iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it
produces pleasure instead of the previous pain.
produces pleasure instead of the previous pain.
Summa Theologica
ii, 3) that "calm is contrary
to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or
privation.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different,
but not contrary to one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power,
specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another.
For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the
objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this
distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no
passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another,
differ specifically.
Objection 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of
form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety,
as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that
are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in
approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every
difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the
difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and
withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first
two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as
stated above [1217](A[2]): whereas the third difference does not
diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be
infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power
to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the
concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another;
rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power
there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one
another.
I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes,
which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now,
the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first,
from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from
water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their
active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference
of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as
if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either
draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing
it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the
first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to
the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the
body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above.
Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover
gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest,
when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause
are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same
applies to the cause of repulsion.
Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were,
a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the
first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain
inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this
belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which
is "hatred" in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet
possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment
of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or
"concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion
of "aversion" or "dislike. " Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it
causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this
belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in
respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness. "
On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or
inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising
from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely.
And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair. "
In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring. " But in
respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is
no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above
[1218](A[3]). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of
"anger. "
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are
three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion,
joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible
faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has
not contrary passion.
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing
specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the
irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
From this the replies to the objections are evident.
__________________________________________________________________
OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the
soul?
(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?
(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice
of an act?
(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good
or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals are
properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog. ). But
passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other
animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.
Objection 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in
accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the
sensitive appetite, as stated above ([1219]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore they
have no connection with human, i. e. moral, good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are
neither praised nor blamed for our passions. " But we are praised and
blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally
good or evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of
the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if
our love is good. "
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways:
first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the
reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to
wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral
good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above
([1220]Q[18] , A[5]). If, however, they be considered as subject to the
command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them.
Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to
the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward
members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much
more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be
called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either
from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the
will.
Reply to Objection 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are
common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they
are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called
rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i,
13).
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised
nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not
exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are
subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears or is
angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a
certain way, i. e. according to, or against reason. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are
morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call
the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those
things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances
rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance
of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is
evil morally.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
"movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to
nature is passion. " But in movements of the soul, what is against
nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide
Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with
nature to that which is against nature. " Therefore these passions are
morally evil.
Objection 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But
these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions of
sins" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these
emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they
fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they
rejoice in good works. "
I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from
that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions are
evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are
good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is
nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider
the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between
sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual
and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of
the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as the passions of
the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of
the will are in the intellectual appetite: but every rational movement
of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a
movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following
their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of
the soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound;
and those who are unsound are wanting in sense. " Hence we speak of
those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound. "
On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all
the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem them
good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not
controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in
disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a
mean in the passions, when he says that "every evil, though moderate,
should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately ailing,
is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is
not sound. " For passions are not called "diseases" or "disturbances" of
the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason.
Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease
in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved
more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it
derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion to
deviate always from the order of natural reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are
contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as
they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of
a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, on
which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the
goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment of
reason: for Sallust says (Catilin. ): "All those that take counsel about
matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship and
pity. " Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act.
Objection 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the
better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye followers of
God, as most dear children. " But "God and the holy angels feel no anger
when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve
the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is
better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to
reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion:
for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately.
Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without passion, than he
who does with passion.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion
of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating
right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven. " But
nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a
passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.
I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is
evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the
goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good
altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by
passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the
sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we
give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive
appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his
passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good is founded on
reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according
as it extends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no one
questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good,
that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of
reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated
above ([1221]Q[17], A[7]), it belongs to the perfection of moral or
human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by
reason.
Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do
it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of
moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of
his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to
Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God":
where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by
"flesh" the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold
relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus,
since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the
moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is
more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason
than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place, consequently:
and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, to wit,
when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the
lower part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that
results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the
intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness.
Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his
reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more
promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a
passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.
Reply to Objection 2: In God and the angels there is no sensitive
appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend
on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in
us.
Reply to Objection 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the
judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either
of the ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or
else it is a sign of its being more grievous.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil
morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend on
reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that
accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing
accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is
good or evil according to its species.
Objection 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from their
object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to its
species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is
good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and that
those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as
hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no
passion is good or evil according to its species.
Objection 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be
found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no
passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a
kind of virtue. " Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that
modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or
evil according to their species.
I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been
said in regard to acts ([1222]Q[18], AA[5],6;[1223] Q[20], A[1])---viz.
that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be
considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural
genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species
of an act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch
as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and
evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to
which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with
reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is base fear; and of
"envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to
the same species as the external act.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the passions in their
natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in
itself. But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and
evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the
appetite, but essentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are
themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like
manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other
hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a
tendency to evil, are themselves evil.
Reply to Objection 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does
not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of
estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i. e. the Divine reason,
there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the
soul's passions.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible
passions;
(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;
(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;
(4) The four principal passions.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice
versa?
Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their
objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good,
which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible passions
seem to precede the concupiscible passions.
Objection 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the
irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that
which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of
removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from
enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1; [1224]FP,
Q[81], A[2] ). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover"
(Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions.
Objection 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But
joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic.
iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it
produces pleasure instead of the previous pain. " Therefore the
concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.
On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good,
while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult,
good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good,
it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the irascible.
I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity
than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we
find something relating to movement---e. g. desire; and something
belonging to repose, e. g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible
passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which
belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a
thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous;
whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of
intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we
compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible
passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of
execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions
of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes
it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope. " But the
concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes
between two irascible passions: because it follows fear; since we
become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it
precedes the movement of anger; since the movement of self-vindication,
that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is
looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the
angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every
passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion
denoting rest, viz. either in joy or in sadness.
But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible
passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take
precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something
to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the
irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of
the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort,
and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous
good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain
lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil.
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those
concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and
those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it
is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and
terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object
of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous,
just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is
arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good
absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the
common precedes the proper.
Reply to Objection 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an
accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly
related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the
obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.
Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those
concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object leads to the
same conclusion.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the
concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from
concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are
named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
desire takes precedence of love.
Objection 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a
"uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But
concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing
coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
Objection 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is
sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure
(Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently
love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the
passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved
object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy. " Therefore love
is the first of the concupiscible passions.
I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible
faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of
good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are
naturally before those, the object of which is evil---that is to say,
each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the
reason for shunning the opposite evil.
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the
order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently
the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the
order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of
execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in
the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends
to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that
end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved
to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it.
And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love,
which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or
concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this
order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the
order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended
causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good,
which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as
stated above ([1225]Q[11], A[3], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for "words
are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1).
Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of
love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not
possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De
Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we
love. " Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is
felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.
Reply to Objection 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There
is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other.
This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is
also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so
far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and
an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a
union. This union precedes the movement of desire.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes
love in the order of intention.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible
passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger.
Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief characteristic"
(cf. A[2], OBJ[1]), it seems that anger precedes and surpasses hope.
Objection 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something
arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary
evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or
an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive
simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to
overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to
be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And
consequently it seems that hope does not precede them.
Objection 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the
movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and
despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply
approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and
daring.
On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it
precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the
passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible
faculty.
I answer that, As stated above [1226](A[1]) all irascible passions
imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible
faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere
aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred,
those whose object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or
joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion in
the irascible, as stated above (Q[23], AA[3],4); but the presence of
evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude
to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all
the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation.
And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a
movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose
object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those
whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes
despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is
essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly; whereas
despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent
with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its
tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear,
through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and
despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this---that
as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and
despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises from
the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming.
Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is angry while seeking
vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in
the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it is evident that hope is
the first of all the irascible passions.
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of
generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second;
hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth
and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as
stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire
precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy
precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above.
Reply to Objection 1: Because anger arises from the other passions, as
an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being
more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the arduousness but the good that is
the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards
good more directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even
anger regards something more arduous.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the appetite is essentially and
directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement
from evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is
in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of nature,
which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which
removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining the end.
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Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the
four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] sqq. )
omits hope and puts desire in its place.
Objection 2: Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the
soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation.
The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order
of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the final passions,
will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or
generation, and thus love will be the principal passion. Therefore joy
and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the four
principal passions.
Objection 3: Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is
caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be
reckoned as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and
daring, from being akin to one another.
On the contrary, Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four
principal passions, says:
"Banish joys: banish fears:
Away with hope: away with tears. "
I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal passions.
Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in
them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore
they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5.
Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the
others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement
of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, movement
begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in
respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in
fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in
relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the
future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to
present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future
good, and fear, future evil.
As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future,
they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that
these four are the principal passions, because they are general
passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we
understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of
hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some
future good.
Reply to Objection 2: These are called principal passions, in the order
of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last
passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend
towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any
further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned
a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be
a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply OBJ 3).
Reply to Objection 3: Despair implies movement away from good; and this
is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil;
and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal
passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be
principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion,
because it arises from daring.
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OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1) the
passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the
irascible faculty.
The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall
consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure and
sadness.
Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2)
The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
(2) Whether love is a passion?
(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?
(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love
of concupiscence?
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Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power.
For it is written (Wis. 8:2): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and
have sought her out from my youth. " But the concupiscible power, being
a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not
apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible
power.
Objection 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every passion:
for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the object
beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is
contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is
sadness. " But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed,
fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible power.
Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible
power.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural
love. " But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers,
which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the
concupiscible power.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in
the concupiscible power. "
I answer that, Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good
is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the
difference of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an
apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in some
other: and this is called the "natural appetite. " Because natural
things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by
reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author of
their nature, as stated in the [1227]FP, Q[6], A[1], ad 2; [1228]FP,
Q[103], A[1], ad 1,3. And there is another appetite arising from an
apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and not
from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the "sensitive
appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share of liberty, in
so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following
freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And this is
the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the "will. "
Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the
principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the
principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness
with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love":
thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of
its weight and may be called "natural love. " In like manner the
aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is
to say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or
"intellectual" or "rational love. " So that sensitive love is in the
sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual
appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards
good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the
object of the irascible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or
rational love.
Reply to Objection 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and
sadness, not essentially but causally.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the
vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts
of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; since
each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally
suitable to it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether love is a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is
a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore love is not a passion.
Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine
says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but
rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the
appetite; for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle.
Therefore love is not a passion.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a
passion. "
I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a
natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the
first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement
that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body
both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight,
from being the principle of movement to the place, which is connatural
to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called "natural
love. " In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first,
a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that
object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object.
For "the appetitive movement is circular," as stated in De Anima iii,
10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing
itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves
towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement
ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the
appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else
than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a
movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and
lastly, there is rest which is "joy. " Since, therefore, love consists
in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is
evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is
in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according
as it is in the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement or
action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of
movement in the appetite.
to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or
privation.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different,
but not contrary to one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power,
specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another.
For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the
objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this
distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no
passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another,
differ specifically.
Objection 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of
form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety,
as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that
are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in
approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every
difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the
difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and
withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first
two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as
stated above [1217](A[2]): whereas the third difference does not
diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be
infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power
to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the
concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another;
rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power
there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one
another.
I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes,
which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now,
the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first,
from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from
water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their
active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference
of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as
if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either
draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing
it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the
first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to
the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the
body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above.
Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover
gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest,
when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause
are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same
applies to the cause of repulsion.
Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were,
a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the
first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain
inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this
belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which
is "hatred" in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet
possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment
of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or
"concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion
of "aversion" or "dislike. " Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it
causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this
belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in
respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness. "
On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or
inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising
from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely.
And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair. "
In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring. " But in
respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is
no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above
[1218](A[3]). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of
"anger. "
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are
three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion,
joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible
faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has
not contrary passion.
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing
specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the
irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
From this the replies to the objections are evident.
__________________________________________________________________
OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the
soul?
(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?
(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice
of an act?
(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?
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Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good
or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals are
properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog. ). But
passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other
animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.
Objection 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in
accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the
sensitive appetite, as stated above ([1219]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore they
have no connection with human, i. e. moral, good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are
neither praised nor blamed for our passions. " But we are praised and
blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally
good or evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of
the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if
our love is good. "
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways:
first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the
reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to
wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral
good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above
([1220]Q[18] , A[5]). If, however, they be considered as subject to the
command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them.
Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to
the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward
members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much
more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be
called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either
from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the
will.
Reply to Objection 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are
common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they
are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called
rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i,
13).
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised
nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not
exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are
subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears or is
angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a
certain way, i. e. according to, or against reason. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are
morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call
the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those
things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances
rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance
of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is
evil morally.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
"movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to
nature is passion. " But in movements of the soul, what is against
nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide
Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with
nature to that which is against nature. " Therefore these passions are
morally evil.
Objection 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But
these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions of
sins" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these
emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they
fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they
rejoice in good works. "
I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from
that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions are
evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are
good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is
nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider
the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between
sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual
and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of
the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as the passions of
the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of
the will are in the intellectual appetite: but every rational movement
of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a
movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following
their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of
the soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound;
and those who are unsound are wanting in sense. " Hence we speak of
those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound. "
On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all
the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem them
good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not
controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in
disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a
mean in the passions, when he says that "every evil, though moderate,
should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately ailing,
is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is
not sound. " For passions are not called "diseases" or "disturbances" of
the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason.
Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply to Objection 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease
in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved
more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it
derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion to
deviate always from the order of natural reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are
contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as
they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of
a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, on
which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the
goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment of
reason: for Sallust says (Catilin. ): "All those that take counsel about
matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship and
pity. " Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act.
Objection 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the
better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye followers of
God, as most dear children. " But "God and the holy angels feel no anger
when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve
the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is
better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to
reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion:
for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately.
Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without passion, than he
who does with passion.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion
of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating
right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven. " But
nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a
passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.
I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is
evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the
goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good
altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by
passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the
sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we
give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive
appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his
passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good is founded on
reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according
as it extends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no one
questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good,
that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of
reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated
above ([1221]Q[17], A[7]), it belongs to the perfection of moral or
human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by
reason.
Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do
it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of
moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of
his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to
Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God":
where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by
"flesh" the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold
relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus,
since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the
moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is
more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason
than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place, consequently:
and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, to wit,
when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the
lower part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that
results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the
intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness.
Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his
reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more
promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a
passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.
Reply to Objection 2: In God and the angels there is no sensitive
appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend
on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in
us.
Reply to Objection 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the
judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either
of the ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or
else it is a sign of its being more grievous.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil
morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend on
reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that
accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing
accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is
good or evil according to its species.
Objection 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from their
object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to its
species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is
good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and that
those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as
hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no
passion is good or evil according to its species.
Objection 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be
found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no
passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a
kind of virtue. " Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that
modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or
evil according to their species.
I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been
said in regard to acts ([1222]Q[18], AA[5],6;[1223] Q[20], A[1])---viz.
that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be
considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural
genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species
of an act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch
as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and
evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to
which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with
reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is base fear; and of
"envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to
the same species as the external act.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the passions in their
natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in
itself. But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and
evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the
appetite, but essentially.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are
themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like
manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other
hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a
tendency to evil, are themselves evil.
Reply to Objection 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does
not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of
estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i. e. the Divine reason,
there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the
soul's passions.
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OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible
passions;
(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;
(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;
(4) The four principal passions.
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Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice
versa?
Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their
objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good,
which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible passions
seem to precede the concupiscible passions.
Objection 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the
irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that
which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of
removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from
enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1; [1224]FP,
Q[81], A[2] ). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover"
(Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions.
Objection 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But
joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic.
iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it
produces pleasure instead of the previous pain. " Therefore the
concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.
On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good,
while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult,
good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good,
it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the irascible.
I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity
than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we
find something relating to movement---e. g. desire; and something
belonging to repose, e. g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible
passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which
belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a
thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous;
whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of
intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we
compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible
passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of
execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions
of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes
it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope. " But the
concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes
between two irascible passions: because it follows fear; since we
become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it
precedes the movement of anger; since the movement of self-vindication,
that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is
looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the
angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every
passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion
denoting rest, viz. either in joy or in sadness.
But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible
passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take
precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something
to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the
irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of
the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort,
and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous
good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain
lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil.
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those
concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and
those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it
is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and
terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object
of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous,
just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is
arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good
absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the
common precedes the proper.
Reply to Objection 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an
accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly
related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the
obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.
Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those
concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object leads to the
same conclusion.
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Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the
concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from
concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are
named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
desire takes precedence of love.
Objection 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a
"uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But
concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing
coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
Objection 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is
sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure
(Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently
love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the
passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved
object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy. " Therefore love
is the first of the concupiscible passions.
I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible
faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of
good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are
naturally before those, the object of which is evil---that is to say,
each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the
reason for shunning the opposite evil.
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the
order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently
the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the
order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of
execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in
the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends
to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that
end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved
to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it.
And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love,
which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or
concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this
order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the
order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended
causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good,
which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as
stated above ([1225]Q[11], A[3], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for "words
are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1).
Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of
love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not
possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De
Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we
love. " Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is
felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.
Reply to Objection 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There
is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other.
This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is
also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so
far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and
an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a
union. This union precedes the movement of desire.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes
love in the order of intention.
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Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible
passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger.
Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief characteristic"
(cf. A[2], OBJ[1]), it seems that anger precedes and surpasses hope.
Objection 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something
arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary
evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or
an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive
simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to
overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to
be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And
consequently it seems that hope does not precede them.
Objection 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the
movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and
despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply
approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and
daring.
On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it
precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the
passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible
faculty.
I answer that, As stated above [1226](A[1]) all irascible passions
imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible
faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere
aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred,
those whose object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or
joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion in
the irascible, as stated above (Q[23], AA[3],4); but the presence of
evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude
to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all
the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation.
And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a
movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose
object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those
whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes
despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is
essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly; whereas
despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent
with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its
tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear,
through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and
despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this---that
as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and
despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises from
the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming.
Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is angry while seeking
vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in
the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it is evident that hope is
the first of all the irascible passions.
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of
generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second;
hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth
and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as
stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire
precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy
precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above.
Reply to Objection 1: Because anger arises from the other passions, as
an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being
more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the arduousness but the good that is
the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards
good more directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even
anger regards something more arduous.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the appetite is essentially and
directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement
from evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is
in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of nature,
which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which
removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining the end.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the
four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] sqq. )
omits hope and puts desire in its place.
Objection 2: Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the
soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation.
The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order
of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the final passions,
will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or
generation, and thus love will be the principal passion. Therefore joy
and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the four
principal passions.
Objection 3: Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is
caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be
reckoned as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and
daring, from being akin to one another.
On the contrary, Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four
principal passions, says:
"Banish joys: banish fears:
Away with hope: away with tears. "
I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal passions.
Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in
them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore
they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5.
Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the
others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement
of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, movement
begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in
respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in
fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in
relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the
future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to
present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future
good, and fear, future evil.
As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future,
they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that
these four are the principal passions, because they are general
passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we
understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of
hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some
future good.
Reply to Objection 2: These are called principal passions, in the order
of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last
passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend
towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any
further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned
a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be
a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply OBJ 3).
Reply to Objection 3: Despair implies movement away from good; and this
is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil;
and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal
passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be
principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion,
because it arises from daring.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1) the
passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the
irascible faculty.
The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall
consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure and
sadness.
Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2)
The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
(2) Whether love is a passion?
(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?
(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love
of concupiscence?
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Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power.
For it is written (Wis. 8:2): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and
have sought her out from my youth. " But the concupiscible power, being
a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not
apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible
power.
Objection 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every passion:
for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the object
beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is
contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is
sadness. " But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed,
fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible power.
Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible
power.
Objection 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural
love. " But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers,
which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the
concupiscible power.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in
the concupiscible power. "
I answer that, Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good
is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the
difference of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an
apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in some
other: and this is called the "natural appetite. " Because natural
things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by
reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author of
their nature, as stated in the [1227]FP, Q[6], A[1], ad 2; [1228]FP,
Q[103], A[1], ad 1,3. And there is another appetite arising from an
apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and not
from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the "sensitive
appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share of liberty, in
so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following
freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And this is
the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the "will. "
Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the
principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the
principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness
with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love":
thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of
its weight and may be called "natural love. " In like manner the
aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is
to say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or
"intellectual" or "rational love. " So that sensitive love is in the
sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual
appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards
good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the
object of the irascible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or
rational love.
Reply to Objection 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and
sadness, not essentially but causally.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the
vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts
of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; since
each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally
suitable to it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether love is a passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is
a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore love is not a passion.
Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine
says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but
rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the
appetite; for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle.
Therefore love is not a passion.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a
passion. "
I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a
natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the
first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement
that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body
both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight,
from being the principle of movement to the place, which is connatural
to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called "natural
love. " In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first,
a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that
object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object.
For "the appetitive movement is circular," as stated in De Anima iii,
10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing
itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves
towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement
ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the
appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else
than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a
movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and
lastly, there is rest which is "joy. " Since, therefore, love consists
in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is
evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is
in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according
as it is in the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement or
action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of
movement in the appetite.
