No More Learning

? ? 1 12
Tht First Alcibiades ; or,
Socrat. W e are already agreed that it is not that bywhichwecanmakeanyofthosethingsthatbe longtousbetter:Butthatbywhichwecanmeli orate our selves. Alcib. 'Tis true.
Socrat. CartweknowtheArtofmakingShoesbet ter,ifwedon'tfirstknowwhat aShoeis-,orthe ArtoftakingcareofRings, ifwe don'tknow first what a Ring is>
Alcib. N o that can't be.
? S. CanwethenknowwhatArtitisthatmakesusbet
t e r ; i f w e d o n ' t first k n o w w h a t w e o u r s e l v e s a r e > Alcib. Tis absolutely impossible. Socrat. Butisitaveryeasythingtoknow ones
self-, and was it some ignorant Person that Avrote thatTrivialPrecepton theGate ofJpoltisTemple at D e / p h o s > O r is it o n t h e c o n t r a r y a t h i n g o f g r e a t d i f ficulty,andwhichisnotgiventoeveryMan ?
Alcib. Formy part, Socrates-,Ihaveoftenthonght itwasgiventoallMen :andyetithasoftenfeem'd to m e to be a thing of very great difficulty.
S o c B u t , A l c i b i a d e s ; L e t i t b e e a s y o r d i f f i c u l t ? , ' t i s still c e r t a i n t h a t w h e n o n c e w e k n o w it ? w e i m e d i a t e -
lyandeasilyknowwhatcarewe oughttotakeofour selves. Whereaswhileweareignorantofit-,we(hall nevercome to theknowledg oftheNature ofthis Care.
Alcib. That isbeyondalldoubt.
S o c r a t . C o m e o n t h e n -, b y w h a t m e a n s s h a l l w e f i n d
outthe*Essenceofthingstospeak universally? By * ThisuniversalEssenceofthings,dvrorottvrQ,istheDivine Intelligence, the Eternal Idea, the only cause of Beings, and the
singular Essence, <<Woiva<ti', is the thing form'd on this Idea. Sothattherearctwowaysofknowingone'sself:Thefirstisto know the Divine Intelligence; and to descend from that to the Soul, by foil wing the designs which the All-wife Creator had in creatingit:andtheotherissimplytoknow theSoulasaBeing different Ircm the Eo . y, and to be convine'd that that alone is theMan. Thefirstisthemostperfect:HoweverSocratesleaves t h i s a t p r e s e n t -, a n d a p p l i e s h i m s e l f o n l y t o t h e s e c o n d , w h i c h i s more easy : but he afterwards resumes it, and from the knowledg of the Soul raises Alcibiadis to the Consideration of the Eternal Idea, inwhichalone, asinthetrueLightaManmay perfectlyfee bhSoul,andallthatbelongstoit. ThewholeArgumentofSo-
train isworthy the most solid Theology.
this
? ? Os thefeatureo Man. 21 j thiswe shallsoonfindwhatweareourselves$andif
weareignorantofthisEssencewe shallalwaysbe ignorant of our selves.
Alcib. You fay right.
Socrat. Follow m e close then I conjure you in the NameofGod:Withwhomareyounowdiscours ing,isitwithsomeotherpersonorwithme?
Alcib. N o 'tis with you.
Soc. And. Iinlikemanner discoursewithnonebut You,'TisSocratesthatnow speaks,and ALibiadesthat hears. Alcib. True.
Soc. 'TisbyusingWords thatSocratesspeaksjforto speak, and to use words is one and the fame thing.
Alcib. 'Tis Ib without doubt.
Socrat. ArenotHewho usesathing,andtheThing which he uses, different ?
Alcib. Howdoyoufay>
Socrat. ForExample, a Shoemaker, w h o usesKnives, LastsandotherTools, cutswithhisKnifeandis d ifferent from the Knife with which he cuts. A Man thatplaysontheHarpis notthe famething
with the Harp on which he plays. Alcib. Tharscertain.
Socrat. ThisiswhatIask'dyoujustnow, whe ther he that uses a thing, and the thing he uses, al ways seem to you two different things ?
Alcib. So they seem to me.
Socrat. *ButtheShoemakerdoesnotonlyusehis Tools, but his Hands too.
Alcib. That's beyond all doubt.
Socrat. He also uses his Eyes.
Alcib. That's certain.
Socrat. We areagreedthathewhousesathing,is
always different from the thing he uses.
Alcib. That is agreed between us.
Soc. So thattheShoemaker and theHarper are some o-
ther thing than theHands andEyes which they both ule. Alcib. That's plain.
*Hedesignstoprove,th. ittheBcdy isrolessanInstrument of the Soul, than ill the other remoter Instruments which ituses.
P 3 Socrat.
? ? % 14
7 he Virji Alcibiades ? or,
Socrat. M a n uses his Body.
Alcib. Who doubtsit?
Soc Thatwhichusesathing-isdifferentfromthe
thing which isused.
Alcib. Yes.
Soc. Man thenisadifferentthingfromhisBody ?
Alcib. I believe it.
Socrat. WhatisManthen?
"v. ^Alcib. Indeed, Socrates, I can't tell.
Joe. You canatleasttellme thatMan isthatwhich
usestheBody.
Alcib. That's true.
Socrat. Is there any thing that uses the B o d y besides
the Soul ?
Alcib. N o nothing else.
Socrat. 'Tisthatthatgoverns.
Alcib. Most certainly.
$oc. Ibelieve there'snoMan but isfore'd to confess - Alcib. What ?
Soc, That Man isoneofthesethreethings, either
theSoulortheBody, ortheCompoundof'emboth.
Now weareagreedthatManisthatwhichcommands
the Body.
Alcib. That we are.
Soc. What isMan then? Does theBody command
Itself? No. Forwehavesaid'tistheManthatcom mandsthat. SpthattheBodyisnottheMan.
Alcib. So it seems.
Socrat. Isitthen theCompound that commands theBody? and(hallthisCompoundbetheMan ?
Alcib. That may be.
Socrat. Nothingless. Forsinceoneof'emdoes not command as we have already said, * 'tisimpos sible they both (hould command together.
Alcib. 'Tis very true.
Socrat. SeingthenneithertheBody, northeCom-
* For besides thar this is a Contradiction; feeing that which does ho: comrh n>l would then co martd ? , there isno: a third
tilingforthesetwotocomnundtogether. If heSouland the Bodybothcommand, whatisit,thatisundertheirCommand?
1 pound
? ? OftheNaturevfMan, gj?
ponnd ofSoulandBody aretheMan ;'tisabsolute
lynecessaryeitherthatMan isNothingatall,"or thattheSoulalone istheMan. ,', ? -. ? ,/"\". '?
Alcib. Most certainly.
<SW>vtf. Shall I demonstrate to you yet hapie . clearly that the Soul alone is the. Man ?
Alcib. No, Iprotest,thisissufficientlypfoy'dVH*
Socrat. We havenotyetsoundedthisTrufdiwith all theAccuracy itdeserves jbut 'tissufficiehtlvorov'd, andthatmay serve. ? We (hallsound41farther,,and
penetrateitbetter^whenwe havefound6)d. what
w e just n o w quitted, because it requir'd. a longer In vestigation. ? ','. '. '? '? ',V. , ^ .
Alcib. Whatisthat?
S o c r a t . ' T i s w h a t w e l a i d b u t n o w ? , t h a t . ' t i s ' n e
cessarywewouldfirstseektoknow the:very. essence ofthingstospeak universally;insteadofwhichwe havestop'dtoexamine and know thefesJenceofa particularthing;andperhapsthatis'sufficieht, For wecanfindnothingthatismoreproperly, 'andpre cisely our selves than our Souls.
Alcib. That's very certain.
Socrat. So then this isa principle very well esta blished that when you and! converse together,- by
makinguleofDiscourses"tismy Soulthatconver seswithyours. Andthisiswhatwesaidjustnow, thatSaeratesspeakstoAlcibiades, byaddressing WordsnottotheBodywhichisexpos'dtomy Eyes, but to Alcibiaies himself, w h o m I do . not see, that is, to his Soul. \
Alcib. This,isevident.
Socrat. H e then w h o requires us to k n o w our selves, requiresus. toknowourSouls. ? ;
Alcib. I beiieve it. . ? t
Socrat. HewhoknowshisBodyonly,knowsthat which belongs to him, but does not know himself. Thus a Physician as a Physician, does not know him-j self, -nor 3. Wrestling-Master as a Wrestling-Masters noraHusband-ManasaHusband-Man. Allpersons of these- Professions, and those of the like Nature,
P4 are
? ? 't16* The Virfl Alcibiades ; or,
are so far from knowing themselves, * that they do notknow particularlywhatbelongsto'em-,andtheir Artmakes 'emadheretowhatisyetmoreforreign to'emthanthatwhichproperlybelongsto'em.
For they know only those things that appertain to the Body, and by which they cure, and preserve it in health.
Alcib. Allthisisverytrue.
Socrat. Ifthereforeitbea pieceofWisdomto knowone'sself,ThereisnoManofanyof'these Professionswho iswifebyhisArt.
Alcib. IamofthefameMind.
_ Soc. + A n d 'tis for this reason all these Arts appear
vile and sordid, and consequently unworthy of a good Man.
Alcib. Tis very true.
Socrat. WellthentoreturntoourPrinciple,eve ryManthattakescareofhisBody,takescareof that which belongs to him, and not of himself.
Alcib. I grant it.
Socrat. Every M a n that loves Riches, loves neither himself, northatwhichbelongstohim, butlovesa thingwhichisyetmoreforreigntohim, And which only refpeffs that wbich belongs to him,
Alcib. I think so.
T-oiohovr
>>niytohnr affirm, that he who employs his Care to heap up
Socrat. Then accordingtothisprincipleone may
MtTrtifmx Riches, does not manage his Affairs well. istomanage Akib. 'Tismostcertainlyso.
msjqars Socrat. IfanyonehasbeeninlovewiththeBody
of stkibiades, that Person has not been in love with
* Physicians and Masters of Exercise indeed apply themselTcj to know the Body ; but they know it only to a certain degree: For as Jtippocrates fays in his Treatise of the Ancient Art of M e dicine, the\ content themselves with knowing what Man is, with respect to what he tats and drinks, and to the Exercises he per forms: md <<hatmayoccurtohimfrom*nyofthesethings. So thattheyonly! nowsomecertainQualiiesofMatter,butnotthe Essenceofit. 'TismoreejsytoknowtheEflehceof theSoul, than th-t of the Body.
f TheonlyArttrulyworthyofa,goodMan, isthatofknow ing, and kb&unng to pertfctiqnate Himself. *
Alct,
? ? OftheNatureofMan. 117
Alcibiaies\ but with one of those things that apper tain to him.
Alcib. Iam convinc'dofit.
Socrat*ThatPersonwho isinlovewithAlcibiades^ must be one that is in love with his Soul.
Alcib. That'sanecessaryConsequenceofyourPrin ciple.
Socrat. And thisistheReasonthatthatPerson who only loves your Body, retires when the beauty, of this Body begins to decay.
Alcib. 'Tis true.
Socrat. But one that loves your Soul never retires * while you make any progress in Vertue $ aud eve ry day make your self still a better Man.
Alcib. That isvery likely.
Socrat. A n d this likewise is the reason that I a m the only Person that does not leave you, but conti nue constantaftertheflowerofyourBeautyisfaded, and all your Admirers are retir'd.
Alcib. You very much oblige me, Socrates; and I entreat you not to abandon me.
Socrat. Labour then with ailyourMight tobecome B/ btutiftil every day more and more beautiful. *"mtm
Alcib. I'lllabour to become so.
Socrat. As Matters stand with you, 'tiseasy to judg that Akib'iades^ the Son of C/inias, never had nor has yet more than only one true Lover ; and this
wt*"w*
faithfulLover isthetlovelySocrates^theSonof Sophroniscus and fhenareta.
jilcib. 'Tisvery true.
Socrat. ButdidyounottellmewhenImetyou5 that I prevented you but one moment, and that you badadesigntospeakto. me, toknowwhyIwas the only Person that had not left you.
Alcib. I told you so, and 'tis true.
S o c r a t . Y o u n o w k n o w t h e r e a s o n o f i t ? , ' t i s b e -
*SothisPassageoughttobetranslated. ThelacinInterpre ters have made a mistake here, nptremembring "saunas often the Significationofthepresenttime. JH. LtFeyre.
+ He jokes on his own deformity and low Birth, which ha op poses to the Beauty, fine Air, and Nobility of his Rivals.
cause
? ? z 1 8 T h e F i r s t A l c i b i a d e s ,? o r ,
cause I always lov'd you, and others only lov'd what belongstoyou. TheBeautyofthatwhichbelongs to you begins to decay, whereas your own Beauty
M m dt. begins to flourish. And if you don't suffer your formed,that feif t0 be corrupted by the People, and become ldoT. 'm' moredeform'd:I'llnotforsakeyou. aslongasI
live. But I very much fear, since you are so much * in love with the applause of the People, that you'll destroy your selfby this unhappy Dispo sition, as it has been the Lot of a. great many of ourbestAthenians. ForthePeopleoftheMagna-
was<<w<<f nimousEreBheushaveafairoutside. Butweought thefir[l tolookinto'em,andremovethatfaircovering Kingsof whichhides'emfromus. Believemethen,Mi- Athens, biades,andtakethePrecautionsIgiveyou,
Akib. What Precautions>
Socrat. To exercise your self, and be instructed inwhatisnecessarytobeknown beforeyouinter meddle with the Affairs of the Common-wealth ; that you may be always fortifiedwith an Antidote; and that you may not perish in so contagious, and fatal a Conversation.
Akib. Allyousayisverywell,Socrates-,Buten deavour to explain to me, by what means we may be able to take care of our selves.
Socrat. That'sdonealready, forfirstofallm haveprov'dwhatMan is,andthatwithgoodreason; becausewe fear'd, ifthatwere notwell known, we should take care of something quite different from our selves, without perceiving it. W e afterwards a g r e e d t h a t w e o u g h t t o t a k e c a r e o f o u r S o u l s -, t h a t this is the only end w e should propose to cur selves; and that the care of the Body, and of that which ap pertainstoit,asRiches, shouldbelefttoothers.
Alcib. Can any one deny this ?
*HewassoinlovewiththePeople,thatheAidnotceaseto bestow Gifts on 'em, and to presen: 'era with Shows and Plays. Pinturebspeaksota. Distribution of Money, which he made when
hewasveryyoung,andcarriedQuailesinhisBosom.
Somt-
? ? Of the Nature of Man. 2 19
Socrat. H o w can we understand thisTruth * more clearly, and evidently? Forwhen we havesetitin itstrueLight, 'tisverycertain,thatwe ihallknow
our selves perfectly well : Let us then in the N a m e
o f t h e G o d s e n d e a v o u r t o u n d e r s t a n d w e l l t h e P r e c e p t K n o w thy
ofDelpbos,ofwhichwehavealreadyspoken. For/*//, we don't yet well comprehend all its torce.
Alcib. What force ? What do you mean >
Socrat. F m going to communicate to you what I take to be the meaning of that Inscription, and the Preceptitincludes. 'Tishardlypossibletomake you understand itby any other companion than this,
whichistakenfromthesight. Ale. Howdoyoulay? Socrat. ObservewellwhatIlay. IfthisInscrip
tionspoketotheEye, asitspeakstotheMan, and s h o u l d l a y t o it, K n o w t h y s e l f . : w h a t m o u l d w e think it required of it > Should w e not think it re quired it to look upon it self in something in which the Eye might see it self>
Alcib. That'sevident.
Soc. Let us then seek for this thing, in which, as w e behold our selves in it,w e m a y seebo. h it,and our selves. Alcib. We may seeourselvesinaLooking-glass,
and in other Bodies of the like kind. Socrat. Youfayverywell. Isnottherelikewise some little part of the Eye, which has the fame
Effect as a Looking-glass?
Alcib. Yes certainly there is.
Socrat' You have observed then, that as often
as you look into an Eye, you see your own Image, as in a Glass, in that little part which is calfd by a Name which signifies a t Baby, be-
* M. Le Fevre had reason to fay, that e#*f-3*Ve0s ought to be tead for oy<<j;*'raTct, andtl'at it should ;e transited more clearly. Socrates is now going to resume the Proposi ion he had quitted, whichwastoknowrheuniversalEssenceofthingsyandallheis going to fay on this Subject i: incomparably fine.
f There is a taukin the Greek, which I wonder to find left there ; for whar lensehas Hojucpw here, which signifies thetopof a. thing? ftoug'itto be read yjitnv char, is the Apple of the Eye. *>>{>>> p'lpillc, a Poppec or Baby.
cause
? ? xio
Tk FirstAlcibiades;or, cause 'tis the Image of him that looks on it.
Akib. - 'Tis true.
Sccrat. Then an Eye, that it may fee into ano ther Eye, ought to look into this part of it,which is the most beautiful, and which alone has the fa culty of seeing.
Akib. Who doubts it>
Sacra. For if he should fix his Looks on any other part of the Body of Man, or on any other Object, unless it were like this part of the Eye which fees, itwould fee nothing of it self.
Akib. You are in the right.
Socrat. Therefore an Eye that would fee it self, ought to look into another Eye, and into that tsart of the Eye, in which all the Venue of it rendcs, that is, the Sight.
'
Akib. That's certain.
inwhatwe Socrat. My dearAlcibiades,isitnotjustsowith
jhouldlok, the Soul ? Ought it not to look into the Soul to uponour feeitself,andintothat*partoftheSoul,inwhich riV"Zr al*itsVertues, that5st0% Wisdom>ising. ne-
ftiZivili. rated? orelseought ftnot t0behold itselfinlome other thing yet more noble, which this part ot the. Soul in some sort resembles >
Akib. So methinks, Socrates.
Socrat. But can we find any part of the Soul which is more divine than that in which Knowledg and Wiidom reside.
Akib. No certainly.
*ThatisintoourIntellectorUnderstanding. Weought strictlytoremark withwhatWisdom Socrateshereexprefl'shim self. In speaking of the Soul of Man, he acknowledges, that Wisdom is iogenerated in it, that is, that it comes to it from without; foritisnotitsownLight;thisisdcriv'dintoitfrom
God. AndafewLineslower,ashespeaksoftheDivineIntelli gence,hedoesnotchoosetosay,inwhichKnowledgandWisdom areingenerated;butsayshe,inwhichtheyreside, becauseitis Wisdomitself,andtheSourceofWisdom. TheLatinInterpre ters, who did not pry into this Accuracy of Socrttes have spoiled
aHtheb;autyofthesePassagesbytheirTranslations. MoreAtten tion and Fidelity aught to have been used in handling Theological Truths.
Sfcraj.
? ? OftheNatureofMan. 211 Socrat. Tis then in thisSoul, of which oursis? <<*>>*/***?
buttheImage,'tisinthisdivineSoulweoughtto^ "f behold our selves, and to contemplate the whole c<<<w*ww Deity in it, that is to lay God, and Wisdom ; ii'ourftivts we would know our selves perfectly. mil.
Alcib. This seems very probable.
Socrat. To know one'sselfisWildom ,aswe have both agreed.
Alab. 'Tistrue.
Socrat. While we don't know our selves, nor are wise wich this Wisdom ? , we can't know either our
Goods or our Evils \ for it is not possible that he who knows noc Akibiades, should know that what belongs co Alcihioies, does indeed appertain to him.
Alcib. 'Tis impossible.
Socrat. 'Tis only by knowing our selves that we
come to know that that which belongs to us does in
deedappertaintous. Andifwe knownotwhatbe l o n g s t o u s ? , n e i t h e r s h a l l w e k n o w w h a t h a s r e s e n t
ence to the things that belong to us,
Alcib. I conless. it.
Socrat. We thereforejustnowdidilltoagree,
that there are some Persons, who tho' they don't know themselves, yet know that which belongs to them, withoutknowingthethingsthatappertainto thatwhichbelongstothem. ForthesethreeKnow ledges ; to know one's self, to know that which be longstoone; andtoknowthethingsthatappertain
4tothatwhichbelongstoone, arelink'dtogether, theyaretheActionof thefameMan, andtheEffect of one and the fame Art.
Alcib. 'Tis very likely.
Socrat. Now thatMan thatknowsnotthethings thatbelongtohimself neitherwillknowthosethat belong to others.
AlciB. That's evident.
Socrat.