But every
corporeal
thing is finite.
Summa Theologica
For the
sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks the
universal good, as was said above ([565]Q[59], A[1]); as also the sense
apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers
universals. Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this
respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we
apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit
of "intelligence"; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably,
passing from one consideration to another; and having the way open by
which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man's
will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it and
of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres fixedly
and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its
adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite
(namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he
has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that
man's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after
choice; but the angel's free-will is flexible either opposite before
the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to
justice, were confirmed therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are
obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who
are damned (SP, [566]Q[98], AA[1], 2).
Reply to Objection 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but
according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said.
Reply to Objection 2: God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent.
But such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and
are not delivered by the Divine mercy.
Reply to Objection 3: The devil's first sin still remains in him
according to desire; although not as to his believing that he can
obtain what he desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can
commit murder, and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is
taken from him; nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so
that he would he had done it, or still would do it if he could.
Reply to Objection 4: The fact that man sinned from another's
suggestion, is not the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable.
Consequently the argument does not hold good.
Reply to Objection 5: A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate
will; and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the
demon's part is always wicked; because, although at times he does
something good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth
in order to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not
willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things. Another kind of act
is natural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to the
goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.
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Whether there is sorrow in the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For
since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the same
subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing against
the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: "The devil has power
over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices over this
sinister power. " Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things
cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are
present. But there is no fear in the demons, according to Job 41:24,
"Who was made to fear no one. " Therefore there is no grief in the
demons.
Objection 3: Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the
demons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at least
for the evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience.
On the contrary, The demon's sin is greater than man's sin. But man is
punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin, according
to Apoc. 18:7, "As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in
delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her. " Consequently
much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow, because he
especially glorified himself.
I answer that, Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are
passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the
sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According,
however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the
demons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because
sorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the
resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is evident
that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are, and others
to be, which are not: for, out of envy, they would wish others to be
damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said to exist in
them: and especially because it is of the very notion of punishment for
it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are deprived of
happiness, which they desire naturally; and their wicked will is curbed
in many respects.
Reply to Objection 1: Joy and sorrow about the same thing are
opposites, but not about different things. Hence there is nothing to
hinder a man from being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another;
especially so far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will;
because, not merely in different things, but even in one and the same
thing, there can be something that we will, and something that we will
not.
Reply to Objection 2: As there is sorrow in the demons over present
evil, so also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, "He
was made to fear no one," this is to be understood of the fear of God
which restrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that "the devils
believe and tremble" (James 2:19).
Reply to Objection 3: To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the
sin bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin
is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, for the evil of
sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to the goodness of
nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that "sorrow for good lost by punishment,
is the witness to a good nature. " Consequently, since the demon has a
perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin.
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Whether our atmosphere is the demons' place of punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons'
place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual
nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no place of
punishment for demons.
Objection 2: Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But
man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the
demons' place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome
atmosphere.
Objection 3: Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire.
But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the darksome
atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that "the
darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment
day. "
I answer that, The angels in their own nature stand midway between God
and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it
procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But
man's welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of
all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil;
and this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way,
indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against
opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be
brought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be
of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of
punishment is due to the demons: one, by reason of their sin, and this
is hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the
darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment.
Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment
day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with demons
endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to us
here; and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial:
although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they
have led astray; just as some of the good angels are with the holy
souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men
and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: A place is not penal to angel or soul as if
affecting the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by
saddening it: because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a
place not agreeable to its will.
Reply to Objection 2: One soul is not set over another in the order of
nature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature; consequently
there is no parallel.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have maintained that the pain of sense for
demons and souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the
beatitude of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day.
But this is erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2
Cor. 5:1): "If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we
have a house in heaven. " Others, again, while not admitting the same of
souls, admit it as to demons. But it is better to say that the same
judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on good
souls and good angels.
Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs
to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their
coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the same
way as we say that the bishop's honor is not lessened while he is not
actually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said, that
although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of hell
while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their punishment
is none the less; because they know that such confinement is their due.
Hence it is said in a gloss upon James 3:6: "They carry fire of hell
with them wherever they go. " Nor is this contrary to what is said (Lk.
8:31), "They besought the Lord not to cast them into the abyss"; for
they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for them to be cast
out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it is stated, "They
[Vulg. 'He'] besought Him that He would not expel them [Vulg. 'him']
out of the country" (Mk. 5:10).
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (QQ[65]-74)
__________________________________________________________________
THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES (FOUR ARTICLES)
From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of
corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture
makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as
given in the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth";
the work of distinction as given in the words, "He divided the light
from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the
waters that are under the firmament"; and the work of adornment,
expressed thus, "Let there be lights in the firmament. "
First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the work
of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the first
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?
(2) Whether they were created on account of God's goodness?
(3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels?
(4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from
God.
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Whether corporeal creatures are from God?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God.
For it is said (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works which
God hath made, continue for ever. " But visible bodies do not continue
for ever, for it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): "The things which are seen are
temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. " Therefore God
did not make visible bodies.
Objection 2: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all things that
He had made, and they were very good. " But corporeal creatures are
evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in
serpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called
evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are
not from God.
Objection 3: Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God,
but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God.
Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18): "While we look not at the things which
are seen. " Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 145:6): "Who made heaven and earth,
the sea, and all things that are in them. "
I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not
created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof
of their error the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), "The god of this
world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers. " But this position is
altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point,
there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in
nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different
things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these
different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as
different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being
is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different. There
must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in
whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and
spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of
this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him,
of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense, "Whose god
is their belly" (Phil. 3:19).
Reply to Objection 1: All the creatures of God in some respects
continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will
never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a
creature approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is
immovable. For corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their
matter, though they change as regards their substantial form. But
incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance, though
they are mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the
heavenly bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the
Apostle's words, "The things which are seen are temporal," though true
even as regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as
every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to
movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they
are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these
visible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure for
ever. Hence he said before (2 Cor. 4:17): "It worketh for us . . . an
eternal weight of glory. "
Reply to Objection 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are
good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the
consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities,
though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate
things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can
derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems
simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious
to one person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves
the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And
this could not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful.
Reply to Objection 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from
God, but lead us to Him; for "the invisible things of God are clearly
seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). If,
then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them
foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): "Creatures are turned into a
snare to the feet of the unwise. " And the very fact that they can thus
withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot
lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some good
that they have from Him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether corporeal things were made on account of God's goodness?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on
account of God's goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that God "created
all things that they might be. " Therefore all things were created for
their own being's sake, and not on account of God's goodness.
Objection 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the
greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual
creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to
the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of
spiritual creatures, and not on account of God's goodness.
Objection 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to
the unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God
must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not
created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all
inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now,
corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the
former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on
account of God's goodness.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all
things for Himself. "
I answer that, Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii. ] that corporeal
creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in
punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that
God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal
nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God,
and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher
or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from
God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the
degree of their turning away. But this position is erroneous. In the
first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after
narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins,
"God saw that it was good" (Gn. 1), as if to say that everything was
brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But
according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not
because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another
might be punished. Secondly, because it would follow that the
arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal world would arise from
mere chance. For it the sun's body was made what it is, that it might
serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it
would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way
as the one to punish whom the sun had been created, that many suns
would exist in the world; and so of other things. But such a
consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this
theory as false, and consider that the entire universe is constituted
by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts.
Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that
whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the
sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly,
that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses
for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all
parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form,
since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore,
the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the
fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also every
creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less
noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man
exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for
the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire
universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end,
inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine
goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in
some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain
to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is
plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.
Reply to Objection 1: In the very fact of any creature possessing
being, it represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore,
that God created all things, that they might have being, does not
exclude that He created them for His own goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate
end. Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the
sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account of
God's goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: Equality of justice has its place in retribution,
since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit.
But this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as
an architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in
different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent
difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection
of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the
different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning, to
secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of various
and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without injustice,
since no diversity of merit is presupposed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the
angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by
God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed
by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps.
103:24 "Thou hast made all things in wisdom. " But "it belongs to wisdom
to ordain," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). Hence
in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a
certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore
in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should
be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher.
Objection 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes,
since like always produces like. It then all creatures, both spiritual
and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no
diversity in creatures, for one would not be further removed from God
than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher says that
some things are corruptible because they are far removed from God (De
Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).
Objection 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a
finite effect.
But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could
be, and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for
in suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is
possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that
nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth"; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These,
therefore, were produced immediately by God.
I answer that, Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from God
by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him
immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the
production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable,
since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by
which matter itself is produced: for in the act of coming into being
the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible
that anything should be created, save by God alone.
In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause,
the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the
underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which
informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living,
living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one
thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing proceed from
a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things,
belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no
secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in
the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But
creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing
being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that
nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore,
in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses
said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth. "
Reply to Objection 1: In the production of things an order exists, but
not such that one creature is created by another, for that is
impossible; but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades
are constituted in creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many
and different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature,
as has been shown above ([567]Q[15], A[2]); so that by His wisdom He is
the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by
apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.
Reply to Objection 3: The amount of the power of an agent is measured
not only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for
one and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another
by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is
presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such,
can belong to no creature.
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Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the
angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without
matter come the forms that are in matter. " But forms that are without
matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the
forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual
substances.
Objection 2: Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to
that which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms
essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation.
Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual
substances.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation
than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things
here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and
corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from
spiritual substances.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "We must not suppose
that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather
that it obeys God thus. " But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve
that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not
from the angels, but from God.
I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are
derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And there
are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that the
forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms
immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held that
there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth,
and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are
constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the
impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of
assimilation, or as he calls it, "participation" (Phaedo xlix). And,
according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the
order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single
separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst
above this is separate life, or "per se" life, as they term it, which
is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they
call being itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however,
and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things
do not subsist "per se" in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they
say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures
(called "intelligences" by them, but "angels" by us) proceed all the
forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from
the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the
same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God
indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter,
and differentiated it into species.
But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact,
sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought
into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28),
proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite. " Now, such
are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at
another exist not, without being themselves generated or corrupted, but
by reason of the generation or corruption of the "composite"; since
even forms have not being, but composites have being through forms:
for, according to a thing's mode of being, is the mode in which it is
brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like, we must
not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but
in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire.
Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some
immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act
by some composite agent. But since the composite agent, which is a
body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are
derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the
term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic
intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms,
must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production
of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can
have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had
when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding alone
matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces
each work with the words, "God said, Let this thing be," or "that," to
denote the formation of all things by the Word of God, from Whom,
according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4], is
"all form and fitness and concord of parts. "
Reply to Objection 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the
types of things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3):
"By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God;
that from invisible things visible things might be made. " But if by
immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come
material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.
Reply to Objection 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred,
not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held,
but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which
they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine
intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things,
that they may be able to be brought by movement into act.
Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by
movement, not by emanation.
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ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of
creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself. Under
the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its
formation?
(2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?
(3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with
formless matter?
(4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?
Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time
its formation. For it is said (Gn. 1:2): "The earth was void and
empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another version
[*Septuagint]; by which is understood the formlessness of matter, as
Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until
it received its form.
Objection 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of
God, as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of
nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in
the Divine working.
Objection 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is
part of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without
substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause
matter to exist without form.
On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent.
But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said of Him
(Dt. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect. " Therefore the work of His
creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation of corporeal
creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But confusion is
opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. It, therefore,
formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows that
at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in
the corporeal creation.
I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for
instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of matter
was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order
of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem. ), Ambrose (In
Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen. ), hold that formlessness of
matter preceded in time its formation. And although these opinions seem
mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but little; for
Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from
the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we
thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was
prior in time either to its formation or to its distinction. As to
formation, the argument is clear. For it formless matter preceded in
duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since
the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say,
then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being
existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms.
Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which
afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. For this
would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who
maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as
fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, it followed
that to be made means merely to be changed; for since that preceding
form bestowed actual substantial being, and made some particular thing
to be, it would result that the supervening form would not simply make
an actual being, but 'this' actual being; which is the proper effect of
an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely
accidents, implying not generation, but alteration. Hence we must
assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor
under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the
formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of
primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not
precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and
nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to
act, and the part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand
by formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that
beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation.
Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded
its form in duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that
Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees,
as will be shown later ([568]Q[69], A[1]; [569]Q[74], A[2]).
As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty
was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to
be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that
transparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that
"darkness was upon the fact of the deep. " And the earth lacked beauty
in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil
was withdrawn, and so we read that "the earth was void," or
"invisible," inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from view;
secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants,
for which reason it is called "empty," or, according to another reading
[*Septuagint], "shapeless"---that is, unadorned. Thus after mention of
two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the formlessness of the
heaven is indicated by the words, "darkness was upon the face of the
deep," since the air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of
the earth, by the words, "the earth was void and empty. "
Reply to Objection 1: The word earth is taken differently in this
passage by Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the
words "earth" and "water," in this passage. primary matter itself is
signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea
of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the
similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of figures in
speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only, lest they
should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it
has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and
to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect,
then, the earth is said to be "void and empty," or "invisible and
shapeless," that matter is known by means of form. Hence, considered in
itself, it is called "invisible" or "void," and its potentiality is
completed by form; thus Plato says that matter is "place" [*Timaeus,
quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv, text. 15]. But other holy writers
understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said [570](A[1])
how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, without form.
Reply to Objection 2: Nature produces effect in act from being in
potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality
must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God
produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a
perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power.
Reply to Objection 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of
act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality.
Hence it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form,
than for accident to be without subject.
In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if,
according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the
informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's part,
but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due order in the
disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection.
In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient
natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction;
except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and
without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy
Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being
that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material distinction
is expressed, as will be shown later [571](A[3]; [572]Q[68], A[1]).
This is signified by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven
and earth. " The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements
according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That
air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the
corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and
water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus
xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words,
"Spirit of God," since spirit is another name for air, and considered
that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be
composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But
Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says
that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire does
not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold
to what we stated above; because by the words "Spirit of God" Scripture
usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the waters,"
not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman's will may be said
to move over the material to which he intends to give a form. The third
distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to be under the
waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, the subject of
darkness, is described as being above the waters, in the words:
"Darkness was upon the face of the deep. " The remaining distinctions
will appear from what follows [573](Q[71]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?
Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal
things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find two
things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he says
that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he
says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the
matter of all corporeal things is the same.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10):
"Things that are one in genus are one in matter. " But all corporeal
things are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all
bodies is the same.
Objection 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities,
and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the
same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.
Objection 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in
potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter
considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.
On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the same are mutually
interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener.
i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each
other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.
I answer that, On this question the opinions of philosophers have
differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are
of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements
have one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption
prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the
fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not
to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom
he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: "By your own nature you
are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My
will is more powerful than the link that binds you together. " But this
theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5) disproves by the natural
movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a
natural movement, different from that of the elements, it follows that
they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which
is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the
movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards,
another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without
contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in their
nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it
follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies
are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural
corruption and incorruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all
bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity
were one form in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish
bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be
true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and
so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then be
merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms---that
is to say, it would be corruption, not pure and simple, but partial,
since a being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the
ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was
some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form
exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath
generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of
corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it
is in itself, is in potentiality to form.
Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all
those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is
in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to
all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more
perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves.
For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection
and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality
to a perfect form, and "vice versa. " Matter, therefore, whilst existing
under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to
the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the
latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form
in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this
condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that
bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should
possess the same matter.
Neither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii. ] imagines,
that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven---beings in
potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its
form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it
is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be
act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside,
then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with
motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form---that
is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form---it
follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing
is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not,
being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly
bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone
which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to
inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form
perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no
potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle
[*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly
bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so
far as they agree in the character of potentiality.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato,
who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter
is one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of
corporeal creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense,
corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on
account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph.
sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks the
universal good, as was said above ([565]Q[59], A[1]); as also the sense
apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers
universals. Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this
respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we
apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit
of "intelligence"; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably,
passing from one consideration to another; and having the way open by
which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man's
will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it and
of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres fixedly
and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its
adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite
(namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he
has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that
man's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after
choice; but the angel's free-will is flexible either opposite before
the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to
justice, were confirmed therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are
obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who
are damned (SP, [566]Q[98], AA[1], 2).
Reply to Objection 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but
according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said.
Reply to Objection 2: God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent.
But such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and
are not delivered by the Divine mercy.
Reply to Objection 3: The devil's first sin still remains in him
according to desire; although not as to his believing that he can
obtain what he desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can
commit murder, and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is
taken from him; nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so
that he would he had done it, or still would do it if he could.
Reply to Objection 4: The fact that man sinned from another's
suggestion, is not the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable.
Consequently the argument does not hold good.
Reply to Objection 5: A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate
will; and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the
demon's part is always wicked; because, although at times he does
something good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth
in order to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not
willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things. Another kind of act
is natural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to the
goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is sorrow in the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For
since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the same
subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing against
the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: "The devil has power
over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices over this
sinister power. " Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons.
Objection 2: Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things
cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are
present. But there is no fear in the demons, according to Job 41:24,
"Who was made to fear no one. " Therefore there is no grief in the
demons.
Objection 3: Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the
demons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at least
for the evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience.
On the contrary, The demon's sin is greater than man's sin. But man is
punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin, according
to Apoc. 18:7, "As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in
delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her. " Consequently
much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow, because he
especially glorified himself.
I answer that, Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are
passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the
sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According,
however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the
demons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because
sorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the
resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is evident
that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are, and others
to be, which are not: for, out of envy, they would wish others to be
damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said to exist in
them: and especially because it is of the very notion of punishment for
it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are deprived of
happiness, which they desire naturally; and their wicked will is curbed
in many respects.
Reply to Objection 1: Joy and sorrow about the same thing are
opposites, but not about different things. Hence there is nothing to
hinder a man from being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another;
especially so far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will;
because, not merely in different things, but even in one and the same
thing, there can be something that we will, and something that we will
not.
Reply to Objection 2: As there is sorrow in the demons over present
evil, so also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, "He
was made to fear no one," this is to be understood of the fear of God
which restrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that "the devils
believe and tremble" (James 2:19).
Reply to Objection 3: To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the
sin bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin
is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, for the evil of
sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to the goodness of
nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that "sorrow for good lost by punishment,
is the witness to a good nature. " Consequently, since the demon has a
perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether our atmosphere is the demons' place of punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons'
place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual
nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no place of
punishment for demons.
Objection 2: Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But
man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the
demons' place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome
atmosphere.
Objection 3: Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire.
But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the darksome
atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that "the
darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment
day. "
I answer that, The angels in their own nature stand midway between God
and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it
procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But
man's welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of
all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil;
and this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way,
indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against
opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be
brought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be
of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of
punishment is due to the demons: one, by reason of their sin, and this
is hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the
darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment.
Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment
day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with demons
endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to us
here; and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial:
although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they
have led astray; just as some of the good angels are with the holy
souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men
and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: A place is not penal to angel or soul as if
affecting the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by
saddening it: because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a
place not agreeable to its will.
Reply to Objection 2: One soul is not set over another in the order of
nature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature; consequently
there is no parallel.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have maintained that the pain of sense for
demons and souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the
beatitude of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day.
But this is erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2
Cor. 5:1): "If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we
have a house in heaven. " Others, again, while not admitting the same of
souls, admit it as to demons. But it is better to say that the same
judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on good
souls and good angels.
Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs
to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their
coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the same
way as we say that the bishop's honor is not lessened while he is not
actually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said, that
although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of hell
while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their punishment
is none the less; because they know that such confinement is their due.
Hence it is said in a gloss upon James 3:6: "They carry fire of hell
with them wherever they go. " Nor is this contrary to what is said (Lk.
8:31), "They besought the Lord not to cast them into the abyss"; for
they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for them to be cast
out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it is stated, "They
[Vulg. 'He'] besought Him that He would not expel them [Vulg. 'him']
out of the country" (Mk. 5:10).
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (QQ[65]-74)
__________________________________________________________________
THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES (FOUR ARTICLES)
From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of
corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture
makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as
given in the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth";
the work of distinction as given in the words, "He divided the light
from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the
waters that are under the firmament"; and the work of adornment,
expressed thus, "Let there be lights in the firmament. "
First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the work
of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the first
head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?
(2) Whether they were created on account of God's goodness?
(3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels?
(4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from
God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether corporeal creatures are from God?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God.
For it is said (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works which
God hath made, continue for ever. " But visible bodies do not continue
for ever, for it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): "The things which are seen are
temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. " Therefore God
did not make visible bodies.
Objection 2: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all things that
He had made, and they were very good. " But corporeal creatures are
evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in
serpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called
evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are
not from God.
Objection 3: Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God,
but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God.
Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18): "While we look not at the things which
are seen. " Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 145:6): "Who made heaven and earth,
the sea, and all things that are in them. "
I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not
created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof
of their error the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), "The god of this
world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers. " But this position is
altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point,
there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in
nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different
things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these
different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as
different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being
is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different. There
must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in
whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and
spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of
this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him,
of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense, "Whose god
is their belly" (Phil. 3:19).
Reply to Objection 1: All the creatures of God in some respects
continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will
never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a
creature approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is
immovable. For corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their
matter, though they change as regards their substantial form. But
incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance, though
they are mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the
heavenly bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the
Apostle's words, "The things which are seen are temporal," though true
even as regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as
every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to
movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they
are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these
visible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure for
ever. Hence he said before (2 Cor. 4:17): "It worketh for us . . . an
eternal weight of glory. "
Reply to Objection 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are
good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the
consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities,
though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate
things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can
derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems
simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious
to one person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves
the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And
this could not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful.
Reply to Objection 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from
God, but lead us to Him; for "the invisible things of God are clearly
seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). If,
then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them
foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): "Creatures are turned into a
snare to the feet of the unwise. " And the very fact that they can thus
withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot
lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some good
that they have from Him.
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Whether corporeal things were made on account of God's goodness?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on
account of God's goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that God "created
all things that they might be. " Therefore all things were created for
their own being's sake, and not on account of God's goodness.
Objection 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the
greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual
creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to
the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of
spiritual creatures, and not on account of God's goodness.
Objection 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to
the unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God
must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not
created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all
inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now,
corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the
former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on
account of God's goodness.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all
things for Himself. "
I answer that, Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii. ] that corporeal
creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in
punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that
God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal
nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God,
and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher
or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from
God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the
degree of their turning away. But this position is erroneous. In the
first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after
narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins,
"God saw that it was good" (Gn. 1), as if to say that everything was
brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But
according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not
because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another
might be punished. Secondly, because it would follow that the
arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal world would arise from
mere chance. For it the sun's body was made what it is, that it might
serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it
would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way
as the one to punish whom the sun had been created, that many suns
would exist in the world; and so of other things. But such a
consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this
theory as false, and consider that the entire universe is constituted
by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts.
Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that
whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the
sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly,
that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses
for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all
parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form,
since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore,
the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the
fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also every
creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less
noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man
exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for
the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire
universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end,
inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine
goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in
some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain
to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is
plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.
Reply to Objection 1: In the very fact of any creature possessing
being, it represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore,
that God created all things, that they might have being, does not
exclude that He created them for His own goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate
end. Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the
sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account of
God's goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: Equality of justice has its place in retribution,
since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit.
But this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as
an architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in
different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent
difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection
of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the
different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning, to
secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of various
and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without injustice,
since no diversity of merit is presupposed.
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Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the
angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by
God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed
by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps.
103:24 "Thou hast made all things in wisdom. " But "it belongs to wisdom
to ordain," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). Hence
in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a
certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore
in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should
be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher.
Objection 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes,
since like always produces like. It then all creatures, both spiritual
and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no
diversity in creatures, for one would not be further removed from God
than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher says that
some things are corruptible because they are far removed from God (De
Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).
Objection 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a
finite effect.
But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could
be, and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for
in suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is
possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that
nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth"; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These,
therefore, were produced immediately by God.
I answer that, Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from God
by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him
immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the
production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable,
since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by
which matter itself is produced: for in the act of coming into being
the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible
that anything should be created, save by God alone.
In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause,
the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the
underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which
informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living,
living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one
thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing proceed from
a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things,
belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no
secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in
the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But
creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing
being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that
nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore,
in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses
said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth. "
Reply to Objection 1: In the production of things an order exists, but
not such that one creature is created by another, for that is
impossible; but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades
are constituted in creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many
and different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature,
as has been shown above ([567]Q[15], A[2]); so that by His wisdom He is
the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by
apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.
Reply to Objection 3: The amount of the power of an agent is measured
not only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for
one and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another
by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is
presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such,
can belong to no creature.
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Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the
angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without
matter come the forms that are in matter. " But forms that are without
matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the
forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual
substances.
Objection 2: Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to
that which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms
essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation.
Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual
substances.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation
than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things
here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and
corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from
spiritual substances.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "We must not suppose
that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather
that it obeys God thus. " But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve
that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not
from the angels, but from God.
I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are
derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And there
are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that the
forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms
immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held that
there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth,
and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are
constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the
impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of
assimilation, or as he calls it, "participation" (Phaedo xlix). And,
according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the
order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single
separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst
above this is separate life, or "per se" life, as they term it, which
is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they
call being itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however,
and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things
do not subsist "per se" in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they
say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures
(called "intelligences" by them, but "angels" by us) proceed all the
forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from
the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the
same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God
indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter,
and differentiated it into species.
But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact,
sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought
into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28),
proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite. " Now, such
are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at
another exist not, without being themselves generated or corrupted, but
by reason of the generation or corruption of the "composite"; since
even forms have not being, but composites have being through forms:
for, according to a thing's mode of being, is the mode in which it is
brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like, we must
not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but
in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire.
Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some
immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act
by some composite agent. But since the composite agent, which is a
body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are
derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the
term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic
intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms,
must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production
of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can
have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had
when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding alone
matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces
each work with the words, "God said, Let this thing be," or "that," to
denote the formation of all things by the Word of God, from Whom,
according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4], is
"all form and fitness and concord of parts. "
Reply to Objection 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the
types of things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3):
"By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God;
that from invisible things visible things might be made. " But if by
immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come
material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.
Reply to Objection 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred,
not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held,
but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which
they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine
intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things,
that they may be able to be brought by movement into act.
Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by
movement, not by emanation.
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ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of
creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself. Under
the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its
formation?
(2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?
(3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with
formless matter?
(4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?
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Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?
Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time
its formation. For it is said (Gn. 1:2): "The earth was void and
empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another version
[*Septuagint]; by which is understood the formlessness of matter, as
Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until
it received its form.
Objection 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of
God, as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of
nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in
the Divine working.
Objection 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is
part of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without
substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause
matter to exist without form.
On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent.
But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said of Him
(Dt. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect. " Therefore the work of His
creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation of corporeal
creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But confusion is
opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. It, therefore,
formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows that
at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in
the corporeal creation.
I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for
instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of matter
was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order
of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem. ), Ambrose (In
Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen. ), hold that formlessness of
matter preceded in time its formation. And although these opinions seem
mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but little; for
Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from
the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we
thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was
prior in time either to its formation or to its distinction. As to
formation, the argument is clear. For it formless matter preceded in
duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since
the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say,
then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being
existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms.
Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which
afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. For this
would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who
maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as
fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, it followed
that to be made means merely to be changed; for since that preceding
form bestowed actual substantial being, and made some particular thing
to be, it would result that the supervening form would not simply make
an actual being, but 'this' actual being; which is the proper effect of
an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely
accidents, implying not generation, but alteration. Hence we must
assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor
under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the
formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of
primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not
precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and
nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to
act, and the part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand
by formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that
beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation.
Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded
its form in duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that
Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees,
as will be shown later ([568]Q[69], A[1]; [569]Q[74], A[2]).
As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty
was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to
be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that
transparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that
"darkness was upon the fact of the deep. " And the earth lacked beauty
in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil
was withdrawn, and so we read that "the earth was void," or
"invisible," inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from view;
secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants,
for which reason it is called "empty," or, according to another reading
[*Septuagint], "shapeless"---that is, unadorned. Thus after mention of
two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the formlessness of the
heaven is indicated by the words, "darkness was upon the face of the
deep," since the air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of
the earth, by the words, "the earth was void and empty. "
Reply to Objection 1: The word earth is taken differently in this
passage by Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the
words "earth" and "water," in this passage. primary matter itself is
signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea
of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the
similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of figures in
speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only, lest they
should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it
has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and
to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect,
then, the earth is said to be "void and empty," or "invisible and
shapeless," that matter is known by means of form. Hence, considered in
itself, it is called "invisible" or "void," and its potentiality is
completed by form; thus Plato says that matter is "place" [*Timaeus,
quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv, text. 15]. But other holy writers
understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said [570](A[1])
how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, without form.
Reply to Objection 2: Nature produces effect in act from being in
potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality
must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God
produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a
perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power.
Reply to Objection 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of
act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality.
Hence it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form,
than for accident to be without subject.
In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if,
according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the
informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's part,
but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due order in the
disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection.
In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient
natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction;
except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and
without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy
Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being
that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material distinction
is expressed, as will be shown later [571](A[3]; [572]Q[68], A[1]).
This is signified by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven
and earth. " The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements
according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That
air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the
corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and
water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus
xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words,
"Spirit of God," since spirit is another name for air, and considered
that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be
composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But
Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says
that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire does
not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold
to what we stated above; because by the words "Spirit of God" Scripture
usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the waters,"
not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman's will may be said
to move over the material to which he intends to give a form. The third
distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to be under the
waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, the subject of
darkness, is described as being above the waters, in the words:
"Darkness was upon the face of the deep. " The remaining distinctions
will appear from what follows [573](Q[71]).
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Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?
Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal
things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find two
things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he says
that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he
says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the
matter of all corporeal things is the same.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10):
"Things that are one in genus are one in matter. " But all corporeal
things are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all
bodies is the same.
Objection 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities,
and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the
same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.
Objection 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in
potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter
considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.
On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the same are mutually
interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener.
i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each
other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.
I answer that, On this question the opinions of philosophers have
differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are
of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements
have one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption
prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the
fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not
to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom
he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: "By your own nature you
are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My
will is more powerful than the link that binds you together. " But this
theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5) disproves by the natural
movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a
natural movement, different from that of the elements, it follows that
they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which
is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the
movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards,
another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without
contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in their
nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it
follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies
are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural
corruption and incorruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all
bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity
were one form in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish
bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be
true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and
so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then be
merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms---that
is to say, it would be corruption, not pure and simple, but partial,
since a being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the
ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was
some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form
exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath
generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of
corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it
is in itself, is in potentiality to form.
Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all
those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is
in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to
all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more
perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves.
For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection
and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality
to a perfect form, and "vice versa. " Matter, therefore, whilst existing
under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to
the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the
latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form
in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this
condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that
bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should
possess the same matter.
Neither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii. ] imagines,
that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven---beings in
potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its
form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it
is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be
act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside,
then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with
motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form---that
is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form---it
follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing
is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not,
being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly
bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone
which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to
inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form
perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no
potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle
[*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly
bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so
far as they agree in the character of potentiality.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato,
who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter
is one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of
corporeal creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense,
corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on
account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph.
