This would seem to
compromise
the notion that the Guatemalan people had gotten into long lines out of patriotic enthusiasm.
Manufacturing Consent - Chomsky
" These observations reinforce the conclusions that we have documented throughout.
The existing level of media subordination to state authority is often deemed unsatisfactory by critics. We have discussed several examples. Thus, Freedom House and others who are concerned to protect state authority from an intrusive public condemn the media for lack of sufficient enthusiasm in supporting official crusades, and even the lim- ited challenge to established authority during the Vietnam War and the Watergate period aroused concerns over the excessive power of the media. Quite commonly, the slight opening occasionally granted to dissent is considered far too dangerous to permit. This perception sometimes even takes the form of a paranoid vision of left-wing power that sweeps all in its path: for example, the plea of Claire Sterling and others who dominated media coverage of the Bulgarian Connection that they could barely be heard above the din of Soviet propaganda. A still more striking case is the Aikman-Shawcross fantasy, eagerly echoed by many others, about the "silencing" of the international media and governments by the left during the Pol Pot era. In reality, there was a huge chorus of protest over Khmer Rouge atrocities, which reached an extraordinary level of fabrication and deceit. The signifi- cance of these facts, and of the pretense of left-imposed "silence," is highlighted by the contrast with the real silence over comparable atroci- ties in Timor at the same time, and the evasions and suppressions
CONCLUSIONS 301
302 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
during the first phase of "the decade of the genocide," to mention two cases where the United States was the responsible agent and protest could have been effective in diminishing or terminating large-scale atrocities.
A propaganda model provides a ready explanation for this quite typical dichotomous treatment. Atrocities by the Khmer Rouge could be attributed to the Communist enemy and valuable propaganda points could be scored, although nothing useful could be done, or was even proposed, for the Cambodian victims. The image of Communist mon- sters would also be useful for subsequent U. S. participation in terror and violence, as in its crusades in Central America shortly after. In EI Salvador, the United States backed the murderous junta in its struggle against what was depicted as "the Pol Pot left," while Jeane Kirkpatrick mused darkly about the threat to EI Salvador of "well-armed guerrillas whose fanaticism and violence remind some observers of Pol Pot"- shortly after the archbishop had denounced her junta friends for con- ducting a "war of extermination and genocide against a defenseless civilian population. "6 Some are more circumspect-for example, Wil- liam Buckley, who observes that "the Sandinistas have given their people genocide" and are clearly heading in the direction of Pol Pot, although they have not quite reached that level yet. 7 The utility of the show of outrage over Pol Pot atrocities is evident from the way the fate
of these worthy victims was immediately exploited to justify U. S. orga- nization of atrocities that, in fact, do merit comparison to Pol Pot.
Atrocities in East Timor, however, have no such utilitarian function; quite the opposite. These atrocities were carried out by our Indonesian client, so that the United States could readily have acted to reduce or terminate them. But attention to the Indonesian invasion would have embarrassed a loyal ally and quickly disclosed the crucial role of the United States in providing military aid and diplomatic support for aggression and slaughter. Plainly, news about East Timor would not have been useful, and would, in fact, have discomfited important do- mestic power groups. The mass media-and the intellectual community generally-therefore channeled their benevolent impulses elsewhere: to Cambodia, not Timor.
As we have stressed throughout this book, the U. S. media do not function in the manner of the propaganda system of a totalitarian state. Rather, they permit-indeed, encourage-spirited debate, criticism, and dissent, as long as these remain faithfully within the system of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a system so powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness. No one instructed the media to focus on Cambodia and ignore East Timor.
They gravitated naturally to the Khmer Rouge and discussed them freely8-just as they naturally suppressed information on Indonesian atrocities in East Timor and U. S. responsibility for the aggression and massacres. In the process, the media provided neither facts nor analyses that would have enabled the public to understand the issues or the bases of government policies toward Cambodia and Timor, and they thereby assured that the public could not exert any meaningful influence on the decisions that were made. This is quite typical of the actual "societal purpose" of the media on matters that are of significance for established power; not "enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political process," but rather averting any such danger. In these cases, as in numerous others, the public was managed and mobilized from above, by means of the media's highly selective messages and evasions. As noted by media analyst W. Lance Bennett,
The public is exposed to powerful persuasive messages from above and is unable to communicate meaningfully through the media in response to these messages. . . . Leaders have usurped enormous amounts of political power and reduced popular control over the political system by using the media to generate support, compliance, and just plain confusion among the public. 9
More significantly for our particular concerns here, the media typically provide their own independent contribution even without being "used," in the manner and for the reasons that we have discussed. Another media analyst, Ben Bagdikian, observes that the institutional bias of the private mass media "does not merely protect the corporate system. It robs the public of a chance to understand the real world. "lo That conclusion is well supported by the evidence we have reviewed.
A propaganda model has a certain initial plausibility on guided free- market assumptions that are not particularly controversial. In essence, the private media are major corporations selling a product (readers and audiences) to other businesses (advertisers). The national medja typi- cally target and serve elite opinion, groups that, on the one hand, provide an optimal "profile" for advertising purposes, and, on the other, playa role in decision-making in the private and public spheres.
The national media would be failing to meet their elite audience's needs if they did not present a tolerably realistic portrayal of the world. But their "societal purpose" also requires that the media's interpretation of the world reflect the interests and concerns of the sellers, the buyers, and the governmental and private institutions dominated by these groups.
CONCLUSIONS 303
304 MANUFACTUIUNG CONSENT
A propaganda model also helps us to understand how media person- nel adapt, and are adapted, to systemic demands. Given the imperatives of corporate organization and the workings of the various filters, con- formity to the needs and interests of privileged seeton; is essential to success. In the media, as in other major institutions, those who do not display the requisite values and perspectives will be regarded as "irre- sponsible," "ideological," or otherwise aberrant, and will tend to fall by the wayside. While there may be a small number of exceptions, the pattern is pervasive, and expected. Those who adapt, perhaps quite honestly, will then be free to express themselves with little managerial control, and they will be able to assert, accurately, that they perceive no pressures to conform. The media are indeed free-for those who adopt the principles required for their "societal purpose. " There may be some who are simply corrupt, and who serve as "errand boys" for state and other authority, but this is not the normY We know from personal experience that many journalists are quite aware of the way the system operates, and utilize the occasional openings it affords to provide information and analysis that departs in some measure from the elite consensus, carefully shaping it so as to accommodate to required norms in a general way. But this degree ofinsight is surely not common. Rather, the norm is a belief that freedom prevails, which is true for those who have internalized the required values and perspectives.
These matters are of some importance. We can readily understand
why Guatemalan reporters do not report the atrocities of the 1980s;
some fifty corpses dramatically illustrate the costs of deviance from authority on the part of independent journalists. To explain why American reporters avoid such topics, and even go so far as to describe Guatemala as a model for Nicaragua (see p. uS), requires further explanation, and the same is true in innumerable other similar cases,
some of which we have analyzed in detail. A propaganda model pro- t vides a basis for understanding this pervasive phenomenon.
No simple model will suffice, however, to account for every detail of such a complex matter as the working of the national mass media. A propaganda model, we believe, captures essential features of the pro- cess, but it leaves many nuances and secondary effects unanalyzed. There are other factors that should be recognized. Some of these con- flict with the "societal purpose" of the media as described by the propaganda model; some support it. In the former category, the human- ity and professional integrity of journalists often leads them in direc- tions that are unacceptable in the ideological institutions, and one should not underestimate the psychological burden of suppressing ob- vious truths and maintaining the required doctrines of benevolence
(possibly gone awry), inexplicable error, good intentions, injured inno- cence, and so on, in the face of overwhelming evidence incompatible with these patriotic premises. The resulting tensions sometimes find limited expression, but more often they are suppressed either con- sciously or unconsciously, with the help of belief systems that permit the pursuit of narrow interest, whatever the facts.
In the category of supportive factors, we find, first of all, elemental patriotism, the overwhelming wish to think well of ourselves, our insti- tutions, and our leaders. We see ourselves as basically good and decent in personal life, so it must be that our institutions function in accord- ance with the same benevolent intent, an argument that is often persua- sive even though it is a transparent non sequitur. The patriotic premise is reinforced by the belief that "we the people" rule, a central principle of the system of indoctrination from early childhood, but also one with little merit, as an analysis of the sociahlnd political system will quickly reveal. There are also real advantages in conformity beyond the re- wards and privilege that it yields. If one chooses to denounce Qaddafi, or the Sandinistas, or the PLO, or the Soviet Union, no credible evi- dence is required. The same is true if one repeats conventional doc- trines about our own society and its behavior-say, that the U. S. government is dedicated to our traditional noble commitment to de- mocracy and human rights. But a critical analysis of American institu- tions, the way they function domestically and their international operations, must meet far higher standards; in fact, standards are often imposed that can barely be met in the natural sciences. One has to work hard, to produce evidence that is credible, to construct serious argu- ments, to present extensive documentation-all tasks that are super-
fluous as long as one remains within the presuppositional framework of the doctrinal consensus. It is small wonder that few are willing to undertake the effort, quite apart from the rewards that accrue to con- formity and the costs of honest dissidence.
There are other considerations that tend to induce obedience. A journalist or commentator who does not want to have to work too hard can survive, even gain respectability, by publishing information (official or leaks) from standard sources;12 these opportunities may well be denied to those who are not content to relay the constructions of state propaganda as fact. The technical structure of the media virtually compels adherence to conventional thoughts; nothing else can be ex- pressed between two commercials, or in seven hundred words, without the appearance of absurdity that is difficult to avoid when one is chal- lenging familiar doctrine with no opportunity to develop facts or argu- ment. In this respect, the U. S. media are rather different from those in
CONCLUSIONS 305
306 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
most other industrial democracies, and the consequences are noticeable in the narrowness of articulated opinion and analysis. The critic must also be prepared to face a defamation apparatus against which there is little recourse, an inhibiting factor that is not insubstantial. Many such factors exist, related to the essential structural features brought to light by a propaganda model but nevertheless worthy of derailed examina- tion in themselves. The result is a powerful system of induced conform- ity to the needs of privilege and power.
In sum, the mass media of the United States are effective and power- ful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propa- ganda function by reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions. and self-censorship, and without significant overt coercion. This propa- ganda system has become even more efficient in recent decades with the rise of the national television networks, greater mass-media concentra- tion, right-wing pressures on public radio and television, and the growth in scope and sophistication of public relations and news man- agement.
This system is not all-powerful, however. Government and elite domination of the media have oot succeeded in overcoming the Viet- nam syndrome and public hostility to direct U. S. involvement in the destabilization and overthrow of foreign governments. A massive Rea- gan-era disinforrnation and propaganda effort, reflecting in large mea- sure an elite consensus, did succeed in its major aims of mobilizing support for the U. S. terror states (the "fledgling democracies"), while demonizing the Saodinistas and eliminating from Congress and the mass media all controversy beyond tactical debate over the means that should be employed to return Nicaragua to the "Central American mode" and "contain" its "aggressiveness" in attempting to defend itself from a murderous and destructive U. S. assault on al: fronts. But it failed to win public support even for proxy army warfare against Nicaragua, and as the costs to the U. S. mounted, and the proxy war accompanied by embargo and other pressures succeeded in restoring the "Central American mode" of misery and suffering in Nicaragua and aborting the highly successful reforms and prospects for development of the early years after the overthrow of Washington's ally Somoza, elite opinion too shifted-quite dramatically, in fact-toward resort to other, more cost-effective means to attain shared ends. 13 The partial failures of the very well organized and extensive state propaganda effort, and the simultaneous rise of an active grass-roots oppositional movement with very limited media access, was crucial in making an outright U. S. invasion of Nicaragua unfeasible and driving the state underground, to illegal clandestine operations that could be better
concealed from the domestic population-with, in fact, considerable media complicity. 14
Furthermore, while there have been important structural changes centralizing and strengthening the propaganda system, there have been counterforces at work with a potential for broader access. The rise of cable and satellite communications, while initially captured and domi- nated by commercial interests, has weakened the power of the network oligopoly and retains a potential for enhanced local-group access. There are already some 3,000 public-access channels in use in the United States, offering 20,000 hours of locally produced programs per week, and there are even national producers and distributors of pro- grams for access channels through satellites (e. g. , Deep-Dish Televi- sion), as well as hundreds of local suppliers, although all of them must struggle for funding. Grass-roots and public-interest organizations need to recognize and try to avail themselves of these media (and organizational) opportunities. 15 Local nonprofit radio and television stations also provide an opportunity for direct media access that has been underutilized in the United States. In France, many local groups have their own radio stations. In a notable case, the progressive cooper- ative Longo Mai, in Upper Provence, has its own 24-hour-a-day Radio Zinzine, which has become an important community institution that has helped inform and activate many previously isolated farmers. The potential value of noncommercial radio can be perceived in sections of the country where stations such as Pacifica Radio offer a view of the world, depth of coverage, and scope of discussion and debate that is generally excluded from the major media. Public radio and television, despite having suffered serious damage during the Reagan years, also represent an alternative media channel whose resuscitation and im- provement should be of serious concern to those interested in contest- ing the propaganda system. 16 The steady commercialization of the
publicly owned air waves should be vigorously opposed. In the long run, a democratic political order requires far wider control of and access to the media. Serious discussion of how this can be done, and the incorporation of fundamental media reform into political programs, should be high on progressive agendas. 17
The organization and self-education of groups in the community and workplace, and their networking and activism, continue to be the fundamental elements in steps toward the democratization of our so- ciallife and any meaningful social change. Only to the extent that such developments succeed can we hope to see media that are free and independent.
CONCLUSIONS 307
Appendix I
THE u. s. OFFICIAL OBSERVERS IN GUATEMALA, JULY 1-2, 1984
For the July I, 1984, elections in Guatemala, the Reagan administration sent an observer team, headed by Republican Congressman Ralph Regula, that also included Congressmen Jack Hightower (Democrat, Texas) and Mickey Ed- wards (Republican, Oklahoma); Secretaries of State Jack Brier, of Kansas, and Ed Simcox, of Indiana; Father Kenneth Baker, editor of Homiletic and Pastoral Review, New York City; John Carbaugh, a Washington attorney; Jesse Fried- man, of the American Institute of Free Labor Development; Tom Kahn, of the AFL-CIO; Max Singer, of the Potomac Organization; and Howard Penni- man,theelectionspecialistoftheAmericanEnterpriseInstitute. l Thisgroup, in Guatemala for a very brief stay, was transported around the country to "observe" on election day by helicopter, and made a brief statement and held a press conference on July 2. That statement and the press conference pro- ceedings were released by the U. S. embassy in Guatemala City on July 18, 1984, and form the basis for the discussion below.
Although Guatemala had been assailed by human-rights organizations for years for political murder on a vast scale and record-breaking numbers of
"disappeared," the words "murder" and "disappeared" do not appear in the remarks of any of the ten observers who spoke at the press conference. Other words or phrases never uttered were: "National Security Doctrine," "Law of Illicit Association," "state terrorism," "death squad," "massacre," "torture," "forced relocations," "civil-defense patrols," "freedom of the press," or "vot- ing requirement. " None of the observers doubted the authenticity of "posi- tive" responses by Guatemalan peasants to questions by non-Spanish-speaking foreigners flown in by helicopter in a country subject to military occupation. All of the observers felt quite capable of assessing the true feelings of the Guatemalan people on the basis of long lines, facial expressions, and a handful of responses to visitors under official protection. There was no dissent among the observers from the conclusion that the election was fair, inspiring, a testimonial to the eagerness of the Guatemalan people to participate and express their patriotic sentiments, and a first step toward democracy. No demonstration-election cliche was omitted-history was blacked out, and no basic condition of a free election was examined by the observers.
Let us sample a few of the cliches offered by these Guatemalan election observers:
1. People full of hope--'Dery positi'De start. This was a "dynamic begin- ning, . . . a first step," according to delegation head Ralph Regula. Father Kenneth Baker found a "great sense of hope for the future . . . the spirit of hopefulness. " Jack Brier also observed "a spirit of hopefulness about the future, but not necessarily confidence in whatever actions may come about as a result of the elections. " (This is a very nuanced distinction that Brier was able to make on the basis of translated brief answers by a few voters. ) Tom Kahn claimed that "many of the workers whom we spoke to on the voting lines told us that they had great hope, that this was a first step. " Kahn was asked during the press conference whether he had visited any of the embattled Coca-Cola workers. He hadn't. Neither Kahn nor his AIFLD colleague, Jesse Friedman, mentioned the enormous decline in union membership or the deci- mation of union leadership by murder.
2. Long lines, patient 'Doters. The observers were deeply impressed with "the way the people patiently waited" to vote (Regula). Howard Penniman noted "the extraordinary patience of the people voting. " Ed Simcox pointed out that the voters "did go out, they formed lines very early in the morning, they waited in some instances two, three, four hours to go up and vote. " According to Congressman Hightower, "The thing that impressed us instantly was the long lines. " Tom Kahn was impressed with the "calm and order which prevailed around the voting tables. "
Long lines and patient voters are quite compatible with voting by a terror- ized population desiring mainly to survive. The official observers, who never once mention the record of spectacular state terror in Guatemala, merely
postulate that voters who get in line and wait patiently do so for reasons that are benign.
3. The patriotic imperati'De. The main theme of this observer team is that the voters are eager to vote as good patriots, loyal to the militarized terrorist
state that Ronald Reagan and the State Department find acceptable. Max Singer says that "I did sense that Guatemalans feel that voting is important to them. " (This is correct, but Singer was not contemplating the possibility that its importance to them might lie in fear and a desire to avoid retribution by the omnipresent army. ) Regula said that the people were patiently waiting "for an opportunity to share in the process of choosing the constituent assembly. " According to Simcox, "They know that this was the patriotic thing to do, that this was important for their country. " Tom Kahn found that the people he talked to in voting lines "expressed a great sense of national pride. "
4. Absence of any sign of coercion. Father Kenneth Baker stated that "there seemed to be a general atmosphere of no intimidation. " Baker didn't say how he sensed this atmosphere, ? and whether it was assuredly reliable in a foreign country observed for a day under military guard. Baker referred to the bishops having urged people to vote, but he failed to note their extended observations suggesting that a meaningful election couldn't be held in an environment of disappearances, terror, and catastrophic socioeconomic condi- tions. Jack Brier saw "absolutely no violence. I saw no evidence of direct military involvement. " A problem that Brier doesn't discuss is that if pacifica- tion is thorough, no violence or substantial military presence will be necessary to confirm military choices. There is absolutely no violence or evidence of direct military involvement in elections in the Soviet Union. Brier plays dumb, pretending that violence on election day is really relevant, and ignoring the long-term violence that strips away institutional protections and produces a terrorized population. 2 Congressman Mickey Edwards did find a military pres- ence in Guatemala, but it was not "oppressive": "We did not find anything to indicate that the people in those areas were under any pressure or intimida- tion. " How hard Edwards looked must remain in doubt. 3
5. Amazing turnout. Jack Brier referred to the "surprisingly large turnout," and Ed Simcox found the 60-70 percent turnout "really an incredibly positive statistic. " Even the U. S. embassy noted that voting in Guatemala is compul- sory (although it tried to discount this by citing a Guatemalan official who said that the law was only rarely enforced). The official observers, however, never mentioned this small matter of a legal requirement, or the need to get an ID card stamped, let alone the army warnings and the background of mass killings and disappearances.
6. Human rights impro'Ding. Congressman Mickey Edwards found that "by all objective observations, the human-rights record in this country has improved tremendously over the last two or three years. " He does not say what objective observations he is referring to. Max Singer also found that "the human-rights record is improving in Guatemala, as near as I can tell," partly because the guerrilla movement has weakened, and that movement has been a serious threat to the human rights of the Guatemalan people. Singer was asked in the press conference how he determined this improvement. His answer was "From the statements of people living in the countryside. "
7. Reasonfor the blank and spoiled 'Dotes. Some 26 percent of the ballots cast in the Guatemalan election, far exceeding the total for any party, were
312 A P P E N D IX I
blank or spoiled.
This would seem to compromise the notion that the Guatemalan people had gotten into long lines out of patriotic enthusiasm. Howard Penniman explained, however, that this was a result of illiteracy. Other possibilities are unmentioned. Why the illiteracy rates were so high thirty years after the United States saved Guatemala for freedom is also not discussed.
8. The case for further aid. The observers showed their objectivity, and the labor representatives Kahn and Friedman demonstrated their commitment to liberal principles, by acknowledging that this election wae only a "first step," and that a full-fledged democracy such as that just established in EI Salvador (Regula) was still to come. Some of the observers would sanction additional aid immediately, Mickey Edwards urging that the Guatemalan army would benefit from being "exposed to American values and to American training. "4 The others were more noncommittal, but agreed that the election was fair, meaningful, and deserving of U. S. recognition and support.
In sum, this was a caricature of observation, but a fairly typical performance of U. S. "official observers. " The report of this group was cited by Stephen Kinzer in the New York Times and elsewhere in the U. S. press as a serious source of information on the Guatemalan election. The official report of the Latin American Studies Association on the Nicaraguan election, written by specialists in the region after an intensive eight-day investigation, Kinzer and his mass-media colleagues never mentioned.
Appendix z
TAGLIABUE'S FINALE ON THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION:
A Case Study in Bias
To show in another way the propagandistic quality ofthe mass media's cover- age of the Bulgarian Connection, we will examine in detail the article by John Taglia~ue,"Verdict on Papal Plot, But No Answer," published in the New York Tzmes on March 31, 1986. This piece, which provides a final wrap-up that enters "history" as the mature judgment of the veteran Times newsman as- signed to the Rome trial, is a model illustration of the systematic bias that we
believe characterized mass-media reporting of the Bulgarian Connection with only minor exceptions. A close examination shows how Tagliabue incorp~rates a. ll of the elements. of the Sterling-Henze-Kalb (SHK) model of the connec-
tIOn, selects facts In accordance with the requirements of that model and bypasses conflicting facts and interpretations. I '
The Framing of the Issue: The Case Still "Unresolved"
The court dismissal of the case against the Bulgarians in Rome confronted the Times with a problem of framing. The Times had presented the case as plausi- ble for years, and now had to confront the rejection of the case in a court decision. The solution was to latch on to the peculiar feature of the Italian judicial system whereby a party found not guilty can be declared positively innocent or not guilty for reason of lack of evidence. Thus, as the title of Tagliabue's article suggests, there was a verdict, but "no answer," and Taglia- bue's first paragraph focuses on the "unresolved" nature of the case. It would have been possible to stress the fact that the Bulgarians were found not guilty for lack of evidence, and to emphasize that Western law requires positive proof of guilt. But the Times was not about to acknowledge defeat after five years of finding the Bulgarians guilty.
Tagliabue also downplays the court decision by making it an unsurprising event. "Few people were surprised by the verdict," states Tagliabue. But the failure to find the Bulgarians guilty should have been quite surprising, given the earlier assurances by Sterling and associates that the Bulgarians were clearly behind the plot, and that, as Paul Henze stated, the "evidence" has "steadily accumulated to the point where little real doubt is now possible. "2
An alternative frame would have been as follows: After a three-year investi- gation and lengthy trial, backed by the resources of the Italian state, and despite the powerful interests in Italy and the West with a stake in finding the Bulgarians guilty, the prosecution still failed to persuade an Italian jury of Bulgarian guilt. These vested interests and their propaganda vehicles were given a bone to chew on, however, in the form of a decision to dismiss the charge for "lack of evidence," rather than complete exoneration. This then allowed the propaganda agencies to frame the case in the Tagliabue manner.
Protection of the Italian Judicial Process
Throughout the history ofthe case, the U. S. mass media blacked out evidence of the compromised quality of the Italian institutions involved in pursuing the connection. Investigating Judge Martella was always treated as a model of probity, and conflicting facts were ignored. 3 Operating in this tradition, Taglia- bue wastes space on a gratuitous and irrelevant accolade to Martella (which is also given a subheading for emphasis). His statement that "Few people stood up to assail the magistrate" is absurd, as the trial witnesses were asked to give concrete evidence on the facts of the case; they were not in a position to assail the pretrial investigating magistrate, and any such attempts would have been impermissible in the courtroom. Only the Bulgarian defense was well qualified and able to assail Martella, and they did so, in effective statements on March 4-8, 1986, that were unreported in the T imes and the rest of the mass media. Tagliabue points out that although the trial was supposed merely to verify the
findings of t~e pre~imi~aryinvestigation, in fact the prosecution did a great
deal of new mvestlgatIve work. This suggests that the trial court may have
fo~ndMartella's investigation sadly lacking, but Tagliabue never addresses the pomt.
Agcats Desertion of the Case
An important part of the apologetic fr. amework is the claim that Agca, who had present~d an allegedly coherent verSIOn of a connection up to the trial, sud- denly dId an about face and refused to testify altogether. Tagliabue devotes several paragraphs to this theme, eventually suggesting that Agca's increas- ingly erratic behavior "may have been designed to torpedo the efforts of the court. " He suggests th~t the pr~secuto~couldn:t overcome th~s difficulty, so that the loss of the case IS lodged m Agca s behavior rather than m any inherent deficiencies in the prosecution's case.
In reality, Ag~a's claims emerged very slowly and contradictorily, with dozens of retractions that, taken together, are best explained by coaching outside information, and guesses by Agca as to what Martella and the pres~ would like to hear. There is no reason to believe that Agca ever offered or ~ettled upon a cO,herent, version of a Bulgarian connection. On the contrary, It appears that hiS version changed continually, and that the final result in Martella's report was Martella's own arbitrary synthesis. 4
The claim that Agca became more erratic during the trial is also not based on evidence. Agca's persistently erratic behavior was obscured by the secrecy of his earlier testimony, but it is clear from the Martella report that he was already claiming to be Jesus and displaying other symptoms of irrationality. Furthermore, Tagliabue's statement that Agca refused to cooperate during the trial is false-Agca periodically withdrew from the proceedings when his testimony became too incoherent, but he always returned to the stand, and he answered a vast number of questions. One hypothesis that Tagliabue never ~ntertainsis that if Agca's claims were based on coaching and/or imagination, m an open court he would be vulnerable and quickly pushed to the wall.
Tagliabue also never asks this further question: Even if Agca had clammed up (which was not true), given the extensive Martella investigation and report, why would the court not be able to follow the already established leads to a successful outcome? Why was not a single witness produced to confirm Agca's allegations of numerous meetings and trips with Bulgarians in Rome? Why was the car allegedly rented by the Bulgarians never found? Where is the money supposedly given to Agca? Tagliabue fails to address these questions.
"Partial Confirmation" of Agcats Ta Ie
Tagliabue describes some alleged partial confirmations of Agca's claims. The first is that "Mr. Ozbey said the Bulgarians had indeed wanted to use Mr. Agca
to shoot the Pope, but did not trust him. " But this is not a partial confirmation if the net result was that the Bulgarians failed to hire Agca. Furthermore, another reporter present when Ozbey testified in Rome claims that Ozbey did not tell the court that the Bulgarians "wanted to use" Agca. According to Wolfgang Achtner, of ABC-TV News, in Rome, the only thing Ozbey said was that the Bulgarians "listened with interest, but behaved with indifference" (the translation by the Turkish interpreter in court), or "listened with interest but didn't take it seriously" (Achtner's own translation). In short, it would appear that Tagliabue has doctored the evidence.
The other "partial confirmation" is that "Catli hinted at obscure secret service contacts with West German intelligence, and of payments for unspeci- fied purposes to Turks involved in the investigations. " This vague statement does not even mention the plot against the pope and is partial confirmation of nothing. The most important Catli evidence bearing on this point was his description of the attempt by the West German police to bribe Agca's supposed co-conspirator Oral Celik to come to West -Germany and confirm Agca's claims. This supports the coaching hypothesis: accordingly, Tagliabue blacks it out. The only other testimony by Catli mentioning the secret services in- volved Gray Wolves leader Ali Batman, who told Catli he had heard from the German secret police that at a meeting in Romania, the Warsaw Pact powers had decided to kill the pope. This was apparently a leak of the forged SISMI document of May 19, 1981, which had made this claim. Thus the hearsay recounting of the substance of a forgery is Tagliabue's "partial confirmation" of Agca's claims of a plot.
We should also note that while he cites these alleged "partial confirma- tions," nowhere does Tagliabue list the contentions of Agca that remained unconfirmed.
The Soviet-Bulgarian Motive
Two of Tagliabue's thirty-two paragraphs were devoted to expounding the Soviet motive in allegedly sponsoring Agca's assassination attempt: "to crack religiously inspired resistance to Communist rule in Poland. " Tagliabue here follows a long-standing Times tradition of absolutely refusing to allow a coun- terargument to be voiced on this issue. Even if they covered their tracks well, a Soviet-inspired murder of the pope would have been blamed on the Soviets, solidified Polish hostility, and had enormously damaging effects on Soviet relations with Western Europe. Thus it would have been risky without any offsetting benefits. s
Who gained and who lost from the plot? Were there any possible Western motives that might bear on the case? Tagliabue follows the SHK line in failing to raise these questions. But once Agca was imprisoned in Italy, cold warriors of the West had much to gain and little to lose by manipulating Agca to pin the assassination attempt on the East. Tagliabue mentions that the charges of a Bulgarian Connection surfaced "at the nadir" of U. S. -Soviet relations. While he notes how this added to the credibility of the plot in the West, he never
hints at the possibility that its serviceability to the new Cold War might explain Agca's belated confession.
Agca's Stay in Bulgaria
This has always been critical in the Sterling-Times scenarios, and Tagliabue drags it in. It is given further emphasis with the heading "Spent 2 Months in Bulgaria. " Tagliabue does not mention that Agca stopped in eleven other countries. He fails to note here, and the Times suppressed throughout, Cadi's testimony in Rome that the Gray Wolves liked to go through Bulgaria to reach Western Europe because the heavy Turkish traffic made it easy to hide. Taglia- bue fails to mention that bringing Agca for a long stay in Sofia would have been a violation of the rule of plausible deniability. Even more so would be using Bulgarians to help Agca in Rome. Tagliabue does not discuss the question of
plausible deniability. He also fails to note that if Agca had stayed in Sofia for a while, this would allow a prima facie case to be made by a Western propagan- dist that the East was behind the shooting, and could provide the basic materi- als for working Agca over for the desired confession.
Bulgarian Involvement in Turkey
Tagliabue asserts that the Bulgarians were "purportedly" supporting both the extreme left and right in Turkey "to promote instability" in a conflict "that pitted violent leftist terrorists against their counterparts on the right. " This is a Sterling myth, with Tagliabue hiding behind "purportedly" to allow him to pass off myth as purported evidence. The equating of left and right in the Turkish violence of the 1970S is false: the great majority of violent attacks were launched by the Gray Wolves, under the protection of the police and military. Tagliabue also fails to discuss the fact that the extreme right actually par- ticipated in the government in 1977 and had extensive links to the army and
intelligence services. The claim of Bulgarian support for both the right and left has never been supported by evidence. Tagliabue never mentions that the United States had more than "purported" links with the Turkish army, the secret services, and the Fascist Nationalist Action party, and that the terrorist events of the late 1970S eventually served U. S. interests well.
Key Question: How Agca Knew So Much
The "key question" for Tagliabue is "how Agca knew what he knew and when he knew it. " This is an important issue, but there are others that he might have
E
raised if he had worked outside the SHK format. Why did it take Agca so 10ng
to name Bulgarians? Was he subject to any coercion or offered any posl't? . d k" IVe In . ucements . t~ rna e him talk. Why did he have to make major retractions?
reports, had mentioned Mafia official Giovanni Pandico's statement in Italy outlining a scenario of coaching at which he claimed to be present, but Taglia- bue doesn't even cite this or any other documents or facts that lend support to the coaching hypothesis. He sticks to the ingredients that fit the SHK format-good Martella, Agca the betrayer of the case, the Soviet motive, Agca's visit to Bulgaria, and his knowledge of details. All other materials are designated "sinister" or blacked out to enhance the credibility of the party line.
Agca Helped the Bulgarians
Tagliabue closes his article with a quote from Agca's attorney that the Bulgari- ans "should be thankful" to Agca. This reiterates one of Tagliabue's preferred themes-that Agca deliberately blew the case. This is derived from Sterling's theory that Agca's vacillations were really "signals" to the Bulgarians, alter- nately threatening and rewarding them, but aiming at getting them to help him out of jail. In his earlier articles Tagliabue followed this line, and it is implicit in this summing-up article, although it is a wholly unproven Sterling gimmick. ' What was Agca bargaining for in the trial? Did he expect the Bulgarians to spring him? To admit their own involvement in the case by arranging a deal for his release? And if he was sabotaging the case in order to win favor with the Bulgarians, and since the Bulgarians obviously refused to respond, why did he not finally decide to do them injury? Tagliabue never addresses these points.
In sum, this is a model case of propaganda under the guise of "news" or "news analysis. " In this instance there are a number of lies, but these are less important than the other systematic distortions. Tagliabue and the Times frame the issue in terms ofprobable Bulgarian guilt and the factors that caused the case to be lost-exclusive of those suggesting that there was no case to begin with. They refuse to discuss the failure to obtain confirmation of any factual claims of meetings or deals with Bulgarians. They fail to discuss-or even to mention-problems of plausible deniability. They reiterate the ele- ments of the preferred SHK model without noting the illogic or the incompati- ble facts. They ignore evidence that would support the coaching model. They use invidious language only for the disfavored line of argument and spokesper- sons, manipulating words and bending evidence to the desired end. This article should be perfect for classroom use in courses on propaganda, media bias, and related subjects.
Is It not SUSpiCIOUS that when Agca finally talked, he said J'ust what his int
? er-
. .
and where he could lie and retract evidence without penalty? lon,
rogators wanted h1m to say? How are we to evaluate a judicial process wh
? (A)
the witness gca was In regular contact with outside sources of informaf
ere
"Even the Attorneys for the Bulgarians . . . . "
In assessing how Agca knew so much, Tagliabue allocates only one paragraph to the possibility that Agca was coached. On the other hand, he goes to great pains to stress that Agca knew an awful lot-telephone numbers, personal habits, nicknames. Tagliabue gives as the "simplest explanation" of Agca's knowledge that he had access to books, newspapers, magazines, and other materials from the outside. Interestingly, he fails to mention the numerous prison contacts between Agca and secret service, Mafia, and Vatican agents and emissaries. Agca even wrote a letter to the Vatican complaining of the pressure from its representative in prison (also linked to the Mafia), a fact long blacked out by the Times. These visits would point to the ease with which Agca could have been fed information while in prison. Tagliabue will not admit facts that get into this dangerous territory.
A major question is how Agca knew details about Antonov's apartment when he later admitted to Martella that he had never been there. The Bulgarians and Antonov's defense went to great pains to prove that the information Agca provided about Antonov's apartment had never been divulged in the media before Agca enumerated the details. This implied coaching, as did a mistake in identification where Agca described a characteristic of Antonov's apartment that fitted other apartments in the building, but not Antonov's. Tagliabue says that "Even the attorneys for the Bulgarians acknowledge" that Agca named things not available through reading the papers, as if they were conceding a point, not making a devastating case for coaching. Newspaper work couldn't be more dishonest than this.
"The More Sinister View"
In a single, late paragraph devoted to the possibility of coaching, Tagliabue merely asserts it as a claim, without providing a single supportive point of evidence, although there are many. 6 He uses a double propagandist's put- down-ironically designating the coaching hypothesis as "the more sinister view," and stating that it is "espoused by critics of the case on the political left, including Soviet bloc governments. " Even Tagliabue, in his earlier news
I
I
Appendix 3
BRAESTRUP'S BIG STORY: Some "Freedom House Exclusives"
In "The Tet offensive" (p. 211), we considered the example that has regularly been put forth to substantiate the charge that the media adopt an "adversarial stance" with regard to established power-eoverage ofthe Tet offensive-and the Freedom House study on which this charge is based. As we saw, in this case too the behavior of the media conforms to the expectations of the propa- ganda model, and the major theses advanced in the Freedom House study are refuted even by their own evidence. What remains of their charge is the possibility that media coverage of the Tet offensive was technically incompe- tent, although subordinated to elite requirements. Turning to a closer exami- nation ofthis charge, we find that the shoe is on the other foot: when "Freedom House exclusives" are corrected, the performance of the media appears quite creditable, while the incompetence of the Freedom House study is seen to transcend even the level already demonstrated. That this study has been taken seriously, and permitted to set much of the agenda for subsequent discussion, is a most intriguing fact.
According to Freedom House, television commentary and Newsweek are the
worst offenders in this "extreme case" of journalistic incompetence, so let us begin by reviewing some of their sins. One example to which Braestrup reverts several times is Walter Cronkite's "much publicized half-hour CBS 'special' on the war" on February 27 (Big Seory, I, 158). According to Braestrup Cronkite's "assessment" here is "that U. S. troops would have to garrison th~ countryside" (I, 645). In his foreword, Leonard Sussman properly observes that "We do not expect the reader to accept on faith our various analyses or judgments," and so "the complete texts of many of the reports discussed" are presented, primarily in volume II (I, x). Following his advice, we turn to volume II, where we find the complete text of Cronkite's "special" (180ff. ). There is not even a remote hint of the "assessment" that Braestrup attributes to him.
In this important "special," Braestrup claims, "In effect, Cronkite seemed to say, the ruins, the refugees, the disruption of pacification that came at Tet added up to a defeat for the allies that would force President Johnson to the negotiating table" (I, 158). Cronkite says nothing of the kind. He reports that "there are doubts about the measure of success or setback," noting accurately that "the experts do not agree on the objectives or on the amount of success the communists had in achieving them. " They "failed" in many of their aims, but in a third phase the enemy might "recoup there what he lost in the first two phases. " In what he calls a "speculative, personal, subjective" judgment, Cronkite states that he is "not sure . . . who won and who lost," or to what extent. He concludes that the United States is probably "mired in stalemate," and that historians may conclude that the Tet battle was "a draw"; "To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. " He does not say that Johnson will be "forced" to the negotiating table by a "defeat," but rather that if indeed there is a "stalemate," then "the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could. " Note the typical reiteration of government propaganda concerning American
aims, unsullied by the factual record-enormous in scale, by this time-of U. S. government efforts to undermine democracy and to destroy all popular forces-the NLF, the Buddhist "third force," etc. -in South Vietnam, on the assumption, openly admitted, that the forces placed in power by U. S. violence could not survive political competition. Recall also that in these comments that Freedom House derides, Cronkite reaches essentially the same conclusion as did the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, in his summary to the president on the same day as Cronkite's broadcast, and the president's advisers a month later.
We may note also that two weeks earlier, Cronkite had "assessed" the impact of the Communist offensive, on the basis of U. S. and Vietnamese sources, reporting that "first, and simplest, the Vietcong suffered a military defeat" (I, 158). Similarly, on an NBC-TV special of March 10 that Braestrup repeatedly condemns, Howard Tuckner stated that "Militarily the allies won" (I, 159), as did others repeatedly.
Cronkite's "special" is exhibit A in the Freedom House indictment. The example is typical of the relation between their conclusions and the evidence they cite.
Braestrup refers to a television comment by Robert Schakne on February 28 for which he gives the following paraphrase: "In short, the United States would now have to take over the whole war, including the permanently dam- aged pacification program, because of Saigon's failures" (I, 562-63). Braestrup claims further that Schackne attributed "this argument" to Robert Komer. This he calls "a CBS exclusive," his standard term of derision. In fact, "this argument" is yet another "Freedom House exclusive. " What Schackne said, according to Braestrup, is that it was "likely" that Komer was in Washington with General Wheeler to ask for more troops "to help get the Vietnam pacifi- cation program back on the road.
The existing level of media subordination to state authority is often deemed unsatisfactory by critics. We have discussed several examples. Thus, Freedom House and others who are concerned to protect state authority from an intrusive public condemn the media for lack of sufficient enthusiasm in supporting official crusades, and even the lim- ited challenge to established authority during the Vietnam War and the Watergate period aroused concerns over the excessive power of the media. Quite commonly, the slight opening occasionally granted to dissent is considered far too dangerous to permit. This perception sometimes even takes the form of a paranoid vision of left-wing power that sweeps all in its path: for example, the plea of Claire Sterling and others who dominated media coverage of the Bulgarian Connection that they could barely be heard above the din of Soviet propaganda. A still more striking case is the Aikman-Shawcross fantasy, eagerly echoed by many others, about the "silencing" of the international media and governments by the left during the Pol Pot era. In reality, there was a huge chorus of protest over Khmer Rouge atrocities, which reached an extraordinary level of fabrication and deceit. The signifi- cance of these facts, and of the pretense of left-imposed "silence," is highlighted by the contrast with the real silence over comparable atroci- ties in Timor at the same time, and the evasions and suppressions
CONCLUSIONS 301
302 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
during the first phase of "the decade of the genocide," to mention two cases where the United States was the responsible agent and protest could have been effective in diminishing or terminating large-scale atrocities.
A propaganda model provides a ready explanation for this quite typical dichotomous treatment. Atrocities by the Khmer Rouge could be attributed to the Communist enemy and valuable propaganda points could be scored, although nothing useful could be done, or was even proposed, for the Cambodian victims. The image of Communist mon- sters would also be useful for subsequent U. S. participation in terror and violence, as in its crusades in Central America shortly after. In EI Salvador, the United States backed the murderous junta in its struggle against what was depicted as "the Pol Pot left," while Jeane Kirkpatrick mused darkly about the threat to EI Salvador of "well-armed guerrillas whose fanaticism and violence remind some observers of Pol Pot"- shortly after the archbishop had denounced her junta friends for con- ducting a "war of extermination and genocide against a defenseless civilian population. "6 Some are more circumspect-for example, Wil- liam Buckley, who observes that "the Sandinistas have given their people genocide" and are clearly heading in the direction of Pol Pot, although they have not quite reached that level yet. 7 The utility of the show of outrage over Pol Pot atrocities is evident from the way the fate
of these worthy victims was immediately exploited to justify U. S. orga- nization of atrocities that, in fact, do merit comparison to Pol Pot.
Atrocities in East Timor, however, have no such utilitarian function; quite the opposite. These atrocities were carried out by our Indonesian client, so that the United States could readily have acted to reduce or terminate them. But attention to the Indonesian invasion would have embarrassed a loyal ally and quickly disclosed the crucial role of the United States in providing military aid and diplomatic support for aggression and slaughter. Plainly, news about East Timor would not have been useful, and would, in fact, have discomfited important do- mestic power groups. The mass media-and the intellectual community generally-therefore channeled their benevolent impulses elsewhere: to Cambodia, not Timor.
As we have stressed throughout this book, the U. S. media do not function in the manner of the propaganda system of a totalitarian state. Rather, they permit-indeed, encourage-spirited debate, criticism, and dissent, as long as these remain faithfully within the system of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a system so powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness. No one instructed the media to focus on Cambodia and ignore East Timor.
They gravitated naturally to the Khmer Rouge and discussed them freely8-just as they naturally suppressed information on Indonesian atrocities in East Timor and U. S. responsibility for the aggression and massacres. In the process, the media provided neither facts nor analyses that would have enabled the public to understand the issues or the bases of government policies toward Cambodia and Timor, and they thereby assured that the public could not exert any meaningful influence on the decisions that were made. This is quite typical of the actual "societal purpose" of the media on matters that are of significance for established power; not "enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political process," but rather averting any such danger. In these cases, as in numerous others, the public was managed and mobilized from above, by means of the media's highly selective messages and evasions. As noted by media analyst W. Lance Bennett,
The public is exposed to powerful persuasive messages from above and is unable to communicate meaningfully through the media in response to these messages. . . . Leaders have usurped enormous amounts of political power and reduced popular control over the political system by using the media to generate support, compliance, and just plain confusion among the public. 9
More significantly for our particular concerns here, the media typically provide their own independent contribution even without being "used," in the manner and for the reasons that we have discussed. Another media analyst, Ben Bagdikian, observes that the institutional bias of the private mass media "does not merely protect the corporate system. It robs the public of a chance to understand the real world. "lo That conclusion is well supported by the evidence we have reviewed.
A propaganda model has a certain initial plausibility on guided free- market assumptions that are not particularly controversial. In essence, the private media are major corporations selling a product (readers and audiences) to other businesses (advertisers). The national medja typi- cally target and serve elite opinion, groups that, on the one hand, provide an optimal "profile" for advertising purposes, and, on the other, playa role in decision-making in the private and public spheres.
The national media would be failing to meet their elite audience's needs if they did not present a tolerably realistic portrayal of the world. But their "societal purpose" also requires that the media's interpretation of the world reflect the interests and concerns of the sellers, the buyers, and the governmental and private institutions dominated by these groups.
CONCLUSIONS 303
304 MANUFACTUIUNG CONSENT
A propaganda model also helps us to understand how media person- nel adapt, and are adapted, to systemic demands. Given the imperatives of corporate organization and the workings of the various filters, con- formity to the needs and interests of privileged seeton; is essential to success. In the media, as in other major institutions, those who do not display the requisite values and perspectives will be regarded as "irre- sponsible," "ideological," or otherwise aberrant, and will tend to fall by the wayside. While there may be a small number of exceptions, the pattern is pervasive, and expected. Those who adapt, perhaps quite honestly, will then be free to express themselves with little managerial control, and they will be able to assert, accurately, that they perceive no pressures to conform. The media are indeed free-for those who adopt the principles required for their "societal purpose. " There may be some who are simply corrupt, and who serve as "errand boys" for state and other authority, but this is not the normY We know from personal experience that many journalists are quite aware of the way the system operates, and utilize the occasional openings it affords to provide information and analysis that departs in some measure from the elite consensus, carefully shaping it so as to accommodate to required norms in a general way. But this degree ofinsight is surely not common. Rather, the norm is a belief that freedom prevails, which is true for those who have internalized the required values and perspectives.
These matters are of some importance. We can readily understand
why Guatemalan reporters do not report the atrocities of the 1980s;
some fifty corpses dramatically illustrate the costs of deviance from authority on the part of independent journalists. To explain why American reporters avoid such topics, and even go so far as to describe Guatemala as a model for Nicaragua (see p. uS), requires further explanation, and the same is true in innumerable other similar cases,
some of which we have analyzed in detail. A propaganda model pro- t vides a basis for understanding this pervasive phenomenon.
No simple model will suffice, however, to account for every detail of such a complex matter as the working of the national mass media. A propaganda model, we believe, captures essential features of the pro- cess, but it leaves many nuances and secondary effects unanalyzed. There are other factors that should be recognized. Some of these con- flict with the "societal purpose" of the media as described by the propaganda model; some support it. In the former category, the human- ity and professional integrity of journalists often leads them in direc- tions that are unacceptable in the ideological institutions, and one should not underestimate the psychological burden of suppressing ob- vious truths and maintaining the required doctrines of benevolence
(possibly gone awry), inexplicable error, good intentions, injured inno- cence, and so on, in the face of overwhelming evidence incompatible with these patriotic premises. The resulting tensions sometimes find limited expression, but more often they are suppressed either con- sciously or unconsciously, with the help of belief systems that permit the pursuit of narrow interest, whatever the facts.
In the category of supportive factors, we find, first of all, elemental patriotism, the overwhelming wish to think well of ourselves, our insti- tutions, and our leaders. We see ourselves as basically good and decent in personal life, so it must be that our institutions function in accord- ance with the same benevolent intent, an argument that is often persua- sive even though it is a transparent non sequitur. The patriotic premise is reinforced by the belief that "we the people" rule, a central principle of the system of indoctrination from early childhood, but also one with little merit, as an analysis of the sociahlnd political system will quickly reveal. There are also real advantages in conformity beyond the re- wards and privilege that it yields. If one chooses to denounce Qaddafi, or the Sandinistas, or the PLO, or the Soviet Union, no credible evi- dence is required. The same is true if one repeats conventional doc- trines about our own society and its behavior-say, that the U. S. government is dedicated to our traditional noble commitment to de- mocracy and human rights. But a critical analysis of American institu- tions, the way they function domestically and their international operations, must meet far higher standards; in fact, standards are often imposed that can barely be met in the natural sciences. One has to work hard, to produce evidence that is credible, to construct serious argu- ments, to present extensive documentation-all tasks that are super-
fluous as long as one remains within the presuppositional framework of the doctrinal consensus. It is small wonder that few are willing to undertake the effort, quite apart from the rewards that accrue to con- formity and the costs of honest dissidence.
There are other considerations that tend to induce obedience. A journalist or commentator who does not want to have to work too hard can survive, even gain respectability, by publishing information (official or leaks) from standard sources;12 these opportunities may well be denied to those who are not content to relay the constructions of state propaganda as fact. The technical structure of the media virtually compels adherence to conventional thoughts; nothing else can be ex- pressed between two commercials, or in seven hundred words, without the appearance of absurdity that is difficult to avoid when one is chal- lenging familiar doctrine with no opportunity to develop facts or argu- ment. In this respect, the U. S. media are rather different from those in
CONCLUSIONS 305
306 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
most other industrial democracies, and the consequences are noticeable in the narrowness of articulated opinion and analysis. The critic must also be prepared to face a defamation apparatus against which there is little recourse, an inhibiting factor that is not insubstantial. Many such factors exist, related to the essential structural features brought to light by a propaganda model but nevertheless worthy of derailed examina- tion in themselves. The result is a powerful system of induced conform- ity to the needs of privilege and power.
In sum, the mass media of the United States are effective and power- ful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propa- ganda function by reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions. and self-censorship, and without significant overt coercion. This propa- ganda system has become even more efficient in recent decades with the rise of the national television networks, greater mass-media concentra- tion, right-wing pressures on public radio and television, and the growth in scope and sophistication of public relations and news man- agement.
This system is not all-powerful, however. Government and elite domination of the media have oot succeeded in overcoming the Viet- nam syndrome and public hostility to direct U. S. involvement in the destabilization and overthrow of foreign governments. A massive Rea- gan-era disinforrnation and propaganda effort, reflecting in large mea- sure an elite consensus, did succeed in its major aims of mobilizing support for the U. S. terror states (the "fledgling democracies"), while demonizing the Saodinistas and eliminating from Congress and the mass media all controversy beyond tactical debate over the means that should be employed to return Nicaragua to the "Central American mode" and "contain" its "aggressiveness" in attempting to defend itself from a murderous and destructive U. S. assault on al: fronts. But it failed to win public support even for proxy army warfare against Nicaragua, and as the costs to the U. S. mounted, and the proxy war accompanied by embargo and other pressures succeeded in restoring the "Central American mode" of misery and suffering in Nicaragua and aborting the highly successful reforms and prospects for development of the early years after the overthrow of Washington's ally Somoza, elite opinion too shifted-quite dramatically, in fact-toward resort to other, more cost-effective means to attain shared ends. 13 The partial failures of the very well organized and extensive state propaganda effort, and the simultaneous rise of an active grass-roots oppositional movement with very limited media access, was crucial in making an outright U. S. invasion of Nicaragua unfeasible and driving the state underground, to illegal clandestine operations that could be better
concealed from the domestic population-with, in fact, considerable media complicity. 14
Furthermore, while there have been important structural changes centralizing and strengthening the propaganda system, there have been counterforces at work with a potential for broader access. The rise of cable and satellite communications, while initially captured and domi- nated by commercial interests, has weakened the power of the network oligopoly and retains a potential for enhanced local-group access. There are already some 3,000 public-access channels in use in the United States, offering 20,000 hours of locally produced programs per week, and there are even national producers and distributors of pro- grams for access channels through satellites (e. g. , Deep-Dish Televi- sion), as well as hundreds of local suppliers, although all of them must struggle for funding. Grass-roots and public-interest organizations need to recognize and try to avail themselves of these media (and organizational) opportunities. 15 Local nonprofit radio and television stations also provide an opportunity for direct media access that has been underutilized in the United States. In France, many local groups have their own radio stations. In a notable case, the progressive cooper- ative Longo Mai, in Upper Provence, has its own 24-hour-a-day Radio Zinzine, which has become an important community institution that has helped inform and activate many previously isolated farmers. The potential value of noncommercial radio can be perceived in sections of the country where stations such as Pacifica Radio offer a view of the world, depth of coverage, and scope of discussion and debate that is generally excluded from the major media. Public radio and television, despite having suffered serious damage during the Reagan years, also represent an alternative media channel whose resuscitation and im- provement should be of serious concern to those interested in contest- ing the propaganda system. 16 The steady commercialization of the
publicly owned air waves should be vigorously opposed. In the long run, a democratic political order requires far wider control of and access to the media. Serious discussion of how this can be done, and the incorporation of fundamental media reform into political programs, should be high on progressive agendas. 17
The organization and self-education of groups in the community and workplace, and their networking and activism, continue to be the fundamental elements in steps toward the democratization of our so- ciallife and any meaningful social change. Only to the extent that such developments succeed can we hope to see media that are free and independent.
CONCLUSIONS 307
Appendix I
THE u. s. OFFICIAL OBSERVERS IN GUATEMALA, JULY 1-2, 1984
For the July I, 1984, elections in Guatemala, the Reagan administration sent an observer team, headed by Republican Congressman Ralph Regula, that also included Congressmen Jack Hightower (Democrat, Texas) and Mickey Ed- wards (Republican, Oklahoma); Secretaries of State Jack Brier, of Kansas, and Ed Simcox, of Indiana; Father Kenneth Baker, editor of Homiletic and Pastoral Review, New York City; John Carbaugh, a Washington attorney; Jesse Fried- man, of the American Institute of Free Labor Development; Tom Kahn, of the AFL-CIO; Max Singer, of the Potomac Organization; and Howard Penni- man,theelectionspecialistoftheAmericanEnterpriseInstitute. l Thisgroup, in Guatemala for a very brief stay, was transported around the country to "observe" on election day by helicopter, and made a brief statement and held a press conference on July 2. That statement and the press conference pro- ceedings were released by the U. S. embassy in Guatemala City on July 18, 1984, and form the basis for the discussion below.
Although Guatemala had been assailed by human-rights organizations for years for political murder on a vast scale and record-breaking numbers of
"disappeared," the words "murder" and "disappeared" do not appear in the remarks of any of the ten observers who spoke at the press conference. Other words or phrases never uttered were: "National Security Doctrine," "Law of Illicit Association," "state terrorism," "death squad," "massacre," "torture," "forced relocations," "civil-defense patrols," "freedom of the press," or "vot- ing requirement. " None of the observers doubted the authenticity of "posi- tive" responses by Guatemalan peasants to questions by non-Spanish-speaking foreigners flown in by helicopter in a country subject to military occupation. All of the observers felt quite capable of assessing the true feelings of the Guatemalan people on the basis of long lines, facial expressions, and a handful of responses to visitors under official protection. There was no dissent among the observers from the conclusion that the election was fair, inspiring, a testimonial to the eagerness of the Guatemalan people to participate and express their patriotic sentiments, and a first step toward democracy. No demonstration-election cliche was omitted-history was blacked out, and no basic condition of a free election was examined by the observers.
Let us sample a few of the cliches offered by these Guatemalan election observers:
1. People full of hope--'Dery positi'De start. This was a "dynamic begin- ning, . . . a first step," according to delegation head Ralph Regula. Father Kenneth Baker found a "great sense of hope for the future . . . the spirit of hopefulness. " Jack Brier also observed "a spirit of hopefulness about the future, but not necessarily confidence in whatever actions may come about as a result of the elections. " (This is a very nuanced distinction that Brier was able to make on the basis of translated brief answers by a few voters. ) Tom Kahn claimed that "many of the workers whom we spoke to on the voting lines told us that they had great hope, that this was a first step. " Kahn was asked during the press conference whether he had visited any of the embattled Coca-Cola workers. He hadn't. Neither Kahn nor his AIFLD colleague, Jesse Friedman, mentioned the enormous decline in union membership or the deci- mation of union leadership by murder.
2. Long lines, patient 'Doters. The observers were deeply impressed with "the way the people patiently waited" to vote (Regula). Howard Penniman noted "the extraordinary patience of the people voting. " Ed Simcox pointed out that the voters "did go out, they formed lines very early in the morning, they waited in some instances two, three, four hours to go up and vote. " According to Congressman Hightower, "The thing that impressed us instantly was the long lines. " Tom Kahn was impressed with the "calm and order which prevailed around the voting tables. "
Long lines and patient voters are quite compatible with voting by a terror- ized population desiring mainly to survive. The official observers, who never once mention the record of spectacular state terror in Guatemala, merely
postulate that voters who get in line and wait patiently do so for reasons that are benign.
3. The patriotic imperati'De. The main theme of this observer team is that the voters are eager to vote as good patriots, loyal to the militarized terrorist
state that Ronald Reagan and the State Department find acceptable. Max Singer says that "I did sense that Guatemalans feel that voting is important to them. " (This is correct, but Singer was not contemplating the possibility that its importance to them might lie in fear and a desire to avoid retribution by the omnipresent army. ) Regula said that the people were patiently waiting "for an opportunity to share in the process of choosing the constituent assembly. " According to Simcox, "They know that this was the patriotic thing to do, that this was important for their country. " Tom Kahn found that the people he talked to in voting lines "expressed a great sense of national pride. "
4. Absence of any sign of coercion. Father Kenneth Baker stated that "there seemed to be a general atmosphere of no intimidation. " Baker didn't say how he sensed this atmosphere, ? and whether it was assuredly reliable in a foreign country observed for a day under military guard. Baker referred to the bishops having urged people to vote, but he failed to note their extended observations suggesting that a meaningful election couldn't be held in an environment of disappearances, terror, and catastrophic socioeconomic condi- tions. Jack Brier saw "absolutely no violence. I saw no evidence of direct military involvement. " A problem that Brier doesn't discuss is that if pacifica- tion is thorough, no violence or substantial military presence will be necessary to confirm military choices. There is absolutely no violence or evidence of direct military involvement in elections in the Soviet Union. Brier plays dumb, pretending that violence on election day is really relevant, and ignoring the long-term violence that strips away institutional protections and produces a terrorized population. 2 Congressman Mickey Edwards did find a military pres- ence in Guatemala, but it was not "oppressive": "We did not find anything to indicate that the people in those areas were under any pressure or intimida- tion. " How hard Edwards looked must remain in doubt. 3
5. Amazing turnout. Jack Brier referred to the "surprisingly large turnout," and Ed Simcox found the 60-70 percent turnout "really an incredibly positive statistic. " Even the U. S. embassy noted that voting in Guatemala is compul- sory (although it tried to discount this by citing a Guatemalan official who said that the law was only rarely enforced). The official observers, however, never mentioned this small matter of a legal requirement, or the need to get an ID card stamped, let alone the army warnings and the background of mass killings and disappearances.
6. Human rights impro'Ding. Congressman Mickey Edwards found that "by all objective observations, the human-rights record in this country has improved tremendously over the last two or three years. " He does not say what objective observations he is referring to. Max Singer also found that "the human-rights record is improving in Guatemala, as near as I can tell," partly because the guerrilla movement has weakened, and that movement has been a serious threat to the human rights of the Guatemalan people. Singer was asked in the press conference how he determined this improvement. His answer was "From the statements of people living in the countryside. "
7. Reasonfor the blank and spoiled 'Dotes. Some 26 percent of the ballots cast in the Guatemalan election, far exceeding the total for any party, were
312 A P P E N D IX I
blank or spoiled.
This would seem to compromise the notion that the Guatemalan people had gotten into long lines out of patriotic enthusiasm. Howard Penniman explained, however, that this was a result of illiteracy. Other possibilities are unmentioned. Why the illiteracy rates were so high thirty years after the United States saved Guatemala for freedom is also not discussed.
8. The case for further aid. The observers showed their objectivity, and the labor representatives Kahn and Friedman demonstrated their commitment to liberal principles, by acknowledging that this election wae only a "first step," and that a full-fledged democracy such as that just established in EI Salvador (Regula) was still to come. Some of the observers would sanction additional aid immediately, Mickey Edwards urging that the Guatemalan army would benefit from being "exposed to American values and to American training. "4 The others were more noncommittal, but agreed that the election was fair, meaningful, and deserving of U. S. recognition and support.
In sum, this was a caricature of observation, but a fairly typical performance of U. S. "official observers. " The report of this group was cited by Stephen Kinzer in the New York Times and elsewhere in the U. S. press as a serious source of information on the Guatemalan election. The official report of the Latin American Studies Association on the Nicaraguan election, written by specialists in the region after an intensive eight-day investigation, Kinzer and his mass-media colleagues never mentioned.
Appendix z
TAGLIABUE'S FINALE ON THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION:
A Case Study in Bias
To show in another way the propagandistic quality ofthe mass media's cover- age of the Bulgarian Connection, we will examine in detail the article by John Taglia~ue,"Verdict on Papal Plot, But No Answer," published in the New York Tzmes on March 31, 1986. This piece, which provides a final wrap-up that enters "history" as the mature judgment of the veteran Times newsman as- signed to the Rome trial, is a model illustration of the systematic bias that we
believe characterized mass-media reporting of the Bulgarian Connection with only minor exceptions. A close examination shows how Tagliabue incorp~rates a. ll of the elements. of the Sterling-Henze-Kalb (SHK) model of the connec-
tIOn, selects facts In accordance with the requirements of that model and bypasses conflicting facts and interpretations. I '
The Framing of the Issue: The Case Still "Unresolved"
The court dismissal of the case against the Bulgarians in Rome confronted the Times with a problem of framing. The Times had presented the case as plausi- ble for years, and now had to confront the rejection of the case in a court decision. The solution was to latch on to the peculiar feature of the Italian judicial system whereby a party found not guilty can be declared positively innocent or not guilty for reason of lack of evidence. Thus, as the title of Tagliabue's article suggests, there was a verdict, but "no answer," and Taglia- bue's first paragraph focuses on the "unresolved" nature of the case. It would have been possible to stress the fact that the Bulgarians were found not guilty for lack of evidence, and to emphasize that Western law requires positive proof of guilt. But the Times was not about to acknowledge defeat after five years of finding the Bulgarians guilty.
Tagliabue also downplays the court decision by making it an unsurprising event. "Few people were surprised by the verdict," states Tagliabue. But the failure to find the Bulgarians guilty should have been quite surprising, given the earlier assurances by Sterling and associates that the Bulgarians were clearly behind the plot, and that, as Paul Henze stated, the "evidence" has "steadily accumulated to the point where little real doubt is now possible. "2
An alternative frame would have been as follows: After a three-year investi- gation and lengthy trial, backed by the resources of the Italian state, and despite the powerful interests in Italy and the West with a stake in finding the Bulgarians guilty, the prosecution still failed to persuade an Italian jury of Bulgarian guilt. These vested interests and their propaganda vehicles were given a bone to chew on, however, in the form of a decision to dismiss the charge for "lack of evidence," rather than complete exoneration. This then allowed the propaganda agencies to frame the case in the Tagliabue manner.
Protection of the Italian Judicial Process
Throughout the history ofthe case, the U. S. mass media blacked out evidence of the compromised quality of the Italian institutions involved in pursuing the connection. Investigating Judge Martella was always treated as a model of probity, and conflicting facts were ignored. 3 Operating in this tradition, Taglia- bue wastes space on a gratuitous and irrelevant accolade to Martella (which is also given a subheading for emphasis). His statement that "Few people stood up to assail the magistrate" is absurd, as the trial witnesses were asked to give concrete evidence on the facts of the case; they were not in a position to assail the pretrial investigating magistrate, and any such attempts would have been impermissible in the courtroom. Only the Bulgarian defense was well qualified and able to assail Martella, and they did so, in effective statements on March 4-8, 1986, that were unreported in the T imes and the rest of the mass media. Tagliabue points out that although the trial was supposed merely to verify the
findings of t~e pre~imi~aryinvestigation, in fact the prosecution did a great
deal of new mvestlgatIve work. This suggests that the trial court may have
fo~ndMartella's investigation sadly lacking, but Tagliabue never addresses the pomt.
Agcats Desertion of the Case
An important part of the apologetic fr. amework is the claim that Agca, who had present~d an allegedly coherent verSIOn of a connection up to the trial, sud- denly dId an about face and refused to testify altogether. Tagliabue devotes several paragraphs to this theme, eventually suggesting that Agca's increas- ingly erratic behavior "may have been designed to torpedo the efforts of the court. " He suggests th~t the pr~secuto~couldn:t overcome th~s difficulty, so that the loss of the case IS lodged m Agca s behavior rather than m any inherent deficiencies in the prosecution's case.
In reality, Ag~a's claims emerged very slowly and contradictorily, with dozens of retractions that, taken together, are best explained by coaching outside information, and guesses by Agca as to what Martella and the pres~ would like to hear. There is no reason to believe that Agca ever offered or ~ettled upon a cO,herent, version of a Bulgarian connection. On the contrary, It appears that hiS version changed continually, and that the final result in Martella's report was Martella's own arbitrary synthesis. 4
The claim that Agca became more erratic during the trial is also not based on evidence. Agca's persistently erratic behavior was obscured by the secrecy of his earlier testimony, but it is clear from the Martella report that he was already claiming to be Jesus and displaying other symptoms of irrationality. Furthermore, Tagliabue's statement that Agca refused to cooperate during the trial is false-Agca periodically withdrew from the proceedings when his testimony became too incoherent, but he always returned to the stand, and he answered a vast number of questions. One hypothesis that Tagliabue never ~ntertainsis that if Agca's claims were based on coaching and/or imagination, m an open court he would be vulnerable and quickly pushed to the wall.
Tagliabue also never asks this further question: Even if Agca had clammed up (which was not true), given the extensive Martella investigation and report, why would the court not be able to follow the already established leads to a successful outcome? Why was not a single witness produced to confirm Agca's allegations of numerous meetings and trips with Bulgarians in Rome? Why was the car allegedly rented by the Bulgarians never found? Where is the money supposedly given to Agca? Tagliabue fails to address these questions.
"Partial Confirmation" of Agcats Ta Ie
Tagliabue describes some alleged partial confirmations of Agca's claims. The first is that "Mr. Ozbey said the Bulgarians had indeed wanted to use Mr. Agca
to shoot the Pope, but did not trust him. " But this is not a partial confirmation if the net result was that the Bulgarians failed to hire Agca. Furthermore, another reporter present when Ozbey testified in Rome claims that Ozbey did not tell the court that the Bulgarians "wanted to use" Agca. According to Wolfgang Achtner, of ABC-TV News, in Rome, the only thing Ozbey said was that the Bulgarians "listened with interest, but behaved with indifference" (the translation by the Turkish interpreter in court), or "listened with interest but didn't take it seriously" (Achtner's own translation). In short, it would appear that Tagliabue has doctored the evidence.
The other "partial confirmation" is that "Catli hinted at obscure secret service contacts with West German intelligence, and of payments for unspeci- fied purposes to Turks involved in the investigations. " This vague statement does not even mention the plot against the pope and is partial confirmation of nothing. The most important Catli evidence bearing on this point was his description of the attempt by the West German police to bribe Agca's supposed co-conspirator Oral Celik to come to West -Germany and confirm Agca's claims. This supports the coaching hypothesis: accordingly, Tagliabue blacks it out. The only other testimony by Catli mentioning the secret services in- volved Gray Wolves leader Ali Batman, who told Catli he had heard from the German secret police that at a meeting in Romania, the Warsaw Pact powers had decided to kill the pope. This was apparently a leak of the forged SISMI document of May 19, 1981, which had made this claim. Thus the hearsay recounting of the substance of a forgery is Tagliabue's "partial confirmation" of Agca's claims of a plot.
We should also note that while he cites these alleged "partial confirma- tions," nowhere does Tagliabue list the contentions of Agca that remained unconfirmed.
The Soviet-Bulgarian Motive
Two of Tagliabue's thirty-two paragraphs were devoted to expounding the Soviet motive in allegedly sponsoring Agca's assassination attempt: "to crack religiously inspired resistance to Communist rule in Poland. " Tagliabue here follows a long-standing Times tradition of absolutely refusing to allow a coun- terargument to be voiced on this issue. Even if they covered their tracks well, a Soviet-inspired murder of the pope would have been blamed on the Soviets, solidified Polish hostility, and had enormously damaging effects on Soviet relations with Western Europe. Thus it would have been risky without any offsetting benefits. s
Who gained and who lost from the plot? Were there any possible Western motives that might bear on the case? Tagliabue follows the SHK line in failing to raise these questions. But once Agca was imprisoned in Italy, cold warriors of the West had much to gain and little to lose by manipulating Agca to pin the assassination attempt on the East. Tagliabue mentions that the charges of a Bulgarian Connection surfaced "at the nadir" of U. S. -Soviet relations. While he notes how this added to the credibility of the plot in the West, he never
hints at the possibility that its serviceability to the new Cold War might explain Agca's belated confession.
Agca's Stay in Bulgaria
This has always been critical in the Sterling-Times scenarios, and Tagliabue drags it in. It is given further emphasis with the heading "Spent 2 Months in Bulgaria. " Tagliabue does not mention that Agca stopped in eleven other countries. He fails to note here, and the Times suppressed throughout, Cadi's testimony in Rome that the Gray Wolves liked to go through Bulgaria to reach Western Europe because the heavy Turkish traffic made it easy to hide. Taglia- bue fails to mention that bringing Agca for a long stay in Sofia would have been a violation of the rule of plausible deniability. Even more so would be using Bulgarians to help Agca in Rome. Tagliabue does not discuss the question of
plausible deniability. He also fails to note that if Agca had stayed in Sofia for a while, this would allow a prima facie case to be made by a Western propagan- dist that the East was behind the shooting, and could provide the basic materi- als for working Agca over for the desired confession.
Bulgarian Involvement in Turkey
Tagliabue asserts that the Bulgarians were "purportedly" supporting both the extreme left and right in Turkey "to promote instability" in a conflict "that pitted violent leftist terrorists against their counterparts on the right. " This is a Sterling myth, with Tagliabue hiding behind "purportedly" to allow him to pass off myth as purported evidence. The equating of left and right in the Turkish violence of the 1970S is false: the great majority of violent attacks were launched by the Gray Wolves, under the protection of the police and military. Tagliabue also fails to discuss the fact that the extreme right actually par- ticipated in the government in 1977 and had extensive links to the army and
intelligence services. The claim of Bulgarian support for both the right and left has never been supported by evidence. Tagliabue never mentions that the United States had more than "purported" links with the Turkish army, the secret services, and the Fascist Nationalist Action party, and that the terrorist events of the late 1970S eventually served U. S. interests well.
Key Question: How Agca Knew So Much
The "key question" for Tagliabue is "how Agca knew what he knew and when he knew it. " This is an important issue, but there are others that he might have
E
raised if he had worked outside the SHK format. Why did it take Agca so 10ng
to name Bulgarians? Was he subject to any coercion or offered any posl't? . d k" IVe In . ucements . t~ rna e him talk. Why did he have to make major retractions?
reports, had mentioned Mafia official Giovanni Pandico's statement in Italy outlining a scenario of coaching at which he claimed to be present, but Taglia- bue doesn't even cite this or any other documents or facts that lend support to the coaching hypothesis. He sticks to the ingredients that fit the SHK format-good Martella, Agca the betrayer of the case, the Soviet motive, Agca's visit to Bulgaria, and his knowledge of details. All other materials are designated "sinister" or blacked out to enhance the credibility of the party line.
Agca Helped the Bulgarians
Tagliabue closes his article with a quote from Agca's attorney that the Bulgari- ans "should be thankful" to Agca. This reiterates one of Tagliabue's preferred themes-that Agca deliberately blew the case. This is derived from Sterling's theory that Agca's vacillations were really "signals" to the Bulgarians, alter- nately threatening and rewarding them, but aiming at getting them to help him out of jail. In his earlier articles Tagliabue followed this line, and it is implicit in this summing-up article, although it is a wholly unproven Sterling gimmick. ' What was Agca bargaining for in the trial? Did he expect the Bulgarians to spring him? To admit their own involvement in the case by arranging a deal for his release? And if he was sabotaging the case in order to win favor with the Bulgarians, and since the Bulgarians obviously refused to respond, why did he not finally decide to do them injury? Tagliabue never addresses these points.
In sum, this is a model case of propaganda under the guise of "news" or "news analysis. " In this instance there are a number of lies, but these are less important than the other systematic distortions. Tagliabue and the Times frame the issue in terms ofprobable Bulgarian guilt and the factors that caused the case to be lost-exclusive of those suggesting that there was no case to begin with. They refuse to discuss the failure to obtain confirmation of any factual claims of meetings or deals with Bulgarians. They fail to discuss-or even to mention-problems of plausible deniability. They reiterate the ele- ments of the preferred SHK model without noting the illogic or the incompati- ble facts. They ignore evidence that would support the coaching model. They use invidious language only for the disfavored line of argument and spokesper- sons, manipulating words and bending evidence to the desired end. This article should be perfect for classroom use in courses on propaganda, media bias, and related subjects.
Is It not SUSpiCIOUS that when Agca finally talked, he said J'ust what his int
? er-
. .
and where he could lie and retract evidence without penalty? lon,
rogators wanted h1m to say? How are we to evaluate a judicial process wh
? (A)
the witness gca was In regular contact with outside sources of informaf
ere
"Even the Attorneys for the Bulgarians . . . . "
In assessing how Agca knew so much, Tagliabue allocates only one paragraph to the possibility that Agca was coached. On the other hand, he goes to great pains to stress that Agca knew an awful lot-telephone numbers, personal habits, nicknames. Tagliabue gives as the "simplest explanation" of Agca's knowledge that he had access to books, newspapers, magazines, and other materials from the outside. Interestingly, he fails to mention the numerous prison contacts between Agca and secret service, Mafia, and Vatican agents and emissaries. Agca even wrote a letter to the Vatican complaining of the pressure from its representative in prison (also linked to the Mafia), a fact long blacked out by the Times. These visits would point to the ease with which Agca could have been fed information while in prison. Tagliabue will not admit facts that get into this dangerous territory.
A major question is how Agca knew details about Antonov's apartment when he later admitted to Martella that he had never been there. The Bulgarians and Antonov's defense went to great pains to prove that the information Agca provided about Antonov's apartment had never been divulged in the media before Agca enumerated the details. This implied coaching, as did a mistake in identification where Agca described a characteristic of Antonov's apartment that fitted other apartments in the building, but not Antonov's. Tagliabue says that "Even the attorneys for the Bulgarians acknowledge" that Agca named things not available through reading the papers, as if they were conceding a point, not making a devastating case for coaching. Newspaper work couldn't be more dishonest than this.
"The More Sinister View"
In a single, late paragraph devoted to the possibility of coaching, Tagliabue merely asserts it as a claim, without providing a single supportive point of evidence, although there are many. 6 He uses a double propagandist's put- down-ironically designating the coaching hypothesis as "the more sinister view," and stating that it is "espoused by critics of the case on the political left, including Soviet bloc governments. " Even Tagliabue, in his earlier news
I
I
Appendix 3
BRAESTRUP'S BIG STORY: Some "Freedom House Exclusives"
In "The Tet offensive" (p. 211), we considered the example that has regularly been put forth to substantiate the charge that the media adopt an "adversarial stance" with regard to established power-eoverage ofthe Tet offensive-and the Freedom House study on which this charge is based. As we saw, in this case too the behavior of the media conforms to the expectations of the propa- ganda model, and the major theses advanced in the Freedom House study are refuted even by their own evidence. What remains of their charge is the possibility that media coverage of the Tet offensive was technically incompe- tent, although subordinated to elite requirements. Turning to a closer exami- nation ofthis charge, we find that the shoe is on the other foot: when "Freedom House exclusives" are corrected, the performance of the media appears quite creditable, while the incompetence of the Freedom House study is seen to transcend even the level already demonstrated. That this study has been taken seriously, and permitted to set much of the agenda for subsequent discussion, is a most intriguing fact.
According to Freedom House, television commentary and Newsweek are the
worst offenders in this "extreme case" of journalistic incompetence, so let us begin by reviewing some of their sins. One example to which Braestrup reverts several times is Walter Cronkite's "much publicized half-hour CBS 'special' on the war" on February 27 (Big Seory, I, 158). According to Braestrup Cronkite's "assessment" here is "that U. S. troops would have to garrison th~ countryside" (I, 645). In his foreword, Leonard Sussman properly observes that "We do not expect the reader to accept on faith our various analyses or judgments," and so "the complete texts of many of the reports discussed" are presented, primarily in volume II (I, x). Following his advice, we turn to volume II, where we find the complete text of Cronkite's "special" (180ff. ). There is not even a remote hint of the "assessment" that Braestrup attributes to him.
In this important "special," Braestrup claims, "In effect, Cronkite seemed to say, the ruins, the refugees, the disruption of pacification that came at Tet added up to a defeat for the allies that would force President Johnson to the negotiating table" (I, 158). Cronkite says nothing of the kind. He reports that "there are doubts about the measure of success or setback," noting accurately that "the experts do not agree on the objectives or on the amount of success the communists had in achieving them. " They "failed" in many of their aims, but in a third phase the enemy might "recoup there what he lost in the first two phases. " In what he calls a "speculative, personal, subjective" judgment, Cronkite states that he is "not sure . . . who won and who lost," or to what extent. He concludes that the United States is probably "mired in stalemate," and that historians may conclude that the Tet battle was "a draw"; "To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. " He does not say that Johnson will be "forced" to the negotiating table by a "defeat," but rather that if indeed there is a "stalemate," then "the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could. " Note the typical reiteration of government propaganda concerning American
aims, unsullied by the factual record-enormous in scale, by this time-of U. S. government efforts to undermine democracy and to destroy all popular forces-the NLF, the Buddhist "third force," etc. -in South Vietnam, on the assumption, openly admitted, that the forces placed in power by U. S. violence could not survive political competition. Recall also that in these comments that Freedom House derides, Cronkite reaches essentially the same conclusion as did the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, in his summary to the president on the same day as Cronkite's broadcast, and the president's advisers a month later.
We may note also that two weeks earlier, Cronkite had "assessed" the impact of the Communist offensive, on the basis of U. S. and Vietnamese sources, reporting that "first, and simplest, the Vietcong suffered a military defeat" (I, 158). Similarly, on an NBC-TV special of March 10 that Braestrup repeatedly condemns, Howard Tuckner stated that "Militarily the allies won" (I, 159), as did others repeatedly.
Cronkite's "special" is exhibit A in the Freedom House indictment. The example is typical of the relation between their conclusions and the evidence they cite.
Braestrup refers to a television comment by Robert Schakne on February 28 for which he gives the following paraphrase: "In short, the United States would now have to take over the whole war, including the permanently dam- aged pacification program, because of Saigon's failures" (I, 562-63). Braestrup claims further that Schackne attributed "this argument" to Robert Komer. This he calls "a CBS exclusive," his standard term of derision. In fact, "this argument" is yet another "Freedom House exclusive. " What Schackne said, according to Braestrup, is that it was "likely" that Komer was in Washington with General Wheeler to ask for more troops "to help get the Vietnam pacifi- cation program back on the road.
