Here, the self and the activity of being
conscious
cannot be thought as separated independent entity, nor as the same.
Aryadeva - Four Hundred Verses
Femaleness and so forth are also not attributes of the self.
Thus it follows that the inner agential person does not exist by way of its own entity, for when the inner self is neither female, male or neuter, it is just out of ignorant confusion that you imagine your own self male.
It is a fabrication like mistaking a mottled rope for a snake.
Sutra says:
~ An attitude of doubt foments poison,
~ And though it has not entered one, one faints) .
L6: [b. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ ###
\ 227.
\ When all the elements are not
\ Male, female or neuter,
\ How is that which depends on them
\ Male, female or neuter?
.
(i. e. And those attributes do not come with the parts: The basis for the attribute cannot be found in the parts. Gender cannot be an attribute of the outer self either since we cannot find it in the parts; gender is merely an imputation, a conventional name. All attributes that would be used to define an inherently existing self are like that. )
.
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.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
(If you try to find this "female state", as the goddess did in the Vimalakirti Sutra, you will not find it. It is merely a name attributed, by convention, to some basis. So the self is not "essentially by nature" male, or female, or neuter.
-- Assertion: Male gender, female gender and so forth are marks of the outer self. Through its connection with this the inner self is male and so forth.
-- Answer: It follows that because of their connection with the outer self, the four great elements would also be a male self and so forth. If that were so, all the elements would be the person, since for truly existent functional things there can be no differences between what is and is not male and so forth.
-- When all the elements do not have male, female or neuter gender, how can the inner self which relies upon the outer self -- those elements -- feasibly be male, female or neuter? It cannot. If all the elements were male, female or neuter, it would follow that even during the early stages of the fetus, maleness and so forth should be observable.
-- Objection: The same error is entailed for you.
-- Answer: Since we impute gender in dependence upon elements which lack inherent existence, there is no error. )
.
L6: [c. [Unwanted] conclusion that generating the thought "I" when observing another's self is reasonable] .
\ ###
\ 228.
\ Your self is not my self and thus there is
\ No such self, since it is not ascertained.
\ Does the conception not arise
\ In relation to impermanent things?
.
(i. e. The term "I" is relative: The "I" is relative to the subject, it is not an absolute external functional thing. It is merely an imputation of the mind, a convention, a concept. )
.
(Sort of like: the perception of the "self" of someone is relative. It depends on the subject and on many other factors. It is a creation of the mind, an imputation on a valid base. If the "I" was an absolute functional thing everybody would see it as such, the "I", independently of who is looking. But, as we all know, the "I" is relative to the person looking. Exactly like right and left is relative to the position of the subject.
-- It follows that the personal self is not established by way of its own entity. If it were, just as the thought "blue" arises universally in relation to blue, the thought "I" should arise in Yajna when he observes Devadatta's self, but it does not. -- Since that which is your self is not my own self, it follows that the object of your conception of "I" is not a self existing by way of its own entity, because it is not ascertained as the object of my conception of "I" or my attachment to the self. Therefore doesn't the thought "I" arise in relation to impermanent things called form and so forth? The self is only imputed. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting the proofs]
L6: [a. Refuting that a permanent self is the cause of entering and leaving cyclic existence]
.
\ ###
\ 229.
\ From one rebirth to another
\ The person changes like the body.
\ It is illogical for yours to be
\ Separate from the body and permanent.
.
(i. e. No permanent self: Since a person change from one rebirth to another, there is nothing permanent. We cannot find a self that would be separated from the aggregates. )
.
(-- Assertion: The self is permanent because of being the one that enters and leaves cyclic existence. If there were no self, who would be in cyclic existence because of accumulation actions? Who would gain freedom from cyclic existence? Thus the self exists.
-- Answer: It follows that it is illogical for the self you assert to be permanent and a separate entity from the body, because the person, like the body, changes from one rebirth as a god, human and so forth to another. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting it as the activator of the body] L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
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\ ###
\ 230.
\ Intangible things do not
\ Produce so-called motility.
\ Thus the life force is not
\ Agent of the body's movements.
.
(i. e. No intangible self: An intangible inner self would not be able to create physical movement, just like a permanent self would not produce impermanent effect. )
.
(How could an inner permanent self, which would be intangible because not part of the body, have influence on the body. This is like the problem of the interaction between mind and matter in western philosophy. It has never been seen that an intangible could cause an effect on a tangible. So this inner self cannot exist and be the "driver" of your actions. This is like the fact that a permanent cause cannot create an impermanent effect as mentioned in chapter 9.
-- Nor can a permanent intangible self act as agent of the body's movement, as is claimed, since only something tangible can cause motion.
-- Assertion: Without a self there would be no physical movements such as stretching of flexing because the body would lack an activator. Thus an inner agential person exists who activates the body just as Devadatta drives his chariot. -- Answer: That is illogical. It follows that your life force or self is not the instigator of physical movement because the self is not tangible.
-- It is so because, just as a chariot can only be moved by something tangible and not by anything intangible, an intangible functional thing cannot actually move that which has form from one place to another. Though Vaisesikas assert that the self has form, they do not accept that it has external tangibility and so forth. )
.
L7: [(2) Showing what invalidated [belief in] a permanent self]
.
\ ###
\ 231.
\ Why [teach] non-violence and wonder about
\ Conditions for a permanent self?
\ A diamond never has to be
\ Protected against woodworm.
.
(i. e. A permanent self would not need morality: On the contrary, it is the though of a permanent self that would eliminate the need for morality. )
.
(-- A permanent self would be invulnerable to harm of any kind and would therefore not need to seek spiritual practices as a means of protection.
-- It follows that if the self is permanent, it is contradictory to teach non-violence as a practice to protect it from dangers such as a bad rebirth or to wonder what conditions are not unfavorable to it, because nothing can harm a permanent functional thing, just as a diamond which is not in danger of harm is never protected against woodworms, nor does it need to be. )
.
L6: [c. Refuting proof of a permanent self]
L7: [(1) Seeing memory of past rebirths is unsuitable as proof of a permanent self]
.
\ ###
\ 232.
\ If your self is permanent
\ Because of remembering other lives,
\ How can your body be impermanent
\ When you see a scar previously formed?
.
(i. e. There is no need for a permanent self to explain continuity / memory of past rebirths: There is no need for a permanent memory holder -- a permanent holder of karma seeds. There is no need for inherently existing causes and effects to explain interdependence, to support dependent origination. On the contrary, one would not exist without the other; dependent origination and emptiness implies each other. The continuum permits the uninterrupted flow of influences / information / cause & effect, without assuming inherently existing causes and effects. )
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Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
.
(-- Nor does memory of past lives establish the self as permanent, but demonstrates the presence of a continuum of consciousness, consisting of moments which arise in dependence upon each other.
-- Assertion: The self is permanent because there is memory of previous rebirths. Memory of other lives is not feasible for a composite thing whose nature is to disintegrate as soon as it is produced.
-- Answer: You may consider the self permanent because there is memory of past lives, like thinking, "I was human in my last rebirth. " Then how could your body be impermanent? It should be permanent because in a past life you saw the scar of a wound inflicted on the body and now, when you see a birthmark which resembles that previously inflicted wound, you say, "That is the scar of the wound inflicted in the past. " According to us the object of the thought "I" is co- extensive with both the past and of this life. Since it is merely imputed, memory of past rebirths is feasible.
There is a bowl of curd in a house. The footprint of a pale-colored pigeon perched on the thick thatch is visible on it, even though its foot has not touched the curd and so forth. Similarly, all actions and agents are feasible for that which arises dependently. )
.
L7: [(2) Unfeasibility of mindless matter remembering past rebirths]
.
\ ###
\ 233.
\ If the self when possessing that
\ Which has mind is a knower,
\ By that [same argument] that which has mind would be
\ Mindless and the person permanent.
.
(i. e. The self is not different, nor the same as karma / memories: On the contrary, the simple fact that it can accumulate memory makes this self impermanent. This self cannot be separated from the mind, nor can it be the same as the mind - next verse. )
.
(-- If, as claimed, the person were mindless matter only capable of memory through an association with consciousness, then the person could not be permanent and unchanging, since it would first lack and then possess the faculty of remembering
-- It follows that the self cannot remember past rebirths because it is asserted as mindless matter. It is also unreasonable to assert that it remembers past lives by virtue of having mind, because by first lacking memory and later possessing memory, it has given up its entity.
-- If the self, despite being matter, is a knower of the past because of possessing that which has mind, by that [same argument] the attribute, that which has mind, should be mindless and matter because of possessing a self which is classified as matter. It follows that the self is also not permanent because first it does not remember but later newly develops memory of past lives. )
.
L7: [(3) Entailment of permanence, if that which has attributes such as intelligence remembers past rebirths]
.
\ ###
\ 234.
\ A life force which has pleasure and so forth
\ Appears as various as pleasure and so forth.
\ Thus like pleasure it is not
\ Suitable as something permanent.
.
(i. e. The self is not different, nor the same as the five aggregates: The simple fact that it can change makes it impermanent. )
.
(-- Moreover something which at different times has different attributes, such as pleasure and pain, cannot be permanent either.
-- If the life force or self has mind because of having attributes like intelligence, then because of having attributes like pleasure and pain, it should appear as different as pleasure and so forth while experiencing satisfaction and affliction. Thus like pleasure and so forth it cannot be permanent either. )
.
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.
\ ###
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L4: [B. Refuting the self imputed by Samkhyas]
L5: [1. Unacceptability of asserting a permanent conscious person]
.
\ ###
\ 235.
\ If consciousness is permanent
\ An agent is superfluous.
\ if fire is permanent
\ Fuel is unnecessary.
.
(i. e. Consciousness and it object are not two, not one - so there is no permanent consciousness: A permanent consciousness, a knower, would not need the sense organs, nor the object of which it is conscious . . . On the contrary consciousness is dependent on the sense organs, and to be conscious has to be conscious of something . . . Those two are interdependent, two concepts co-dependently arisen. )
.
(-- The Samkhya assertion that a permanent conscious person exists is then examined and its flaws are revealed. What role would the eyes and other senses play, if such a continually conscious person existed?
-- Samkhya assertion: If the self is asserted as matter these inconsistencies apply, but since, according to us, the person's nature is to be conscious, there is not the least unwanted entailment.
-- Answer: Samkhyas define twenty-five categories of phenomena of which twenty-two are matter and the twenty-fifth is asserted as the knower, person and self . They assert that the person experiences objects which the intellect makes it crave. This is explained extensively elsewhere.
-- If the conscious person is asserted as permanent, it follows that agents such as the eyes and so forth which permit experience of objects are superfluous and useless because the person that experiences objects exists as a permanent functional thing. Fuel is needed to make a fire but if fire is permanent, fuel is unnecessary. )
.
L5: [2. Entailment that [the activity of experiencing] cannot stop until the conscious person, the substance, has disintegrated]
.
\ ###
\ 236.
\ A substantial entity, unlike an action,
\ Does not alter until it disintegrates.
\ Thus it is improper to claim
\ The person exists but consciousness does not.
.
(i. e. Consciousness and the activity of being conscious are not two, not one: There is no consciousness without the activity of being conscious of something. So there is no consciousness that exist and then become conscious of something; like there is no doer without the action of doing. Those two are interdependent, two concepts co- dependently arisen. So there is no permanent consciousness. )
.
(Maybe like in "the doer does" the subject and the action are not one, neither separate.
Here, the self and the activity of being conscious cannot be thought as separated independent entity, nor as the same. Consciousness is not something added to a permanent self.
-- Assertion: The person whose nature is potential consciousness is the experiencer of objects and being conscious is the activity of experiencing. Since this depends on agents like the eye, there is no flaw.
-- Answer: Movement does not occur unless, for instance, a tree is agitated by the wind, but those fallacies would entail movement until the substantial entity disintegrates. The phenomenon of activity depends on the substantial entity and its motion.
-- The activity of moving depends on the substantial entity and may cease even though the substantial entity has not disintegrated. The nature of the substantial entity does not likewise change between its production and its disintegration. By contrast, consciousness and the person are an indifferentiable permanent entity. Thus it is improper to claim that the person but not consciousness exists prior to experiencing an object. )
.
L5: [3. Unacceptability of asserting that the person's nature [changes] f rom actual consciousness first to potential consciousness]
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Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ 237.
\ At times one sees potential consciousness,
\ At others consciousness itself.
\ Because of being like molten iron
\ The person undergoes change.
.
(i. e. The simple fact that it becomes conscious of something proves that it is impermanent. All functional phenomenon are impermanent as stated before; they are both cause and effect. )
.
(-- If the person is claimed to be potentially conscious, the self and consciousness could not be a permanent indifferentiable entity, for then the person but no consciousness would exist before an object is experienced. Any transition from the potential consciousness to actual consciousness indicates that the person is not permanent.
-- Assertion: Although there is no consciousness prior to experiencing objects, its potential and thus the person exists. -- Answer: On occasions other than when objects are being experienced one sees potential consciousness, and when objects are being experienced, consciousness itself. In that case, like molten iron which later becomes a solid mass, former potential consciousness later becomes actual consciousness. It therefore follows that the person undergoes change because consciousness and the person are accepted as one entity. )
.
L4: [C. Refuting the self imputed by Naiyayikas]
L5: [1. Refuting that a part of the self possessing a mere particle of mind perceives objects]
.
\ ###
\ 238.
\ Merely [a small part with] mind is conscious
\ But the person is as vast as space.
\ Therefore it would seem as though
\ Its nature is not to be conscious.
.
(-- The Naiyayika assertion that there is a vast permanent partless self which is present in each being is next shown to be illogical, for then that which is one person's self should also be another's.
-- Naiyayika assertion: Our person is not a conscious entity. Since a part of the self the mere size of a particle has mind, there is consciousness of objects. It depends on just this part with mind. A person that is conscious and not separate from mind is produced through this association. The person is permanent and very extensive like space.
-- Answer: Since except for a part as small as a particle the rest of this permanent and extensive self is not associated with consciousness, that self's nature does not seem to have consciousness of objects. Just as it cannot be said that water of the Ganges is salty because of contact with a grain of salt, it is inappropriate to assert that which is not conscious as the person. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting belief in a permanent omnipresent self]
.
\ ###
\ 239.
\ If the self is in everyone then why
\ Does another not think of this one as "I"?
\ It is unacceptable to say that
\ It is obscured by itself. .
( -- If there is a partless permanent self which is omnipresent like space and in each individual sentient being, why would another person not think "I" in relation to my own self? It follows that they should think of it as "I" because the two selves are one. It cannot be omnipresent if the object of someone else's conception of the self is not my own self. -- Assertion: It is not perceived because it has been obscured by the other's self.
-- Answer: It is unacceptable to say that the self obscures itself for there is no duality of that which obscures and that which is obscured. )
.
L4: [D. Explaining other refutation like that of the attributes and so forth]
L5: [1. Asserting that though the principal is matter it is the creator of everything amounts to madness]
.
\ ###
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\ 240.
\ There is no difference between
\ The insane and those from whom
\ The attributes are the creator
\ But are never conscious.
.
(-- This is followed by an examination of the Samkhya belief that the creative force is unconscious matter with the capacity to produce virtue and non-virtue but with no capacity to experience their effects.
-- Samkhya assertion: The great one, a synonym for the intellect, evolves from the principal which is matter and a balance of pleasure, pain and equanimity. The three I-principles evolve from the great one. Eleven faculties evolve from the I-principle associated with lightness: five mental faculties for action and the speculative faculty. From the I- principle associated with motility come the five mere objects from which the five elements evolve. The I-principle of darkness acts as the basis for the other to I-principles.
-- Answer: It follows that it is contradictory to assert, as do the Samkhyas, that the principal which is a balance of the three attributes is the creator of all manifestations but is never conscious. There is not the least difference between those who assert the like and the insane whose perception is distorted. )
.
L5: [2. Contradiction of asserting that it creates virtue and non-virtue but does not experience their maturation]
.
\ ###
\ 241.
\ What is more illogical
\ Than that the attributes should always
\ Know how to construct homes and so forth
\ But not know how to experience them? .
( -- Since such a contention contradicts reason and conflicts with worldly convention, it is utterly incorrect. What is more illogical than to claim that the attributes whose nature is pleasure, pain and equanimity know how to construct homes and so forth but do not know how to experience these amenities? It contradicts both reason and convention. ) .
L5: [3. Refuting that a permanent self is the agent of actions and experiencer of their maturation]
.
\ ###
\ 242.
\ The active is not permanent.
\ (i. e. A cause cannot be permanent, thus the self cannot be permanent)
\ The ubiquitous is actionless.
\ (i. e. Something omnipresent does not need to act, thus the self cannot be omnipresent)
\ The actionless is like the non-existent.
\ (i. e. An actionless self, non-functional, is as non-existent)
\ Why do you not prefer selflessness?
\ (i. e. Conclude that there is no real self; it is more useful)
.
(-- On the other hand if, as the Vaisesikas claim, the self is the doer of actions and experiencer of their results, how can it be permanent, for this necessarily entails transformation from a previous state to a subsequent one.
-- Vaisesika assertion: The self alone is the doer of actions and the experiencer of their maturation.
-- Answer ab: If that is so, the self cannot be permanent.
-- If the self is an agent it must be accepted as causing action. If it does not perform actions it is unsuitable as an agent. That which performs actions like coming and going is not permanent since one must admit that it differs from before. Something the whole of which is everywhere all the time does not perform activities such as coming and going since there is no place or time it does not occupy.
-- Assertion: Well then, an actionless self exist.
-- Answer cd: Since an actionless self is as non-existent as a sky flower, why do you not prefer selflessness? It is worth doing so, for understanding it frees one from all fears. )
.
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L3: [II. General refutation]
L4: [A. Erroneousness of thinking a personal self exist]
.
\ ###
\ 243.
\ Some see it as ubiquitous and for some
\ The person is the mere [size of the] body.
\ Some see it as a mere particle.
\ The wise see it as non-existent.
.
(i. e. There is no inherently existing self. Since it doesn't exist those who assert its existence cannot agree among themselves. )
.
( -- It follows that the conception of a personal self is erroneous. Since the self, if it existed, would do so by way of its own entity, it should appear without differences.
-- Some such as Vaisesikas and Samkhyas see the self as existing in each body and as being ubiquitous like space. Others such as Nirgranthas see that which has a body as proportionate to the size of that body, such as an ant's or an elephant's.
Nirgranthas assert the life force is large or small like the size of the body.
Others, unable to accept this, see it as a mere particle.
Those with the wisdom that perceives the suchness of functional things without distortion see the self as non-existent. Indeed, if the self existed by way of its own entity, the Forders' view would not differ. )
.
L4: [B. Impossibility of liberation from cyclic existence for a permanent self]
.
\ ###
\ 244.
\ How can what is permanent be harmed,
\ Or the unharmed be liberated?
\ Liberation is irrelevant
\ For one whose self is permanent.
.
(i. e. A permanent self would not seek protection and liberation. The path would be useless for a permanent self. )
.
(-- A permanent self would be invulnerable to suffering of cyclic existence and would therefore not need to seek release.
-- For an opponent who asserts a permanent self, attaining liberation is irrelevant. How can that which is permanent be harmed by dangers and so forth in cyclic existence, and how can that which is unharmed in cyclic existence be liberated by subsequent mediation on the paths? It cannot for these very reasons. )
.
L4: [C. Inappropriateness of asserting the existence of a self during liberation]
.
\ ###
\ 245.
\ If the self exists it is inappropriate
\ To think there is no self
\ And false to claim one attains nirvana
\ Through certain knowledge of reality.
.
(i. e. There is no individual Liberation - no self in Nirvana: To say that a permanent self is liberated by abandoning the belief in a self is contradictory. There is no self being liberated, or attaining Nirvana. )
.
(-- Moreover, if the self were truly existent, how could giving up conceptions of a self be the means to attain liberation, as is claimed?
-- If the self exists by way of its own entity, it follows that thinking there is no self is inappropriate and that attainment of liberation is not feasible, since the basis for conceptions of a self is intact. Moreover the contention of these amazing people [who assert that the self exists but claim] that though ascertaining knowledge of suchness one abandons conceptions of a self and thereby attains nirvana would be false. Therefore those who seek liberation should accept
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selflessness. ) .
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L4: [D. Refuting a substantially established liberated [person] without a self]
.
\ ###
\ 246.
\ If it exists at liberation
\ It should not be non-existent before.
\ It is explained that what is seen
\ Without anything is its nature.
.
(i. e. Nothing permanent heving rebirths - no self in samsara: And if there is no individual liberation there is also no real individuality taking rebirths in samsara. )
.
(-- Fearing the absurd consequence that conceptions of a self would occur in the liberated state if the self exists, one might assert that though there is no self, there is a truly existent liberated person.
-- It follows that there must be such a truly existent liberated person previously too during cyclic existence, because its entity, isolated from any associated factors, as perceived by unmistaken awareness, is said to be its nature. If there is no self during liberation, it should not be asserted as existing during the cycle of rebirths either. )
.
L3: [III. Eliminating any fault of annihilation with regard to selflessness]
L4: [A. Although there is no self, there is no danger of the composite and transitory discontinuing]
.
\ ###
\ 247.
\ If the impermanent discontinues
\ How could there be grass at present?
\ If, indeed, this were true,
\ No one would have ignorance either.
.
(i. e. No-self doesn't mean no possible continuity of karma or Liberation: There is no need for a permanent self, to support karma and rebirth, to explain bondage and continuity, and the possibility of Liberation. There is a flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. There is continuity in the endless chain of causes and effects without the need to postulate any inherently existing cause or effect. - This is the same as saying that emptiness doesn't deny dependent origination, or that the Two Truths are not contradictory, but inseparable. . . )
.
(Nothing has origination, duration, cessation; nothing is impermanent; this model would not explain continuity and bounding; there is just the flow without anything inherently existent in it. Reality should not be seen as real impermanent things changing from one moment to another through discrete steps. Nothing really originate or discontinue. There is no real cause and effect. Just the continuum. The model consisting of "moments" (ksana) is not consistent, it cannot explain continuity, nor the dependence in samsara. See Karikas 19-21.
~ An attitude of doubt foments poison,
~ And though it has not entered one, one faints) .
L6: [b. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ ###
\ 227.
\ When all the elements are not
\ Male, female or neuter,
\ How is that which depends on them
\ Male, female or neuter?
.
(i. e. And those attributes do not come with the parts: The basis for the attribute cannot be found in the parts. Gender cannot be an attribute of the outer self either since we cannot find it in the parts; gender is merely an imputation, a conventional name. All attributes that would be used to define an inherently existing self are like that. )
.
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.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
(If you try to find this "female state", as the goddess did in the Vimalakirti Sutra, you will not find it. It is merely a name attributed, by convention, to some basis. So the self is not "essentially by nature" male, or female, or neuter.
-- Assertion: Male gender, female gender and so forth are marks of the outer self. Through its connection with this the inner self is male and so forth.
-- Answer: It follows that because of their connection with the outer self, the four great elements would also be a male self and so forth. If that were so, all the elements would be the person, since for truly existent functional things there can be no differences between what is and is not male and so forth.
-- When all the elements do not have male, female or neuter gender, how can the inner self which relies upon the outer self -- those elements -- feasibly be male, female or neuter? It cannot. If all the elements were male, female or neuter, it would follow that even during the early stages of the fetus, maleness and so forth should be observable.
-- Objection: The same error is entailed for you.
-- Answer: Since we impute gender in dependence upon elements which lack inherent existence, there is no error. )
.
L6: [c. [Unwanted] conclusion that generating the thought "I" when observing another's self is reasonable] .
\ ###
\ 228.
\ Your self is not my self and thus there is
\ No such self, since it is not ascertained.
\ Does the conception not arise
\ In relation to impermanent things?
.
(i. e. The term "I" is relative: The "I" is relative to the subject, it is not an absolute external functional thing. It is merely an imputation of the mind, a convention, a concept. )
.
(Sort of like: the perception of the "self" of someone is relative. It depends on the subject and on many other factors. It is a creation of the mind, an imputation on a valid base. If the "I" was an absolute functional thing everybody would see it as such, the "I", independently of who is looking. But, as we all know, the "I" is relative to the person looking. Exactly like right and left is relative to the position of the subject.
-- It follows that the personal self is not established by way of its own entity. If it were, just as the thought "blue" arises universally in relation to blue, the thought "I" should arise in Yajna when he observes Devadatta's self, but it does not. -- Since that which is your self is not my own self, it follows that the object of your conception of "I" is not a self existing by way of its own entity, because it is not ascertained as the object of my conception of "I" or my attachment to the self. Therefore doesn't the thought "I" arise in relation to impermanent things called form and so forth? The self is only imputed. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting the proofs]
L6: [a. Refuting that a permanent self is the cause of entering and leaving cyclic existence]
.
\ ###
\ 229.
\ From one rebirth to another
\ The person changes like the body.
\ It is illogical for yours to be
\ Separate from the body and permanent.
.
(i. e. No permanent self: Since a person change from one rebirth to another, there is nothing permanent. We cannot find a self that would be separated from the aggregates. )
.
(-- Assertion: The self is permanent because of being the one that enters and leaves cyclic existence. If there were no self, who would be in cyclic existence because of accumulation actions? Who would gain freedom from cyclic existence? Thus the self exists.
-- Answer: It follows that it is illogical for the self you assert to be permanent and a separate entity from the body, because the person, like the body, changes from one rebirth as a god, human and so forth to another. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting it as the activator of the body] L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
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\ ###
\ 230.
\ Intangible things do not
\ Produce so-called motility.
\ Thus the life force is not
\ Agent of the body's movements.
.
(i. e. No intangible self: An intangible inner self would not be able to create physical movement, just like a permanent self would not produce impermanent effect. )
.
(How could an inner permanent self, which would be intangible because not part of the body, have influence on the body. This is like the problem of the interaction between mind and matter in western philosophy. It has never been seen that an intangible could cause an effect on a tangible. So this inner self cannot exist and be the "driver" of your actions. This is like the fact that a permanent cause cannot create an impermanent effect as mentioned in chapter 9.
-- Nor can a permanent intangible self act as agent of the body's movement, as is claimed, since only something tangible can cause motion.
-- Assertion: Without a self there would be no physical movements such as stretching of flexing because the body would lack an activator. Thus an inner agential person exists who activates the body just as Devadatta drives his chariot. -- Answer: That is illogical. It follows that your life force or self is not the instigator of physical movement because the self is not tangible.
-- It is so because, just as a chariot can only be moved by something tangible and not by anything intangible, an intangible functional thing cannot actually move that which has form from one place to another. Though Vaisesikas assert that the self has form, they do not accept that it has external tangibility and so forth. )
.
L7: [(2) Showing what invalidated [belief in] a permanent self]
.
\ ###
\ 231.
\ Why [teach] non-violence and wonder about
\ Conditions for a permanent self?
\ A diamond never has to be
\ Protected against woodworm.
.
(i. e. A permanent self would not need morality: On the contrary, it is the though of a permanent self that would eliminate the need for morality. )
.
(-- A permanent self would be invulnerable to harm of any kind and would therefore not need to seek spiritual practices as a means of protection.
-- It follows that if the self is permanent, it is contradictory to teach non-violence as a practice to protect it from dangers such as a bad rebirth or to wonder what conditions are not unfavorable to it, because nothing can harm a permanent functional thing, just as a diamond which is not in danger of harm is never protected against woodworms, nor does it need to be. )
.
L6: [c. Refuting proof of a permanent self]
L7: [(1) Seeing memory of past rebirths is unsuitable as proof of a permanent self]
.
\ ###
\ 232.
\ If your self is permanent
\ Because of remembering other lives,
\ How can your body be impermanent
\ When you see a scar previously formed?
.
(i. e. There is no need for a permanent self to explain continuity / memory of past rebirths: There is no need for a permanent memory holder -- a permanent holder of karma seeds. There is no need for inherently existing causes and effects to explain interdependence, to support dependent origination. On the contrary, one would not exist without the other; dependent origination and emptiness implies each other. The continuum permits the uninterrupted flow of influences / information / cause & effect, without assuming inherently existing causes and effects. )
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.
(-- Nor does memory of past lives establish the self as permanent, but demonstrates the presence of a continuum of consciousness, consisting of moments which arise in dependence upon each other.
-- Assertion: The self is permanent because there is memory of previous rebirths. Memory of other lives is not feasible for a composite thing whose nature is to disintegrate as soon as it is produced.
-- Answer: You may consider the self permanent because there is memory of past lives, like thinking, "I was human in my last rebirth. " Then how could your body be impermanent? It should be permanent because in a past life you saw the scar of a wound inflicted on the body and now, when you see a birthmark which resembles that previously inflicted wound, you say, "That is the scar of the wound inflicted in the past. " According to us the object of the thought "I" is co- extensive with both the past and of this life. Since it is merely imputed, memory of past rebirths is feasible.
There is a bowl of curd in a house. The footprint of a pale-colored pigeon perched on the thick thatch is visible on it, even though its foot has not touched the curd and so forth. Similarly, all actions and agents are feasible for that which arises dependently. )
.
L7: [(2) Unfeasibility of mindless matter remembering past rebirths]
.
\ ###
\ 233.
\ If the self when possessing that
\ Which has mind is a knower,
\ By that [same argument] that which has mind would be
\ Mindless and the person permanent.
.
(i. e. The self is not different, nor the same as karma / memories: On the contrary, the simple fact that it can accumulate memory makes this self impermanent. This self cannot be separated from the mind, nor can it be the same as the mind - next verse. )
.
(-- If, as claimed, the person were mindless matter only capable of memory through an association with consciousness, then the person could not be permanent and unchanging, since it would first lack and then possess the faculty of remembering
-- It follows that the self cannot remember past rebirths because it is asserted as mindless matter. It is also unreasonable to assert that it remembers past lives by virtue of having mind, because by first lacking memory and later possessing memory, it has given up its entity.
-- If the self, despite being matter, is a knower of the past because of possessing that which has mind, by that [same argument] the attribute, that which has mind, should be mindless and matter because of possessing a self which is classified as matter. It follows that the self is also not permanent because first it does not remember but later newly develops memory of past lives. )
.
L7: [(3) Entailment of permanence, if that which has attributes such as intelligence remembers past rebirths]
.
\ ###
\ 234.
\ A life force which has pleasure and so forth
\ Appears as various as pleasure and so forth.
\ Thus like pleasure it is not
\ Suitable as something permanent.
.
(i. e. The self is not different, nor the same as the five aggregates: The simple fact that it can change makes it impermanent. )
.
(-- Moreover something which at different times has different attributes, such as pleasure and pain, cannot be permanent either.
-- If the life force or self has mind because of having attributes like intelligence, then because of having attributes like pleasure and pain, it should appear as different as pleasure and so forth while experiencing satisfaction and affliction. Thus like pleasure and so forth it cannot be permanent either. )
.
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.
\ ###
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L4: [B. Refuting the self imputed by Samkhyas]
L5: [1. Unacceptability of asserting a permanent conscious person]
.
\ ###
\ 235.
\ If consciousness is permanent
\ An agent is superfluous.
\ if fire is permanent
\ Fuel is unnecessary.
.
(i. e. Consciousness and it object are not two, not one - so there is no permanent consciousness: A permanent consciousness, a knower, would not need the sense organs, nor the object of which it is conscious . . . On the contrary consciousness is dependent on the sense organs, and to be conscious has to be conscious of something . . . Those two are interdependent, two concepts co-dependently arisen. )
.
(-- The Samkhya assertion that a permanent conscious person exists is then examined and its flaws are revealed. What role would the eyes and other senses play, if such a continually conscious person existed?
-- Samkhya assertion: If the self is asserted as matter these inconsistencies apply, but since, according to us, the person's nature is to be conscious, there is not the least unwanted entailment.
-- Answer: Samkhyas define twenty-five categories of phenomena of which twenty-two are matter and the twenty-fifth is asserted as the knower, person and self . They assert that the person experiences objects which the intellect makes it crave. This is explained extensively elsewhere.
-- If the conscious person is asserted as permanent, it follows that agents such as the eyes and so forth which permit experience of objects are superfluous and useless because the person that experiences objects exists as a permanent functional thing. Fuel is needed to make a fire but if fire is permanent, fuel is unnecessary. )
.
L5: [2. Entailment that [the activity of experiencing] cannot stop until the conscious person, the substance, has disintegrated]
.
\ ###
\ 236.
\ A substantial entity, unlike an action,
\ Does not alter until it disintegrates.
\ Thus it is improper to claim
\ The person exists but consciousness does not.
.
(i. e. Consciousness and the activity of being conscious are not two, not one: There is no consciousness without the activity of being conscious of something. So there is no consciousness that exist and then become conscious of something; like there is no doer without the action of doing. Those two are interdependent, two concepts co- dependently arisen. So there is no permanent consciousness. )
.
(Maybe like in "the doer does" the subject and the action are not one, neither separate.
Here, the self and the activity of being conscious cannot be thought as separated independent entity, nor as the same. Consciousness is not something added to a permanent self.
-- Assertion: The person whose nature is potential consciousness is the experiencer of objects and being conscious is the activity of experiencing. Since this depends on agents like the eye, there is no flaw.
-- Answer: Movement does not occur unless, for instance, a tree is agitated by the wind, but those fallacies would entail movement until the substantial entity disintegrates. The phenomenon of activity depends on the substantial entity and its motion.
-- The activity of moving depends on the substantial entity and may cease even though the substantial entity has not disintegrated. The nature of the substantial entity does not likewise change between its production and its disintegration. By contrast, consciousness and the person are an indifferentiable permanent entity. Thus it is improper to claim that the person but not consciousness exists prior to experiencing an object. )
.
L5: [3. Unacceptability of asserting that the person's nature [changes] f rom actual consciousness first to potential consciousness]
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\ 237.
\ At times one sees potential consciousness,
\ At others consciousness itself.
\ Because of being like molten iron
\ The person undergoes change.
.
(i. e. The simple fact that it becomes conscious of something proves that it is impermanent. All functional phenomenon are impermanent as stated before; they are both cause and effect. )
.
(-- If the person is claimed to be potentially conscious, the self and consciousness could not be a permanent indifferentiable entity, for then the person but no consciousness would exist before an object is experienced. Any transition from the potential consciousness to actual consciousness indicates that the person is not permanent.
-- Assertion: Although there is no consciousness prior to experiencing objects, its potential and thus the person exists. -- Answer: On occasions other than when objects are being experienced one sees potential consciousness, and when objects are being experienced, consciousness itself. In that case, like molten iron which later becomes a solid mass, former potential consciousness later becomes actual consciousness. It therefore follows that the person undergoes change because consciousness and the person are accepted as one entity. )
.
L4: [C. Refuting the self imputed by Naiyayikas]
L5: [1. Refuting that a part of the self possessing a mere particle of mind perceives objects]
.
\ ###
\ 238.
\ Merely [a small part with] mind is conscious
\ But the person is as vast as space.
\ Therefore it would seem as though
\ Its nature is not to be conscious.
.
(-- The Naiyayika assertion that there is a vast permanent partless self which is present in each being is next shown to be illogical, for then that which is one person's self should also be another's.
-- Naiyayika assertion: Our person is not a conscious entity. Since a part of the self the mere size of a particle has mind, there is consciousness of objects. It depends on just this part with mind. A person that is conscious and not separate from mind is produced through this association. The person is permanent and very extensive like space.
-- Answer: Since except for a part as small as a particle the rest of this permanent and extensive self is not associated with consciousness, that self's nature does not seem to have consciousness of objects. Just as it cannot be said that water of the Ganges is salty because of contact with a grain of salt, it is inappropriate to assert that which is not conscious as the person. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting belief in a permanent omnipresent self]
.
\ ###
\ 239.
\ If the self is in everyone then why
\ Does another not think of this one as "I"?
\ It is unacceptable to say that
\ It is obscured by itself. .
( -- If there is a partless permanent self which is omnipresent like space and in each individual sentient being, why would another person not think "I" in relation to my own self? It follows that they should think of it as "I" because the two selves are one. It cannot be omnipresent if the object of someone else's conception of the self is not my own self. -- Assertion: It is not perceived because it has been obscured by the other's self.
-- Answer: It is unacceptable to say that the self obscures itself for there is no duality of that which obscures and that which is obscured. )
.
L4: [D. Explaining other refutation like that of the attributes and so forth]
L5: [1. Asserting that though the principal is matter it is the creator of everything amounts to madness]
.
\ ###
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\ 240.
\ There is no difference between
\ The insane and those from whom
\ The attributes are the creator
\ But are never conscious.
.
(-- This is followed by an examination of the Samkhya belief that the creative force is unconscious matter with the capacity to produce virtue and non-virtue but with no capacity to experience their effects.
-- Samkhya assertion: The great one, a synonym for the intellect, evolves from the principal which is matter and a balance of pleasure, pain and equanimity. The three I-principles evolve from the great one. Eleven faculties evolve from the I-principle associated with lightness: five mental faculties for action and the speculative faculty. From the I- principle associated with motility come the five mere objects from which the five elements evolve. The I-principle of darkness acts as the basis for the other to I-principles.
-- Answer: It follows that it is contradictory to assert, as do the Samkhyas, that the principal which is a balance of the three attributes is the creator of all manifestations but is never conscious. There is not the least difference between those who assert the like and the insane whose perception is distorted. )
.
L5: [2. Contradiction of asserting that it creates virtue and non-virtue but does not experience their maturation]
.
\ ###
\ 241.
\ What is more illogical
\ Than that the attributes should always
\ Know how to construct homes and so forth
\ But not know how to experience them? .
( -- Since such a contention contradicts reason and conflicts with worldly convention, it is utterly incorrect. What is more illogical than to claim that the attributes whose nature is pleasure, pain and equanimity know how to construct homes and so forth but do not know how to experience these amenities? It contradicts both reason and convention. ) .
L5: [3. Refuting that a permanent self is the agent of actions and experiencer of their maturation]
.
\ ###
\ 242.
\ The active is not permanent.
\ (i. e. A cause cannot be permanent, thus the self cannot be permanent)
\ The ubiquitous is actionless.
\ (i. e. Something omnipresent does not need to act, thus the self cannot be omnipresent)
\ The actionless is like the non-existent.
\ (i. e. An actionless self, non-functional, is as non-existent)
\ Why do you not prefer selflessness?
\ (i. e. Conclude that there is no real self; it is more useful)
.
(-- On the other hand if, as the Vaisesikas claim, the self is the doer of actions and experiencer of their results, how can it be permanent, for this necessarily entails transformation from a previous state to a subsequent one.
-- Vaisesika assertion: The self alone is the doer of actions and the experiencer of their maturation.
-- Answer ab: If that is so, the self cannot be permanent.
-- If the self is an agent it must be accepted as causing action. If it does not perform actions it is unsuitable as an agent. That which performs actions like coming and going is not permanent since one must admit that it differs from before. Something the whole of which is everywhere all the time does not perform activities such as coming and going since there is no place or time it does not occupy.
-- Assertion: Well then, an actionless self exist.
-- Answer cd: Since an actionless self is as non-existent as a sky flower, why do you not prefer selflessness? It is worth doing so, for understanding it frees one from all fears. )
.
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L3: [II. General refutation]
L4: [A. Erroneousness of thinking a personal self exist]
.
\ ###
\ 243.
\ Some see it as ubiquitous and for some
\ The person is the mere [size of the] body.
\ Some see it as a mere particle.
\ The wise see it as non-existent.
.
(i. e. There is no inherently existing self. Since it doesn't exist those who assert its existence cannot agree among themselves. )
.
( -- It follows that the conception of a personal self is erroneous. Since the self, if it existed, would do so by way of its own entity, it should appear without differences.
-- Some such as Vaisesikas and Samkhyas see the self as existing in each body and as being ubiquitous like space. Others such as Nirgranthas see that which has a body as proportionate to the size of that body, such as an ant's or an elephant's.
Nirgranthas assert the life force is large or small like the size of the body.
Others, unable to accept this, see it as a mere particle.
Those with the wisdom that perceives the suchness of functional things without distortion see the self as non-existent. Indeed, if the self existed by way of its own entity, the Forders' view would not differ. )
.
L4: [B. Impossibility of liberation from cyclic existence for a permanent self]
.
\ ###
\ 244.
\ How can what is permanent be harmed,
\ Or the unharmed be liberated?
\ Liberation is irrelevant
\ For one whose self is permanent.
.
(i. e. A permanent self would not seek protection and liberation. The path would be useless for a permanent self. )
.
(-- A permanent self would be invulnerable to suffering of cyclic existence and would therefore not need to seek release.
-- For an opponent who asserts a permanent self, attaining liberation is irrelevant. How can that which is permanent be harmed by dangers and so forth in cyclic existence, and how can that which is unharmed in cyclic existence be liberated by subsequent mediation on the paths? It cannot for these very reasons. )
.
L4: [C. Inappropriateness of asserting the existence of a self during liberation]
.
\ ###
\ 245.
\ If the self exists it is inappropriate
\ To think there is no self
\ And false to claim one attains nirvana
\ Through certain knowledge of reality.
.
(i. e. There is no individual Liberation - no self in Nirvana: To say that a permanent self is liberated by abandoning the belief in a self is contradictory. There is no self being liberated, or attaining Nirvana. )
.
(-- Moreover, if the self were truly existent, how could giving up conceptions of a self be the means to attain liberation, as is claimed?
-- If the self exists by way of its own entity, it follows that thinking there is no self is inappropriate and that attainment of liberation is not feasible, since the basis for conceptions of a self is intact. Moreover the contention of these amazing people [who assert that the self exists but claim] that though ascertaining knowledge of suchness one abandons conceptions of a self and thereby attains nirvana would be false. Therefore those who seek liberation should accept
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selflessness. ) .
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L4: [D. Refuting a substantially established liberated [person] without a self]
.
\ ###
\ 246.
\ If it exists at liberation
\ It should not be non-existent before.
\ It is explained that what is seen
\ Without anything is its nature.
.
(i. e. Nothing permanent heving rebirths - no self in samsara: And if there is no individual liberation there is also no real individuality taking rebirths in samsara. )
.
(-- Fearing the absurd consequence that conceptions of a self would occur in the liberated state if the self exists, one might assert that though there is no self, there is a truly existent liberated person.
-- It follows that there must be such a truly existent liberated person previously too during cyclic existence, because its entity, isolated from any associated factors, as perceived by unmistaken awareness, is said to be its nature. If there is no self during liberation, it should not be asserted as existing during the cycle of rebirths either. )
.
L3: [III. Eliminating any fault of annihilation with regard to selflessness]
L4: [A. Although there is no self, there is no danger of the composite and transitory discontinuing]
.
\ ###
\ 247.
\ If the impermanent discontinues
\ How could there be grass at present?
\ If, indeed, this were true,
\ No one would have ignorance either.
.
(i. e. No-self doesn't mean no possible continuity of karma or Liberation: There is no need for a permanent self, to support karma and rebirth, to explain bondage and continuity, and the possibility of Liberation. There is a flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. There is continuity in the endless chain of causes and effects without the need to postulate any inherently existing cause or effect. - This is the same as saying that emptiness doesn't deny dependent origination, or that the Two Truths are not contradictory, but inseparable. . . )
.
(Nothing has origination, duration, cessation; nothing is impermanent; this model would not explain continuity and bounding; there is just the flow without anything inherently existent in it. Reality should not be seen as real impermanent things changing from one moment to another through discrete steps. Nothing really originate or discontinue. There is no real cause and effect. Just the continuum. The model consisting of "moments" (ksana) is not consistent, it cannot explain continuity, nor the dependence in samsara. See Karikas 19-21.
