as a study of the Viennese
newspapers of November 1896 proves, was seriously upset, and
there was much excited comment on Bismarck's betrayal of the
Dual Alliance by the secret arrangements with Russia. But the
Austrian government maintained an official discretion and re-
served its indignation, if it felt any, for confidential communica-
tion to the Wilhelmstrasse at Berlin. Nor did the debate in the
Reichstag (November 16, 1896) add anything to our knowledge.
The official Reichsanzeiger had published (October 27) a curt note,
pronouncing the 'revelation' to be a 'violation of the most con-
fidential secrets of State which constituted a blow at the grave
interests of the Empire'; but neither the Chancellor, Prince
Hohenlohe, nor Foreign Secretary Baron Marschallv on Bieberstein,
though they spoke at considerable length in reply to the interpella-
tion of Grat Hompesch, gave any new information, except to admit
the bare fact that a compact had been made in 1887 and not re-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX
499
newed in 1890. Prince Hohenlohe took refuge in the necessity of
official secrecy and reasons of State. The Foreign Secretary indeed
pointed out that a diplomacy which rested on a series of engage-
ments, possibly conflicting in their terms, was of doubtful value,
and that the worth of any single engagement was not increased by
the number of other contracts. What the precise meaning of
this cryptic utterance was, it is impossible to decide; but it clearly
was intended to convey--whether truly or not, we cannot say--
that the German Foreign Office had not docketed in its cupboard
other secret treaties of 'a reinsurance character,' together with
an assurance for the world in general and Vienna in particular,
that the German government of 1896 was, and intended to
remain, free to fulfil loyally the terms of the Dual or Triple
Alliance.
Both ministers, however, also spoke casually of 'negotiations
between 1887 and 189b. ' Negotiations with whom or for what
they did not explain, but presumably they referred to negotiations
with Russia between 1887 and 1890 for the renewal of 'the
Compact of 1887' or a similar treaty. No explanation was
offered of the reasons why Chancellor Caprivi did not renew the
Compact of 1887--e. g.
was it, as Hohenlohe suggests in his Diary
(January 14, 1895, ii. 462), ' because the policy it led to was too
complicated,' or because Russia raised her terms, or because the
Emperor had embarked on a serious attempt in 1890 to bring
Great Britain into the Triple Alliance, or because ? the reinsurance'
was judged to be a betrayal of Austria? It is tempting to connect
the non-renewal in 1890 with the dismissal of Bismarck; for we
know that Bismarck's policy was regarded as a betrayal of Austria
by the Emperor and his military entourage. Another inference
is still more tempting. Hohenlohe twice (e. g. ii. 429, and 452)
succinctly states the contents of' the reinsurance' as he understood
them to be (i. e. before he became Chancellor and had free access
to confidential documents, when his silence is instructive):
'When I told him (Caprivi) that Schuvaloff had described him
as a trop honnete homme, he said that was because Bismarck had
concluded a treaty with Russia, under which we guaranteed
Russia a free hand in Bulgaria and Constantinople, while Russia
undertook to observe a neutral attitude in the Franco-GermanWar.
This treaty had lapsed when Caprivi assumed office, and he had
not renewed it, because its publication would have shattered the
Triple Alliance. I fear that Austria will not be grateful to us. '
And to the same effect (ii. 452): with the addition, 'Russia
pledged herself to remain neutral in case of a war with France,
even though Austria should lend a hand in the East-'
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 500
BISMARCK
These passages are apparently explicit enough; in reality they
are full of difficulties. Caprivi took office in March 1890; if,
as we seem bound to assume, 'the reinsurance' was made in
November 1887, it did not lapse when Caprivi assumed office, but
ten months later. Are we to believe that 'the reinsurance'
lapsed in March 1890, i. e. that it was made in March 1887?
If so, what happened in November 1887? For if the Compact
of 1884 was renewed in the spring of 1887, what is the explanation
of the strained Russo-German relations from March to November
1887, and of the arrangement with the Tsar in that month at
Berlin ? ' The publication' would have 'shattered the Triple
Alliance' (sic)--but who was going to ' publish' it? If it was a
secret treaty, why should it be 'published'? Did Hohenlohe
intend to convey that Austria (as was probable) knew nothing
of the ' reinsurance,' but that if she learned (from Russia or whom? )
of its existence, the Triple Alliance would be shattered? Why
should 'Austria not be grateful? ' Because she had been told
(between 1890 and 1892) that she had been betrayed between
1887 and 1890, but would not be betrayed any more? And how
was ' Austria to lend a hand in the East,' detrimental to Germany?
By tearing up the Triple Alliance and attacking Germany? By
making an alliance with France or how? Without the text of the
document it is impossible to answer these and other conundrums.
But if Hohenlohe is correct, the inference is certain that (a) ' the
reinsurance' of 1887 at least was concluded behind Austria's
back; (b) that its contents gravely imperilled the Dual and Triple
Alliances; and (c) that the policy involved was condemned in 1890
and renounced.
What was that policy? Clearly ' a free hand for Russia' in the
Near East, and Bismarck said as much in his big speeches in 1887
and 1888, as noted in the text (see p. 446). That such' a free hand'
was in conflict with Austrian ambitions is no less certain. But,
in 1890, the inference is irresistible that the Kaiser had already
embarked on the Weltpolitik which aimed ? not at a free hand for
Russia in Bulgaria and Constantinople' but 'at a free hand for
Germany. ' The heir to Constantinople, with Bulgaria as his
washpot, was to be the German Emperor, not the Emperor of
Russia; while, concurrently, Austria was to throw the Habsburg
shoe over Serbia, the valleys of the Morava and Vardar and
Salonica, meeting on a Macedonian frontier, to be delimited later,
the Kaiser's brother-in-law, the Duke of Sparta, the 'Tino' of
imperial telegrams and recent history. The non-renewal of * the
reinsurance' was the categorical pre-condition of such a policy,
with which the Kaiser, flushed with super-Teutonic ambitions,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX
5oi
returned from his pilgrimage in the East, to pledge himself to
Austria and to dismiss Bismarck, who regarded ' the new course'
as midsummer madness. It is at any rate very noticeable that
in 1896 neither Hohenlohe nor Baron Marschall attempted to
meet the challenge of the Hamburger Nachrichten, that the Kaiser's
and Caprivi's policy had driven Russia into the arms of France,
and that the authors of the Franco-Russian alliance were the men
who broke with Russia and supported Austria, coute que coute.
It is no less certain that the non-renewal of the ' reinsurance' was
made with the full knowledge and approval of the Kaiser.
A writer, M. Andre Mevil, in the Revue Hebdomadaire for June
1907 gives a very confident and detailed account of the ' reinsur-
ance' treaties. He does not give his authorities, but he writes as if
he had had access to information that could not be precisely stated.
Briefly, according to M. Mevil, the first secret treaty was made
at Berlin on February 2\, 1884, and was verbally ratified (and not
in writing, as not being necessary) in September 15, 1884, at
Skierniewice. The contents were known to Austria, or Austria was
a party to it. The Pan-Slav party under Katkoff worked un-
ceasingly to prevent the renewal of the agreement, and in 1887
it was not renewed. This coincided with a dangerous crisis in
Franco-German relations. Alexander declined to give a pledge
to remain neutral in case of a war on the Rhine, and M. Mevil
thinks that 'the Schnaebele incident' was closed by Bismarck
because he could not rely on Russian neutrality. Subsequently,
when Bismarck had exposed certain forgeries misrepresenting
Germany's policy in Bulgaria, the Tsar, when in Berlin, November
18, 1887, concluded the 'reinsurance' which was not renewed in
1890. The agreement pledged Russia or Germany to neutrality
in the event of either being attacked by a third party {i. e. pre-
sumably a Franco-German, or an Austro-German war). M. Mevil
draws a clear distinction between the Compact of 1884, to which
Austria was a party, and that of 1887, to which she was not. He
asserts that it was Russia's unwillingness in 1887 to include Austria
in the renewal that caused the Compact of 1884 to be dropped.
Hohenlohe spoke in the debate of November 16, 1896, 'of 1887
when Boulangism reached its height, and threatened a danger
that disappeared with the disappearance of Boulangism,' i. e. a
clear suggestion that the raison d'etre of 'the reinsurance' was
the possibility of a Franco-German war, and the urgent desirability
of securing Russia's neutrality against that eventuality (as was
done by Bismarck in 1870).
The Hamburger Nachrichten also suggested (October 24, 1896)
that the agreement was for six years, and M. Mevil seems to
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 502
BISMARCK
support this. But in view of the assertion in the same paper,
that it had not been renewed in 1890, this seems impossible,
unless it is meant that it was the treaty of 1884 which was for
six years and that the agreement of 1887 was a separate convention,
wholly independent of that of 1884--a hypothesis that only opens
up fresh queries and difficulties.
Marschall and Hohenlohe positively asserted that the agreement,
that was not renewed, was a secret one, to be kept secret. Against
this the Hamburger Nachrichten of November I, 1896, asserted
that its tenor had been communicated both to Austria and to
Italy! How in that case it could be a secret arrangement, and
what value it would have, and why its non-renewal should have
been such a grave blunder, and why the revelation of what was
known both by the Austrian and Italian governments, as well as
by the Russian government, should have caused the flurry of
excitement in 1896 and been denounced as equivalent to a lese-
majestk, I confess I cannot understand.
In conclusion, I am driven to infer that: (1) the agreement of
1884 was for three years; (2) Austria may have been a party to it;
(3) it pledged the signatories, possibly of three States, i. e. Bismarck,
Szechenyi, and Sabouroff to a benevolent neutrality in the case of
any of the three being attacked; (4) this tripartite arrangement
lapsed in 1887; (5) Bismarck, behind the back of Austria, con-
cluded a secret and private 'reinsurance' with Russia in 1887;
(6) this 'reinsurance' was for three years, and pledged each
signatory to neutrality in the event of either being attacked by
a third party, i. e. France or Austria; (7) this was not renewed by
Caprivi in 1890; (8) in consequence Russia felt isolated and
gradually drifted into an entente and then an alliance with France.
It is noticeable, further, that the British Standard and the
German Zukunft in 1884 duly notified their readers with the
information that Germany had come to an understanding with
Russia. So far as I know, no other newspaper discovered or pub-
lished the fact. But the information passed practically unnoticed
in 1884.
Secondly,German public criticism in 1896 represented Bismarck's
'reinsurance' of 1887 as a masterpiece of German statecraft--
that is to say, German public opinion hailed with enthusiasm
the conclusion of a secret understanding by Germany with Russia,
at the expense and behind the back of their ally, Austria; and it
regretted that Caprivi had failed to continue this Bismarckian
method of pledging his country to one ally, while the value of the
pledge was being secretly whittled away in favour of that ally's
avowed enemy. Such a mental attitude is instructive in the
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX
thoroughness with which the German public had assimilated
Bismarckian principles. What would German public opinion
have said had Austria behind the back of Germany, and in violation
of the Dual Alliance, made a secret reinsurance with Russia to the
detriment of Germany? Would that have been Austrian 'per-
fidy ' or a masterpiece of Austrian statecraft?
The articles in the Hamburger Nachrichten and other papers, and
a full report of the Debate of November 16, 1896, will be found in
Penzler, Bismarck nach seiner Entlassung, vol. vii. and in vol. iii.
of the Bismarck Jabrbuch. While this book was in the press,
Professor Simpson's second article (Nineteenth Century, January
1918) on the Sabouroff Papers became available. Professor Simpson,
unfortunately, does not throw any more light on the secret agree-
ment of 1884, or of 1887--except to say (p. 75): 'as a matter of
fact the understanding became closer with Germany, especially
as Bismarck was endeavouring to negotiate a "reinsurance"
treaty with Russia, unknown to Austria, providing for neutrality
in case either Power was attacked by a third. In this he succeeded.
"Then came Caprivi in place of Bismarck"--the words are
M. SabourofPs--" and said that it was not necessary to make
a separate treaty with Russia, because Germany was on good
relations with her. Then followed still other councillors who
began to smile towards France, but whether it began with Russia
or with France I do not know. "'
The main thesis of Professor Simpson's article is to summarise
from the Sabouroff MSS. the negotiations by which Austria,
Germany, and Russia came to conclude a treaty in 1881, arranging
for an agreed policy in the Near East. This treaty was signed on
June 18,1881: in 1884 'it was renewed for a further term of three
years, subject to one slight modification,' but not renewed in 1887.
The whole article with the preceding one" (Nineteenth Century,
December 1917) fully bears out the general line of interpretation
of Bismarck's policy and methods maintained in the text (chapter vi.
? ? 3, 5, and 6)- Some quotations are so relevant as to justify their
presence here. 'Bismarck was a rough man even in politics, but
his conservative convictions were very sincere; he was opposed to
Liberalism in any form. "There are five great Powers; I must
always strive," Bismarck said, "to be one of three against two. "
Gortschakov in 1870 " consulted the Emperor to take immediate
steps, whatever the risk, to annul the clauses of the Treaty of
Paris rather than wait the definitive victory of Prussia before doing
so. " In 1875 d props of "the crisis" in May--" I confess that
all my admiration went to Prince Gortschakov; he showed himself
superior in self-command, courtesy, precise and, I ought to add,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? BISMARCK
breadth of view. " The Grand Duke Nicholas in 1877 "did not
occupy Constantinople in accordance with the instructions tele-
graphed to him, and the Emperor never forgave him. " In 1880,
Bismarck said: "Thus at last we shall be able to form that solid
monarchical bloc, and feel no longer any concern about the internal
convulsions with which the Western Powers may be troubled.
The three Emperors are strong enough to defy all the agitations
abroad, and sufficiently great lords to live content with the patri-
mony of their ancestors. "'
Bismarck said on two occasions to M. Sabouroff: 'I do not
share the prejudices of the other cabinets on the subject of the
danger of handing over Constantinople to Russia': and again:
'1 flatter myself that I was the first in Europe to break with the
old tradition with which the Westerners inoculated all the Cabinets,
viz. , that a Russian Constantinople would be a European danger. ' As
to these utterances it is relevant to point out that Bismarck's obiter
dicta and ' confessions' are always interesting, but generally, unless
confirmed by specific acts, wholly untrustworthy. Bismarckian
thinking aloud, in the presence of another person, had invariably
a concealed objective. Had Bismarck carried out all the 'con-
fessions' and 'thinking aloud' that he made to Napoleon III.
between 1858 and 1867, Central Europe would never have been
reconstructed as it actually was. Napoleon, Lord Ampthill,
M. Sabouroff, and many others learned that between Bismarck's
ideas and confessions and Bismarck's acts there lay a substantial
world of difference. Words with Bismarck were generally in-
tended to mask his own, or unmask the thoughts of those with
whom he conversed, and his alluring geniality was one of his
finest and most deceptive diplomatic gifts. Hohenlohe records
how Alexander in. after 1890 said that in doing business with
Bismarck, even when the arrangement was satisfactory, he always
felt' qu'il me tricherait. '
Austria required much pressure in 1881 to come into the pro-
posed arrangement. 'Throughout the Sabouroff Memoirs? writes
Professor Simpson, 'nothing"is so obvious as the disdain that
both the negotiators feel for "the ramshackle Empire," and yet
it is always Bismarck who says the really brutal things. ' 'It is
abundantly clear, however, that the vital significance of the Dual
Alliance had not been disclosed to the Tsar. ' The arrangement
of 1881 was for three years. 'When Austria,' Bismarck said,
with one of his usual vivid touches, 'has worn that flannel
next her skin for three whole years, she won't be able to take
it off without running the risk of catching cold. ' That was
what happened in 1890 in the matter- of the reinsurance treaties.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX
Caprivi threw off the flannel that Bismarck had made Germany
wear next her skin for six years--and Germany caught cold. One
other Bismarckian touch is too deliriously characteristic to be
omitted.
'We shall make a mistake if we keep Austria from compromising
herself by committing to writing these demands of hers (i. e. the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, plus the Sandjak of Novi
Bazar and some other acquisitions of a like character), which will
only embroil her with the Western Powers, and furnish proofs
of complicity with us in any future Eastern crisis. '
The negotiator who had lured Benedetti to state his proposals in
writing, and then published them in The Times, knew well the
value of promissory notes with the signature of the promissor
attached. Bismarck liked a cupboard full of such compromising
stuff--to be revealed, when he chose--and he took good care
to leave as little of his own 'paper' in other persons' hands as
possible. In Bismarckian ethics the morality of the betrayal of a
confidence was decided by the difference between the betrayer and
the betrayed. If you were the former, reason of State could ad-
minister a plenary absolution; but if you were the latter, then let the
welkin ring with the iniquity of the act. But the best comment
on Bismarckian methods and all of the same character was supplied
by Bismarck himself to his wife, when he first became initiated in
the grand diplomacy at Frankfort: 'Not even the most scoun-
drelly democrat or sceptic could conceive the charlatanry and
fraud that lies in this diplomacy. '
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? BIBLIOGRAPHY
This Bibliographical Appendix is not, nor does it profess to be,
a bibliography of German history for the period of Bismarck's
lifetime. Such would require a separate volume. Nor does it
profess to be an exhaustive bibliography of the historical literature
on Bismarck himself. Attention here is necessarily confined to the
chief original sources available, together with the leading secondary
authorities, and brief critical comments based on the author's
study. For a more complete catalogue reference should be made
to Dahlmann-Waitz, Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte (8th
edition, ed. Ko? hler, 1912), and R. Charmatz, Wegweiser durch
die Literatur der Osterreichischen Geschichte (1912), also to the
bibliographies in vols, x. , xi. , and xii.
the master's precepts or are driven to employ them in de-
stroying the master's work. One conclusion, however, will
be readily accepted by all, irrespective of creed or race.
No political figure ip the "'"pfHIth fXntnry J*"""** 1 TMnTM
indelible impression of force--of that inHpfinahle and
unanalysable union of brajn, wj11f and chariirtn--i trnn
Bismarck; and the closer he is studied, and the more
remorselessly the historical microscope is applied, the
more exigent and irrefutable is the impression. It is not
easy to be moderate in estimating the sum of his positive
achievement, for the Continent of Europe was his field,
and the map and the State-system testify to what he
wrought, and how he wrought it. But it is impossible
to be moderate in the estimate of his personality. The
force in the man himself surpassed the results that he
stamped on the world. From the age of Luther onwards
no other German political figure is his equal in titanic
power. In German history Bismarck is, and is likely to
remain, unique.
It is striking that like another Prussian genius--Frederick
the Great--with whom he has so often been compared,
Bismarck only seems to have grasped at the close of his life
that with himself an epoch had ended and a new age had
begun. Prince von Btilow, who can speak with authority,
writes in his Imperial Germany :1 'It was Bismarck himself
who pointed out the new way to us by bringing our old
policy to a close. . . . It is certain that he did not foresee
the course of this new development of Germany, nor the
details of the problems of this new epoch. . . . We seek
in vain in the conclusions of his practical policy for a justi-
fication of the steps which our international problems
exacts from us. ' And in a later chapter the ex-Chancellor
relates how Bismarck was taken in his eightieth year to
see the harbour of Hamburg. 'He stopped when he set
foot on a giant steamboat, looked at the ship for a long
time, at the many steamers lying in the vicinity, at the
docks and huge cranes, at the mighty picture presented
by the harbour, and said at last: "I am stirred and moved.
Yes, this is a new age--a new world. "'
1 The edition of 1913, not the amended war edition of 1916.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 49o
BISMARCK
It is always difficult for a man to recognise that the age
in which he has lived has reached a terminus, and that the
forces and ideas and ambitions which have made his world
have changed their character, volume, and direction; but
when the man himself has been the most puissant expres-
sion and manipulator of those forces, ideas, and ambitions,
the difficulty very nearly becomes an impossibility. The
eight years of life that remained for Bismarck after his
dismissal were not happy, nor did they add to his fame.
Bismarck took with him to Varzin and Friedrichsruhe the
profound sympathy, no less than the unstinted homage of
the German people. The nation felt justly that the dis-
missal by a young Emperor of the servant whose loyalty to
the Crown was beyond question, and whose services to the
House of Hohenzollern were unexampled in their fidelity
and magnitude, lacked both grace and gratitude. Bismarck
was entitled, it must be frankly conceded, to be bitter and
angry. But even his most unqualified admirers must
admit that his subsequent behaviour provided his severest
critics with material, ample and indisputable, for the
harshest interpretation of his character.
He was not helped by those about him, relatives or hench-
men. Love and loyalty forgot in the rancour of the
situation the highest duty and interest of the chief; and
Bismarck lent himself with a zeal and a readiness that
admit of no extenuation to the playing of a part wholly
unworthy of the claim that he had to the admiration and
affection of the nation and the place that he had made for
himself in his country's history. Of magnanimity, genero-
sity, reticence, charity, or self-respect he exhibited no trace,
and he seems almost to have rejoiced in exposing to the
world every unlovely frailty and defect, and to desire to
prove that he could only hate and neither forgive nor forget.
'Le roi me reverra,' he told Richter before he left Berlin;
but if he believed, as he probably did, that he was indis-
pensable and that he would be recalled on his own terms,
he did his best to break down all the bridges and to render
a return to office impossible. In this, and in this alone, he
succeeded. The Emperor, who after 1890 showed com-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 491
mendable self-restraint under intolerable provocation,
said all that needs to be said in this connection: 'It is
melancholy to think that such a man can sink so low. '
And when Prince Hohenlohe (June 22, 1892) said point-
blank, 'The only thing that people are afraid of is, that
Bismarck will return. ' 'They can make their minds easy,'
replied the Emperor with a laugh, 'he will not return. '
(Memoirs, ii. 432. )
For the first time Bismarck found himself at Varzin and
Friedrichsruhe unemployed; yet the absolute leisure for
which he had so often craved was framed in political iso-
lation, and proved to be a curse. Had he been thirty years
younger he could have flung himself, as he had often con-
templated, into the duties of a great landowner, and found
in Nature an outlet for his energies and an anodyne for the
savage pain that ceaselessly tore his heart. To many states-
men the opportunity, before the final call comes, to remake
the broken threads of intellectual interests and ambitions,
or simply to sift and test in serene reflection the criticism
of life matured by the golden sunshine of the ripening
years, has been the boon they have valued most. For them
old age, warmed by the recognition of a people's grati-
tude, has been a fruitful and satisfying climax. Through
Leisure with Dignity the men of action have often taught
their richest criticism of life. But Bismarck assuredly was
not one of these. At seventy-six he could neither resume
nor begin a contemplative and intellectual phase; and his
ebbing physical forces denied to him the power that he
demanded for the mastery of nature. To him life without
power and the contest for power lost all its savour. In his
love of Nature, with all its keen appreciation of beauty
--the dawn on dreaming woods, the blue witchery of
distant hills, sunset on lush pastures, a mighty river wave
--charmed by the earnest stars--can be detected from
his boyhood an unconscious craving to make the beauty
his own, and to bend the power it enshrined to his insur-
gent will. Nature now failed him, just because he was old
and Nature was young, and could yearly repeat the miracle
of renewing her youth. As he drove or walked on his
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 492
BISMARCK
estates, followed by his dogs as imperious and fierce as him-
self, Nature seemed to cry at every turn the mocking truth
that no longer could he find the healing rest or the balm
that had in the past always been the prelude to a mightier
toil. In one place, and one alone,--the Reichskanzler-
palais in the Wilhelmstrasse--was the power that would
satisfy. His favourite Goethe had said so truly that no
young man can be a master. Knowledge, judgment, ex-
perience, the secrets of the Higher Command--these were
not the prerogatives of youth but of a maturity, fired in the
furnace of a life passed in great affairs. Bismarck knew
that life had made him a master. Yet away there in Berlin
the mastery was torn from him by ingrates and incom-
petents, mere novices and apprentices, compared with
himself. The laceration of his heart poured out the
pent-up passion in the revelation of State secrets and
journalist denunciation.
It is not necessary here to follow the minute record.
When Caprivi fell from power (1895), it was Prince Hohen-
lohe, not Bismarck, who succeeded to the Chancellorship.
In 1892, when Herbert Bismarck was married and his
father made a triumphal progress to Vienna, via Berlin, the
German government was driven to forbid the German
ambassador to be present at the wedding. In 1893, when
Bismarck was seriously ill, there was, however, a temporary
reconciliation with the Emperor; and in 1895 when the
Reichstag refused to associate itself by vote with the
national rejoicing to celebrate his eightieth birthday, the
Emperor visited Friedrichsruhe, and repeated the visit in
December of the same year on the eve of the celebrations
for the ' silver wedding ' of . the Empire (January 18, 1896).
Bismarck, in the autumn of 1896, repaid the homage by
publishing (October 24) the article that revealed the
'Reinsurance Treaty' of 1887 and its non-renewal in
1890. He was entitled apparently to do with impunity
what had ' justified ' the destruction of Arnim.
In 1894 he had suffered in the death of his wife (Novem-
ber 27) the personal bereavement that completed the soli-
tude of these years of unquenchable resentment. The
princess was buried at Varzin--the home that he made
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
for her, and which was in itself a record of the achieve-
ment in which she had played a share, fully known only
to Bismarck himself. Johanna von Puttkamer had been
happy in the supreme gifts of love and life to a woman--
the right to be the wife and ally of the mightiest German
of her and his century; and of that personal union both
husband and wife could have said with truth that they had
lived with distinction between the torch of marriage and
the torch of death:
yiximus insignet inter utramque facem.
Varzin never beheld its bereaved master again, though to
this day the peasantry tell how in the glades that Bismarck
planted the lonely wayfarer in the dusk has suddenly been
confronted with the familiar figure, now on horseback,
now on foot--erect and superhuman in mien and stature,
galloping or striding with the effortless majesty of power
from one beloved haunt to another--and sometimes halting
to turn on the awed spectator the penetration of eyes, once
seen in life, never to be forgotten.
The end came on July 30, 1898, at Friedrichsruhe.
Nations that have beaten out their path through toil,
failure, controversy, revolution, and civil war to the golden
summits of victorious ambitions frequently anticipate the
verdict of posterity even in the lifetime of the leader and
in all the asphyxiating and blinding atmosphere of strife.
The Germany of 1890 had already placed Bismarck along
with the other three greatest of German figures since the
Renaissance, with Luther, Frederick the Great, and Goethe,
That first division of the first class, which nations in-
tuitively limit with an unerring and jealous severity,
Germany now opened to admit the Prussian statesman.
It was aware that Bismarck, in common with the other
three, had demonstrable and conspicuous defects. Canoni-
sation, however, by a people is a more exacting inquest
than canonisation by a church, for the duty assigned to the
Devil's Advocate, who is none other than the nation itself,
covers the vast field and infinite tests of that whole nation's
endeavour. Hard as it unquestionably may be, it is easier
to be a saint and to achieve a perfection of individual char-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 494
BISMARCK
acter and spirit than to sum up an epoch in a single per-
sonality, and thereby create an age in history. The title
to be the maker of a nation and an epoch is, and always
will remain, different from the accepted claims that dis-
tinguish the national saint or even the national hero. In
the sanctuaries of a nation's Valhalla there will be niches
without number for the heroes and the saints, and they
will be perpetual shrines of honour, virtue, and praise;
but the corner reserved for the Makers of the Nation will
be a scanty and awful plot. The few, the very few, who
lie there, because they cannot he in any other place,
have made their grave for themselves from the blood,
dust, passions, fears, hates, and dreams of their race,
and their race cannot refuse the privilege, if privilege it
be, in justice to itself rather than to them. Truth, not
honour or reverence or praise, is the Makers' meed, and to
such no tomb and no monument can pay the tribute of the
final judgment. Over what they did, the good that they
bequeathed and the evil that they wrought, men and
women will wrangle as long as the nation that gave them
birth retains its ambitions and can keep the flame of its
conscience burning. On the hearts of all who come after
is graven a testimony which words either falsify or mar,
and from which there is and can be no appeal. Of the
Makers the nation itself is the supreme judge. Germany
or Europe may sternly reject or acclaim with enthusiasm
Bismarck the man and Bismarck's achievement, but the
Prussia and the Germany remain to which he gave himself
with a passion and a loyalty that soar beyond all the
doubts and all the praise, and the German people of the
twentieth century faced the future as his memorial.
Bismarck himself knew it and was content. 'I do not,'
he commanded when he was dying,' I do not want a lying
official epitaph. Write on my tomb,' he added, 'that I
was the faithful servant of my master, the Emperor William,
King of Prussia. ' It was the bare truth. But something
more was required, if justice was to be done. The dead
Bismarck was happy in the felicity of those who made his
grave at Friedrichsruhe. Set in the oaks and the beeches
that he loved, far from the roaring Berlin that was for Ger-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 495
many but not for him the heart of the German Empire,
was placed a simple chamber, yet massive with Prussian
strength. On the slab that marks his resting-place, beside
the grave of his wife, 'who made him what he was,' is
engraved but one word--and that is enough--' Bismarck. '
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX A
THE EMS DISPATCH
The texts of (a) Abeken's dispatch to Bismarck, and (b) Bismarck's
syncopated version for publication are printed in parallel columns
below. It will be observed that the. King left to Bismarck's
discretion the public communication of his message, without
sending any instructions as to the form that publication should
take, should Bismarck decide upon this step.
Abeken to Bismarck
Ems, July 13, 1870.
3'40 p. m. Bismarck's Version for Publication
His Majesty writes to me: After the news of the renuncia-
'Count Benedetti spoke to me tion of the hereditary Prince of
on the promenade, in order to Hohenzollern had been officially
demand from me, finally in a communicated to the Imperial
very importunate manner, that government of France by the
I should authorise him to tele- Royal government of Spain, the
graph at once that I bound French Ambassador further de-
myself for all future time never manded of his Majesty, the
again to give my consent if the King, at Ems, that he would
Hohenzollerns should renew authorise him to telegraph to
their candidature. I refused Paris that his Majesty, the
at last somewhat sternly, as it King, bound himself for all time
is neither right nor possible to never again to give "his consent,
undertake engagements of this should the Hohenzollerns renew
kind a tout jamais. I told him their candidature. His Majesty,
that I had as yet received no the King, thereupon decided
news, and as he was earlier in- not to receive the French Am-
formed from Paris and Madrid bassador again, and sent the
than myself, he could see clearly aide-de-camp on duty to tell
that my government had no him that his Majesty had
more interest in the matter. ' nothing further to communi-
His Majesty has since received cate to the ambassador,
a letter from Prince Charles
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX
497
Anthony. His Majesty, having
told Count Benedetti that he
was awaiting news from the
Prince, has decided, with refer-
ence to the above demand, on
the suggestion of Count Eulen-
berg and myself, not to receive
Count Benedetti again, but only
to let him be informed through
an aide-de-camp: 'That his
Majesty has now received from
the Prince confirmation of the
news which Benedetti had al-
ready received from Paris, and
had nothing further to say to the
ambassador. ' His Majesty leaves
it to your Excellency to decide
whether Benedetti's fresh de-
mand and its rejection should be
at once communicated to both
our ambassadors, to foreign
nations, and to the Press.
at
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX B
THE REINSURANCE TREATIES OF 1884 AND 1887
The nature and contents of these secret undertakings, which -form
so decisive and interesting a feature of Bismarck's policy from
1883 to his dismissal in March 1890, still remain very obscure.
The texts have never been officially or unofficially published, and
inference from scattered and contradictory statements is all that
is possible. Certain points, however, are quite clear. In 1884
Germany concluded with Russia a specific arrangement; in 1887,
presumably because the arrangement of 1884 had terminated,
Germany concluded a fresh arrangement with Russia. In 1890
the arrangement of 1887 was not renewed by Chancellor Gaprivi.
The public of Europe would probably have never known of the
existence of 'the 1887 Compact' but for Bismarck's deliberate
revelation of its existence and non-renewal in the Hambu get
NachrichUn of October 24, 1896. It is noticeable that the revela-
tion caused much excitement in Germany and a storm of indignant
criticism in Austria. It was very embarrassing to the German
government; whether it was as great a surprise to the Foreign
Office in the Ball-Platz as it obviously was to the Austrian public is
one of the points in controversy, on which precise information is
still lacking. The Austrian public mind, as a study of the Viennese
newspapers of November 1896 proves, was seriously upset, and
there was much excited comment on Bismarck's betrayal of the
Dual Alliance by the secret arrangements with Russia. But the
Austrian government maintained an official discretion and re-
served its indignation, if it felt any, for confidential communica-
tion to the Wilhelmstrasse at Berlin. Nor did the debate in the
Reichstag (November 16, 1896) add anything to our knowledge.
The official Reichsanzeiger had published (October 27) a curt note,
pronouncing the 'revelation' to be a 'violation of the most con-
fidential secrets of State which constituted a blow at the grave
interests of the Empire'; but neither the Chancellor, Prince
Hohenlohe, nor Foreign Secretary Baron Marschallv on Bieberstein,
though they spoke at considerable length in reply to the interpella-
tion of Grat Hompesch, gave any new information, except to admit
the bare fact that a compact had been made in 1887 and not re-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX
499
newed in 1890. Prince Hohenlohe took refuge in the necessity of
official secrecy and reasons of State. The Foreign Secretary indeed
pointed out that a diplomacy which rested on a series of engage-
ments, possibly conflicting in their terms, was of doubtful value,
and that the worth of any single engagement was not increased by
the number of other contracts. What the precise meaning of
this cryptic utterance was, it is impossible to decide; but it clearly
was intended to convey--whether truly or not, we cannot say--
that the German Foreign Office had not docketed in its cupboard
other secret treaties of 'a reinsurance character,' together with
an assurance for the world in general and Vienna in particular,
that the German government of 1896 was, and intended to
remain, free to fulfil loyally the terms of the Dual or Triple
Alliance.
Both ministers, however, also spoke casually of 'negotiations
between 1887 and 189b. ' Negotiations with whom or for what
they did not explain, but presumably they referred to negotiations
with Russia between 1887 and 1890 for the renewal of 'the
Compact of 1887' or a similar treaty. No explanation was
offered of the reasons why Chancellor Caprivi did not renew the
Compact of 1887--e. g.
was it, as Hohenlohe suggests in his Diary
(January 14, 1895, ii. 462), ' because the policy it led to was too
complicated,' or because Russia raised her terms, or because the
Emperor had embarked on a serious attempt in 1890 to bring
Great Britain into the Triple Alliance, or because ? the reinsurance'
was judged to be a betrayal of Austria? It is tempting to connect
the non-renewal in 1890 with the dismissal of Bismarck; for we
know that Bismarck's policy was regarded as a betrayal of Austria
by the Emperor and his military entourage. Another inference
is still more tempting. Hohenlohe twice (e. g. ii. 429, and 452)
succinctly states the contents of' the reinsurance' as he understood
them to be (i. e. before he became Chancellor and had free access
to confidential documents, when his silence is instructive):
'When I told him (Caprivi) that Schuvaloff had described him
as a trop honnete homme, he said that was because Bismarck had
concluded a treaty with Russia, under which we guaranteed
Russia a free hand in Bulgaria and Constantinople, while Russia
undertook to observe a neutral attitude in the Franco-GermanWar.
This treaty had lapsed when Caprivi assumed office, and he had
not renewed it, because its publication would have shattered the
Triple Alliance. I fear that Austria will not be grateful to us. '
And to the same effect (ii. 452): with the addition, 'Russia
pledged herself to remain neutral in case of a war with France,
even though Austria should lend a hand in the East-'
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 500
BISMARCK
These passages are apparently explicit enough; in reality they
are full of difficulties. Caprivi took office in March 1890; if,
as we seem bound to assume, 'the reinsurance' was made in
November 1887, it did not lapse when Caprivi assumed office, but
ten months later. Are we to believe that 'the reinsurance'
lapsed in March 1890, i. e. that it was made in March 1887?
If so, what happened in November 1887? For if the Compact
of 1884 was renewed in the spring of 1887, what is the explanation
of the strained Russo-German relations from March to November
1887, and of the arrangement with the Tsar in that month at
Berlin ? ' The publication' would have 'shattered the Triple
Alliance' (sic)--but who was going to ' publish' it? If it was a
secret treaty, why should it be 'published'? Did Hohenlohe
intend to convey that Austria (as was probable) knew nothing
of the ' reinsurance,' but that if she learned (from Russia or whom? )
of its existence, the Triple Alliance would be shattered? Why
should 'Austria not be grateful? ' Because she had been told
(between 1890 and 1892) that she had been betrayed between
1887 and 1890, but would not be betrayed any more? And how
was ' Austria to lend a hand in the East,' detrimental to Germany?
By tearing up the Triple Alliance and attacking Germany? By
making an alliance with France or how? Without the text of the
document it is impossible to answer these and other conundrums.
But if Hohenlohe is correct, the inference is certain that (a) ' the
reinsurance' of 1887 at least was concluded behind Austria's
back; (b) that its contents gravely imperilled the Dual and Triple
Alliances; and (c) that the policy involved was condemned in 1890
and renounced.
What was that policy? Clearly ' a free hand for Russia' in the
Near East, and Bismarck said as much in his big speeches in 1887
and 1888, as noted in the text (see p. 446). That such' a free hand'
was in conflict with Austrian ambitions is no less certain. But,
in 1890, the inference is irresistible that the Kaiser had already
embarked on the Weltpolitik which aimed ? not at a free hand for
Russia in Bulgaria and Constantinople' but 'at a free hand for
Germany. ' The heir to Constantinople, with Bulgaria as his
washpot, was to be the German Emperor, not the Emperor of
Russia; while, concurrently, Austria was to throw the Habsburg
shoe over Serbia, the valleys of the Morava and Vardar and
Salonica, meeting on a Macedonian frontier, to be delimited later,
the Kaiser's brother-in-law, the Duke of Sparta, the 'Tino' of
imperial telegrams and recent history. The non-renewal of * the
reinsurance' was the categorical pre-condition of such a policy,
with which the Kaiser, flushed with super-Teutonic ambitions,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX
5oi
returned from his pilgrimage in the East, to pledge himself to
Austria and to dismiss Bismarck, who regarded ' the new course'
as midsummer madness. It is at any rate very noticeable that
in 1896 neither Hohenlohe nor Baron Marschall attempted to
meet the challenge of the Hamburger Nachrichten, that the Kaiser's
and Caprivi's policy had driven Russia into the arms of France,
and that the authors of the Franco-Russian alliance were the men
who broke with Russia and supported Austria, coute que coute.
It is no less certain that the non-renewal of the ' reinsurance' was
made with the full knowledge and approval of the Kaiser.
A writer, M. Andre Mevil, in the Revue Hebdomadaire for June
1907 gives a very confident and detailed account of the ' reinsur-
ance' treaties. He does not give his authorities, but he writes as if
he had had access to information that could not be precisely stated.
Briefly, according to M. Mevil, the first secret treaty was made
at Berlin on February 2\, 1884, and was verbally ratified (and not
in writing, as not being necessary) in September 15, 1884, at
Skierniewice. The contents were known to Austria, or Austria was
a party to it. The Pan-Slav party under Katkoff worked un-
ceasingly to prevent the renewal of the agreement, and in 1887
it was not renewed. This coincided with a dangerous crisis in
Franco-German relations. Alexander declined to give a pledge
to remain neutral in case of a war on the Rhine, and M. Mevil
thinks that 'the Schnaebele incident' was closed by Bismarck
because he could not rely on Russian neutrality. Subsequently,
when Bismarck had exposed certain forgeries misrepresenting
Germany's policy in Bulgaria, the Tsar, when in Berlin, November
18, 1887, concluded the 'reinsurance' which was not renewed in
1890. The agreement pledged Russia or Germany to neutrality
in the event of either being attacked by a third party {i. e. pre-
sumably a Franco-German, or an Austro-German war). M. Mevil
draws a clear distinction between the Compact of 1884, to which
Austria was a party, and that of 1887, to which she was not. He
asserts that it was Russia's unwillingness in 1887 to include Austria
in the renewal that caused the Compact of 1884 to be dropped.
Hohenlohe spoke in the debate of November 16, 1896, 'of 1887
when Boulangism reached its height, and threatened a danger
that disappeared with the disappearance of Boulangism,' i. e. a
clear suggestion that the raison d'etre of 'the reinsurance' was
the possibility of a Franco-German war, and the urgent desirability
of securing Russia's neutrality against that eventuality (as was
done by Bismarck in 1870).
The Hamburger Nachrichten also suggested (October 24, 1896)
that the agreement was for six years, and M. Mevil seems to
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 502
BISMARCK
support this. But in view of the assertion in the same paper,
that it had not been renewed in 1890, this seems impossible,
unless it is meant that it was the treaty of 1884 which was for
six years and that the agreement of 1887 was a separate convention,
wholly independent of that of 1884--a hypothesis that only opens
up fresh queries and difficulties.
Marschall and Hohenlohe positively asserted that the agreement,
that was not renewed, was a secret one, to be kept secret. Against
this the Hamburger Nachrichten of November I, 1896, asserted
that its tenor had been communicated both to Austria and to
Italy! How in that case it could be a secret arrangement, and
what value it would have, and why its non-renewal should have
been such a grave blunder, and why the revelation of what was
known both by the Austrian and Italian governments, as well as
by the Russian government, should have caused the flurry of
excitement in 1896 and been denounced as equivalent to a lese-
majestk, I confess I cannot understand.
In conclusion, I am driven to infer that: (1) the agreement of
1884 was for three years; (2) Austria may have been a party to it;
(3) it pledged the signatories, possibly of three States, i. e. Bismarck,
Szechenyi, and Sabouroff to a benevolent neutrality in the case of
any of the three being attacked; (4) this tripartite arrangement
lapsed in 1887; (5) Bismarck, behind the back of Austria, con-
cluded a secret and private 'reinsurance' with Russia in 1887;
(6) this 'reinsurance' was for three years, and pledged each
signatory to neutrality in the event of either being attacked by
a third party, i. e. France or Austria; (7) this was not renewed by
Caprivi in 1890; (8) in consequence Russia felt isolated and
gradually drifted into an entente and then an alliance with France.
It is noticeable, further, that the British Standard and the
German Zukunft in 1884 duly notified their readers with the
information that Germany had come to an understanding with
Russia. So far as I know, no other newspaper discovered or pub-
lished the fact. But the information passed practically unnoticed
in 1884.
Secondly,German public criticism in 1896 represented Bismarck's
'reinsurance' of 1887 as a masterpiece of German statecraft--
that is to say, German public opinion hailed with enthusiasm
the conclusion of a secret understanding by Germany with Russia,
at the expense and behind the back of their ally, Austria; and it
regretted that Caprivi had failed to continue this Bismarckian
method of pledging his country to one ally, while the value of the
pledge was being secretly whittled away in favour of that ally's
avowed enemy. Such a mental attitude is instructive in the
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX
thoroughness with which the German public had assimilated
Bismarckian principles. What would German public opinion
have said had Austria behind the back of Germany, and in violation
of the Dual Alliance, made a secret reinsurance with Russia to the
detriment of Germany? Would that have been Austrian 'per-
fidy ' or a masterpiece of Austrian statecraft?
The articles in the Hamburger Nachrichten and other papers, and
a full report of the Debate of November 16, 1896, will be found in
Penzler, Bismarck nach seiner Entlassung, vol. vii. and in vol. iii.
of the Bismarck Jabrbuch. While this book was in the press,
Professor Simpson's second article (Nineteenth Century, January
1918) on the Sabouroff Papers became available. Professor Simpson,
unfortunately, does not throw any more light on the secret agree-
ment of 1884, or of 1887--except to say (p. 75): 'as a matter of
fact the understanding became closer with Germany, especially
as Bismarck was endeavouring to negotiate a "reinsurance"
treaty with Russia, unknown to Austria, providing for neutrality
in case either Power was attacked by a third. In this he succeeded.
"Then came Caprivi in place of Bismarck"--the words are
M. SabourofPs--" and said that it was not necessary to make
a separate treaty with Russia, because Germany was on good
relations with her. Then followed still other councillors who
began to smile towards France, but whether it began with Russia
or with France I do not know. "'
The main thesis of Professor Simpson's article is to summarise
from the Sabouroff MSS. the negotiations by which Austria,
Germany, and Russia came to conclude a treaty in 1881, arranging
for an agreed policy in the Near East. This treaty was signed on
June 18,1881: in 1884 'it was renewed for a further term of three
years, subject to one slight modification,' but not renewed in 1887.
The whole article with the preceding one" (Nineteenth Century,
December 1917) fully bears out the general line of interpretation
of Bismarck's policy and methods maintained in the text (chapter vi.
? ? 3, 5, and 6)- Some quotations are so relevant as to justify their
presence here. 'Bismarck was a rough man even in politics, but
his conservative convictions were very sincere; he was opposed to
Liberalism in any form. "There are five great Powers; I must
always strive," Bismarck said, "to be one of three against two. "
Gortschakov in 1870 " consulted the Emperor to take immediate
steps, whatever the risk, to annul the clauses of the Treaty of
Paris rather than wait the definitive victory of Prussia before doing
so. " In 1875 d props of "the crisis" in May--" I confess that
all my admiration went to Prince Gortschakov; he showed himself
superior in self-command, courtesy, precise and, I ought to add,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? BISMARCK
breadth of view. " The Grand Duke Nicholas in 1877 "did not
occupy Constantinople in accordance with the instructions tele-
graphed to him, and the Emperor never forgave him. " In 1880,
Bismarck said: "Thus at last we shall be able to form that solid
monarchical bloc, and feel no longer any concern about the internal
convulsions with which the Western Powers may be troubled.
The three Emperors are strong enough to defy all the agitations
abroad, and sufficiently great lords to live content with the patri-
mony of their ancestors. "'
Bismarck said on two occasions to M. Sabouroff: 'I do not
share the prejudices of the other cabinets on the subject of the
danger of handing over Constantinople to Russia': and again:
'1 flatter myself that I was the first in Europe to break with the
old tradition with which the Westerners inoculated all the Cabinets,
viz. , that a Russian Constantinople would be a European danger. ' As
to these utterances it is relevant to point out that Bismarck's obiter
dicta and ' confessions' are always interesting, but generally, unless
confirmed by specific acts, wholly untrustworthy. Bismarckian
thinking aloud, in the presence of another person, had invariably
a concealed objective. Had Bismarck carried out all the 'con-
fessions' and 'thinking aloud' that he made to Napoleon III.
between 1858 and 1867, Central Europe would never have been
reconstructed as it actually was. Napoleon, Lord Ampthill,
M. Sabouroff, and many others learned that between Bismarck's
ideas and confessions and Bismarck's acts there lay a substantial
world of difference. Words with Bismarck were generally in-
tended to mask his own, or unmask the thoughts of those with
whom he conversed, and his alluring geniality was one of his
finest and most deceptive diplomatic gifts. Hohenlohe records
how Alexander in. after 1890 said that in doing business with
Bismarck, even when the arrangement was satisfactory, he always
felt' qu'il me tricherait. '
Austria required much pressure in 1881 to come into the pro-
posed arrangement. 'Throughout the Sabouroff Memoirs? writes
Professor Simpson, 'nothing"is so obvious as the disdain that
both the negotiators feel for "the ramshackle Empire," and yet
it is always Bismarck who says the really brutal things. ' 'It is
abundantly clear, however, that the vital significance of the Dual
Alliance had not been disclosed to the Tsar. ' The arrangement
of 1881 was for three years. 'When Austria,' Bismarck said,
with one of his usual vivid touches, 'has worn that flannel
next her skin for three whole years, she won't be able to take
it off without running the risk of catching cold. ' That was
what happened in 1890 in the matter- of the reinsurance treaties.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? APPENDIX
Caprivi threw off the flannel that Bismarck had made Germany
wear next her skin for six years--and Germany caught cold. One
other Bismarckian touch is too deliriously characteristic to be
omitted.
'We shall make a mistake if we keep Austria from compromising
herself by committing to writing these demands of hers (i. e. the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, plus the Sandjak of Novi
Bazar and some other acquisitions of a like character), which will
only embroil her with the Western Powers, and furnish proofs
of complicity with us in any future Eastern crisis. '
The negotiator who had lured Benedetti to state his proposals in
writing, and then published them in The Times, knew well the
value of promissory notes with the signature of the promissor
attached. Bismarck liked a cupboard full of such compromising
stuff--to be revealed, when he chose--and he took good care
to leave as little of his own 'paper' in other persons' hands as
possible. In Bismarckian ethics the morality of the betrayal of a
confidence was decided by the difference between the betrayer and
the betrayed. If you were the former, reason of State could ad-
minister a plenary absolution; but if you were the latter, then let the
welkin ring with the iniquity of the act. But the best comment
on Bismarckian methods and all of the same character was supplied
by Bismarck himself to his wife, when he first became initiated in
the grand diplomacy at Frankfort: 'Not even the most scoun-
drelly democrat or sceptic could conceive the charlatanry and
fraud that lies in this diplomacy. '
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:49 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? BIBLIOGRAPHY
This Bibliographical Appendix is not, nor does it profess to be,
a bibliography of German history for the period of Bismarck's
lifetime. Such would require a separate volume. Nor does it
profess to be an exhaustive bibliography of the historical literature
on Bismarck himself. Attention here is necessarily confined to the
chief original sources available, together with the leading secondary
authorities, and brief critical comments based on the author's
study. For a more complete catalogue reference should be made
to Dahlmann-Waitz, Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte (8th
edition, ed. Ko? hler, 1912), and R. Charmatz, Wegweiser durch
die Literatur der Osterreichischen Geschichte (1912), also to the
bibliographies in vols, x. , xi. , and xii.
