No More Learning

* 'Keoueil,' vol. 15, No. 110 and
No. 162.
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? 484
[part IV.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
munity, either formally or informally, through the Provincial
Estates, the States General, or some less formal assembly,
before it could impose taxation. It is no doubt probably
true that in the sixteenth century, as in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, the crown from time to time raised money
without any constitutional formality, but it seems clear that
this was irregular.
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? 485
CHAPTER V.
THE THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS IN
THE POLITICAL LITERATURE OP THE SIXTEENTH
CENTURY.
We have so far considered the importance of the representa-
tive institutions as we find them illustrated in the actual
proceedings of the Cortes and the Estates, Provincial and
General, of Spain and France, but we must now take account
of the discussion of the subject in the political treatises and
pamphlets of the sixteenth century. We have said enough to
show that these representative institutions continued in the
sixteenth century to have some real importance in the struc-
ture of political society.
This, however, is not a sufficient account of the significance
of the conception of the organised representation of the
community. We think that it is clear that the importance of
this was almost universally recognised in theory, and was
accepted even by those who insisted most strongly upon the
authority of the monarchy.
We may begin by reminding ourselves of the terms in which
Commines, in the last years of the fifteenth century (or the
first years of the sixteenth century), refers to the States
General. Commines' own opinion was that the royal power
was greatly increased when the king acted with the advice or
counsel of his subjects, that is of the Estates; he speaks with
disdainful contempt of those who opposed their meetings as
tending to diminish the royal authority; and he is equally
dogmatic in maintaining that the king had no authority to
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? 486
[PABT IV.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
impose taxation on his subjects without their consent. 1 It
is quite clear that to Commines the meetings of the Estates
were a normal, useful, and even, for financial purposes, a
necessary part of any intelligent system of government; and
this is the more important because he was a great servant and
officer of the French crown.
It is, again, true that while de Seyssel's principle of the
limitation of the authority of the French monarchy rested
primarily upon a legal foundation, and that he was little
interested in representative institutions, he was clear in
maintaining that when there were great matters to consider,
such as war or legislation, the king should call together, not
his Ordinary Council, but a great council of princes, prelates,
nobles, jurists, and (though he seems to admit it grudgingly)
some citizens of the great towns. 2 De Seyssel had been, like
Commines, for many years in the service of the French crown.
Again, as we have seen in the last chapter, Michel L'Hdpital
as Chancellor of France, at the opening of the States General of
Blois in 1559, spoke of the ancient Kings of France as having
held meetings of the Estates frequently, and said that they
had consulted them on matters of grave importance for the
country. He says indeed that the king was not bound to
take counsel with his people, but it was good and useful that
lie should do so. 3 It is clear that in L'Hdpital's opinion the
States General, as representing the French people, were a
normal and valuable part of the political organisation of the
country.
It is also very important to observe that even Bodin, with
all his insistence upon the "Maiestas" (sovereignty) of the
King of France, maintains the great importance of the meet-
ings of the representative assemblies, and indeed states this
as a general principle which applied not only to France, but
to the other important countries of Western Europe. He
urges the great advantages of such assemblies for dealing with
the evils which might arise in the commonwealth, for making
laws, or for raising money. He praises the Spanish and
1 Cf. pp. 214 and 201. >> Cf. p. 473.
? Cf. p. 223.
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? CHAP V. ] THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS. 487
English rule that their "Curiae" or "Parlamenta" met
every three years, and while he admits that the King of
Prance did not call together the "Comitia" (the States
General) so frequently, he points out that six of the French
provinces had their particular assemblies. He mentions with
approval Commines' vigorous criticism of those who had
opposed the meeting of the States General, on the accession of
Charles VIII. (Tours, 1484); and finally he describes with
admiration the system of representative assemblies, local and
general, which were highly developed in Switzerland and
Germany. 1
1 Bodin, 'De Ropublica,' III. 7
(p. 346): "" Regia tamen potestas
optimis legibus ac institutis modorata,
nihil corporibus et collegiis firmius
aut stabilius habere potest. Nam si
opibus, ei pecuniis, exercitu, regi opus
est, id omnium optimo a collegiis et
corporibus fieri solet. Quinetiam i 11 i
ipsi qui conventus, quae Hispani
curiae, Angli parlamenta vocant aboleri
cupiunt, urgentibus periculis ad con-
ventus, velut ad sacram anchoram
confugiunt. ut soipsos Rempublicam
ab hostibus tueantur. TJbi enim
melius de curandis Reipublicae morbis,
de sanandis populis, do iubendis legibus,
de statu conformando, quam apud
principom in Senatu, coram populo
agi potest? . . . Quamobrem sapi-
enter ab Anglis et Hispanis institutum
est, si quidem illud teneremus, populi
conventus tertio quoque anno haberi,
et ut princeps libentius id faceret,
nullum imperari tributum poterat, nisi
populi conventus baberentur: id
quod etiamnum factum memini, quum
ab Andium Duce Francisco in Angliam
iussus legationis causa traijeci. Nostri
reges non ita saepe ut Angli comitia
oogunt, sed cum sexdecim provinciae
in hoc imperio numerentur, sex habent
sua quaedam singularia comitia, quae
ut omnino tollerentur modis omnibus
tentatum est ab iis qui sua scelera et
peeulatus pervulgari metuunt. Ut
etiam Carolo VIII Rege Imperium
ineunte, cum universee provinciae
conventus haberi opertere una voce
conclamarentur, non defuerunt qui
maiestatis crimen ingcrerent iis, qui
in eenatu cum populo idem sentirent;
qui bus acerrimo restitit Philippus
Comminius rerum gerendarum us a
clarissimus senator. Sed quam sint
necossaria totius populi concilia, ex eo
perspicitur, quod quibus populis sua
concilia cogere licet, oum iis optime
agi tor: coeteri populi tributis ao
servitute urgentur, nam singulorum
voces minus exaudiuntur: totius vere
provinciae clarissima vox est, rogatio
efficax, quam ne princeps quidem ipse,
si velit, repudiare possit. Quanquam
innumerabiles sunt conciliorum utilt-
tates. Nam si conscribendi exercitiu,
imperanda tributa, cogenda pecunia
sit, tum ad hostes repellandos, tum ad
? ? latrocinia perditorum hominum coer-
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? 488
[PART IV.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
Bodin returns to the subject in a later book of the 'De
Eepublica,' and deals specially with the principle that no
taxation could be imposed without the consent of the Estates.
He says that in an assembly held by Philip of Valois in 1338
it was declared that no taxation could be imposed without
the consent of the Estates; and that though Louis XI. im-
posed a tax (without their consent) in the last years of his
reign, this was abolished by the States General of Tours on the
accession of Charles VIII. He adds that Commines main-
tained that princes could only impose taxes with the consent
of their subjects, as was still the rule in Spain, Britain, and
Germany. 1
We have already referred to the very interesting and im-
portant statements of James Almain and John Major, in the
early years of the century, that the community is superior to
the king, and can depose him; and John Major says that in
difficult matters the Three Estates of the kingdom are to
direct him. 2 In another place we have pointed out that
Calvin, with all his emphatic condemnation of the disobedience
of private persons to the divine authority of the ruler, was
also clear that if the king should abuse his authority and
misgovern his subjects, the magistrates of the people, or
De Helvetiis notum e>>t, et libris praodiorum publicorum ao dominii
accurate praescriptum: de German is fere octingenties H. S. Tributi nomine
obscurius, habent tamen non modo extremo imperii suo anno cxigerct:
singulae civitates sua collegia, corpora, nihilominus tamen Carolo VIII. regnum
iura univcrsitatis: verum etiam decem ineunte, coacti a apud Turonee comitiis,
Imperii provinciae, circulos ipsi appel- annua ilia, quae ordinaria evaserunt,
lant, sua singulis annis comitia cogunt, tributa sublata sunt: sed oandem
quorum rogationes ac decreta ad oblationem quam Carolo VII. dono
universos totius Imperii oonventus dederant, in aerarium ac septuagiee
referuntur: quibus Imperium illud H. S. donationis nomine inferri, quam
stare videmus, et quibus sublatis mere summam semel tan tum ab universis
necesse est. " ordinibus exigi placuit: ne imposterum
1 Bodin, 'Do Republica,' VI. 2 imperaretur. Et quidem Philippus
(p. 656): "Itaque Pbilippo Valesio Comminius, qui tunc publici consilii
conventus Oallicos habente anno particeps erat, negavit principibus tri-
Kcccxuvut, populi rogatione decre- buta imperare licere: sed ea tantum
tum est, ne ullum tributi aut vectigalis capere posse quae consentiontibus
genus nisi consentientibus ordinibus subditis dono darentur: eoque iure
imperaretur. Ao tametsi Ludovicum Hispanos, Britannos, Germanos etiam-
XI. regcm gravissima diffioillimaque num uti videmus. "
bella eo impulissent, ut praetor vectigal * Cf. pp. 245 and 248.
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? CHAP V. ] THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS. 489
perhaps the Three Estates, should restrain him. 1 We have
also, in an earlier chapter, dealt with the conception of the
nature and source of law in St Germans (1539), and especially
his treatment of English law as being primarily founded upon
custom; and we are here only concerned to observe that
when this was not adequate, the laws which he calls
statutes could be made by the king, the lords spiritual and
temporal, and the community of the whole kingdom in
Parliament. 2
We have also referred to that important work of Sir
Thomas Smith, 'De Eepublica Anglorum,' which sharply
contrasts the prince who governs with the consent of the
people and according to the laws of the commonwealth, with
the tyrant who makes and breaks the law at his pleasure. 3
We must now consider his treatment of the nature and power
of Parliament. He defines a respublica or commonwealth as
being a multitude of free men united into one, and holding
together by mutual wills and contracts, for their protection
in peace and war. * The fundamental character of the
government of the commonwealth of England he describes
in sweeping and emphatic words. It belongs to three kinds
of men; the king or queen by whose will and authority all
things are ruled, the greater and lesser nobles, and the yeo-
manry, and each of these classes has its part in judgments,
in election of officers, in imposing taxation, and in making
laws. 5 The meaning of this far-reaching statement is ex-
plained when, in a later chapter, he goes on to describe the
Parliament and its powers. It is in the Parliament that the
whole absolute power resides, for there are present the king,
the nobles, the commons, and the clergy are represented
by the bishops. It is they who take counsel for the well-
being of the kingdom and commonwealth, and when, after
long deliberation, a Bill is read three times, discussed in
both Houses, approved, and confirmed by the assent of
the king, no question can be raised as to what has been
1 Cf. p. 266.
* Cf. pp. 234-236.
1 Cf. p. 326.
* Sir Thos. Smith, 'Do Republics
Anglorum,' I. 10 (ed. 1583).
? Id. , I. 24.
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? 490 THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
decided, for it has the force of law. 1 There was indeed little
or nothing that was new in this, but it is interesting to compare
the statement of the "absolute" authority which resides in
Parliament with the conception of Bodin.
Sir Thomas Smith goes on to enumerate the powers of
Parliament, and in a later chapter, those of the king. Parlia-
ment among other things makes laws, declares the rights and
properties of private persons, establishes the forms of religion,
determines the succession to the kingdom, imposes taxation. 2
The king, on the other hand, has the right of making war
and peace, of appointing the Council, he has absolute power,
not restricted by any laws, in time of war; he has control over
the currency, the right of moderating the severity of law,
when mercy and equity require it; he appoints the chief
officers of the kingdom, and no jurisdiction great or little
belongs to anyone except the king. 3
We have set out these statements of political writers,
mostly of the earlier part of the century, because, as it seems
to us, it is only when we have made clear to ourselves what
was the normal judgment of the time that we can properly
understand and appreciate the significance of the often
highly controversial literature of the lator part of the century.
We have already cited George Buchanan's emphatic state-
ment that the legislative authority belonged to the whole
people of a commonwealth, but that as in Scotland this
1 Id. id. , II. 1: "The most high
and absolute power of the realm of
England consieteth in the Parliament.
For as in warro where the king himself
in person, the nobilitie, the rest of the
gentilitie, and the yeomanrio are, is
the force and power of England: so in
peace and consultation when the Prinoe
is to give . . . the last and highest
commandement, the Baronie for the
nobilitie and higher, the knights es-
quiers, gentlemen and commons for the
lower part of the commonwealth, the
bishoppes for the clergie, bee present
to avertise, consult and shew what is
good and necessarie for the common-
wealth, and to consult together; and
upon mature deliberation everie bill or
lawe being thrise reade and disputed
uppon in either house, the other two
partes first each apart, and after the
Prince himself in presence of both the
parties doeth consent unto and alloweth.
That is the Prince's and whole realmes'
deede: whereupon justlie no man can
complaine, but must accomodate him-
selfe to Bnde it good and obey it. "
>> Id. id. , II. 1.
? Id. id. , n.
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? chap V. ] THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS. 491
power should be entrusted to persons chosen from all the
orders (Estates) who should deliberate with the king, and
that only after this should the final judgment be given by the
people. 1
In the Huguenot pamphlets the demand for the recognition
of a regular representative authority was founded in the
first place upon historical contentions, which may have been
in some respects overstated and even fantastic, but that
does not mean they had no value.
Hotman in the 'Franco
Gallia' (1573) maintained that the supreme government in
the Merovingian period belonged to the assembly of the repre-
sentatives of the whole people, which met every year, and was
composed of the king, the nobles, and the depnties of the
provinces, and he held that this continued in the Carolingian
period, and under the house of Capet. 2 He was on firmer
ground when he came to the later Middle Ages, and put
together a number of examples of the importance and actions
of the States General in France, from the time of the first
great meeting, to deal with the conflict between Philip the
Fair and Boniface VIII. in 1302, down to the States General
of Tours in 1484. 3 He cites that important passage in Com-
mines' 'Memoires,' to which we have already referred, and
concludes that it was only the flatterers of the king who
resisted the freedom of the Estates. *
Much of this may seem a little fanciful, but it is not so
fantastic as the notion that in the Middle Ages the govern-
ment of the Empire or the French kingdom had been
that of an absolute monarch. We are, however, not here
concerned with the accuracy of Hotman's appeal to history,
but with the importance of its appearance at this time. For
it recurs in the other important political tracts of the
time.
The 'Eemonstrance' demanded the restoration of the
ancient laws and the assembling of the Estates, as had been
the custom till the French kings desired to rule absolutely
>> Cf. p. 333.
* Hotman, 'Franco Gallia,' X. , pp.
847; XV. , XVII.
>> Id. id. , XVII. -XIX.
* Id. id. , XIX. (p. 708).
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? 492
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
(souverainement) and uncontrolled. 1 The writer cites varions
examples of such meetings in Merovingian and Carolingian
times, and contends that it was by these means that the
proper relations between the king, the nobles, and the people
had been maintained, and should now be restored. 2 Ho
urges the excellent results of the meeting of the States General
at Tours in 1484, and the good work begun by the Estates
which met at Orleans in 1560, which had been unhappily
frustrated by evil machinations. 3 What is better, he ex-
claims, than that the Ordinance of God should be graved on
the heart of the king, and that the king should govern with
the goodwill and consent of his people; and what is more
detestable than that he should lord it over them by constraint;
how can the State be now maintained but by the ancient and
sacred rule of calling togothor the Estates, by means of which
some remedy might be found for the corruption of religion
and justice. *
The ' Droit des Magistrats ' points out the excellent results
of the recognition of the authority of Parliament in England,5
and asserts that the French people had from the first so
ordered the monarchy that the kings did not reign by heredi-
tary succession alone, but were elected by the Estates of the
1 'Remonstrance aux Seigneurs,' >> Id. , p. 77.
p. 76: "Procurez que les lois anciennes * Id. , p. 78.
obtiennent et recouvrent leurs vigueurs 4 Id. , p. 78: "Qu'y a il plus re-
en ce Royaume, et que par la convoca- commandable, que quand l'ordonnance
tion legitime des Estats (ou comme en de Dieu qui est autheur et conservateur
un Royaume libre, les langues doivent de tout bon ordre, est engrauee au
aussi estre libres), on pourvoye a` une coeurs des Roy, et le Roy regno auec la
ruine prochaine dont la France est benevolence et consentement de son
menassoe. Qui est un moyen legitime peuple. Comme aussi il n'y a rien de
des la premiere institution de ceste plus detestable que quand le prince
Monarchie, pratique? et continue? iusques veut dominer par contrainte, et per-
a` ce que nos Roys ayent voulu regner vertit la fin pour laquelle il est ordonne?
souverainement sans estro contrerollez, de Dieu. Et comment est il anjourdhuy
lequel il est expedient et necessaire de possible do maintenir cest estat . , .
revoquer en usage. En ces assemblees, si ce n'est par ceste ancienne et sainte
qui au commencement se nommoyent observance, d'assembler les Estats, par
parlemens, le Roy communiquait avec lesquels on pourra remedier a` la cor-
ses sujets, prenoit leurs ad vis, oyoit ruption qui a tant gaigne? e sur la
leurs plaintes et y pourvoyait. Et de Religion et la justice. "
ceste police dependent la grandeur de * 'Droit des Magistrats,' p. 760.
la France. "
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? CHAP V. ] THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS. 493
kingdom, who had also exercised the right of deposition. 1
The ancient and authentic histories showed that the same
Estates had possessed the authority to appoint and remove
the principal officers of the crown, or at least to observe
what the kings did in this matter, and to control taxation and
the other more important affairs of the kingdom in war and
peace. The writer recognised indeed that this was no longer
the case in France, but he maintains that this was contrary
to the methods of the "Anciens" and "directement repug-
nant aux loix posees avec le fondement de la Monarchie
Francaise," and he appeals to all good jurists to say whether
any prescription was valid against these. 2
The 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos' sets out the same con-
ception in emphatic terms. In ancient times the assembly
of the Three Estates met every year, in later periods from
time to time, to determine matters concerning the common-
wealth, and the authority of this assembly was such that its
decisions were held as sacred. It was in its power to deter-
mine such matters as war and peace, as the imposition of
taxation, and when the corruption or tyranny of the king
required, it could even change the succession. Hereditary
succession had been accepted to avoid the inconveniences of
election, but when it caused greater evils and the kingdom
became a tyranny, the lawful assembly of the people retained
authority to depose the tyrant and to appoint a good king in
his place. 3
1 Id. , p. 786.
? Id. , p. 767.
* 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos,' Q. 3,
p. 98: "At praetor haec, quotannis
olim, poet vero aliquando, quotiescun-
que saltem necessitas postulabat, habe-
batur trium ordinum conventus, quo
regiones urbesque omnes alicuius nomi-
nis suos logatos mittebant, et quidem
I'lebei, Nobiles, Ecclesiastici in una-
quaque sigillatim, ubi de his quao
ad Rempublicam portinebant publico
statuebatur. Eius vero conventus,
ea fuit perpetua authoritas, ut non
modo, quae ibi statuta forent sacra
sanctaque haberentur, seu pax facienda,
sou bellum gerendum, sive Regni
Procuratio cuiquam deferenda, sive
vectigal imperandum esset: verum
etiam regis luxus, desidiae, tyranni-
disve causa in coenobia detruderentur,
eoquo authore, universae adeo stirpes
regni successione privarentur, non socus
ao primum, Populo auctore, ad regnum
vocatao fuerant. Nempe quas consen-
sus extulerat, dissensus exturbabat.
. . . Ex quo sane liquet, succossionem
tolleratam quidem ad vitandum ambi-
tum, secession em, interregnum, et alia
electionis incommoda. At sane ubi
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? 494
[PABT IV.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
Like the 'Droit des Magistrats,' the 'Vindiciae' cites the
example of the regular meetings of the Parliament in England
and Scotland,1 and in another place maintains that in the
empire, as well as in Poland, Hungary, Denmark, and Eng-
land, taxes could only be imposed by the authority of the
public assembly, and asserts that this had been the rule also
in France, and refers to the law of Philip of Valois. 2
We turn to Spain and the Jesuit Mariana. In an early
chapter he declares that the decision about the law of suc-
cession must be made "ordinum consensu";3 but his
position is more completely developed in a later chapter in
which he discusses the question whether the authority of the
community or the king is the greater. (We have already
cited some passages from this chapter. ) * He begins by
referring to the constitutional order of Aragon, but, feeling
apparently that this was somewhat unusual, he turns to
other countries where the authority of the people was less.
Almost all recognise the king as ruler and head of the common-
wealth, and that his authority is greater than that of any one
of the citizens, but they deny that his authority is equal to
that of the whole commonwealth or to that of the represen-
tatives and principal men elected from all the orders (Estates)
in their assembly; as we see in Spain, where the king cannot
impose taxes against the will of the people. It is the same with
laws, they are set up when they are promulgated, but are
established by the custom of those who live by them. The
commonwealth has the right to depose and even to slay the
graviora damns consequerentur, ubi
regnum Tyrannis, ubi regis solium
Tyrannos invaderet, Populi legitime
conventum, et Tyranni regisve ignavi
expellendi, adve agnates deducendi, et
boni regis in oius locum adsciscendi,
authoritatem sibi perpetuo retinuisse. "
1 Id. , Q. 3, p. 100.
? Id. , Q. 3 (p. 142): "Ne vero
pecuniae in alium usum extorque-
antur, iurat Imperator, so nulla, nisi
conventus publici authoritate voctigalia
impositurum, tributave indicturum.
Idem reges Poloniae, Hungariae,
Daniae, Angliae consimiliter, ex lege
Eduardi primi. Francorum reges
olim in trium Ordinum conventu vecti-
galia imperabant. Unde onim est lex
Philippi Valesii, ne collectae indicantur,
nisi summa necessitate urgente, deque
Trium Ordinum consensu. "
3 Mariana, ' De Rege,' I. 3 (p. 36).
4 Cf. p. 376-77.
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? CHAP V. ] THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS. 495
king who becomes a tyrant, for it has retained in its own
hands an authority greater than that which it has delegated. 1
Mariana recognised indeed that there were some learned
men who denied this, and maintained that the king was
greater than the whole body of the citizens. He answered
that this was true only in nations where there was no public
assembly, where the people or the chief men never met to
deliberate on the affairs of the commonwealth, where men
were compelled to obey, whether the rule of the king was just
or unjust. He adds contemptuously that this was surely an
excessive authority, and very near a tyranny, and as Aristotle
had said might be found among barbarous peoples. We are,
however, he says, not concerned with barbarians but with
that form of government which exists among ourselves (in
Spain), and with the best and most wholesome form of
government. 2
? Id. id. , I. 8 (p. 70): "In aliis
provinoiis ubi minor populi auctoritas
est, Regiun maior: an idem iudicium
sit, et an rebus communibus id ex-
podiat considerandum est. Plerique
omnes Regem rectorem reipublicae
et caput esse concedunt, rebus gerendis
supremam et maximum auctoritatem
habere, sive bellum hostilibus indican-
dam sit, sive iura subditis in pace
danda. Neque dubitant maiorem
utu'us quam singulorum tum civium
tum populorum imperandi potestatem
esse.
Idem tamen, si respublica universa,
aut qui oius partes gerunt, sive primarii
ex omnibus ordinibus delecti, in unum
locum sententiamque conveniant, ne-
gant pari iubendi auctoritate Regem
fore. Quod experimonto comprobatur
in Hispania, vectigalia itnperare Regem
non posse populo dissentiente. Utetur
quidem ille arte, praemia civibus
ostentabit, nonnunquam torrores, per.
trahendis caeteris in suam sententiam:
solicitabit verbis, spe, promiasis (quod
an recto flat non disputamus); sed si
restiterint tamen, eorum potius iudioio
quam Regis voluntati stabitur. Idem
de legum sanctione iudicium esto, quae,
auctore Augustino, d. quarta, c. in
istis (Gratian, Decretum, D. 4, 3), tunc
instituuntur cum promulgantur, firm,
antur, cum moribus utentium appro-
bantur. . . .
Praeterea Regem pravis moribus
rempublicam vexantem, atque in aper-
tam tyrannidem degenerantem com-
primere eadem respublica qui posset,
principatu et vita, si opus sit, spoliaro,
nisi maiore potestato penes se retenta,
cum Regi suas partes delegavit. "
? Id. id. , I. 8 (p. 71): "Video
tamen non deesse viros eruditionis
opinione prostantes, qui secus statuant.
Regem non singulis modo civibus, sod
etiam universis maiorem esse. . . .
(p. 72) Est autem perspicuum, id
institutum in quibusdam gontibus
vigere, ubi nullus est publicus con von tus,
numquam populus aut procsres do
republica deliberaturi conveniunt: ob-
? ? temperandi tantum nocessitas urget,
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? 496
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
Mariana's conception is clear, but it is further developed in
a very important passage dealing directly with the Cortes.
In order to restrain the king within due bounds, our ancestors,
he says, had provided that nothing of greater importance
should be done without the will of the chief men and the
people, and to this end it was the custom to call to the
assembly of the kingdom men chosen from all the orders
(Estates), the Bishops, the u Proceres " and the Procurators of
the cities. This still continued in Aragon and other provinces
of Spain, but in Castile (in nostra gente) it had for some time
come about that the "Proceres " and the Bishops had been
excluded from the assembly, and he suggests that this had
been done in order that public affairs should be controlled by
the capricious will of the king and the desires of a few. The
people complained that the Procurators of the cities who
alone continued to attend were frequently corrupted by bribes
and promises, especially as they were appointed by lot and
not by deliberate choice. 1
These observations of Mariana on the composition of the
Cortes of Castile are very important and interesting, and in
the remainder of the chapter he develops his view of the
importance of the aristocratic element in the Spanish consti-
Neo mirum cum robore corporis sine
consilio, sine prudentia ad servitutem
nati suntquidam: Principum imperium,
quamvis graue, volentes nolentes ferunt.
Nos hoc loco non de barbaris, sed de
principatu qui in nostra gente viget
et vigere aequum est, deque optima ct
saluberrima imperandi forma die.
putamus. "
1 Id. id. , I. 8 (p. 75): "Hoo maiores
nostri, providentes viri prudentes
periculum, ut Reges continerent intra
modestiae et mediocritatis fines, ne se
nimia potestate efferent, unde publica
pernicies existeret, multa sapionter
sanxerunt atque praoclare. In his
quam prudenter, quod nihil maioris
rei sine voluntate procerum et populi
sanctum esse voluerunt; eoque con-
silio, delectos ex omnibus ordinibus ad
conventus regni, Pontifices tota ditione,
proceres, et procuratores civitatum
euocare moris erat. Quod hoc tempore
in Aragonia aliisque prouinciis re ten tum,
vellem nostri Principes reponerent.
Our enim maiori ex parte antiquatum
in nostra gente est, exclusis proceribus
et Episcopis, nisi ut sublato communi
consensu, quo salus publica oontinetur,
Regis ad arbitrium, et ad pancorum
libidinem res publicae et privatae ver-
tantur.