I submit it to the
house, whether this was not a prudent course, and whether
it is not to be lamented that the proposed amendment
forces the discussion upon us.
house, whether this was not a prudent course, and whether
it is not to be lamented that the proposed amendment
forces the discussion upon us.
Hamilton - 1834 - Life on Hamilton - v2
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? HAMILTON.
387
three, which yielded the appointment of the revenue offi-
cers to the states, but rendered them amenable to, and
removable by, the United States* alone.
Early in the year seventeen hundred and eighty-four, a
motion was made in the legislature of New-York, urging
the abolition of the officers of superintendent of finance
and of continental receiver, which was followed by the
acts establishing a customhouse and a revenue system.
The immense and improvident speculations made on the
return of peace, poured into the coffers of that state a
large revenue. This was subsequently increased by the
navigation acts of other states, which rendered New-York
the entrepot of the whole region east of the Delaware, and
presented to her tempting prospects of future wealth.
Blinded by these adventitious circumstances to the supe-
rior advantages to be derived from the general prosperity
of the whole union, the idea of state aggrandizement
engrossed the thoughts of Clinton, who, had the desire
of establishing a separate government ever conflicted in
his mind with a more comprehensive patriotism, would
have regarded this as the great source of influence and
power.
To whatever cause it may be attributed, it became the
settled policy of New-York to defeat the proposition for a
national revenue. A measure conforming with the recom-
mendation of congress was proposed in the legislature in
seventeen hundred and eighty-four, and failed. It was
* In a letter to Hamilton, Schuyler remarks, May 4th, 1783: "Although
our legislature seems still inclined to confer powers on congress adequate to
the proper discharge of the great duties of the sovereign council of these
states, yet I perceive with pain that some, chagrined at disappointment, are
already attempting to inculcate a contrary principle, and I fear it will gain
too deep a root to be eradicated, until such confusion prevails as will make
men deeply feel the necessity of not retaining so much sovereignty in the
states individually. "
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? 388
THE LIFE OF
again brought forward in seventeen hundred and eighty-
five, and again failed by two votes in the senate.
At the close of the session of seventeen hundred and
eighty-six, in which the exertions of Schuyler to induce
the grant were most conspicuous, a law was enacted giv-
ing the revenue to congress, but reserving to the state "the
sole power of levying and collecting" the duties; the con-
ferring of which power on congress, was an indispensable
and express condition of the acts of some of the other
states. Instead of making the collectors amenable, and
removable by congress, it subjected them to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state courts.
It also rendered the duties payable in the bills of credit
of the state, and thus so entirely contravened the plan of
seventeen hundred and eighty-three, as to be equivalent to its'
rejection. This enactment was defended by the argument
that congress, being a single body, and consequently without
checks, would be apt to misapply the money arisingfrom it.
All hope had, in the mean time, centred in this question;
and palsied for the want of resources, congress is seen de-
bating Indian treaties, consulting measures to suppress their
hostilities, discussing the inquiry whether a member could,
without permission from that body or from his state with-
draw from his seat, and suspending all action, waiting the
decision of New-York. *
* The confederation required nine states to form a quorum for every es-
sential purpose. Each state had one vote--no state could be represented by
less than two members. The withdrawal therefore of a member could sus-
pend its functions, and yet New-York, Maryland, and Virginia, affirmed the
absolute right to withdraw, and New-Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecti-
cut, and Georgia were divided. For the right--William Grayson, John
Haring, Harrison, Henry, Hindman, Houston, Livermorc, Miller, Mitchell,
James Monroe, Melancton Smith; against it--Bayard, Bloodworth, Dane, ,
Few, N. Gorham, Hornblower, Dl. Huger, William Samuel Johnston, Ru-
fus King, Lee, Long, Manning, Parker, Petit, Charles Pinckney, Sedg-
virk, Symmes, White.
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? HAMILTON.
389
Perceiving that no benefit could be derived from the
law recently passed by this state; that if acceded to, the
acts of twelve adopting states (for Rhode Island had
meanwhile concurred) would, by their conditions, which
required the concurrence of all the states, become void;
that the provision which rendered the duties payable in
bills of credit was most pernicious, as it would, on the same
principle, admit all the paper money of the other states at
various rates of depreciation, thus reducing the revenue,
producing an inequality in the public burdens, and deter-
ring the states averse from paper money from engaging in
the measure--congress treated it as a nullity.
Feeling deeply their humiliating condition in being una-
ble to meet the claims of foreigners who had advanced
money to prosecute the war, and to discharge the inter-
est on the foreign debt without new loans in Europe,
and thereby compounding it, they passed a resolution
requesting Governor Clinton to convene the legislature
for the purpose of submitting this subject again to its
consideration. To this application, involving such mo-
mentous consequences, Clinton replied by letter, stating
that "he entertained the highest deference and respect for
the authority of congress, and that it would afford him the
greatest pleasure to have it in his power to comply with
their recommendations, but that he had not the power to
convene the legislature before the time fixed by law for
their stated meeting, except upon 'extraordinary occasions'
and as the present business had already been particularly
laid before them, and so recently as at their last session
received their determination, it cannot come within that
description. "
Soon after receiving this communication, congress then
sitting at New-York, adopted a series of resolutions, de-
claring that the act of New-York was not a compliance
with the general plan. "That the present critical and em-
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? 390
TIIE LIFE OF
barrassed state of the finances was such as to'require that
the system of impost should be carried into immediate
effect; that they consider this 'an occasion sufficiently im-
portant and extraordinary' for the convening of the legisla-
ture, and 'earnestly' recommend that it should be 'immedi-
ately' called. " Clinton was immovable. This earnest and
solemn appeal of the confederacy was disregarded, and the
hope of establishing a general revenue was almost aban-
doned.
While the dignity of the nation was thus prostrated be-
fore the executive of a single state, difficulties, the conse-
quences of recent example, were pending with several
others. New-Jersey, wearied with fruitless efforts to in-
culcate the benefits of a national system, and jealous of the
commercial prosperity of New-York, early in this year
had resorted to decisive measures. She passed a resolution
(reciting as a reason for it the delinquency of other states)
by which she refused a compliance with the requisition of
congress for her quota, " until all the states in the union
had complied with the revenue system of seventeen hun-
dred and eighty-three, or until states having peculiar com-
mercial advantages should forbear a system of partial le-
gislation. " This formidable decision alarmed the nation,
and demanded the immediate attention of congress, who
sent a deputation to remonstrate with that state. After an
able address from each of the delegates, showing the ne-
cessity of union to the general happiness of all its mem-
bers, but especially to the smaller states, the legislature
rescinded their resolution, but declared that the requisition
had no binding force.
Pennsylvania claimed a set-off against part of her quota-
and a committee was appointed to confer with her legisla-
ture. A similar claim was, after much debate, conceded
to South Carolina. Another committee was directed to
repair to Connecticut, New-Jersey, and North Carolina,
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? HAMILTON.
391
and an address was made to New-Hampshire and Mary-
land, urging upon them a full and immediate compliance
with the last requisition. Was this a government?
These obstacles indicated the necessity of an adjustment
of accounts with the several states, and an ordinance was
framed for that purpose. Another ordinance before re-
commended was passed, of much prospective importance.
It was for the establishment of a mint; the standard of
gold and silver, and the money of account in a decimal ra-
tio, having been previously fixed.
While congress were thus engaged, the insurrection of
Massachusetts broke upon them. After much delay, they,
in secret session, made a report strongly indicative of their
feebleness and their fears. Having stated that unless speedy
and effectual measures were taken to suppress the designs
of the insurgents, they will possess themselves of the arse-
nal at Springfield, subvert the government, and not only
reduce that commonwealth to a state of anarchy and con-
fusion, but probably involve the United States in the ca-
lamity of a civil war; it declared their obligations to
restore the authority of the state, and to protect the public
property, and that for these purposes a body of troops
should be immediately raised, but that the causes of raising
them ought not to be publicly assigned, and that they had,
in a separate report, on the intelligence from the western
country, recommended the augmentation of the troops in
the service of the United States. By this report a legion-
ary corps was ordered to be enlisted for three years, prin-
cipally in New-England.
Thus did an emergency, which every government should
have been empowered to meet, drive congress to a usurpa-
tion upon a false pretext; for where is to be found the
authority in the articles of the confederation to raise a
military force for such a purpose, and what was there to pre-
vent an increase of its number, and its permanent existence 1
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? 392
THE LIFE OF
The only security against this usurpation of power was
the want of means; but this want involved the very dan-
ger, for, while acting upon the necessity of the measure,
congress declared," that in the present embarrassments of
the federal finances, they would not hazurd the perilous
step of putting arms into the hands of men, whose fidelity
must in some degree depend on the faithful payment of
their wages, had they not the fullest confidence, from au-
thentic and respectable information, in the most liberal
exertions of the money-holders in the state of Massachu-
setts and the other states, in filling the loans authorized"
for that purpose.
The suppression of the insurrection by her own militia,
leaves it only a subject for speculation what would have
been the consequences of an invasion, by the confederacy,
of so populous, so warlike, and then so jealous a state.
The friends of the union in New-York had in the mean
time determined to make another and a final effort. The
popularity of Hamilton, it was hoped, might have influence;
and while General Schuyler was brought forward as a can-
didate for the senate, Hamilton was put in nomination for
the assembly. His election was earnestly opposed--op-
posed by the men whose cupidity he had exposed in seven-
teen hundred and eighty-four, and who, identified with the
state policy of Clinton, as leaders of the democratic party,
regarded him as a formidable adversary to their narrow
and selfish politics. But serious apprehensions had seized
the community as to the future. They saw in the discords
and the weakness of the confederacy the fulfilment of all
his prophecies, and they looked to him as their last hope
of changing the vicious direction which had been given to
the councils of the state. He was elected. *
* On the eve of this election a letter was received by him from a tory mer-
chant, asking his influence to obtain legislative relief. In his reply he states,
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? HAMILTON. 393
The legislature opened its session in January, seventeen
hundred and eighty-seven, at the city of New-York. The
speech from the governor, after alluding to the annual ap-
pointment of state officers, from which so large a share of
his influence was derived, adverted to the requisitions for
the service of the year, and stated his confidence that the
dispositions of the legislature being truly federal, would in-
duce a speedy compliance with a measure so essential to
the national support and credit. The representatives were
informed of the resolutions of congress, expressing their
sense of the act granting the impost, and requesting an im-
mediate call of the legislature, whereby the revenue system
of seventeen hundred and eighty-three would be brought
to their view--" a subject which had been repeatedly sub-
mitted to them, and must be well understood. "
The correspondence which had recently passed on that
subject was laid before them, with a declaration, " that a
regard to their excellent constitution, and an anxiety to
preserve unimpaired the right of free deliberation in mat-
ters not stipulated by the confederation, had restrained
him from convening them at an earlier period. " The ad-
"that he would not be understood to declare any opinion concerning the prin-
ciples of the bill;" and remarks, " I make this observation from that spirit of
candour which I hope will always direct my conduct. I am aware that I have
been represented as an enemy to the wishes of what you call your corps. If
by this is meant that I do not feel as much as any man not immediately in-
terested for the distresses of those merchants who have been in a great meas-
ure the victims of the revolution, the supposition does not do justice either to
my head or my heart. But if it means that I have always viewed the mode
of relieving them as a matter of peculiar delicacy and difficulty, it is well
founded.
"I should have thought it unnecessary to enter into this explanation, were it
not that I am held up as a candidate at the ensuing election, and would not
wish that the step I have taken in respect to your letter should be considered
as implying more than it does, for I would never wish to conciliate at the ex-
pense of candour; on the other hand, I confide in your liberality not to infer
more than I intend from the explanation I have given you. "
50
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? 394
THE LIFE OF
justment of the territorial controversies with Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania was mentioned, and the speech concluded
by calling the attention of the legislature to local topics.
The address in reply to the speech was referred to a com-
mittee, of which Hamilton was a member, and was reported
by him. It was a mere echo of the speech on all subjects,
except as to the request of congress to convene the legis-
lature, which was passed by in silence. On being reported
to the house, a motion was made by the speaker to amend
it, by expressing their approbation of the governor's con-
duct in not convening the legislature at an earlier period
than that fixed by law; he at the same time disclaiming
all hostility to the impost. This motion produced the effect
which had been sought to be avoided, and called up a long
and vehement debate. While the friends of the union
expressed in general terms a dissent from the views of the
governor, feeling themselves in a minority, they sedulously
endeavoured to prevent all discussion of this topic, seeing
that it had been thrown in as an apple of discord; but the
friends of the governor, who were guided with an adroit
and subtle policy, seized upon this occasion to kindle an
excitement, and to rouse all the hostile feelings of the
states rights party.
The speaker then proposed to withdraw the motion, but
it was insisted that it could not be withdrawn. That no
}11 consequences could arise from a decision; that it was
only a question whether there was such a pressing neces-
sity as to authorize the governor to convene the legisla-
ture. That if the doctrine that the governor was bound
to comply with a requisition of congress on this subject
was sustained, it was impossible to tell where it would end.
That congress might, by repeated requisitions, perhaps once
a month, tease and weary the legislature into a compliance
with their measures; an apprehension not exaggerated,
for such had been the practice of the former government.
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? HAMILTON.
395
Several propositions were made to get rid of the motion
for an amendment, and it was at last agreed that the com-
mittee should rise and report; Colonel Hamilton stating,
"that he would reserve himself on this subject until it came
again before them, when he hoped to be enabled to offer
such arguments as would strike with conviction the candid
part of the house. "
This question was brought forward on the nineteenth
of January, when an amendment was proposed by General
Malcolm, as a substitute for that of the speaker, the object
of which was to avoid a direct expression of opinion as to
the governor's conduct, and to place his justification on the
ground of the extraordinary expense an extra session
would have produced. This amendment was resisted with
great ingenuity and art. An attempt was made to show that
silence would be in effect a censure upon the governor,
while approbation of his conduct did not necessarily re-
flect upon that of congress,--that this motion was in
reality an attempt to debar them from the right of de-
claring their sentiments; and the house was asked whether,
if it was necessary, they were afraid to justify their gov-
ernor?
A comparison was drawn between the former and
present government, and an absurd analogy sought to be
shown to the attempt of the British government to levy
ship-money, which was finally and effectually resisted by
the English commons. It was contended that if to the
right of making peace and war, of raising fleets and armies,
was superadded that of Convening at pleasure the state
legislatures, and of exercising such a prerogative, the issue
no man could foretell;--that congress was an irresponsible
body, and that the governor was accountable to the state;
--that this was not the "extraordinary occasion" contem-
plated by the constitution; and as they were now ready
to approve the governor's conduct, they should have been
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? 396
THE LIFE OF
as ready, had his course been different, to have cen-
sured it.
The question was then called as to the substitute, when
Hamilton, who had previously spoken on the point of or-
der, arose. This body was, with few exceptions, composed
of respectable individuals, who had enjoyed small advan-
tages of education, and who regarded with jealousy all
oratorical embellishment. Having previously felt its pulse,
and only anxious to carry this great measure, on the right
decision of which such vast consequences depended, Ham-
ilton conformed his effort to the character of the assembly,
and addressed them in the following conciliatory and mod-
erate tone. After a few preliminary observations, he pro-
ceeded to remark :*
"This now leads us to examine the important question
presented to us by the proposed amendment. For my own
part, I have seen with regret the progress of this business,
and it was my earnest wish to have avoided the present
discussion. I saw with regret the first application of con-
gress to the governor, because it was easy to pe-rceive
that it involved a delicate dilemma. Either the governor,
from considerations of inconvenience, might refuse to call
the assembly, which would derogate from the respect due
to congress; or he might call them, and by being brought
together at an unreasonable period, before the time appoint-
ed by law for the purpose, they would meet with reluc-
tance, and perhaps with a disposition less favourable than
might be wished to the views of congress themselves. I
saw with equal regret the next step of the business. If a
conference had been desired with congress, it might have
been had--circumstances might have been explained, rea-
* All of these speeches arc reported by Cliilds, the reporter of the debates
in the New-York convention. They are very imperfect, and generally in the
language the reporter would himself have used.
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? HAMILTON.
397
sons might have been assigned satisfactory to them for not
calling the legislature. The affair might have been com-
promised. But instead of this, the governor thought pro-
per to answer by a flat denial, founded on a constitutional
impediment, and an idea of the invasion of the right of free
deliberation was brought into view. I earnestly wished
the matter to have rested here. I might appeal to gentle-
men in this house, and particularly to the honourable mem-
ber who is so zealous in support of the amendment, that
before the speech appeared, I discovered a solicitude that
by passing the subject over in silence, it might not give
occasion to the present discussion. It however came be-
fore us in a form very different from that which I should
have thought advisable, for there was no need of an appeal
to the legislature. The next step was to appoint a com-
mittee to prepare an answer to the speech. It fell to my lot
to be a member of that committee; my object still was to
avoid the interference of this house in a matter about which
there was a difference of opinion between the United
States and the governor of this state on constitutional
ground. The best way to effect this, was to frame the
answer in the most general terms. This was done; not a
word is said even about the revenue system, which occa-
sioned the request of congress to convene the legislature.
The answer is generally, that the house will take into con-
sideration the different acts of congress, and make such
provisions as appear to them compatible with the abilities
and constitution of the state. By not touching at all on
the topic connected with the origin of the controversy, I
thought we might safely be silent without any implication
of censure on the governor. It was neither my wish to
condemn nor to approve. I was only desirous of avoiding
an interference in a constitutional question, which belong-
ed entirely to the province of the executive authority of
the state, and about which I knew there would be a differ-
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? 398
THE LIFE OF
ence of opinion, even in this house.
I submit it to the
house, whether this was not a prudent course, and whether
it is not to be lamented that the proposed amendment
forces the discussion upon us. Constitutional questions
are always delicate; they should never be touched but
from necessity.
"But though I shall be readily acquitted of having had
any agency in bringing the house into this disagreeable
situation, since the question is brought forward, I shall
with freedom meet the discussion. This my duty demands
from me; and whoever may be affected by it, I shall pro-
ceed under an impression that my constituents expect from
me the free exercise of my judgment, and the free decla-
ration of my sentiments on the matters deliberated upon in
this house.
"The question by the honourable member on my right,
has been wrongly stated. He says it is this--whether a re-
quest of congress to convene the legislature is conclusive
upon the governor of the state, or whether a bare intima-
tion of that honourable body lays him under a constitu-
tional necessity of convening the legislature? But this is
not the true question. From the shape in which the busi-
ness comes before us, the inquiry truly is--whether a sol-
emn application of the United States to the executive of
this state to convene the legislature for the purpose of de-
liberating on a matter which is considered by that body as
of essential importance to the nation, and which has been
viewed in a similar light by most of the other states indi-
vidually, is such an extraordinary occasion as left the gov-
ernor under no constitutional impediment to a compliance?
and it may be added, whether that , application, under all
the circumstances, was an attempt to invade the freedom
of deliberation in this house 1
"Here let me ask, what does the constitution say upon
the subject? Simply this--that the governor 'shall have
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? HAMILTON. 399
power to convene the assembly and senate on extraordi-
nary occasions. '
"But what is an extraordinary occasion? what circum-
stances are to concur, what ingredients combine, to con-
stitute one? What general rule can be imagined by which
to define the precise meaning of these vague terms, and
draw the fine between an ordinary and an extraordinary
occasion? Will the gentleman on my right furnish us with
such a criterion? Profoundly skilled as he is in law, (at
least in the local laws of this state,) I fancy it will be diffi-
cult for him to invent one that will suit his present pur-
pose. Let him consult his law books: they will not relieve
his embarrassment. It is easy to see the clause allows the
greatest latitude to opinion. What one may think a very
extraordinary occasion, another may think a very ordinary
one, according to his bias, his interest, or his intellect. If
there is any rule at all, it is this--the governor shall not call
the legislature with a view to the ordinary details of the
state administration. Whatever does not fall within this
description, and has any pretensions to national importance
in any view, leaves him at liberty to exercise the discre-
tion vested in him by the constitution. There is, at least,
no constitutional bar in the way.
"The United States are intrusted with the management
of the general concerns and interests of the community--
they have the power of war and peace, they have the
power of treaty.
"Our affairs with respect to foreign nations are left to
their direction. We must entertain very diminutive ideas
of the government of the union, to conceive that their
earnest call on a subject which they deem of great national
magnitude, which affects their engagements with two re-
spectable foreign powers, France and the United Nether-
lands, which relates to the preservation of their faith at
home and abroad, is not such an occasion as would justify
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? 400
THE LIFE OF
the executive, upon the terms of the constitution, in con-
vening the legislature. If this doctrine is maintained,
where will it lead to--what kind of emergency must exist
before the constitution will authorize the governor to call
the legislature? Is the preservation of our national faith
a matter of such trivial moment? Is the fulfilment of the
public engagements domestic and foreign of no conse-
quence 1 Must we wait for the fleets of the United Neth-
erlands or of France to enforce the observance of them,
before the executive will be at liberty to give the legisla-
ture an opportunity of deliberating on the means of their
just demands? This is straining the indefinite words of
the constitution to a most unreasonable extreme. It would
be a tenable position to say that the call of the United
States is alone sufficient to satisfy the idea of an extraor-
dinary occasion. It is easy to conceive, that such a pos-
ture of European affairs might exist, as would render it
necessary to convene the different legislatures to adopt
measures for the public safety, and at the same time inex-
pedient to disclose the object till they were assembled.
Will we say that congress would be bound to communi-
cate the object of their call to the executive of every state 1
or that the executive of this state, in complying with their
request, would be guilty of a violation of the constitution?
But the present case is not that of a mere general request;
it is specifically to deliberate upon an object of acknow-
ledged importance in one view or another. On one hand
it is alleged to be a measure essential to the honour, inter-
est, and perhaps the existence of the union; on the other,
it is said to be on principles subversive of the constitution
and dangerous to the liberty of the subject. It is, there-
fore, a matter of delicacy and moment, and the earnest
call of the union to have it considered cannot fall within
the notion of so common, so ordinary an occasion, as
would prohibit the executive from summoning a meeting
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? HAMILTON. 401
of the legislature. The only argument urged to denomi-
nate it such, is that it had been recently decided on by the
legislature. But there is an evident fallacy in this position;
the call was addressed to a new and different body, totally
different in the contemplation of the constitution, and ma-
terially different in fact with respect to the members who
compose it. A large proportion of the members of the
present house were not members of the last. For aught
that either congress or the governor could officially know,
there might have been a total change in the individuals,
and, therefore, a total difference in the sentiments. No
inference, of course, could be fairly drawn from the con-
duct of the last legislature to that of the present. Indeed,
however it might be wished to prepossess the minds of the
members of the former house with a contrary idea, it is
plain that there is no necessary connection between what
they did at that time, and what it may be proper for them
to do now. The act of the last session proves the con-
viction of the house then, that the grant of the impost was
an eligible measure. Many of the members were led to
suppose that it would answer the purpose, and might have
been accepted by congress. If the experiment has shown
that they were mistaken in their expectations, and if it
should appear to them that congress could not for good
reasons accept it, the same motives which induce them to
the grant already made, would determine them to consent
to such alterations as would accommodate it to the views
of congress and the other states, and make it practicable
to carry the system into execution.
"It may be observed, that as congress accompanied
their request with an explanation of the object, they by
that mode of proceeding submitted the whole matter to
the discretion of the governor, to act according to the esti-
mate formed in his own mind of its importance. It is not
denied the governor had a discretion upon the occasion.
51
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? 402 THE LIFE OP
It is not contended, that he was under a constitutional ne-
cessity to convene the legislature. The resolution of con-
gress itself does not imply or intimate this. They do not
pretend to require, they only earnestly recommend. The
governor might at his peril refuse; responsible, however,
for any ill consequences that might have attended his re-
fusal. But what is contended for is, that the call of the
United States, under all circumstances, was sufficient to
satisfy the terms of the constitution empowering him to
convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions, and
left him at full liberty to comply.
"The admission of his discretion does not admit that it
was properly exercised, nor does it admit that the footing
upon which he placed his refusal was proper. It does not
admit that the constitution interposed an obstacle in his
way, or that the request of congress implied any thing hos-
tile to the right of free deliberation.
"This is the aspect under which the business presents
itself to our consideration, as well from the correspond-
ence between congress and the governor, as from the
manner in which it is ushered to us in the speech. A
general approbation of his conduct, is an approbation of
the principle by which it is professed to have been actuated.
"Are we ready to say that the constitution would have
been violated by a compliance? Are we ready to say that
the call upon us to deliberate is an attempt to infringe the
freedom of deliberation? If we are not ready to say both,
we must reject the amendment. In particular, I think it
must strike us all that there is something singularly forced
in intimating, that an application of congress to the gov-
ernor of the state to convene a new legislature to consider
a very important national subject, has any thing in it dan-
gerous to the freedom of our deliberations. I natter my-
self we should all have felt ourselves as much at liberty to
have pursued our sentiments, if we had met upon an ex-
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? HAMILTON.
403
traordinary call, as we now do when met according to our
own appointment.
"There yet remains an important light in which the
subject merits consideration; I mean as it respects the
executive authority of the state itself. By deciding that
the application of congress, upon which the debate turns,
was not such an extraordinary occasion as left the gov-
ernor at liberty to call the legislature, we may form a pre-
cedent of a very dangerous tendency; we may put a sense
on the constitution very different from the true meaning
of it, and may fetter the present or a future executive
with very inconvenient restraints. A few more such pre-
cedents may tie up the hands of a governor in such a man-
ner as would either oblige him to act at an extreme peril,
or to omit acting when public exigencies required it. The
mere sense of one governor would be no precedent for his
successor; but that sense approved by both houses of the
legislature, would become a rule of conduct. Suppose a
few more precedents of the kind on different combinations
of circumstances equally strong, and let us ask ourselves
what would be the situation of a governor whenever he
came to deliberate on the propriety of exercising the dis-
cretion in this respect vested in him by the constitution?
Would he not be apt to act with a degree of caution, or
rather timidity, which in certain emergencies might be
productive of very pernicious consequences? A mere in-
timation of the constitution to him not to call the legisla-
ture in their recess upon every trifling affair, which is its
true import, would be turned into an injunction not to do
so but upon occasions of the last necessity.
"We see, therefore, that the question upon which we
are pressed to decide, is not less delicate, as it respects the
constitution of the state itself, than as it respects the union;
and that in every possible view it is most prudent to avoid
the determination. Let the conduct of the governor stand
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THE LIFE OF
on its own merits. If he was right, our approbation will
not make him more right. If he was wrong, it would be
improper to give sanction to his error.
"Several things have been said in the debate which
have no connection with it; but to prevent their making
improper impressions, it may not be amiss to take some no-
tice of them. The danger of a power in congress to com-
pel the convening of the legislature at their pleasure has
been strongly insisted upon. It has been urged, if they
possessed it they might make it an engine to fatigue the
legislature into a compliance with their measures. In-
stances of an abuse of the like power in the crown, under
the former government, have been cited.
"It is a sufficient answer to all this to say, that no such
power is contended for. I do not assert that their request
obliged the governor to convene the legislature; I only
maintain that their request on an important national sub-
ject, was such an occasion as left him at liberty to do it
without any colour for imputing to him a breach of the
constitution; and that from motives of respect to the union,
and to avoid any further degradation of its authority,
already at too low an ebb, he ought to have complied.
"Admitting in the fullest extent that it would be danger-
ous to allow to congress the power of requiring the legis-
lature to be convened at pleasure, yet no injury or incon-
venience can result from supposing the call of the United
States, on a matter by them deemed of importance, to be
an occasion sufficiently extraordinary to authorize, not to
oblige the governor to comply with it.
"I cannot forbear remarking, that it is a common artifice
to insinuate a resemblance between the king under the
former government and congress; though no two things
can be more unlike each other. Nothing can be more dis-
similar than a monarch, permanent, hereditary, the source
of honour and emolument, and a republican body com-
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? HAMILTON.
405
posed of a number of individuals appointed annually, liable
to be recalled within the year, and subject to a continual
rotation; which, with few exceptions, is the fountain
neither of honour nor emolument. If we will exercise
our judgments, we shall readily see no such resemblance
exists, and that all inferences deduced from the comparison
must be false.
"Upon every occasion, however foreign such observa-
tions may be, we hear a loud cry raised about the danger
of intrusting power to congress; we are told it is danger-
ous to trust power any where; that power is liable to
abuse, with a variety of trite maxims of the same kind.
General propositions of this nature are easily framed, the
truth of which cannot be denied, but they rarely convey
any precise idea. To these we might oppose other propo-
sitions equally true, and equally indefinite. It might be
said that too little power is as dangerous as too much; that
it leads to anarchy, and from anarchy to despotism. But
the question still recurs, what is too much or too little 1
Where is the measure or<< standard to ascertain the happy
mean?
"Powers must be granted, or civil society cannot exist:
the possibility of abuse is no argument against the thing;
this possibility is incident to every species of power, how-
ever placed or modified. The United States, for instance,
have the power of war and peace. It cannot be disputed
that conjunctures might occur, in which^hat power might
be turned against the rights of the citizens; but where can
we better place it--in short, where else can we place it at
all?
"In our state constitution we might discover power lia-
ble to be abused to very dangerous purposes. I shall in-
stance only the council of appointment. In that council
the governor claims and exercises the power of nominating
to all offices. This power of nomination, in its operation,
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? 406
THE LIFE OF
amounts to a power of appointment; for it can always be
so managed as to bring in persons agreeable to him, and
exclude all others. Suppose a governor disposed to make
this an instrument of personal influence and aggrandize-
ment--suppose him inclined to exclude from office all inde-
pendent men. and to fill the different departments of the
state with persons devoted to himself--what is to hinder
him from doing it? who can say how far the influence
arising from such a prerogative might be carried? Per-
haps this power, if closely inspected, is a more proper sub-
ject of republican jealousy than any power possessed or
asked by congress, fluctuating and variable as that body is.
"But as my intention is not to instil any unnecessary
jealousies, I shall prosecute these observations no further.
They are only urged to show the imperfections of human
institutions, and to confirm the principle, that the possibility
of a power being abused, is no argument against its exist-
ence.
"Upon the whole, let us venture with caution upon con-
stitutional ground. Let us not court nor invite discussions
of this kind. Let us not endeavour still more to weaken
and degrade the federal government, by heaping fresh
marks of contempt on its authority. Perhaps the time is
not far remote, when . we may be inclined to disapprove
what we now seem eager to commend, and may wish we
had cherished the union with as much zeal as we now dis-
cover apprehension of its encroachments.
"I hope the house will not agree to the amendment. In
saying this, I am influenced by no other motive than a
sense of duty. I trust my conduct will be considered in
this light. I cannot give my consent to put any thing upon
our minutes which, it appears to me, we may one day have
occasion to wish obliterated from them. "
The opposition was again called up, and travelled over
the same ground; inveighed against the dangers of an in-
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? HAMILTON.
407
croachment on the rights of the people; justified fully the
conduct of the governor; declared that the decision of the
constitutional question was not necessarily involved, and
closed with a strong appeal to popular feeling on the dan-
gers to be apprehended from countenancing such an inva-
sion of the freedom of their deliberations.
Hamilton replied; indicated more clearly the fallacy of
the arguments which had been used; pointed out the true
construction of the language of the constitution; warned
the house of the folly and danger of this distrust of the
powers of congress, and ridiculed the attempt to draw an
analogy between its powers and those of a monarchy.
"Are we not," he asked, " to respect federal decisions?
are we on the contrary to take every opportunity of hold-
ing up their resolutions and requests in a contemptible and
insignificant light, and tell the world their calls, their re-
quests are nothing to us; that we are bound by none of
their measures? Do not let us add to their embarrassments,
for it is but a slender tie that at present holds us. You
see, alas ! what contempt we are falling into since the peace;
you see to what our commerce is exposed on every side;
you see us the laughing-stock, the sport of foreign nations.
And what may this lead to? I dread, sir, to think. Little
will it avail then to say, we could not attend to your wise
and earnest requests without inconvenience: little will it
avail to say, it would have injured individual interests to
have left our farms. These things arc trifling when com-
pared to bringing the councils and powers of the union into
universal contempt, by saying their call was unimportant,
and that it did not come under the indefinite meaning of
'extraordinary. See, gentlemen, before you may feel, what
may be your situation hereafter. There is more involved
in this measure than presents itself to your view.
"You hear it rung in your ears that, from the resem-
blance between the king and the congress of these states,
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? HAMILTON.
387
three, which yielded the appointment of the revenue offi-
cers to the states, but rendered them amenable to, and
removable by, the United States* alone.
Early in the year seventeen hundred and eighty-four, a
motion was made in the legislature of New-York, urging
the abolition of the officers of superintendent of finance
and of continental receiver, which was followed by the
acts establishing a customhouse and a revenue system.
The immense and improvident speculations made on the
return of peace, poured into the coffers of that state a
large revenue. This was subsequently increased by the
navigation acts of other states, which rendered New-York
the entrepot of the whole region east of the Delaware, and
presented to her tempting prospects of future wealth.
Blinded by these adventitious circumstances to the supe-
rior advantages to be derived from the general prosperity
of the whole union, the idea of state aggrandizement
engrossed the thoughts of Clinton, who, had the desire
of establishing a separate government ever conflicted in
his mind with a more comprehensive patriotism, would
have regarded this as the great source of influence and
power.
To whatever cause it may be attributed, it became the
settled policy of New-York to defeat the proposition for a
national revenue. A measure conforming with the recom-
mendation of congress was proposed in the legislature in
seventeen hundred and eighty-four, and failed. It was
* In a letter to Hamilton, Schuyler remarks, May 4th, 1783: "Although
our legislature seems still inclined to confer powers on congress adequate to
the proper discharge of the great duties of the sovereign council of these
states, yet I perceive with pain that some, chagrined at disappointment, are
already attempting to inculcate a contrary principle, and I fear it will gain
too deep a root to be eradicated, until such confusion prevails as will make
men deeply feel the necessity of not retaining so much sovereignty in the
states individually. "
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? 388
THE LIFE OF
again brought forward in seventeen hundred and eighty-
five, and again failed by two votes in the senate.
At the close of the session of seventeen hundred and
eighty-six, in which the exertions of Schuyler to induce
the grant were most conspicuous, a law was enacted giv-
ing the revenue to congress, but reserving to the state "the
sole power of levying and collecting" the duties; the con-
ferring of which power on congress, was an indispensable
and express condition of the acts of some of the other
states. Instead of making the collectors amenable, and
removable by congress, it subjected them to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state courts.
It also rendered the duties payable in the bills of credit
of the state, and thus so entirely contravened the plan of
seventeen hundred and eighty-three, as to be equivalent to its'
rejection. This enactment was defended by the argument
that congress, being a single body, and consequently without
checks, would be apt to misapply the money arisingfrom it.
All hope had, in the mean time, centred in this question;
and palsied for the want of resources, congress is seen de-
bating Indian treaties, consulting measures to suppress their
hostilities, discussing the inquiry whether a member could,
without permission from that body or from his state with-
draw from his seat, and suspending all action, waiting the
decision of New-York. *
* The confederation required nine states to form a quorum for every es-
sential purpose. Each state had one vote--no state could be represented by
less than two members. The withdrawal therefore of a member could sus-
pend its functions, and yet New-York, Maryland, and Virginia, affirmed the
absolute right to withdraw, and New-Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecti-
cut, and Georgia were divided. For the right--William Grayson, John
Haring, Harrison, Henry, Hindman, Houston, Livermorc, Miller, Mitchell,
James Monroe, Melancton Smith; against it--Bayard, Bloodworth, Dane, ,
Few, N. Gorham, Hornblower, Dl. Huger, William Samuel Johnston, Ru-
fus King, Lee, Long, Manning, Parker, Petit, Charles Pinckney, Sedg-
virk, Symmes, White.
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? HAMILTON.
389
Perceiving that no benefit could be derived from the
law recently passed by this state; that if acceded to, the
acts of twelve adopting states (for Rhode Island had
meanwhile concurred) would, by their conditions, which
required the concurrence of all the states, become void;
that the provision which rendered the duties payable in
bills of credit was most pernicious, as it would, on the same
principle, admit all the paper money of the other states at
various rates of depreciation, thus reducing the revenue,
producing an inequality in the public burdens, and deter-
ring the states averse from paper money from engaging in
the measure--congress treated it as a nullity.
Feeling deeply their humiliating condition in being una-
ble to meet the claims of foreigners who had advanced
money to prosecute the war, and to discharge the inter-
est on the foreign debt without new loans in Europe,
and thereby compounding it, they passed a resolution
requesting Governor Clinton to convene the legislature
for the purpose of submitting this subject again to its
consideration. To this application, involving such mo-
mentous consequences, Clinton replied by letter, stating
that "he entertained the highest deference and respect for
the authority of congress, and that it would afford him the
greatest pleasure to have it in his power to comply with
their recommendations, but that he had not the power to
convene the legislature before the time fixed by law for
their stated meeting, except upon 'extraordinary occasions'
and as the present business had already been particularly
laid before them, and so recently as at their last session
received their determination, it cannot come within that
description. "
Soon after receiving this communication, congress then
sitting at New-York, adopted a series of resolutions, de-
claring that the act of New-York was not a compliance
with the general plan. "That the present critical and em-
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? 390
TIIE LIFE OF
barrassed state of the finances was such as to'require that
the system of impost should be carried into immediate
effect; that they consider this 'an occasion sufficiently im-
portant and extraordinary' for the convening of the legisla-
ture, and 'earnestly' recommend that it should be 'immedi-
ately' called. " Clinton was immovable. This earnest and
solemn appeal of the confederacy was disregarded, and the
hope of establishing a general revenue was almost aban-
doned.
While the dignity of the nation was thus prostrated be-
fore the executive of a single state, difficulties, the conse-
quences of recent example, were pending with several
others. New-Jersey, wearied with fruitless efforts to in-
culcate the benefits of a national system, and jealous of the
commercial prosperity of New-York, early in this year
had resorted to decisive measures. She passed a resolution
(reciting as a reason for it the delinquency of other states)
by which she refused a compliance with the requisition of
congress for her quota, " until all the states in the union
had complied with the revenue system of seventeen hun-
dred and eighty-three, or until states having peculiar com-
mercial advantages should forbear a system of partial le-
gislation. " This formidable decision alarmed the nation,
and demanded the immediate attention of congress, who
sent a deputation to remonstrate with that state. After an
able address from each of the delegates, showing the ne-
cessity of union to the general happiness of all its mem-
bers, but especially to the smaller states, the legislature
rescinded their resolution, but declared that the requisition
had no binding force.
Pennsylvania claimed a set-off against part of her quota-
and a committee was appointed to confer with her legisla-
ture. A similar claim was, after much debate, conceded
to South Carolina. Another committee was directed to
repair to Connecticut, New-Jersey, and North Carolina,
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? HAMILTON.
391
and an address was made to New-Hampshire and Mary-
land, urging upon them a full and immediate compliance
with the last requisition. Was this a government?
These obstacles indicated the necessity of an adjustment
of accounts with the several states, and an ordinance was
framed for that purpose. Another ordinance before re-
commended was passed, of much prospective importance.
It was for the establishment of a mint; the standard of
gold and silver, and the money of account in a decimal ra-
tio, having been previously fixed.
While congress were thus engaged, the insurrection of
Massachusetts broke upon them. After much delay, they,
in secret session, made a report strongly indicative of their
feebleness and their fears. Having stated that unless speedy
and effectual measures were taken to suppress the designs
of the insurgents, they will possess themselves of the arse-
nal at Springfield, subvert the government, and not only
reduce that commonwealth to a state of anarchy and con-
fusion, but probably involve the United States in the ca-
lamity of a civil war; it declared their obligations to
restore the authority of the state, and to protect the public
property, and that for these purposes a body of troops
should be immediately raised, but that the causes of raising
them ought not to be publicly assigned, and that they had,
in a separate report, on the intelligence from the western
country, recommended the augmentation of the troops in
the service of the United States. By this report a legion-
ary corps was ordered to be enlisted for three years, prin-
cipally in New-England.
Thus did an emergency, which every government should
have been empowered to meet, drive congress to a usurpa-
tion upon a false pretext; for where is to be found the
authority in the articles of the confederation to raise a
military force for such a purpose, and what was there to pre-
vent an increase of its number, and its permanent existence 1
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THE LIFE OF
The only security against this usurpation of power was
the want of means; but this want involved the very dan-
ger, for, while acting upon the necessity of the measure,
congress declared," that in the present embarrassments of
the federal finances, they would not hazurd the perilous
step of putting arms into the hands of men, whose fidelity
must in some degree depend on the faithful payment of
their wages, had they not the fullest confidence, from au-
thentic and respectable information, in the most liberal
exertions of the money-holders in the state of Massachu-
setts and the other states, in filling the loans authorized"
for that purpose.
The suppression of the insurrection by her own militia,
leaves it only a subject for speculation what would have
been the consequences of an invasion, by the confederacy,
of so populous, so warlike, and then so jealous a state.
The friends of the union in New-York had in the mean
time determined to make another and a final effort. The
popularity of Hamilton, it was hoped, might have influence;
and while General Schuyler was brought forward as a can-
didate for the senate, Hamilton was put in nomination for
the assembly. His election was earnestly opposed--op-
posed by the men whose cupidity he had exposed in seven-
teen hundred and eighty-four, and who, identified with the
state policy of Clinton, as leaders of the democratic party,
regarded him as a formidable adversary to their narrow
and selfish politics. But serious apprehensions had seized
the community as to the future. They saw in the discords
and the weakness of the confederacy the fulfilment of all
his prophecies, and they looked to him as their last hope
of changing the vicious direction which had been given to
the councils of the state. He was elected. *
* On the eve of this election a letter was received by him from a tory mer-
chant, asking his influence to obtain legislative relief. In his reply he states,
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? HAMILTON. 393
The legislature opened its session in January, seventeen
hundred and eighty-seven, at the city of New-York. The
speech from the governor, after alluding to the annual ap-
pointment of state officers, from which so large a share of
his influence was derived, adverted to the requisitions for
the service of the year, and stated his confidence that the
dispositions of the legislature being truly federal, would in-
duce a speedy compliance with a measure so essential to
the national support and credit. The representatives were
informed of the resolutions of congress, expressing their
sense of the act granting the impost, and requesting an im-
mediate call of the legislature, whereby the revenue system
of seventeen hundred and eighty-three would be brought
to their view--" a subject which had been repeatedly sub-
mitted to them, and must be well understood. "
The correspondence which had recently passed on that
subject was laid before them, with a declaration, " that a
regard to their excellent constitution, and an anxiety to
preserve unimpaired the right of free deliberation in mat-
ters not stipulated by the confederation, had restrained
him from convening them at an earlier period. " The ad-
"that he would not be understood to declare any opinion concerning the prin-
ciples of the bill;" and remarks, " I make this observation from that spirit of
candour which I hope will always direct my conduct. I am aware that I have
been represented as an enemy to the wishes of what you call your corps. If
by this is meant that I do not feel as much as any man not immediately in-
terested for the distresses of those merchants who have been in a great meas-
ure the victims of the revolution, the supposition does not do justice either to
my head or my heart. But if it means that I have always viewed the mode
of relieving them as a matter of peculiar delicacy and difficulty, it is well
founded.
"I should have thought it unnecessary to enter into this explanation, were it
not that I am held up as a candidate at the ensuing election, and would not
wish that the step I have taken in respect to your letter should be considered
as implying more than it does, for I would never wish to conciliate at the ex-
pense of candour; on the other hand, I confide in your liberality not to infer
more than I intend from the explanation I have given you. "
50
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? 394
THE LIFE OF
justment of the territorial controversies with Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania was mentioned, and the speech concluded
by calling the attention of the legislature to local topics.
The address in reply to the speech was referred to a com-
mittee, of which Hamilton was a member, and was reported
by him. It was a mere echo of the speech on all subjects,
except as to the request of congress to convene the legis-
lature, which was passed by in silence. On being reported
to the house, a motion was made by the speaker to amend
it, by expressing their approbation of the governor's con-
duct in not convening the legislature at an earlier period
than that fixed by law; he at the same time disclaiming
all hostility to the impost. This motion produced the effect
which had been sought to be avoided, and called up a long
and vehement debate. While the friends of the union
expressed in general terms a dissent from the views of the
governor, feeling themselves in a minority, they sedulously
endeavoured to prevent all discussion of this topic, seeing
that it had been thrown in as an apple of discord; but the
friends of the governor, who were guided with an adroit
and subtle policy, seized upon this occasion to kindle an
excitement, and to rouse all the hostile feelings of the
states rights party.
The speaker then proposed to withdraw the motion, but
it was insisted that it could not be withdrawn. That no
}11 consequences could arise from a decision; that it was
only a question whether there was such a pressing neces-
sity as to authorize the governor to convene the legisla-
ture. That if the doctrine that the governor was bound
to comply with a requisition of congress on this subject
was sustained, it was impossible to tell where it would end.
That congress might, by repeated requisitions, perhaps once
a month, tease and weary the legislature into a compliance
with their measures; an apprehension not exaggerated,
for such had been the practice of the former government.
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? HAMILTON.
395
Several propositions were made to get rid of the motion
for an amendment, and it was at last agreed that the com-
mittee should rise and report; Colonel Hamilton stating,
"that he would reserve himself on this subject until it came
again before them, when he hoped to be enabled to offer
such arguments as would strike with conviction the candid
part of the house. "
This question was brought forward on the nineteenth
of January, when an amendment was proposed by General
Malcolm, as a substitute for that of the speaker, the object
of which was to avoid a direct expression of opinion as to
the governor's conduct, and to place his justification on the
ground of the extraordinary expense an extra session
would have produced. This amendment was resisted with
great ingenuity and art. An attempt was made to show that
silence would be in effect a censure upon the governor,
while approbation of his conduct did not necessarily re-
flect upon that of congress,--that this motion was in
reality an attempt to debar them from the right of de-
claring their sentiments; and the house was asked whether,
if it was necessary, they were afraid to justify their gov-
ernor?
A comparison was drawn between the former and
present government, and an absurd analogy sought to be
shown to the attempt of the British government to levy
ship-money, which was finally and effectually resisted by
the English commons. It was contended that if to the
right of making peace and war, of raising fleets and armies,
was superadded that of Convening at pleasure the state
legislatures, and of exercising such a prerogative, the issue
no man could foretell;--that congress was an irresponsible
body, and that the governor was accountable to the state;
--that this was not the "extraordinary occasion" contem-
plated by the constitution; and as they were now ready
to approve the governor's conduct, they should have been
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? 396
THE LIFE OF
as ready, had his course been different, to have cen-
sured it.
The question was then called as to the substitute, when
Hamilton, who had previously spoken on the point of or-
der, arose. This body was, with few exceptions, composed
of respectable individuals, who had enjoyed small advan-
tages of education, and who regarded with jealousy all
oratorical embellishment. Having previously felt its pulse,
and only anxious to carry this great measure, on the right
decision of which such vast consequences depended, Ham-
ilton conformed his effort to the character of the assembly,
and addressed them in the following conciliatory and mod-
erate tone. After a few preliminary observations, he pro-
ceeded to remark :*
"This now leads us to examine the important question
presented to us by the proposed amendment. For my own
part, I have seen with regret the progress of this business,
and it was my earnest wish to have avoided the present
discussion. I saw with regret the first application of con-
gress to the governor, because it was easy to pe-rceive
that it involved a delicate dilemma. Either the governor,
from considerations of inconvenience, might refuse to call
the assembly, which would derogate from the respect due
to congress; or he might call them, and by being brought
together at an unreasonable period, before the time appoint-
ed by law for the purpose, they would meet with reluc-
tance, and perhaps with a disposition less favourable than
might be wished to the views of congress themselves. I
saw with equal regret the next step of the business. If a
conference had been desired with congress, it might have
been had--circumstances might have been explained, rea-
* All of these speeches arc reported by Cliilds, the reporter of the debates
in the New-York convention. They are very imperfect, and generally in the
language the reporter would himself have used.
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? HAMILTON.
397
sons might have been assigned satisfactory to them for not
calling the legislature. The affair might have been com-
promised. But instead of this, the governor thought pro-
per to answer by a flat denial, founded on a constitutional
impediment, and an idea of the invasion of the right of free
deliberation was brought into view. I earnestly wished
the matter to have rested here. I might appeal to gentle-
men in this house, and particularly to the honourable mem-
ber who is so zealous in support of the amendment, that
before the speech appeared, I discovered a solicitude that
by passing the subject over in silence, it might not give
occasion to the present discussion. It however came be-
fore us in a form very different from that which I should
have thought advisable, for there was no need of an appeal
to the legislature. The next step was to appoint a com-
mittee to prepare an answer to the speech. It fell to my lot
to be a member of that committee; my object still was to
avoid the interference of this house in a matter about which
there was a difference of opinion between the United
States and the governor of this state on constitutional
ground. The best way to effect this, was to frame the
answer in the most general terms. This was done; not a
word is said even about the revenue system, which occa-
sioned the request of congress to convene the legislature.
The answer is generally, that the house will take into con-
sideration the different acts of congress, and make such
provisions as appear to them compatible with the abilities
and constitution of the state. By not touching at all on
the topic connected with the origin of the controversy, I
thought we might safely be silent without any implication
of censure on the governor. It was neither my wish to
condemn nor to approve. I was only desirous of avoiding
an interference in a constitutional question, which belong-
ed entirely to the province of the executive authority of
the state, and about which I knew there would be a differ-
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? 398
THE LIFE OF
ence of opinion, even in this house.
I submit it to the
house, whether this was not a prudent course, and whether
it is not to be lamented that the proposed amendment
forces the discussion upon us. Constitutional questions
are always delicate; they should never be touched but
from necessity.
"But though I shall be readily acquitted of having had
any agency in bringing the house into this disagreeable
situation, since the question is brought forward, I shall
with freedom meet the discussion. This my duty demands
from me; and whoever may be affected by it, I shall pro-
ceed under an impression that my constituents expect from
me the free exercise of my judgment, and the free decla-
ration of my sentiments on the matters deliberated upon in
this house.
"The question by the honourable member on my right,
has been wrongly stated. He says it is this--whether a re-
quest of congress to convene the legislature is conclusive
upon the governor of the state, or whether a bare intima-
tion of that honourable body lays him under a constitu-
tional necessity of convening the legislature? But this is
not the true question. From the shape in which the busi-
ness comes before us, the inquiry truly is--whether a sol-
emn application of the United States to the executive of
this state to convene the legislature for the purpose of de-
liberating on a matter which is considered by that body as
of essential importance to the nation, and which has been
viewed in a similar light by most of the other states indi-
vidually, is such an extraordinary occasion as left the gov-
ernor under no constitutional impediment to a compliance?
and it may be added, whether that , application, under all
the circumstances, was an attempt to invade the freedom
of deliberation in this house 1
"Here let me ask, what does the constitution say upon
the subject? Simply this--that the governor 'shall have
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? HAMILTON. 399
power to convene the assembly and senate on extraordi-
nary occasions. '
"But what is an extraordinary occasion? what circum-
stances are to concur, what ingredients combine, to con-
stitute one? What general rule can be imagined by which
to define the precise meaning of these vague terms, and
draw the fine between an ordinary and an extraordinary
occasion? Will the gentleman on my right furnish us with
such a criterion? Profoundly skilled as he is in law, (at
least in the local laws of this state,) I fancy it will be diffi-
cult for him to invent one that will suit his present pur-
pose. Let him consult his law books: they will not relieve
his embarrassment. It is easy to see the clause allows the
greatest latitude to opinion. What one may think a very
extraordinary occasion, another may think a very ordinary
one, according to his bias, his interest, or his intellect. If
there is any rule at all, it is this--the governor shall not call
the legislature with a view to the ordinary details of the
state administration. Whatever does not fall within this
description, and has any pretensions to national importance
in any view, leaves him at liberty to exercise the discre-
tion vested in him by the constitution. There is, at least,
no constitutional bar in the way.
"The United States are intrusted with the management
of the general concerns and interests of the community--
they have the power of war and peace, they have the
power of treaty.
"Our affairs with respect to foreign nations are left to
their direction. We must entertain very diminutive ideas
of the government of the union, to conceive that their
earnest call on a subject which they deem of great national
magnitude, which affects their engagements with two re-
spectable foreign powers, France and the United Nether-
lands, which relates to the preservation of their faith at
home and abroad, is not such an occasion as would justify
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? 400
THE LIFE OF
the executive, upon the terms of the constitution, in con-
vening the legislature. If this doctrine is maintained,
where will it lead to--what kind of emergency must exist
before the constitution will authorize the governor to call
the legislature? Is the preservation of our national faith
a matter of such trivial moment? Is the fulfilment of the
public engagements domestic and foreign of no conse-
quence 1 Must we wait for the fleets of the United Neth-
erlands or of France to enforce the observance of them,
before the executive will be at liberty to give the legisla-
ture an opportunity of deliberating on the means of their
just demands? This is straining the indefinite words of
the constitution to a most unreasonable extreme. It would
be a tenable position to say that the call of the United
States is alone sufficient to satisfy the idea of an extraor-
dinary occasion. It is easy to conceive, that such a pos-
ture of European affairs might exist, as would render it
necessary to convene the different legislatures to adopt
measures for the public safety, and at the same time inex-
pedient to disclose the object till they were assembled.
Will we say that congress would be bound to communi-
cate the object of their call to the executive of every state 1
or that the executive of this state, in complying with their
request, would be guilty of a violation of the constitution?
But the present case is not that of a mere general request;
it is specifically to deliberate upon an object of acknow-
ledged importance in one view or another. On one hand
it is alleged to be a measure essential to the honour, inter-
est, and perhaps the existence of the union; on the other,
it is said to be on principles subversive of the constitution
and dangerous to the liberty of the subject. It is, there-
fore, a matter of delicacy and moment, and the earnest
call of the union to have it considered cannot fall within
the notion of so common, so ordinary an occasion, as
would prohibit the executive from summoning a meeting
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? HAMILTON. 401
of the legislature. The only argument urged to denomi-
nate it such, is that it had been recently decided on by the
legislature. But there is an evident fallacy in this position;
the call was addressed to a new and different body, totally
different in the contemplation of the constitution, and ma-
terially different in fact with respect to the members who
compose it. A large proportion of the members of the
present house were not members of the last. For aught
that either congress or the governor could officially know,
there might have been a total change in the individuals,
and, therefore, a total difference in the sentiments. No
inference, of course, could be fairly drawn from the con-
duct of the last legislature to that of the present. Indeed,
however it might be wished to prepossess the minds of the
members of the former house with a contrary idea, it is
plain that there is no necessary connection between what
they did at that time, and what it may be proper for them
to do now. The act of the last session proves the con-
viction of the house then, that the grant of the impost was
an eligible measure. Many of the members were led to
suppose that it would answer the purpose, and might have
been accepted by congress. If the experiment has shown
that they were mistaken in their expectations, and if it
should appear to them that congress could not for good
reasons accept it, the same motives which induce them to
the grant already made, would determine them to consent
to such alterations as would accommodate it to the views
of congress and the other states, and make it practicable
to carry the system into execution.
"It may be observed, that as congress accompanied
their request with an explanation of the object, they by
that mode of proceeding submitted the whole matter to
the discretion of the governor, to act according to the esti-
mate formed in his own mind of its importance. It is not
denied the governor had a discretion upon the occasion.
51
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? 402 THE LIFE OP
It is not contended, that he was under a constitutional ne-
cessity to convene the legislature. The resolution of con-
gress itself does not imply or intimate this. They do not
pretend to require, they only earnestly recommend. The
governor might at his peril refuse; responsible, however,
for any ill consequences that might have attended his re-
fusal. But what is contended for is, that the call of the
United States, under all circumstances, was sufficient to
satisfy the terms of the constitution empowering him to
convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions, and
left him at full liberty to comply.
"The admission of his discretion does not admit that it
was properly exercised, nor does it admit that the footing
upon which he placed his refusal was proper. It does not
admit that the constitution interposed an obstacle in his
way, or that the request of congress implied any thing hos-
tile to the right of free deliberation.
"This is the aspect under which the business presents
itself to our consideration, as well from the correspond-
ence between congress and the governor, as from the
manner in which it is ushered to us in the speech. A
general approbation of his conduct, is an approbation of
the principle by which it is professed to have been actuated.
"Are we ready to say that the constitution would have
been violated by a compliance? Are we ready to say that
the call upon us to deliberate is an attempt to infringe the
freedom of deliberation? If we are not ready to say both,
we must reject the amendment. In particular, I think it
must strike us all that there is something singularly forced
in intimating, that an application of congress to the gov-
ernor of the state to convene a new legislature to consider
a very important national subject, has any thing in it dan-
gerous to the freedom of our deliberations. I natter my-
self we should all have felt ourselves as much at liberty to
have pursued our sentiments, if we had met upon an ex-
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? HAMILTON.
403
traordinary call, as we now do when met according to our
own appointment.
"There yet remains an important light in which the
subject merits consideration; I mean as it respects the
executive authority of the state itself. By deciding that
the application of congress, upon which the debate turns,
was not such an extraordinary occasion as left the gov-
ernor at liberty to call the legislature, we may form a pre-
cedent of a very dangerous tendency; we may put a sense
on the constitution very different from the true meaning
of it, and may fetter the present or a future executive
with very inconvenient restraints. A few more such pre-
cedents may tie up the hands of a governor in such a man-
ner as would either oblige him to act at an extreme peril,
or to omit acting when public exigencies required it. The
mere sense of one governor would be no precedent for his
successor; but that sense approved by both houses of the
legislature, would become a rule of conduct. Suppose a
few more precedents of the kind on different combinations
of circumstances equally strong, and let us ask ourselves
what would be the situation of a governor whenever he
came to deliberate on the propriety of exercising the dis-
cretion in this respect vested in him by the constitution?
Would he not be apt to act with a degree of caution, or
rather timidity, which in certain emergencies might be
productive of very pernicious consequences? A mere in-
timation of the constitution to him not to call the legisla-
ture in their recess upon every trifling affair, which is its
true import, would be turned into an injunction not to do
so but upon occasions of the last necessity.
"We see, therefore, that the question upon which we
are pressed to decide, is not less delicate, as it respects the
constitution of the state itself, than as it respects the union;
and that in every possible view it is most prudent to avoid
the determination. Let the conduct of the governor stand
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? 404
THE LIFE OF
on its own merits. If he was right, our approbation will
not make him more right. If he was wrong, it would be
improper to give sanction to his error.
"Several things have been said in the debate which
have no connection with it; but to prevent their making
improper impressions, it may not be amiss to take some no-
tice of them. The danger of a power in congress to com-
pel the convening of the legislature at their pleasure has
been strongly insisted upon. It has been urged, if they
possessed it they might make it an engine to fatigue the
legislature into a compliance with their measures. In-
stances of an abuse of the like power in the crown, under
the former government, have been cited.
"It is a sufficient answer to all this to say, that no such
power is contended for. I do not assert that their request
obliged the governor to convene the legislature; I only
maintain that their request on an important national sub-
ject, was such an occasion as left him at liberty to do it
without any colour for imputing to him a breach of the
constitution; and that from motives of respect to the union,
and to avoid any further degradation of its authority,
already at too low an ebb, he ought to have complied.
"Admitting in the fullest extent that it would be danger-
ous to allow to congress the power of requiring the legis-
lature to be convened at pleasure, yet no injury or incon-
venience can result from supposing the call of the United
States, on a matter by them deemed of importance, to be
an occasion sufficiently extraordinary to authorize, not to
oblige the governor to comply with it.
"I cannot forbear remarking, that it is a common artifice
to insinuate a resemblance between the king under the
former government and congress; though no two things
can be more unlike each other. Nothing can be more dis-
similar than a monarch, permanent, hereditary, the source
of honour and emolument, and a republican body com-
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? HAMILTON.
405
posed of a number of individuals appointed annually, liable
to be recalled within the year, and subject to a continual
rotation; which, with few exceptions, is the fountain
neither of honour nor emolument. If we will exercise
our judgments, we shall readily see no such resemblance
exists, and that all inferences deduced from the comparison
must be false.
"Upon every occasion, however foreign such observa-
tions may be, we hear a loud cry raised about the danger
of intrusting power to congress; we are told it is danger-
ous to trust power any where; that power is liable to
abuse, with a variety of trite maxims of the same kind.
General propositions of this nature are easily framed, the
truth of which cannot be denied, but they rarely convey
any precise idea. To these we might oppose other propo-
sitions equally true, and equally indefinite. It might be
said that too little power is as dangerous as too much; that
it leads to anarchy, and from anarchy to despotism. But
the question still recurs, what is too much or too little 1
Where is the measure or<< standard to ascertain the happy
mean?
"Powers must be granted, or civil society cannot exist:
the possibility of abuse is no argument against the thing;
this possibility is incident to every species of power, how-
ever placed or modified. The United States, for instance,
have the power of war and peace. It cannot be disputed
that conjunctures might occur, in which^hat power might
be turned against the rights of the citizens; but where can
we better place it--in short, where else can we place it at
all?
"In our state constitution we might discover power lia-
ble to be abused to very dangerous purposes. I shall in-
stance only the council of appointment. In that council
the governor claims and exercises the power of nominating
to all offices. This power of nomination, in its operation,
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? 406
THE LIFE OF
amounts to a power of appointment; for it can always be
so managed as to bring in persons agreeable to him, and
exclude all others. Suppose a governor disposed to make
this an instrument of personal influence and aggrandize-
ment--suppose him inclined to exclude from office all inde-
pendent men. and to fill the different departments of the
state with persons devoted to himself--what is to hinder
him from doing it? who can say how far the influence
arising from such a prerogative might be carried? Per-
haps this power, if closely inspected, is a more proper sub-
ject of republican jealousy than any power possessed or
asked by congress, fluctuating and variable as that body is.
"But as my intention is not to instil any unnecessary
jealousies, I shall prosecute these observations no further.
They are only urged to show the imperfections of human
institutions, and to confirm the principle, that the possibility
of a power being abused, is no argument against its exist-
ence.
"Upon the whole, let us venture with caution upon con-
stitutional ground. Let us not court nor invite discussions
of this kind. Let us not endeavour still more to weaken
and degrade the federal government, by heaping fresh
marks of contempt on its authority. Perhaps the time is
not far remote, when . we may be inclined to disapprove
what we now seem eager to commend, and may wish we
had cherished the union with as much zeal as we now dis-
cover apprehension of its encroachments.
"I hope the house will not agree to the amendment. In
saying this, I am influenced by no other motive than a
sense of duty. I trust my conduct will be considered in
this light. I cannot give my consent to put any thing upon
our minutes which, it appears to me, we may one day have
occasion to wish obliterated from them. "
The opposition was again called up, and travelled over
the same ground; inveighed against the dangers of an in-
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? HAMILTON.
407
croachment on the rights of the people; justified fully the
conduct of the governor; declared that the decision of the
constitutional question was not necessarily involved, and
closed with a strong appeal to popular feeling on the dan-
gers to be apprehended from countenancing such an inva-
sion of the freedom of their deliberations.
Hamilton replied; indicated more clearly the fallacy of
the arguments which had been used; pointed out the true
construction of the language of the constitution; warned
the house of the folly and danger of this distrust of the
powers of congress, and ridiculed the attempt to draw an
analogy between its powers and those of a monarchy.
"Are we not," he asked, " to respect federal decisions?
are we on the contrary to take every opportunity of hold-
ing up their resolutions and requests in a contemptible and
insignificant light, and tell the world their calls, their re-
quests are nothing to us; that we are bound by none of
their measures? Do not let us add to their embarrassments,
for it is but a slender tie that at present holds us. You
see, alas ! what contempt we are falling into since the peace;
you see to what our commerce is exposed on every side;
you see us the laughing-stock, the sport of foreign nations.
And what may this lead to? I dread, sir, to think. Little
will it avail then to say, we could not attend to your wise
and earnest requests without inconvenience: little will it
avail to say, it would have injured individual interests to
have left our farms. These things arc trifling when com-
pared to bringing the councils and powers of the union into
universal contempt, by saying their call was unimportant,
and that it did not come under the indefinite meaning of
'extraordinary. See, gentlemen, before you may feel, what
may be your situation hereafter. There is more involved
in this measure than presents itself to your view.
"You hear it rung in your ears that, from the resem-
blance between the king and the congress of these states,
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