in seiner
Stellung
zur deutschen Philosophie (188;?
Windelband - History of Philosophy
Hodgson ( Time and Space, 1866 ; The Philosophy of Reflection, 1878 ; Meta physics of Experience, 1898), James Sully (The Human Mind, 2 vols.
.
1892), and G.
F.
Stout (Analytic Psychology, 1896) as Englishmen.
Darwin, Romanes, and Lloyd Morgan have treated comparative psychology.
The Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy, ed.
by J.
M.
Baldwin with cooper*
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 631
tion of British and American writers, will give historical material as well as definitions (in press). ]
The Italian philosophy of the nineteenth century hag been determined more than the French by political motives, and in the content of the thought*
that have been worked over for these ends, it has been dependent
French, partly upon German, philosophy. At the beginning the Kncyclopte- dint*' view of the world, both in its practical and it* theoretical aspects, was
dominant In men like Oioja (1760-1829) or his friend, Romagnoai (17(11- 1835), while as early as Pasquale Qaluppi (1771-1846 ; Saggio Filosojico sulla Critica delle Cunosceme Umane, 1320 ft ; Filosofla delta 'Volouta, 1832 ff. ) Kantian influences assert themselves, — to be sure, under the psychologists
form of the Leibnizian virtual innateness.
At a later period philosophy, which was mainly developed by the clergy, was
influenced essentially by the political alliance of the Papacy with democratic Liberalism, inasmuch as Rationalism wished to unite itaelf with revealed faith. The most characteristic representative of this tendency and the most attractive
personally was Antonio Boamini-Serbati (1797-1855; Xuuvo Saggio suit' Ori gin* delle Idee, 1830; Principii delta Srietua Morale, 1831 ; Post hum, Teosojia, 1*59 II. ; Saggio Storico-Critico suite Cateyorie e la Dialettiea, 1884) [Eng. tr. of the first, Origin of Idea*, 3 vols. . Loud. 188:1 f. ; also It's Philtut. System, by T. Davidson, with int. bibliog. , etc. , Loud. 1882 ; Psychology, vols. , Lond. and Boston, 1884-1889]. Ct. op him F. X. Kraus (Deutsche Kuiolxchiiu, 1890). The combination of Platonic, Cartesian, and Schellingian ideas proceeds in still wore pronounced lines to an Ontologism. i. e. an <i priori science of Being, in Vincenzo Oiobertl (1801-1852; Deyli Errori Filosojico di Rosmitii. 1842; iHlmdmione alia Filosofla, 1840 Prolologia, 1857. Ct. B. Spaveuta, La Filo-
iiflix di G. , 180:1). Terenzo Mamlanl passed through this entire development (1800-1885; Coufessioni di tin Mebtfisir,,, 18*55) l. uigi Ferri (1820-1806), l. abanca, Bonatetli, and others followed it, though intlueuced also by Ueruian and French views.
As opponents this tendency found, on the one hand, the rigid Orthodoxiem <>f Ventura IT'. '. ' 18t;i Tappaielll and Liberatore (Drlla Conosreuza Intel- letnale, 1865), and, on the other hand, politically radical Scepticism, as repre sented by Guiseppe Ferrari (1811-1808 La Filosofla delle Reroluzioni, 1861) and Antonio Franckl (La Religione del 19. Secolo, 1863). The Kantian philosophy was introduced by Alf. Teata (1784-1800; Delia Critica delta lingione Punt, 1841» ff. ), and uioru successfully by C. Canton! (born 1840; cf. above, 632), F. Tocco, S. Turbiglio, and others. Hegel's doctrine wa* intro duced by A. Vara (1813-1885), It. Spaventa (1817-188:5), and Fr. Fiorentino, and Comte's positivism by Cataneo, Ardigo, and I. aliriola. [Cf. for this Italian thought the App. in Ueberweg's Hit. Phil. , Eng. tr. , Vol. II. 401 ff. ]
In Germany (cf. J. E. Erdmann. History of Phil. [Eng. tr. Vol. III. ] :Ui\ ff. ) the first development was that of the great philosophic schools in the third and fourth decades of the century. Herbert's following proved the most complete in Itself and firmest in it* adherence. In were prominent: M.
Drobiech (Religionsphilosophie, 1840; Psychologic, 1842; Die moralischt Statisttk und die menschliche Willensfreiheit, 1807), R. Zimmermann (jEs- thetik. Vienna, 18415), I> Btriimpell (Jfnttplpunkte der Metophysik, 1840; Einleitung in die Philosophir, 1880), T. Ziller (Einleitung in die Allgemrine Pddagogik, I860). special divarication of the school formed by the so-called Volkerpeycholorie [Comparative or Folk-Psychology], as opened by M. Itasexoa (Leben der Seele, 1856 f. ) and H. Stein thai (Aliriss der Sprach- tsistenschafl, I,; Einleilung in die Psychologic und Sprachtrissenschaft, 1871) cL their common programme in Vol. of the Zeitschrift fiir dlkerpsyeholoyie und Sprachmssensrhoft.
The Hegelian School had rich experience in it* own life of the blessing of dialectic; split even in the Thirties upon religious antitheses. The important historian* of philosophy, Zeller and Prantl, Erdmann and Kuno Fischer, went their way, not confused by this. Between the two parties, with consid erable degree of independent thinking, stand K. Rosenkrans (1805-1879;
partly upon
still
Wisstnschafl der tnglsehcn Idee. 1868 f. ) and Friedrich Tbeodor Vlacher (1807-
18S7
jStkttik, 1*40-1*68 Auch Emer, 1879).
;
i
p.
;
a
it
I
I.
V
is
. '!
;
A
),
it
;
;
;
632 Philosophy of ilte Nineteenth Century. [Part VII
The "right wing" of the Hegelian school, which resisted a pantheistic inter pretation of the master, and emphasised the metaphysical importance of per sonality, attracted those thinkers who stood in a freer relation to Hegel, and maintained Fichtean and Leibniziau motifs. Such were I. H. Fichte (son of the creator of the Wissenschaftslehre, 1797-1879 ; Beiträge zur Characteristic, der neueren Philosophie, 1829 ; Ethik, 1850 ff. ; Anthropologie, 1856), C. Fort- lage (1806-1881; System der Psychologie, 1856), Christ. Weisse (1801-1880; System der Ästhetik, 1830 and 1871 ; Grundzüge der Metaphysik, 1835 ; Ihi> philosophische Problem der Gegenwart, 1842 ; Philosophie des Christenthumi, 1855 ff. ), H. Ulrioi (180Ö-1884 ; Das Grundprincip der Philosophie, 1845 f. ; Gott und die Natur, 1861 ; Gott und der Mensch, 1866); further, E. Trahn- dorf (1782-1863; JEsthetik, 1827), Mor. Carriere (1817-1895; Ästhetik, 185! '. 3d ed. 1885 ; Die Kunst im Zusammenhang der Kulturentwickelung, 5 vols. ).
Related to these was, on the one side, K. Rothe (1797-1867; Theolngisehr Ethik, 2d ed. 1867-1871 ; cf. on his speculative system, H. Holtzmann, 1899), who interwove many suggestions from the idealistic development into an origi nal mysticism, and on the other side A. Trendelenburg, who set the concep tion of " Motion " in the place of Hegel's dialectical principle, and thought thereby to combat Hegel's philosophy. His merit, however, lies in the stimulus which he gave to Aristotelian studies (1802-1872; Logische Untersuchungen. 1840 ; Naturrecht, 1860).
To the " Left" among the Hegelians belong Arnold Huge (1802-1880 ; joint editor with Echtermeyer of the Halle'sehe Jahrbücher, 1838-1840, and of the Deutsche Jahrbücher, 1841 f. ; coll. writings in 10 vols. , Mannheim, 184« ff. "). Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872 ; Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit, IS}»: Philosophie und Christentum, 1839; Wesen des Chrislenthums, 1841 ; U>w» der Religion, 1846; Theogonie, 1857 ; Works, 10 vols. , Leips. 1840 ff. ). Cf. K. Grün (L. F. , Leips. 1874), David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874 ; Das Lei** Jesu, 1835; Christliche Glaubenslehre, 1840 f. ; Der Alte und der neue Glaube,
1872 ; Works, 12 vols. , Berlin, 1876 ff. ). Cf. A. Hausrath, D. F. Str. und die Theologie seiner Zeit (Heidelberg, 1876 and 1878).
From the Materialism controversy are to be mentioned : K. Moleschott (Kreislauf des Lebens, 1852), Rudolph Wagner (Ueber Wissen und Glauben, 1854; Der Kampf um die Seele, 1857), C. Vogt (Köhlerglaube und Wissen schaft, 1854 ; Vorlesungen über den Menschen, 1863), L. Büchner (Kraft und Stoff, 1855) [Force and Matter, Lond. l.
Related to this materialism was the development of the extreme Sensualism in the form in which it was presented by H. Czolbe (1819-1873; Neue Dar stellung des Sensualismiis, 1855 ; Grundzüge, der extensionalen Erkenntniss- theorie, 1875), and by F. Ueberweg (1826-1871), who was originally more closely related to Beneke (cf. A. Lange, History of Materialism, IL). In a similar relation stood the so-called Monism which E. Haeckel (born 1814 ; Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte, 1868 ; Welträlhsel, nth ed. 1900 : cf. Loots, Anti-Haeckel, 1900, and Fr. Paulsen, E. ' H. als Philosoph. Preuss. Jahrl*. 1900) has attempted to develop, and finally the socialistic Philosophy of His tory, whose founders are Fr. Engels (Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie, 1888 ; Der Ursprung der Familie, des Pri- vateigenthums und des Staates, 1884) and Karl Marx (Das Kapital, 1867 ff. . Capital, 1801); cf. on Engels and Marx, R. Stammler, Wirthschaft und Hecht, 1896 ; L. Wolfmann, Der historische Materialistnus, 1900.
By far the most important among the epigones of the German Philosophy was Rudolph Herrn. Lotze (1817-1881 ; Metaphysik, 1841 ; Logik, 1842 ; Medi- cinische Psychologie, 1842; Mikrokosmus, 1856 ff. ; System der Philosophie. 1. Logik, 1874 ; IL Metaphysik, 1870) [Microcosmus, tr. by Hamilton and Jones, Edin. and N. Y. 1885 ; Logic and Metaphysics, 2 vols, each, tr. ed. by B. ßosan- quet, Oxford, 1884, also 1888 ; Outlines, ed. by G. T. Ladd, Boston, 1886 ff. ). Cf. O. Caspari, H. L.
in seiner Stellung zur deutschen Philosophie (188;? ); E. v. Hartmann, L. 's Philosophie (Berlin, 1888); H. Jones, Phüos. of /. . , 189i
Interesting side phenomena are : G. T. Fechner (1801-1887 ; Nanna, 1848; Physical, und philos. Atomenlehre, 1865; Elemente der Psychophysik, 1860; Drei Motive des Glaubens, 1868 ; Vorschule der Ästhetik, 1876 ; Die Tagesan sicht gegenüber der Nachtansicht, 1879) and Eug. Dühring (born 1833 ; Natür liche Dialektik, 1865 ; Werth des Lebens, 1866 ; Logik und Wissenschafistheorie
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 688
IP'S). — The following from the Catholic aide have taken part in the develop ment of philosophy : Fr. Hermea (1775-1831 ; Einleitung in die christkatho-
lische Theologie, 1819), Beruli. Bolaano (1781-1848;
1837), Anton GUnther (1785-1803; Ges. Schriften, Vienna, 1881), and Wil-
helm Roaenkrants (1824-1874 ; Wissenschaft des Wi*»en», 1860).
I'hiloaophic interest in Germany, which was much crippled about the middle of the century, has strongly revived, owing to the union of the study of Kant with the demands of natural science. The former, called forth by Kuno Fischer's work (1800). evoked a movement which has been characterized in various aspects a. « Neo-Kantianlam. To it belong, as principal members, A. Lange (1828- 1876; History of Materialism, 1800) and (). Liebmann (born 1840; Analyst* der Wirklichkeil, 3 Aufl. , 1900). In theology it was represented by Alb. Hitachi ( Theologie und Metaphysik, 1881). [A. T. Swing, Theol. of A. S. 1901. ]
Theoretical Physics became significant for philosophy through the work prin cipally of Rob. Mayer (Bemerkungen liber die Krafte der unbelebten Natur, 1845 ; Ueber das mtchanische ^Equivalent der Warme, 1850 ; cf. on him A.
Riehl in the Sigvsart-Abhandlungen, 1900) and H. Helmholts (Physiologische Optik, 1886 ; Sensations of Tone, 1876 ; Thatsaehen der Wahrnehmung, 1879). Beginning with physiology, Willhelm Wundt (born 1837) has developed a
comprehensive system of philosophy. From his numerous writings may be men tioned Orundziige der physiologischen Psychologic, 1878 f„ 4th ed. 1893 [Outlines of Physiological Psychology, Eng. tr. in prep, by E. Titcnenor] ; Logii, 18801. ; Ethik. 1886 [Eng. tr. by Titchenor, Washburn, and Gulliver] ; The Facts of the Moral Life, Ethical Systems, 1897 ; Principles of Morality, 1901 ; System der Philosophic, 1889 ; Orundriss der Psychologic, 1897 [Eng. tr. by Judd, Out lines of Psychology, 1897] ; VUlkerpsychologie, 1900.
Wissenschaflslehre,
The Kantian theory of knowledge was met by Realism in J. v. Kirchmann (Philosophic des Wissens, 1804), and by Positivism in C. Goring (System der kritisrhcn Philosophic, 1874 f. ), E. Laas (Jdealismus und Positicismus, 1879 ft. ), and in part too in A. Riehl (Der philosnphische Kriticismus, 1876 ff. [Eng. tr. of Part III. by A. Fairbanks, 1894, Science and Metaphysics]). A similar tendency was followed by R. Avenarius (Kritik der reinen Erfahrung, 1888- 1890; Der menschliche Weltbegriff, 1891).
As in the first-named authors the concepts of natural science were especially authoritative, so on the other hand the interests of the historical view of the world have normative value for investigators such as Rudolf Eucken (Die Ein- hrit des (ieisteslcbens, 1888 ; Der Kampfvm einen geistigen Lebensinhalt, 1896),
II. Glogau (Abriss der philosuphischen Gnmdicissenschaften, 1880), and W.
Ollthey (Einleitung in die Geistcswissenschaflen,
A mediating standpoint is taken by Christian Sigwart (Logik, 2d ed. 1893;
[Eng. tr. by Helen Dendy, 1896]).
Two authors who occupy a position in closer relation to general literature
are —
E. ▼. Hartmann (born 1842), who excited general attention by his Philosophy
of the Unconscious, 1869 [Eng. tr. by Coupland, 1884]. This was followed by a long series of writings, of which the most important are Das Unbeteusste r«n» Standpunkt der Deseendenztheorie, 1872; Phdnnmenologie des sittlichrn
Beicusstseins, 1879 ; Die Religion ilrs Geistes, 1882 ; ^Esthetik, 1886 f. ; Katego- rtrnlehre, 1897 ; Geschichte der Metaphysik, 1900. These works represent a more and more completely scientific standpoint. As representing a popular philosophy, in part pessimistic, in part mystical, may be named as typical, Mainlander (Philosophic der ErISsung, 1874 f. ) on the one hand, and on the other, Duprel {Philosophic der Myttik, 1884 f).
Fr. VVilh. ITietaaoba (1844-1900), whose development in its changing stages h characterised by the following selection from his numerous writings, of which the complete edition la published in Lelpsic, 1895 ff. : Die Geburt der TragSdis nm dem Grille der Musik, 1872; Unzritgrmassc Betrachtungcn, 1873-1876;
Mrnsfhliehrs — Allrvmensrhliches, 1876-1880 ; Also sprach Zarathustra, 1883 f ; Jensrits ron Gut und B6sc, 1886 ; Zur Genealogie der Moral, 1887 ; Gbtsendam- merung. 1889. [Eng. tr. by A. Tille, 1896 ff. . Thus spake Zarathustra • Beyond
Good and Bad : Genealogy of Morals. ] Cf. Al. Riehl, . \iettsehe, Stuttgart, Id ed. 1897. [P. Cams In The Monist. IX. 672 ff. ; G. N. Dolson in Cornell
Com. to Phu\ HI]
1883).
634 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century [Part VII
§ 44. The Controversy over the Soul.
A characteristic change in the general scientific relations during the nineteenth century has been the constantly progressing loosening and separation of psychology from philosophy,1 which may now be regarded as in principle complete. This followed from the rapid decline of metaphysical interest and metaphysical production, which appeared in Germany, especially, as a natural reaction from the high tension of speculative thought. Robbed thus of a more general base of support, in its effort to give itself a firm footing as purely empir ical science, psychology had at first but little power of resistance against the inroad of the method of natural science, according to which it should be treated as a special province of physiology or general biology. About this question a number of vigorous move ments grouped themselves.
1. At the beginning of the century a brisk interchange of thought obtained between the French Ideology and the later developments of the English Enlightenment philosophy which had split into asso ciational psychology and the common sense doctrine : in this inter change, however, France bore now the leading part. Here the antithesis which had existed in the French sensualism from the be ginning between Condillac and Bonnet (cf. p. 458), came out more sharply. With Destutt de Tracy, and even as yet with Laromiguiere, it does not come to a sharp decision. On the other hand, Cabanis is the leader of the materialistic line : his investigation as to the interconnec tion of the physical and the psychical (moral) nature of man, after con sidering the various influences of age, sex, temperament, climate, etc, comes to the result that the psychical life is everywhere determined by the body and its physical relations. With the organic functions thus reduced solely to mechanical and chemical processes, at least in prin ciple, it seemed that the soul, now superfluous as vital force, had also outlived its usefulness as the agent and supporter of consciousness.
In carrying out these thoughts other physicians, for example Broussais, gave to materialism a still sharper expression : the intel lectual activity is "one of the results" of the brain functions. Hence men eagerly seized upon the strange hypothesis of phre nology, with which Gall professed to localise at definite places in the brain all the particular " faculties," which empirical
psychology had provided up to that time. It was not merely an interesting diversion to hear in public that a more or less vigorous development
of special psychical powers could be recognised in the skull; the
1 Cf. W. Windelband, Ueber den gegemoartigen Stand der psychologitchf* Forschung (I-eips. 1876).
|44. J Controversy over the Soul: Ideology. t>35
thought was connected with this, especially among physicians, that now the materiality of the so-called soul-life was discovered, with out doubt In England especially, as is shown by the success of Combe's writings, the phrenological superstition called out very great interest and promoted a purely physiological psychology, in the line of that of Hartley. It was John Stuart Mill who first brought his countrymen back to Hume's conception of associational psychology. Without asking what matter and mind are in them selves, the student should proceed from the fact that the corporeal and mental states form two domains of experience, completely inca pable of comparison, and that psychology as the science of the laws of mental life must study the facts of the latter in themselves, and may not reduce them to the laws of another sphere of existence. Alex ander Bain, attaching himself to Mill's standpoint, developed the associational psychology farther. His especial contribution was to point out the significance of the muscular sensations, in which the fundamental facts of the mental life which correspond to spontane ous bodily motion are to be found. This associational psychology has thus nothing in common with a materialistic view of the soul ; nevertheless the mechanism of ideas and impulses is the only prin ciple recognised for the purpose of explaining the mental processes.
2. The opposition to the materialistic psychology comes much more sharply to the fore in those lines of thought which emphasise the activity of consciousness as a unity. Following de Tracy's example Laromignitre's Ideology distinguished carefully between the " modifications," which are the mere consequence of bodily exci tations, and the " actions " of the soul, in which the soul proves its independent existence, even in perception. In the school of Mont jollier they still believed in the " vital force. " Barthez regarded this as separate from body and soul, as a something completely unknown : Bichat distinguished the " animal " from the " organic " life by the characteristic of spontaneous " reaction. " This element in psychology came to full development through Maine de Hirun. The acute, subtle mind of this philosopher received many suggestions from English and German philosophy ; with reference to the latter his acquaintance with Kant's and Fichte's doctrines —though only a superficial one — and with the virtualism of Bouterwek, who was named with remarkable frequency in Paris, is to be emphasised. 1
1 The line* of communication were here not merely literary (Villers, Pege>ando, etc. ), but In a strong decree personal. Of great Importance among other thing* waa the preaence of the Schlegela in Paris, especially the lectures of Frederick Schlegel. In Pari* itself the society of Auteuil, to which also the Swiss embassador Stapfer, a prominent medium of Influence, belonged, was of importance.
636 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VIL
The fundamental fact on which Maine de Biran bases his theory, later called spiritualism, is that in the will we immediately experi ence at once our own activity and the resistance of the " Non-Moi '* (primarily our own body). The reflection of personality upon this its own activity forms the starting-point of all philosophy: inner experience furnishes the form, experience of that which resists fur nishes the matter. From this fundamental fact the conceptions force, substance, cause, unity, identity, freedom, and necessity are developed. Thus Maine de Biran builds upon psychology a meta physical system, which frequently reminds of Descartes and Male- branche, but replaces the cogito ergo sum, by a volo ergo sum; just for this reason he exerts himself especially to fix securely the boundary lines between psychology and physiology, and particularly to exhibit the conception of inner experience (sens intime) as the clear and self-evident basis of all mental science, of which the self- consciousness of the willing and choosing personality appeared to him to be the fundamental principle. These significant thoughts, directed against the naturalistic one-sidedness of the eighteenth century, were supplemented by Maine de Biran for his own faith by a mystical turn, which finds the highest form of life in the giving up and losing of personality in the love of God. This sup plementation was made especially toward the close of his life. His scientific doctrine, on the contrary, found further points of contact, in part with the Scottish, and in part with the German philosophy, through his friends, such as Ampere, Jouffroy, and Cousin. In this process, much of the original character was lost in consequence of the eclectic appropriation of material. This was shown externally
in the fact that his theory, as thus modified, especially in the in structional form which it received through Cousin, was freely called Spiritualism. In fact, the original character of the theory, which might better have been called Voluntarism, was changed by the intellectualistic additions which Cousin especially brought to it from the German philosophy of identity. At a later time, Ravais- son, and in a still more independent fashion, closely related to the Kantian criticism, Eenouvier, sought to hark back from eclecticism to Maine de Biran. 1
3. Voluntarism has been on the whole, perhaps, the most strongly marked tendency of the psychology of the nineteenth century. It is the form in which empirical science has appropriated Kant's and
1 A similar position is occupied in Italy by Gallupi. Among the "facts of consciousness" which he makes the basis of philosophy, he regards the au tonomy of the ethical will as the determining factor, while Rosmini has retained the older intellectualism.
% 44. ] Controverty over the Soul : Voluntaritm. 637
Fichte's transfer of the standpoint of philosophy from the theoretical over to the practical reason. In Germany the principal influences on this side have been Fichte's and 'Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Both these authors make the essential nature of man to consist in the will, and the colouring which such a point of view gives to the whole the ory of the world could only be strengthened by the course of German history in our century, and by the transformation in the popular mind which has accompanied it The importance of the practical, which has been enhanced to the highest degree, and the repression of the theoretical, which is not without its dangers, have appeared more and more as the characteristic features of the age.
This tendency made its appearance in a scientific form with Beneke, who in spite of his dependence in part upon English philos ophy and in part upon Herbart, gave a peculiar turn to his exposi tion of the associational psychology (cf. above, p. 586) by conceiving the elements of the mental life as active processes or impulses ( Triebe). He called them " elementary faculties " ( Urvermogen), and maintained that these, originally set into activity by stimuli, bring about the apparently substantial unity of the psychical nature by their persistence as traces {Spuren), and by their reciprocal adjust ment in connection with the continual production of new forces. The soul is accordingly a bundle — not of ideas, as with Hume, but — of impulses, forces, and "faculties. " On the other hand, all real significance is denied to the faculties in the older sense of classifica tions of the mental activities (cf. above, p. 577). To establish this doctrine inductively by a methodical elaboration of the facts of inner perception is regarded by Beneke as the only possible presupposition for the philosophical disciplines, such as logic, ethics, metaphysics,
and the philosophy of religion. In this procedure he passes on to a theory of the values which belong to stimuli (the so-called "things"), on account of the increase or diminution of the impulses.
Fortlage gave metaphysical form to the psychological method and theory of Beneke, by incorporating it into Fichte's Science of Know ledge. He, too, conceives of the soul and all things in their relations as a system of impulses or forces, and perhaps no one has carried through so sharply as he the conception that the source of substantial existence is the activity of the will, — an activity which is devoid of any substrate. 1 He regarded the essential nature of the psychical pro cesses as follows : From original functions arise contents which grow into synthetic union, remain, become established, and thus produce the forms of psychical reality. He thus pointed out once more the way
> CI C. Fortlage, Btitrtge mr Ptyehologii (Leips. 1876), p. 40.
638 Philotophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII
by which alone metaphysics can be freed from the schema of material processes which are conceived as movements of unchangeable sub stances, such as atoms. But, at the same time, there were in these theories suggestions for the thought that the processes of ideation, of attention, and of evaluation in judgments, must be regarded as functions of the " impulse " which issues in question and assent or re jection. In the later development, indeed, the psychological analysis of the thinking process has penetrated even to the realm of logic, and here has often averted attention from the proper problems of that science. In the last decades especially, psychology as method and theory has had a luxurious development similar to that in the eighteenth century, and in its degenerate forms it has led to the same manifestations of the most superficial popular philosophy.
4. In England, also, the traditional psychological method and standpoint remain in control; nor was this dominance essentially affected by the transformation which Hamilton gave to the Scottish tradition under the influence of German philosophy and particularly of Kant. He, too, defends the standpoint of inner experience and regards it as affording the standard for all philosophical disciplines. Necessity and universality are to be found only in the simple, imme diately intelligible facts of consciousness which are present in every one. But in these facts — and to these belong also all individual perceptions of the presence of an external thing — it is only the finite, in finite relations and conditions, which comes to our knowl edge. It is in this sense, and without reference to the Kantian con ception of the phenomenal, that human knowledge is regarded by Hamilton as limited to experience of the finite. Of the Infinite and Absolute, i. e. , of God, man has only a moral certainty of faith. Sci ence, on the contrary, has no knowledge of this " Unconditioned," because it can think only what it first distinguishes from another in order then to relate it to another (cf. Kant's conception of synthesis). Mansel brought this " Agnosticism " into the service of revealed theology, making a still stronger and more sceptical employment of the Kantian theory of knowledge. He shows that religious dogmas are absolutely incomprehensible for human reason, and maintains that just on this account they are also incapable of attack.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 631
tion of British and American writers, will give historical material as well as definitions (in press). ]
The Italian philosophy of the nineteenth century hag been determined more than the French by political motives, and in the content of the thought*
that have been worked over for these ends, it has been dependent
French, partly upon German, philosophy. At the beginning the Kncyclopte- dint*' view of the world, both in its practical and it* theoretical aspects, was
dominant In men like Oioja (1760-1829) or his friend, Romagnoai (17(11- 1835), while as early as Pasquale Qaluppi (1771-1846 ; Saggio Filosojico sulla Critica delle Cunosceme Umane, 1320 ft ; Filosofla delta 'Volouta, 1832 ff. ) Kantian influences assert themselves, — to be sure, under the psychologists
form of the Leibnizian virtual innateness.
At a later period philosophy, which was mainly developed by the clergy, was
influenced essentially by the political alliance of the Papacy with democratic Liberalism, inasmuch as Rationalism wished to unite itaelf with revealed faith. The most characteristic representative of this tendency and the most attractive
personally was Antonio Boamini-Serbati (1797-1855; Xuuvo Saggio suit' Ori gin* delle Idee, 1830; Principii delta Srietua Morale, 1831 ; Post hum, Teosojia, 1*59 II. ; Saggio Storico-Critico suite Cateyorie e la Dialettiea, 1884) [Eng. tr. of the first, Origin of Idea*, 3 vols. . Loud. 188:1 f. ; also It's Philtut. System, by T. Davidson, with int. bibliog. , etc. , Loud. 1882 ; Psychology, vols. , Lond. and Boston, 1884-1889]. Ct. op him F. X. Kraus (Deutsche Kuiolxchiiu, 1890). The combination of Platonic, Cartesian, and Schellingian ideas proceeds in still wore pronounced lines to an Ontologism. i. e. an <i priori science of Being, in Vincenzo Oiobertl (1801-1852; Deyli Errori Filosojico di Rosmitii. 1842; iHlmdmione alia Filosofla, 1840 Prolologia, 1857. Ct. B. Spaveuta, La Filo-
iiflix di G. , 180:1). Terenzo Mamlanl passed through this entire development (1800-1885; Coufessioni di tin Mebtfisir,,, 18*55) l. uigi Ferri (1820-1806), l. abanca, Bonatetli, and others followed it, though intlueuced also by Ueruian and French views.
As opponents this tendency found, on the one hand, the rigid Orthodoxiem <>f Ventura IT'. '. ' 18t;i Tappaielll and Liberatore (Drlla Conosreuza Intel- letnale, 1865), and, on the other hand, politically radical Scepticism, as repre sented by Guiseppe Ferrari (1811-1808 La Filosofla delle Reroluzioni, 1861) and Antonio Franckl (La Religione del 19. Secolo, 1863). The Kantian philosophy was introduced by Alf. Teata (1784-1800; Delia Critica delta lingione Punt, 1841» ff. ), and uioru successfully by C. Canton! (born 1840; cf. above, 632), F. Tocco, S. Turbiglio, and others. Hegel's doctrine wa* intro duced by A. Vara (1813-1885), It. Spaventa (1817-188:5), and Fr. Fiorentino, and Comte's positivism by Cataneo, Ardigo, and I. aliriola. [Cf. for this Italian thought the App. in Ueberweg's Hit. Phil. , Eng. tr. , Vol. II. 401 ff. ]
In Germany (cf. J. E. Erdmann. History of Phil. [Eng. tr. Vol. III. ] :Ui\ ff. ) the first development was that of the great philosophic schools in the third and fourth decades of the century. Herbert's following proved the most complete in Itself and firmest in it* adherence. In were prominent: M.
Drobiech (Religionsphilosophie, 1840; Psychologic, 1842; Die moralischt Statisttk und die menschliche Willensfreiheit, 1807), R. Zimmermann (jEs- thetik. Vienna, 18415), I> Btriimpell (Jfnttplpunkte der Metophysik, 1840; Einleitung in die Philosophir, 1880), T. Ziller (Einleitung in die Allgemrine Pddagogik, I860). special divarication of the school formed by the so-called Volkerpeycholorie [Comparative or Folk-Psychology], as opened by M. Itasexoa (Leben der Seele, 1856 f. ) and H. Stein thai (Aliriss der Sprach- tsistenschafl, I,; Einleilung in die Psychologic und Sprachtrissenschaft, 1871) cL their common programme in Vol. of the Zeitschrift fiir dlkerpsyeholoyie und Sprachmssensrhoft.
The Hegelian School had rich experience in it* own life of the blessing of dialectic; split even in the Thirties upon religious antitheses. The important historian* of philosophy, Zeller and Prantl, Erdmann and Kuno Fischer, went their way, not confused by this. Between the two parties, with consid erable degree of independent thinking, stand K. Rosenkrans (1805-1879;
partly upon
still
Wisstnschafl der tnglsehcn Idee. 1868 f. ) and Friedrich Tbeodor Vlacher (1807-
18S7
jStkttik, 1*40-1*68 Auch Emer, 1879).
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632 Philosophy of ilte Nineteenth Century. [Part VII
The "right wing" of the Hegelian school, which resisted a pantheistic inter pretation of the master, and emphasised the metaphysical importance of per sonality, attracted those thinkers who stood in a freer relation to Hegel, and maintained Fichtean and Leibniziau motifs. Such were I. H. Fichte (son of the creator of the Wissenschaftslehre, 1797-1879 ; Beiträge zur Characteristic, der neueren Philosophie, 1829 ; Ethik, 1850 ff. ; Anthropologie, 1856), C. Fort- lage (1806-1881; System der Psychologie, 1856), Christ. Weisse (1801-1880; System der Ästhetik, 1830 and 1871 ; Grundzüge der Metaphysik, 1835 ; Ihi> philosophische Problem der Gegenwart, 1842 ; Philosophie des Christenthumi, 1855 ff. ), H. Ulrioi (180Ö-1884 ; Das Grundprincip der Philosophie, 1845 f. ; Gott und die Natur, 1861 ; Gott und der Mensch, 1866); further, E. Trahn- dorf (1782-1863; JEsthetik, 1827), Mor. Carriere (1817-1895; Ästhetik, 185! '. 3d ed. 1885 ; Die Kunst im Zusammenhang der Kulturentwickelung, 5 vols. ).
Related to these was, on the one side, K. Rothe (1797-1867; Theolngisehr Ethik, 2d ed. 1867-1871 ; cf. on his speculative system, H. Holtzmann, 1899), who interwove many suggestions from the idealistic development into an origi nal mysticism, and on the other side A. Trendelenburg, who set the concep tion of " Motion " in the place of Hegel's dialectical principle, and thought thereby to combat Hegel's philosophy. His merit, however, lies in the stimulus which he gave to Aristotelian studies (1802-1872; Logische Untersuchungen. 1840 ; Naturrecht, 1860).
To the " Left" among the Hegelians belong Arnold Huge (1802-1880 ; joint editor with Echtermeyer of the Halle'sehe Jahrbücher, 1838-1840, and of the Deutsche Jahrbücher, 1841 f. ; coll. writings in 10 vols. , Mannheim, 184« ff. "). Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872 ; Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit, IS}»: Philosophie und Christentum, 1839; Wesen des Chrislenthums, 1841 ; U>w» der Religion, 1846; Theogonie, 1857 ; Works, 10 vols. , Leips. 1840 ff. ). Cf. K. Grün (L. F. , Leips. 1874), David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874 ; Das Lei** Jesu, 1835; Christliche Glaubenslehre, 1840 f. ; Der Alte und der neue Glaube,
1872 ; Works, 12 vols. , Berlin, 1876 ff. ). Cf. A. Hausrath, D. F. Str. und die Theologie seiner Zeit (Heidelberg, 1876 and 1878).
From the Materialism controversy are to be mentioned : K. Moleschott (Kreislauf des Lebens, 1852), Rudolph Wagner (Ueber Wissen und Glauben, 1854; Der Kampf um die Seele, 1857), C. Vogt (Köhlerglaube und Wissen schaft, 1854 ; Vorlesungen über den Menschen, 1863), L. Büchner (Kraft und Stoff, 1855) [Force and Matter, Lond. l.
Related to this materialism was the development of the extreme Sensualism in the form in which it was presented by H. Czolbe (1819-1873; Neue Dar stellung des Sensualismiis, 1855 ; Grundzüge, der extensionalen Erkenntniss- theorie, 1875), and by F. Ueberweg (1826-1871), who was originally more closely related to Beneke (cf. A. Lange, History of Materialism, IL). In a similar relation stood the so-called Monism which E. Haeckel (born 1814 ; Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte, 1868 ; Welträlhsel, nth ed. 1900 : cf. Loots, Anti-Haeckel, 1900, and Fr. Paulsen, E. ' H. als Philosoph. Preuss. Jahrl*. 1900) has attempted to develop, and finally the socialistic Philosophy of His tory, whose founders are Fr. Engels (Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie, 1888 ; Der Ursprung der Familie, des Pri- vateigenthums und des Staates, 1884) and Karl Marx (Das Kapital, 1867 ff. . Capital, 1801); cf. on Engels and Marx, R. Stammler, Wirthschaft und Hecht, 1896 ; L. Wolfmann, Der historische Materialistnus, 1900.
By far the most important among the epigones of the German Philosophy was Rudolph Herrn. Lotze (1817-1881 ; Metaphysik, 1841 ; Logik, 1842 ; Medi- cinische Psychologie, 1842; Mikrokosmus, 1856 ff. ; System der Philosophie. 1. Logik, 1874 ; IL Metaphysik, 1870) [Microcosmus, tr. by Hamilton and Jones, Edin. and N. Y. 1885 ; Logic and Metaphysics, 2 vols, each, tr. ed. by B. ßosan- quet, Oxford, 1884, also 1888 ; Outlines, ed. by G. T. Ladd, Boston, 1886 ff. ). Cf. O. Caspari, H. L.
in seiner Stellung zur deutschen Philosophie (188;? ); E. v. Hartmann, L. 's Philosophie (Berlin, 1888); H. Jones, Phüos. of /. . , 189i
Interesting side phenomena are : G. T. Fechner (1801-1887 ; Nanna, 1848; Physical, und philos. Atomenlehre, 1865; Elemente der Psychophysik, 1860; Drei Motive des Glaubens, 1868 ; Vorschule der Ästhetik, 1876 ; Die Tagesan sicht gegenüber der Nachtansicht, 1879) and Eug. Dühring (born 1833 ; Natür liche Dialektik, 1865 ; Werth des Lebens, 1866 ; Logik und Wissenschafistheorie
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 688
IP'S). — The following from the Catholic aide have taken part in the develop ment of philosophy : Fr. Hermea (1775-1831 ; Einleitung in die christkatho-
lische Theologie, 1819), Beruli. Bolaano (1781-1848;
1837), Anton GUnther (1785-1803; Ges. Schriften, Vienna, 1881), and Wil-
helm Roaenkrants (1824-1874 ; Wissenschaft des Wi*»en», 1860).
I'hiloaophic interest in Germany, which was much crippled about the middle of the century, has strongly revived, owing to the union of the study of Kant with the demands of natural science. The former, called forth by Kuno Fischer's work (1800). evoked a movement which has been characterized in various aspects a. « Neo-Kantianlam. To it belong, as principal members, A. Lange (1828- 1876; History of Materialism, 1800) and (). Liebmann (born 1840; Analyst* der Wirklichkeil, 3 Aufl. , 1900). In theology it was represented by Alb. Hitachi ( Theologie und Metaphysik, 1881). [A. T. Swing, Theol. of A. S. 1901. ]
Theoretical Physics became significant for philosophy through the work prin cipally of Rob. Mayer (Bemerkungen liber die Krafte der unbelebten Natur, 1845 ; Ueber das mtchanische ^Equivalent der Warme, 1850 ; cf. on him A.
Riehl in the Sigvsart-Abhandlungen, 1900) and H. Helmholts (Physiologische Optik, 1886 ; Sensations of Tone, 1876 ; Thatsaehen der Wahrnehmung, 1879). Beginning with physiology, Willhelm Wundt (born 1837) has developed a
comprehensive system of philosophy. From his numerous writings may be men tioned Orundziige der physiologischen Psychologic, 1878 f„ 4th ed. 1893 [Outlines of Physiological Psychology, Eng. tr. in prep, by E. Titcnenor] ; Logii, 18801. ; Ethik. 1886 [Eng. tr. by Titchenor, Washburn, and Gulliver] ; The Facts of the Moral Life, Ethical Systems, 1897 ; Principles of Morality, 1901 ; System der Philosophic, 1889 ; Orundriss der Psychologic, 1897 [Eng. tr. by Judd, Out lines of Psychology, 1897] ; VUlkerpsychologie, 1900.
Wissenschaflslehre,
The Kantian theory of knowledge was met by Realism in J. v. Kirchmann (Philosophic des Wissens, 1804), and by Positivism in C. Goring (System der kritisrhcn Philosophic, 1874 f. ), E. Laas (Jdealismus und Positicismus, 1879 ft. ), and in part too in A. Riehl (Der philosnphische Kriticismus, 1876 ff. [Eng. tr. of Part III. by A. Fairbanks, 1894, Science and Metaphysics]). A similar tendency was followed by R. Avenarius (Kritik der reinen Erfahrung, 1888- 1890; Der menschliche Weltbegriff, 1891).
As in the first-named authors the concepts of natural science were especially authoritative, so on the other hand the interests of the historical view of the world have normative value for investigators such as Rudolf Eucken (Die Ein- hrit des (ieisteslcbens, 1888 ; Der Kampfvm einen geistigen Lebensinhalt, 1896),
II. Glogau (Abriss der philosuphischen Gnmdicissenschaften, 1880), and W.
Ollthey (Einleitung in die Geistcswissenschaflen,
A mediating standpoint is taken by Christian Sigwart (Logik, 2d ed. 1893;
[Eng. tr. by Helen Dendy, 1896]).
Two authors who occupy a position in closer relation to general literature
are —
E. ▼. Hartmann (born 1842), who excited general attention by his Philosophy
of the Unconscious, 1869 [Eng. tr. by Coupland, 1884]. This was followed by a long series of writings, of which the most important are Das Unbeteusste r«n» Standpunkt der Deseendenztheorie, 1872; Phdnnmenologie des sittlichrn
Beicusstseins, 1879 ; Die Religion ilrs Geistes, 1882 ; ^Esthetik, 1886 f. ; Katego- rtrnlehre, 1897 ; Geschichte der Metaphysik, 1900. These works represent a more and more completely scientific standpoint. As representing a popular philosophy, in part pessimistic, in part mystical, may be named as typical, Mainlander (Philosophic der ErISsung, 1874 f. ) on the one hand, and on the other, Duprel {Philosophic der Myttik, 1884 f).
Fr. VVilh. ITietaaoba (1844-1900), whose development in its changing stages h characterised by the following selection from his numerous writings, of which the complete edition la published in Lelpsic, 1895 ff. : Die Geburt der TragSdis nm dem Grille der Musik, 1872; Unzritgrmassc Betrachtungcn, 1873-1876;
Mrnsfhliehrs — Allrvmensrhliches, 1876-1880 ; Also sprach Zarathustra, 1883 f ; Jensrits ron Gut und B6sc, 1886 ; Zur Genealogie der Moral, 1887 ; Gbtsendam- merung. 1889. [Eng. tr. by A. Tille, 1896 ff. . Thus spake Zarathustra • Beyond
Good and Bad : Genealogy of Morals. ] Cf. Al. Riehl, . \iettsehe, Stuttgart, Id ed. 1897. [P. Cams In The Monist. IX. 672 ff. ; G. N. Dolson in Cornell
Com. to Phu\ HI]
1883).
634 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century [Part VII
§ 44. The Controversy over the Soul.
A characteristic change in the general scientific relations during the nineteenth century has been the constantly progressing loosening and separation of psychology from philosophy,1 which may now be regarded as in principle complete. This followed from the rapid decline of metaphysical interest and metaphysical production, which appeared in Germany, especially, as a natural reaction from the high tension of speculative thought. Robbed thus of a more general base of support, in its effort to give itself a firm footing as purely empir ical science, psychology had at first but little power of resistance against the inroad of the method of natural science, according to which it should be treated as a special province of physiology or general biology. About this question a number of vigorous move ments grouped themselves.
1. At the beginning of the century a brisk interchange of thought obtained between the French Ideology and the later developments of the English Enlightenment philosophy which had split into asso ciational psychology and the common sense doctrine : in this inter change, however, France bore now the leading part. Here the antithesis which had existed in the French sensualism from the be ginning between Condillac and Bonnet (cf. p. 458), came out more sharply. With Destutt de Tracy, and even as yet with Laromiguiere, it does not come to a sharp decision. On the other hand, Cabanis is the leader of the materialistic line : his investigation as to the interconnec tion of the physical and the psychical (moral) nature of man, after con sidering the various influences of age, sex, temperament, climate, etc, comes to the result that the psychical life is everywhere determined by the body and its physical relations. With the organic functions thus reduced solely to mechanical and chemical processes, at least in prin ciple, it seemed that the soul, now superfluous as vital force, had also outlived its usefulness as the agent and supporter of consciousness.
In carrying out these thoughts other physicians, for example Broussais, gave to materialism a still sharper expression : the intel lectual activity is "one of the results" of the brain functions. Hence men eagerly seized upon the strange hypothesis of phre nology, with which Gall professed to localise at definite places in the brain all the particular " faculties," which empirical
psychology had provided up to that time. It was not merely an interesting diversion to hear in public that a more or less vigorous development
of special psychical powers could be recognised in the skull; the
1 Cf. W. Windelband, Ueber den gegemoartigen Stand der psychologitchf* Forschung (I-eips. 1876).
|44. J Controversy over the Soul: Ideology. t>35
thought was connected with this, especially among physicians, that now the materiality of the so-called soul-life was discovered, with out doubt In England especially, as is shown by the success of Combe's writings, the phrenological superstition called out very great interest and promoted a purely physiological psychology, in the line of that of Hartley. It was John Stuart Mill who first brought his countrymen back to Hume's conception of associational psychology. Without asking what matter and mind are in them selves, the student should proceed from the fact that the corporeal and mental states form two domains of experience, completely inca pable of comparison, and that psychology as the science of the laws of mental life must study the facts of the latter in themselves, and may not reduce them to the laws of another sphere of existence. Alex ander Bain, attaching himself to Mill's standpoint, developed the associational psychology farther. His especial contribution was to point out the significance of the muscular sensations, in which the fundamental facts of the mental life which correspond to spontane ous bodily motion are to be found. This associational psychology has thus nothing in common with a materialistic view of the soul ; nevertheless the mechanism of ideas and impulses is the only prin ciple recognised for the purpose of explaining the mental processes.
2. The opposition to the materialistic psychology comes much more sharply to the fore in those lines of thought which emphasise the activity of consciousness as a unity. Following de Tracy's example Laromignitre's Ideology distinguished carefully between the " modifications," which are the mere consequence of bodily exci tations, and the " actions " of the soul, in which the soul proves its independent existence, even in perception. In the school of Mont jollier they still believed in the " vital force. " Barthez regarded this as separate from body and soul, as a something completely unknown : Bichat distinguished the " animal " from the " organic " life by the characteristic of spontaneous " reaction. " This element in psychology came to full development through Maine de Hirun. The acute, subtle mind of this philosopher received many suggestions from English and German philosophy ; with reference to the latter his acquaintance with Kant's and Fichte's doctrines —though only a superficial one — and with the virtualism of Bouterwek, who was named with remarkable frequency in Paris, is to be emphasised. 1
1 The line* of communication were here not merely literary (Villers, Pege>ando, etc. ), but In a strong decree personal. Of great Importance among other thing* waa the preaence of the Schlegela in Paris, especially the lectures of Frederick Schlegel. In Pari* itself the society of Auteuil, to which also the Swiss embassador Stapfer, a prominent medium of Influence, belonged, was of importance.
636 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VIL
The fundamental fact on which Maine de Biran bases his theory, later called spiritualism, is that in the will we immediately experi ence at once our own activity and the resistance of the " Non-Moi '* (primarily our own body). The reflection of personality upon this its own activity forms the starting-point of all philosophy: inner experience furnishes the form, experience of that which resists fur nishes the matter. From this fundamental fact the conceptions force, substance, cause, unity, identity, freedom, and necessity are developed. Thus Maine de Biran builds upon psychology a meta physical system, which frequently reminds of Descartes and Male- branche, but replaces the cogito ergo sum, by a volo ergo sum; just for this reason he exerts himself especially to fix securely the boundary lines between psychology and physiology, and particularly to exhibit the conception of inner experience (sens intime) as the clear and self-evident basis of all mental science, of which the self- consciousness of the willing and choosing personality appeared to him to be the fundamental principle. These significant thoughts, directed against the naturalistic one-sidedness of the eighteenth century, were supplemented by Maine de Biran for his own faith by a mystical turn, which finds the highest form of life in the giving up and losing of personality in the love of God. This sup plementation was made especially toward the close of his life. His scientific doctrine, on the contrary, found further points of contact, in part with the Scottish, and in part with the German philosophy, through his friends, such as Ampere, Jouffroy, and Cousin. In this process, much of the original character was lost in consequence of the eclectic appropriation of material. This was shown externally
in the fact that his theory, as thus modified, especially in the in structional form which it received through Cousin, was freely called Spiritualism. In fact, the original character of the theory, which might better have been called Voluntarism, was changed by the intellectualistic additions which Cousin especially brought to it from the German philosophy of identity. At a later time, Ravais- son, and in a still more independent fashion, closely related to the Kantian criticism, Eenouvier, sought to hark back from eclecticism to Maine de Biran. 1
3. Voluntarism has been on the whole, perhaps, the most strongly marked tendency of the psychology of the nineteenth century. It is the form in which empirical science has appropriated Kant's and
1 A similar position is occupied in Italy by Gallupi. Among the "facts of consciousness" which he makes the basis of philosophy, he regards the au tonomy of the ethical will as the determining factor, while Rosmini has retained the older intellectualism.
% 44. ] Controverty over the Soul : Voluntaritm. 637
Fichte's transfer of the standpoint of philosophy from the theoretical over to the practical reason. In Germany the principal influences on this side have been Fichte's and 'Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Both these authors make the essential nature of man to consist in the will, and the colouring which such a point of view gives to the whole the ory of the world could only be strengthened by the course of German history in our century, and by the transformation in the popular mind which has accompanied it The importance of the practical, which has been enhanced to the highest degree, and the repression of the theoretical, which is not without its dangers, have appeared more and more as the characteristic features of the age.
This tendency made its appearance in a scientific form with Beneke, who in spite of his dependence in part upon English philos ophy and in part upon Herbart, gave a peculiar turn to his exposi tion of the associational psychology (cf. above, p. 586) by conceiving the elements of the mental life as active processes or impulses ( Triebe). He called them " elementary faculties " ( Urvermogen), and maintained that these, originally set into activity by stimuli, bring about the apparently substantial unity of the psychical nature by their persistence as traces {Spuren), and by their reciprocal adjust ment in connection with the continual production of new forces. The soul is accordingly a bundle — not of ideas, as with Hume, but — of impulses, forces, and "faculties. " On the other hand, all real significance is denied to the faculties in the older sense of classifica tions of the mental activities (cf. above, p. 577). To establish this doctrine inductively by a methodical elaboration of the facts of inner perception is regarded by Beneke as the only possible presupposition for the philosophical disciplines, such as logic, ethics, metaphysics,
and the philosophy of religion. In this procedure he passes on to a theory of the values which belong to stimuli (the so-called "things"), on account of the increase or diminution of the impulses.
Fortlage gave metaphysical form to the psychological method and theory of Beneke, by incorporating it into Fichte's Science of Know ledge. He, too, conceives of the soul and all things in their relations as a system of impulses or forces, and perhaps no one has carried through so sharply as he the conception that the source of substantial existence is the activity of the will, — an activity which is devoid of any substrate. 1 He regarded the essential nature of the psychical pro cesses as follows : From original functions arise contents which grow into synthetic union, remain, become established, and thus produce the forms of psychical reality. He thus pointed out once more the way
> CI C. Fortlage, Btitrtge mr Ptyehologii (Leips. 1876), p. 40.
638 Philotophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII
by which alone metaphysics can be freed from the schema of material processes which are conceived as movements of unchangeable sub stances, such as atoms. But, at the same time, there were in these theories suggestions for the thought that the processes of ideation, of attention, and of evaluation in judgments, must be regarded as functions of the " impulse " which issues in question and assent or re jection. In the later development, indeed, the psychological analysis of the thinking process has penetrated even to the realm of logic, and here has often averted attention from the proper problems of that science. In the last decades especially, psychology as method and theory has had a luxurious development similar to that in the eighteenth century, and in its degenerate forms it has led to the same manifestations of the most superficial popular philosophy.
4. In England, also, the traditional psychological method and standpoint remain in control; nor was this dominance essentially affected by the transformation which Hamilton gave to the Scottish tradition under the influence of German philosophy and particularly of Kant. He, too, defends the standpoint of inner experience and regards it as affording the standard for all philosophical disciplines. Necessity and universality are to be found only in the simple, imme diately intelligible facts of consciousness which are present in every one. But in these facts — and to these belong also all individual perceptions of the presence of an external thing — it is only the finite, in finite relations and conditions, which comes to our knowl edge. It is in this sense, and without reference to the Kantian con ception of the phenomenal, that human knowledge is regarded by Hamilton as limited to experience of the finite. Of the Infinite and Absolute, i. e. , of God, man has only a moral certainty of faith. Sci ence, on the contrary, has no knowledge of this " Unconditioned," because it can think only what it first distinguishes from another in order then to relate it to another (cf. Kant's conception of synthesis). Mansel brought this " Agnosticism " into the service of revealed theology, making a still stronger and more sceptical employment of the Kantian theory of knowledge. He shows that religious dogmas are absolutely incomprehensible for human reason, and maintains that just on this account they are also incapable of attack.
