75b29-c2: Why should one answer these questions
categorically?
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-3-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991-PDF-Search-Engine
.
.
Certain masters say: If one follows the Sutra (sutrdrtha), vibhavatrsna is abandoned solely through Meditation; but according to the Truth (tattvdrtha) it is abandoned through both Seeing and Meditation.
How is this?
The Sutra says: "It is as if someone overwhelmed by fear and by suffering thinks: May I, after death, be annihilated, disappear, no longer exist!
" In this Sutra one should understand vibhava as the anityatd subsequent to nikdyasabhdga: this vibhava is abandoned through Meditation, and so vibhavatrsna is not abandoned through Seeing.
Here the Master (lun-chu) presents the meaning of the Sutra .
.
.
When one is attached to the truth, one should say as the Vibhajyavadins above: "Vibhava is the name of the anityatd of the Three Dhatus .
.
.
"
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 138c26: Why does the Srotaapanna not produce vibhavatrsna? Answer: Because he sees the nature of things (dharmata); that is, seeing that the nature of things is a series of causes and effect, he ,does not desire annihilation (uccheda). In the
? second place, because he believes in the result of action; that is, believing that action and its effect are the successive parts of one series, he does not desire annihilation. Again, because heunderstandsemptiness,theSrotaapannaobtainssUnyatavimoksamukha (viii. 24);he knows that there is no present existence, nor subsequent non-existence of the "self" and "things pertaining to self;" consequently he does not produce trsnd, the desire for annihilation, or subsequent destruction. Furthermore, vibhavatrsnd is nourished (upacita) by vibhavadrsti (v. 7), and vibhavadrsti manifests itself following it; now the Srotaapanna has already abandoned vibhavadrsti, so he does not produce vibhavatrsnd.
50. In order to demonstrate that one can "love impermanence," YaSomitra quotes the Sutra:
ydvad ayam dtmdjivati tisphati dhriyate ydpayati tdvat sarogah sagandah sasalyah sajvarah sapriddhakah / yatas cdyam dtmd ucchidyate vina/yati na bhavati / iyatdyam dtmd samyaksamucchinno bhavati /
51. asmitd = asmimana.
52. Hsiian-tsang reads bhagnaprsthatvdt, "their back being burned. " The Tibetan has rkan,
marrow.
53. Independent or aveniki avidyd, is the avidyd which does not accompany other anusayas, rdga, etc.
On the universals, ii. 54a-b.
54. That is: they bear, in their Dhatu, on the five categories (nikdyas, ii. 52b), which are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. According to another explanation, they are called universals because they are the cause of amis'ayas belonging to all five categories.
55. According to Hsiian-tsang, "superior" refers to the higher Dhatus or bhumis. These anusayas are not in the lower ones. On the sarvatragas and the bhumis, see v. 18.
56. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93a5. Some say that, not having any object, avidyd does not have any pure dharmas for its object; in fact, it is not jndna by nature; rather, it forms an obstacle to the knowledge of things . . . (Samghabhadra TD 29, p. 6l3bl0). See iii. 28c, v. 38d.
57. See Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 94al2.
58. Hsiian-tsang adds: "which are abandoned through the Seeing of andsrava," according to
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93al5, which Vasubandhu summarizes in Karika 16.
59. According to other authorities, kusaladharmacchanda is sraddha (ii. 25) or again the
universal mental state of adhimukti (ii. 24). Kathdvatthu, ix. 2.
60. One prides himself solely on gross and mobile things which provoke satisfaction in the
lower bhumis.
61. Our texts interpert anuhte, or anusayana, in the sense oipustim labhate, "to undertake
growth," and pratisphdm labhate, "to begin, to become active;" see i. English trans, page 59 f
and v. 39. The Tibetan version anusete = rgyas gyur - to become great. The Chinese sui-tseng H t ^ has the same meaning.
In certain cases an anus ay a grows by the fact that it becomes active in the object; in other cases it grows by the fact of the sensations, etc. , which favor its growth.
On the two types of anusayana, see Samyuktahrdaya, TD 28, p. 901b6ff, Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 898cll, Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 257a26, and p. 442b24 to 452bl9 (Saeki also refers to Vibhdsd 32. 1 and 16. 1). Saeki quotes the Vibhdsd, p. 110a20: Certain masters say that the anusayas do not constitute anusayana in the dharmas associated with the mind. The DarstSntikas say: T o affirm that the anus ay a constitutes the object of anuiayana is to admit that it grows by the fact of the pure dharmas or the dharmas of a higher sphere, when it has for its object similar dharmas [and this contradicts the thesis v. l8a-b]; to affirm that it
Footnots 877
? 878 Chapter Five
constitutes anuiayana in associated dhannas is to admit that the anuiaya [for example, attachment] will never be cut off, or that even if it is cut off, it will always be anuiayana, for one cannot definitively disjoin the mind from associated dharmas [, for example, from agreeable sensation which nourishes attachment. ]. " See below note 62.
62. See v. 39.
63. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 444c21: "Is a locus of anuiaya also a locus of anuiayana? [That is: is the object on which an anuiaya can bear--the thing relative to which one takes up attachment, hatred, doubt, false view, etc. --always favorable to the development ipuspt) and the installation (pratisthalabha) of the anuiaya? ]Pute (andsrava) things (Nirvana and the Path) are loci of anuiaya but not loci of anuiayana. Vasumitra says: When one produces anuiaya having impure {sdsrava) things for their object, the anuiayas progressively increase {sui-tseng) [that is, they grow by the fact of these things taken as object], in the same way that the organ of sight of a person who looks at the moon develops {tseng-ch'ang t^JI
); when one produces anuiayas having pure things for their object, the anuiayas diminish, like the organ of sight of a person who looks at the sun. "
64. As long as rdga is not abandoned, it will continue to develop from the fact of the agreeable sensation which is associated with the mind.
65. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 259c8.
66. See note 27, and also BodhisattvabhUmi, Muse on, 1906, 224.
67. According to the Japanese editor, the Sautrantikas.
68. This refers to the doctrine of Kapila and the Vaisesikas, of the philosophical proponents of an atman.
69. On the roots of evil, iv. 8c-d. The commentary on the Ndmasamgiti quotes an Abhidharma treatise which enumerates the six anuiayas: mdnadrgvicikitsdi ca rdgapratigh- amUdhayah.
70. The word "all" signifies "of the five categories," abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. (ii. 52b).
71. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 259c8-260a9: Some (= the Darstantikas) say that all kleias are bad (akuiala); others, that the kleias of Kamadhatu are bad, whereas the kleias of the other Dhatus are neutral; a third hold that, among the three bonds (samyojana) of Kamadhatu, one bond is neutral, namely satkdyadrspi. . . Why is satkdyadrspi neutral? It is not bad because it does not absolutely destroy the diaya (see above, iv. 80d) and it does not destroy the diaya because it is not associated with non-shame and non-respect . . . it is neutral because it does not have retribution (vipdka). Vasumitra says: "because it does not produce gross actions of the body and voice" (compare iv. l2d, p. 580 of the English translation).
72. On morally neutral things, see ii. 66, iv. 9d.
73. Koia, ii. 57,71b.
74. Trsnd with respect to the dhydnas and the drupyas ("nonmaterial" absorptions) which are "tasteable" (viii. 6), at the moment of its arising with respect to the heavenly dwellings, is, in the higher spheres, neutral. All avidyd of the higher spheres, and the two views of satkaya and antagrdha in Kamadhatu, are neutral. Prajfid in Kamadhatu (1) associated with these two views, or (2) associated with minds arisen from retribution, etc. , is neutral, like all prajfid of the higher spheres associated with the kleias, or which is also associated with the minds arisen from retribution, etc. (The content of "etc. " varies according to the spheres, see ii. 72
? 75. Hsiian-tsang translates Aparintakas as "masters of foreign countries. " The term dhydyin is taken in a pejorative sense, see Aryadeva, Catuhiatika, 176 (Mem. As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8,1914, p. 473): kateid dhydyi cittavibhramam anuprdptah kapdlam mama Urasi lagnam hi. . . Bad dhydna, Majjhima, iii. 14.
76. A tfsnottaradhydyin is a "meditator" who cultivates the "tasteable" dhydna (dsvddanasamprayuktadhydna, viii. 6): a dfspyuttaradhydyin produces a drspi of eternity, etc. ; a mdnottaradhydyin thinks: "I possess this dhydna, others do not possess it. " One who cultivates dhydna with excessive trsnd (tfsnottaram, trsnoparikam), or who is dominated by trsnd (tfsnottarah, tfsnddhikah, is called a tfsnottaradhydyin. The other two names are explained in the same way.
These are all different modes of klefa within those who enter into meditation; they are the root, the cause of neutral dharmas.
According to Hsiian-tsang: Why do the Aparantakas create these four neutral roots? Because the mahdpurusas cultivate the superior absorptions without passing beyond the point of departure which is made up of trsnd, drspi and mdna . . .
77. Samyutta, 32. 1, 34. 12; Ekottara, TD 2, p. 784b2. See De la Valle'e Poussin's Nirvana (1924).
78. See Mahdvyutpatti, 86, according to Taisho no. 1536; Digha, iii. 229, Anguttara, i. 197, ii. 46, Milinda, 144; Childers sub. voc. patiho. 'Five types of very different questions, Atthasdlini, p. 55, Sumangalavildsini, 68.
For ekamsikd dhammd, anekamsikd, see Digha, i. 191. 79. The Tibetan has "This person;" see page 801.
80. Hsiian-tsang takes up the above paragraph immediately before explaining the Abhidharmikas.
81. According to Hsiian-tsang: One should answer (vydkarana) by distinguishing this question. A general answer is not suitable, for even though the questioner knows in general that all does not arise, the problem has not been explained (na vydkhydtam).
82. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 75b20. The Vydkhyd explains: sappdddbhidharmapdphin.
83. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p.
75b29-c2: Why should one answer these questions categorically? These questions lead to great advantages, lead to good dharmas, are favorable to brahmacarya, produce bodhi, and cause one to attain nirvdna. This is why one should respond to them in a categorical manner. Compare Digha, i. 191.
84. The Tibetan has: can mi smra ba am / bdag nid lun ston du bzhug ces bya ba'i tha thsig go-
85. Missing in the Tibetan.
86. According to Hsiian-tsang: When someone asks if purusa-samjnd is identical or not identical to the dtman, one should ask: "What atman are you refering to in asking this question? ,"andifheanswers"Iamreferingtothegrossself . . . "
87. The Tibetan has de bzhin ons pa. The usual reading is de bzhin gsegs pa.
88. Svalaksanaklesa - kiefa bearing on a determinate object; the object of rdga and mdna is
always agreeable; the object of pratigha is always disagreeable.
89. Karikas 25-27 continue the presentation and the criticism of the sarvdstivdda, "the doctrine of universal existence," as understood by the Sarvastivadin-Vibhasikas. This problem is studied in the Introduction. Our text has been translated by Th. Stcherbatsky,
Footnotes 879
? 880 Chapter Five
Central Conception of Buddhism, 1923, Appendix, p. 76-91.
De la Valle'e Poussin translated the Chapter of DevaSarman's Vijnanakaya which treats
of the existence of the past and future in an anniversary volume of the E cole franchise d'Extreme-Orient.
See Kosa, i. 7c-d, 34d, iv. 35a-b, v. 62; trans, i. page 70.
Kathdvatthu, i. 7-8, note of Shwe Zan Aung, p. 375, 392 of the translation; ix. 6-7; Milinda, 50-54; Visuddhimagga, 686 (If one abandons present, past, and future defilements; comp. Kathdvatthu, xix. l).
Aryadeva, Catuhsatikd, 256-8 {Memoirs As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8, 1914, p. 491); Bodhicarydvatdrapanjikd, 579-580 (Traikalyavadin); Madhyamaka, xvii. 14, xxii. ll, xxxv. 5; Wassilieff (on the Prasangikas), 363 (=331).
Remarks of A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 163-5. See also the bibliography below note 94.
90. The Chinese versions give: "The three time periods (literally
'worlds,' loka) exist;" but according to the Tibetan: "The Vaibhasikas do not maintain that conditioned things (samskrtas), which have the characteristics of conditioned things, are eternal; but these masters maintain that they exist in all of the time periods" (dus mains kun tuyodpar ni gsal bar dam 'cha'o).
91. Samyuktakdgama, TD 2, p. 20all: rupam anityam atitam anagatam / kah punar vddam pratyutpannasya / evamdarit srutavdn dryasravako'tite rupe'nape- kso bhavati / anagatam rupam ndbhinandati / pratyutpannasya rupasya nirvide virdgdya nirodhdya pratipanno bhavati / atitam ced bhtksavo rupam ndbhavisyan na srutavdn dryasrdvako . . .
Compare the quotation from the same Sutra, Madhyamakavrtti, xxii. l 1; Majjhima, iii. 188.
92. Samyutta ii. 72, etc. ; Kosa, iii. 32.
93. Paramartha: "If a person says that all exists,--past, present, future, space, pratisamkhydnirodha (=Nirvana), and apratisamkhydnirodha,--it is said that this person is of the Sarvastivadin school. There are other persons who say, 'Present dharmas exist; past actions, if they have not produced their result, exist; but when they have produced their result, they no longer exist, as do neither future dharmas which are the results [of a past or present action]. ' Persons who say that the three time periods exist but who make these distinctions, are not Sarvastivadins, but Vibhajyavadins.
Vasumitra, on the KaSyapiyas (Wassiliev, 283, fol 176b): "The action whose retribution has ripened, does not exist; the action whose retribution has not ripened, exists; the samskdras arise from past causes and not from future causes. " This is the thesis of the Kassapikas, Kathdvatthu, i. 8.
On the Vibhajyavadins, above note 38.
94. The Vydkhyd gives the terms bhavanyathika, laksanayathika, avasthdnyathika, anyathanyathika.
Bhavanyathika = "one who maintains that the time periods differ (anyatha) through the fact of bhava"K\xt anyathanyathika is translated into Tibetangzhan dan gzhan du gyur pa pa; and we have the gloss purvdparam apeksydnyonya ucyate: "the time period is called reciprocally distinct (anyonya) by reason of what follows and precedes. " gzhan dan gzhan = anyonya. The Chinese sources translate
the name of the fourth master "who affirms that the difference of the time
y periods is related to their relationship (apeksd)!
See Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, p. 196 (translation of the work of Bhavya on the sects); Watters, Yuan Chwang, i. 274. The author of the Yogasutras, iii. 13, iv. 12, etc. , relies on Sarvastivadin sources, see "Notes bouddhiques," Bull. Acad, de Belgique, 1922, p. 522.
? characteristic, but it is not devoid of other characteristics, for in this hypothesis a certain future dharma could not later be this same present and past dharma.
96. The two commentators on Hsiian-tsang differ. According to Fa-pao (TD 41, p. 704all, al9-23), the future is posited relative (apeksa) to the past and the present; the past, relative to the present and the future; the present, relative the past and the future. This is also the opinion of Samghabhadra. According to P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 311a6-8, a26-28), the future is posited relative to former things; the past, relative to later things; and the present relative to both: this is the system of the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396bl8-23.
97. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396al0: "The Sarvaastivadins have four great masters who differently establish the differences of the three time periods . . . 1. Vasumitra who says that they differ through their state (avasthd); 2. Buddhadeva who says that they differ through their point of view (apeksa); 3. the follower of difference with respect to bhdva, who says: a dharma, changing its time period, differs through its bhdva, not through its nature . . . ; a dharma, passing from the future into the present, abandons its future bhdva and acquires its present bhdva, yet neither loses nor acquires its nature. . . ; and 4. the follower of difference with respect to its laksana. " The Ekavyavaharika school (i-shuo pu -^fftitB ) says that the three time periods are only speech, and that their nature does not exist. The Lokottaravadins posit the time period by reason (*' ) of the dharma: thus that which is worldly (laukikd) relatively exists, whereas that which is transworldly (lokottara) really
anc
<< past and the future do not exist; only the present
exists. For the school of the Sutras (ching-pu M. W> )>
* f?
r trie
Mahasamghikas
(ta-chung-pu ;fcffc? |$ )>> exists.
tn
98. The Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396M8: refutes the theory of the difference of bhdva: "Outside of the characteristics of a dharma, what can indeed be its bhdva? " But a commentary says: The nature of a dharma in the three time periods is not transformed; there is only difference in the fact of its activity or non-activity, etc. : this is the bhdva of a dharma. But this transformation (parindma) is not similar to that of the Samkhyas: these latter say that the nature of the dharmas is eternal and yet it transforms itself into the twenty-three tattvas. Now the nature of a conditioned dharma is not eternal. It is by reason of this modification,--activity, non-activity, etc. ,--that we speak of transformation. The theories established by Ghosaka and Buddhadeva are also irreprochable: they do not present any great difference from that of Vasumitra. Only Vasumitra gives a solid and simple explanation. Furthermore the Sastra Master (Vasubandhu), in agreement with the Vibhdsd, prefers it. . .
99. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 393cl8: Sensation not yet experienced is future; while one experiences it, it is present; experienced, it is p a s t . . .
100. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 394c5: Is activity the same thing as the nature of a dharma? Is it different? It is not possible to say that it is the same thing nor that it is different. . .
101. On the definition of abhutvd bhdvah, see the sources quoted Madhyamakavrtti, p. 263, Majjhima, iii. 25, Sikssdsamuccaya, 248, Milinda, 52, etc.
102.
svabhdvah sarvadd cdsti bhdvo nityas ca nesyate /
na ca svabhdvdd bhdvo'nyo vyaktam isvaracespitam //
Quoted by Prajrlakaramati, Bodhicarydvatdra, p. 581, who utilizes (p. 579-582) the Koia
without citing his source.
That is: The self nature (svabhdva, svalaksana) of rupa, etc. , always exists; but the being,
rUpa, etc. (rupadibhdva), is not held to be eternal. Would it thus be different from its self nature? No, it is not different from its self nature. Purely arbitrary, this theory is an arbitrary action, which has no justification (ndtra yuktir asti).
Footnotes 881
? 882 Chapter Five
103. Samyukta, 13. 21 (TD 2, p. 92bl5? ).
104. According to Hsiian-tsang: "the word 'is' is applied to what exists, as well as to what does not exist. " Bodhicaryavatara, 581. 17: astiiabdasya nipdtatvdt kdlatrayavrttitvam. See ii. 55d, page 245 of our translation.
105. Or, according to one varient: "on the subject of the Parivrajakas. . . " This refers to the monks who assassinated Maudgalyayana and who affirmed the non-existence of past action:
yat karmdbhyatitam tan ndsti.
According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, this Sutra is found in Madhyama 4. 10;
according to the Vydkhyd, in the Samyuktakdgama. Neither Jdtaka 522, nor the Dhammapada commentary (x. 7), which recounts the death of Maudgalyayana, gives the name of the Parivrajakas.
106. Quotation {Samyukta, TD 2, p. 92cl6) reproduced in Bodhicaryavatara ad ix. 142 (p. 581):caksurbhiksavautpadydmdnamnakutasridagacchati/ nirudhyamdnamcanakvacit samnicayam gaccbati / iti hi bhiksavah caksur abhUtvd bhavati bh&tvd ca prativigacchati.
Another fragment of the ParamdrthaiunyatdsUtra is quoted ad ix. 73 (p. . 474): iti hi bhiksavo'sti karma / asti phalam J kdrakas tu nopalabhyate ya iman skandhdn vijahdti anyami ca skandhdn upddatte; a quotation reproduced in Madhyamakdvatdra (p. 262, Tibetan trans. ), Sutrdlamkdra, xviii. lOl (text p. 158, trans, p. 264) and utilized by Vasubandhu (Hsiian-tsang's edition, TD 29, p. 154cl3, p. 155b26) in the supplement to the Ko/a.
107. AbhUd bhavisyati ca: that which, in the present, has been or will be "visible," is the object.
108. Divyacaksuravabhdsa, vii. 42.
109.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 138c26: Why does the Srotaapanna not produce vibhavatrsna? Answer: Because he sees the nature of things (dharmata); that is, seeing that the nature of things is a series of causes and effect, he ,does not desire annihilation (uccheda). In the
? second place, because he believes in the result of action; that is, believing that action and its effect are the successive parts of one series, he does not desire annihilation. Again, because heunderstandsemptiness,theSrotaapannaobtainssUnyatavimoksamukha (viii. 24);he knows that there is no present existence, nor subsequent non-existence of the "self" and "things pertaining to self;" consequently he does not produce trsnd, the desire for annihilation, or subsequent destruction. Furthermore, vibhavatrsnd is nourished (upacita) by vibhavadrsti (v. 7), and vibhavadrsti manifests itself following it; now the Srotaapanna has already abandoned vibhavadrsti, so he does not produce vibhavatrsnd.
50. In order to demonstrate that one can "love impermanence," YaSomitra quotes the Sutra:
ydvad ayam dtmdjivati tisphati dhriyate ydpayati tdvat sarogah sagandah sasalyah sajvarah sapriddhakah / yatas cdyam dtmd ucchidyate vina/yati na bhavati / iyatdyam dtmd samyaksamucchinno bhavati /
51. asmitd = asmimana.
52. Hsiian-tsang reads bhagnaprsthatvdt, "their back being burned. " The Tibetan has rkan,
marrow.
53. Independent or aveniki avidyd, is the avidyd which does not accompany other anusayas, rdga, etc.
On the universals, ii. 54a-b.
54. That is: they bear, in their Dhatu, on the five categories (nikdyas, ii. 52b), which are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. According to another explanation, they are called universals because they are the cause of amis'ayas belonging to all five categories.
55. According to Hsiian-tsang, "superior" refers to the higher Dhatus or bhumis. These anusayas are not in the lower ones. On the sarvatragas and the bhumis, see v. 18.
56. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93a5. Some say that, not having any object, avidyd does not have any pure dharmas for its object; in fact, it is not jndna by nature; rather, it forms an obstacle to the knowledge of things . . . (Samghabhadra TD 29, p. 6l3bl0). See iii. 28c, v. 38d.
57. See Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 94al2.
58. Hsiian-tsang adds: "which are abandoned through the Seeing of andsrava," according to
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93al5, which Vasubandhu summarizes in Karika 16.
59. According to other authorities, kusaladharmacchanda is sraddha (ii. 25) or again the
universal mental state of adhimukti (ii. 24). Kathdvatthu, ix. 2.
60. One prides himself solely on gross and mobile things which provoke satisfaction in the
lower bhumis.
61. Our texts interpert anuhte, or anusayana, in the sense oipustim labhate, "to undertake
growth," and pratisphdm labhate, "to begin, to become active;" see i. English trans, page 59 f
and v. 39. The Tibetan version anusete = rgyas gyur - to become great. The Chinese sui-tseng H t ^ has the same meaning.
In certain cases an anus ay a grows by the fact that it becomes active in the object; in other cases it grows by the fact of the sensations, etc. , which favor its growth.
On the two types of anusayana, see Samyuktahrdaya, TD 28, p. 901b6ff, Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 898cll, Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 257a26, and p. 442b24 to 452bl9 (Saeki also refers to Vibhdsd 32. 1 and 16. 1). Saeki quotes the Vibhdsd, p. 110a20: Certain masters say that the anusayas do not constitute anusayana in the dharmas associated with the mind. The DarstSntikas say: T o affirm that the anus ay a constitutes the object of anuiayana is to admit that it grows by the fact of the pure dharmas or the dharmas of a higher sphere, when it has for its object similar dharmas [and this contradicts the thesis v. l8a-b]; to affirm that it
Footnots 877
? 878 Chapter Five
constitutes anuiayana in associated dhannas is to admit that the anuiaya [for example, attachment] will never be cut off, or that even if it is cut off, it will always be anuiayana, for one cannot definitively disjoin the mind from associated dharmas [, for example, from agreeable sensation which nourishes attachment. ]. " See below note 62.
62. See v. 39.
63. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 444c21: "Is a locus of anuiaya also a locus of anuiayana? [That is: is the object on which an anuiaya can bear--the thing relative to which one takes up attachment, hatred, doubt, false view, etc. --always favorable to the development ipuspt) and the installation (pratisthalabha) of the anuiaya? ]Pute (andsrava) things (Nirvana and the Path) are loci of anuiaya but not loci of anuiayana. Vasumitra says: When one produces anuiaya having impure {sdsrava) things for their object, the anuiayas progressively increase {sui-tseng) [that is, they grow by the fact of these things taken as object], in the same way that the organ of sight of a person who looks at the moon develops {tseng-ch'ang t^JI
); when one produces anuiayas having pure things for their object, the anuiayas diminish, like the organ of sight of a person who looks at the sun. "
64. As long as rdga is not abandoned, it will continue to develop from the fact of the agreeable sensation which is associated with the mind.
65. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 259c8.
66. See note 27, and also BodhisattvabhUmi, Muse on, 1906, 224.
67. According to the Japanese editor, the Sautrantikas.
68. This refers to the doctrine of Kapila and the Vaisesikas, of the philosophical proponents of an atman.
69. On the roots of evil, iv. 8c-d. The commentary on the Ndmasamgiti quotes an Abhidharma treatise which enumerates the six anuiayas: mdnadrgvicikitsdi ca rdgapratigh- amUdhayah.
70. The word "all" signifies "of the five categories," abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. (ii. 52b).
71. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 259c8-260a9: Some (= the Darstantikas) say that all kleias are bad (akuiala); others, that the kleias of Kamadhatu are bad, whereas the kleias of the other Dhatus are neutral; a third hold that, among the three bonds (samyojana) of Kamadhatu, one bond is neutral, namely satkdyadrspi. . . Why is satkdyadrspi neutral? It is not bad because it does not absolutely destroy the diaya (see above, iv. 80d) and it does not destroy the diaya because it is not associated with non-shame and non-respect . . . it is neutral because it does not have retribution (vipdka). Vasumitra says: "because it does not produce gross actions of the body and voice" (compare iv. l2d, p. 580 of the English translation).
72. On morally neutral things, see ii. 66, iv. 9d.
73. Koia, ii. 57,71b.
74. Trsnd with respect to the dhydnas and the drupyas ("nonmaterial" absorptions) which are "tasteable" (viii. 6), at the moment of its arising with respect to the heavenly dwellings, is, in the higher spheres, neutral. All avidyd of the higher spheres, and the two views of satkaya and antagrdha in Kamadhatu, are neutral. Prajfid in Kamadhatu (1) associated with these two views, or (2) associated with minds arisen from retribution, etc. , is neutral, like all prajfid of the higher spheres associated with the kleias, or which is also associated with the minds arisen from retribution, etc. (The content of "etc. " varies according to the spheres, see ii. 72
? 75. Hsiian-tsang translates Aparintakas as "masters of foreign countries. " The term dhydyin is taken in a pejorative sense, see Aryadeva, Catuhiatika, 176 (Mem. As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8,1914, p. 473): kateid dhydyi cittavibhramam anuprdptah kapdlam mama Urasi lagnam hi. . . Bad dhydna, Majjhima, iii. 14.
76. A tfsnottaradhydyin is a "meditator" who cultivates the "tasteable" dhydna (dsvddanasamprayuktadhydna, viii. 6): a dfspyuttaradhydyin produces a drspi of eternity, etc. ; a mdnottaradhydyin thinks: "I possess this dhydna, others do not possess it. " One who cultivates dhydna with excessive trsnd (tfsnottaram, trsnoparikam), or who is dominated by trsnd (tfsnottarah, tfsnddhikah, is called a tfsnottaradhydyin. The other two names are explained in the same way.
These are all different modes of klefa within those who enter into meditation; they are the root, the cause of neutral dharmas.
According to Hsiian-tsang: Why do the Aparantakas create these four neutral roots? Because the mahdpurusas cultivate the superior absorptions without passing beyond the point of departure which is made up of trsnd, drspi and mdna . . .
77. Samyutta, 32. 1, 34. 12; Ekottara, TD 2, p. 784b2. See De la Valle'e Poussin's Nirvana (1924).
78. See Mahdvyutpatti, 86, according to Taisho no. 1536; Digha, iii. 229, Anguttara, i. 197, ii. 46, Milinda, 144; Childers sub. voc. patiho. 'Five types of very different questions, Atthasdlini, p. 55, Sumangalavildsini, 68.
For ekamsikd dhammd, anekamsikd, see Digha, i. 191. 79. The Tibetan has "This person;" see page 801.
80. Hsiian-tsang takes up the above paragraph immediately before explaining the Abhidharmikas.
81. According to Hsiian-tsang: One should answer (vydkarana) by distinguishing this question. A general answer is not suitable, for even though the questioner knows in general that all does not arise, the problem has not been explained (na vydkhydtam).
82. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 75b20. The Vydkhyd explains: sappdddbhidharmapdphin.
83. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p.
75b29-c2: Why should one answer these questions categorically? These questions lead to great advantages, lead to good dharmas, are favorable to brahmacarya, produce bodhi, and cause one to attain nirvdna. This is why one should respond to them in a categorical manner. Compare Digha, i. 191.
84. The Tibetan has: can mi smra ba am / bdag nid lun ston du bzhug ces bya ba'i tha thsig go-
85. Missing in the Tibetan.
86. According to Hsiian-tsang: When someone asks if purusa-samjnd is identical or not identical to the dtman, one should ask: "What atman are you refering to in asking this question? ,"andifheanswers"Iamreferingtothegrossself . . . "
87. The Tibetan has de bzhin ons pa. The usual reading is de bzhin gsegs pa.
88. Svalaksanaklesa - kiefa bearing on a determinate object; the object of rdga and mdna is
always agreeable; the object of pratigha is always disagreeable.
89. Karikas 25-27 continue the presentation and the criticism of the sarvdstivdda, "the doctrine of universal existence," as understood by the Sarvastivadin-Vibhasikas. This problem is studied in the Introduction. Our text has been translated by Th. Stcherbatsky,
Footnotes 879
? 880 Chapter Five
Central Conception of Buddhism, 1923, Appendix, p. 76-91.
De la Valle'e Poussin translated the Chapter of DevaSarman's Vijnanakaya which treats
of the existence of the past and future in an anniversary volume of the E cole franchise d'Extreme-Orient.
See Kosa, i. 7c-d, 34d, iv. 35a-b, v. 62; trans, i. page 70.
Kathdvatthu, i. 7-8, note of Shwe Zan Aung, p. 375, 392 of the translation; ix. 6-7; Milinda, 50-54; Visuddhimagga, 686 (If one abandons present, past, and future defilements; comp. Kathdvatthu, xix. l).
Aryadeva, Catuhsatikd, 256-8 {Memoirs As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8, 1914, p. 491); Bodhicarydvatdrapanjikd, 579-580 (Traikalyavadin); Madhyamaka, xvii. 14, xxii. ll, xxxv. 5; Wassilieff (on the Prasangikas), 363 (=331).
Remarks of A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 163-5. See also the bibliography below note 94.
90. The Chinese versions give: "The three time periods (literally
'worlds,' loka) exist;" but according to the Tibetan: "The Vaibhasikas do not maintain that conditioned things (samskrtas), which have the characteristics of conditioned things, are eternal; but these masters maintain that they exist in all of the time periods" (dus mains kun tuyodpar ni gsal bar dam 'cha'o).
91. Samyuktakdgama, TD 2, p. 20all: rupam anityam atitam anagatam / kah punar vddam pratyutpannasya / evamdarit srutavdn dryasravako'tite rupe'nape- kso bhavati / anagatam rupam ndbhinandati / pratyutpannasya rupasya nirvide virdgdya nirodhdya pratipanno bhavati / atitam ced bhtksavo rupam ndbhavisyan na srutavdn dryasrdvako . . .
Compare the quotation from the same Sutra, Madhyamakavrtti, xxii. l 1; Majjhima, iii. 188.
92. Samyutta ii. 72, etc. ; Kosa, iii. 32.
93. Paramartha: "If a person says that all exists,--past, present, future, space, pratisamkhydnirodha (=Nirvana), and apratisamkhydnirodha,--it is said that this person is of the Sarvastivadin school. There are other persons who say, 'Present dharmas exist; past actions, if they have not produced their result, exist; but when they have produced their result, they no longer exist, as do neither future dharmas which are the results [of a past or present action]. ' Persons who say that the three time periods exist but who make these distinctions, are not Sarvastivadins, but Vibhajyavadins.
Vasumitra, on the KaSyapiyas (Wassiliev, 283, fol 176b): "The action whose retribution has ripened, does not exist; the action whose retribution has not ripened, exists; the samskdras arise from past causes and not from future causes. " This is the thesis of the Kassapikas, Kathdvatthu, i. 8.
On the Vibhajyavadins, above note 38.
94. The Vydkhyd gives the terms bhavanyathika, laksanayathika, avasthdnyathika, anyathanyathika.
Bhavanyathika = "one who maintains that the time periods differ (anyatha) through the fact of bhava"K\xt anyathanyathika is translated into Tibetangzhan dan gzhan du gyur pa pa; and we have the gloss purvdparam apeksydnyonya ucyate: "the time period is called reciprocally distinct (anyonya) by reason of what follows and precedes. " gzhan dan gzhan = anyonya. The Chinese sources translate
the name of the fourth master "who affirms that the difference of the time
y periods is related to their relationship (apeksd)!
See Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, p. 196 (translation of the work of Bhavya on the sects); Watters, Yuan Chwang, i. 274. The author of the Yogasutras, iii. 13, iv. 12, etc. , relies on Sarvastivadin sources, see "Notes bouddhiques," Bull. Acad, de Belgique, 1922, p. 522.
? characteristic, but it is not devoid of other characteristics, for in this hypothesis a certain future dharma could not later be this same present and past dharma.
96. The two commentators on Hsiian-tsang differ. According to Fa-pao (TD 41, p. 704all, al9-23), the future is posited relative (apeksa) to the past and the present; the past, relative to the present and the future; the present, relative the past and the future. This is also the opinion of Samghabhadra. According to P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 311a6-8, a26-28), the future is posited relative to former things; the past, relative to later things; and the present relative to both: this is the system of the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396bl8-23.
97. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396al0: "The Sarvaastivadins have four great masters who differently establish the differences of the three time periods . . . 1. Vasumitra who says that they differ through their state (avasthd); 2. Buddhadeva who says that they differ through their point of view (apeksa); 3. the follower of difference with respect to bhdva, who says: a dharma, changing its time period, differs through its bhdva, not through its nature . . . ; a dharma, passing from the future into the present, abandons its future bhdva and acquires its present bhdva, yet neither loses nor acquires its nature. . . ; and 4. the follower of difference with respect to its laksana. " The Ekavyavaharika school (i-shuo pu -^fftitB ) says that the three time periods are only speech, and that their nature does not exist. The Lokottaravadins posit the time period by reason (*' ) of the dharma: thus that which is worldly (laukikd) relatively exists, whereas that which is transworldly (lokottara) really
anc
<< past and the future do not exist; only the present
exists. For the school of the Sutras (ching-pu M. W> )>
* f?
r trie
Mahasamghikas
(ta-chung-pu ;fcffc? |$ )>> exists.
tn
98. The Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396M8: refutes the theory of the difference of bhdva: "Outside of the characteristics of a dharma, what can indeed be its bhdva? " But a commentary says: The nature of a dharma in the three time periods is not transformed; there is only difference in the fact of its activity or non-activity, etc. : this is the bhdva of a dharma. But this transformation (parindma) is not similar to that of the Samkhyas: these latter say that the nature of the dharmas is eternal and yet it transforms itself into the twenty-three tattvas. Now the nature of a conditioned dharma is not eternal. It is by reason of this modification,--activity, non-activity, etc. ,--that we speak of transformation. The theories established by Ghosaka and Buddhadeva are also irreprochable: they do not present any great difference from that of Vasumitra. Only Vasumitra gives a solid and simple explanation. Furthermore the Sastra Master (Vasubandhu), in agreement with the Vibhdsd, prefers it. . .
99. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 393cl8: Sensation not yet experienced is future; while one experiences it, it is present; experienced, it is p a s t . . .
100. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 394c5: Is activity the same thing as the nature of a dharma? Is it different? It is not possible to say that it is the same thing nor that it is different. . .
101. On the definition of abhutvd bhdvah, see the sources quoted Madhyamakavrtti, p. 263, Majjhima, iii. 25, Sikssdsamuccaya, 248, Milinda, 52, etc.
102.
svabhdvah sarvadd cdsti bhdvo nityas ca nesyate /
na ca svabhdvdd bhdvo'nyo vyaktam isvaracespitam //
Quoted by Prajrlakaramati, Bodhicarydvatdra, p. 581, who utilizes (p. 579-582) the Koia
without citing his source.
That is: The self nature (svabhdva, svalaksana) of rupa, etc. , always exists; but the being,
rUpa, etc. (rupadibhdva), is not held to be eternal. Would it thus be different from its self nature? No, it is not different from its self nature. Purely arbitrary, this theory is an arbitrary action, which has no justification (ndtra yuktir asti).
Footnotes 881
? 882 Chapter Five
103. Samyukta, 13. 21 (TD 2, p. 92bl5? ).
104. According to Hsiian-tsang: "the word 'is' is applied to what exists, as well as to what does not exist. " Bodhicaryavatara, 581. 17: astiiabdasya nipdtatvdt kdlatrayavrttitvam. See ii. 55d, page 245 of our translation.
105. Or, according to one varient: "on the subject of the Parivrajakas. . . " This refers to the monks who assassinated Maudgalyayana and who affirmed the non-existence of past action:
yat karmdbhyatitam tan ndsti.
According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, this Sutra is found in Madhyama 4. 10;
according to the Vydkhyd, in the Samyuktakdgama. Neither Jdtaka 522, nor the Dhammapada commentary (x. 7), which recounts the death of Maudgalyayana, gives the name of the Parivrajakas.
106. Quotation {Samyukta, TD 2, p. 92cl6) reproduced in Bodhicaryavatara ad ix. 142 (p. 581):caksurbhiksavautpadydmdnamnakutasridagacchati/ nirudhyamdnamcanakvacit samnicayam gaccbati / iti hi bhiksavah caksur abhUtvd bhavati bh&tvd ca prativigacchati.
Another fragment of the ParamdrthaiunyatdsUtra is quoted ad ix. 73 (p. . 474): iti hi bhiksavo'sti karma / asti phalam J kdrakas tu nopalabhyate ya iman skandhdn vijahdti anyami ca skandhdn upddatte; a quotation reproduced in Madhyamakdvatdra (p. 262, Tibetan trans. ), Sutrdlamkdra, xviii. lOl (text p. 158, trans, p. 264) and utilized by Vasubandhu (Hsiian-tsang's edition, TD 29, p. 154cl3, p. 155b26) in the supplement to the Ko/a.
107. AbhUd bhavisyati ca: that which, in the present, has been or will be "visible," is the object.
108. Divyacaksuravabhdsa, vii. 42.
109.
