The communication between the great and little camps was
composed of a parapet, formed by the earth thrown out of two contiguous
fosses, each four feet in depth and six in breadth, so that the breadth
of the two together is only twelve feet.
composed of a parapet, formed by the earth thrown out of two contiguous
fosses, each four feet in depth and six in breadth, so that the breadth
of the two together is only twelve feet.
Napoleon - History of Julius Caesar - b
11 and 68, and three times in _De Bello Civili_,
lib. III. cc. 19, 26, and 30. Is that coincidence alone not sufficient
to make us suppose that _altero die_ ought not to be confounded with the
preceding expressions; and does it not appear certain that, if Cæsar had
arrived at Vellaunodunum the morning after his departure from Agedincum,
he would have written, _Postero die_ (or _proximo die_) _quum ad oppidum
Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset_, &c. ?
We believe, therefore, that we are authorized in concluding that Cæsar
arrived at Vellaunodunum the second day after the army moved.
Farther on, on page 339, will be found a new confirmation of the sense
which we give to _altero die_. It results from the appreciation of the
distance which separates Alesia from the battle-field where Cæsar
defeated the cavalry of Vercingetorix. (See the opinions of the
commentators on _altero die_ in the sixth volume of Cicero, edit.
Lemaire, Classiques Latins, _Excursus ad Philippicam primam_. )
[468] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 11. --Contrary to the generally received
opinion, we adopt _Gien_ and not _Orleans_ for the ancient Genabum,
_Triguères_ for Vellaunodonum, _Sancerre_ for Noviodunum, and, lastly,
_Saint-Parize-le-Châtel_ for the Gorgobina of the Boii.
As Cæsar’s object, on quitting Sens, was to march as quickly as possible
to the _oppidum_ of the Boii, in order to raise the siege, since he
starts without baggage, so as to be less impeded in his march, we will
first examine the probable position of this latter town, before
discussing the question relating to the intermediate points.
_Gorgobina Boiorum_. After the defeat of the Helvetii, Cæsar allowed the
Ædui to receive the Boii upon their territory, and it is probable that
they were established on the western frontier, as in an advanced post
against the Arverni and the Bituriges. Several data confirm this
opinion. Tacitus (_Histor. _, II. 61) relates that: _Mariccus quidam, e
plebe Boiorum,. . . . concitis octo millibus hominum, proximos Æduorum
pagos trahebat_. The possessions of the Boii were, therefore, contiguous
to the Æduan territory. Pliny the Elder (_Hist. Nat. _, IV. 18) places
the Boii in the number of the nations who inhabited the centre of the
Lyonnaise. _Intus autem Ædui fœderati, Carnuti fœderati, Boii,
Senones_. . . . The place here occupied by the word _Boii_ shows us again
that this people was not far from the Ædui, the Senones, and the
Carnutes. Lastly, the text of the “Commentaries” represents
Vercingetorix as obliged to traverse the country of the Bituriges to
repair to Gorgobina. The most plausible opinion is that which places the
Boii between the Loire and the Allier, towards the confluence of these
two rivers. This was already an old tradition, adopted in the fifteenth
century by Raimondus Marlianus, one of the first editors of Cæsar. This
space of ground, covered in its eastern part with woods and marshes, was
admirably suited by its extent to the limited population of the Boii,
who did not number more than 20,000 souls. Neither
Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier, marked on the map of Gaul as Gorgobina, nor La
Guerche, proposed by General de Gœler, answer completely, by their
topographical position, to the site of a Gaulish _oppidum_. In fact,
Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier is far from being advantageously situated; this
village stands at the foot of the hills which border the right bank of
the Allier. La-Guerche-sur-Aubois fulfils no better the conditions of
defence which must be required in the principal town of the Boii: it is
situated almost in a plain, on the edge of a marshy valley of the
Aubois. It presents a few remains of fortifications of the Middle Ages,
but not a trace of more remote antiquity has been discovered in it. To
seek Gorgobina farther down, and on the left bank of the Loire, is
impossible, since, according to Cæsar, the Boii had been established on
the territory of the Ædui, and the Loire formed the boundary between the
Ædui and the Bituriges. If we are reduced to conjectures, we must at
least admit as incontestable what is advanced by Cæsar.
The village of Saint-Parize-le-Châtel suits better. It is about eight
kilomètres to the north of Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier, nearly in the middle
of the space comprised between the Loire and the Allier; it occupies the
centre of ancient agglomeration of inhabitants, which Guy Coquille, at
the end of the sixteenth century, designates under the name of the
_bourg de Gentily_, and which the _chronicles_ called, down to the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, _Pagus Gentilicus_, or _bourg des
gentils_. The history of this people has this remarkable peculiarity,
that, whilst all the neighbouring nations on the other side of the
Allier and the Loire had, as early as the fourth century, accepted the
Christian religion, they alone continued in idolatry until the sixth
century. Does this fact apply to a tribe settled in a foreign country,
as the Boii were, who would retain their customs and religion for a
longer time unchanged? An ancient tradition states that, in the environs
of Saint-Parize, there was, at a very remote period, a considerable
town, which was destroyed by a fire. A few scattered foundations,
discovered in the woods of Bord, to the south-west of Saint Parize, seem
to indicate the site of the _oppidum_ of the Boii. The name of the
castle, of the domain, and of the place called _Les Bruyères de Buy_,
remind us of that of the Boii.
There was probably a Roman station at Saincaise-Meauce (thirteen
kilomètres to the north of Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier), on the right bank
of the Allier. In 1861, there were discovered there numerous objects of
the Gallo-Roman period, and two busts in white marble, life-size,
representing Roman emperors. At Chantenay, eight kilomètres south from
Saint-Pierre, a few Roman foundations have been found, and a
considerable number of Gaulish coins, one of which, amongst others,
bears the name of the Æduan Litavicus.
_Genabum_. The position of Gorgobina once established at the confluence
of the Loire and the Allier, we must admit _Gien_ as the ancient
Genabum, and not _Orleans_, for the following reasons:--
1st. We cannot believe that Cæsar, leaving Sens in spite of the rigour
of the season, and in haste to raise the siege of Gorgobina, should,
without any reason, have taken a circuitous road of seventy-five
kilomètres, which would represent three or four days march, in order to
pass by Orleans. In fact, the distance from Sens to the confluence of
the Allier and the Loire, is, by Orleans, 270 kilomètres, whilst it is
only 180 kilomètres by the way of Gien.
2nd. From Sens to Gien the road was short and easy; on the contrary,
from Sens to Orleans it was necessary to pass the great marsh of Sceaux
and the forest of Orleans, probably impracticable. Now, the road
indicated on the Peutingerian Table, as leading from Orleans to Sens,
must have had a decided curve towards the south, and passed close by
Gien, after having passed through Aquæ-Segeste (_Craon_ and
_Chenevière_), for the distance between Sens and Orleans is marked at
fifty-nine Gaulish leagues, or 134 kilomètres. The Roman road, which
leads directly from Sens to Orleans, by way of Sceaux, and which the
itineraries do not mention, has only a length of 110 kilomètres: it is
certainly less ancient than the former, and can never have been a
Gaulish road.
3rd. The “Commentaries” inform us that the news of the insurrection of
Genabum arrived in a short time among the Averni (of whom Gergovia, near
Clermont, was the principal centre), at a distance of 160 miles (237
kilomètres) from Genabum. Now, the distance from Gien to Gergovia, by
the valleys of the Loire and the Allier, is 240 kilomètres, which agrees
with the text, whilst from Orleans to the same spot it is 300
kilomètres.
4th. After having crossed the Loire at Genabum, Cæsar was in the
territory of the Bituriges. This is true if he passed by Gien, and false
if he passed by Orleans, since, opposite Orleans, the left bank belonged
to the territory of the Carnutes. It is true that it has been pretended
that Gien belonged to the ancient diocese of Auxerre, and that,
consequently, it was in the territory of the Senones, and not in that of
the Carnutes. The limits of the ancient dioceses cannot be considered as
indicating in an absolute manner the frontiers of the peoples of Gaul;
and we cannot admit that the territory of the Senones formed an acute
angle upon the territory of the Carnutes, the summit of which would be
occupied by Gien. Moreover, whatever change it may have experienced in
feudal times, in regard to its diocesan attribution, Gien has never
formed a part of the Orléanais, in its civil and political relations. In
561, Gien was included in the kingdom of Orleans and Burgundy.
We believe, therefore, that Genabum was, not old Gien, which,
notwithstanding its epithet, may be posterior to Cæsar, but the present
Gien. This little town, by its position on the banks of the Loire,
besides containing a hill very appropriate for the site of an ancient
_oppidum_, possesses sufficiently interesting ruins, and agrees much
better than Old Gien with the _oppidum_ of the Carnutes. Without
attaching too great faith to traditions and etymologies, we must,
nevertheless, mention a gate at Gien, which, from time immemorial, has
been called Cæsar’s Gate (_la Porte de César_); a street called _à la
Genabye_, which leads, not towards Orleans, but towards the high part of
town; a piece of ground, situated to the north of Gien, at the angle
formed by the road to Montargis and the Roman road, at a distance of
about one kilomètre, which still preserves the name of the Field of the
Camp (_La Pièce du Camp_). Perhaps this is the spot where Cæsar placed
his camp, opposite the most accessible part of the town.
The principal reason why Orleans has been taken for Genabum is that the
Itinerary of Antoninus indicates that town under the name of _Cenabum_
or _Cenabo_, and that this name is also found in some lately discovered
inscriptions. It may be supposed that the inhabitants of Gien, after
having escaped from the destruction of their town, descended the river,
and, on the spot where Orleans now stands, formed a new establishment,
to which they gave the name of the first city; in the same manner the
inhabitants of Bibracte removed to Autun, and those of Gergovia to
Clermont.
Independently of the above considerations, Orleans, by its position on a
declivity uniformly inclined toward the Loire, does not at all answer to
the conditions of a Gaulish _oppidum_. If we admit Orleans to be
Genabum, it becomes very difficult to assign a convenient site for the
_oppida_ of Vellaunodunum and Noviodunum.
_Vellaunodunum. _ The situation of the territory of the Boii being
admitted, as well as that of Genabum, we have to find, on the road which
Cæsar pursued from Sens to Gorgobina, the intermediate points of
Vellaunodunum and Noviodunum.
On the direct line from Sens to Gien, at the distance of 40 kilomètres
from Sens, we meet with the little town of Triguères. The hill which
overlooks it from the north agrees with the position of the ancient
_oppidum_; the remains of walls, fosses, and parapets have been found on
it. Farther, there were discovered in 1856, at 500 mètres to the
north-west of Triguères, the ruins of a large semi-elliptical theatre,
capable of containing from 5,000 to 6,000 spectators. In another
direction, the ruins of a Druidical monument have been pointed out; in
fact, everything leads to the belief that there existed at Triguères, in
the Gallo-Roman period, an important centre, which had been preceded by
a Gaulish establishment anterior to the conquest. A road paved with
stones, considered by some as a Gaulish or Celtic way, but accepted by
all archæologists as a Roman road, goes direct from Sens to Triguères,
by Courtenay, and passes along the eastern side of the _oppidum_.
Another ancient way leads similarly from Triguères to Gien. We feel no
hesitation, after what precedes, in placing Vellaunodunum at Triguères.
It will be objected that the distance from Sens to this little town (40
kilomètres) is too small to have taken the Roman army, without baggage,
three days’ march; but Cæsar does not say that he employed three days in
proceeding from _Agedincum_ to _Vellaunodunum_: he informs us merely
that, leaving all his baggage at Agedincum, he journeyed towards the
country of the Boii, and that on the second day he arrived at
Vellaunodunum. Nothing, therefore, obliges us to suppose that, before it
marched, the Roman army was concentrated or encamped at Agedincum
itself. Persons unacquainted with military art are apt to suppose that
an army lives and marches always concentrated on one point.
Cæsar, although he was effecting the concentration of his troops before
entering into campaign, did not keep them massed at the gates of Sens,
but he probably distributed them in _échelon_ in the neighbourhood of
the town, along the Yonne. When afterwards he decided on marching to the
succour of the Boii, we must suppose that the first day was employed in
concentrating the whole army at Sens itself, in leaving the baggage
there, perhaps also in crossing the Yonne, a long operation for more
than 60,000 men. The first day having passed, the army continued its
march next day, and arrived at Triguères the day following, having
performed two days’ march of 20 kilomètres each. We see, then, that the
distance between Sens and Triguères does not prevent us from identifying
this latter locality with Vellaunodunum. Triguères is distant 44
kilomètres from Gien, the distance which separated Vellaunodunum from
Genabum, and which might have been marched in two days.
_Noviodunum. _ To find the site of Noviodunum, we must seek a position
which agrees best with the “Commentaries” in the triangle formed by the
three known points, Gien, Le Bec-d’Allier, and Bourges. Since, according
to the text, Vercingetorix did not raise the siege of the town of the
Boii until he had heard of Cæsar’s arrival on the left bank of the
Loire, and since the two hostile armies, marching towards each other,
met at Noviodunum, it follows that this last-named town must be about
half-way between the spot where the Loire was passed and the town of the
Boii; on another hand, since Cæsar took several days to reach Bourges
from Noviodunum, there must have been a rather considerable distance
between those two last-named towns. Moreover, in order that the
inhabitants of Noviodunum should have seen in the distance, from the top
of their walls, the cavalry of Vercingetorix, the town must necessarily
have been situated on an eminence. Lastly, the cavalry combat, fought at
a small distance from the town, proves that the ground was sufficiently
flat to permit that engagement.
It is, therefore, because certain points hitherto indicated do not
answer to the conditions required by the text, that we have not
admitted, as representing Noviodunum, the towns of Nouan-le-Fuselier,
Pierrefitte-sur-Saudre, Nohant-en-Goût, Neuvy-en-Sullias, or
Neuvy-sur-Barangeon. In fact, some of these are too far from
Bec-d’Allier, while others are too near Bourges, and most of them are
situated in a plain.
Sancerre, on the contrary, answers all the conditions of the text. It is
situated on a hill which rises 115 mètres above the valley watered by
the Loire. Encircled on all sides by deep ravines, it can only be
approached from one point, situated to the east, where the ancient Roman
road of Bourges terminated, which is still at the present day called the
Big Road (_le Gros Chemin_). The Abbé Lebœuf, as early as 1727, had
designated this town as the ancient Noviodunum. It is near Saint-Satur,
at the very foot of the mountain of Sancerre, that a Gallo-Roman town
existed, of which, within the last few years, numerous foundations have
been found. It is probable that this Gallo-Roman town had succeeded to a
great centre of Gaulish population, for the Bituriges must necessarily
have occupied in their territory a point so admirably fortified by
nature, and which commanded the course of the Loire, the line of
boundary between them and the Ædui. The present town seems to have kept
within the very limits of the ancient _oppidum_; it has the form of an
ellipse of from 700 to 800 mètres in length on a breadth of about 500
mètres, capable of containing a population of from 4,000 to 5,000
inhabitants. At Sancerre there was also, at the extremity of one of the
streets, towards the north, a gate called the Gate of Cæsar (_Porte de
César_), which was demolished in the beginning of the nineteenth
century. By adopting Sancerre, all the movements of the commencement of
the campaign of 702 are easily explained. This town is forty-six
kilomètres from Gien, forty-eight kilomètres from Le Bec-d’Allier,
distances nearly equal, so that Vercingetorix and Cæsar, starting almost
at the same time from two opposite points, may have met under its walls.
Its elevated position allowed the eye to range far towards the south
along the valley of the Loire, through which the inhabitants would have
seen the approach of the cavalry of Vercingetorix. Cæsar may have
occupied with his army the heights of Verdigny or Saint-Satur, to the
north of Sancerre. A cavalry engagement may have taken place in the
valley of Saint-Satur, or on the plain between Ménétréol and
Saint-Thibaud. The captain of staff Rouby has examined with the greatest
care the places just mentioned.
Cæsar, after the surrender of Noviodunum, marches towards Bourges.
Vercingetorix follows him by short marches (_minoribus itineribus_). The
Roman general, having Bourges before him, and a hostile army on his
left, marches slowly and with precaution. Perhaps he took three or four
days to perform the forty-five kilomètres which separate Sancerre from
Bourges. At last, after having reconnoitred the site of Avaricum, he
must have traversed the marshes of the Yèvre, at a distance of three or
four kilomètres from that town, so as to take up a position to the
south-east of the _oppidum_, in that part which was not surrounded by
the river and the marshes, and which only offered a narrow passage. As
to Vercingetorix, he follows, or rather hovers on, the Roman army,
taking up his position on its left, and still keeping up his
communication with Avaricum, hesitating whether he shall deliver it to
the flames.
[469] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 13.
[470] Archælogists have pretended they find traces still existing of the
camp of Vercingetorix in the neighbourhood of Bourges, not considering
that Cæsar declares that the Gaulish chief did not, for the first time,
think of retrenching his camp in the Roman fashion till after the siege
of this town. We believe that Vercingetorix, although he came from the
east, encamped to the south of Bourges. It was, indeed, natural that he
should place himself between the Roman army and the land of the Arverni,
whence, probably, it drew its provisions. Besides, if he had placed his
camp to the east of Bourges, he would have intercepted the provisions
which Cæsar expected from the land of the Ædui, which the text does not
say.
[471] The ravine which descends to the Auron is still recognised at the
present day, between the Portes Saint-Michel and Saint-Paul, by the
sudden incline of the ground. Old plans of Bourges designate it by the
name of the _Vallée Saint-Paul_. The opposite ravine, which runs towards
the Porte Bourbonnoux, has disappeared under the successive fillings up
composing the soil of the garden of the archbishop’s palace. The ridge
of land forming the avenue cannot have been in Cæsar’s time more than
100 mètres broad. It has lost its primitive physiognomy, especially by
the formation of the Place Sérancourt, in 1700, on a site the level of
which did not then exceed that of the field of the present fair. The
depression of the ground which existed before the wall is more visible;
it has been filled-up during the different sieges of Bourges.
[472] This is evident, since the Romans, in order to be able to give the
assault, were obliged to construct a terrace eighty feet high. General
de Gœler believed this measurement exaggerated. Nevertheless, as this
terrace was constructed in a ravine, it was necessary that it should
compensate a difference of level of eighty mètres, of which thirty,
perhaps, represent the height of the wall.
[473] Vercingetorix, encamped first towards Dun-le-Roi, had approached
nearer Bourges. He had established his new camp to the east of that of
Cæsar, perhaps at La Chenevière, at the confluence of the Yèvre and the
brook of Villabon, fourteen kilomètres from Bourges.
[474] See the quotation from Vegetius, p. 143, note (1).
[475] We read in Vitruvius, on occasion of the siege of Marseilles:
“When the tortoise approached to batter the wall, they let down a cord
furnished with a slip-knot, in which they caught the ram, and raised its
head so high, by means of a wheel, that they prevented its striking the
wall. ” (Vitruvius, X. 16. )
[476] Titus Livius expresses himself thus in speaking of the beseiged in
Ambracia, who dug a mine to meet that of the enemies: “Aperiunt viam
rectam in cuniculum. ” (XXXVII. 7. )
[477] Several authors have thought that these beams, instead of being
placed perpendicularly to the direction of the wall, were placed
parallel to that direction. This interpretation appears to us
inadmissable. The beams so placed would have no solidity, and would
easily have been torn down. We see on the Trajan Column walls
constructed as we describe; moreover, the Latin expression _trabes
directæ_ can leave no doubt, for the word _directus_ means always
_perpendicular to a direction_. (See _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 17,
_directa materia injecta_, and the dissertation in the _Philologus_,
Jahrganges 19, Heft. 3. )
[478] The name of _pluteus_ was given generally to all kinds of covering
with hurdles or with skins. (Festus, in voce _Pluteus_. --Vitruvius, X.
20. )--Vegetius (IV. 15) applies the name of _pluteus_ to a kind of
penthouse, of wicker-work or skins, mounted on three wheels, and
protecting the men placed behind it, so that they might shoot at the
defenders.
[479] They gave this name to a small engine resembling the balistæ,
which threw darts. These scorpions composed, as it were, the
field-artillery of the ancients.
[480] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 32.
[481] It is very probably that Cæsar proceeded first to Noviodunum
(_Nevers_), since he informs us that he had established in that town a
great magazine and provisions of every kind.
[482] At present the Allier is fordable almost everywhere in summer; but
in the course of nineteen centuries the bed of the river must have been
considerably raised.
[483] The commentators are not agreed on this passage. I have adopted
the version which seemed to me the best, and which MM. Köchly and Rustow
have followed in their German translation, Stuttgart, 1862.
[484] Dio Cassius, XL. 35.
[485] Cæsar, on leaving Decize, followed, no doubt the Gaulish road
which led to the Allier, and the existence of which may be assumed from
the later construction of the Roman road which goes from Decize to
Bourbon-l’Archambault (_Aquæ Borvonis_), and which crossed the Allier a
little below Moulins. Thence he followed the course of the river for
some days, constantly in face of the enemy. In order to pass it by the
help of a stratagem, he took advantage of the remains of a bridge; and,
as this bridge indicates that there must have been a road, it becomes a
question to find among the ancient roads which crossed the Allier that
which Cæsar followed. Now we only know two Roman roads leading to the
Allier below Moulins, one at Varennes, the other at Vichy. We adopt
Varennes. That locality is seventy-seven kilomètres from Gergovia,
reckoning them along the Allier, and Cæsar took five days to perform
them; but, as the four legions sent forward to deceive the enemy
returned during the night, in order to rejoin him, they must have
suffered great fatigues; hence it is to be presumed that the next day
the first march was very short. The fifth also was not long, for,
according to the “Commentaries,” Cæsar had time on the day of his
arrival to fortify his camp, to reconnoitre the place, and to engage in
a cavalry combat. Besides, the country, interspersed with woods and
marshes, was unknown to him; and we believe that we do not depart from
the truth if we admit that the first and the last march were of no more
than ten kilomètres, and the three others of nineteen, which gives a
total of seventy-seven kilomètres, the distance from Varennes to
Gergovia. When Cæsar left Gergovia, he crossed the Allier again, but at
a point nearer to Gergovia, being in haste to place the river between
him and the enemy. Indeed, on the second day after his check, he fought
a successful cavalry engagement, broke up his camp, and the following
day (_tertio die_) crossed the Allier again, according to our opinion,
at Vichy, which is only fifty-five kilomètres from Gergovia.
[486] The Artières receives, on the north of Gergovia, the little brook
of Clémensat, marked on _Plate 21_.
[487] It is by seeking the essential conditions required for the placing
of troops that Commandant Baron Stoffel succeeded in finding the camps.
Cæsar had to place from 30,000 to 40,000 men in the neighbourhood of
water, at a convenient distance from Gergovia, and in such a manner as
to preserve his line of operation upon Nevers, where his magazines were.
These necessities indicated that the principal camp would be near the
Auzon, and to the east. Moreover, it must be sufficiently near the
_oppidum_, that from the top of the mountain of Gergovia could be seen
what was going on in it; and yet sufficiently distant that the objects
could not be clearly distinguished. The camp must be in the plain; Dio
Cassius (XL. 36) formally says, “Cæsar remained in the plain, not having
been able to take (for placing his camp) a place strong by its
elevation;” and then the “Commentaries” inform us that the Romans only
occupied one single hill, namely, the one they took by surprise (La
Roche-Blanche). Lastly, it was indispensable that there should be in
front of the camp a space sufficiently large to admit of cavalry
engagements.
[488] Vercingetorix, placed in the centre of a kind of semicircle, might
easily be considered by Cæsar as surrounded by his numerous troops
(_collocaverat copias circum se_).
[489] The combats of cavalry took place in the plain which extends from
the small eminence called _Le Puy-de-Marmant_ to the marsh of Sarlièves.
[490] The hill is certainly the Roche-Blanche, for it is situated
opposite the _oppidum_ (_e regione oppidi_); it begins at the very foot
of the slopes of the mountain of Gergovia (_sub ipsis radicibus
montis_), is singularly fortified by nature, and, as it were, cut out
from all sides (_egregie munitus atque ex omni parte circumcisus_). So
long as the Gauls occupied it, they could go to the Auzon by the ravine
of Merdogne, to obtain water and forage; but as soon as it was in the
power of the Romans, the Gauls were compelled to draw their water from
the springs on the mountain of Gergovia, and from the little brook of
Artières.
The excavations made in 1862 brought the two camps to light. The fosses
of the little camp are clearly defined in the calcareous soil. They form
an irregular outline, represented on _Plate 22_. The Roche-Blanche,
which presents in its southern part an escarpment almost as
perpendicular as a wall, has lost on the sides its abrupt form by
successive landslips, the last of which took place within memory of the
inhabitants.
The communication between the great and little camps was
composed of a parapet, formed by the earth thrown out of two contiguous
fosses, each four feet in depth and six in breadth, so that the breadth
of the two together is only twelve feet. If we wonder that the Romans
should have dug two little ditches, each six feet broad and four feet
deep, instead of making one eight feet wide by six feet deep, which
would have given the same amount of soil to take out, it may be answered
that the two little ditches were much more quickly made than one large
ditch.
[491]
HOURS.
Cæsar starts at four o’clock in the morning, and arrives at Randan
at one o’clock in the afternoon 9
Employs in negotiation from one o’clock to seven o’clock 6
Repose from seven o’clock to ten o’clock in the evening 3
Hurried return from Randan to Gergovia, from ten o’clock to
four o’clock in the morning 6
--
Duration of Cæsar’s absence 24
[492] _Plate 22_ shows the places which Cæsar’s eye could embrace from
the summit of the Roche-Blanche. He could see neither the plateau, nor
the country situated on the norther slopes of the mountains of Gergovia
and Rissoles. It was for this reason that he had to learn from the
deserters the form of the ground which lay on the other side. He thus
learnt that the ridge of this latter mountain (_dorsum ejus jugi_) was
not very uneven, and gave access to the western part of the town (_ad
alteram partem oppidi_) by a narrow wooded passage (the defile of the
Goules, which separates Rissoles from Gergovia). (_See Plate 21 in C. _)
This defile leads to the gate _P_ of the _oppidum_. The foundations, of
masonry, and the approaches to this gate, were uncovered in the month of
July, 1861. The wide road which led from this gate to the defile _C_ is
distinctly seen. The alarm of Vercingetorix may be imagined; he feared
lest the Romans might shut up from the Gauls this issue from the
_oppidum_. These latter would have been almost blockaded (_pœne
circumvallati_), without any way out, and in the impossibility of
producing forage from the valley of the Artières, since the northern
part of the town was difficult to access. Consequently, the words _si
alterum collem amisissent_ can only apply to the mountain mass of
Rissoles, and not, as several authors have pretended, to Montrognon or
to Puy-Giroux; for the possession of those two peaks, detached and
rather far from the mountain mass of Gergovia, offered no interest
either for the attack or for the defence.
The spot which it was important for the Gauls to fortify was the part _D
E_ of the heights of Rissoles which are opposite the village of Opme,
because troops could only scale the mass by the western slope. How can
any one suppose that, fearing for the defile of the Goules, the Gauls
would have abandoned their camp before the place to go and entrench
themselves on Montrognon, three kilomètres from Gergovia? How admit that
Cæsar, to threaten the defile, would have sent troops to make the
circuit of the mountain of Gergovia by the north? How could the legion,
which supported this movement, without advancing far, and which
concealed itself in the woods, have assisted in the stratagem, if the
false attack had been made to the east and to the north of Gergovia, at
two leagues from the camp? In passing by the south, that is, by the
defile of Opme, the legion was always in communication with the camps,
on which it could fall back, and the broken and wooded ground prevented
the Gauls from knowing accurately the importance of the attack. Besides,
two facts which result from the “Commentaries” prove that the Gauls were
not very far from the _oppidum_. Cæsar sees the southern front
abandoned, and he establishes his legions at a distance of 1,200 paces
from the place. The soldiers scale the heights at a rapid pace; but
scarcely have they reached the principal enclosure, when the Gauls, who
hear the cries of the women and of the small number of defenders left in
the place (_primo exaudito clamore_), have time to hurry to them, and
drive back the Romans. Consequently, the Gauls were at a distance where
the cries could be heard; and this distance may be measured by the time
which the attacking columns must have taken to climb the space of 1,200
paces, since they arrived almost simultaneously. We believe, therefore,
that they were at a distance of less than two kilomètres from the gate
_O_ of the town, engaged in fortifying the plateau of the heights of
Risolles.
[493] According to Polyænus (VIII. xxiii. 9), the soldiers marched with
their heads bent down, in order not to be seen.
[494] It is, in fact, 1780 mètres from the foot of the mountain, where
Cæsar must have assembled his troops, between the Roche-Blanche and the
Puy-de-Marmant, to the gate _O_ of the _oppidum_. This is the line which
passes by the ravine in which the village of Merdogne is situated; to
the left and to the right the ground is too rugged for the troops to
climb it.
[495] General Gœler believes, with apparent reason, that we ought to
read _regressus_ instead of _progressus_. The 10th legion, which acted
as reserve, must, in the presence of a combat, the issue of which was
uncertain, have taken up a position behind rather than towards the
front.
[496] The part of the southern slope of Gergovia which was the scene of
the last battle is clearly indicated by the ground itself. This battle
took place on the whole space which extends in front of the gate _O_ of
the _oppidum_, the principal object of the attack. The ravine which,
according to the “Commentaries,” prevented the legions from hearing the
signal to retreat, is that which descends to the west of the Merdogne.
Hence it may be concluded that, at this moment, Cæsar and the 10th
legion were to the right of this ravine. Lastly, we understand on the
spot the movement of the Ædui. To the east of Merdogne there is a spur,
_H_, attached to the mountain of Gergovia, forty mètres below the
table-land, and presenting several successive terraces. So long as the
Ædui, who came from the east, had not arrived on the crest of this spur,
they could not be perceived by the Romans, who were fighting towards
Merdogne; but it may be imagined that, when they appeared all at once on
this crest, and at a distance of 600 mètres from the right flank of the
legions, the sight of them must have singularly surprised the troops,
who were expecting no re-enforcement from that side.
General de Gœler, without having seen the locality, has indicated nearly
the site of the Roman camp; but he does not place it sufficiently to the
west. He makes the Gaulish troops encamp on the four slopes of the
mountain of Gergovia. It is, no doubt, the expression _circum se_ (VII.
36) which led him into this error. It is, indeed, impossible to admit
that the Gauls could have encamped on the abrupt slopes of the northern
declivity. General de Gœler is also mistaken in directing the false
attack upon Montrognon. Lastly, he places the scene of the battle too
much towards the west.
[497] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 52.
[498] “In the war of the Gauls, Caius Julius Cæsar was surprised by an
enemy, who carried him off, armed as he was, on his horse, when another
Gaul, who recognized Cæsar, called out, intending to insult him, “Cæcos,
Cæsar! ” which in the Gaulish language signifies, _let him go, set him
loose_; and so he escaped. Cæsar says so himself, in his _Ephemerides_,
in the passage where he speaks of his good fortune. ” (Servius Maurus
Honoratus, a grammarian of the fifth century, in his commentary on the
11th book of the _Æneid_, line 743, II. p. 48, edit. Albert Lion. )
The manuscripts of Servius do not all present the same reading. The
following are some of the principal variations: _Cecos, Cæsar_; _Cæcos
ac Cæsar_; and _Cæsar, Cesar_.
[499] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 29.
[500] There has always been a ford at Bourbon-Lancy.
[501] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 56.
[502] A sling-ball of lead has been found at Sens, on which are stamped
in relief the words “T. Labienus. ” This ball forms part of the
collection of the Museum of Saint-Germain.
[503] MM. de Saulcy and J. Quicherat have already demonstrated in a
conclusive manner that Labienus must have followed the left bank of the
Yonne, after leaving Sens, and that he crossed over to the right bank of
the Seine at Melun. In fact, Labienus, on the right bank, found himself,
as Cæsar says, threatened on one side by the Bellovaci, on the other by
the army of Camulogenus (VII. 59). On the opposite bank, on the
contrary, Labienus would not have been placed between the two, since he
would have had Camulogenus in front, and, at a greater distance, the
Bellovaci coming from the north.
“A very large river kept the legions separated from their reserve and
their baggage. ” This very great river cannot be the Marne, which Cæsar
does not even mention in the whole course of this campaign: it was
evidently the Seine, which Labienus has crossed once only, at Melodunum
(_Melun_); by crossing over to the right bank, he was separated from his
base of operations, which was at Sens. On the contrary hypothesis, no
river would have separated Labienus from his line of retreat; unless we
admit, with Dulaure and several others, the identity of Agedincum with
Provius, which is no longer possible.
The Captain of the Staff Rouby has made investigations on the spot,
which prove that from Sens the most ancient ways leading to Paris passed
on the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine. Moreover, the
discoveries of M. Carré have made us acquainted with the exact direction
followed by the Roman road after quitting Sens towards Paris; it was
entirely on the left bank of the Yonne. If Cæsar’s lieutenant had
followed the right bank of the Yonne, he would, the day after his
departure, have been arrested by the course of the Seine, and would have
fallen in with the Gaulish town of Condate, built in the very angle of
the two streams, in the midst of perhaps impassable marshes. If only a
few thousand Gauls had occupied the heights which played so important a
part in the campaign of 1814, Labienus, compelled to seek for a place to
cross higher up the stream, would have been diverted considerably from
his aim.
It has been supposed wrongly that the Bièvre was the marsh where
Labienus, in his march on the left bank of the Seine, had been arrested
by the Gaulish army. Leaving out of consideration the fact that the
Bièvre, which flows through a calcareous soil, can at no epoch have
formed a marsh capable of arresting an army, how can we suppose that
Labienus, if he had arrived at this stream, that is, close to Lutetia,
would have retraced his steps as far back as Melun, to march from thence
towards the _oppidum_ of the Parisii by the right bank of the Seine,
which would have obliged him to make a journey of twenty-four leagues?
The manœuvre of Labienus can only be explained by his desire to turn the
strong position of Camulogenus, and arrive at Paris before him. The text
of the “Commentaries” says clearly that Labienus, stopped by the marsh
which shelves towards the Seine, stole away by night, surprised the
passage of the Seine at Melun, and marched upon Lutetia, where he
arrived before Camulogenus. To allow of the success of this manœuvre,
the marsh in question must necessarily not have been far from Melun. The
Essonne alone fulfils that condition. The ground on the banks of this
little river offers, even at present, by its nature, a very serious
obstacle to an army. It is cut up by innumerable peat mosses; and it was
behind this line of Essonne that, in 1814, the Emperor Napoleon I.
established his army, whilst the enemy occupied Paris.
[504] We have not translated these words, _fugam parare_, because this
passage has always appeared unintelligible to us. How, indeed, could the
Gauls, seeing that the Romans were ready to pass the Seine by force,
believe that this was a flight?
[505] Some manuscripts have Metiosedum, a version which, in our opinion,
is utterly incorrect.
[506] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 62.
[507] See _Appendix D_.
[508] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 65. --_Evocati_ was the name given to the
old soldiers who, after having served, returned voluntarily to the ranks
of the army.
[509] Let us here recapitulate the numbers of the legions employed
during the war in Gaul. Cæsar’s army, as we have seen, was composed in
696 of six legions, the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th. In 697, two
new legions were raised in Italy, the 13th and 14th. Probably, in the
winter between 699 and 700, Cæsar brought several cohorts composed of
soldiers and sailors who were to serve in the fleet; for, on his return
from the second expedition into England, notwithstanding the losses he
had sustained, he was at the head of eight legions and five cohorts (V.
24). He lost at Aduatuca one legion and a half, that is, the 14th
legion, besides five cohorts; but in 701 three new legions replaced the
cohorts lost, and even doubled their number. These legions were the 1st,
lent by Pompey (_De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 54, and Lucan, _Pharsalia_,
VII. , 1. 218); the 14th, which took the number of the legion destroyed
at Aduatuca (_De Bello Gallico_, VI. 32; VIII. 4); and the 15th; this
last legion was afterwards, with the 1st, given to Pompey for the war of
the Parthians; it figured in the Civil War, and took, in Pompey’s army,
the number 3. (Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, III. 88. )
The 6th legion, judging from its number, must have been one of the
oldest, for Dio Cassius (XXXVIII. 47) informs us that the legions were
designated according to their order of inscription on the rolls of the
army; but, as it only appears for the first time in 702, it is probable
that it had remained in garrison among the Allobroges or in Italy. A
proof that this legion assisted in the siege of Alesia is found in the
fact that, after the surrender of the place, it was sent to winter
quarters on the Saône, where Cæsar found it a few months afterwards (_De
Bello Gallico_, VIII. 4). The distribution of the troops in their winter
quarters after the taking of Alesia confirms the number of legions given
above. The re-distribution after the siege of Uxellodunum gives also the
same result, for in book VII. c. 46 the “Commentaries” give the
positions of ten legions, without reckoning the 15th, which, according
to book VIII. c. 24, had been sent to Cisalpine Gaul. These facts are
repeated again, book VIII. c. 54.
[510] It is evident that an army could not remain in the wars for eight
years without receiving frequent re-enforcements in order to keep it up
to its effective number. Thus, when, after the murder of Clodius, all
the youth of Italy had been called to arms, Cæsar made new levies, which
were used probably to swell the ranks of his legions, for no new numbers
appear (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 1). --In the same manner, when he
arrived, in 702, in the south of Gaul, and crossed the Cévennes, he
placed himself at the head of the troops which had been recruited in the
Roman province and of the re-enforcements which he had brought from
Italy (_partem copiarum ex provincia supplementumque quod ex Italia
adduxerat in Helvois, qui fines Arvernorum contingunt, convenire
jubet_). (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 7. )--Labienus, on the other hand,
during his expedition to Paris, left his recruits in dépôt at Sens
(_Labienus eo supplemento quod nuper ex Italia venerat relicto_). (_De
Bello Gallico_, VII. 57. )
[511] Plutarch, _Cato_, 53.
[512] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 36.
[513] See above, page 87.
[514] See above, page 108, note (2).
[515] We learn from the text that he formed three camps. This
disposition was necessitated by circumstances and the character of the
locality. The heights of Sacquenay form, in fact, three promontories,
_V_, _V_, _V_ (_see Plate 24_), advancing towards the north; the road to
Dijon passes over the one to the left, the road to Pontallier over the
one in the middle. By establishing three camps on these three
promontories, Vercingetorix occupied each of these roads with one-third
of his army, whilst he backed his right wing against the Vingeanne.
The Gaulish army had there a position of great natural strength, for, to
attack it, the enemy would have to climb high hills which were easy to
defend; it was, moreover, protected by two watercourses: one, the
Vingeanne, which covered its right; the other, the Badin, a small
tributary of the Vingeanne, which protected its front. In the space
comprised between these two watercourses and the road from Dijon to
Langres, a ground extends, measuring five kilomètres in every direction,
slightly broken in some parts, but almost flat everywhere else,
particularly between the Vingeanne and the hillock of Montsaugeon. Near
the road, and to the west, arise hills which command it, as well as the
whole country as far as Badin and the Vingeanne.
[516] The field of battle of the Vingeanne, which H. M. Defay, of
Langres, first pointed out, answers perfectly to all the requirements of
the Latin narrative, and, moreover, material proofs exist which are
undeniable evidences of the struggle. We allude to the tumuli which are
found, some at Prauthoy, others on the banks of the Vingeanne, at
Dardenay, and Cusey, and those which, at Pressant, Rivières-les-Fosses,
Chamberceau, and Vesvres, mark, as it were, the line of retreat of the
Gaulish army, to a distance of twelve kilomètres.
Two of these tumuli are situated near each other, between Prauthoy and
Montsaugeon (_see Plate 24_, where the tumuli are marked). There is one
near Dardenay, three to the west of Cusey, one at Rivières-les-Fosses,
another at Chamberceau. We will not mention those which have been
destroyed by agriculture, but which are still remembered by the
inhabitants.
Researches lately made in these tumuli have brought to light skeletons,
many of which had bronze bracelets round the arms and legs, calcined
bones of men and horses, thirty-six bracelets, several iron circles
which were worn around the neck, iron rings, fibulæ, fragments of metal
plates, pieces of Celtic pottery, an iron sword, &c.
It is a fact worthy of remark, that the objects found in the tumuli at
Rivières-les-Fosses and Chamberceau bear so close a resemblance to those
of the tumuli on the banks of the Vingeanne, that we might think they
had come from the hand of the same workman. Hence there can be no doubt
that all these tumuli refer to one and the same incident of war.
(Several of these objects are deposited in the Museum of Saint-Germain. )
We must add that the agricultural labourers of Montsaugeon, Isomes, and
Cusey have found during many years, when they make trenches for
drainage, horse-shoes buried a foot or two deep under the soil. In 1860,
at the dredging of the Vingeanne, hundreds of horse-shoes, the
inhabitants say, of excellent metal, were extracted from the gravel of
the river, at a depth of two or three feet. They are generally small,
and bear a groove all round, in which the heads of the nails were
lodged. A great number of these horse-shoes have preserved their nails,
which are flat, have a head in the form of a T, and still have their
rivet--that is, the point which is folded back over the hoof--which
proves that they are not shoes that have been lost, but shoes of dead
horses, the foot of which has rotted away in the soil or in the gravel.
Thirty-two of these horse-shoes have been collected. One of them is
stamped in the middle of the curve with a mark, sometimes found on
Celtic objects, and which has a certain analogy with the stamp on a
plate of copper found in one of the tumuli of Montsaugeon.
When we consider that the action between the Roman and Gaulish armies
was merely a cavalry battle, in which were engaged from 20,000 to 25,000
horses, the facts just stated cannot but appear interesting, although
they may possibly belong to a battle of a later date.
[517] We have adopted the reading, _aciemque constitui jubebat_, which
alone gives a reasonable interpretation.
[518] He was not the same as the one mentioned in pp. 307, 321, 320.
(_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 67. )
[519] The three Gaulish camps having been established on the heights of
Sacquenay, four or five kilomètres behind the position occupied by the
infantry during the battle, and the line of retreat towards Alesia lying
to the left, in the direction of Pressant and Vesvres, if Vercingetorix
had returned to ascend the hills with his 80,000 men, to remove the
baggage, that operation would have taken two or three hours, during
which Cæsar might have cut off his retreat, or have inflicted a still
more serious defeat upon him. But, by immediately hastening his march on
Pressant, in order to follow from thence the road which, by
Rivières-les-Fosses and Vesvres, joined the great road from Langres to
Alise, near Aujeur, he got in advance of the Roman army, which, in the
disorder in which it was at that moment, was not able to pursue him at
once. And this is what he did.
The text says, also, that Vercingetorix gave orders that the baggage
should be taken out of the camps in all haste, to follow him. If the
baggage of an army of 100,000 men had accompanied Vercingetorix, on the
road followed by the infantry, we cannot understand how the Roman army,
which pursued the Gauls as long as daylight lasted, should not have
captured it all. But investigations made in the country situated between
the field of battle and the Alise, behind the heights of Sacquenay, have
brought to light vestiges of a Roman road which, starting from
Thil-Châtel, thirteen kilomètres behind Sacquenay, proceeded, by
Avelanges, towards the hamlet of Palus, where it branched from the road
from Langres to Alise. We may suppose, therefore, that Vercingetorix
caused his baggage to follow in his rear as far as Thil-Châtel, where it
took the road to Palus.
The Roman road from Langres to Alise, which, without any doubt, marks
the direction followed by the two armies, has been traced almost in its
whole extent by Commandant Stoffel. Even at the present day, on the
territories of Fraignot, Salives, Echalot, and Poiseul-la-Grange, the
inhabitants call it the _Road of the Romans_, or _Cæsar’s way_.
[520] We read (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 68) the words, _Altero die ad
Alesiam castra fecit_. We have before sought to prove that the words
_altero die_ must be translated by the _second day after_, and not by
the _next day_. [See page 279, note (1). ] It took Cæsar, therefore, two
days’ march to move from the field of battle to Alesia.
A study of the country fully confirms the interpretation we give to the
expression _altero die_. In fact, to the north and east of
Alise-Sainte-Reine (_Alesia_), to less than two days’ march, the ground
is so cut up and broken that no cavalry battle would be possible upon
it. It retains this character as far as fifty-five or sixty kilomètres
from Alise, to the east of the road from Pranthoy to Dijon, where it
becomes more easy and open. The battle-field of the Vingeanne, which we
consider as the true one, is at a distance of sixty-five kilomètres from
Alise. Supposing that, on the day of the victory, the Roman army had
pursued the Gauls over a space of fifteen kilomètres, it would have had
to traverse in the two following days, before arriving at Alesia, a
distance of fifty kilomètres, that is to say, twenty-five kilomètres a
day.
[521] We call the reader’s attention particularly to the numerous Roman
and Gaulish coins found in one of the fosses of the camp _D_, the list
of which will be found in _Appendix C_, at the end of this volume.
[522] Near the western summit of the mountain two abundant springs
arise; there is another on the eastern side. With these springs, as at
Gergovia, it was easy to form large watering-places for cattle. Besides,
manifest traces of a great number of wells are visible on the
table-land, so that it is evident the besieged can never have wanted
water, besides which, they could always descend to the two rivers.
[523] We believe that these _castella_ were palisaded redoubts having a
recess attached, similar to the wooden blockhouses represented on the
Trajan Column; often even these recesses alone composed the _castellum_.
[524] It was not, as will be remarked, the countervallation which was
11,000 feet in extent, but the line of investment.
[525] _Eadem altitudine_. See paragraph XIII. , Details on the
Excavations of Alesia, page 364.
[526] _Dolabratis_, diminished to a point, and not _delibratis_, peeled.
[527] In the excavations at Alesia, five _stimuli_ have been found, the
form of which is represented in _Plate 27_. The new names which Cæsar’s
soldiers gave to these accessory defenses prove that they were used for
the first time.
[528] This appears from a passage in _De Bello Civili_, III. 47.
[529]
The Ædui and their clients, the Segusiavi, the Ambluareti, the MEN.
Aulerci-Brannovices, and the Blannovii 35,000
The Arverni, with the people in their dependence, as the
Cadurci-Eleutheri, the Gabali, the Vellavi 35,000
The Senones, the Sequani, the Bituriges, the Santones, the Ruteni,
the Carnutes (each 12,000) 72,000
The Bellovaci 10,000
The Lemovices 10,000
The Pictones, the Turones, the Parisii, the Helvii (each 8,000) 32,000
The Suessiones, the Ambiani, the Mediomatrice, the Petrocorii,
the Nervii, the Morini, the Nitiobriges (each 5,000) 35,000
The Aulerci-Cenomanni 5,000
The Atrebates 4,000
The Veliocasses, the Lexovii, the Aulerci-Eburovices (each 3,000) 9,000
The Rauraci and the Boii (each 3,000) 6,000
Lastly, the peoples who dwelt on the shores of the ocean, and
whom the Gauls called Armoricans, amongst whom were the
Curiosolites, the Redones, the Ambibari, the Caletes, the
Osismii, the Lemovices-Armoricani, the Veneti, and the Unelli,
had to furnish together 30,000
-------
Total 283,000
[530]: See note on page 143.
[531] This passage proves clearly that the army of succour attacked also
the circumvallation of the plain.
lib. III. cc. 19, 26, and 30. Is that coincidence alone not sufficient
to make us suppose that _altero die_ ought not to be confounded with the
preceding expressions; and does it not appear certain that, if Cæsar had
arrived at Vellaunodunum the morning after his departure from Agedincum,
he would have written, _Postero die_ (or _proximo die_) _quum ad oppidum
Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset_, &c. ?
We believe, therefore, that we are authorized in concluding that Cæsar
arrived at Vellaunodunum the second day after the army moved.
Farther on, on page 339, will be found a new confirmation of the sense
which we give to _altero die_. It results from the appreciation of the
distance which separates Alesia from the battle-field where Cæsar
defeated the cavalry of Vercingetorix. (See the opinions of the
commentators on _altero die_ in the sixth volume of Cicero, edit.
Lemaire, Classiques Latins, _Excursus ad Philippicam primam_. )
[468] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 11. --Contrary to the generally received
opinion, we adopt _Gien_ and not _Orleans_ for the ancient Genabum,
_Triguères_ for Vellaunodonum, _Sancerre_ for Noviodunum, and, lastly,
_Saint-Parize-le-Châtel_ for the Gorgobina of the Boii.
As Cæsar’s object, on quitting Sens, was to march as quickly as possible
to the _oppidum_ of the Boii, in order to raise the siege, since he
starts without baggage, so as to be less impeded in his march, we will
first examine the probable position of this latter town, before
discussing the question relating to the intermediate points.
_Gorgobina Boiorum_. After the defeat of the Helvetii, Cæsar allowed the
Ædui to receive the Boii upon their territory, and it is probable that
they were established on the western frontier, as in an advanced post
against the Arverni and the Bituriges. Several data confirm this
opinion. Tacitus (_Histor. _, II. 61) relates that: _Mariccus quidam, e
plebe Boiorum,. . . . concitis octo millibus hominum, proximos Æduorum
pagos trahebat_. The possessions of the Boii were, therefore, contiguous
to the Æduan territory. Pliny the Elder (_Hist. Nat. _, IV. 18) places
the Boii in the number of the nations who inhabited the centre of the
Lyonnaise. _Intus autem Ædui fœderati, Carnuti fœderati, Boii,
Senones_. . . . The place here occupied by the word _Boii_ shows us again
that this people was not far from the Ædui, the Senones, and the
Carnutes. Lastly, the text of the “Commentaries” represents
Vercingetorix as obliged to traverse the country of the Bituriges to
repair to Gorgobina. The most plausible opinion is that which places the
Boii between the Loire and the Allier, towards the confluence of these
two rivers. This was already an old tradition, adopted in the fifteenth
century by Raimondus Marlianus, one of the first editors of Cæsar. This
space of ground, covered in its eastern part with woods and marshes, was
admirably suited by its extent to the limited population of the Boii,
who did not number more than 20,000 souls. Neither
Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier, marked on the map of Gaul as Gorgobina, nor La
Guerche, proposed by General de Gœler, answer completely, by their
topographical position, to the site of a Gaulish _oppidum_. In fact,
Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier is far from being advantageously situated; this
village stands at the foot of the hills which border the right bank of
the Allier. La-Guerche-sur-Aubois fulfils no better the conditions of
defence which must be required in the principal town of the Boii: it is
situated almost in a plain, on the edge of a marshy valley of the
Aubois. It presents a few remains of fortifications of the Middle Ages,
but not a trace of more remote antiquity has been discovered in it. To
seek Gorgobina farther down, and on the left bank of the Loire, is
impossible, since, according to Cæsar, the Boii had been established on
the territory of the Ædui, and the Loire formed the boundary between the
Ædui and the Bituriges. If we are reduced to conjectures, we must at
least admit as incontestable what is advanced by Cæsar.
The village of Saint-Parize-le-Châtel suits better. It is about eight
kilomètres to the north of Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier, nearly in the middle
of the space comprised between the Loire and the Allier; it occupies the
centre of ancient agglomeration of inhabitants, which Guy Coquille, at
the end of the sixteenth century, designates under the name of the
_bourg de Gentily_, and which the _chronicles_ called, down to the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, _Pagus Gentilicus_, or _bourg des
gentils_. The history of this people has this remarkable peculiarity,
that, whilst all the neighbouring nations on the other side of the
Allier and the Loire had, as early as the fourth century, accepted the
Christian religion, they alone continued in idolatry until the sixth
century. Does this fact apply to a tribe settled in a foreign country,
as the Boii were, who would retain their customs and religion for a
longer time unchanged? An ancient tradition states that, in the environs
of Saint-Parize, there was, at a very remote period, a considerable
town, which was destroyed by a fire. A few scattered foundations,
discovered in the woods of Bord, to the south-west of Saint Parize, seem
to indicate the site of the _oppidum_ of the Boii. The name of the
castle, of the domain, and of the place called _Les Bruyères de Buy_,
remind us of that of the Boii.
There was probably a Roman station at Saincaise-Meauce (thirteen
kilomètres to the north of Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier), on the right bank
of the Allier. In 1861, there were discovered there numerous objects of
the Gallo-Roman period, and two busts in white marble, life-size,
representing Roman emperors. At Chantenay, eight kilomètres south from
Saint-Pierre, a few Roman foundations have been found, and a
considerable number of Gaulish coins, one of which, amongst others,
bears the name of the Æduan Litavicus.
_Genabum_. The position of Gorgobina once established at the confluence
of the Loire and the Allier, we must admit _Gien_ as the ancient
Genabum, and not _Orleans_, for the following reasons:--
1st. We cannot believe that Cæsar, leaving Sens in spite of the rigour
of the season, and in haste to raise the siege of Gorgobina, should,
without any reason, have taken a circuitous road of seventy-five
kilomètres, which would represent three or four days march, in order to
pass by Orleans. In fact, the distance from Sens to the confluence of
the Allier and the Loire, is, by Orleans, 270 kilomètres, whilst it is
only 180 kilomètres by the way of Gien.
2nd. From Sens to Gien the road was short and easy; on the contrary,
from Sens to Orleans it was necessary to pass the great marsh of Sceaux
and the forest of Orleans, probably impracticable. Now, the road
indicated on the Peutingerian Table, as leading from Orleans to Sens,
must have had a decided curve towards the south, and passed close by
Gien, after having passed through Aquæ-Segeste (_Craon_ and
_Chenevière_), for the distance between Sens and Orleans is marked at
fifty-nine Gaulish leagues, or 134 kilomètres. The Roman road, which
leads directly from Sens to Orleans, by way of Sceaux, and which the
itineraries do not mention, has only a length of 110 kilomètres: it is
certainly less ancient than the former, and can never have been a
Gaulish road.
3rd. The “Commentaries” inform us that the news of the insurrection of
Genabum arrived in a short time among the Averni (of whom Gergovia, near
Clermont, was the principal centre), at a distance of 160 miles (237
kilomètres) from Genabum. Now, the distance from Gien to Gergovia, by
the valleys of the Loire and the Allier, is 240 kilomètres, which agrees
with the text, whilst from Orleans to the same spot it is 300
kilomètres.
4th. After having crossed the Loire at Genabum, Cæsar was in the
territory of the Bituriges. This is true if he passed by Gien, and false
if he passed by Orleans, since, opposite Orleans, the left bank belonged
to the territory of the Carnutes. It is true that it has been pretended
that Gien belonged to the ancient diocese of Auxerre, and that,
consequently, it was in the territory of the Senones, and not in that of
the Carnutes. The limits of the ancient dioceses cannot be considered as
indicating in an absolute manner the frontiers of the peoples of Gaul;
and we cannot admit that the territory of the Senones formed an acute
angle upon the territory of the Carnutes, the summit of which would be
occupied by Gien. Moreover, whatever change it may have experienced in
feudal times, in regard to its diocesan attribution, Gien has never
formed a part of the Orléanais, in its civil and political relations. In
561, Gien was included in the kingdom of Orleans and Burgundy.
We believe, therefore, that Genabum was, not old Gien, which,
notwithstanding its epithet, may be posterior to Cæsar, but the present
Gien. This little town, by its position on the banks of the Loire,
besides containing a hill very appropriate for the site of an ancient
_oppidum_, possesses sufficiently interesting ruins, and agrees much
better than Old Gien with the _oppidum_ of the Carnutes. Without
attaching too great faith to traditions and etymologies, we must,
nevertheless, mention a gate at Gien, which, from time immemorial, has
been called Cæsar’s Gate (_la Porte de César_); a street called _à la
Genabye_, which leads, not towards Orleans, but towards the high part of
town; a piece of ground, situated to the north of Gien, at the angle
formed by the road to Montargis and the Roman road, at a distance of
about one kilomètre, which still preserves the name of the Field of the
Camp (_La Pièce du Camp_). Perhaps this is the spot where Cæsar placed
his camp, opposite the most accessible part of the town.
The principal reason why Orleans has been taken for Genabum is that the
Itinerary of Antoninus indicates that town under the name of _Cenabum_
or _Cenabo_, and that this name is also found in some lately discovered
inscriptions. It may be supposed that the inhabitants of Gien, after
having escaped from the destruction of their town, descended the river,
and, on the spot where Orleans now stands, formed a new establishment,
to which they gave the name of the first city; in the same manner the
inhabitants of Bibracte removed to Autun, and those of Gergovia to
Clermont.
Independently of the above considerations, Orleans, by its position on a
declivity uniformly inclined toward the Loire, does not at all answer to
the conditions of a Gaulish _oppidum_. If we admit Orleans to be
Genabum, it becomes very difficult to assign a convenient site for the
_oppida_ of Vellaunodunum and Noviodunum.
_Vellaunodunum. _ The situation of the territory of the Boii being
admitted, as well as that of Genabum, we have to find, on the road which
Cæsar pursued from Sens to Gorgobina, the intermediate points of
Vellaunodunum and Noviodunum.
On the direct line from Sens to Gien, at the distance of 40 kilomètres
from Sens, we meet with the little town of Triguères. The hill which
overlooks it from the north agrees with the position of the ancient
_oppidum_; the remains of walls, fosses, and parapets have been found on
it. Farther, there were discovered in 1856, at 500 mètres to the
north-west of Triguères, the ruins of a large semi-elliptical theatre,
capable of containing from 5,000 to 6,000 spectators. In another
direction, the ruins of a Druidical monument have been pointed out; in
fact, everything leads to the belief that there existed at Triguères, in
the Gallo-Roman period, an important centre, which had been preceded by
a Gaulish establishment anterior to the conquest. A road paved with
stones, considered by some as a Gaulish or Celtic way, but accepted by
all archæologists as a Roman road, goes direct from Sens to Triguères,
by Courtenay, and passes along the eastern side of the _oppidum_.
Another ancient way leads similarly from Triguères to Gien. We feel no
hesitation, after what precedes, in placing Vellaunodunum at Triguères.
It will be objected that the distance from Sens to this little town (40
kilomètres) is too small to have taken the Roman army, without baggage,
three days’ march; but Cæsar does not say that he employed three days in
proceeding from _Agedincum_ to _Vellaunodunum_: he informs us merely
that, leaving all his baggage at Agedincum, he journeyed towards the
country of the Boii, and that on the second day he arrived at
Vellaunodunum. Nothing, therefore, obliges us to suppose that, before it
marched, the Roman army was concentrated or encamped at Agedincum
itself. Persons unacquainted with military art are apt to suppose that
an army lives and marches always concentrated on one point.
Cæsar, although he was effecting the concentration of his troops before
entering into campaign, did not keep them massed at the gates of Sens,
but he probably distributed them in _échelon_ in the neighbourhood of
the town, along the Yonne. When afterwards he decided on marching to the
succour of the Boii, we must suppose that the first day was employed in
concentrating the whole army at Sens itself, in leaving the baggage
there, perhaps also in crossing the Yonne, a long operation for more
than 60,000 men. The first day having passed, the army continued its
march next day, and arrived at Triguères the day following, having
performed two days’ march of 20 kilomètres each. We see, then, that the
distance between Sens and Triguères does not prevent us from identifying
this latter locality with Vellaunodunum. Triguères is distant 44
kilomètres from Gien, the distance which separated Vellaunodunum from
Genabum, and which might have been marched in two days.
_Noviodunum. _ To find the site of Noviodunum, we must seek a position
which agrees best with the “Commentaries” in the triangle formed by the
three known points, Gien, Le Bec-d’Allier, and Bourges. Since, according
to the text, Vercingetorix did not raise the siege of the town of the
Boii until he had heard of Cæsar’s arrival on the left bank of the
Loire, and since the two hostile armies, marching towards each other,
met at Noviodunum, it follows that this last-named town must be about
half-way between the spot where the Loire was passed and the town of the
Boii; on another hand, since Cæsar took several days to reach Bourges
from Noviodunum, there must have been a rather considerable distance
between those two last-named towns. Moreover, in order that the
inhabitants of Noviodunum should have seen in the distance, from the top
of their walls, the cavalry of Vercingetorix, the town must necessarily
have been situated on an eminence. Lastly, the cavalry combat, fought at
a small distance from the town, proves that the ground was sufficiently
flat to permit that engagement.
It is, therefore, because certain points hitherto indicated do not
answer to the conditions required by the text, that we have not
admitted, as representing Noviodunum, the towns of Nouan-le-Fuselier,
Pierrefitte-sur-Saudre, Nohant-en-Goût, Neuvy-en-Sullias, or
Neuvy-sur-Barangeon. In fact, some of these are too far from
Bec-d’Allier, while others are too near Bourges, and most of them are
situated in a plain.
Sancerre, on the contrary, answers all the conditions of the text. It is
situated on a hill which rises 115 mètres above the valley watered by
the Loire. Encircled on all sides by deep ravines, it can only be
approached from one point, situated to the east, where the ancient Roman
road of Bourges terminated, which is still at the present day called the
Big Road (_le Gros Chemin_). The Abbé Lebœuf, as early as 1727, had
designated this town as the ancient Noviodunum. It is near Saint-Satur,
at the very foot of the mountain of Sancerre, that a Gallo-Roman town
existed, of which, within the last few years, numerous foundations have
been found. It is probable that this Gallo-Roman town had succeeded to a
great centre of Gaulish population, for the Bituriges must necessarily
have occupied in their territory a point so admirably fortified by
nature, and which commanded the course of the Loire, the line of
boundary between them and the Ædui. The present town seems to have kept
within the very limits of the ancient _oppidum_; it has the form of an
ellipse of from 700 to 800 mètres in length on a breadth of about 500
mètres, capable of containing a population of from 4,000 to 5,000
inhabitants. At Sancerre there was also, at the extremity of one of the
streets, towards the north, a gate called the Gate of Cæsar (_Porte de
César_), which was demolished in the beginning of the nineteenth
century. By adopting Sancerre, all the movements of the commencement of
the campaign of 702 are easily explained. This town is forty-six
kilomètres from Gien, forty-eight kilomètres from Le Bec-d’Allier,
distances nearly equal, so that Vercingetorix and Cæsar, starting almost
at the same time from two opposite points, may have met under its walls.
Its elevated position allowed the eye to range far towards the south
along the valley of the Loire, through which the inhabitants would have
seen the approach of the cavalry of Vercingetorix. Cæsar may have
occupied with his army the heights of Verdigny or Saint-Satur, to the
north of Sancerre. A cavalry engagement may have taken place in the
valley of Saint-Satur, or on the plain between Ménétréol and
Saint-Thibaud. The captain of staff Rouby has examined with the greatest
care the places just mentioned.
Cæsar, after the surrender of Noviodunum, marches towards Bourges.
Vercingetorix follows him by short marches (_minoribus itineribus_). The
Roman general, having Bourges before him, and a hostile army on his
left, marches slowly and with precaution. Perhaps he took three or four
days to perform the forty-five kilomètres which separate Sancerre from
Bourges. At last, after having reconnoitred the site of Avaricum, he
must have traversed the marshes of the Yèvre, at a distance of three or
four kilomètres from that town, so as to take up a position to the
south-east of the _oppidum_, in that part which was not surrounded by
the river and the marshes, and which only offered a narrow passage. As
to Vercingetorix, he follows, or rather hovers on, the Roman army,
taking up his position on its left, and still keeping up his
communication with Avaricum, hesitating whether he shall deliver it to
the flames.
[469] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 13.
[470] Archælogists have pretended they find traces still existing of the
camp of Vercingetorix in the neighbourhood of Bourges, not considering
that Cæsar declares that the Gaulish chief did not, for the first time,
think of retrenching his camp in the Roman fashion till after the siege
of this town. We believe that Vercingetorix, although he came from the
east, encamped to the south of Bourges. It was, indeed, natural that he
should place himself between the Roman army and the land of the Arverni,
whence, probably, it drew its provisions. Besides, if he had placed his
camp to the east of Bourges, he would have intercepted the provisions
which Cæsar expected from the land of the Ædui, which the text does not
say.
[471] The ravine which descends to the Auron is still recognised at the
present day, between the Portes Saint-Michel and Saint-Paul, by the
sudden incline of the ground. Old plans of Bourges designate it by the
name of the _Vallée Saint-Paul_. The opposite ravine, which runs towards
the Porte Bourbonnoux, has disappeared under the successive fillings up
composing the soil of the garden of the archbishop’s palace. The ridge
of land forming the avenue cannot have been in Cæsar’s time more than
100 mètres broad. It has lost its primitive physiognomy, especially by
the formation of the Place Sérancourt, in 1700, on a site the level of
which did not then exceed that of the field of the present fair. The
depression of the ground which existed before the wall is more visible;
it has been filled-up during the different sieges of Bourges.
[472] This is evident, since the Romans, in order to be able to give the
assault, were obliged to construct a terrace eighty feet high. General
de Gœler believed this measurement exaggerated. Nevertheless, as this
terrace was constructed in a ravine, it was necessary that it should
compensate a difference of level of eighty mètres, of which thirty,
perhaps, represent the height of the wall.
[473] Vercingetorix, encamped first towards Dun-le-Roi, had approached
nearer Bourges. He had established his new camp to the east of that of
Cæsar, perhaps at La Chenevière, at the confluence of the Yèvre and the
brook of Villabon, fourteen kilomètres from Bourges.
[474] See the quotation from Vegetius, p. 143, note (1).
[475] We read in Vitruvius, on occasion of the siege of Marseilles:
“When the tortoise approached to batter the wall, they let down a cord
furnished with a slip-knot, in which they caught the ram, and raised its
head so high, by means of a wheel, that they prevented its striking the
wall. ” (Vitruvius, X. 16. )
[476] Titus Livius expresses himself thus in speaking of the beseiged in
Ambracia, who dug a mine to meet that of the enemies: “Aperiunt viam
rectam in cuniculum. ” (XXXVII. 7. )
[477] Several authors have thought that these beams, instead of being
placed perpendicularly to the direction of the wall, were placed
parallel to that direction. This interpretation appears to us
inadmissable. The beams so placed would have no solidity, and would
easily have been torn down. We see on the Trajan Column walls
constructed as we describe; moreover, the Latin expression _trabes
directæ_ can leave no doubt, for the word _directus_ means always
_perpendicular to a direction_. (See _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 17,
_directa materia injecta_, and the dissertation in the _Philologus_,
Jahrganges 19, Heft. 3. )
[478] The name of _pluteus_ was given generally to all kinds of covering
with hurdles or with skins. (Festus, in voce _Pluteus_. --Vitruvius, X.
20. )--Vegetius (IV. 15) applies the name of _pluteus_ to a kind of
penthouse, of wicker-work or skins, mounted on three wheels, and
protecting the men placed behind it, so that they might shoot at the
defenders.
[479] They gave this name to a small engine resembling the balistæ,
which threw darts. These scorpions composed, as it were, the
field-artillery of the ancients.
[480] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 32.
[481] It is very probably that Cæsar proceeded first to Noviodunum
(_Nevers_), since he informs us that he had established in that town a
great magazine and provisions of every kind.
[482] At present the Allier is fordable almost everywhere in summer; but
in the course of nineteen centuries the bed of the river must have been
considerably raised.
[483] The commentators are not agreed on this passage. I have adopted
the version which seemed to me the best, and which MM. Köchly and Rustow
have followed in their German translation, Stuttgart, 1862.
[484] Dio Cassius, XL. 35.
[485] Cæsar, on leaving Decize, followed, no doubt the Gaulish road
which led to the Allier, and the existence of which may be assumed from
the later construction of the Roman road which goes from Decize to
Bourbon-l’Archambault (_Aquæ Borvonis_), and which crossed the Allier a
little below Moulins. Thence he followed the course of the river for
some days, constantly in face of the enemy. In order to pass it by the
help of a stratagem, he took advantage of the remains of a bridge; and,
as this bridge indicates that there must have been a road, it becomes a
question to find among the ancient roads which crossed the Allier that
which Cæsar followed. Now we only know two Roman roads leading to the
Allier below Moulins, one at Varennes, the other at Vichy. We adopt
Varennes. That locality is seventy-seven kilomètres from Gergovia,
reckoning them along the Allier, and Cæsar took five days to perform
them; but, as the four legions sent forward to deceive the enemy
returned during the night, in order to rejoin him, they must have
suffered great fatigues; hence it is to be presumed that the next day
the first march was very short. The fifth also was not long, for,
according to the “Commentaries,” Cæsar had time on the day of his
arrival to fortify his camp, to reconnoitre the place, and to engage in
a cavalry combat. Besides, the country, interspersed with woods and
marshes, was unknown to him; and we believe that we do not depart from
the truth if we admit that the first and the last march were of no more
than ten kilomètres, and the three others of nineteen, which gives a
total of seventy-seven kilomètres, the distance from Varennes to
Gergovia. When Cæsar left Gergovia, he crossed the Allier again, but at
a point nearer to Gergovia, being in haste to place the river between
him and the enemy. Indeed, on the second day after his check, he fought
a successful cavalry engagement, broke up his camp, and the following
day (_tertio die_) crossed the Allier again, according to our opinion,
at Vichy, which is only fifty-five kilomètres from Gergovia.
[486] The Artières receives, on the north of Gergovia, the little brook
of Clémensat, marked on _Plate 21_.
[487] It is by seeking the essential conditions required for the placing
of troops that Commandant Baron Stoffel succeeded in finding the camps.
Cæsar had to place from 30,000 to 40,000 men in the neighbourhood of
water, at a convenient distance from Gergovia, and in such a manner as
to preserve his line of operation upon Nevers, where his magazines were.
These necessities indicated that the principal camp would be near the
Auzon, and to the east. Moreover, it must be sufficiently near the
_oppidum_, that from the top of the mountain of Gergovia could be seen
what was going on in it; and yet sufficiently distant that the objects
could not be clearly distinguished. The camp must be in the plain; Dio
Cassius (XL. 36) formally says, “Cæsar remained in the plain, not having
been able to take (for placing his camp) a place strong by its
elevation;” and then the “Commentaries” inform us that the Romans only
occupied one single hill, namely, the one they took by surprise (La
Roche-Blanche). Lastly, it was indispensable that there should be in
front of the camp a space sufficiently large to admit of cavalry
engagements.
[488] Vercingetorix, placed in the centre of a kind of semicircle, might
easily be considered by Cæsar as surrounded by his numerous troops
(_collocaverat copias circum se_).
[489] The combats of cavalry took place in the plain which extends from
the small eminence called _Le Puy-de-Marmant_ to the marsh of Sarlièves.
[490] The hill is certainly the Roche-Blanche, for it is situated
opposite the _oppidum_ (_e regione oppidi_); it begins at the very foot
of the slopes of the mountain of Gergovia (_sub ipsis radicibus
montis_), is singularly fortified by nature, and, as it were, cut out
from all sides (_egregie munitus atque ex omni parte circumcisus_). So
long as the Gauls occupied it, they could go to the Auzon by the ravine
of Merdogne, to obtain water and forage; but as soon as it was in the
power of the Romans, the Gauls were compelled to draw their water from
the springs on the mountain of Gergovia, and from the little brook of
Artières.
The excavations made in 1862 brought the two camps to light. The fosses
of the little camp are clearly defined in the calcareous soil. They form
an irregular outline, represented on _Plate 22_. The Roche-Blanche,
which presents in its southern part an escarpment almost as
perpendicular as a wall, has lost on the sides its abrupt form by
successive landslips, the last of which took place within memory of the
inhabitants.
The communication between the great and little camps was
composed of a parapet, formed by the earth thrown out of two contiguous
fosses, each four feet in depth and six in breadth, so that the breadth
of the two together is only twelve feet. If we wonder that the Romans
should have dug two little ditches, each six feet broad and four feet
deep, instead of making one eight feet wide by six feet deep, which
would have given the same amount of soil to take out, it may be answered
that the two little ditches were much more quickly made than one large
ditch.
[491]
HOURS.
Cæsar starts at four o’clock in the morning, and arrives at Randan
at one o’clock in the afternoon 9
Employs in negotiation from one o’clock to seven o’clock 6
Repose from seven o’clock to ten o’clock in the evening 3
Hurried return from Randan to Gergovia, from ten o’clock to
four o’clock in the morning 6
--
Duration of Cæsar’s absence 24
[492] _Plate 22_ shows the places which Cæsar’s eye could embrace from
the summit of the Roche-Blanche. He could see neither the plateau, nor
the country situated on the norther slopes of the mountains of Gergovia
and Rissoles. It was for this reason that he had to learn from the
deserters the form of the ground which lay on the other side. He thus
learnt that the ridge of this latter mountain (_dorsum ejus jugi_) was
not very uneven, and gave access to the western part of the town (_ad
alteram partem oppidi_) by a narrow wooded passage (the defile of the
Goules, which separates Rissoles from Gergovia). (_See Plate 21 in C. _)
This defile leads to the gate _P_ of the _oppidum_. The foundations, of
masonry, and the approaches to this gate, were uncovered in the month of
July, 1861. The wide road which led from this gate to the defile _C_ is
distinctly seen. The alarm of Vercingetorix may be imagined; he feared
lest the Romans might shut up from the Gauls this issue from the
_oppidum_. These latter would have been almost blockaded (_pœne
circumvallati_), without any way out, and in the impossibility of
producing forage from the valley of the Artières, since the northern
part of the town was difficult to access. Consequently, the words _si
alterum collem amisissent_ can only apply to the mountain mass of
Rissoles, and not, as several authors have pretended, to Montrognon or
to Puy-Giroux; for the possession of those two peaks, detached and
rather far from the mountain mass of Gergovia, offered no interest
either for the attack or for the defence.
The spot which it was important for the Gauls to fortify was the part _D
E_ of the heights of Rissoles which are opposite the village of Opme,
because troops could only scale the mass by the western slope. How can
any one suppose that, fearing for the defile of the Goules, the Gauls
would have abandoned their camp before the place to go and entrench
themselves on Montrognon, three kilomètres from Gergovia? How admit that
Cæsar, to threaten the defile, would have sent troops to make the
circuit of the mountain of Gergovia by the north? How could the legion,
which supported this movement, without advancing far, and which
concealed itself in the woods, have assisted in the stratagem, if the
false attack had been made to the east and to the north of Gergovia, at
two leagues from the camp? In passing by the south, that is, by the
defile of Opme, the legion was always in communication with the camps,
on which it could fall back, and the broken and wooded ground prevented
the Gauls from knowing accurately the importance of the attack. Besides,
two facts which result from the “Commentaries” prove that the Gauls were
not very far from the _oppidum_. Cæsar sees the southern front
abandoned, and he establishes his legions at a distance of 1,200 paces
from the place. The soldiers scale the heights at a rapid pace; but
scarcely have they reached the principal enclosure, when the Gauls, who
hear the cries of the women and of the small number of defenders left in
the place (_primo exaudito clamore_), have time to hurry to them, and
drive back the Romans. Consequently, the Gauls were at a distance where
the cries could be heard; and this distance may be measured by the time
which the attacking columns must have taken to climb the space of 1,200
paces, since they arrived almost simultaneously. We believe, therefore,
that they were at a distance of less than two kilomètres from the gate
_O_ of the town, engaged in fortifying the plateau of the heights of
Risolles.
[493] According to Polyænus (VIII. xxiii. 9), the soldiers marched with
their heads bent down, in order not to be seen.
[494] It is, in fact, 1780 mètres from the foot of the mountain, where
Cæsar must have assembled his troops, between the Roche-Blanche and the
Puy-de-Marmant, to the gate _O_ of the _oppidum_. This is the line which
passes by the ravine in which the village of Merdogne is situated; to
the left and to the right the ground is too rugged for the troops to
climb it.
[495] General Gœler believes, with apparent reason, that we ought to
read _regressus_ instead of _progressus_. The 10th legion, which acted
as reserve, must, in the presence of a combat, the issue of which was
uncertain, have taken up a position behind rather than towards the
front.
[496] The part of the southern slope of Gergovia which was the scene of
the last battle is clearly indicated by the ground itself. This battle
took place on the whole space which extends in front of the gate _O_ of
the _oppidum_, the principal object of the attack. The ravine which,
according to the “Commentaries,” prevented the legions from hearing the
signal to retreat, is that which descends to the west of the Merdogne.
Hence it may be concluded that, at this moment, Cæsar and the 10th
legion were to the right of this ravine. Lastly, we understand on the
spot the movement of the Ædui. To the east of Merdogne there is a spur,
_H_, attached to the mountain of Gergovia, forty mètres below the
table-land, and presenting several successive terraces. So long as the
Ædui, who came from the east, had not arrived on the crest of this spur,
they could not be perceived by the Romans, who were fighting towards
Merdogne; but it may be imagined that, when they appeared all at once on
this crest, and at a distance of 600 mètres from the right flank of the
legions, the sight of them must have singularly surprised the troops,
who were expecting no re-enforcement from that side.
General de Gœler, without having seen the locality, has indicated nearly
the site of the Roman camp; but he does not place it sufficiently to the
west. He makes the Gaulish troops encamp on the four slopes of the
mountain of Gergovia. It is, no doubt, the expression _circum se_ (VII.
36) which led him into this error. It is, indeed, impossible to admit
that the Gauls could have encamped on the abrupt slopes of the northern
declivity. General de Gœler is also mistaken in directing the false
attack upon Montrognon. Lastly, he places the scene of the battle too
much towards the west.
[497] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 52.
[498] “In the war of the Gauls, Caius Julius Cæsar was surprised by an
enemy, who carried him off, armed as he was, on his horse, when another
Gaul, who recognized Cæsar, called out, intending to insult him, “Cæcos,
Cæsar! ” which in the Gaulish language signifies, _let him go, set him
loose_; and so he escaped. Cæsar says so himself, in his _Ephemerides_,
in the passage where he speaks of his good fortune. ” (Servius Maurus
Honoratus, a grammarian of the fifth century, in his commentary on the
11th book of the _Æneid_, line 743, II. p. 48, edit. Albert Lion. )
The manuscripts of Servius do not all present the same reading. The
following are some of the principal variations: _Cecos, Cæsar_; _Cæcos
ac Cæsar_; and _Cæsar, Cesar_.
[499] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 29.
[500] There has always been a ford at Bourbon-Lancy.
[501] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 56.
[502] A sling-ball of lead has been found at Sens, on which are stamped
in relief the words “T. Labienus. ” This ball forms part of the
collection of the Museum of Saint-Germain.
[503] MM. de Saulcy and J. Quicherat have already demonstrated in a
conclusive manner that Labienus must have followed the left bank of the
Yonne, after leaving Sens, and that he crossed over to the right bank of
the Seine at Melun. In fact, Labienus, on the right bank, found himself,
as Cæsar says, threatened on one side by the Bellovaci, on the other by
the army of Camulogenus (VII. 59). On the opposite bank, on the
contrary, Labienus would not have been placed between the two, since he
would have had Camulogenus in front, and, at a greater distance, the
Bellovaci coming from the north.
“A very large river kept the legions separated from their reserve and
their baggage. ” This very great river cannot be the Marne, which Cæsar
does not even mention in the whole course of this campaign: it was
evidently the Seine, which Labienus has crossed once only, at Melodunum
(_Melun_); by crossing over to the right bank, he was separated from his
base of operations, which was at Sens. On the contrary hypothesis, no
river would have separated Labienus from his line of retreat; unless we
admit, with Dulaure and several others, the identity of Agedincum with
Provius, which is no longer possible.
The Captain of the Staff Rouby has made investigations on the spot,
which prove that from Sens the most ancient ways leading to Paris passed
on the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine. Moreover, the
discoveries of M. Carré have made us acquainted with the exact direction
followed by the Roman road after quitting Sens towards Paris; it was
entirely on the left bank of the Yonne. If Cæsar’s lieutenant had
followed the right bank of the Yonne, he would, the day after his
departure, have been arrested by the course of the Seine, and would have
fallen in with the Gaulish town of Condate, built in the very angle of
the two streams, in the midst of perhaps impassable marshes. If only a
few thousand Gauls had occupied the heights which played so important a
part in the campaign of 1814, Labienus, compelled to seek for a place to
cross higher up the stream, would have been diverted considerably from
his aim.
It has been supposed wrongly that the Bièvre was the marsh where
Labienus, in his march on the left bank of the Seine, had been arrested
by the Gaulish army. Leaving out of consideration the fact that the
Bièvre, which flows through a calcareous soil, can at no epoch have
formed a marsh capable of arresting an army, how can we suppose that
Labienus, if he had arrived at this stream, that is, close to Lutetia,
would have retraced his steps as far back as Melun, to march from thence
towards the _oppidum_ of the Parisii by the right bank of the Seine,
which would have obliged him to make a journey of twenty-four leagues?
The manœuvre of Labienus can only be explained by his desire to turn the
strong position of Camulogenus, and arrive at Paris before him. The text
of the “Commentaries” says clearly that Labienus, stopped by the marsh
which shelves towards the Seine, stole away by night, surprised the
passage of the Seine at Melun, and marched upon Lutetia, where he
arrived before Camulogenus. To allow of the success of this manœuvre,
the marsh in question must necessarily not have been far from Melun. The
Essonne alone fulfils that condition. The ground on the banks of this
little river offers, even at present, by its nature, a very serious
obstacle to an army. It is cut up by innumerable peat mosses; and it was
behind this line of Essonne that, in 1814, the Emperor Napoleon I.
established his army, whilst the enemy occupied Paris.
[504] We have not translated these words, _fugam parare_, because this
passage has always appeared unintelligible to us. How, indeed, could the
Gauls, seeing that the Romans were ready to pass the Seine by force,
believe that this was a flight?
[505] Some manuscripts have Metiosedum, a version which, in our opinion,
is utterly incorrect.
[506] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 62.
[507] See _Appendix D_.
[508] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 65. --_Evocati_ was the name given to the
old soldiers who, after having served, returned voluntarily to the ranks
of the army.
[509] Let us here recapitulate the numbers of the legions employed
during the war in Gaul. Cæsar’s army, as we have seen, was composed in
696 of six legions, the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th. In 697, two
new legions were raised in Italy, the 13th and 14th. Probably, in the
winter between 699 and 700, Cæsar brought several cohorts composed of
soldiers and sailors who were to serve in the fleet; for, on his return
from the second expedition into England, notwithstanding the losses he
had sustained, he was at the head of eight legions and five cohorts (V.
24). He lost at Aduatuca one legion and a half, that is, the 14th
legion, besides five cohorts; but in 701 three new legions replaced the
cohorts lost, and even doubled their number. These legions were the 1st,
lent by Pompey (_De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 54, and Lucan, _Pharsalia_,
VII. , 1. 218); the 14th, which took the number of the legion destroyed
at Aduatuca (_De Bello Gallico_, VI. 32; VIII. 4); and the 15th; this
last legion was afterwards, with the 1st, given to Pompey for the war of
the Parthians; it figured in the Civil War, and took, in Pompey’s army,
the number 3. (Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, III. 88. )
The 6th legion, judging from its number, must have been one of the
oldest, for Dio Cassius (XXXVIII. 47) informs us that the legions were
designated according to their order of inscription on the rolls of the
army; but, as it only appears for the first time in 702, it is probable
that it had remained in garrison among the Allobroges or in Italy. A
proof that this legion assisted in the siege of Alesia is found in the
fact that, after the surrender of the place, it was sent to winter
quarters on the Saône, where Cæsar found it a few months afterwards (_De
Bello Gallico_, VIII. 4). The distribution of the troops in their winter
quarters after the taking of Alesia confirms the number of legions given
above. The re-distribution after the siege of Uxellodunum gives also the
same result, for in book VII. c. 46 the “Commentaries” give the
positions of ten legions, without reckoning the 15th, which, according
to book VIII. c. 24, had been sent to Cisalpine Gaul. These facts are
repeated again, book VIII. c. 54.
[510] It is evident that an army could not remain in the wars for eight
years without receiving frequent re-enforcements in order to keep it up
to its effective number. Thus, when, after the murder of Clodius, all
the youth of Italy had been called to arms, Cæsar made new levies, which
were used probably to swell the ranks of his legions, for no new numbers
appear (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 1). --In the same manner, when he
arrived, in 702, in the south of Gaul, and crossed the Cévennes, he
placed himself at the head of the troops which had been recruited in the
Roman province and of the re-enforcements which he had brought from
Italy (_partem copiarum ex provincia supplementumque quod ex Italia
adduxerat in Helvois, qui fines Arvernorum contingunt, convenire
jubet_). (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 7. )--Labienus, on the other hand,
during his expedition to Paris, left his recruits in dépôt at Sens
(_Labienus eo supplemento quod nuper ex Italia venerat relicto_). (_De
Bello Gallico_, VII. 57. )
[511] Plutarch, _Cato_, 53.
[512] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 36.
[513] See above, page 87.
[514] See above, page 108, note (2).
[515] We learn from the text that he formed three camps. This
disposition was necessitated by circumstances and the character of the
locality. The heights of Sacquenay form, in fact, three promontories,
_V_, _V_, _V_ (_see Plate 24_), advancing towards the north; the road to
Dijon passes over the one to the left, the road to Pontallier over the
one in the middle. By establishing three camps on these three
promontories, Vercingetorix occupied each of these roads with one-third
of his army, whilst he backed his right wing against the Vingeanne.
The Gaulish army had there a position of great natural strength, for, to
attack it, the enemy would have to climb high hills which were easy to
defend; it was, moreover, protected by two watercourses: one, the
Vingeanne, which covered its right; the other, the Badin, a small
tributary of the Vingeanne, which protected its front. In the space
comprised between these two watercourses and the road from Dijon to
Langres, a ground extends, measuring five kilomètres in every direction,
slightly broken in some parts, but almost flat everywhere else,
particularly between the Vingeanne and the hillock of Montsaugeon. Near
the road, and to the west, arise hills which command it, as well as the
whole country as far as Badin and the Vingeanne.
[516] The field of battle of the Vingeanne, which H. M. Defay, of
Langres, first pointed out, answers perfectly to all the requirements of
the Latin narrative, and, moreover, material proofs exist which are
undeniable evidences of the struggle. We allude to the tumuli which are
found, some at Prauthoy, others on the banks of the Vingeanne, at
Dardenay, and Cusey, and those which, at Pressant, Rivières-les-Fosses,
Chamberceau, and Vesvres, mark, as it were, the line of retreat of the
Gaulish army, to a distance of twelve kilomètres.
Two of these tumuli are situated near each other, between Prauthoy and
Montsaugeon (_see Plate 24_, where the tumuli are marked). There is one
near Dardenay, three to the west of Cusey, one at Rivières-les-Fosses,
another at Chamberceau. We will not mention those which have been
destroyed by agriculture, but which are still remembered by the
inhabitants.
Researches lately made in these tumuli have brought to light skeletons,
many of which had bronze bracelets round the arms and legs, calcined
bones of men and horses, thirty-six bracelets, several iron circles
which were worn around the neck, iron rings, fibulæ, fragments of metal
plates, pieces of Celtic pottery, an iron sword, &c.
It is a fact worthy of remark, that the objects found in the tumuli at
Rivières-les-Fosses and Chamberceau bear so close a resemblance to those
of the tumuli on the banks of the Vingeanne, that we might think they
had come from the hand of the same workman. Hence there can be no doubt
that all these tumuli refer to one and the same incident of war.
(Several of these objects are deposited in the Museum of Saint-Germain. )
We must add that the agricultural labourers of Montsaugeon, Isomes, and
Cusey have found during many years, when they make trenches for
drainage, horse-shoes buried a foot or two deep under the soil. In 1860,
at the dredging of the Vingeanne, hundreds of horse-shoes, the
inhabitants say, of excellent metal, were extracted from the gravel of
the river, at a depth of two or three feet. They are generally small,
and bear a groove all round, in which the heads of the nails were
lodged. A great number of these horse-shoes have preserved their nails,
which are flat, have a head in the form of a T, and still have their
rivet--that is, the point which is folded back over the hoof--which
proves that they are not shoes that have been lost, but shoes of dead
horses, the foot of which has rotted away in the soil or in the gravel.
Thirty-two of these horse-shoes have been collected. One of them is
stamped in the middle of the curve with a mark, sometimes found on
Celtic objects, and which has a certain analogy with the stamp on a
plate of copper found in one of the tumuli of Montsaugeon.
When we consider that the action between the Roman and Gaulish armies
was merely a cavalry battle, in which were engaged from 20,000 to 25,000
horses, the facts just stated cannot but appear interesting, although
they may possibly belong to a battle of a later date.
[517] We have adopted the reading, _aciemque constitui jubebat_, which
alone gives a reasonable interpretation.
[518] He was not the same as the one mentioned in pp. 307, 321, 320.
(_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 67. )
[519] The three Gaulish camps having been established on the heights of
Sacquenay, four or five kilomètres behind the position occupied by the
infantry during the battle, and the line of retreat towards Alesia lying
to the left, in the direction of Pressant and Vesvres, if Vercingetorix
had returned to ascend the hills with his 80,000 men, to remove the
baggage, that operation would have taken two or three hours, during
which Cæsar might have cut off his retreat, or have inflicted a still
more serious defeat upon him. But, by immediately hastening his march on
Pressant, in order to follow from thence the road which, by
Rivières-les-Fosses and Vesvres, joined the great road from Langres to
Alise, near Aujeur, he got in advance of the Roman army, which, in the
disorder in which it was at that moment, was not able to pursue him at
once. And this is what he did.
The text says, also, that Vercingetorix gave orders that the baggage
should be taken out of the camps in all haste, to follow him. If the
baggage of an army of 100,000 men had accompanied Vercingetorix, on the
road followed by the infantry, we cannot understand how the Roman army,
which pursued the Gauls as long as daylight lasted, should not have
captured it all. But investigations made in the country situated between
the field of battle and the Alise, behind the heights of Sacquenay, have
brought to light vestiges of a Roman road which, starting from
Thil-Châtel, thirteen kilomètres behind Sacquenay, proceeded, by
Avelanges, towards the hamlet of Palus, where it branched from the road
from Langres to Alise. We may suppose, therefore, that Vercingetorix
caused his baggage to follow in his rear as far as Thil-Châtel, where it
took the road to Palus.
The Roman road from Langres to Alise, which, without any doubt, marks
the direction followed by the two armies, has been traced almost in its
whole extent by Commandant Stoffel. Even at the present day, on the
territories of Fraignot, Salives, Echalot, and Poiseul-la-Grange, the
inhabitants call it the _Road of the Romans_, or _Cæsar’s way_.
[520] We read (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 68) the words, _Altero die ad
Alesiam castra fecit_. We have before sought to prove that the words
_altero die_ must be translated by the _second day after_, and not by
the _next day_. [See page 279, note (1). ] It took Cæsar, therefore, two
days’ march to move from the field of battle to Alesia.
A study of the country fully confirms the interpretation we give to the
expression _altero die_. In fact, to the north and east of
Alise-Sainte-Reine (_Alesia_), to less than two days’ march, the ground
is so cut up and broken that no cavalry battle would be possible upon
it. It retains this character as far as fifty-five or sixty kilomètres
from Alise, to the east of the road from Pranthoy to Dijon, where it
becomes more easy and open. The battle-field of the Vingeanne, which we
consider as the true one, is at a distance of sixty-five kilomètres from
Alise. Supposing that, on the day of the victory, the Roman army had
pursued the Gauls over a space of fifteen kilomètres, it would have had
to traverse in the two following days, before arriving at Alesia, a
distance of fifty kilomètres, that is to say, twenty-five kilomètres a
day.
[521] We call the reader’s attention particularly to the numerous Roman
and Gaulish coins found in one of the fosses of the camp _D_, the list
of which will be found in _Appendix C_, at the end of this volume.
[522] Near the western summit of the mountain two abundant springs
arise; there is another on the eastern side. With these springs, as at
Gergovia, it was easy to form large watering-places for cattle. Besides,
manifest traces of a great number of wells are visible on the
table-land, so that it is evident the besieged can never have wanted
water, besides which, they could always descend to the two rivers.
[523] We believe that these _castella_ were palisaded redoubts having a
recess attached, similar to the wooden blockhouses represented on the
Trajan Column; often even these recesses alone composed the _castellum_.
[524] It was not, as will be remarked, the countervallation which was
11,000 feet in extent, but the line of investment.
[525] _Eadem altitudine_. See paragraph XIII. , Details on the
Excavations of Alesia, page 364.
[526] _Dolabratis_, diminished to a point, and not _delibratis_, peeled.
[527] In the excavations at Alesia, five _stimuli_ have been found, the
form of which is represented in _Plate 27_. The new names which Cæsar’s
soldiers gave to these accessory defenses prove that they were used for
the first time.
[528] This appears from a passage in _De Bello Civili_, III. 47.
[529]
The Ædui and their clients, the Segusiavi, the Ambluareti, the MEN.
Aulerci-Brannovices, and the Blannovii 35,000
The Arverni, with the people in their dependence, as the
Cadurci-Eleutheri, the Gabali, the Vellavi 35,000
The Senones, the Sequani, the Bituriges, the Santones, the Ruteni,
the Carnutes (each 12,000) 72,000
The Bellovaci 10,000
The Lemovices 10,000
The Pictones, the Turones, the Parisii, the Helvii (each 8,000) 32,000
The Suessiones, the Ambiani, the Mediomatrice, the Petrocorii,
the Nervii, the Morini, the Nitiobriges (each 5,000) 35,000
The Aulerci-Cenomanni 5,000
The Atrebates 4,000
The Veliocasses, the Lexovii, the Aulerci-Eburovices (each 3,000) 9,000
The Rauraci and the Boii (each 3,000) 6,000
Lastly, the peoples who dwelt on the shores of the ocean, and
whom the Gauls called Armoricans, amongst whom were the
Curiosolites, the Redones, the Ambibari, the Caletes, the
Osismii, the Lemovices-Armoricani, the Veneti, and the Unelli,
had to furnish together 30,000
-------
Total 283,000
[530]: See note on page 143.
[531] This passage proves clearly that the army of succour attacked also
the circumvallation of the plain.
