Reply to Objection 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible
species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process
of reason, as stated above.
species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process
of reason, as stated above.
Summa Theologica
Therefore habits cannot increase.
On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the
disciples said to our Lord (Lk. 17:5): "Lord, increase our faith. "
Therefore habits increase.
I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is
transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on
account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal
things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities,
a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of
quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in
man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms,
we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the
nature of perfection, therefore "in things which are great, but not in
quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says
(De Trin. vi, 8).
Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation
of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of
a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be
"little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science.
But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the
participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or
"less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this
distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a
being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to
consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to
consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.
In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers
concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius
relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the
other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were
susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and
so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of
matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of
themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things
affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect of
the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not
more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in
the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the
Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they held that
some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for
instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. The fourth
opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms
are not susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are.
In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe
that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be
something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for
whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and
whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more
or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text.
10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or
subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at
all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect
of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in
itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more
nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are
not denominated from a relation to something else: and much more so,
substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive
their species from something to which they are related, can be
diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and
nonetheless they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness
of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their
species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more
remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the
oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same
thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of health, according
as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which
various dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is therefore
variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health
remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself
may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it
always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may
decrease and still remain health. "
Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of
excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the
most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or
less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or
decrease of itself, and how it cannot.
But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by
the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are
susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the
cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be
susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And
therefore every form which is participated substantially by its
subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus
of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity
is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore
is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less.
Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing
receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made.
But other qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are
connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less,
in respect of their participation by the subject.
Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity.
For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must
remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible.
Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated
more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect
of that form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated
more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10)
that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is
in the species of substance," that is, in respect of its participation
of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter,"
i. e. in respect of material dispositions, "more or less are found in
substance. "
Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially
indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must needs
participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do
not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more or
less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible
unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity,
which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long,
three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble,
and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.
This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of
more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle
or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": to wit, because
indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever
participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility.
It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in
respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two
ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and
dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for
instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science,
which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of
participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is
participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse
aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and
disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they
essentially imply indivisibility.
We shall say further on ([1472]Q[66], A[1]) how it is with the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: As the word "great" is taken from corporeal
quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so
also is the word "growth," the term of which is something great.
Reply to Objection 2: Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a
perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term
giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a
habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers.
Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more
or less.
Reply to Objection 3: Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities
of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the
first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there
follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like
manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive
appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration
follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).
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Whether habits increases by addition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of
addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred to
forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is
no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is
said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing. "
Therefore in habits also there is no increase without addition.
Objection 2: Further, habit is not increased except by means of some
agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for
instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated.
Therefore there is no increase without addition.
Objection 3: Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to
be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more
white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the
addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made
more white, except by an added whiteness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which
is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot,
that was not hot, when the thing was less hot. " Therefore, in like
manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase.
I answer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have
said above [1473](A[1]). For we said that increase and decrease in
forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way
not on the part of the very form considered in itself, through the
diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase
of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to
form; but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and
the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is
made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to participate a form, not as
though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text.
32, so, by an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot,
as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though
something were added to the form.
For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition,
this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject. If it
be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated
[1474](A[1]) that such an addition or subtraction would change the
species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from
being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be
understood as applying to the subject, this could only be either
because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not
previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man who, after being
cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because
some other subject is added sharing in the same form (as when a hot
thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in
either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing,
but a greater white or hot thing.
Since, however, as stated above [1475](A[1]), certain accidents are of
themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find
increase by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to
the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species
remains the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement
increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i. e. in so
far as the same movement can be executed more or less speedily or
readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition;
thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same
specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science
increases, as to the subject's participation thereof, in intensity, in
so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering
the same conclusions.
As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive
increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be simply
healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be
brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in
the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in
intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them.
How this question affects virtues we shall state further on
([1476]Q[66], A[1] ).
Reply to Objection 1: Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First,
by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living
things. Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such
is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in Phys.
iv, text. 63.
Reply to Objection 2: The cause that increases a habit, always effects
something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject
to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form
to extend further.
Reply to Objection 3: What is not already white, is potentially white,
as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a
new form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in
potentiality to those forms, since it has them already actually: but it
is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it
receives through the agent's action.
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Whether every act increases its habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when
the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of
habits, as stated above ([1477]Q[51], A[2]). Therefore a habit
increases when its acts are multiplied.
Objection 2: Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed.
But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike
(Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act
should increase it.
Objection 3: Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like
the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.
On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause.
But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they
proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not
every act that increases a habit.
I answer that, "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now
things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being
the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different
mode of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white,
but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from
less white to more white, even as from one opposite to another, as
stated in Phys. v, text. 52.
But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above
([1478]Q[50], A[5]); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or
may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing
an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.
Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to
the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either
increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may speak
of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For
not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's size as
neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the
multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body. So,
too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls
short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an
increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
From this it is clear how to solve the objections.
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HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?
(2) Whether it can be diminished?
(3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?
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Whether a habit can be corrupted?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit
is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant to
act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted.
Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject
remains.
Objection 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either
to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases
through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now
science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its
subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance
that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, text. 65). In like manner, neither
can it be lost through the action of its contrary: since intelligible
species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52).
Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost.
Objection 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement. But
the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a
direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved
directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of the
body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the
intelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect
independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which
reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or
through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the same
reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are
in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 10),
"virtue is more lasting than learning. "
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
"forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science. " Moreover,
by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are
engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).
I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary;
indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore a habit
has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be
corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits---for
instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an
incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are,
however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible
subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such
is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the "possible"
intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as
stated above ([1479]Q[50], A[3], ad 3). Consequently the habit of
science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible"
intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.
We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted
directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the
part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted
directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly.
Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the
"possible" intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active intellect,
which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in
the "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the
active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly and
indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both
speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any
forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about
prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost by being forgotten. "
There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the
reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to
the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the
part of those very propositions which are the starting point of the
reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the
assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the
process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is contrary
to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a
false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of
science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception
is the corruption of science. " As to virtues, some of them are
intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and
to these applies what we have said of science and opinion. Some,
however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the
soul; and the same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of
the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it to
be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice,
may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is
contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or
deliberate choice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a
second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while
the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a
habit is removed, though with difficulty.
Reply to Objection 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible
species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process
of reason, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the
body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may
prove an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in
its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by
corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can
corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the
habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless
when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must
be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act:
because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas
the use of learning does not.
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Whether a habit can diminish?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a
habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed
either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it
cannot diminish.
Objection 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by
reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not
become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow
that a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less. And
if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject,
it would follow that something is accidental to a habit, proper thereto
and not common to the habit and its subject. Now whenever a form has
something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate,
as stated in De Anima i, text. 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a
separable form; which is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any
accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined
with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become
more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its inherence in its
subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense.
On the contrary, It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the
same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore a
habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish.
I answer that, Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as
we have already explained ([1480]Q[52], A[1]). And since they increase
through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they
diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them: since the
diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even
as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of
its increase.
Reply to Objection 1: A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form.
It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the
different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to
the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its
being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a
greater or a smaller number of things.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold, if the essence itself
of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but
that a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not
in the habit, but in its subject.
Reply to Objection 3: No matter how we take an accident, its very
notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if
we take an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject,
which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject:
for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white. " Accordingly in
defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as
though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but we
give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say
that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose. " But if we take accidents
in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in
the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the
accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness. "
Accordingly in defining this kind of accident, we place the subject as
the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a
"simum" is a "snub-nose. " Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident
on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence of the
accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the
concrete. Such are increase and decrease in certain accidents:
wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to
a white thing. The same applies to habits and other qualities; save
that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits
increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we have already clearly
explained ([1481]Q[52], A[2]).
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Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished
through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than
passion-like qualities, as we have explained above ([1482]Q[49], A[2],
ad 3;[1483] Q[50], A[1]). But passion-like qualities are neither
corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not
lessened through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to
make something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or
corrupted through cessation from act.
Objection 2: Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now
nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation
from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit
can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
Objection 3: Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the
intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above
time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither,
therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through length of
time, if one fails for long to exercise them.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of
science. " Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse
has dissolved many a friendship. " In like manner other habits of virtue
are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.
I answer that, As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of
movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement
by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly,
indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this
latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results
through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we cease from
exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened
that habit. For it has been stated [1484](A[1]) that habits are
destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency.
Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary
agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those
habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation
from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue.
For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to
choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use
of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds,
the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe
the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination of the sensitive
appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed
or lessened through cessation from act. The same applies to the
intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those
things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to
make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in
opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those
fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his
intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and
sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus the
intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation
from act.
Reply to Objection 1: Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to
give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat
were to increase.
Reply to Objection 2: Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive
of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual part of the soul, considered in
itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and
therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of
the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence
the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
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OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether many habits can be in one power?
(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
(3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
(4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?
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Whether many habits can be in one power?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one
power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the same
thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and
powers are distinguished in respect of the same thing, viz. their acts
and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore
there cannot be many habits in one power.
Objection 2: Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple
subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is the
cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can
proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits in
one power.
Objection 3: Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is
a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the
same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed
at the same time by many habits. Therefore several habits cannot be at
the same time in one power.
On the contrary, The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are
the habits of various sciences.
I answer that, As stated above ([1485]Q[49], A[4]), habits are
dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to
nature, or to operation, which is the end of nature. As to those habits
which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in
one same subject: since in one subject we may take parts in various
ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are
various habits. Thus, if we take the humors as being parts of the human
body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we
have the habit or disposition of health: while, if we take like parts,
such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect
of nature is strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i. e.
the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion to
nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in
the same subject.
If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to
operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, there may be
several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of
a habit is a passive power, as stated above ([1486]Q[51], A[2]): for it
is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was
clearly shown above ([1487]Q[51], A[2]). Now a passive power is
compared to the determinate act of any species, as matter to form:
because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so,
too, is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object
to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move
one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several
acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are qualities or
forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a
determinate species. Consequently several habits, even as several
specifically different acts, can belong to one power.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as in natural things, diversity of species
is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter,
as stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter
belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity of objects
entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in
Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ generically belong to
different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of
objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of
habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in species, but not
vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in
species: but it does not follow that different habits are in different
powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may
be included in one genus, and several species be contained in one
species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and
powers.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a power is simple as to its essence, it
is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically
different acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many
superficially different habits from being in one power.
Reply to Objection 3: A body is informed by its shape as by its own
terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a
power, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate
term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at the same
time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another;
just as neither can a body have several shapes, save in so far as one
shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided figure. For
the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time
"actually"; and yet it can know several things at the same time
"habitually. "
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Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their
objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of
science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the
unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects
specifically distinct.
Objection 2: Further, different sciences are different habits. But the
same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both the
physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in
Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by their
objects.
Objection 3: Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the
same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if it
be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be
done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in
order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object
can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits does
not follow diversity of objects.
On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of
their objects, as stated above ([1488]Q[18], A[5]). But habits are
dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according
to the diversity of objects.
I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific
distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms
differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is
proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one another
in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every
agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to
something: and all things that imply order to something, are
distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they
are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order:
viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature.
Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three
things. First, in respect of the active principles of such
dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of
specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows.
Reply to Objection 1: In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must
consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which
may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction
between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they are both
known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And
consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of
cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.
Reply to Objection 2: The physicist proves the earth to be round by one
means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means
of mathematics, e. g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the
sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e. g. by the
movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the
whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism producing
science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And
consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect
of which the habits of science are distinguished.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89;
Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is
in speculative matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a
diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does.
Moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above
all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said
([1489]Q[18], A[6];[1490] Q[19], A[2], ad 1;[1491] Q[34], A[4]).
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Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not divided into good and
bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards
contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are
not divided into good and bad.
Objection 2: Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it
is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the
Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation
and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits
cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, there can be different evil habits about one same
object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of
concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for
instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philosopher
clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into
good and bad.
On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to
vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits.
I answer that, As stated above [1492](A[2]), habits are specifically
distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles,
but also in their relation to nature. Now, this happens in two ways.
First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In
this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since
a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's
nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable
to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since
they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from
human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that
habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and
bad.
Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact
that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature,
while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And
thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is
distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act
befitting some higher nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The same habit may be about contraries in so far
as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it
happen that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of
habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided
into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another
bad; but not by reason of one habit being something good, and another
about something bad.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the good which is common to every
being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but
some determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate,
viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a
difference of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate
repugnant to a determinate nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Several good habits about one same specific thing
are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as
stated above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are
distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which is in
keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are
contrary to one virtue.
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Whether one habit is made up of many habits?
Objection 1: It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits.
For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems to
be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once,
but little by little out of several acts, as stated above ([1493]Q[51],
A[3]). Therefore one habit is made up of several.
Objection 2: Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts
are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude,
temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
Objection 3: Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a
habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to but one
science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one
habit is made up of many.
On the contrary, A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form.
On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the
disciples said to our Lord (Lk. 17:5): "Lord, increase our faith. "
Therefore habits increase.
I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is
transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on
account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal
things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities,
a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of
quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in
man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms,
we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the
nature of perfection, therefore "in things which are great, but not in
quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says
(De Trin. vi, 8).
Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation
of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of
a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be
"little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science.
But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the
participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or
"less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this
distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a
being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to
consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to
consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.
In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers
concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius
relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the
other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were
susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and
so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of
matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of
themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things
affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect of
the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not
more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in
the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the
Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they held that
some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for
instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. The fourth
opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms
are not susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are.
In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe
that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be
something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for
whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and
whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more
or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text.
10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or
subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at
all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect
of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in
itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more
nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are
not denominated from a relation to something else: and much more so,
substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive
their species from something to which they are related, can be
diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and
nonetheless they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness
of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their
species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more
remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the
oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same
thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of health, according
as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which
various dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is therefore
variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health
remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself
may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it
always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may
decrease and still remain health. "
Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of
excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the
most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or
less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or
decrease of itself, and how it cannot.
But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by
the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are
susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the
cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be
susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And
therefore every form which is participated substantially by its
subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus
of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity
is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore
is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less.
Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing
receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made.
But other qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are
connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less,
in respect of their participation by the subject.
Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity.
For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must
remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible.
Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated
more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect
of that form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated
more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10)
that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is
in the species of substance," that is, in respect of its participation
of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter,"
i. e. in respect of material dispositions, "more or less are found in
substance. "
Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially
indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must needs
participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do
not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more or
less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible
unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity,
which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long,
three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble,
and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.
This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of
more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle
or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": to wit, because
indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever
participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility.
It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in
respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two
ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and
dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for
instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science,
which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of
participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is
participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse
aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and
disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they
essentially imply indivisibility.
We shall say further on ([1472]Q[66], A[1]) how it is with the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: As the word "great" is taken from corporeal
quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so
also is the word "growth," the term of which is something great.
Reply to Objection 2: Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a
perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term
giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a
habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers.
Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more
or less.
Reply to Objection 3: Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities
of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the
first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there
follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like
manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive
appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration
follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).
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Whether habits increases by addition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of
addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred to
forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is
no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is
said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing. "
Therefore in habits also there is no increase without addition.
Objection 2: Further, habit is not increased except by means of some
agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for
instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated.
Therefore there is no increase without addition.
Objection 3: Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to
be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more
white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the
addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made
more white, except by an added whiteness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which
is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot,
that was not hot, when the thing was less hot. " Therefore, in like
manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase.
I answer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have
said above [1473](A[1]). For we said that increase and decrease in
forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way
not on the part of the very form considered in itself, through the
diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase
of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to
form; but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and
the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is
made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to participate a form, not as
though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text.
32, so, by an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot,
as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though
something were added to the form.
For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition,
this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject. If it
be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated
[1474](A[1]) that such an addition or subtraction would change the
species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from
being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be
understood as applying to the subject, this could only be either
because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not
previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man who, after being
cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because
some other subject is added sharing in the same form (as when a hot
thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in
either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing,
but a greater white or hot thing.
Since, however, as stated above [1475](A[1]), certain accidents are of
themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find
increase by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to
the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species
remains the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement
increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i. e. in so
far as the same movement can be executed more or less speedily or
readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition;
thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same
specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science
increases, as to the subject's participation thereof, in intensity, in
so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering
the same conclusions.
As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive
increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be simply
healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be
brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in
the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in
intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them.
How this question affects virtues we shall state further on
([1476]Q[66], A[1] ).
Reply to Objection 1: Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First,
by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living
things. Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such
is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in Phys.
iv, text. 63.
Reply to Objection 2: The cause that increases a habit, always effects
something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject
to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form
to extend further.
Reply to Objection 3: What is not already white, is potentially white,
as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a
new form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in
potentiality to those forms, since it has them already actually: but it
is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it
receives through the agent's action.
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Whether every act increases its habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when
the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of
habits, as stated above ([1477]Q[51], A[2]). Therefore a habit
increases when its acts are multiplied.
Objection 2: Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed.
But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike
(Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act
should increase it.
Objection 3: Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like
the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.
On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause.
But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they
proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not
every act that increases a habit.
I answer that, "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now
things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being
the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different
mode of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white,
but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from
less white to more white, even as from one opposite to another, as
stated in Phys. v, text. 52.
But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above
([1478]Q[50], A[5]); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or
may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing
an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.
Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to
the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either
increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may speak
of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For
not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's size as
neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the
multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body. So,
too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls
short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an
increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
From this it is clear how to solve the objections.
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HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?
(2) Whether it can be diminished?
(3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?
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Whether a habit can be corrupted?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit
is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant to
act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted.
Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject
remains.
Objection 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either
to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases
through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now
science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its
subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance
that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, text. 65). In like manner, neither
can it be lost through the action of its contrary: since intelligible
species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52).
Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost.
Objection 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement. But
the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a
direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved
directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of the
body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the
intelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect
independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which
reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or
through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the same
reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are
in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 10),
"virtue is more lasting than learning. "
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
"forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science. " Moreover,
by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are
engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).
I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary;
indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore a habit
has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be
corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits---for
instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an
incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are,
however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible
subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such
is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the "possible"
intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as
stated above ([1479]Q[50], A[3], ad 3). Consequently the habit of
science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible"
intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.
We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted
directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the
part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted
directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly.
Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the
"possible" intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active intellect,
which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in
the "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the
active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly and
indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both
speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any
forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about
prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost by being forgotten. "
There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the
reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to
the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the
part of those very propositions which are the starting point of the
reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the
assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the
process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is contrary
to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a
false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of
science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception
is the corruption of science. " As to virtues, some of them are
intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and
to these applies what we have said of science and opinion. Some,
however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the
soul; and the same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of
the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it to
be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice,
may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is
contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or
deliberate choice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a
second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while
the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a
habit is removed, though with difficulty.
Reply to Objection 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible
species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process
of reason, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the
body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may
prove an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in
its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by
corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can
corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the
habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless
when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must
be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act:
because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas
the use of learning does not.
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Whether a habit can diminish?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a
habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed
either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it
cannot diminish.
Objection 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by
reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not
become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow
that a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less. And
if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject,
it would follow that something is accidental to a habit, proper thereto
and not common to the habit and its subject. Now whenever a form has
something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate,
as stated in De Anima i, text. 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a
separable form; which is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any
accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined
with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become
more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its inherence in its
subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense.
On the contrary, It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the
same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore a
habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish.
I answer that, Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as
we have already explained ([1480]Q[52], A[1]). And since they increase
through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they
diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them: since the
diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even
as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of
its increase.
Reply to Objection 1: A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form.
It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the
different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to
the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its
being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a
greater or a smaller number of things.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold, if the essence itself
of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but
that a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not
in the habit, but in its subject.
Reply to Objection 3: No matter how we take an accident, its very
notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if
we take an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject,
which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject:
for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white. " Accordingly in
defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as
though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but we
give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say
that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose. " But if we take accidents
in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in
the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the
accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness. "
Accordingly in defining this kind of accident, we place the subject as
the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a
"simum" is a "snub-nose. " Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident
on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence of the
accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the
concrete. Such are increase and decrease in certain accidents:
wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to
a white thing. The same applies to habits and other qualities; save
that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits
increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we have already clearly
explained ([1481]Q[52], A[2]).
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Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished
through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than
passion-like qualities, as we have explained above ([1482]Q[49], A[2],
ad 3;[1483] Q[50], A[1]). But passion-like qualities are neither
corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not
lessened through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to
make something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or
corrupted through cessation from act.
Objection 2: Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now
nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation
from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit
can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.
Objection 3: Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the
intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above
time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither,
therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through length of
time, if one fails for long to exercise them.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of
science. " Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse
has dissolved many a friendship. " In like manner other habits of virtue
are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.
I answer that, As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of
movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement
by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly,
indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this
latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results
through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we cease from
exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened
that habit. For it has been stated [1484](A[1]) that habits are
destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency.
Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary
agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those
habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation
from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue.
For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to
choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use
of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds,
the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe
the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination of the sensitive
appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed
or lessened through cessation from act. The same applies to the
intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those
things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to
make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in
opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those
fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his
intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and
sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus the
intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation
from act.
Reply to Objection 1: Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to
give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat
were to increase.
Reply to Objection 2: Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive
of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual part of the soul, considered in
itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and
therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of
the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence
the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
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OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether many habits can be in one power?
(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
(3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
(4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?
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Whether many habits can be in one power?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one
power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the same
thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and
powers are distinguished in respect of the same thing, viz. their acts
and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore
there cannot be many habits in one power.
Objection 2: Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple
subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is the
cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can
proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits in
one power.
Objection 3: Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is
a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the
same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed
at the same time by many habits. Therefore several habits cannot be at
the same time in one power.
On the contrary, The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are
the habits of various sciences.
I answer that, As stated above ([1485]Q[49], A[4]), habits are
dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to
nature, or to operation, which is the end of nature. As to those habits
which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in
one same subject: since in one subject we may take parts in various
ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are
various habits. Thus, if we take the humors as being parts of the human
body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we
have the habit or disposition of health: while, if we take like parts,
such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect
of nature is strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i. e.
the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion to
nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in
the same subject.
If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to
operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, there may be
several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of
a habit is a passive power, as stated above ([1486]Q[51], A[2]): for it
is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was
clearly shown above ([1487]Q[51], A[2]). Now a passive power is
compared to the determinate act of any species, as matter to form:
because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so,
too, is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object
to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move
one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several
acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are qualities or
forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a
determinate species. Consequently several habits, even as several
specifically different acts, can belong to one power.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as in natural things, diversity of species
is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter,
as stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter
belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity of objects
entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in
Ethic. vi, 1, that "those objects that differ generically belong to
different departments of the soul"); while specific difference of
objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of
habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in species, but not
vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in
species: but it does not follow that different habits are in different
powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may
be included in one genus, and several species be contained in one
species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and
powers.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a power is simple as to its essence, it
is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically
different acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many
superficially different habits from being in one power.
Reply to Objection 3: A body is informed by its shape as by its own
terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a
power, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate
term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at the same
time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another;
just as neither can a body have several shapes, save in so far as one
shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided figure. For
the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time
"actually"; and yet it can know several things at the same time
"habitually. "
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Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their
objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of
science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the
unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects
specifically distinct.
Objection 2: Further, different sciences are different habits. But the
same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both the
physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in
Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by their
objects.
Objection 3: Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the
same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if it
be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be
done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in
order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object
can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits does
not follow diversity of objects.
On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of
their objects, as stated above ([1488]Q[18], A[5]). But habits are
dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according
to the diversity of objects.
I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific
distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms
differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is
proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one another
in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every
agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to
something: and all things that imply order to something, are
distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they
are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order:
viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature.
Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three
things. First, in respect of the active principles of such
dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of
specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows.
Reply to Objection 1: In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must
consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which
may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction
between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they are both
known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And
consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of
cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.
Reply to Objection 2: The physicist proves the earth to be round by one
means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means
of mathematics, e. g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the
sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e. g. by the
movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the
whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism producing
science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And
consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect
of which the habits of science are distinguished.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89;
Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is
in speculative matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a
diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does.
Moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above
all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said
([1489]Q[18], A[6];[1490] Q[19], A[2], ad 1;[1491] Q[34], A[4]).
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Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not divided into good and
bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards
contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are
not divided into good and bad.
Objection 2: Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it
is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the
Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation
and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits
cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, there can be different evil habits about one same
object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of
concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for
instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philosopher
clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into
good and bad.
On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to
vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits.
I answer that, As stated above [1492](A[2]), habits are specifically
distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles,
but also in their relation to nature. Now, this happens in two ways.
First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In
this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since
a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's
nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable
to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since
they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from
human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that
habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and
bad.
Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact
that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature,
while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And
thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is
distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act
befitting some higher nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The same habit may be about contraries in so far
as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it
happen that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of
habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided
into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another
bad; but not by reason of one habit being something good, and another
about something bad.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the good which is common to every
being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but
some determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate,
viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a
difference of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate
repugnant to a determinate nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Several good habits about one same specific thing
are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as
stated above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are
distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which is in
keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are
contrary to one virtue.
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Whether one habit is made up of many habits?
Objection 1: It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits.
For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems to
be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once,
but little by little out of several acts, as stated above ([1493]Q[51],
A[3]). Therefore one habit is made up of several.
Objection 2: Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts
are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude,
temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.
Objection 3: Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a
habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to but one
science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one
habit is made up of many.
On the contrary, A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form.
