No More Learning

Few princes have realised the imperial dignity in a more marked
degree than this parvenu, or have done more to maintain the ancient
CH. i. 1—2


## p. 4 (#34) ###############################################

Justinians Aims [527-565
Roman traditions. From the day when he first mounted the throne of
Constantine, he claimed in its full extent the ancient Roman Empire.
Sovereign of a State in which Latin was still the official tongue, and which
was still styled the " Roman Empire11 in official documents, Justinian was
less a Byzantine than the last of the Roman Emperors. The mast
essential part of his imperial duty seemed to him to be the restoration of
that Roman Empire whose fragments the barbarians had divided, and
the recovery of those unwritten but historic rights over the lost West
which his predecessors had so carefully maintained. The thought of the
insignia of the Empire, symbols of supreme authority, which, since they
had been stolen by Gaiseric in the sack of Rome had been held by the
barbarians, inflicted an intolerable wound upon his pride, and he felt
himself bound, with the help of God, to reconquer "the countries
possessed by the ancient Romans, to the limits of the two oceans,11 to
quote his own words.
Justinian considered himself the obvious overlord of the barbarian
kings who had established themselves in Roman territory, and thought
he could withdraw, if he wished, the delegated imperial authority which
they held. This fact was the keystone of the arch of his foreign policy,
while at the same time the imperial idea lent inspiration to his domestic
government. The Roman Emperor was practically the law incarnate,
the most perfect representative of absolute power that the world has
known. This was Justinian's ideal. He was, according to Agathias the
historian, "the first of the Byzantine Emperors to shew himself, by
word and deed, the absolute master of the Romans. 11 The State, the
law, the religion; all hung on his sovereign will. In consequence of the
necessary infallibility attaching to his imperial function, he desired
equally to be lawgiver and conqueror, and to unite, as the Roman
Emperors had done, the majesty of law to the lustre of arms. Anxious
to wield the imperial power for the good of the Empire, he wished to be
a reformer; and the mass of Novellae promulgated by him attests the
trouble that he took to secure good administration. Desirous, further-
more, of surrounding the imperial position with every luxury, and of
adorning it with all magnificence, he determined that the trappings of
the monarchy should be dignified and splendid. He felt the need of
resounding titles and pompous ceremonial, and counted the cost of
nothing that might increase the splendour of his capital. St Sophia
was the incomparable monument of this imperial pride. >
But since the time of Constantine, the Roman Emperor could not
claim to be heir of the Caesars only: he was also the champion of religion,
and the supreme head of the Church. Justinian gladly received this
part of his inheritance. Of a disposition naturally devout, and even
superstitious, he had a taste for religious controversy, a considerable
amount of theological knowledge, and a real talent for oratory. He
therefore willingly gave his time to the consideration of matters relating


## p. 5 (#35) ###############################################

527-56ft] Justinian's Aims
to the Church. His decisions were as unhesitating on matters of dogma
as on matters of law and reform, and he brought the same intolerant
despotism to bear on church government as on everything else. But
above all, as Emperor, he believed himself to be the man whom the Lord
had specially chosen and prepared for the direction of human affairs, and
over whom the divine protection would ever rest throughout his life.
He considered himself to be the most faithful of servants to the God
who aided him. If he made war, it was not simply in order to collect
the lost provinces into the Roman Empire, but also to protect the
Catholics from their enemies the Arian heretics, "persecutors of souls
and bodies. "" His military undertakings had therefore something of the
enthusiasm of a Crusade. Furthermore, one of the chief aims of his
diplomacy was to lead the heathen peoples into the Christian fold.
Missions were one of the most characteristic features of the Byzantine
policy in the sixth century. By their means Justinian flattered himself,
according to a contemporary, that he "indefinitely increased the extent
of the Christian world. " Thus the Emperor allied care for religion with
every political action. If this pious ardour which consumed the prince
had its dangers, in that it quickly led to intolerance and persecution,
yet it was not without grandeur; since the progress of civilisation
always follows evangelisation. As champion of God, as protector of
the Church, and as ally and dictator to the Papacy, Justinian was the
great representative of what has been called "Caesaropapism. "
From the day when, under Justin's name, he originally undertook the
government of the Empire, these ideas inspired Justinian's conduct.
His first wish was to come to some agreement with Rome in order to
end the schism. The announcement made to Pope Hormisdas, of the
accession of the new sovereign, together with the embassy despatched
soon afterwards to Italy to request that peace might be restored, made
it dear to the pontifical court that they had but to formulate their
requests in order to have them granted. The Roman legates proceeded
to Constantinople, where because of Justinian's friendship they received
a splendid welcome, and obtained all that they demanded. The
Patriarch John with the greater number of Eastern prelates in his train
signed the profession of orthodoxy brought by the papal envoys. The
names of Acacius and other heretical patriarchs with those of the
Emperors Zeno and Anastasius were effaced from the ecclesiastical
diptychs. After this the Pope was able to congratulate Justinian upon
his real for the peace of the Church, and the energy with which he
sought to restore it. In consequence of the prince's attitude, and at
the pressing request of the pontifical legates, who remained in the East
for eighteen months, the dissentient Monophysites were vigorously
pereecuted throughout the Empire. In Syria the Patriarch Severus of
Antioch was deposed and anathematised by the Synod of Tyre (518),


## p. 6 (#36) ###############################################

6 Last Years of Theodoric [518-526
and more than fifty other bishops were soon afterwards chased from
their sees. For three years (518-521) the persecution continued. The
chief heretical meetings were scattered, the convents closed, the monks
reduced to flight, imprisoned or massacred. However, the orthodox
reaction lacked strength to attack Egypt, where the exiles found shelter,
while the Monophysite agitation was secretly continuing to spread its
propaganda in other parts of the East, and even in the capital itself.
None the less, Rome had scored a decisive victory, and the new dynasty
could celebrate a success which did much to establish it securely.
But it was not only religious zeal that moved Justinian. From this
time he fully realised the political importance of an agreement with the
Papacy. Without doubt the new government set itself, at any rate at first,
to maintain friendly relations with the Ostrogothic kingdom of Italy.
On 1 January 519 Theodoric's son-in-law and heir Eutharic became
Consul as colleague of the Emperor Justin; and there was a constant
interchange of ambassadors between Constantinople and Ravenna during
the years that followed. From this moment, however, Justinian dreamed
of the fall of the Ostrogothic power, and watched events in Italy with
great attention.
In spite of the prudent toleration that Theodoric had always
maintained, neither the senatorial aristocracy nor the Roman Church
had forgotten their enmity towards a master obnoxious as a barbarian
and an Arian. Naturally they turned their gaze ceaselessly upon
Byzantium, where an orthodox prince was striving to restore the faith
and to defend religion. In 524 Theodoric, exasperated by the intercourse
which he suspected, had Boethius and Symmachus arrested and con-
demned to death, and furthermore in the following year sent Pope John
on an embassy to Constantinople to protest against the Emperor's harsh
measures towards those who would not conform. Justinian was ready
to treat the matter in a way calculated to further his own ends. A
solemn and triumphant reception was prepared for the pontiff" in the
capital. The Emperor, with the populace, sallied forth twelve miles to
meet the first pope who had ever entered Constantinople. Sovereign
honours were lavished upon him, and Justin desired to be reconsecrated
by his hands. When on his return Theodoric, misdoubting the success
of the embassy, arrested and imprisoned the unhappy John, who died
miserably in his prison soon afterwards (18 May 526), no Italian could
help comparing this heretical and persecuting prince with the pious
basileus who reigned in the East. It followed that when death claimed
Theodoric in his turn (Aug. 526) and when the regent Amalasuntha
was involved in difficulties, the population of the peninsula was intoxi-
cated by hope, and only waited an opportunity for changing their master,
and eagerly cried out for a deliverer.
Meanwhile Justinian's domestic policy successfully overcame the
obstacles which, one after another, threatened the security of the new


## p. 7 (#37) ###############################################

505-565] T/ie Persian War
government. Vitalianus was a rival not to be despised, and at first he was
tactfully treated. He was given the title of magiiter militum praesentalis
and became Consul in 520. He appeared to be all-powerful in the palace,
and afterwards Justinian got rid of him by means of an assassin. The
Greens were partisans of Anastasius. Against them the Emperor raised
up for himself a devoted party amongst the Blues, to whom every
privilege, and every opportunity to harm their foes was given throughout
the Empire. Further, to please the mob of the capital, great largess
was distributed. The imperial Consulate in 521 was unrivalled for the
magnificence of its shows, which cost 288,000 solidi, more than £200,000
sterling to-day. In this way Justinian became popular amongst all
classes in Byzantium, with the Church by his orthodoxy, with the senate
by his flattery, and with the aristocracy and the populace. Feeling
thus secure, he launched forth on his career. At this time his con-
nexion with Theodora began, which ended in a somewhat scandalous
marriage. Neither Justin nor Byzantium appear to have been much
shocked by it. To please his nephew the Emperor conferred on his
mistress the high dignity of patrician; he then, in order that the
marriage might take place, abrogated the law by which alliances between
senators and high officials and actresses were forbidden. When, in 527,
Justinian was officially associated in the Empire, Theodora was crowned
with him on Easter Day in the church of St Sophia, by the hands of
the patriarch. When Justin died (1 Aug. 527), his nephew succeeded
him without opposition. He was to reign over the Roman Empire in
the East for nearly forty years (527-565), and to begin to realise the
ambitious dreams which had long filled his soul.
II.
However, during the first years of his reign, before beginning to
carry out the far-reaching plans which he had made, or even thinking of
the reconstruction of the Roman Empire on its ancient plan, Justinian
had to deal with numerous and serious difficulties.
The Persian war, stopped by the peace of 505, had again broken out
in the last months of Justin's reign. The old king Kawad declared war,
worried by the encroaching policy of Byzantium, and specially menaced
by the increase of Roman influence during Justin's reign in the
Caucasus region among the Lazi, the Iberians and even the Huns, and
furthermore indignant at the attack that the imperialists attempted on
Nisibis. The vassals of the two States were already at daggers drawn on
the Syrian and Armenian frontiers, and in Mesopotamia open war was
on the point of breaking out. To Justinian this was specially annoying,
since it necessitated the mobilisation of the greater part of the Byzantine
army under Belisarius, its most famous general, on the Asiatic frontier.
The Emperor had only one care, which was not to proceed to extremities,


## p. 8 (#38) ###############################################

8 Justinian's Ministers [517—532
and to end the war as soon as possible. Not realising, perhaps not
wishing to realise, the greatness of the Eastern peril, and anxious only to
free his hands for the conquest and liberation of the West, he shewed
himself ready to make the largest concessions in order to heal the breach.
In this way the peace of 532 was concluded, and gave to Justinian the
disposition of his entire forces.
At home, other difficulties presented themselves. The special favour
shewn by the government to the Blues, led to a dangerous agitation in
the capital. Sure of imperial support the Blues took all possible licence
against their adversaries without let or hindrance from police or justice.
Thus injured, the Greens opposed violence to violence, and since they
were still attached to the family of their old protector Anastasius, whose
nephews Hypatius and Pompeius dwelt in Constantinople, their opposition
soon took on a political and dynastic complexion. This resulted in a
perilous state of unrest in the capital, still further aggravated by the
deplorable condition of the public administration.
At the beginning of his reign Justinian had chosen as ministers
Tribonian, nominated in 529 Quaestor of the Sacred Palace, and John
of Cappadocia, invested in 531 with the high post of praetorian praefect
in the East. The former was a remarkable man. An eminent jurist,
and the greatest scholar of the day, he was unfortunately capable of any
action for the sake of money, and as ready to sell justice as to amend
the law. The latter was a skilful administrator, and a real statesman,
but harsh, unscrupulous, greedy and cruel. Nothing could check him in
his efforts to tear from the subjects the money needed for the Emperor's
ceaseless expenditure, and although he won the favour of the prince by
his great skill in finding resources, his harshness and exactions made him
otherwise universally detested. Under such ministers, the officials in
every rank of the government service thought only of imitating their
chiefs. The rapacity of the government ruined the taxpayers, while the
partiality of the administration of justice resulted in a general feeling of
insecurity. Under the weight of these miseries the provinces, according
to an official document, had become " quite uninhabitable. 11 The country
was depopulated, the fields deserted, and complaints poured into
Constantinople from all sides against "the wickedness of the officials. 11
An incessant stream of immigration brought a host of miserable folk to
the capital, adding new elements of disorder and discontent to those
already there. From these causes sprang, in January 532, the dangerous
rising known as the Nika Riot, which shook Justinian's throne.
The Emperor was hissed at in the Circus (11 Jan. 532), and the
disturbance spread beyond the boundaries of the hippodrome, and soon
reached all quarters of the city. Greens and Blues made common cause
against the hated government, and soon to the accompaniment of cries
of NIKA (Victory) the crowd was tearing at the railings of the imperial
palace, demanding the dismissal of the praefect of the city, and of the


## p. 9 (#39) ###############################################

532] The Nika Riot 9
two hated ministers, Tribonian and John of Cappadocia. Justinian
gave way, but too late. His apparent weakness only encouraged the
mob, and the revolt became a revolution. The fires kindled by the
rebels raged for three days, and destroyed the finest quarters of the
capital. Justinian, almost destitute of means of defence, shut himself
up in the palace without attempting to do anything, and the obvious
result followed. As might have been expected, the mob proclaimed
emperor Hypatius, the nephew of Anastasius, and, swelled by all
malcontents, the insurrection became a definite political movement.
"The Empire,'" wrote an eye-witness, "seemed on the verge of its fall. '"
Justinian, in despair of curbing the riot which had continued for six
days, lost his head, and thought of saving himself by flight. He had
already ordered to load the imperial treasure in ships. It was then that
Theodora rose in the Council, to recall to their duty the Emperor and
ministers who were abandoning it. She said " When safety only remains
in flight still I will not flee. Those who have worn the crown should
not survive its fall. I will never live to see the day when I shall no
longer be saluted as Empress. Flee if you wish, Caesar; you have
money, the ships await you, the sea is unguarded. As for me, I stay. I
hold with the old proverb which says that the purple is a good winding-
sheet" This display of energy revived the courage of all. As soon as
discord had been sown among the rebels by a lavish distribution of gold,
Belisarius and Mundus with their barbarian mercenaries threw them-
selves on the crowd collected in the hippodrome. They gave no quarter,
but continued their bloody work throughout the night (18 January).
More than 30,000 corpses according to one computation, more than
50,000 according to other witnesses, flooded the arena with blood.
Hypatius and Pompeius were arrested, and both executed the next
morning. Other condemnations followed, and, thanks to the frightful
bloodshed which ended this six days' battle, order was established once
more in the capital, and thenceforth the imperial power became more
absolute than ever.
In spite of every difficulty the imperial diplomacy never lost sight of
any event that might further the accomplishment of Justinian's plans.
Occurrences in the Vandal kingdom in Africa and the Ostrogothic
kingdom in Italy were carefully watched for the profit of the Empire.
In Africa, as in Italy, everything was in favour of the imperial restoration.
The Roman people, governed by barbarian kings, had kept alive the
memory of the Empire, and looked impatiently to Constantinople for
a deliverer. According to Fustel de Coulanges "they persisted in
regarding the Roman Empire as their supreme head; the distant power
seemed to them to be an ancient and sacred authority, a kind of far-off
providence, to be called upon as the last hope and consolation of the
anfortunate. " They felt still more keenly, perhaps, the misery of being
ruled by heretical sovereigns. In Africa, where rigorous persecution of
s


## p. 10 (#40) ##############################################

10 Justinian s Designs in the West [523-533
Catholics had long been carried on, everyone hoped for the end of the
"horrible secular captivity. '" In Italy, Theodoric's prolonged toleration
had reconciled no one to him, and his ultimate severity exasperated his
Roman subjects. A dumb agitation held sway in the West, and the
coming of the Emperor's soldiers was eagerly awaited and desired.
What is more surprising is that the barbarian kings themselves
acknowledged the justice of the imperial claims. They also still
reverenced the Empire whose lands they had divided, they thought of
themselves as vassals of the basilem, received his commands with respect
and bowed before his remonstrance. Hilderic, who had reigned over the
Vandal kingdom since 523, was proud to proclaim himself the personal
friend of Justinian. The two interchanged presents and embassies, and
the Emperor's head replaced that of the king on the Vandal coinage.
Amalasuntha, who had governed Italy since 526 in the name of her son
Athalaric, made it her first care to recommend the youth of the new
prince to Justinian's kindness: and the prince himself begged for the
imperial favour the day after his accession. He recalled with pride the
fact that his father had been adopted by Justin, and that he could
therefore claim kinship with the basileus. So great was the prestige of
the Roman Empire throughout the West that even the opponents of
the imperial policy, such as Witigis or Totila, were willing to acknowledge
themselves the Emperor's vassals.
Justinian realised this: he also realised the essential weakness of the
barbarian kingdoms—their internal dissensions, and inability to make
common cause against a foe. Therefore from the first he took up the
position of their overlord, waiting until circumstances should furnish him
with an opportunity for more active interference. This occurred, as far
as Africa was concerned, in 531. At this time a domestic revolution
substituted Gelimer, another descendant of Gaiseric, for the weakly
Hilderic. Hilderic at once appealed to Byzantium, begging the Emperor
to support the cause of his dethroned vassal. Byzantine diplomacy at
once interfered in the haughtiest manner, demanding the restoration, or
at any rate the liberation of the unhappy king, and evoking the decision
of the dispute to the Emperor's court. Gelimer alone, perhaps, among
the barbarian princes, recognised the fact that concessions, however large,
would only postpone the inevitable struggle. Therefore he flatly refused
the satisfaction required, and replied to the Byzantine demands by
redoubled severity towards his political and religious enemies. The
struggle had begun, and all was ready for the imperial restoration.
III.
Besides holding several trump cards, Justinian possessed another
advantage in the redoubtable war machine constituted by the Byzantine
army with its generals. The imperial army, in Justinian's time, was


## p. 11 (#41) ##############################################

533] The Army 11
formed essentially of mercenaries, recruited from all the barbarians of the
East and West. Huns, Gepids, Heruls, Vandals, Goths and Lombards,
Antae and Slavs, Persians, Armenians, men from the Caucasus, Arabs
from Syria, and Moors from Africa served in it side by side, glad to sell
their services to an Emperor who paid well, or to attach themselves to
the person of a celebrated general, to whom they would form the guard
and staff (inratrrriaTai). The greater number of these soldiers were
mounted. Only the smallest part of the troops consisted of infantry
which, being heavily equipped, was more notable for solidity than
mobility. The cavalry, on the other hand, was excellent. Barbed with
iron, armed with sword and lance, bow and quiver, the heavy regiments
of Byzantine cuirassiers (cataphracti) were equally formed to break the
enemy's ranks from a distance by a flight of arrows, or to carry all before
them by the splendid dash of their charge. This cavalry generally
sufficed to win battles, and the old regiments, proved as they were
by a hundred fights, and matchless in bravery, made incomparable
soldiers.
However, in spite of these qualities, the troops were not lacking in
the faults inseparable from mercenary armies. Convinced that war
should maintain war, and owning no fatherland, they pillaged merci-
lessly wherever they went. With an insatiable greed of gold, wine and
women, and with thoughts always bent on plunder, they easily slipped
the yoke of discipline, and imposed unheard-of conditions on their
generals. Even treason was not below them, and more than one victory
was lost by the defection of the troops on the field of battle, or their
disorganisation in the rush for plunder. After a victory, things were
still worse. Only anxious for leisure in which to enjoy their ill-gotten
gains, they were deaf to entreaty, and the efforts of the generals to
restore discipline frequently led to mutiny in the camp. The officers, of
whom the greater number were barbarians, were not much more to be
trusted than the men. They also were greedy, undisciplined and jealous
of each other, always a willing prey to intrigue and treason.
Certainly the faulty organisation of the army explained some of these
failings. The commissariat was badly arranged, pay generally in arrears,
while the treasury officials and the generals sought, under various
pretexts, to cheat the soldiers. Thus if the army was to be of any use,
everything really depended on the Commander-in-Chief. Justinian had
the good fortune to find excellent generals at the head of his armies;
they were adored by the troops, and able, by a mixture of skilful energy
and firm kindness, to keep them in hand and lead them where they
wished. Such were the patrician Germanus, the Emperor's nephew, who
commanded in turn in Thrace, Africa and Syria; Belisarius, the hero of
the reign, conqueror of the Persians, Vandals and Ostrogoths of Africa
and Italy, and the last resource of the Empire in every peril; and
lastly the eunuch Narses, who concealed under a frail appearance
e


## p. 12 (#42) ##############################################

12 Conquest of Africa [533
indomitable energy, prodigious activity and a strong will. He was a
wonderful general, who completed the ruin of the Goths, and chased the
Alemannic hordes from Italy.
The numerical force of the imperial armies must not be exaggerated.
Belisarius had scarcely 15,000 men with which to destroy the Vandal
kingdom, he had still less in his attack on the Ostrogothic realm, only
10,000 or 11,000; and altogether 25,000 to 30,000 sufficed to break
down the Ostrogothic resistance. The weakness of this force added to
the faulty organisation explains the interminable length of Justinian's
wars, specially during the second half of the reign. It also illustrates
the fundamental vice of the government, which was the perpetual
disproportion between the end aimed at, and the means employed for its
accomplishment. Lack of money always led to reduction of expenses
and curtailment of effort.
However, when in 583 the chance of intervention in Africa presented
itself, Justinian did not hesitate. Grave doubts as to the success of the
distant enterprise were felt at court, and in the Council John of Cappadocia
pointed out its many perils with a somewhat brutal clearness. Before
this opposition, added to the critical condition of the treasury and the
discontent of the soldiers, Justinian himself began to waver. On the
other hand, the African bishops, surrounded as they were with the halo
of martyrdom, revived the prince's nagging zeal and promised him victory.
As soon as it became known that imperial intervention was probable,
risings against the Vandal domination broke out in Tripolitana and
Sardinia. Furthermore, Justinian could not hesitate long, because of
the strength of the motives impelling him forward, his burning desire of
conquest, and his absolute trust in the justice of his claims and in divine
protection. He himself took the initiative in making the final decision,
and events proved that in doing so he was wiser than his more prudent
ministers.
The African campaign was equally rapid and triumphant. On
22 June 533 Belisarius embarked for the West. Ten thousand infantry,
and from five to six thousand cavalry were shipped in five hundred
transport-ships, manned by twenty thousand sailors. A fleet of war-ships
(dromons) manned by two thousand oarsmen convoyed the expedition.
The Vandals could offer little resistance to these forces.
During the last
hundred years they had lost in Africa the energy which had once made
them invincible; and in spite of his boasted bravery, their king Gelimer
proved himself, by his indecision, sensitiveness, lack of perseverance and
want of will power, the worst possible leader for a nation in danger.
The neutrality of the Ostrogoths, which Byzantine diplomacy had secured,
gave Belisarius every chance of fair play. Early in September 533 he
was able to disembark unhindered on the desert headland of Caput-Vada.
He was well received by the African people, and marched on Carthage,


## p. 13 (#43) ##############################################

533-546] Conquest of Africa 13
while the imperial fleet turned back, skirting the coast in a northerly
direction. On September 13 the battle of Decimum was fought, and
shattered Gelimer's hopes by a single blow, while Carthage, the chief
town and only fortress in Africa, fell into the conqueror's hands un-
defended. In vain the Vandal king recalled the forces which he had
detached for service in Sardinia, and endeavoured to regain his capital.
He was forced to raise the blockade, and on the day of Tricamarum
(mid-Dec. 533) the Byzantine cavalry again overcame the impetuosity of
the barbarians. This was the final and decisive defeat. All Gelimer's
towns, his treasures and family fell in turn into Belisarius1 hands. He
himself, hemmed in in his retreat on Mt Pappua, was forced to surrender,
on receiving a promise that his life should be spared, and that he should
be honourably treated (March 534). In a few months, contrary to all
expectations, a few cavalry regiments had destroyed Gaiseric's kingdom.
Justinian, always optimistic, considered the war at an end. He
recalled Belisarius, who was decreed the honours of a triumph; while he
himself, somewhat arrogantly, assumed the titles of Vandalicus and
Africanus. Furthermore he adorned the walls of the imperial palace
with mosaics representing the events of the African war, and Gelimer
paying homage to the Emperor and Theodora. He hastened to restore
Roman institutions in the conquered province, but at this very moment
the war broke out afresh. The Berber tribes had passively allowed the
Vandals to be crushed; now it was their turn to rise against the imperial
authority. The patrician Solomon, who had succeeded Belisarius,
energetically put down the revolt in Byzacena (534) but he was unable
to break through the group of Aures in Numidia (535): and soon the
discontented troops, dissatisfied with a general who was strict and
demanded too much from them, broke into a serious mutiny (536).
Belisarius was obliged to leave Sicily for Africa at once, and arrived just
in time to save Carthage, and defeat the rebels in the plains of
Membressa. To complete the pacification it was found necessary to
appoint the Emperor's own nephew Germanus governor of Africa.
After performing prodigies of courage, skill and energy, he succeeded at
last in crushing out the insurrection (538). But four years had been
lost in useless and exhausting struggles. Only then was the patrician
Solomon, invested a second time with the rank of Governor-General,
able to complete the pacification of the country (539). By a bold march
he forced Iabdas, the strongest of the Berber princes and the great chief
of the Aures, into submission. He overran Zab, Hodna and Mauretania
Sitifensis, forcing the petty kings to acknowledge the imperial suzerainty.
Under his beneficent rule (539-544) Africa once more experienced peace
and security. His death occasioned another crisis. The revolted Berbers
made common cause with the mutinous soldiers. A usurper Guntharic
murdered Areobindus, the Governor-General, and proclaimed his own
independence (546). Africa seemed on the point of slipping from the


## p. 14 (#44) ##############################################

14 Invasion of Italy [533-548
Empire, and the fruits of Belisarius1 victories were, to quote Procopius'
phrase, "as completely annihilated as though they had never existed. 11
This time again, the energy of a general, John Troglita, overcame
the danger. After two years of warfare (546-548) he beat down the
Berber resistance, and restored, permanently at last, the imperial
authority.
After fifteen years of war and strife Africa once more took her place
in the Roman Empire. Doubtless it was not the Africa that Rome had
once possessed, and of which Justinian dreamed. It included Tripolitana,
Byzacena, Proconsularis, Numidia, and Mauretania Sitifensis. The Byzan-
tines also occupied Sardinia, Corsica and the Balearic Isles, all dependencies
of the African government. But with the exception of several scattered
places on the coast, of which the most important was the citadel of
Septem (Ceuta) at the Pillars of Hercules, the whole of West Africa
broke away from Justinian. Mauretania Caesariensis and Mauretania
Tingitana always remained independent, joined to the Empire only by
the loosest bond of vassalage. However, within these limited boundaries
the work of the imperial restoration was not in vain. It is clear that
Justinian's reign left a lasting impress on the lands drawn once more
into the bosom of the monarchy.
The conquest of Africa by Belisarius furnished Justinian with a
splendid base for operations in Italy, where he hoped to carry out his
ambitious projects. As had been the case in Africa, circumstances
provided him, in the nick of time, with a pretext for interference in the
peninsula.
Amalasuntha, daughter of Theodoric, and regent for her young son
Athalaric, had soon succeeded in arousing the discontent of her barbarian
subjects by her Roman sympathies. Made uneasy by the growing
opposition, she put herself into communication with the Court at
Constantinople, begging of the imperial benevolence an asylum in the
East should she need it. In return she offered all facilities for therfleet
of Belisarius to revictual in Sicily in 533, and finally allowed herself to
be persuaded to propose to Justinian the conquest of Italy (534). The
death of the young Athalaric (October 534) further complicated the
princess's position. In order to strengthen it, she made her cousin
Theodahad her partner; but a few months later a national revolution,
like that which had hurled Hilderic from the throne in Africa, deposed
Theodoric's daughter. Amalasuntha was imprisoned by order of her
royal husband, and soon afterwards assassinated (April 535). As had
been the case in Africa, but even with increased imperiousness, the
Byzantine diplomacy demanded satisfaction for the arrest of a princess
allied to and protected by Justinian. Her death proved to be the
wished-for casus belli.
As if to complete the remarkable parallelism presented by Italian


## p. 15 (#45) ##############################################

536-639] Conquest of Italy 15
and African affairs, Theodahad the Gothic king was, like Gelimer,
impressionable, changeable, unsteady, unreliable, and, in addition, a
coward. After the first military demonstrations he offered to Justinian's
ambassador to cede Sicily to the Empire, to acknowledge himself as a
vassal of Byzantium, and, soon afterwards, he proposed to abandon the
whole of Italy in return for a title and a money settlement. Against
such a foe Belisarius had no formidable task, specially as in view of the
Ostrogothic war, Byzantine diplomacy had secured the Frankish alliance,
just as in the African war it had secured that of the Ostrogoths. From
the end of 535, while a Byzantine army was concentrated in Dalmatia,
Belisarius landed in Sicily, and occupied it, hardly needing to strike a blow.
Theodahad was terrified, and "already feeling the fate of Gelimer about
to descend on him11 offered any concessions. Then, on hearing that
Belisarius had been obliged to return to Africa, he once more plucked
up courage, imprisoned the imperial ambassadors, and flung himself
desperately into the struggle. Little good it did him. While one of
Justinian's generals conquered Dalmatia, Belisarius crossed the Strait
of Messina (May 536) and, greeted by the Italian people as a liberator,
in turn seized Naples and occupied Rome unopposed (10 December 536).
However, the Ostrogoths still possessed more energy than the Vandals.
On the news of the first disasters, even before the fall of Rome, they
dethroned the incapable Theodahad, and elected as king Witigis, one of
the bravest of their warriors. With considerable skill the new king
checked the march of the Franks by the cession of Provence; then,
having united all his forces, he proceeded with 150,000 men to-besiege
Belisarius in Rome. For a whole year (March 537—March 538) he
exhausted himself in vain efforts to take the Eternal City. Everything
miscarried before the splendid energy of Belisarius. Meanwhile, another
Roman army, which had landed at the beginning of 538 on the Adriatic
coast, was occupying Picenum. Greek troops, at the request of the
Archbishop of Milan, had made a descent on Liguria, and seized the
great town of northern Italy. Witigis, in despair, decided to abandon
Rome. The triumph of the imperialists seemed assured, and to finish it
Justinian despatched another army under Narses into Italy. Unfor-
tunately, Narses' instructions were not only to reinforce Belisarius, but
also to spy upon him; and the misunderstanding between the two
generals soon paralysed all operations. They confined themselves to
saving Rimini, which was attacked by Witigis; but allowed the Goths
to reconquer Milan, and Theudibert's Franks to pillage the valley of the
Po on their own account. At last in 539 Justinian decided to recall
Narses, and to leave to Belisarius alone the task of conducting the war.
It was brought rapidly to a successful end. Pressed on every side,
Witigis threw himself into Ravenna, and the imperialists besieged it
(end of 539). For six months the Ostrogoths held out, counting on a
diversion to be caused by the Persians in the East, the intervention of the


## p. 16 (#46) ##############################################

16 Mismanagement in Italy [540-544
Lombards, and the defection of the Franks. When they saw themselves
abandoned by all, they determined to negotiate with Justinian (May 540).
The Emperor leaned towards conciliation and shewed himself inclined to
allow Witigis to keep possession of Italy north of the Po. But for the
first time in his life Belisarius refused to obey, and declared that he
would never ratify the convention. He wished for complete victory,
and hoped to destroy the Ostrogothic kingdom as completely as the
Vandal. Then occurred a strange episode. The Goths suggested that
the Byzantine general, whose valour they had proved, and whose
independence they had just ascertained, should be their king, Witigis
himself consenting to abdicate in his favour. Belisarius pretended to
fall in with their plans in order to obtain the capitulation of Ravenna;
then he threw off all disguise and declared that he had never worked for
anyone but the Emperor.
Once more, as he had done in Africa, Justinian in his optimistic
mind considered the war at an end. Proudly he assumed the title of
Gothicus, recalled Belisarius, reduced the troops in occupation; and in
the Ostrogothic kingdom, now transformed into a Roman province, he
organised a system of purely civil administration. Once more the issue
disappointed his anticipations. The Goths indeed soon recovered them-
selves. Scarcely had Belisarius gone, before they organised resistance to
the north of the Po, and instead of Witigis (a prisoner of the Greeks)
they chose Hildibad for king. The tactlessness of the Byzantine adminis-
tration, which was both harsh and vexatious, still further aggravated the
situation; and when, at the end of 541, the accession of the young and
brilliant Totila gave the barbarians a prince equally remarkable for his
chivalrous courage and unusual attractiveness, the work of the imperial
restoration was undone in a few months. For eleven years Totila was
able to hold at bay the whole force of the Empire, to reconquer the
whole of Italy, and to ruin the reputation of Belisarius.
He passed the Po with only five thousand men. Central Italy was
soon opened to him by the victories of Faenza and Mugillo. Then,
while the disabled Byzantine generals shut themselves up in forts,
without attempting any joint action, Totila skilfully moved towards the
Campania and southern Italy, where the provinces had suffered less from
the war, and would consequently yield him supplies. Naples fell to him
(543), and Otranto, where the imperialists revictualled, was besieged.
At the same time Totila conciliated the Roman population by his
political skill; he made war without pillaging the country, and his
justice was proverbial. Justinian felt sure that no one except Belisarius
was capable of dealing with this formidable foe. Therefore he was
ordered back to Italy (544). Unfortunately there were just then so
many calls on the Empire, from Africa, on the Danube, and from the
Persian frontier, that the great effort needed in the peninsula was not
forthcoming. The imperial general, bereft of money, and almost


## p. 17 (#47) ##############################################

544-552] Totila 17
without an army, was practically powerless. Content with having
thrown supplies into Otranto, he fortified himself in Ravenna and stayed
there (545). Totila seized the posts by which communications were
maintained between Ravenna and Rome, and finally invested the Eternal
City, which Belisarius was unable to save when he finally roused himself
from his inaction (17 December 546). Totila then tried to make
peace with the Emperor, but Justinian obstinately refused to negotiate
with a sovereign whom he held to be nothing but an usurper. Therefore
the war went on. Belisarius did manage to recover Rome, evacuated
by the Gothic king and emptied of its inhabitants, and clung to it
successfully in spite of all Totila's hostile attacks (547). But the
imperial army was scattered over the whole of Italy, and quite powerless;
and reinforcements, when they did arrive from the East, could not
prevent Totila from taking Perusia in the north and Rossano in
the south. Belisarius, badly supported by his lieutenants, and driven
to desperation, demanded to be recalled (548). When his request
was granted he left Italy, where his glory had been so sadly tarnished.
"God himself,'" wrote a contemporary, "fought for Totila and the
Goths. "
In fact, no resistance to them remained. Belisarius had been gone
for less than a year when the imperialists were left with only four towns
in the peninsula: Ravenna, Ancona, Otranto and Crotona. Soon after-
wards the fleet which Totila had created conquered Sicily (550), Corsica,
Sardinia (551), and ravaged Dalmatia, Corfu and Epirus (551). Mean-
while the fast ageing Justinian was absorbed in useless theological
discussions, and forgot his province of Italy. "The whole West was in
the hands of the barbarians,'" wrote Procopius. However, moved by
the entreaties of the emigrant Italians who flocked to Byzantium, the
Emperor recovered himself. He despatched a fleet to the West which
forced Totila to evacuate Sicily, while a great army was mobilised under
the direction of Germanus to reconquer Italy (550). The sudden death
of the general hindered the operations, but Narses, appointed as his
successor, canned them on with a long forgotten energy and decision.
He boldly stated his conditions to the Emperor, and succeeded in
wringing from him those supplies that had been doled out so meagrely
to his predecessors. He obtained money, arms and soldiers, and soon
commanded the largest army ever entrusted by Justinian to any of his
generals, numbering probably from thirty to thirty-five thousand men.
In the spring of 552 he attacked Italy from the north, moved on
Ravenna, and from there made a bold push for the south in order to
force Totila to a decisive engagement. He encountered the Goths in
the Apennines at Taginae (May or June 552), not far from the site
of Busta Gallorum where, Procopius tells us, Camillus repulsed the
Gauls in ancient days. The Ostrogothic army was stricken with panic,
and broke and fled as soon as the battle was joined; Totila was borne
C. SI ED. H. VOL. II. I'll. I. 2


## p. 18 (#48) ##############################################

18 End of the Gothic Kingdom [552-563
away in the rout, and perished in it. The Gothic State had received its
death-blow.
The Byzantines could hardly believe that their formidable enemy was
really overcome. They wanted to disinter his body to assure themselves
of their good fortune; "and having gazed at it for a long time," wrote
Procopius,"they felt satisfied that Italy was really conquered. " It was in
vain that the unhappy remnant of the Gothic people rallied under a new
king, Teias, for a last desperate struggle. By degrees the whole of
central Italy, including Rome itself, again passed into the hands of the
Greeks. Finally Narses fought the last barbarian muster in Campania
near the foot of Mt Vesuvius on the slopes of Monte I^ettere (Mons
Lactarius) early in 558. The battle lasted for two whole days, "a
giants' combat" according to Procopius, desperate, implacable, epic.
The flower of the Gothic army fell round their king, the remainder
received honourable treatment from Narses, and permission to seek land
amongst the other barbarians, where they would no longer be subjects
of Justinian.
Italy had still to be cleared of the Franks. They had profited by
what was happening, and had occupied part of Liguria, and almost the
whole of the Venetian territory, had repulsed the imperialists of Verona
after Taginae, and now claimed to inherit all the possessions of the
Goths. In the middle of the year 553 two Alemannic chieftains,
Leutharis and Bucelin, rushed on Italy, with seventy-five thousand
barbarians, marking a trail from the north to the centre with blood and
fire. Fortunately for Narses the remnant of the Ostrogoths thought
submission to the Emperor better than submission to the Franks.
Thanks to their help, the Greek general was able to crush the hordes of
Bucelin near Capua (autumn of 554), while those of Leutharis, decimated
by sickness, perished miserably on their retreat. In the following year
peace was restored to Italy by the capitulation of Compsae, which had
been the centre of Ostrogothic resistance in<the south (555). Thus,
after twenty years of warfare, Italy was once more drawn into the
Roman Empire. Like Africa, her extent was not so great as it had
been formerly, as the Italian praefecture. Without mentioning places
like Brescia and Verona, where a handful of Goths held out till 563,
neither Pannonia nor Rhaetia nor Noricum ever came under Justinian's
rule again. The imperial province of Italy did not extend beyond the
line of the Alps, but Justinian was none the less proud of having rescued
it from "tyranny," and flattered himself on having restored to it
"perfect peace," likely to prove durable.
It might easily be imagined that Spain, conquered by the Visigoths,
would be added to the Empire, after the reconquest of Africa and Italy.
Here also, just at the right moment, circumstances arose which gave
a pretext for Greek intervention. King Agila was a persecutor of


## p. 19 (#49) ##############################################

539-554] Imperial Position of Justinian 19
Catholics, and against him uprose an usurper Athanagild, who naturally
sought help from the greatest orthodox ruler of the time. A Byzantine
army and fleet were despatched to Spain, Agila was defeated, and in a
few weeks the imperialists were in possession of the chief towns in the
south-east of the peninsula, Carthagena, Malaga and Corduba. As soon
as the Visigoths realised the danger in which they stood, they put an
end to their domestic disagreements, and all parties joined in offering
the crown to Athanagild (554). The new prince soon returned to face his
former allies, and managed to prevent them from making much progress.
However, the Byzantines were able to keep what they had already won,
and the Empire congratulated itself on the acquisition of a Spanish
province.
The imperial diplomacy was able to add successes of its own to the
triumphs won by force of arms. The Frankish kings of Gaul had gladly
received subsidies from Justinian, and had entered into an alliance with
him, calling him Lord and Father, in token of their position as vassals.
They proved themselves fickle and treacherous allies, and after Theudibert,
King of Austrasia, had in 539 worked for himself in Italy, he formed the
plan of overwhelming the Eastern Empire by a concerted attack of all the
barbarian peoples. In spite of such occasional lapses, the prestige of
Rome was undiminished in Gaul: Constantinople was regarded as the
capital of the whole world, and in the distant Frankish churches, by the
Pope's request, prayers were said by the clergy for the safety of the
Roman Emperor. To his titles of Vandalicus and Gothicus Justinian
now added those of Francicus, Alemannicus and Germanicus. He
treated Theudibert as though he were the most submissive of lieutenants,
and confided to him the work of converting the pagans ruled by
him in Germany. It was the same with the Lombards. In 547 the
Emperor gave them permission to settle in Pannonia and Noricum,
and furnished them with subsidies in return for recruits. They were
rewarded by receiving imperial support against their enemies the
Gepidae; and Greek diplomacy was successful in keeping them
faithful.
On the whole, in spite of certain sacrifices which had been wrung
from the pride of the basileus, Justinian had realised his dream. It was
thanks to his splendid and persistent ambition that the Empire could
now boast the acquisition of Dalmatia, Italy, the whole of eastern
Africa, south-east Spain, the islands of the western basin of the
Mediterranean, Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, and the Balearic Isles, which
almost doubled its extent. The occupation of Septem carried the
Emperor's authority to the Pillars of Hercules, and with the exception
of those parts of the coast held by the Visigoths in Spain and Septimania
and the Franks in Provence, the Mediterranean was once more a Roman
lake. We have seen by what efforts these triumphs were bought, we
shall see at what cost of suffering they were held. We must however
ch. i. 2—2


## p. 20 (#50) ##############################################

20 Administration in Africa and Italy
maintain that by them Justinian had won for the Empire a great and
incontestable increase of prestige and honour. In some respects it may
have proved a misfortune that he had taken upon him the splendid but
crushing heritage of Roman traditions and memories with the crown of
the Caesars: none the less, none of his contemporaries realised that he
had repudiated the obligations they entailed. His most savage detractors
saw in his vast ambitions the real glory of his reign. Procopius wrote
"The natural course for a high-souled Emperor to pursue, is to seek to
enlarge the Empire, and make it more glorious. "
IV.
Justinian's great object in accomplishing the imperial restoration in
the West was to restore the exact counterpart of the ancient Roman
Empire, by means of the revival of Roman institutions. The aim of the
two great ordinances of April 534 was the restoration in Africa of that
"perfect order" which seemed to the Emperor to be the index of true
civilisation in any State. The Pragmatic Sanction of 554, while it
completed the measures taken in 538 and 540, had the same object in
Italy—to "give back to Rome Rome's privileges," according to the
expression of a contemporary. By what appears at first sight to be a
surprising anomaly, remarkably well illustrating however Justinian's
disinclination to change any condition of the past he endeavoured to
restore, the Emperor did not extend to the West any of the administrative
reforms which he was compassing in the East at the same time.
In Africa, as in Italy, the principle on which the administrative re-
organisation was carried out was that of maintaining the ancient separation
between civil and military authority. At the head of the civil government
of Africa was placed a praetorian praefect, having seven governors below
him, bearing the titles of consvlares or prewsides, who administered the
restored circumscriptions which had been established by the Roman
Empire. The numerous offices in which Justinian, with his usual care
for detail, minutely regulated the details of staff and salaries, helped the
officials and assured the predominance of civil rule in the praefecture of
Africa. It was the same in the reconstructed praefecture of Italy.
From 535 a praetor was at the head of reconquered Sicily, after 538 a
praetorian praefect was appointed in Italy, and the regime of civil
administration was established the day after the capitulation of Ravenna.
The reorganisation was carried out by the Pragmatic of 554. Under the
praefect's high authority, assisted, as formerly, by the two vicarii of
Rome and Italy, the civil officials governed the thirteen provinces into
which the peninsula was still divided. Occasionally in practice political
or military exigencies led to the concentration of all the authority in the
same hands. In Africa Solomon and Germanus combined the functions and


## p. 21 (#51) ##############################################

Administration in Africa and Italy 21
even the titles of praetorian praefect and magister militum. In Italy
Narses was a real viceroy. These, however, were only exceptional
deviations from the established principle, and only concerned the supreme
government of the province. At the same time Justinian introduced
the legislation that he had promulgated into the reconquered West.
The financial administration was co-ordinated with the territorial. The
ancient system of taxation, slightly modified elsewhere by the barbarians,
was completely restored, and the supplies so raised were divided, as had
formerly been the case, between the praefect's area and the coffer of the
largitiones. A comes sacri patrimonii per Italiam was appointed, and
the imperial hgothetae exacted with great harshness arrears of taxation,
dating back to the time of the Gothic kings, from the country already
ruined by warfare.
Thus Justinian meant to efface, with one stroke of the pen, anything
that might recall the barbarian "tyranny. '1 Contracts signed in the
time of Totila, donations made by the barbarian kings, economic
measures passed by them in favour of settlers and slaves, were all
pronounced void, and the Pragmatic restored to the Roman proprietors
all lands that they had held before the time of Totila. However, though
he might shape the future, the Emperor was obliged to accept many
existing facts.