I shall now submit a written statement of ways and
means for the proposed supply (29), which I ask you to
sanction, if it meets with your approval (30).
means for the proposed supply (29), which I ask you to
sanction, if it meets with your approval (30).
Demosthenese - First Philippic and the Olynthiacs
The future destinies
of Greece turned in large measure on the way in
which Athens was to deal with these conflicting
messages.
The importance of the position of Amphipolis
was obvious. It commanded the passage of the
Strymon, it was the key to the gold-mines of Mount
Pangaeus, and it closed the eastward advance of
Macedonia (cp. Thuc. iv 108, 1). If once it could
be secured by Athens, she could easily retain it by
means of her maritime power in the northern Aegean.
But Athens did nothing. The peril which threatened
Amphipolis was in fact not displeasing to Athens,
but she failed to see that the interests of her unduti-
ful colony were now her own interests also. On the
other hand, she had made peace with Philip only a
year before, and felt indisposed-to mistrust him so
soon. The assurances of Philip were accepted, and
the envoys from Amphipolisdismissed with a refusal.
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? xl PHILIP'S CAPTURE 0F AMPHIPOLIS
Amphipolis held out as long as it could ; at length
a breach was made in the walls, and Philip, with
mm" H; the aid of a party of traitors in
taken 7347' the town, carried it by assault after a
brave resistance. Thenceforward Amphipolis became
one of the bulwarks of Macedonia until the conquest
of that kingdom by Rome.
The fall of Amphipolis alarmed Olynthus, and
the latter sent to negotiate a treaty with Athens.
But Philip's partisans procured the dismissal of the
Olynthian envoys by renewed assurances that he
remained the friend of Athens, and was still disposed
to cede Amphipolis as her rightful possession. They
even suggested that Philip had good reason for
resenting the fact that Athens was retaining the
ancient Macedonian township of Pydna. Accordingly,
negotiations were opened for the exchange of Pydna
against Amphipolis. But, as Pydna was known to be
opposed to the transfer, these treacherous negotiations
were kept a secret (note on 2 g 6 l. 58). The
Assembly, being informed that negotiations, neces-
sarily secret, were proceeding for the acquisition of
Amphipolis, was persuaded to repel the advances of
Olynthus and to continue to regard Philip as its
friend (2 6).
These secret negotiations, of which Athens had
good reason to be ashamed, ended in worse than
nothing. The Olynthians, irritated by their repulse
at Athens, accepted a treaty with Philip (late in
357). He purchased their friendship by immediately
ceding to them the district of Anthemus, lying
between Olynthus and Therma, and by promis-
ing to join them in an attack on the important
Athenian possession of Poteidaea (6 ? 20). Athens
being now distracted by the disasters of the Social
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? P Y DNA AND P0 TEIDAEA xli
\Var, towards the end of 357, Philip attacked Pydna,
which was betrayed by a party of traitors in
the town (I ? 5, 20 63). The siege pydnataken
lasted long enough for an appeal for aid lat? m357 3-C-
to be sent to Athens; but, if any aid was sent, it
arrived too late. Several Athenian citizens captured
at Pydna were sold into slavery, some of them being
afterwards ransomed out of the private resources of
Demosthenes (Plut. ii 851).
Philip next attacked Poteidaea, the key of the
peninsula of Pallene, a source of constant annoyance
to its northern neighbour Olynthus only a few miles
distant at the head of the bay of Torone. The
Olynthians readily aided in the siege (2 ? 14, 23
107 . Though the operations were _
Ee? otractiZd, and thiare was actually a body tafigrieiilian
of Athenians settled in the place, the 356 "'0'
Athenians were slow in sending succours, and their
help arrived too late (4 ? 35, 1 ? 9).
By the capture of Pydna and Poteidaea Philip
had deprived Athens of her hold on the gulf of
Therma ; where, of all the conquests of Timotheus,
her only remaining possession was the town of
Methone. Philip had conciliated the good-will of the
Olynthians, had strengthened his hold on Amphipolis,
and extended his dominion eastward of the Strymon
among the gold-mines of the Pangaean Mount. He
seized the Thracian shore facing the island of Thasos ;
in the interior, he founded a new city called Philippi,
and caused a new gold coin to be struck bearing a
name derived from his own. 1 The fresh source of
wealth now opened to him furnished means for
rewarding his agents in Hellas, and for meeting the
1 Horace Ep. H i 234 rettulit acceptos, regale nomisma,
philippos.
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? xlii SACRED WAR; CAPTURE 0F METHUNE
ever-increasing expense of his military force. In the
summer of 356, not long after the capture of Poteidaea,
Philip received at nearly the same time three
messengers with good news from three different
quarters, one of them telling him of the defeat of
the Illyrians by his general Parmenion ; another,
of the victory of his race-horse at the Olympic
games; and a third, of the birth of a son who was
afterwards renowned as Alexander the Great.
The Social \Var had not yet ended when a new
source of embarrassment arose in the Sacred War,
11,953,,"de which was destined to redound to
355-3465-? ~ the advantage of no other cause than
that of Macedonian aggression. Complaints were
brought before the Amphictyonic Council, first by
Thebes against Sparta for her seizure of the Cadmea
(383), and next by Thebes against the Phocians for
cultivating a portion of the sacred plain of Cirrha.
In punishment for the latter offence the Council
appropriated to Apollo the territory of Phocis. The
Phocians rose in arms under Philomelus, claimed the
control of the Delphic temple, and seized Delphi
itself. A league was formed against them by the
Thebans ; and, with a view to paying mercenaries to
confront the Thebans, Locrians, and Thessalians, part
of the sacred treasures of Delphi were appropriated
by the Phocians. Their leader, Philomelus, being
slain in battle (354), was succeeded by Onomarchus,
who advanced as far as Thermopylae and also
invaded Boeotia, but was repulsed by the Thebans.
In 353 we find Philip attacking Methone. News
of its peril reached Athens, but the expedition
new," taken sent to relieve it-arrived too late. Here,
53 B-u- again, some citizens of Athens were sold
as slaves, to be subsequently ransomed by Demo-
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? PHILIP OHE'OKED AT THERMOPYLAE xliii
sthenes. Having thus secured a seaport which
had never belonged to Macedonia, and was now the
last position held by Athens on the gulf of Therma,
Philip began to extend his power towards the pass
of Thermopylae.
It was the Aleuadae of Larissa who invited him
into Thessaly to aid them against Lycophron, the
despot of Pherae. Lycophron in turn sought help
from Onomarchus and the Phocians. The Phocian
commander defeated Philip in two battles ; but, after
an interval, Philip repaired his forces and returned
to Thessaly, gaining a complete victory over Onom-
archus, who was himself slain in the engagement
(352). He thus put an end to the power of the
Phocians north of Thermopylae, crushed the dynasty
of Pherae, conquered Pherae itself and its port of
Pagasae, and became master of all Thessaly.
He next invaded Thermopylae. But Athens,
which, as usual, had been just too late to aid
Pagasae (4 35), was at last really Themopylae
alarmed and made an unwonted effort, 352 "-
which was carried out with an exceptional prompti-
tude. A strong force arrived in good time, and
Philip withdrew from his proposed attack. In after
days Demosthenes, in combating the general remiss-
ness of his countrymen, often reminded them of this
unwonted act of energy which had been crowned
with complete success (4 17, 18 ? 32, 19 322).
In November 352 Athens received intelligence
that Philip, who had attacked Abdera and Maroneia
on his way towards the Chersonesus, 'Hpa-wv "'5 O;
was besieging 'Hpaiov Teixos. A vote bemgedmv- 2-
was immediately passed at Athens to raise ten
talents in money and to send out a fleet of forty
triremes manned with Athenian citizens (3 ? 4)-
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? xliv PHILIP IN THRA CE
But, before the vote was carried out, rumours
reached Athens that Philip had~fallen ill, and even
that he was actually dead. His military operations
in Thrace were for a time suspended. He attacked
the territory of Olynthus (4 ? 17, 1 ? 13),1 and
Athens contented herself with sending to Thrace a
feeble force under Charidemus--merely ten triremes
without soldiers on board and with only five talents
in money (3 5). ?
Though Philip had been kept out of southern
Greece, yet in Thessaly and to the north of Thermo-
pylae Macedonian ascendency was thenceforward
an indisputable fact. Philip began to inspire alarm
throughout the Hellenic world, and the results of
his generalship and his restless activity were every-
where felt. At three important points, near Amphi-
polis, and also at Methone and Pagasae, Philip's
power now reached the sea, over which Athens had
hitherto enjoyed an almost undisputed control. 3 He
soon contrived to get together a suflicient number
of armed ships and privateers. The navy of Athens
was doubtless far superior, but it was practically in-
effective owing to the languor and remissness of her
citizens. Philip retained possession of the important
port of Pagasae, he levied large contributions on the
insular allies of Athens, and recouped himself for
the costs of war by capturing the merchantmen of
the Aegean. His squadrons descended on the
Athenian islands of Lemnos and Imbros, carrying off
several Athenian citizens as prisoners. They even
reached as far as the south-eastern foreland of Euboea,
where they cut off the corn-ships bound for Athens ;
and lastly they suddenly swooped down upon the
1 Early in 351, ASchaefer ii 562, 1222.
3 October 351. a Rehdantz-Blass p. 15.
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? IV gs 1-3 THE FIRST PHILIPPIO' xlv
historic bay of Marathon and carried off the ' sacred
trireme' on its Way to Delos (4 ? 34, May 352 1).
IV The First Philippic of Demosthenes
In 351 13. 0. the leaders of the peace-party at
Athens, men who deserve the fullest credit for
checking Philip at Thermopylae, proposed no further
measures of energetic resistance to the aggressor.
They shrank from an appeal to the patriotism of
their countrymen. The indispensable duty which
they thus neglected was discharged by a far younger
politician, who was then beneath them in position
and influence, Demosthenes, who, in the thirty-fourth
year of his age, now delivered his First KM. " "Mm
Philippic. It had been usual for '"? " "3351M-
speakers of advanced age and mature experience to
rise first after the subject of the debate had been
announced. But on the present occasion the first
to rise was Demosthenes. His speech was to the
following efi'ect :--
Our customary advisers have so often spoken on the
subject of this debate, that I may be A "pootmov
excused for rising first on the present (ewvrdium)
occasion Introduction-
First of all, you must not despair. The best omen for the
future is your failure in the past, for that failure is
simply due to the fact that you have never a are? seitew.
yet done your duty (2). In the next place, Discussion
there was once a time when you contended with honour against Sparta ; if you take the _S"l"'1_'? ! l ofthe
. . I attuatwn ? ? 2--12.
same precautions now, you have nothing to
fear (3). If any of you deem Philip difficult to conquer,
remember that, if Philip had held that view about others,
he would have accomplished nothing himself. But he
saw that all your strongholds, Pydna, Poteidaea and
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? xlvi THE FIRST PHILIPPIC' IV ? ? 4--23
Methone, were open to him as the prizes of war, and he
has had the energy to secure them (4-43). If you will
once more become your own masters by doing personal
service, you will recover all that you have lost and will
punish Philip (7). His power is not immortal. He has
his enemies in whom he inspires hatred, fear and envy ;
but these feelings find no place of refuge owing to your
own indolence (8). While we dally and delay, he is con-
tinually enlarging his circle and enveloping us on all
sides with his toils (9). When, I ask, will you do your
duty? 'When the necessity arises. ' Why ! the strongest
necessity a free man knows is shame for his cause.
Meanwhile, you lounge about and ask one another the
news of the day 2 could any news he more startling than
that a man of Macedonia is ordering and directing the
affairs of Hellas? (10). As for the rumours of his death,
or illness, they are immaterial : if he dies, you will soon,
by your negligence, create another Philip (11). It is
only by being at the scene of action that you can secure
such prizes as Amphipolis (12).
As to the best and speediest method of making the
necessary preparations, I hold that we must equip and
1117,3695"; keep in reserve a fleet of fifty warships
lifgfizlfgg with transports for 500 horsemen and a
posals ? ? 13-30. sufficient number of vessels; and cztzzens must
serve on board this fleet (16). But, above all, you must
keep in hand a small standing army for offensive opera-
tions, :1 force that shall really belong to the state and obey
its commanders: we must have none of your mercenary
forces that exist only on paper (19). I would have this
small force consist of 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry,
and I would also have one-fourth of each arm citizens,
on short service, to relieve one another, and the rest
mercenaries, with transports for the force, and ten swift
triremes to act as convoy (21--2). At present it is
impossible for us to raise an army fit to meet Philip in
the field ; in the first instance, we must make predatory
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? IV gs 24-33 THE FIRST PHILIPPIC' xlvii
incursions only (23). Citizens must form part of the
force; for it will be remembered, that it was by a
combined force of mercenaries and citizens that you
defeated the Lacedaemonians (in the Corinthian war).
Mercenaries, if left to themselves, are apt to go off on
other business. You must also have citizens on service
to keep a sharp look-out on your commander's conduct
(24). We profess to be at war with Philip; but, as
for your official commanders, apart from a single general
of cavalry, the rest of them stay at home and merely
march in festal array through the market-place. Like
makers of terracotta toys, it is for the market that you
make your officers, and not for war (26). If your cavalry
must he commanded by a foreigner, he ought at least to
be elected by yourselves (27). As to rations for the force,
I reckon the cost at little more than 90 talents for the
year (28). For all other supplies the force must rely on
the spoils of war.
I shall now submit a written statement of ways and
means for the proposed supply (29), which I ask you to
sanction, if it meets with your approval (30).
It will assist your deliberations if you remember that
Philip is constantly managing to get the start of us.
Hence we must carry on the war not mflflfls
with hasty levies from Athens, which (PTOI'Mio)-_
. . . . . Arguments m
Wlll never arrive in time, but With a WWW 01pm.
permanent force on the spot, using as Pom" ? ? 3140-
winter--quarters our islands in the northern Aegean.
From Athens it is difficult to reach those regions either
during the winter, or while the winds are blowing from
the north after n1idsummer,---the seasons usually selected
by Philip for his acts of aggression (31-2). The handling
of the force will rest with the commander appointed by
yourselves and responsible to you. The result will be
that you will prevent Philip's piratical attacks on our
allies, and you will be in security yourselves (33). He
will no longer, as of late, carry off citizens of your own
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? xlviii THE FIRST PHILIPPIO' IV ? ? 34-47
from Lemnos and Imbros, or seize your corn~ships ofi'
Geraestus or your sacred trireme in the bay of Marathon.
At present, you cannot prevent all this (34). In the
arrangement of your festivals, nothing is left unascertained
or undefined, whereas, in your preparations for war, all
is unarranged, unrevised, undefined. We waste in pre-
paration the time required for action; when the crisis
comes, our forces are insufficient ; and, when they are
despatched, they arrive too late (35--6). Philip's arrogant
letter to the Euboeans tells us some unpleasant truths
(37--8). Up to this day you have never made any
proper use of your resources ; and your war with Philip
is like a barbarian's manner of boxing. When he strikes
you, you feel for the blow; you dare not look him in
the face (40). If he is in the Chersonesus, you vote to
send relief there ; if at Thermopylae, the same: you are
always running after his heels, always at his beck and
call (41). But all his activity may be almost regarded as
providential : for his constant encroachments may possibly
arouse you at last (42). I wonder that you do not
notice, with concern and indignation, that a war begun
to chastise Philip has ended in becoming a war for self-
defence. He will not pause in his advance, unless some
one opposes him (43). But, if we make the attempt, the
war will of itself reveal the weak points in his power
(44). Whenever a portion of your own force of citizens joins
in the war, the blessing of Heaven, and the influence of
Fortune, favours the struggle; but, where you merely
send out a general and an empty decree, nothing that
you desire is done. Such an armament makes your
enemies exultant and your allies mortally afraid (45).
It is impossible for all your wishes to be executed by a
general in command of wretched unpaid hirelings (46).
You must make your own citizens soldiers, to be witnesses
of your general's conduct abroad and judges at his audit
on your return. As it is, your generals are constantly
being put on their trial: they die like malefactors by
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? IV gs 48--51 THE FIRST PHILIPPIC' xlix
sentence of the law, and not on the field of battle (47).
As for your gossip about Philip's intentions,. you may
rest assured that he will never allow his real intentions
to be known (48--9). Let us remember only that Philip
is an enemy who keeps us out of our own, and has long
been insulting us ; that the future depends on ourselves ;
and that, unless we are willing to fight him abroad, we
shall perhaps be compelled to fight him at home. The
future cannot fail to be disastrous, unless you do your
duty (50).
As for myself, I have never courted favour, and now
I have spoken my whole mind without reserve. 'What-
ever the consequences may be to lmyself, Q annoy"
I offer my adVIce With the convmtion that (pewme? wt
it will be of advantage to you. I only commwn'
trust that what is for the advantage of us all may
prevail (51).
'Such views,' says Grote, 'were so new, so inde-
pendent of party-sympathies or antipathies, and so
plain-spoken in comments on the past as well as in
demands for the future, that they would hardly have
been proposed except by a speaker instinct with the
ideal of the Periklean foretime, familiar to him from
his study of Thucydides' . . . 'The first Philippic
is alone sufficient to prove, how justly Demosthenes
lays claim to the merit of having "seen events in
their beginnings " (18 ? 246) and given timely warn-
ing to his countrymen ' . . . ' He was not less honest
and judicious in his attempts to fulfil the remaining
portion of the statesman's duty--that of working up
his countrymen to unanimous and resolute enter-
prise ; to the pitch requisite not merely for speaking
and voting, but for acting and suffering, against the
public enemy' (c. 87 viii 61, 67).
The date of the speech is indicated by internal
d
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? 1 DATE OF THE FIRST PHILIPPIU
evidence. Philip's march towards Thermopylae,
Data ofthe his expedition against the Chersonesus
"15,25,113", and his sudden attack on Olynthus are
35113-0- all mentioned in chronological order
(4 ? 17). These events belong to the summer of
352 B. C. and the following winter. The Athenians
sent no aid to the Chersonesus until October 351
(3 ? 5). These considerations point to the spring of
351 as the date of the First Philippic. The practical
proposals made by Demosthenes are appropriate to
the spring of that year; the fleet, which forms part
of those proposals, must clearly be sent to the
northern Aegean before July, when the Etesian
winds began to blow (note on ? 31). It is obviously
later than the speech Against Aristocrates, which
makes no mention of Philip's illness (1 ? 13) during
his second Thracian expedition in the winter of
O]. 107, 1 (352--1 B. C. ), although Thrace is the main
subject of a large portion of the speech. Again, the
First Philippic refers to Philip's sudden attack on
Olynthus (4 ? 17), whereas in the Aristocrates
Olynthus had not yet been attacked by Philip,
though she had already come to terms with Athens.
It was not until the second Thracian expedition that
Philip attacked Olynthus, soon after his recovery.
Hence Dionysius of Halicarnassus is mistaken in
placing the First Philippic earlier than the Aristocrates,
though he is right in assigning both speeches to the
same year, 01. 107, 1 (352-1 B. C. )1
Unhappily, the proposals made by Demosthenes
in the First Philippic were not carried into effect.
1 Ep. ad Ammaeum i 4 p. 725, 14 R, Thirlwall v 374-6,
ASchaefer ii 70--32, Blass III i 3002, Blass-Rehdantz p. 328.
On Dionysius' division of the speech into two parts see ASchaefer
ii 692, and note on 4 ? 30.
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? PHILIP AND 0L YNTHUS 1i
Though the speech had been delivered in the spring
of 351, it was not until October that any force was
sent against Philip, and even then it was only the
mercenary commander Charidemus who was sent to
the Chersonesus with only ten triremes and five
talents in money and no soldiers (3 ? 5).
Meanwhile, at Olynthus, there had been a change
of feeling. Athens had ceased to inspire alarm, but
the vast increase in the power of Philip excited the
liveliest apprehension. His encroachment made it
clear that he would not allow Chalcidice to be held
much longer by free Greek communities. Accord-
ingly, after the great victory of Philip over the
Phocians in Thessaly, in the first half of 352, the
Olynthians had seceded from their alliance with him,
and, before November 352, concluded a peace with
Athens which had every prospect of ripening into an
alliance (23 ? 109). No wonder that a few months
afterwards, at the date of the First Philippic, Philip
had made an inroad into the territory of Olynthus,
though without any vigorous prosecution of war.
Athens, in the meantime, had proposed to Olynthus
a scheme of definite alliance against Philip (1 ? 7,
3 7, 16). But the Olynthians were afraid to be
the first to provoke a contest. Mistrust on both
sides continued for several months, till at length
Philip began serious operations against Olynthus,
apparently towards the middle of 349.
The power of Olynthus depended mainly on her
position as the head of a confederacy including most
of the Greek cities of Chalcidice. Philip began a
series of intrigues in Olynthus and her confederate
cities. He may even have expected to incorporate
the Chalcidic confederacy in his own empire without
serious difficulty and without resorting to real war
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? lii THE FIRST OLYNTHIAG I ? ? 1--3
(1 ? 21). If so, he was disappointed, as there is
ground for believing that he encountered considerable
resistance. Philip at first disclaimed all purposes
injurious to Olynthus (9 11). The Olynthians,
however, sent envoys to Athens proposing alliance
and asking for aid to be sent to Chalcidice. The
Athenians readily accepted the alliance and promised
to send a force to co-operate against Philip.
V The Olynthiacs of Demosthenes
It was after the above recognition of Olynthus
as an ally of Athens that Demosthenes delivered
his three Olynthiac Oratilms, all of them probably
during the last seven months of 349. 1 Their
'oxwgmxbs ,1 chronological sequence has been much
3491M disputed. An abstract of each will
now be given in the usual order, and the order
itself will be considered afterwards.
The First Olynthiac
I feel sure you would give much to know what is
the true policy for the present crisis. You will therefore
A "mommy naturally be willing to listen to counsel,
(ewordimfll whether it has been preconsidered, or
Immuctm' has suggested itself on the spur of the
moment (1).
The present crisis is an eloquent call to action. My
own opinion is that you ought to vote the proposed
3, 6,165"ng succours immediately and make the speediest
possible preparations for despatching them
? ? 2_27. from Athens, and that you should also
15215317332? send envoys to announce the fact and to
mwlim? ? 2-15- watch the course of events (2). There is
real danger that Philip's adroitness and unscrupulousness
1 Grote c. 88 viii 69--75.
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? I ? 4-19 THE FIRST 0L Y N THIA C' liii
may wrest to his own purposes some of our vital in-
terests (3). Yet the very source of his own strength is
really favourable to yourselves. For purposes of war,
his autocracy is a great advantage ; but, for purposes of
peace with Olynthus, it is the very opposite (4). The
Olynthians plainly see that the peril in which they stand
involves the ruin and servitude of their country. They
know what has happened to Amphipolis and to Pydna;
and, like other free states, they mistrust a despotic power
on their borders (5). Now, if ever, you must apply your-
selves vigorously to the war by contributing promptly,
by serving personally, and by leaving nothing undone (6).
Had we acted promptly in the case of Amphipolis,
Pydna, Poteidaea, Methone, Pagasae, we should have found
Philip far easier to attack and less strong than now.
At the present moment, another crisis has come (8, 9).
If we allow Philip to reduce Olynthus, what is to prevent
his marching where he pleases (12)? If it be his
principle always to do more than before, and yours to
apply yourselves vigorously to nothing, the war which
is now at a distance will soon be at our very doors
(14, 15).
At the present crisis I advise you to send succours
in two ways z--firstly, by despatching a body of troops
to Olynthus for the express purpose of pro- II wpe? Qegtg
tecting her confederate towns ; and, secondly, P%fi$'$b_
by employing at the same time another Pom" ? ? 16--20-
force of troops and triremes to act aggressively against
Philip's own territory (17). If you neglect either of
these measures, I fear the expedition will fail. As to
pecuniary resources, you have more money than other
people, but you appropriate it yourselves according to your
good pleasure. Now, if you pay that money to soldiers
on service it is sufficient for the purpose; otherwise,
you need a further fund, or rather you have none at
all to begin with. I shall be asked whether I propose
to apply the festival-fund to military purposes. I propose
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? liv THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC I ? ? 20--28
nothing of the kind (19). I merely say that soldiers
must be raised, and that those who do the work should
receive the pay, whereas your practice is to take the public
money, without any such condition, for the festivals. The
only alternative is an extraordinary war-tax. In any case,
you must act vigorously while you still have the chance
(20).
Let us now consider Philip's present position.
Firstly, he is disappointed at not having carried every-
m "(u-T"; thing before him in Chalcidice (21).
%%? ":}lot),;e Secondly, he is ill at ease about the treacher-
urgency anfithe one condition of Thessaly, on which he
gateway relies for funds (22).
of Greece turned in large measure on the way in
which Athens was to deal with these conflicting
messages.
The importance of the position of Amphipolis
was obvious. It commanded the passage of the
Strymon, it was the key to the gold-mines of Mount
Pangaeus, and it closed the eastward advance of
Macedonia (cp. Thuc. iv 108, 1). If once it could
be secured by Athens, she could easily retain it by
means of her maritime power in the northern Aegean.
But Athens did nothing. The peril which threatened
Amphipolis was in fact not displeasing to Athens,
but she failed to see that the interests of her unduti-
ful colony were now her own interests also. On the
other hand, she had made peace with Philip only a
year before, and felt indisposed-to mistrust him so
soon. The assurances of Philip were accepted, and
the envoys from Amphipolisdismissed with a refusal.
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? xl PHILIP'S CAPTURE 0F AMPHIPOLIS
Amphipolis held out as long as it could ; at length
a breach was made in the walls, and Philip, with
mm" H; the aid of a party of traitors in
taken 7347' the town, carried it by assault after a
brave resistance. Thenceforward Amphipolis became
one of the bulwarks of Macedonia until the conquest
of that kingdom by Rome.
The fall of Amphipolis alarmed Olynthus, and
the latter sent to negotiate a treaty with Athens.
But Philip's partisans procured the dismissal of the
Olynthian envoys by renewed assurances that he
remained the friend of Athens, and was still disposed
to cede Amphipolis as her rightful possession. They
even suggested that Philip had good reason for
resenting the fact that Athens was retaining the
ancient Macedonian township of Pydna. Accordingly,
negotiations were opened for the exchange of Pydna
against Amphipolis. But, as Pydna was known to be
opposed to the transfer, these treacherous negotiations
were kept a secret (note on 2 g 6 l. 58). The
Assembly, being informed that negotiations, neces-
sarily secret, were proceeding for the acquisition of
Amphipolis, was persuaded to repel the advances of
Olynthus and to continue to regard Philip as its
friend (2 6).
These secret negotiations, of which Athens had
good reason to be ashamed, ended in worse than
nothing. The Olynthians, irritated by their repulse
at Athens, accepted a treaty with Philip (late in
357). He purchased their friendship by immediately
ceding to them the district of Anthemus, lying
between Olynthus and Therma, and by promis-
ing to join them in an attack on the important
Athenian possession of Poteidaea (6 ? 20). Athens
being now distracted by the disasters of the Social
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? P Y DNA AND P0 TEIDAEA xli
\Var, towards the end of 357, Philip attacked Pydna,
which was betrayed by a party of traitors in
the town (I ? 5, 20 63). The siege pydnataken
lasted long enough for an appeal for aid lat? m357 3-C-
to be sent to Athens; but, if any aid was sent, it
arrived too late. Several Athenian citizens captured
at Pydna were sold into slavery, some of them being
afterwards ransomed out of the private resources of
Demosthenes (Plut. ii 851).
Philip next attacked Poteidaea, the key of the
peninsula of Pallene, a source of constant annoyance
to its northern neighbour Olynthus only a few miles
distant at the head of the bay of Torone. The
Olynthians readily aided in the siege (2 ? 14, 23
107 . Though the operations were _
Ee? otractiZd, and thiare was actually a body tafigrieiilian
of Athenians settled in the place, the 356 "'0'
Athenians were slow in sending succours, and their
help arrived too late (4 ? 35, 1 ? 9).
By the capture of Pydna and Poteidaea Philip
had deprived Athens of her hold on the gulf of
Therma ; where, of all the conquests of Timotheus,
her only remaining possession was the town of
Methone. Philip had conciliated the good-will of the
Olynthians, had strengthened his hold on Amphipolis,
and extended his dominion eastward of the Strymon
among the gold-mines of the Pangaean Mount. He
seized the Thracian shore facing the island of Thasos ;
in the interior, he founded a new city called Philippi,
and caused a new gold coin to be struck bearing a
name derived from his own. 1 The fresh source of
wealth now opened to him furnished means for
rewarding his agents in Hellas, and for meeting the
1 Horace Ep. H i 234 rettulit acceptos, regale nomisma,
philippos.
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? xlii SACRED WAR; CAPTURE 0F METHUNE
ever-increasing expense of his military force. In the
summer of 356, not long after the capture of Poteidaea,
Philip received at nearly the same time three
messengers with good news from three different
quarters, one of them telling him of the defeat of
the Illyrians by his general Parmenion ; another,
of the victory of his race-horse at the Olympic
games; and a third, of the birth of a son who was
afterwards renowned as Alexander the Great.
The Social \Var had not yet ended when a new
source of embarrassment arose in the Sacred War,
11,953,,"de which was destined to redound to
355-3465-? ~ the advantage of no other cause than
that of Macedonian aggression. Complaints were
brought before the Amphictyonic Council, first by
Thebes against Sparta for her seizure of the Cadmea
(383), and next by Thebes against the Phocians for
cultivating a portion of the sacred plain of Cirrha.
In punishment for the latter offence the Council
appropriated to Apollo the territory of Phocis. The
Phocians rose in arms under Philomelus, claimed the
control of the Delphic temple, and seized Delphi
itself. A league was formed against them by the
Thebans ; and, with a view to paying mercenaries to
confront the Thebans, Locrians, and Thessalians, part
of the sacred treasures of Delphi were appropriated
by the Phocians. Their leader, Philomelus, being
slain in battle (354), was succeeded by Onomarchus,
who advanced as far as Thermopylae and also
invaded Boeotia, but was repulsed by the Thebans.
In 353 we find Philip attacking Methone. News
of its peril reached Athens, but the expedition
new," taken sent to relieve it-arrived too late. Here,
53 B-u- again, some citizens of Athens were sold
as slaves, to be subsequently ransomed by Demo-
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? PHILIP OHE'OKED AT THERMOPYLAE xliii
sthenes. Having thus secured a seaport which
had never belonged to Macedonia, and was now the
last position held by Athens on the gulf of Therma,
Philip began to extend his power towards the pass
of Thermopylae.
It was the Aleuadae of Larissa who invited him
into Thessaly to aid them against Lycophron, the
despot of Pherae. Lycophron in turn sought help
from Onomarchus and the Phocians. The Phocian
commander defeated Philip in two battles ; but, after
an interval, Philip repaired his forces and returned
to Thessaly, gaining a complete victory over Onom-
archus, who was himself slain in the engagement
(352). He thus put an end to the power of the
Phocians north of Thermopylae, crushed the dynasty
of Pherae, conquered Pherae itself and its port of
Pagasae, and became master of all Thessaly.
He next invaded Thermopylae. But Athens,
which, as usual, had been just too late to aid
Pagasae (4 35), was at last really Themopylae
alarmed and made an unwonted effort, 352 "-
which was carried out with an exceptional prompti-
tude. A strong force arrived in good time, and
Philip withdrew from his proposed attack. In after
days Demosthenes, in combating the general remiss-
ness of his countrymen, often reminded them of this
unwonted act of energy which had been crowned
with complete success (4 17, 18 ? 32, 19 322).
In November 352 Athens received intelligence
that Philip, who had attacked Abdera and Maroneia
on his way towards the Chersonesus, 'Hpa-wv "'5 O;
was besieging 'Hpaiov Teixos. A vote bemgedmv- 2-
was immediately passed at Athens to raise ten
talents in money and to send out a fleet of forty
triremes manned with Athenian citizens (3 ? 4)-
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? xliv PHILIP IN THRA CE
But, before the vote was carried out, rumours
reached Athens that Philip had~fallen ill, and even
that he was actually dead. His military operations
in Thrace were for a time suspended. He attacked
the territory of Olynthus (4 ? 17, 1 ? 13),1 and
Athens contented herself with sending to Thrace a
feeble force under Charidemus--merely ten triremes
without soldiers on board and with only five talents
in money (3 5). ?
Though Philip had been kept out of southern
Greece, yet in Thessaly and to the north of Thermo-
pylae Macedonian ascendency was thenceforward
an indisputable fact. Philip began to inspire alarm
throughout the Hellenic world, and the results of
his generalship and his restless activity were every-
where felt. At three important points, near Amphi-
polis, and also at Methone and Pagasae, Philip's
power now reached the sea, over which Athens had
hitherto enjoyed an almost undisputed control. 3 He
soon contrived to get together a suflicient number
of armed ships and privateers. The navy of Athens
was doubtless far superior, but it was practically in-
effective owing to the languor and remissness of her
citizens. Philip retained possession of the important
port of Pagasae, he levied large contributions on the
insular allies of Athens, and recouped himself for
the costs of war by capturing the merchantmen of
the Aegean. His squadrons descended on the
Athenian islands of Lemnos and Imbros, carrying off
several Athenian citizens as prisoners. They even
reached as far as the south-eastern foreland of Euboea,
where they cut off the corn-ships bound for Athens ;
and lastly they suddenly swooped down upon the
1 Early in 351, ASchaefer ii 562, 1222.
3 October 351. a Rehdantz-Blass p. 15.
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? IV gs 1-3 THE FIRST PHILIPPIO' xlv
historic bay of Marathon and carried off the ' sacred
trireme' on its Way to Delos (4 ? 34, May 352 1).
IV The First Philippic of Demosthenes
In 351 13. 0. the leaders of the peace-party at
Athens, men who deserve the fullest credit for
checking Philip at Thermopylae, proposed no further
measures of energetic resistance to the aggressor.
They shrank from an appeal to the patriotism of
their countrymen. The indispensable duty which
they thus neglected was discharged by a far younger
politician, who was then beneath them in position
and influence, Demosthenes, who, in the thirty-fourth
year of his age, now delivered his First KM. " "Mm
Philippic. It had been usual for '"? " "3351M-
speakers of advanced age and mature experience to
rise first after the subject of the debate had been
announced. But on the present occasion the first
to rise was Demosthenes. His speech was to the
following efi'ect :--
Our customary advisers have so often spoken on the
subject of this debate, that I may be A "pootmov
excused for rising first on the present (ewvrdium)
occasion Introduction-
First of all, you must not despair. The best omen for the
future is your failure in the past, for that failure is
simply due to the fact that you have never a are? seitew.
yet done your duty (2). In the next place, Discussion
there was once a time when you contended with honour against Sparta ; if you take the _S"l"'1_'? ! l ofthe
. . I attuatwn ? ? 2--12.
same precautions now, you have nothing to
fear (3). If any of you deem Philip difficult to conquer,
remember that, if Philip had held that view about others,
he would have accomplished nothing himself. But he
saw that all your strongholds, Pydna, Poteidaea and
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? xlvi THE FIRST PHILIPPIC' IV ? ? 4--23
Methone, were open to him as the prizes of war, and he
has had the energy to secure them (4-43). If you will
once more become your own masters by doing personal
service, you will recover all that you have lost and will
punish Philip (7). His power is not immortal. He has
his enemies in whom he inspires hatred, fear and envy ;
but these feelings find no place of refuge owing to your
own indolence (8). While we dally and delay, he is con-
tinually enlarging his circle and enveloping us on all
sides with his toils (9). When, I ask, will you do your
duty? 'When the necessity arises. ' Why ! the strongest
necessity a free man knows is shame for his cause.
Meanwhile, you lounge about and ask one another the
news of the day 2 could any news he more startling than
that a man of Macedonia is ordering and directing the
affairs of Hellas? (10). As for the rumours of his death,
or illness, they are immaterial : if he dies, you will soon,
by your negligence, create another Philip (11). It is
only by being at the scene of action that you can secure
such prizes as Amphipolis (12).
As to the best and speediest method of making the
necessary preparations, I hold that we must equip and
1117,3695"; keep in reserve a fleet of fifty warships
lifgfizlfgg with transports for 500 horsemen and a
posals ? ? 13-30. sufficient number of vessels; and cztzzens must
serve on board this fleet (16). But, above all, you must
keep in hand a small standing army for offensive opera-
tions, :1 force that shall really belong to the state and obey
its commanders: we must have none of your mercenary
forces that exist only on paper (19). I would have this
small force consist of 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry,
and I would also have one-fourth of each arm citizens,
on short service, to relieve one another, and the rest
mercenaries, with transports for the force, and ten swift
triremes to act as convoy (21--2). At present it is
impossible for us to raise an army fit to meet Philip in
the field ; in the first instance, we must make predatory
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? IV gs 24-33 THE FIRST PHILIPPIC' xlvii
incursions only (23). Citizens must form part of the
force; for it will be remembered, that it was by a
combined force of mercenaries and citizens that you
defeated the Lacedaemonians (in the Corinthian war).
Mercenaries, if left to themselves, are apt to go off on
other business. You must also have citizens on service
to keep a sharp look-out on your commander's conduct
(24). We profess to be at war with Philip; but, as
for your official commanders, apart from a single general
of cavalry, the rest of them stay at home and merely
march in festal array through the market-place. Like
makers of terracotta toys, it is for the market that you
make your officers, and not for war (26). If your cavalry
must he commanded by a foreigner, he ought at least to
be elected by yourselves (27). As to rations for the force,
I reckon the cost at little more than 90 talents for the
year (28). For all other supplies the force must rely on
the spoils of war.
I shall now submit a written statement of ways and
means for the proposed supply (29), which I ask you to
sanction, if it meets with your approval (30).
It will assist your deliberations if you remember that
Philip is constantly managing to get the start of us.
Hence we must carry on the war not mflflfls
with hasty levies from Athens, which (PTOI'Mio)-_
. . . . . Arguments m
Wlll never arrive in time, but With a WWW 01pm.
permanent force on the spot, using as Pom" ? ? 3140-
winter--quarters our islands in the northern Aegean.
From Athens it is difficult to reach those regions either
during the winter, or while the winds are blowing from
the north after n1idsummer,---the seasons usually selected
by Philip for his acts of aggression (31-2). The handling
of the force will rest with the commander appointed by
yourselves and responsible to you. The result will be
that you will prevent Philip's piratical attacks on our
allies, and you will be in security yourselves (33). He
will no longer, as of late, carry off citizens of your own
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? xlviii THE FIRST PHILIPPIO' IV ? ? 34-47
from Lemnos and Imbros, or seize your corn~ships ofi'
Geraestus or your sacred trireme in the bay of Marathon.
At present, you cannot prevent all this (34). In the
arrangement of your festivals, nothing is left unascertained
or undefined, whereas, in your preparations for war, all
is unarranged, unrevised, undefined. We waste in pre-
paration the time required for action; when the crisis
comes, our forces are insufficient ; and, when they are
despatched, they arrive too late (35--6). Philip's arrogant
letter to the Euboeans tells us some unpleasant truths
(37--8). Up to this day you have never made any
proper use of your resources ; and your war with Philip
is like a barbarian's manner of boxing. When he strikes
you, you feel for the blow; you dare not look him in
the face (40). If he is in the Chersonesus, you vote to
send relief there ; if at Thermopylae, the same: you are
always running after his heels, always at his beck and
call (41). But all his activity may be almost regarded as
providential : for his constant encroachments may possibly
arouse you at last (42). I wonder that you do not
notice, with concern and indignation, that a war begun
to chastise Philip has ended in becoming a war for self-
defence. He will not pause in his advance, unless some
one opposes him (43). But, if we make the attempt, the
war will of itself reveal the weak points in his power
(44). Whenever a portion of your own force of citizens joins
in the war, the blessing of Heaven, and the influence of
Fortune, favours the struggle; but, where you merely
send out a general and an empty decree, nothing that
you desire is done. Such an armament makes your
enemies exultant and your allies mortally afraid (45).
It is impossible for all your wishes to be executed by a
general in command of wretched unpaid hirelings (46).
You must make your own citizens soldiers, to be witnesses
of your general's conduct abroad and judges at his audit
on your return. As it is, your generals are constantly
being put on their trial: they die like malefactors by
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? IV gs 48--51 THE FIRST PHILIPPIC' xlix
sentence of the law, and not on the field of battle (47).
As for your gossip about Philip's intentions,. you may
rest assured that he will never allow his real intentions
to be known (48--9). Let us remember only that Philip
is an enemy who keeps us out of our own, and has long
been insulting us ; that the future depends on ourselves ;
and that, unless we are willing to fight him abroad, we
shall perhaps be compelled to fight him at home. The
future cannot fail to be disastrous, unless you do your
duty (50).
As for myself, I have never courted favour, and now
I have spoken my whole mind without reserve. 'What-
ever the consequences may be to lmyself, Q annoy"
I offer my adVIce With the convmtion that (pewme? wt
it will be of advantage to you. I only commwn'
trust that what is for the advantage of us all may
prevail (51).
'Such views,' says Grote, 'were so new, so inde-
pendent of party-sympathies or antipathies, and so
plain-spoken in comments on the past as well as in
demands for the future, that they would hardly have
been proposed except by a speaker instinct with the
ideal of the Periklean foretime, familiar to him from
his study of Thucydides' . . . 'The first Philippic
is alone sufficient to prove, how justly Demosthenes
lays claim to the merit of having "seen events in
their beginnings " (18 ? 246) and given timely warn-
ing to his countrymen ' . . . ' He was not less honest
and judicious in his attempts to fulfil the remaining
portion of the statesman's duty--that of working up
his countrymen to unanimous and resolute enter-
prise ; to the pitch requisite not merely for speaking
and voting, but for acting and suffering, against the
public enemy' (c. 87 viii 61, 67).
The date of the speech is indicated by internal
d
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? 1 DATE OF THE FIRST PHILIPPIU
evidence. Philip's march towards Thermopylae,
Data ofthe his expedition against the Chersonesus
"15,25,113", and his sudden attack on Olynthus are
35113-0- all mentioned in chronological order
(4 ? 17). These events belong to the summer of
352 B. C. and the following winter. The Athenians
sent no aid to the Chersonesus until October 351
(3 ? 5). These considerations point to the spring of
351 as the date of the First Philippic. The practical
proposals made by Demosthenes are appropriate to
the spring of that year; the fleet, which forms part
of those proposals, must clearly be sent to the
northern Aegean before July, when the Etesian
winds began to blow (note on ? 31). It is obviously
later than the speech Against Aristocrates, which
makes no mention of Philip's illness (1 ? 13) during
his second Thracian expedition in the winter of
O]. 107, 1 (352--1 B. C. ), although Thrace is the main
subject of a large portion of the speech. Again, the
First Philippic refers to Philip's sudden attack on
Olynthus (4 ? 17), whereas in the Aristocrates
Olynthus had not yet been attacked by Philip,
though she had already come to terms with Athens.
It was not until the second Thracian expedition that
Philip attacked Olynthus, soon after his recovery.
Hence Dionysius of Halicarnassus is mistaken in
placing the First Philippic earlier than the Aristocrates,
though he is right in assigning both speeches to the
same year, 01. 107, 1 (352-1 B. C. )1
Unhappily, the proposals made by Demosthenes
in the First Philippic were not carried into effect.
1 Ep. ad Ammaeum i 4 p. 725, 14 R, Thirlwall v 374-6,
ASchaefer ii 70--32, Blass III i 3002, Blass-Rehdantz p. 328.
On Dionysius' division of the speech into two parts see ASchaefer
ii 692, and note on 4 ? 30.
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? PHILIP AND 0L YNTHUS 1i
Though the speech had been delivered in the spring
of 351, it was not until October that any force was
sent against Philip, and even then it was only the
mercenary commander Charidemus who was sent to
the Chersonesus with only ten triremes and five
talents in money and no soldiers (3 ? 5).
Meanwhile, at Olynthus, there had been a change
of feeling. Athens had ceased to inspire alarm, but
the vast increase in the power of Philip excited the
liveliest apprehension. His encroachment made it
clear that he would not allow Chalcidice to be held
much longer by free Greek communities. Accord-
ingly, after the great victory of Philip over the
Phocians in Thessaly, in the first half of 352, the
Olynthians had seceded from their alliance with him,
and, before November 352, concluded a peace with
Athens which had every prospect of ripening into an
alliance (23 ? 109). No wonder that a few months
afterwards, at the date of the First Philippic, Philip
had made an inroad into the territory of Olynthus,
though without any vigorous prosecution of war.
Athens, in the meantime, had proposed to Olynthus
a scheme of definite alliance against Philip (1 ? 7,
3 7, 16). But the Olynthians were afraid to be
the first to provoke a contest. Mistrust on both
sides continued for several months, till at length
Philip began serious operations against Olynthus,
apparently towards the middle of 349.
The power of Olynthus depended mainly on her
position as the head of a confederacy including most
of the Greek cities of Chalcidice. Philip began a
series of intrigues in Olynthus and her confederate
cities. He may even have expected to incorporate
the Chalcidic confederacy in his own empire without
serious difficulty and without resorting to real war
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:09 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. 31175009758841 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? lii THE FIRST OLYNTHIAG I ? ? 1--3
(1 ? 21). If so, he was disappointed, as there is
ground for believing that he encountered considerable
resistance. Philip at first disclaimed all purposes
injurious to Olynthus (9 11). The Olynthians,
however, sent envoys to Athens proposing alliance
and asking for aid to be sent to Chalcidice. The
Athenians readily accepted the alliance and promised
to send a force to co-operate against Philip.
V The Olynthiacs of Demosthenes
It was after the above recognition of Olynthus
as an ally of Athens that Demosthenes delivered
his three Olynthiac Oratilms, all of them probably
during the last seven months of 349. 1 Their
'oxwgmxbs ,1 chronological sequence has been much
3491M disputed. An abstract of each will
now be given in the usual order, and the order
itself will be considered afterwards.
The First Olynthiac
I feel sure you would give much to know what is
the true policy for the present crisis. You will therefore
A "mommy naturally be willing to listen to counsel,
(ewordimfll whether it has been preconsidered, or
Immuctm' has suggested itself on the spur of the
moment (1).
The present crisis is an eloquent call to action. My
own opinion is that you ought to vote the proposed
3, 6,165"ng succours immediately and make the speediest
possible preparations for despatching them
? ? 2_27. from Athens, and that you should also
15215317332? send envoys to announce the fact and to
mwlim? ? 2-15- watch the course of events (2). There is
real danger that Philip's adroitness and unscrupulousness
1 Grote c. 88 viii 69--75.
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? I ? 4-19 THE FIRST 0L Y N THIA C' liii
may wrest to his own purposes some of our vital in-
terests (3). Yet the very source of his own strength is
really favourable to yourselves. For purposes of war,
his autocracy is a great advantage ; but, for purposes of
peace with Olynthus, it is the very opposite (4). The
Olynthians plainly see that the peril in which they stand
involves the ruin and servitude of their country. They
know what has happened to Amphipolis and to Pydna;
and, like other free states, they mistrust a despotic power
on their borders (5). Now, if ever, you must apply your-
selves vigorously to the war by contributing promptly,
by serving personally, and by leaving nothing undone (6).
Had we acted promptly in the case of Amphipolis,
Pydna, Poteidaea, Methone, Pagasae, we should have found
Philip far easier to attack and less strong than now.
At the present moment, another crisis has come (8, 9).
If we allow Philip to reduce Olynthus, what is to prevent
his marching where he pleases (12)? If it be his
principle always to do more than before, and yours to
apply yourselves vigorously to nothing, the war which
is now at a distance will soon be at our very doors
(14, 15).
At the present crisis I advise you to send succours
in two ways z--firstly, by despatching a body of troops
to Olynthus for the express purpose of pro- II wpe? Qegtg
tecting her confederate towns ; and, secondly, P%fi$'$b_
by employing at the same time another Pom" ? ? 16--20-
force of troops and triremes to act aggressively against
Philip's own territory (17). If you neglect either of
these measures, I fear the expedition will fail. As to
pecuniary resources, you have more money than other
people, but you appropriate it yourselves according to your
good pleasure. Now, if you pay that money to soldiers
on service it is sufficient for the purpose; otherwise,
you need a further fund, or rather you have none at
all to begin with. I shall be asked whether I propose
to apply the festival-fund to military purposes. I propose
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 05:09 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. 31175009758841 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? liv THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC I ? ? 20--28
nothing of the kind (19). I merely say that soldiers
must be raised, and that those who do the work should
receive the pay, whereas your practice is to take the public
money, without any such condition, for the festivals. The
only alternative is an extraordinary war-tax. In any case,
you must act vigorously while you still have the chance
(20).
Let us now consider Philip's present position.
Firstly, he is disappointed at not having carried every-
m "(u-T"; thing before him in Chalcidice (21).
%%? ":}lot),;e Secondly, he is ill at ease about the treacher-
urgency anfithe one condition of Thessaly, on which he
gateway relies for funds (22).
