But it does not happen in created things that the same
numerically can subsist in divers essences or natures.
numerically can subsist in divers essences or natures.
Summa Theologica
For when by the
feebleness of the human race men's knowledge of God began to grow dim
and their morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a standard of
the restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and later on when
reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and because
the gentiles despised it and would not take it upon themselves, and
they who received it would not keep it, being touched with pity, God
sent His Son, to grant to all remission of their sin and to offer them,
justified, to God the Father. " But if this remedy had been put off till
the end of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all
uprightness of morals would have been swept away from the earth.
Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine power,
which has saved men in several ways---not only by faith in some future
thing, but also by faith in something present and past.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss has in view the mercy of God, which
leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown
the human race by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as
Augustine says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be
compared to the youth of the human race, "on account of the strength
and fervor of faith, which works by charity"; and to old age---i. e. the
sixth age---on account of the number of centuries, for Christ came in
the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be together in a
body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account of
quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine says
elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that "it was not becoming that the
Master by Whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the
highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth. " But
in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that Christ came
in the sixth age---i. e. in the old age---of the human race.
Reply to Objection 2: The work of the Incarnation is to be viewed not
as merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection,
but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been
said.
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says on Jn. 3:11, "For God sent not
His Son into the world to judge the world" (Hom. xxviii): "There are
two comings of Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the
second, to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have
perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God. "
Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put off the coming in mercy
till the end of the world.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE (TWELVE ARTICLES)
Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and,
first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the
nature assumed.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature?
(2) Whether it took place in the Person?
(3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?
(4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the
Incarnation?
(5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ?
(6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally?
(7) Whether the union itself is something created?
(8) Whether it is the same as assumption?
(9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union?
(10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about
by grace?
(11) Whether any merits preceded it?
(12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took
place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the
Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): "We must understand not two
natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God"; and this could
not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union
of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature.
Objection 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and
the flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form
a certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature.
Objection 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the
other unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the
Divine and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other;
for Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part
ii, act. 1) that the Divine nature "is incarnate"; and Gregory
Nazianzen says (Ep. i ad Cledon. ) that the human nature is "deified,"
as appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11). Therefore from two
natures one seems to have resulted.
On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the Council of
Chalcedon: "We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten Son
of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change,
without division, without separation---the distinction of natures not
having been taken away by the union. " Therefore the union did not take
place in the nature.
I answer that, To make this question clear we must consider what is
"nature. " Now it is to be observed that the word "nature" comes from
nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the
begetting of living beings, which is called "birth" or "sprouting
forth," the word "natura" meaning, as it were, "nascitura. " Afterwards
this word "nature" was taken to signify the principle of this
begetting; and because in living things the principle of generation is
an intrinsic principle, this word "nature" was further employed to
signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii) that "nature is the principle of motion in that in which it
is essentially and not accidentally. " Now this principle is either form
or matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature, and sometimes matter.
And because the end of natural generation, in that which is generated,
is the essence of the species, which the definition signifies, this
essence of the species is called the "nature. " And thus Boethius
defines nature (De Duab. Nat. ): "Nature is what informs a thing with
its specific difference,"---i. e. which perfects the specific
definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signifies the
essence, or the "what-it-is," or the quiddity of the species.
Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union of
the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made of
two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which remain
in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form is
composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones
brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition; and
a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and fashioned to
a figure. And in this way some said the union was by manner of
confusion (which is without order) or by manner of commensuration
(which is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither
composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but accidental;
and hence it would follow that the union of the Incarnation was not
essential, but accidental, which will be disproved later on
[3856](A[6]). Secondly, because thereby we should not have an absolute
unity, but relative only, for there remain several things actually.
Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the
form of a house; and thus one nature would not be constituted in
Christ, as they wish.
Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed,
as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way some have said
that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by manner of
combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is
altogether immutable, as has been said ([3857]FP, Q[9], AA[1],2), hence
neither can it be changed into something else, since it is
incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it cannot
be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same species
with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from any of its
elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His
Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there can be no mingling
of things widely apart; for the species of one of them is absorbed,
e. g. if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon of wine. And hence,
since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there
could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain.
Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but
imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers
members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation.
First, because each nature, i. e. the Divine and the human, has its
specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures
cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as
the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor
after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be
the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would
follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to
several, and thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly, because
Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature:
since any difference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is
said (Metaph. viii, text. 10).
Reply to Objection 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth
Synod (i. e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: "If anyone
proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not
receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human
natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ results,
but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or substance of
the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be anathema. " Hence
the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature
of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in Person.
Reply to Objection 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of
nature and person---results in each individual---of nature inasmuch as
the soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one
nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter
and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the Divine
Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved ([3858]FP, Q[3],
A[8]). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there is
an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the
likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures.
Reply to Objection 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11), the
Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh
personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the
flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15,17), not
by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still
remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch as it
becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did not
take place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct from
His Nature, as we said ([3859]FP, Q[39], A[1]). If, therefore, the
union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take
place in the person.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's human nature has no less dignity than
ours. But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above
([3860]FP, Q[29], A[3], ad 2). Hence, since our human nature has its
proper personality, much more reason was there that Christ's should
have its proper personality.
Objection 3: Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ), a person is an
individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of God assumed an
individual human nature, for "universal human nature does not exist of
itself, but is the object of pure thought," as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ has its
personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place in the
person.
On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act. 5):
"We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into
two persons, but is one and the same only-Begotten Son and Word of
God. " Therefore the union took place in the person.
I answer that, Person has a different meaning from "nature. " For
nature, as has been said [3861](A[1]), designates the specific essence
which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be
added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no
need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature (which
is the individual subsisting in this nature), because every individual
subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its nature. Now in
certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the
notion of the species, viz. accidents and individuating principles,
which appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence
in such as these the nature and the suppositum really differ; not
indeed as if they were wholly separate, but because the suppositum
includes the nature, and in addition certain other things outside the
notion of the species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole
which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and consequently
in such as are composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated
of the suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But
if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or
its nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really
distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is called
"nature" as it is an essence, and a "suppositum" as it is subsisting.
And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in
rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing else than
"an individual substance of rational nature," according to Boethius.
Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person,
whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is
not united to God the Word in person, it is nowise united to Him; and
thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away with, and
Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has
a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His Divine
Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person of the Word,
and not in the nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Although in God Nature and Person are not really
distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch
as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And
because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists
in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or
change, it follows that the union of human nature to the Word of God
took place in the person, and not in the nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity
of a thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity
and perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by
the word "person"). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something
nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature of
Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us,
being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it
exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs
to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of
its union with the nobler form which perfects the species, is more
noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects.
Reply to Objection 3: The Word of God "did not assume human nature in
general, but 'in atomo'"---that is, in an individual---as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of
God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every
individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a
person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which
exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although
it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist
by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence,
too, this is signified by a "person" being defined as "an individual
substance," for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a
substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of
individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality,
because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect,
viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the
person.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or
hypostasis?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did not
take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii): "Both the Divine and human substance are
one Son of God, but they are one thing [aliud] by reason of the Word
and another thing [aliud] by reason of the man. " And Pope Leo says in
his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): "One of these is glorious with
miracles, the other succumbs under injuries. " But "one" [aliud] and
"the other" [aliud] differ in suppositum. Therefore the union of the
Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum.
Objection 2: Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a "particular
substance," as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ). But it is plain that in
Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of
the Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these.
Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis of
the Word.
Objection 3: Further, the hypostasis of the Word is not included in any
genus or species, as is plain from [3862]FP, Q[3], A[5]. But Christ,
inasmuch as He is made man, is contained under the species of man; for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Within the limits of our nature He came,
Who far surpasses the whole order of nature supersubstantially. " Now
nothing is contained under the human species unless it be a hypostasis
of the human species. Therefore in Christ there is another hypostasis
besides the hypostasis of the Word of God; and hence the same
conclusion follows as above.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5): "In our
Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis. "
I answer that, Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to
person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ, held,
nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of God and another of man,
and hence that the union took place in the person and not in the
hypostasis. Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous. First,
because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate nature, viz.
rational, according to what Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ), "a person is
an individual substance of rational nature"; and hence it is the same
to attribute to the human nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a
proper person. And the holy Fathers, seeing this, condemned both in the
Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying: "If anyone seeks to
introduce into the mystery of the Incarnation two subsistences or two
persons, let him be anathema. For by the incarnation of one of the Holy
Trinity, God the Word, the Holy Trinity received no augment of person
or subsistence. " Now "subsistence" is the same as the subsisting thing,
which is proper to hypostasis, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab.
Nat. ). Secondly, because if it is granted that person adds to
hypostasis something in which the union can take place, this something
is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according as it
is said by some that a person is a "hypostasis distinguished by a
property pertaining to dignity. " If, therefore, the union took place in
the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that the union only
took place in regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the
approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in
these terms: "If anyone after the uniting divides the subsistences in
the one Christ, only joining them in a union of dignity or authority or
power, and not rather in a concourse of natural union, let him be
anathema. " Thirdly, because to the hypostasis alone are attributed the
operations and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to the
nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, and is
risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise this man is said to be a
suppositum, because he underlies [supponitur] whatever belongs to man
and receives its predication. Therefore, if there is any hypostasis in
Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that whatever
pertains to man is verified of some other than the Word, e. g. that He
was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was buried. And this,
too, was condemned with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part
iii, can. 4) in these words: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or
subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic
Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or by Himself of
Himself, and, moreover, applies some of them to the man, taken as
distinct from the Word of God, and some of them (as if they could be
used of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be
anathema. " Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long since by the
Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases, or two
supposita, or that the union did not take place in the hypostasis or
suppositum. Hence in the same Synod (can. 2) it is said: "If anyone
does not confess that the Word was united to flesh in subsistence, and
that Christ with His flesh is both---to wit, God and man---let him be
anathema. "
Reply to Objection 1: As accidental difference makes a thing "other"
[alterum], so essential difference makes "another thing" [aliud]. Now
it is plain that the "otherness" which springs from accidental
difference may pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in created
things, since the same thing numerically can underlie different
accidents.
But it does not happen in created things that the same
numerically can subsist in divers essences or natures. Hence just as
when we speak of "otherness" in regard to creatures we do not signify
diversity of suppositum, but only diversity of accidental forms, so
likewise when Christ is said to be one thing or another thing, we do
not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but diversity of
nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a letter to Chelidonius (Ep.
ci): "In the Saviour we may find one thing and another, yet He is not
one person and another. And I say 'one thing and another'; whereas, on
the contrary, in the Trinity we say one Person and another (so as not
to confuse the subsistences), but not one thing and another. "
Reply to Objection 2: Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not
in every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union
with something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a
hand or a foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is
a particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or
suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz. the
whole Christ, as He is God and man. But the complete being with which
it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum.
Reply to Objection 3: In created things a singular thing is placed in a
genus or species, not on account of what belongs to its individuation,
but on account of its nature, which springs from its form, and in
composite things individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we say
that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature assumed,
and not by reason of the hypostasis.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether after the Incarnation the Person or Hypostasis of Christ is
composite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Person of Christ is not composite.
For the Person of Christ is naught else than the Person or hypostasis
of the Word, as appears from what has been said [3863](A[2]). But in
the Word, Person and Nature do not differ, as appears from [3864]FP,
Q[39], A[1]. Therefore since the Nature of the Word is simple, as was
shown above ([3865]FP, Q[3], A[7]), it is impossible that the Person of
Christ be composite.
Objection 2: Further, all composition requires parts. But the Divine
Nature is incompatible with the notion of a part, for every part
implicates the notion of imperfection. Therefore it is impossible that
the Person of Christ be composed of two natures.
Objection 3: Further, what is composed of others would seem to be
homogeneous with them, as from bodies only a body can be composed.
Therefore if there is anything in Christ composed of the two natures,
it follows that this will not be a person but a nature; and hence the
union in Christ will take place in the nature, which is contrary to
A[2].
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5), "In the
Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, but one hypostasis
composed from both. "
I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two
ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even
as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or
hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the
Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one
subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of
subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as
one being subsists in two.
And thereby the solution to the first is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: This composition of a person from natures is not
so called on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that in
which two things concur may be said to be composed of them.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not verified in every composition, that the
thing composed is homogeneous with its component parts, but only in the
parts of a continuous thing; for the continuous is composed solely of
continuous [parts]. But an animal is composed of soul and body, and
neither of these is an animal.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in Christ there is any union of soul and body?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no union of soul
and body. For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a human
hypostasis is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in Christ,
it follows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But this was
not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal. Therefore in
Christ there would be a person or hypostasis besides the hypostasis of
the Word, which is contrary to [3866]AA[2],3.
Objection 2: Further, from the union of soul and body results the
nature of the human species. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3),
that "we must not conceive a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ. "
Therefore there was no union of soul and body in Him.
Objection 3: Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole
purpose of quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened by
the Word of God Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of life.
Therefore in Christ there was no union of soul and body.
On the contrary, The body is not said to be animated save from its
union with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated, as
the Church chants: "Taking an animate body, He deigned to be born of a
Virgin" [*Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii, Lauds]. Therefore in
Christ there was a union of soul and body.
I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as
being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil. 2:7), "being
made in the likeness of a man. " Now it belongs essentially to the human
species that the soul be united to the body, for the form does not
constitute the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the act of
matter, and this is the terminus of generation through which nature
intends the species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the soul was
united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it destroys
the truth of Christ's humanity.
Reply to Objection 1: This would seem to be the reason which was of
weight with such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ,
viz. lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or
hypostasis in Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body in
mere men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men because the
soul and body are so united in them as to exist by themselves. But in
Christ they are united together, so as to be united to something
higher, which subsists in the nature composed of them. And hence from
the union of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person
does not result, but what is composed of them is united to the already
existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it therefore follow that the
union of the soul and body in Christ is of less effect than in us, for
its union with something nobler does not lessen but increases its
virtue and worth; just as the sensitive soul in animals constitutes the
species, as being considered the ultimate form, yet it does not do so
in man, although it is of greater effect and dignity, and this because
of its union with a further and nobler perfection, viz. the rational
soul, as has been said above (A[2], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Damascene may be taken in two
ways: First, as referring to human nature, which, as it is in one
individual alone, has not the nature of a common species, but only
inasmuch as either it is abstracted from every individual, and
considered in itself by the mind, or according as it is in all
individuals. Now the Son of God did not assume human nature as it
exists in the pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He would
not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said that human
nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists conceived of man
without matter. But in this way the Son of God would not have assumed
flesh, contrary to what is written (Lk. 24:39), "A spirit hath not
flesh and bones as you see Me to have. " Neither can it be said that the
Son of God assumed human nature as it is in all the individuals of the
same species, otherwise He would have assumed all men. Therefore it
remains, as Damascene says further on (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that He
assumed human nature "in atomo," i. e. in an individual; not, indeed, in
another individual which is a suppositum or a person of that nature,
but in the Person of the Son of God.
Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to
human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature
(viz. human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the two
natures Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a third
something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would become
predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he adds:
"For there was not generated, neither will there ever be generated,
another Christ, Who from the Godhead and manhood, and in the Godhead
and manhood, is perfect God and perfect man. "
Reply to Objection 3: There are two principles of corporeal life: one
the effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the
principle of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for
since "in living things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says (De
Anima ii, 37), just as everything is formally by its form, so likewise
the body lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the
Word, Which cannot be the form of a body.
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Whether the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human nature was united to the Word
of God accidentally. For the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) of the Son of
God, that He was "in habit found as a man. " But habit is accidentally
associated with that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for
one of the ten predicaments or as a species of quality. Therefore human
nature is accidentally united to the Son of God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in
being comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can
come or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came
to Christ in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it
came to Him accidentally.
Objection 3: Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or the
essence of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a
substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the
Divine Essence or Nature of the Son of God, for the union did not take
place in the nature, as was said above [3867](A[1]). Hence the human
nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God.
Objection 4: Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the human
nature was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 15), that "the flesh of Christ is the instrument of
the Godhead. " Therefore it seems that the human nature was united to
the Son of God accidentally.
On the contrary, Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates, not
substance, but quantity, or quality, or some other mode of being. If
therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we say Christ is
man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or quantity, or some
other mode of being, which is contrary to the Decretal of Pope
Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): "Since Christ is perfect
God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have some to dare to affirm
that Christ as man is not a substance? "
I answer that, In evidence of this question we must know that two
heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the two
natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches and
Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature resulted, so
that they confessed Christ to be "from" two natures (which were
distinct before the union), but not "in" two natures (the distinction
of nature coming to an end after the union). The second was the heresy
of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the persons. For
they held the Person of the Son of God to be distinct from the Person
of the Son of man, and said these were mutually united: first, "by
indwelling," inasmuch as the Word of God dwelt in the man, as in a
temple; secondly, "by unity of intention," inasmuch as the will of the
man was always in agreement with the will of the Word of God; thirdly,
"by operation," inasmuch as they said the man was the instrument of the
Word of God; fourthly, "by greatness of honor," inasmuch as all honor
shown to the Son of God was equally shown to the Son of man, on account
of His union with the Son of God; fifthly, "by equivocation," i. e.
communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this man is God and the
Son of God. Now it is plain that these modes imply an accidental union.
But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies, through
ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in Christ, but
maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that a man,
composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his conception
assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first opinion set down by
the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But others desirous of keeping the unity
of person, held that the soul of Christ was not united to the body, but
that these two were mutually separate, and were united to the Word
accidentally, so that the number of persons might not be increased. And
this is the third opinion which the Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6).
But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the
first, indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in
Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above
[3868](A[3]). And if stress is laid on the word "person," we must have
in mind that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the
unity of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council (Constantinople II,
coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anathema against such a one as holds
"one person in dignity, honor and adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius
foolishly wrote. " But the other opinion falls into the error of
Nestorius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is no
difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the Man Christ
by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nestorius said), or by putting on
man, as a garment, which is the third opinion; rather it says something
worse than Nestorius---to wit, that the soul and body are not united.
Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid
positions, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place in
the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway, in
a subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council (Constantinople
II, coll. viii, can. 5) we read: "Since the unity may be understood in
many ways, those who follow the impiety of Apollinaris and Eutyches,
professing the destruction of what came together" (i. e. destroying both
natures), "confess a union by mingling; but the followers of Theodore
and Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of purpose. But
the Holy Church of God, rejecting the impiety of both these treasons,
confesses a union of the Word of God with flesh, by composition, which
is in subsistence. " Therefore it is plain that the second of the three
opinions, mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which holds one
hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an
article of Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which holds
two hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union, are not
to be styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in
Councils.
Reply to Objection 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26):
"Examples need not be wholly and at all points similar, for what is
wholly similar is the same, and not an example, and especially in
Divine things, for it is impossible to find a wholly similar example in
the Theology," i. e. in the Godhead of Persons, "and in the
Dispensation," i. e. the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the human
nature in Christ is likened to a habit, i. e. a garment, not indeed in
regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as the Word is seen by the
human nature, as a man by his garment, and also inasmuch as the garment
is changed, for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it
on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account of the garment.
So likewise the human nature assumed by the Word of God is ennobled,
but the Word of God is not changed, as Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 73).
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever accrues after the completion of the
being comes accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the
complete being, just as in the resurrection the body comes to the soul
which pre-exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed unto the
same being, so that the body has vital being through the soul; but it
is not so with whiteness, for the being of whiteness is other than the
being of man to which whiteness comes. But the Word of God from all
eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the
human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed unto one being
inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the body is assumed to the
being of the soul), but to one being inasmuch as this is of the
hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not accidentally united
to the Son of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Accident is divided against substance. Now
substance, as is plain from Metaph. v, 25, is taken in two ways: first,
for essence or nature; secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis---hence
the union having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show that
it is not an accidental union, although the union did not take place in
the nature.
Reply to Objection 4: Not everything that is assumed as an instrument
pertains to the hypostasis of the one who assumes, as is plain in the
case of a saw or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is assumed into the
unity of the hypostasis from being as an instrument, even as the body
of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the human nature was
assumed by the Word merely as an instrument, and not into the unity of
the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede that the man was
really the Son of God, but His instrument. Hence Cyril says (Epist. ad
Monach. Aegyptii): "The Scripture does not affirm that this Emmanuel,"
i. e. Christ, "was assumed for the office of an instrument, but as God
truly humanized," i. e. made man. But Damascene held that the human
nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to the unity of the
hypostasis.
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Whether the union of the Divine nature and the human is anything created?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Divine and human
natures is not anything created. For there can be nothing created in
God, because whatever is in God is God. But the union is in God, for
God Himself is united to human nature. Therefore it seems that the
union is not anything created.
Objection 2: Further, the end holds first place in everything. But the
end of the union is the Divine hypostasis or Person in which the union
is terminated. Therefore it seems that this union ought chiefly to be
judged with reference to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which is
not anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created.
Objection 3: Further, "That which is the cause of a thing being such is
still more so" (Poster. i). But man is said to be the Creator on
account of the union. Therefore much more is the union itself nothing
created, but the Creator.
On the contrary, Whatever has a beginning in time is created. Now this
union was not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore the union is
something created.
I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is a relation which
we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they
come together in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was said above
([3869]FP, Q[13], A[7]), every relation which we consider between God
and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the
relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but
only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in
God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is
not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human
nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is
something created.
Reply to Objection 1: This union is not really in God, but only in our
way of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as
the creature is really united to God without any change in Him.
Reply to Objection 2: The specific nature of a relation, as of motion,
depends on the subject. And since this union has its being nowhere save
in a created nature, as was said above, it follows that it has a
created being.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is called Creator and is God because of the
union, inasmuch as it is terminated in the Divine hypostasis; yet it
does not follow that the union itself is the Creator or God, because
that a thing is said to be created regards its being rather than its
relation.
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Whether union is the same as assumption?
Objection 1: It would seem that union is the same as assumption. For
relations, as motions, are specified by their termini. Now the term of
assumption and union is one and the same, viz. the Divine hypostasis.
Therefore it seems that union and assumption are not different.
Objection 2: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the same thing
seems to be what unites and what assumes, and what is united and what
is assumed. But union and assumption seem to follow the action and
passion of the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming and
the assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as assumption.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "Union is
one thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation,
and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and
humanation determine the end of copulation. " But likewise assumption
does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it seems that union
is the same as assumption.
On the contrary, The Divine Nature is said to be united, not assumed.
I answer that, As was stated above [3870](A[7]), union implies a
certain relation of the Divine Nature and the human, according as they
come together in one Person. Now all relations which begin in time are
brought about by some change; and change consists in action and
passion. Hence the "first" and principal difference between assumption
and union must be said to be that union implies the relation: whereas
assumption implies the action, whereby someone is said to assume, or
the passion, whereby something is said to be assumed. Now from this
difference another "second" difference arises, for assumption implies
"becoming," whereas union implies "having become," and therefore the
thing uniting is said to be united, but the thing assuming is not said
to be assumed. For the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of
assumption unto the Divine hypostasis when man is spoken of; and hence
we can truly say that the Son of God, Who assumes human nature unto
Himself, is man. But human nature, considered in itself, i. e. in the
abstract, is viewed as assumed; and we do not say the Son of God is
human nature. From this same follows a "third" difference, which is
that a relation, especially one of equiparance, is no more to one
extreme than to the other, whereas action and passion bear themselves
differently to the agent and the patient, and to different termini. And
hence assumption determines the term whence and the term whither; for
assumption means a taking to oneself from another. But union determines
none of these things.
feebleness of the human race men's knowledge of God began to grow dim
and their morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a standard of
the restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and later on when
reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and because
the gentiles despised it and would not take it upon themselves, and
they who received it would not keep it, being touched with pity, God
sent His Son, to grant to all remission of their sin and to offer them,
justified, to God the Father. " But if this remedy had been put off till
the end of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all
uprightness of morals would have been swept away from the earth.
Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine power,
which has saved men in several ways---not only by faith in some future
thing, but also by faith in something present and past.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss has in view the mercy of God, which
leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown
the human race by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as
Augustine says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be
compared to the youth of the human race, "on account of the strength
and fervor of faith, which works by charity"; and to old age---i. e. the
sixth age---on account of the number of centuries, for Christ came in
the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be together in a
body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account of
quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine says
elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that "it was not becoming that the
Master by Whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the
highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth. " But
in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that Christ came
in the sixth age---i. e. in the old age---of the human race.
Reply to Objection 2: The work of the Incarnation is to be viewed not
as merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection,
but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been
said.
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says on Jn. 3:11, "For God sent not
His Son into the world to judge the world" (Hom. xxviii): "There are
two comings of Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the
second, to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have
perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God. "
Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put off the coming in mercy
till the end of the world.
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OF THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE (TWELVE ARTICLES)
Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and,
first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the
nature assumed.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature?
(2) Whether it took place in the Person?
(3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?
(4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the
Incarnation?
(5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ?
(6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally?
(7) Whether the union itself is something created?
(8) Whether it is the same as assumption?
(9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union?
(10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about
by grace?
(11) Whether any merits preceded it?
(12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?
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Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took
place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the
Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): "We must understand not two
natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God"; and this could
not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union
of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature.
Objection 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and
the flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form
a certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature.
Objection 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the
other unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the
Divine and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other;
for Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part
ii, act. 1) that the Divine nature "is incarnate"; and Gregory
Nazianzen says (Ep. i ad Cledon. ) that the human nature is "deified,"
as appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11). Therefore from two
natures one seems to have resulted.
On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the Council of
Chalcedon: "We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten Son
of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change,
without division, without separation---the distinction of natures not
having been taken away by the union. " Therefore the union did not take
place in the nature.
I answer that, To make this question clear we must consider what is
"nature. " Now it is to be observed that the word "nature" comes from
nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the
begetting of living beings, which is called "birth" or "sprouting
forth," the word "natura" meaning, as it were, "nascitura. " Afterwards
this word "nature" was taken to signify the principle of this
begetting; and because in living things the principle of generation is
an intrinsic principle, this word "nature" was further employed to
signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii) that "nature is the principle of motion in that in which it
is essentially and not accidentally. " Now this principle is either form
or matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature, and sometimes matter.
And because the end of natural generation, in that which is generated,
is the essence of the species, which the definition signifies, this
essence of the species is called the "nature. " And thus Boethius
defines nature (De Duab. Nat. ): "Nature is what informs a thing with
its specific difference,"---i. e. which perfects the specific
definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signifies the
essence, or the "what-it-is," or the quiddity of the species.
Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union of
the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made of
two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which remain
in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form is
composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones
brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition; and
a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and fashioned to
a figure. And in this way some said the union was by manner of
confusion (which is without order) or by manner of commensuration
(which is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither
composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but accidental;
and hence it would follow that the union of the Incarnation was not
essential, but accidental, which will be disproved later on
[3856](A[6]). Secondly, because thereby we should not have an absolute
unity, but relative only, for there remain several things actually.
Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the
form of a house; and thus one nature would not be constituted in
Christ, as they wish.
Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed,
as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way some have said
that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by manner of
combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is
altogether immutable, as has been said ([3857]FP, Q[9], AA[1],2), hence
neither can it be changed into something else, since it is
incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it cannot
be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same species
with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from any of its
elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His
Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there can be no mingling
of things widely apart; for the species of one of them is absorbed,
e. g. if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon of wine. And hence,
since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there
could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain.
Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but
imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers
members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation.
First, because each nature, i. e. the Divine and the human, has its
specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures
cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as
the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor
after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be
the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would
follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to
several, and thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly, because
Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature:
since any difference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is
said (Metaph. viii, text. 10).
Reply to Objection 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth
Synod (i. e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: "If anyone
proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not
receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human
natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ results,
but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or substance of
the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be anathema. " Hence
the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature
of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in Person.
Reply to Objection 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of
nature and person---results in each individual---of nature inasmuch as
the soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one
nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter
and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the Divine
Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved ([3858]FP, Q[3],
A[8]). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there is
an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the
likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures.
Reply to Objection 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11), the
Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh
personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the
flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15,17), not
by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still
remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch as it
becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did not
take place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct from
His Nature, as we said ([3859]FP, Q[39], A[1]). If, therefore, the
union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take
place in the person.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's human nature has no less dignity than
ours. But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above
([3860]FP, Q[29], A[3], ad 2). Hence, since our human nature has its
proper personality, much more reason was there that Christ's should
have its proper personality.
Objection 3: Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ), a person is an
individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of God assumed an
individual human nature, for "universal human nature does not exist of
itself, but is the object of pure thought," as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ has its
personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place in the
person.
On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act. 5):
"We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into
two persons, but is one and the same only-Begotten Son and Word of
God. " Therefore the union took place in the person.
I answer that, Person has a different meaning from "nature. " For
nature, as has been said [3861](A[1]), designates the specific essence
which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be
added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no
need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature (which
is the individual subsisting in this nature), because every individual
subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its nature. Now in
certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the
notion of the species, viz. accidents and individuating principles,
which appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence
in such as these the nature and the suppositum really differ; not
indeed as if they were wholly separate, but because the suppositum
includes the nature, and in addition certain other things outside the
notion of the species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole
which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and consequently
in such as are composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated
of the suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But
if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or
its nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really
distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is called
"nature" as it is an essence, and a "suppositum" as it is subsisting.
And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in
rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing else than
"an individual substance of rational nature," according to Boethius.
Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person,
whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is
not united to God the Word in person, it is nowise united to Him; and
thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away with, and
Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has
a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His Divine
Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person of the Word,
and not in the nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Although in God Nature and Person are not really
distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch
as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And
because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists
in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or
change, it follows that the union of human nature to the Word of God
took place in the person, and not in the nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity
of a thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity
and perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by
the word "person"). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something
nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature of
Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us,
being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it
exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs
to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of
its union with the nobler form which perfects the species, is more
noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects.
Reply to Objection 3: The Word of God "did not assume human nature in
general, but 'in atomo'"---that is, in an individual---as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of
God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every
individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a
person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which
exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although
it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist
by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence,
too, this is signified by a "person" being defined as "an individual
substance," for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a
substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of
individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality,
because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect,
viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the
person.
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Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or
hypostasis?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did not
take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii): "Both the Divine and human substance are
one Son of God, but they are one thing [aliud] by reason of the Word
and another thing [aliud] by reason of the man. " And Pope Leo says in
his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): "One of these is glorious with
miracles, the other succumbs under injuries. " But "one" [aliud] and
"the other" [aliud] differ in suppositum. Therefore the union of the
Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum.
Objection 2: Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a "particular
substance," as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ). But it is plain that in
Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of
the Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these.
Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis of
the Word.
Objection 3: Further, the hypostasis of the Word is not included in any
genus or species, as is plain from [3862]FP, Q[3], A[5]. But Christ,
inasmuch as He is made man, is contained under the species of man; for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Within the limits of our nature He came,
Who far surpasses the whole order of nature supersubstantially. " Now
nothing is contained under the human species unless it be a hypostasis
of the human species. Therefore in Christ there is another hypostasis
besides the hypostasis of the Word of God; and hence the same
conclusion follows as above.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5): "In our
Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis. "
I answer that, Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to
person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ, held,
nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of God and another of man,
and hence that the union took place in the person and not in the
hypostasis. Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous. First,
because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate nature, viz.
rational, according to what Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ), "a person is
an individual substance of rational nature"; and hence it is the same
to attribute to the human nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a
proper person. And the holy Fathers, seeing this, condemned both in the
Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying: "If anyone seeks to
introduce into the mystery of the Incarnation two subsistences or two
persons, let him be anathema. For by the incarnation of one of the Holy
Trinity, God the Word, the Holy Trinity received no augment of person
or subsistence. " Now "subsistence" is the same as the subsisting thing,
which is proper to hypostasis, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab.
Nat. ). Secondly, because if it is granted that person adds to
hypostasis something in which the union can take place, this something
is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according as it
is said by some that a person is a "hypostasis distinguished by a
property pertaining to dignity. " If, therefore, the union took place in
the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that the union only
took place in regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the
approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in
these terms: "If anyone after the uniting divides the subsistences in
the one Christ, only joining them in a union of dignity or authority or
power, and not rather in a concourse of natural union, let him be
anathema. " Thirdly, because to the hypostasis alone are attributed the
operations and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to the
nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, and is
risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise this man is said to be a
suppositum, because he underlies [supponitur] whatever belongs to man
and receives its predication. Therefore, if there is any hypostasis in
Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that whatever
pertains to man is verified of some other than the Word, e. g. that He
was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was buried. And this,
too, was condemned with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part
iii, can. 4) in these words: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or
subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic
Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or by Himself of
Himself, and, moreover, applies some of them to the man, taken as
distinct from the Word of God, and some of them (as if they could be
used of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be
anathema. " Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long since by the
Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases, or two
supposita, or that the union did not take place in the hypostasis or
suppositum. Hence in the same Synod (can. 2) it is said: "If anyone
does not confess that the Word was united to flesh in subsistence, and
that Christ with His flesh is both---to wit, God and man---let him be
anathema. "
Reply to Objection 1: As accidental difference makes a thing "other"
[alterum], so essential difference makes "another thing" [aliud]. Now
it is plain that the "otherness" which springs from accidental
difference may pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in created
things, since the same thing numerically can underlie different
accidents.
But it does not happen in created things that the same
numerically can subsist in divers essences or natures. Hence just as
when we speak of "otherness" in regard to creatures we do not signify
diversity of suppositum, but only diversity of accidental forms, so
likewise when Christ is said to be one thing or another thing, we do
not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but diversity of
nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a letter to Chelidonius (Ep.
ci): "In the Saviour we may find one thing and another, yet He is not
one person and another. And I say 'one thing and another'; whereas, on
the contrary, in the Trinity we say one Person and another (so as not
to confuse the subsistences), but not one thing and another. "
Reply to Objection 2: Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not
in every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union
with something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a
hand or a foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is
a particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or
suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz. the
whole Christ, as He is God and man. But the complete being with which
it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum.
Reply to Objection 3: In created things a singular thing is placed in a
genus or species, not on account of what belongs to its individuation,
but on account of its nature, which springs from its form, and in
composite things individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we say
that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature assumed,
and not by reason of the hypostasis.
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Whether after the Incarnation the Person or Hypostasis of Christ is
composite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Person of Christ is not composite.
For the Person of Christ is naught else than the Person or hypostasis
of the Word, as appears from what has been said [3863](A[2]). But in
the Word, Person and Nature do not differ, as appears from [3864]FP,
Q[39], A[1]. Therefore since the Nature of the Word is simple, as was
shown above ([3865]FP, Q[3], A[7]), it is impossible that the Person of
Christ be composite.
Objection 2: Further, all composition requires parts. But the Divine
Nature is incompatible with the notion of a part, for every part
implicates the notion of imperfection. Therefore it is impossible that
the Person of Christ be composed of two natures.
Objection 3: Further, what is composed of others would seem to be
homogeneous with them, as from bodies only a body can be composed.
Therefore if there is anything in Christ composed of the two natures,
it follows that this will not be a person but a nature; and hence the
union in Christ will take place in the nature, which is contrary to
A[2].
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5), "In the
Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, but one hypostasis
composed from both. "
I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two
ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even
as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or
hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the
Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one
subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of
subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as
one being subsists in two.
And thereby the solution to the first is clear.
Reply to Objection 2: This composition of a person from natures is not
so called on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that in
which two things concur may be said to be composed of them.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not verified in every composition, that the
thing composed is homogeneous with its component parts, but only in the
parts of a continuous thing; for the continuous is composed solely of
continuous [parts]. But an animal is composed of soul and body, and
neither of these is an animal.
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Whether in Christ there is any union of soul and body?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no union of soul
and body. For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a human
hypostasis is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in Christ,
it follows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But this was
not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal. Therefore in
Christ there would be a person or hypostasis besides the hypostasis of
the Word, which is contrary to [3866]AA[2],3.
Objection 2: Further, from the union of soul and body results the
nature of the human species. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3),
that "we must not conceive a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ. "
Therefore there was no union of soul and body in Him.
Objection 3: Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole
purpose of quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened by
the Word of God Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of life.
Therefore in Christ there was no union of soul and body.
On the contrary, The body is not said to be animated save from its
union with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated, as
the Church chants: "Taking an animate body, He deigned to be born of a
Virgin" [*Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii, Lauds]. Therefore in
Christ there was a union of soul and body.
I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as
being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil. 2:7), "being
made in the likeness of a man. " Now it belongs essentially to the human
species that the soul be united to the body, for the form does not
constitute the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the act of
matter, and this is the terminus of generation through which nature
intends the species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the soul was
united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it destroys
the truth of Christ's humanity.
Reply to Objection 1: This would seem to be the reason which was of
weight with such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ,
viz. lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or
hypostasis in Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body in
mere men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men because the
soul and body are so united in them as to exist by themselves. But in
Christ they are united together, so as to be united to something
higher, which subsists in the nature composed of them. And hence from
the union of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person
does not result, but what is composed of them is united to the already
existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it therefore follow that the
union of the soul and body in Christ is of less effect than in us, for
its union with something nobler does not lessen but increases its
virtue and worth; just as the sensitive soul in animals constitutes the
species, as being considered the ultimate form, yet it does not do so
in man, although it is of greater effect and dignity, and this because
of its union with a further and nobler perfection, viz. the rational
soul, as has been said above (A[2], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Damascene may be taken in two
ways: First, as referring to human nature, which, as it is in one
individual alone, has not the nature of a common species, but only
inasmuch as either it is abstracted from every individual, and
considered in itself by the mind, or according as it is in all
individuals. Now the Son of God did not assume human nature as it
exists in the pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He would
not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said that human
nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists conceived of man
without matter. But in this way the Son of God would not have assumed
flesh, contrary to what is written (Lk. 24:39), "A spirit hath not
flesh and bones as you see Me to have. " Neither can it be said that the
Son of God assumed human nature as it is in all the individuals of the
same species, otherwise He would have assumed all men. Therefore it
remains, as Damascene says further on (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that He
assumed human nature "in atomo," i. e. in an individual; not, indeed, in
another individual which is a suppositum or a person of that nature,
but in the Person of the Son of God.
Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to
human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature
(viz. human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the two
natures Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a third
something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would become
predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he adds:
"For there was not generated, neither will there ever be generated,
another Christ, Who from the Godhead and manhood, and in the Godhead
and manhood, is perfect God and perfect man. "
Reply to Objection 3: There are two principles of corporeal life: one
the effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the
principle of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for
since "in living things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says (De
Anima ii, 37), just as everything is formally by its form, so likewise
the body lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the
Word, Which cannot be the form of a body.
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Whether the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human nature was united to the Word
of God accidentally. For the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) of the Son of
God, that He was "in habit found as a man. " But habit is accidentally
associated with that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for
one of the ten predicaments or as a species of quality. Therefore human
nature is accidentally united to the Son of God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in
being comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can
come or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came
to Christ in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it
came to Him accidentally.
Objection 3: Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or the
essence of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a
substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the
Divine Essence or Nature of the Son of God, for the union did not take
place in the nature, as was said above [3867](A[1]). Hence the human
nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God.
Objection 4: Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the human
nature was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 15), that "the flesh of Christ is the instrument of
the Godhead. " Therefore it seems that the human nature was united to
the Son of God accidentally.
On the contrary, Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates, not
substance, but quantity, or quality, or some other mode of being. If
therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we say Christ is
man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or quantity, or some
other mode of being, which is contrary to the Decretal of Pope
Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): "Since Christ is perfect
God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have some to dare to affirm
that Christ as man is not a substance? "
I answer that, In evidence of this question we must know that two
heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the two
natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches and
Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature resulted, so
that they confessed Christ to be "from" two natures (which were
distinct before the union), but not "in" two natures (the distinction
of nature coming to an end after the union). The second was the heresy
of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the persons. For
they held the Person of the Son of God to be distinct from the Person
of the Son of man, and said these were mutually united: first, "by
indwelling," inasmuch as the Word of God dwelt in the man, as in a
temple; secondly, "by unity of intention," inasmuch as the will of the
man was always in agreement with the will of the Word of God; thirdly,
"by operation," inasmuch as they said the man was the instrument of the
Word of God; fourthly, "by greatness of honor," inasmuch as all honor
shown to the Son of God was equally shown to the Son of man, on account
of His union with the Son of God; fifthly, "by equivocation," i. e.
communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this man is God and the
Son of God. Now it is plain that these modes imply an accidental union.
But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies, through
ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in Christ, but
maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that a man,
composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his conception
assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first opinion set down by
the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But others desirous of keeping the unity
of person, held that the soul of Christ was not united to the body, but
that these two were mutually separate, and were united to the Word
accidentally, so that the number of persons might not be increased. And
this is the third opinion which the Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6).
But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the
first, indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in
Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above
[3868](A[3]). And if stress is laid on the word "person," we must have
in mind that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the
unity of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council (Constantinople II,
coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anathema against such a one as holds
"one person in dignity, honor and adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius
foolishly wrote. " But the other opinion falls into the error of
Nestorius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is no
difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the Man Christ
by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nestorius said), or by putting on
man, as a garment, which is the third opinion; rather it says something
worse than Nestorius---to wit, that the soul and body are not united.
Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid
positions, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place in
the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway, in
a subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council (Constantinople
II, coll. viii, can. 5) we read: "Since the unity may be understood in
many ways, those who follow the impiety of Apollinaris and Eutyches,
professing the destruction of what came together" (i. e. destroying both
natures), "confess a union by mingling; but the followers of Theodore
and Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of purpose. But
the Holy Church of God, rejecting the impiety of both these treasons,
confesses a union of the Word of God with flesh, by composition, which
is in subsistence. " Therefore it is plain that the second of the three
opinions, mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which holds one
hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an
article of Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which holds
two hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union, are not
to be styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in
Councils.
Reply to Objection 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26):
"Examples need not be wholly and at all points similar, for what is
wholly similar is the same, and not an example, and especially in
Divine things, for it is impossible to find a wholly similar example in
the Theology," i. e. in the Godhead of Persons, "and in the
Dispensation," i. e. the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the human
nature in Christ is likened to a habit, i. e. a garment, not indeed in
regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as the Word is seen by the
human nature, as a man by his garment, and also inasmuch as the garment
is changed, for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it
on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account of the garment.
So likewise the human nature assumed by the Word of God is ennobled,
but the Word of God is not changed, as Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 73).
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever accrues after the completion of the
being comes accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the
complete being, just as in the resurrection the body comes to the soul
which pre-exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed unto the
same being, so that the body has vital being through the soul; but it
is not so with whiteness, for the being of whiteness is other than the
being of man to which whiteness comes. But the Word of God from all
eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the
human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed unto one being
inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the body is assumed to the
being of the soul), but to one being inasmuch as this is of the
hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not accidentally united
to the Son of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Accident is divided against substance. Now
substance, as is plain from Metaph. v, 25, is taken in two ways: first,
for essence or nature; secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis---hence
the union having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show that
it is not an accidental union, although the union did not take place in
the nature.
Reply to Objection 4: Not everything that is assumed as an instrument
pertains to the hypostasis of the one who assumes, as is plain in the
case of a saw or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is assumed into the
unity of the hypostasis from being as an instrument, even as the body
of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the human nature was
assumed by the Word merely as an instrument, and not into the unity of
the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede that the man was
really the Son of God, but His instrument. Hence Cyril says (Epist. ad
Monach. Aegyptii): "The Scripture does not affirm that this Emmanuel,"
i. e. Christ, "was assumed for the office of an instrument, but as God
truly humanized," i. e. made man. But Damascene held that the human
nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to the unity of the
hypostasis.
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Whether the union of the Divine nature and the human is anything created?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Divine and human
natures is not anything created. For there can be nothing created in
God, because whatever is in God is God. But the union is in God, for
God Himself is united to human nature. Therefore it seems that the
union is not anything created.
Objection 2: Further, the end holds first place in everything. But the
end of the union is the Divine hypostasis or Person in which the union
is terminated. Therefore it seems that this union ought chiefly to be
judged with reference to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which is
not anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created.
Objection 3: Further, "That which is the cause of a thing being such is
still more so" (Poster. i). But man is said to be the Creator on
account of the union. Therefore much more is the union itself nothing
created, but the Creator.
On the contrary, Whatever has a beginning in time is created. Now this
union was not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore the union is
something created.
I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is a relation which
we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they
come together in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was said above
([3869]FP, Q[13], A[7]), every relation which we consider between God
and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the
relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but
only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in
God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is
not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human
nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is
something created.
Reply to Objection 1: This union is not really in God, but only in our
way of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as
the creature is really united to God without any change in Him.
Reply to Objection 2: The specific nature of a relation, as of motion,
depends on the subject. And since this union has its being nowhere save
in a created nature, as was said above, it follows that it has a
created being.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is called Creator and is God because of the
union, inasmuch as it is terminated in the Divine hypostasis; yet it
does not follow that the union itself is the Creator or God, because
that a thing is said to be created regards its being rather than its
relation.
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Whether union is the same as assumption?
Objection 1: It would seem that union is the same as assumption. For
relations, as motions, are specified by their termini. Now the term of
assumption and union is one and the same, viz. the Divine hypostasis.
Therefore it seems that union and assumption are not different.
Objection 2: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the same thing
seems to be what unites and what assumes, and what is united and what
is assumed. But union and assumption seem to follow the action and
passion of the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming and
the assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as assumption.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "Union is
one thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation,
and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and
humanation determine the end of copulation. " But likewise assumption
does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it seems that union
is the same as assumption.
On the contrary, The Divine Nature is said to be united, not assumed.
I answer that, As was stated above [3870](A[7]), union implies a
certain relation of the Divine Nature and the human, according as they
come together in one Person. Now all relations which begin in time are
brought about by some change; and change consists in action and
passion. Hence the "first" and principal difference between assumption
and union must be said to be that union implies the relation: whereas
assumption implies the action, whereby someone is said to assume, or
the passion, whereby something is said to be assumed. Now from this
difference another "second" difference arises, for assumption implies
"becoming," whereas union implies "having become," and therefore the
thing uniting is said to be united, but the thing assuming is not said
to be assumed. For the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of
assumption unto the Divine hypostasis when man is spoken of; and hence
we can truly say that the Son of God, Who assumes human nature unto
Himself, is man. But human nature, considered in itself, i. e. in the
abstract, is viewed as assumed; and we do not say the Son of God is
human nature. From this same follows a "third" difference, which is
that a relation, especially one of equiparance, is no more to one
extreme than to the other, whereas action and passion bear themselves
differently to the agent and the patient, and to different termini. And
hence assumption determines the term whence and the term whither; for
assumption means a taking to oneself from another. But union determines
none of these things.
