Rome would pav
45,000 nomismata (metal value about i?
45,000 nomismata (metal value about i?
Cambridge Medieval History - v2 - Rise of the Saracens and Foundation of the Western Empire
His conception of his imperial
duty was the ideal of the unbending Roman whom nothing could
affright. This spirit of exalted self-possession had been shewn at its
height when the senate was leader of the State, and it was not without a
definite purpose that the role of the senate is given marked prominence
in the poem of Corippus. Unfortunately for this lofty view of the
Empire's task and of the obligations of the nobility, it was precisely in
the excessive power of the corrupt aristocracy that the greatest dangers
lay. Office was valued as an opportunity for extortion, and riches
gained at the expense of the commonwealth secured immunity from
punishment. When all the armies of the Empire were engaged in the
struggle with Persia, the government was forced to permit the mainte-
nance in the European provinces of bodies of local troops; this was
apparently also the case in Egypt, and again and again we see from the
pages of John of Nikiou that the command of such military force was
employed as an engine of oppression against helpless provincials. An
unscrupulous captain would openly defy law and authority, and had no
hesitation in pillaging unoffending villagers. While freely admitting
## p. 265 (#297) ############################################
56&-572J Policy of Justin II 265
that these accounts of the condition of affairs in Egypt hardly justify
inferences as to the character of the administration in other parts
of the Empire, yet stories related by chroniclers who wrote in the
capital suggest that elsewhere also the ordinary course of justice was
powerless to prevent an aristocracy of office from pursuing unchecked its
own personal advantage. Justin, who scorned to favour either of the
popular parties amongst the denies, looked to the nobles to maintain his
high standard—and was disappointed. Similar views underlay all his
foreign policy: Rome could make no concessions, for concessions were
unworthy of the mistress of the world before whom all barbarian tribes
must bow in awe. "We will not purchase peace with gold but win it at
the sword's point":
Justini imtu gentes et regna tremescunt,
Omnia territicat rigid us vigor. . .
—Fast us lion patimus.
Here lies the poignant tragedy of his reign. He would have had Rome
inspired anew with the high ardours of her early prime; and she sank
helpless under the buffets of her foes. For himself his will was that men
should write of him:
Est virtus roburque tibi, praestantior actas,
Prudens consilium, stabilis mens, sancta voluntas,
and yet within a few years his attendants, to stay his frenzied violence,
were terrifying him, as a nurse her naughty child, with the dread name
of a border sheikh upon the Arabian frontier. It is in fact of cardinal
importance to realise that Justin at first shared the faith of Shakespeare's
Bastard, "Come the three corners of the world in arms, and we shall shock
them. "
But if this policy were to be realised there must be no internal
dissension and the theological strife of Justinian's last years must be set
at rest. In concert with John, his courtier patriarch1, Justin strove long
and anxiously for union. John the patrician, on his embassy to Persia,
was charged with the reconciliation of the Monophysites; exiled bishops
were in due course to return to their sees, and Zechariah, archdeacon and
court physician, drew up an edict which should heal the divisions
between the friends and foes of the Council of Chalcedon. But the
fanaticism of the monks at Callinicum defeated John's diplomacy, and
the renewed efforts of the Emperor were rendered fruitless when Jacob
Baradaeus refused to accept an invitation to the capital. Justin's
temper could no longer brook opposition, and in the seventh year of his
reign (571-572) he began in exasperation that fierce persecution of
the Monophysites which is depicted for us by one of the sufferers in
the pages of John of Ephesus.
1 Cf. J. Haury, "Johannes Malalas identisch mit dem Patriarchen Johannes
Scholastikos? " B. Z. ix. (1900), pp. 337-356.
CH. IX.
## p. 266 (#298) ############################################
266 Negotiations with Persia [561-566
Such then were the aims and policy of the new monarch. With the
haughty pride of a Roman aristocrat, with his ill-timed obstinacy and
imperious self-will, Justin flung defiance at his enemies; and he failed to
make good the challenge.
Seven days after his accession he gave audience to Targasiz, an Avar
ambassador, who claimed the annual payment which Justinian had
granted. Did they not merit a reward, the envoy argued, for driving-
from Thrace the tribes which had endangered the capital ? —would it
not indeed be perilous to refuse their request? Plea and threat were alike
of no avail. Surrounded by the gorgeous pageantry of a court reception,
Justin offered the barbarians the choice of peace or war: tribute he would
not pay; it were prodigality to lavish on barbarians the gold which the
Empire could ill spare. He met their murmurs with immediate action,
shipped the Avars across the strait to Chalcedon, and only after six months
dismissed them—three hundred strong—to their homes. For a time
indeed the Emperor's proud words appeared to have had their effect, but
in truth the Avars were busy in Thuringia waging successful war with
the Frankish Sigebert; their revenge for Rome's insult was perforce
postponed, and Justin was free to turn his attention to the East.
John Comentiolus, who bore to the Persian court the news of
Justinian's death and of his nephew's accession, was given instructions to
raise the question of Suania. Under the terms of the Fifty Years' Peace
which had been concluded between the two empires in 561, Chosroes
had agreed to evacuate Lazica; the Romans contended that Suania was
part of Lazica and must also be relinquished. Persia had not admitted
this construction of the agreement, and the question still remained
undecided. Suania indeed was in itself of no particular value; its
importance lay in its strategic situation, for through it the Persians could
attack the Roman frontier in Colchis. The possession of Suania would
secure Rome's position in the east of the Euxine. The embassy was
detained upon its journey and John found that Saracen tribesmen who
acknowledged Persia's overlordship had arrived before him at the court
of Madain; Justinian had granted them money payments on condition
that they should not ravage the Roman frontiers, but these payments
Justin had discontinued, contending that they were originally voluntary
gifts or that, even if they had been made under a binding engagement,
the obligation ceased with the death of the giver. The unwisdom of
the dead, even though he were an emperor, could not bind the living, and
the days of weakness were now past. The Saracen claims were supported
by Chosroes, but the matter was allowed to drop, while the Emperor by
his envoy expressed his strong desire for peace with Persia and for the
maintenance of the treaty between the two peoples. John casually
remarked that, if Lazica was evacuated, Suania by right should also
fall to Rome. The king apparently accepted this view, but professed
himself bound to refer the question to his ministers. The latter were
## p. 267 (#299) ############################################
566] The Saracen Claims 267
willing to yield the territory for a price, but added conditions so
humiliating to the Empire that John felt himself unable to accept
the proposed terms. The king's counsellors in fact sought by diplo-
matic delays to force Rome to take action in Suania, so that they
might then object that the people themselves refused to be subject to
the Empire. The plan succeeded, and John foolishly entered into cor-
respondence with the king of Suania. By this intervention Persia had
secured a subject for negotiation, and now promised that an ambassador
should be sent to Constantinople to discuss the whole situation. Justin
disgraced his envoy, and Zich, who, besides bearing the congratulations
of Persia, was charged with proposals as to Suania, was stopped at
Nisibis. Justin returned thanks for the greetings of Chosroes, but stated
that as to any other matters Rome could not admit discussion. On
Zich's death Mebodes was sent to Constantinople, and with him came the
Saracen chiefs for whom he craved audience. Justin shewed himself so
arbitrary and unapproachable that Mebodes, though abandoning his
patronage of the Saracens, felt that no course was open to him save to
ask for his dismissal. The question of Suania was not debated, and
Ambros, the Arab chieftain, gave orders to his brother Camboses to
attack Alamoundar, the head of the Saracen tribesmen who were allied
to Rome. From the detailed account of these negotiations given by
Menander the reader already traces in Justin's overbearing and irritable
temper a loss of mental balance and a wilful self-assertion which is
almost childish in its unreasoning violence.
Meanwhile the Emperor could not feel secure so long as his cousin
Justin, son of the patrician Germanus, was at the head of the forces on
the Danube, guarding the passes against the Avars; the general was
banished to Alexandria and there assassinated. It seems probable that
Justin's masterful wife was mainly responsible for the murder. About
the same time Aetherius and Addaeus, senators and patricians, were
accused of treason and executed (3 Oct. 5661)-
In the West the influence of the quaestor of the palace, Anastasius
(a native of Africa), would naturally direct the Emperor's attention to
that province. Through the praefect Thomas, peace was concluded with
the Berber tribesmen and new forts were erected to repel assaults of the
barbarians. But these measures were checked2 by the outbreak of
1 There is some doubt as to the precise date of the murder of Justin. Johannes
Biclarensis assigns it to the same year as the conspiracy of Addaeus and Aetherius
(i. e. 566, in John's reckonings Ann. n. Justini) and Evagrius clearly places it
before the trial of Addaeus and Aetherius (Evagr. v. 1-3). Theophanes, it would
appear wrongly, records it (p. 244, 3) under the year 670. —For the prominent
position occupied by Sophia, cf. Warwick Wroth, Catalogue of the Imperial Byzantine
Coins in the British Museum, London (1908), I. p. xix.
2 For three subsequent invasions by the Moors in which one praefect and two
magistri militum were killed, see Joh. Biol. , M. G. H. Chronica Minora (ed. Mommsen),
n. (1894), p. 212, and Diehl, L'A/rique byzantine, pp. 459-460.
## p. 268 (#300) ############################################
268 War with tJie Avars [565-568
hostilities in Europe between the Lombards and the Gepids. In the
war which ensued the Lombards gained the advantage, and the Gepids
then sought to win the alliance of Justin by the splendour of their
gifts. Baduarius, commanding in Scythia and Moesia, received orders
to aid Kunimund, and the Roman forces won a victory over Alboin.
The latter, looking around for allies in his turn, appealed to Baian, the
Khagan of the Avars, who had just concluded a peace with Sigebert.
The Lombards, Alboin urged, were fighting not so much against the
Gepids as against their ally Justin, who but recently had refused the
tribute which Justinian had conceded. Avars and Lombards united
would be irresistible: when Scythia and Thrace were won, the way would
be open for an attack upon Constantinople. Baian at first declined to
listen to the Lombard envoys, but he finally agreed to give his assistance
on condition that he should at once receive one-tenth of all the animals
belonging to the Lombards, that half the spoil taken should be his, and
that to him should fall the whole territory of the conquered Gepids.
The latter were accused before Justin by a Lombard embassy of not
having kept the promises which had been the price of the Roman
alliance; this intervention secured the neutrality of the Emperor.
We know nothing of the struggle save its issue; the Gepids
were defeated on the Danube and driven from their territory, while
Kunimund was slain. But his grandson Reptilanis carried the royal
treasure in safety to Constantinople, while it would seem that the
Roman troops occupied Sirmium before the Avars could seize the city.
Justin despatched Vitalian, the interpreter, and Komitas as ambassadors
to Baian. They were kept in chains while the Avar leader attacked
Bonus in Sirmium: this city, Baian claimed, was his by right; it had
been in the hands of the Gepids, and should now devolve upon him as
spoils of the victory. At the same time he offered conditions of peace
which were remarkable for their extreme moderation—he only demanded
a silver plate, some gold and a Scythian toga; he would be disgraced
before his allies if he went empty-handed away. These terms Bonus and
the bishop of Sirmium felt that they had no authority to accept without
the Emperor's approval. For answer Baian ordered 10,000 Kotrigur
Huns to cross the Save and ravage Dalmatia, while he himself occupied
the territory which had formerly belonged to the Gepids. But he was
not anxious for war, and there followed a succession of attempts at
negotiation; the Roman generals on the frontier were ready to grant the
Avar's conditions, but the autocrat in the capital held fast to his
doctrinaire conceptions of that which Rome's honour would not allow
her to concede. Targitius and Vitalian were sent to Constantinople to
demand the surrender of Sirmium, the payment to Baian of sums formerly
received from Justinian by the Kotrigur and Utigur Huns who were
now tributary to the Avars, and the delivery of the person of Usdibad,
a Gepid fugitive. The Emperor met the proposals with high-sounding
## p. 269 (#301) ############################################
568-570] The Turkish Embassy 269
words and Bonus was bidden to prepare for war. No success can have
attended the Roman arms, for in a second embassy Targitius added to
his former demands the payment of arrears by the Empire. Bonus was
clearly incapable, argued Justin, and Tiberius was accordingly sent to
arrange terms. After some military successes, it would seem, he con-
curred with Apsich in a proposal that land should be furnished by the
Romans for Avar settlement, while sons of Avar chieftains should be
pledges for the good faith of their fellow-countrymen. Tiberius went to
Constantinople to urge the acceptance of these terms, but Justin was
not satisfied: let Baian surrender his own sons as hostages, he retorted,
and once more despatches to the officers in command ordered vigorous
and aggressive action. Tiberius returned to be defeated by the Avars,
and when yet another mission reached the palace, the Emperor realised
that the honour of Rome must give place to the argument of force.
Peace was concluded, and the Avars retired (end of 570 ? ). The course
of the negotiations throws into clear relief the views and aims of Justin,
while the experience thus gained by Tiberius served to mould his policy
as emperor.
For the rest of the reign the East absorbed the whole energy of the
State. In order to understand clearly the causes which led to the war
with Persia it is necessary to return to the year 568, when Constantinople
was visited by an embassy from the Turks. This people, who had only
recently made their appearance in Western Asia, had some ten years
before overthrown the nation of the Ephthalites and were now themselves
the leading power in the vast stretch of country between China and
Persia. The western Chinese kingdom was at times their tributary, at
other times their ally; with a vision of the possibilities which their
geographical position offered they aspired to be the intermediaries
through whose hands should pass the commerce of West and East.
Naturally enough they first appealed to Persia, but the counsels of a
renegade Ephthalite prevailed: the Turks were, he urged, a treacherous
people, it would be an evil day for Persia if she accepted their alliance.
Dizabul however, Khan of the Western Turks under the suzerainty of
the great Mo-kan1, only relinquished the project when he discovered that
the members of a second embassy had been poisoned by Persian treachery.
Then it was that his counsellor Maniach advised that envoys should
be sent to the Roman capital, the greatest emporium for the silk
of China. It was a remarkable proposal; the emperors had often
sought to open up a route to the East which would be free from
Persia's interference—Justinian, for example, had with this object
entered into relations with the Ethiopian court—but no great success
had attended their efforts, and now it was a Turk who unfolded a scheme
whereby the products of East and West should pass and repass without
1 Silziboulos (Sil-Cybul-baya-qayan).
## p. 270 (#302) ############################################
270 Revolt of Persarmenia [568-572
entering Persian territory, while the Turks drew boundless wealth as the
middlemen between China and Rome. Obviously such a compact would
not be acquiesced in by Persia, but Persia was the common foe: Turk
and Roman must form an offensive and defensive alliance. Rome was
troubled in her European provinces by the raids of Avar tribes and these
tribesmen were fugitives from the Turk: Roman and Turk united could
free the Empire from the scourge. Such was the project. The attitude
of Rome's ministers was one of benevolent interest. They desired in-
formation but were unwilling to commit themselves; an embassy was
accordingly despatched to assure Dizabul of their friendship, but when
the Khan set off upon a campaign against Persia, Zemarchus with the
Roman forces began the long march back to Constantinople1. On the
journey he was forced to alter his route through fear of Persian ambushes
in Suania ; suspicions were clearly already aroused and it would seem that
for a time the negotiations with the Turks were dropped*. More than
this was needed to induce Chosroes to declare war.
In 571 Persian Armenia revolted and appealed to the Empire.
It would seem that Justin had been attempting to force upon his
Armenian subjects acceptance of the orthodox Chalcedonian doctrine,
and Chosroes in turn, on the advice of the magi, determined to impose
the worship of the sacred fire upon the whole of Persarmenia. The
Surena with 2000 armed horsemen was sent to Dovin with orders to
establish a fire temple in the city. The Catholicos objected that the
Armenians, though paying tribute to their Persian overlord, were yet
free to practise their own religion. The building of the temple was
however begun in spite of protests, but ten thousand armed Armenians
implored the Surena to lay the matter before Chosroes, and in face of
this force he was compelled to withdraw. Meanwhile, it appears, the
Armenians had secured from Justin a promise that they would be
welcomed within the boundaries of the Empire, and that religious
toleration would be granted them. On the return of the Surena in
command of 15,000 men with directions to carry into execution the
original design, 20,000 Armenians scattered the Persian forces and killed
the Surena, and his severed head was carried to the patrician Justinian
who was in readiness on the frontier at Theodosiopolis. At the same time
the Iberians, with their king Gorgenes, went over to the Romans. The
fugitives were well received; the nobles were given high positions and
estates, while the Roman province was excused three years' tribute.
It was just at this time (571-572) that a new payment to Persia fell
due under the terms of the peace of 561-562, Chosroes having insisted that
1 The embassy of Zemarchus is dated 572-573 by John of Ephesus, vi. 23.
1 The later embassy of Valentinus in 575-576 produced no lasting result. On the**
missions see J. Marquart, "Historische Glossen zu den altturkischen Inschriften,"
Vienna Oriental Journal, in. (1898), pp. 157-200.
## p. 271 (#303) ############################################
572-575] Justin determines on -war with Persia 271
previous instalments should be paid in advance. Sebocthes arrived
(probably early in 572) to remind the Emperor of his obligations. In
the judgment of Chosroes it was to Persia's present advantage that the
peace should remain unbroken. The disagreeable question of Suania
was shelved for the time, and Rome's claims were quietly ignored.
Sebocthes preserved a studied silence in relation to the disturbances in
Armenia and, when Justin mentioned that country, even appeared willing
to recognise the rights of the Christian inhabitants. On dismissal, how-
ever, he was warned by the Emperor that if a finger was raised against
Armenia it would be regarded as a hostile act. Justin indeed seems to
have been anxious to force Persia to take the aggressive. He chose this
moment of diplomatic tension to send the magistrianus Julian on a
mission to Arethas, then reigning in Abyssinia over the Axumite kingdom.
The envoy persuaded Arethas to break faith with his Persian suzerain,
to send his merchandise through the country of the Homerites by way of
the Nile to Egypt and to invade Persian territory. At the head of his
Saracens the king made a successful foray and dismissed Julian with
costly gifts and high honour1. Evidently Justin considered that Chosroes
was only waiting until the Roman gold had been safely received, and that
he would then declare war on the first favourable opportunity.
The Emperor determined to strike the first blow. The continuance
of the peace entailed heavy periodical payments, and throughout his
reign Justin was consistently opposed to enriching the Empire's enemies
at the expense of the national treasury. Though the subsidies paid to
Persia were to be devoted to the upkeep of the northern forts and the
guarding of the passes against eastern invaders, it was easy for any
unkindly critic to represent them as tribute paid by Rome to her rival'.
Again Justin had welcomed the Turkish overtures: the power which had
overthrown the Ephthalites would, he thought, be a formidable ally in
the coming struggle. Further, through the mistakes in diplomacy of his
own envoy, Suania had remained subject to Chosroes, and it was now
additionally necessary that the country should belong to the Empire,
since Persian ambushes rendered insecure the trade route to Turkish
territory from which so much was hoped. But above all the capital had
been deeply stirred by the oppression of the Armenians: Justin was
resolved to champion their cause and, as a Christian monarch, to challenge
the persecutor in their defence. When the ambassadors of the Frankish
Sigebert returned to Gaul early in 575 they were full of the sufferings of
the Armenians; it was to this cause, they told Gregory of Tours, that
the war with Persia was due.
1 This invasion is assigned by Theophanes (244-245) to the year 572. On this
account cf. G. Hertzsch, De Scriptoribus Rerum Imp. Tiberii Corutantini (Leipsic,
1882), p. 38.
8 Cf. the story in John of Ephesus, vi. 23.
## p. 272 (#304) ############################################
272 The Fall of Dara [569-574
The decisive step was taken in the late summer of 572 when, without
warning, Marcianus1, a first cousin of the Emperor on his mother's side,
invaded Arzanene. Justin had given orders for an immediate attack on
Nisibis, but precious time was wasted in fruitless negotiations with the
Persian marzpan, while Chosroes was informed of the danger, Nisibis
victualled and the Christians expelled. Very early in 578 Marcianus, at
the head of troops raised from Rome's Caucasian allies, won some slight
successes, but despatches from the capital insisted on the immediate
investment of Nisibis; the army encamped before the city at the end
of April 573. The Emperor however, suspecting his cousin's loyalty,
appointed Acacius Archelaus' as his successor. Although Nisibis was
about to capitulate, the new commander on his arrival brutally over-
threw the tent and standard of Marcianus, while the general himself with
rude violence was hurried away to Dara. The army, thinking itself
deserted, fled in wild confusion to Mardes, while Chosroes, who had
hastened to relieve Nisibis, now advanced to besiege Dara. At the same
time Adarmaanes marched into the defenceless province of Syria, captured
Antioch, Apamea and other towns, and rejoined Chosroes with a train
of 292,000 prisoners. After an investment of more than five months, on
15 Nov. 573, Dara fell through the negligence or treachery, men said,
of John, son of Timostratus. The city had been regarded as impreg-
nable; men seeking security in troublous times had made it the treasure
house of the Roman East, and the booty of the victors was immense.
On the news of this terrible disaster Justin ordered the shops to be shut
and all trade to cease in the capital; he himself never recovered from the
shock, but became a hopeless and violent imbecile. It seems that for five
years (presumably since 569) Justin had been ailing and suffering from
occasional mental weakness, but it was now clear that he was quite in-
capable of managing the Empire's affairs. Through the year 574 the
Empress in concert with Tiberius, the comes excubitorum, carried on the
government. They were faced with a difficult problem: Rome had been
the aggressor, could she be the first to propose terms of peace? Persia
however intervened, and sent a certain Jakobos, who knew both Greek and
Persian, to conclude a treaty. Rome, Chosroes argued, could not be
further humbled: she must accept the victor's conditions. The letter
was sent to the Empress owing to Justin's incapacity, and it was her
reply that Zacharias bore to the Persian court8.
Rome would pav
45,000 nomismata (metal value about i? 25,000) to secure peace for
a year in the East, though Armenia was not included in this arrange-
ment. If the Emperor recovered, a plenipotentiary should be sent to
1 Called Martinus in Theoph. 245, 25.
1 Theophanes of Byzantium is mistaken in thinking that the new commander was
Theodore, the son of Justinian.
3 Evagrius v. 12 (p. 208) must be regarded as a confusion with the later embassy
of A. n. 575.
## p. 273 (#305) ############################################
574] Policy of Tiberius II 273
determine all matters in dispute and to end the war. But Justin did
not recover, and by the masterful will of the Empress, Tiberius was
adopted as the Emperor's son and created Caesar in the presence of the
patriarch John and of the officials of the Court (Friday, 7 Dec. 574).
It was a scene which deeply impressed the imagination of contemporary
historians. Justin in a pathetic speech confessed with sincere contrition
his failure, and in this brief interval of unclouded mental vision warned
his successor of the dangers which surrounded the throne.
Tiberius, his position now established, at once busied himself with
the work of reorganisation. His assumption of power marks a change
of policy which is of the highest importance. The new Caesar, himself
by birth a Thracian, had seen service on the Danube, and realised that
from the military standpoint the intrarmgeant imperialism of Justin
was too heroic an ideal for the exhausted Empire. Years before he had
approved of terms of peace which would have given the Avars land on
which to settle within Rome's frontiers. Greek influence was every-
where on the increase; at all costs it was the Greek-speaking Asiatic
provinces which must be defended and retained. Persia was the formid-
able foe and it was her rivalry which was the dominating factor in the
situation. Tiberius had indeed with practical insight comprehended
Rome's true policy. Syrian chroniclers of a later day rightly appreciated
this: to them Tiberius stands at the head of a new imperial line, they
know him as the first of the Greek emperors. But if in his view the
Empire, though maintaining its hold on such bulwark cities as Sirmium,
was in the future to place no longer its chief reliance on those European
provinces from which he had himself sprung, the administration must
scrupulously abstain from arousing the hostility of the eastern nationali-
ties: religious persecution must cease and it must be unnecessary for his
subjects to seek under a foreign domination a wider tolerance and a more
spacious freedom for the profession of their own faith. The Monophysites
gratefully acknowledged that during his reign they found in the Emperor
a champion against their ecclesiastical oppressors. This was not all:
there are hints in our authorities which suggest that he regarded as ill-
timed the aristocratic sympathies of Justin, and strove to increase the
authority of the popular elements in the State. It is possible that
the demesmen, suppressed by Justinian after the Nika sedition and
cowed by Justin, owed to the policy of Tiberius some of the influence
which they exercised towards the close of the reign of Maurice. Even at
the risk of what might be judged financial improvidence, the autocrat
must strive to win the esteem, if not the affection, of his subjects.
Tiberius forthwith remitted a year's taxation and endeavoured to restore
the ravages which Adarmaanes had inflicted on Syria. At the same
time he began to remodel the army, attracting to the service of the
State sturdy barbarian soldiers wherever such could be found1.
1 Is not Theophanes 251,24 really summarising the Persian war as carried on by
C. MED. H. VOL. II. CH. IX. 18
## p. 274 (#306) ############################################
274 The Persian Flight from Melitene [575-577
Obviously the immediate question was the state of affairs in the
East. In the spring of 575 Tiberius sent Trajan, quaestor and
physician, with the former envoy Zacharias to obtain a cessation of
hostilities for three years both in the East and Armenia; if that was not
possible, then in the East excluding Armenia. Persia however insisted
that no truce could be granted for any less period than five years,
and the ambassadors therefore consented, subject to the approval of the
Emperor, to accept a truce of five years in the East alone, Rome under-
taking to pay annually 30,000 gold nomumata. These terms Tiberius
rejected: he wanted a truce for two years if possible, but in no event
would he accept an agreement which would tie his hands for more than
three years: by that time he hoped to be able successfully to withstand
Persia in the field. At last Chosroes agreed to a three years' treaty
which was only to affect the East and was not to include Armenia.
Meanwhile, before the result of the negotiations was known, Justinian,
son of the murdered Justin, was appointed general of the East. Early
in the summer, however, Chosroes with unexpected energy marched
north and invaded Armenia; Persarmenia returned to its allegiance,
and by way of the canton of Bagrevand he advanced into the Roman
province and encamped before Theodosiopolis. This city, the key of
Persarmenia and Iberia, he resolved to capture, and thence to proceed
to Caesarea, the metropolis of Cappadocia. The siege, however, was
soon abandoned, and near Sebaste the Persians met the Roman
army under Justinian, who had now assumed command in Armenia.
Personal jealousies paralysed the action of the imperial troops, and
the enemy was thus able to capture and burn Melitene. Then
the fortune of war turned. Chosroes was forced to flee across the
Euphrates and, with the Romans in hot pursuit, only escaped with
great loss over the mountains of Karcha. Justinian followed up this
advantage by spending the winter on Persian soil. His troops pillaged
and plundered unchecked, and in the spring of 576 he took up his
position on the frontier.
The shame of the flight from Melitene was a severe shock to Persian
pride, and there seemed every prospect that now at last peace would be
concluded. At Athraelon, near Dara, Mebodes met Rome's envoys John
and Peter, patricians and senators, together with Zacharias and Theodore,
count of the treasury. During the negotiations however Tamchosro
defeated Justinian in Armenia (576). Elated by this victory, the
Persians withdrew the concessions which they had already made. Still
all through the years 576-577 the plenipotentiaries discussed terms; two
points stood in the way of a final settlement: Persia claimed the right
Tiberius II and does not etc ovopa 18iov = his position was now legalised, aud as
Caesar he could raise troops in his own name? Finlay sees in the passage the
creation of a troop of Buncellarii.
## p. 275 (#307) ############################################
577-68i] Accession of Tiberius II 275
to punish those Armenian fugitives who in 571 had fled to the Empire,
and these Rome absolutely declined to surrender, while Chosroes in turn
persisted in his refusal to consider the cession of Dara which Tiberius
demanded. In 578, when the three years' truce had all but expired,
a new embassy headed by Trajan and Zacharias began the task
afresh.
Meanwhile, in 578, to put a stop to the mutual dissensions of the
Roman generals Tiberius appointed as commander-in-chief of the eastern
troops Maurice, a Cappadocian of Arabissus, descended, it was said, from
the aristocracy of old Rome1, who had formerly served as the Emperor's
notariws and whom, on becoming Caesar, he had created comes excubitorum.
With the means supplied to him by Tiberius, Maurice at once began to
raise a formidable army; he enrolled men from his own native country,
and enlisted recruits from Syria, Iberia, and the province of Hanzit.
With these forces he successfully invaded Arzanene, captured the strong
fortress of Aphoumon, and carried back with him thousands of Persians
and much spoil.
In the autumn of this year (578) Justin, who had temporarily
recovered his reason, crowned Tiberius Emperor (26 Sept. ) and eight days
later, on 4 Oct. , his troubled life was ended.
Tiberius now as ever sought military triumphs only as a means to
diplomatic ends. In consequence of the victories of the summer he had
in his hands numerous important captives, some of them even connexions
of the royal house. He at once despatched Zacharias and a general,
Theodore by name, giving them full powers to conclude peace and
offering to return the prisoners of war. The Emperor professed himself
prepared to surrender Iberia and Persarmenia (but not those refugees
who had fled to the shelter of the Empire), to evacuate Arzanene and
to restore the fortress of Aphoumon, while in return Dara was to be given
back to the Empire. Tiberius was desirous of arriving at a speedy
agreement, so that the enemy might not gain time for collecting rein-
forcements. Despite the delay of a counter mission from Persia there
was every prospect that Rome's conditions would be accepted, when in
the early spring of 579 Chosroes died and was succeeded on the throne
by Ormizd. Though the Emperor was willing to offer the same terms,
Ormizd procrastinated, while making every effort to provision Dara
and Nisibis and to raise fresh levies. At length he definitely refused to
surrender Dara and stipulated anew for an annual money payment
(summer, 579). The military and diplomatic operations of the years
579-581, though interesting enough in themselves, did not really alter
the general position of affairs.
Thus inconclusively dragged on the long hostilities between the rival
powers in the East, but in Europe the Avars had grown discontented
1 A later tradition connects him with Armenia: cf. B. Z. xix. (1910), p. 649.
ch. ix. 18—2
## p. 276 (#308) ############################################
276 Surrender of Sirmium [580-582
with the Empire's subsidies. Targitius was sent in 580 to receive the
tribute, but immediately after the envoy's departure Baian started with
his rude flotilla down the Danube and, marching over the neck of
country between that river and the Save, appeared before Sirmium and
there began to construct a bridge. When the Roman general in
the neighbouring fortress of Singidunum protested at this violation of
the peace the Khagan claimed that his sole aim was to cross the Save in
order to march through the territory of the Empire, recross the Danube
with the help of the Roman fleet, and thus attack the common enemy,
the Slav invaders, who had refused to render to the Avars their annual
tribute. Sirmium was without stores of provisions and had no effective
garrison. Tiberius had relied upon the continuance of the peace and all
his available troops were in Armenia and Mesopotamia. When Baian's
ambassador arrived in the capital, the Emperor could only temporise:
he himself was preparing an expedition against the Slavs, but for the
present he would suggest that the moment was ill-chosen for a campaign,
since the Turks were occupying the Chersonese (Bosporos had fallen into
their hands in 576) and might shortly advance westward. The Avar
envoy was not slow to appreciate the true position, but on the return
journey he and the attendant Romans were slain by a band of Slav
pillagers—this fact casually mentioned gives us some idea of the con-
dition at this time of the open country-side in the Danubian provinces.
Meanwhile Baian had been pressing forward the building of the bridge
over the Save, and Solachos, the new Avar ambassador, now threw off
the mask and demanded the evacuation of Sirmium. "I would sooner
give your master,11 Tiberius replied, "one of my two daughters to wife
than I would of my own free will surrender Sirmium. 11 The Danube
and the Save were held by the enemy, and the Emperor had no army,
but through Illyria and Dalmatia officers were sent to conduct the
defence. On the islands of Casia and Carbonaria Theognis met the
Khagan, but negotiations were fruitless. For two years, despite fearful
hardships, the city resisted, but the governor was incompetent, and the
troops under Theognis inadequate, and at last, some short time before his
death, Tiberius, to save the citizens, sacrificed Sirmium. The inhabitants
were granted life, but all their possessions were left in the hands of the
barbarians, who also exacted the sum of 240,000 nomismata as payment
for the three years1 arrears (580-582) due under the terms of the former
agreement which was still to remain in force.
It was during the investment of Sirmium that the Slavs seized their
golden hour. They poured over Thrace and Thessaly, scouring the
Roman provinces as far as the Long Walls—a flood of murder and of
ravage: the black horror of their onset still darkens the pages of John
of Ephesus.
In the year which saw the fall of Sirmium (582) Tiberius died. Feeling
that his end was near, on 5 Aug. he created Maurice Caesar and gave
## p. 277 (#309) ############################################
582-586] Accession of Maurice 277
to him the name of Tiberius1; at the same time the Emperor's elder
daughter was named Constantina and betrothed to Maurice. Eight
days later, before an assemblage of representatives of army, church and
people, Tiberius crowned the Caesar Emperor (13 Aug. ) and on 14 Aug.
582, in the palace of the Hebdomon, he breathed his last. The marriage
of Maurice followed hard on the funeral of his father-in-law. We would
gladly have learned more of the policy and aims of'Tiberius. We can
but dimly divine in him a practical statesman who with sure prescience
had seen what was possible of achievement and where the Empire's true
future lay. He fought not for conquest but for peace, he struggled to
win from Persia a recognition that Rome was her peer, that on a basis of
security the Empire might work out its internal union and concentrate
its strength around the shores of the eastern Mediterranean. "The
sins of men," says the chronicler, "were the reason for his short reign.
Men were not worthy of so good an emperor. "
"Make your rule my fairest epitaph" were the words of Tiberius
to Maurice, and the new monarch undertook his task in a spirit of high
seriousness. At his accession Maurice appointed John Mystakon com-
mander-in-chief of the eastern armies, and this position he held until
584, when he was superseded by Philippicus, the Emperor's brother-in-
law. The details of the military operations during the years 582-585
cannot be given here it may be sufficient to state that their general
result was indecisive—most of the time was spent in the capture or
defence of isolated fortresses or in raids upon the enemy's territory'.
No pitched battle of any importance occurred till 586. Philippicus
had met Mebodes at Amida in order to discuss terms of peace, but
Persia had demanded a money payment, and such a condition Maurice
would not accept. The Roman general, finding that negotiations were
useless, led his forces to Mount Izala, and at Solochon the armies engaged.
The Persians were led by Kardarigan, while Mebodes commanded on
the right wing and Aphraates, a cousin of Kardarigan, on the left.
Philippicus was persuaded not to adventure his life in the forefront of the
battle, so that the Roman centre was entrusted to Heraclius, the father of
the future emperor. Vitalius faced Aphraates, while Wilfred, the praefect
of Emesa, and Apsich the Hun opposed Mebodes. On a Sunday morning
the engagement began: the right wing routed Aphraates, but was with
1 It would seem that Germanus was also created Caesar but declined the responsi-
bilities which Maurice was prepared to assume.
1 A short chronological note may however be of service. 582, autumn: John
Mystakon commander-in-chief in Armenia: Roman success on Nymphius turned
into a rout through jealousy of Hours. 583: Capture of fort of Akbas, near
Martyropolis, by Rome. Peace negotiations between Rome and Persia. 584:
Marriage of Philippicus to Gordia, sister of Maurice: Philippicus appointed to
succeed John in the East. He fortifies Monokarton and ravages country round
Nisibis. 585: Philippicus ill: retires to Martyropolis. Stephanus and the Hun
Apsich successfully defend Monokarton.
## p. 278 (#310) ############################################
278 Mutiny of the Eastern Army [586-588
difficulty recalled from its capture of the Persian baggage; the defeated
troops now strengthened the enemy's centre and some of the Roman
horse were forced to dismount to steady the ranks under Heraclius.
But during a desperate hand-to-hand struggle the cavalry charged
the Persians and the day was won: the left wing pursued the troops
under Mebodes as far as Dara. Philippicus then began the siege of
the fortress of Chlorfiara, but his position was turned by the forces under
Kardarigan; a sudden panic seized the Roman commander, who fled
precipitately under cover of night to Aphoumon. The enemy, suspecting
treachery, advanced with caution, but encountered no resistance, while the
seizure of the Roman baggage-train relieved them from threatened
starvation. Across the Nymphius by Amida to Mount Izala Philippicus
retreated: here the forts were strengthened and the command given to
Heraclius, who in late autumn led a pillaging expedition across the Tigris.
The flight of Philippicus may well have been due, at least in part, to
a fresh attack of illness, for in 587 he was unable to take the field, and
when he started for the capital, Heraclius was left as commander in the
East and at once began to restore order and discipline among the Roman
troops.
Maurice's well-intentioned passion for economy had led him to issue
an order that the soldiers' pay should be reduced by a quarter; Philippicus
clearly felt that this was a highly dangerous and inexpedient measure—
the army's anger might lead to the proclamation of a rival emperor; he
delayed the publication of the edict, and it was probably with a view of
explaining the whole situation to his master that, despite his illness, he
set out for Constantinople. On his journey, however, he learned that he
had been superseded and that Priscus had been appointed commander-
in-chief. If Maurice had ceased to trust his brother-in-law let the new
general do what he could: Philippicus would no longer stay his hand.
From Tarsus he ordered Heraclius to leave the army in the hands of
Narses, governor of Constantina, and himself to retire to Armenia; he
further directed the publication of the fatal edict.
Early in 588 Priscus arrived in Antioch. The Roman forces were to
concentrate in Monokarton; and from Edessa he made his way,accompanied
by the bishop of Damascus, towards the camp with the view of celebrating
Easter amongst his men. But when the troops came forth to meet him,
his haughtiness and failure to observe the customary military usages
disgusted the army and at this critical moment a report spread that their
pay was to be reduced. A mutiny forced Priscus to take refuge in
Constantina, and the fears of Philippicus proved well founded. Ger-
manus, commander in the Lebanon district of Phoenicia, was against his
own will proclaimed emperor, though he exacted an oath that the
soldiers would not plunder the luckless provincials. A riot at Constantina,
where the Emperor's statues were overthrown, drove the fugitive Priscus
to Edessa, and thence he was hounded forth to seek shelter in the capital.
## p. 279 (#311) ############################################
588-590] Fall of Martyropolis 279
Maurice's only course was to reappoint Philippicustothesupreme command
in the East, but the army, which had elected its own officers, was not to
be thus easily pacified: the troops solemnly swore that they would never
receive the nominee of an emperor whom they no longer acknowledged.
Meanwhile, as was but natural, Persia seized her opportunity and invested
Constantina, but Germanus prevailed upon his men to take action and
the city was relieved. The soldiers1 resentment was lessened by the
skilful diplomacy of Aristobulus, who brought gifts from Constantinople,
and Germanus was able to invade Persia with a force of 4000 men.
Though checked by Marouzas, he retired in safety to the Nymphius, and
at Martyropolis Marouzas was defeated and killed by the united Roman
forces: three thousand captives were taken, among them many prominent
Persians, while the spoils and standards were sent to Maurice. This was
the signal that the army was once more prepared to acknowledge the
Emperor, and all would have been well had not Maurice felt it necessary
to insist that Philippicus should again be accepted by the troops as their
general. This however they refused to do, even when Andreas, captain
of the imperial shield-bearers, was sent to them; and only after a year's
cessation of hostilities (588-589) was the army, through the personal
influence of Gregory, bishop of Antioch, persuaded to obey its former
commander (Easter 590). Philippicus did not long enjoy his triumph.
About this time Martyropolis fell by treachery into Persian hands, and
with the spring of 590' the Roman forces marched into Armenia to
recover the city. When he failed in this Philippicus was superseded by
Comentiolus, and although the latter was unsuccessful, Heraclius won
a brilliant victory and captured the enemy's camp.
It is at first sight somewhat surprising that the Persians had remained
inactive during the year 589, but we know that they were fully engaged
with internal difficulties. The violence of Ormizd had, it seems, caused
a dangerous revolt in Kusistan and Kerman, and in face of this peril
Persia accepted an offer of help from the Turks. Once admitted into
Khorasan, Schaweh Schah disregarded his promises and advanced south-
wards in the direction of the capital, but was met by Bahrain Cobin, the
governor of Media, and was defeated in the mountains of Ghilan. The
power of the Turks was broken: they could no longer exact, but were
bound to pay, an annual tribute. After this signal success Bahrain
Cobin undertook an invasion of Roman territory in the Caucasus district;
the Persians encountered no resistance, for the imperial forces were con-
centrated in Armenia. Maurice sent Romanus to engage the enemy in
Albania, and in the valley of one of the streams flowing into the Araxes
Bahrain was so severely worsted that he was in consequence removed
from his command by Ormizd. Thus disgraced he determined to seize the
1 This is not the usually accepted chronology. The present writer hopes shortly
to support the view here taken in a paper on the literary construction of the history
of Theophylactus Simocatta.
## p. 280 (#312) ############################################
280 Chosroes restored by Maurice [591-600
crown for himself but veiled his real plan under the pretext of champion-
ing the cause of Chosroes, Ormizd's eldest son1. At the same time a plot
was formed in the palace, and Bahram was forestalled: the conspirators
dethroned the king and Chosroes was crowned at Ctesiphon. But after
the assassination of Ormizd the new monarch was unable to maintain
his position: his troops deserted to Bahram, and he was forced to throw
himself upon the mercy of the Emperor. As a helpless fugitive the
King of kings arrived at Circesium and craved Rome's protection, offer-
ing in return to restore the lost Armenian provinces and to surrender
Martyropolis and Dara. Despite the counsels of the senate, Maurice
saw in this strange reversal of fortune a chance to terminate a war which
was draining the Empire's strength: his resolve to accede to his enemy's
request was at once a courageous and a statesmanlike action. He
furnished Chosroes with men and money, Narses took command of the
troops and John Mystakon marched from Armenia to join the army.
The two forces met at Sargana (probably Sirgan, in the plain of Ushnei1)
and in the neighbourhood of Ganzaca (Takhti-Soleiman) defeated and
put to flight Bahram, while Chosroes recovered his throne without further
resistance. The new monarch kept his promises to Rome and surrounded
himself with a Roman body-guard (591). By this interposition Maurice
had restored the Empire's frontier5 and had ended the long-drawu struggle
in the East.
In 592 therefore he could transport his army into Europe, and was able
to employ his whole military force in the Danubian provinces. Maurice
himself went with the troops as far as Anchialus, when he was recalled
by the presence of a Persian embassy in the capital. The chronology of
the next few years is confused and it is impossible to give here a detailed
account of the campaigns. Their general object was to maintain the
Danube as the frontier line against the Avars and to restrict the forays
of the Slavs. In this Priscus met with considerable success, but Peter,
Maurice's brother, who superseded him in 597, displayed hopeless
incompetency and Priscus was reappointed4. In 600 Comentiolus.
who was, it would appear, in command against his own will, entered
into communications with the Khagan in order to secure the dis-
comfiture of the Roman forces: he was, in fact, anxious to prove that
the attempt to defend the northern frontier was labour lost. He
ultimately fled headlong to the capital and only the personal inter-
ference of the Emperor stifled the inquiry into his treachery. On this
1 There seems no sufficient evidence for the theory that Bahram Cobin relied on
a legitimist claim as representing the prae-Sassanid dynasty.
2 See H. C. Rawliuson, "Memoir on the site of the Atropatenian Ecbatana,"
Journal of the Royal Geographical Society (1840), pp. 71 ff.
3 See maps by H. Hiibschmann in "Die altarmenischen Ortsnamen," Indoger-
manUche Forschungen, xvi. (1904), and in Gelzer's Oeorgius Oyprhu.
4 For the siege of Thessalonica in this year, cf. Wroth, op. cit. i. p. xri.
## p. 281 (#313) ############################################
600-602] Campaigns on the Danube Frontier 281
occasion the panic in Constantinople was such that the city guard—the
Brjfioi—were sent by Maurice to man the Long Walls1.
duty was the ideal of the unbending Roman whom nothing could
affright. This spirit of exalted self-possession had been shewn at its
height when the senate was leader of the State, and it was not without a
definite purpose that the role of the senate is given marked prominence
in the poem of Corippus. Unfortunately for this lofty view of the
Empire's task and of the obligations of the nobility, it was precisely in
the excessive power of the corrupt aristocracy that the greatest dangers
lay. Office was valued as an opportunity for extortion, and riches
gained at the expense of the commonwealth secured immunity from
punishment. When all the armies of the Empire were engaged in the
struggle with Persia, the government was forced to permit the mainte-
nance in the European provinces of bodies of local troops; this was
apparently also the case in Egypt, and again and again we see from the
pages of John of Nikiou that the command of such military force was
employed as an engine of oppression against helpless provincials. An
unscrupulous captain would openly defy law and authority, and had no
hesitation in pillaging unoffending villagers. While freely admitting
## p. 265 (#297) ############################################
56&-572J Policy of Justin II 265
that these accounts of the condition of affairs in Egypt hardly justify
inferences as to the character of the administration in other parts
of the Empire, yet stories related by chroniclers who wrote in the
capital suggest that elsewhere also the ordinary course of justice was
powerless to prevent an aristocracy of office from pursuing unchecked its
own personal advantage. Justin, who scorned to favour either of the
popular parties amongst the denies, looked to the nobles to maintain his
high standard—and was disappointed. Similar views underlay all his
foreign policy: Rome could make no concessions, for concessions were
unworthy of the mistress of the world before whom all barbarian tribes
must bow in awe. "We will not purchase peace with gold but win it at
the sword's point":
Justini imtu gentes et regna tremescunt,
Omnia territicat rigid us vigor. . .
—Fast us lion patimus.
Here lies the poignant tragedy of his reign. He would have had Rome
inspired anew with the high ardours of her early prime; and she sank
helpless under the buffets of her foes. For himself his will was that men
should write of him:
Est virtus roburque tibi, praestantior actas,
Prudens consilium, stabilis mens, sancta voluntas,
and yet within a few years his attendants, to stay his frenzied violence,
were terrifying him, as a nurse her naughty child, with the dread name
of a border sheikh upon the Arabian frontier. It is in fact of cardinal
importance to realise that Justin at first shared the faith of Shakespeare's
Bastard, "Come the three corners of the world in arms, and we shall shock
them. "
But if this policy were to be realised there must be no internal
dissension and the theological strife of Justinian's last years must be set
at rest. In concert with John, his courtier patriarch1, Justin strove long
and anxiously for union. John the patrician, on his embassy to Persia,
was charged with the reconciliation of the Monophysites; exiled bishops
were in due course to return to their sees, and Zechariah, archdeacon and
court physician, drew up an edict which should heal the divisions
between the friends and foes of the Council of Chalcedon. But the
fanaticism of the monks at Callinicum defeated John's diplomacy, and
the renewed efforts of the Emperor were rendered fruitless when Jacob
Baradaeus refused to accept an invitation to the capital. Justin's
temper could no longer brook opposition, and in the seventh year of his
reign (571-572) he began in exasperation that fierce persecution of
the Monophysites which is depicted for us by one of the sufferers in
the pages of John of Ephesus.
1 Cf. J. Haury, "Johannes Malalas identisch mit dem Patriarchen Johannes
Scholastikos? " B. Z. ix. (1900), pp. 337-356.
CH. IX.
## p. 266 (#298) ############################################
266 Negotiations with Persia [561-566
Such then were the aims and policy of the new monarch. With the
haughty pride of a Roman aristocrat, with his ill-timed obstinacy and
imperious self-will, Justin flung defiance at his enemies; and he failed to
make good the challenge.
Seven days after his accession he gave audience to Targasiz, an Avar
ambassador, who claimed the annual payment which Justinian had
granted. Did they not merit a reward, the envoy argued, for driving-
from Thrace the tribes which had endangered the capital ? —would it
not indeed be perilous to refuse their request? Plea and threat were alike
of no avail. Surrounded by the gorgeous pageantry of a court reception,
Justin offered the barbarians the choice of peace or war: tribute he would
not pay; it were prodigality to lavish on barbarians the gold which the
Empire could ill spare. He met their murmurs with immediate action,
shipped the Avars across the strait to Chalcedon, and only after six months
dismissed them—three hundred strong—to their homes. For a time
indeed the Emperor's proud words appeared to have had their effect, but
in truth the Avars were busy in Thuringia waging successful war with
the Frankish Sigebert; their revenge for Rome's insult was perforce
postponed, and Justin was free to turn his attention to the East.
John Comentiolus, who bore to the Persian court the news of
Justinian's death and of his nephew's accession, was given instructions to
raise the question of Suania. Under the terms of the Fifty Years' Peace
which had been concluded between the two empires in 561, Chosroes
had agreed to evacuate Lazica; the Romans contended that Suania was
part of Lazica and must also be relinquished. Persia had not admitted
this construction of the agreement, and the question still remained
undecided. Suania indeed was in itself of no particular value; its
importance lay in its strategic situation, for through it the Persians could
attack the Roman frontier in Colchis. The possession of Suania would
secure Rome's position in the east of the Euxine. The embassy was
detained upon its journey and John found that Saracen tribesmen who
acknowledged Persia's overlordship had arrived before him at the court
of Madain; Justinian had granted them money payments on condition
that they should not ravage the Roman frontiers, but these payments
Justin had discontinued, contending that they were originally voluntary
gifts or that, even if they had been made under a binding engagement,
the obligation ceased with the death of the giver. The unwisdom of
the dead, even though he were an emperor, could not bind the living, and
the days of weakness were now past. The Saracen claims were supported
by Chosroes, but the matter was allowed to drop, while the Emperor by
his envoy expressed his strong desire for peace with Persia and for the
maintenance of the treaty between the two peoples. John casually
remarked that, if Lazica was evacuated, Suania by right should also
fall to Rome. The king apparently accepted this view, but professed
himself bound to refer the question to his ministers. The latter were
## p. 267 (#299) ############################################
566] The Saracen Claims 267
willing to yield the territory for a price, but added conditions so
humiliating to the Empire that John felt himself unable to accept
the proposed terms. The king's counsellors in fact sought by diplo-
matic delays to force Rome to take action in Suania, so that they
might then object that the people themselves refused to be subject to
the Empire. The plan succeeded, and John foolishly entered into cor-
respondence with the king of Suania. By this intervention Persia had
secured a subject for negotiation, and now promised that an ambassador
should be sent to Constantinople to discuss the whole situation. Justin
disgraced his envoy, and Zich, who, besides bearing the congratulations
of Persia, was charged with proposals as to Suania, was stopped at
Nisibis. Justin returned thanks for the greetings of Chosroes, but stated
that as to any other matters Rome could not admit discussion. On
Zich's death Mebodes was sent to Constantinople, and with him came the
Saracen chiefs for whom he craved audience. Justin shewed himself so
arbitrary and unapproachable that Mebodes, though abandoning his
patronage of the Saracens, felt that no course was open to him save to
ask for his dismissal. The question of Suania was not debated, and
Ambros, the Arab chieftain, gave orders to his brother Camboses to
attack Alamoundar, the head of the Saracen tribesmen who were allied
to Rome. From the detailed account of these negotiations given by
Menander the reader already traces in Justin's overbearing and irritable
temper a loss of mental balance and a wilful self-assertion which is
almost childish in its unreasoning violence.
Meanwhile the Emperor could not feel secure so long as his cousin
Justin, son of the patrician Germanus, was at the head of the forces on
the Danube, guarding the passes against the Avars; the general was
banished to Alexandria and there assassinated. It seems probable that
Justin's masterful wife was mainly responsible for the murder. About
the same time Aetherius and Addaeus, senators and patricians, were
accused of treason and executed (3 Oct. 5661)-
In the West the influence of the quaestor of the palace, Anastasius
(a native of Africa), would naturally direct the Emperor's attention to
that province. Through the praefect Thomas, peace was concluded with
the Berber tribesmen and new forts were erected to repel assaults of the
barbarians. But these measures were checked2 by the outbreak of
1 There is some doubt as to the precise date of the murder of Justin. Johannes
Biclarensis assigns it to the same year as the conspiracy of Addaeus and Aetherius
(i. e. 566, in John's reckonings Ann. n. Justini) and Evagrius clearly places it
before the trial of Addaeus and Aetherius (Evagr. v. 1-3). Theophanes, it would
appear wrongly, records it (p. 244, 3) under the year 670. —For the prominent
position occupied by Sophia, cf. Warwick Wroth, Catalogue of the Imperial Byzantine
Coins in the British Museum, London (1908), I. p. xix.
2 For three subsequent invasions by the Moors in which one praefect and two
magistri militum were killed, see Joh. Biol. , M. G. H. Chronica Minora (ed. Mommsen),
n. (1894), p. 212, and Diehl, L'A/rique byzantine, pp. 459-460.
## p. 268 (#300) ############################################
268 War with tJie Avars [565-568
hostilities in Europe between the Lombards and the Gepids. In the
war which ensued the Lombards gained the advantage, and the Gepids
then sought to win the alliance of Justin by the splendour of their
gifts. Baduarius, commanding in Scythia and Moesia, received orders
to aid Kunimund, and the Roman forces won a victory over Alboin.
The latter, looking around for allies in his turn, appealed to Baian, the
Khagan of the Avars, who had just concluded a peace with Sigebert.
The Lombards, Alboin urged, were fighting not so much against the
Gepids as against their ally Justin, who but recently had refused the
tribute which Justinian had conceded. Avars and Lombards united
would be irresistible: when Scythia and Thrace were won, the way would
be open for an attack upon Constantinople. Baian at first declined to
listen to the Lombard envoys, but he finally agreed to give his assistance
on condition that he should at once receive one-tenth of all the animals
belonging to the Lombards, that half the spoil taken should be his, and
that to him should fall the whole territory of the conquered Gepids.
The latter were accused before Justin by a Lombard embassy of not
having kept the promises which had been the price of the Roman
alliance; this intervention secured the neutrality of the Emperor.
We know nothing of the struggle save its issue; the Gepids
were defeated on the Danube and driven from their territory, while
Kunimund was slain. But his grandson Reptilanis carried the royal
treasure in safety to Constantinople, while it would seem that the
Roman troops occupied Sirmium before the Avars could seize the city.
Justin despatched Vitalian, the interpreter, and Komitas as ambassadors
to Baian. They were kept in chains while the Avar leader attacked
Bonus in Sirmium: this city, Baian claimed, was his by right; it had
been in the hands of the Gepids, and should now devolve upon him as
spoils of the victory. At the same time he offered conditions of peace
which were remarkable for their extreme moderation—he only demanded
a silver plate, some gold and a Scythian toga; he would be disgraced
before his allies if he went empty-handed away. These terms Bonus and
the bishop of Sirmium felt that they had no authority to accept without
the Emperor's approval. For answer Baian ordered 10,000 Kotrigur
Huns to cross the Save and ravage Dalmatia, while he himself occupied
the territory which had formerly belonged to the Gepids. But he was
not anxious for war, and there followed a succession of attempts at
negotiation; the Roman generals on the frontier were ready to grant the
Avar's conditions, but the autocrat in the capital held fast to his
doctrinaire conceptions of that which Rome's honour would not allow
her to concede. Targitius and Vitalian were sent to Constantinople to
demand the surrender of Sirmium, the payment to Baian of sums formerly
received from Justinian by the Kotrigur and Utigur Huns who were
now tributary to the Avars, and the delivery of the person of Usdibad,
a Gepid fugitive. The Emperor met the proposals with high-sounding
## p. 269 (#301) ############################################
568-570] The Turkish Embassy 269
words and Bonus was bidden to prepare for war. No success can have
attended the Roman arms, for in a second embassy Targitius added to
his former demands the payment of arrears by the Empire. Bonus was
clearly incapable, argued Justin, and Tiberius was accordingly sent to
arrange terms. After some military successes, it would seem, he con-
curred with Apsich in a proposal that land should be furnished by the
Romans for Avar settlement, while sons of Avar chieftains should be
pledges for the good faith of their fellow-countrymen. Tiberius went to
Constantinople to urge the acceptance of these terms, but Justin was
not satisfied: let Baian surrender his own sons as hostages, he retorted,
and once more despatches to the officers in command ordered vigorous
and aggressive action. Tiberius returned to be defeated by the Avars,
and when yet another mission reached the palace, the Emperor realised
that the honour of Rome must give place to the argument of force.
Peace was concluded, and the Avars retired (end of 570 ? ). The course
of the negotiations throws into clear relief the views and aims of Justin,
while the experience thus gained by Tiberius served to mould his policy
as emperor.
For the rest of the reign the East absorbed the whole energy of the
State. In order to understand clearly the causes which led to the war
with Persia it is necessary to return to the year 568, when Constantinople
was visited by an embassy from the Turks. This people, who had only
recently made their appearance in Western Asia, had some ten years
before overthrown the nation of the Ephthalites and were now themselves
the leading power in the vast stretch of country between China and
Persia. The western Chinese kingdom was at times their tributary, at
other times their ally; with a vision of the possibilities which their
geographical position offered they aspired to be the intermediaries
through whose hands should pass the commerce of West and East.
Naturally enough they first appealed to Persia, but the counsels of a
renegade Ephthalite prevailed: the Turks were, he urged, a treacherous
people, it would be an evil day for Persia if she accepted their alliance.
Dizabul however, Khan of the Western Turks under the suzerainty of
the great Mo-kan1, only relinquished the project when he discovered that
the members of a second embassy had been poisoned by Persian treachery.
Then it was that his counsellor Maniach advised that envoys should
be sent to the Roman capital, the greatest emporium for the silk
of China. It was a remarkable proposal; the emperors had often
sought to open up a route to the East which would be free from
Persia's interference—Justinian, for example, had with this object
entered into relations with the Ethiopian court—but no great success
had attended their efforts, and now it was a Turk who unfolded a scheme
whereby the products of East and West should pass and repass without
1 Silziboulos (Sil-Cybul-baya-qayan).
## p. 270 (#302) ############################################
270 Revolt of Persarmenia [568-572
entering Persian territory, while the Turks drew boundless wealth as the
middlemen between China and Rome. Obviously such a compact would
not be acquiesced in by Persia, but Persia was the common foe: Turk
and Roman must form an offensive and defensive alliance. Rome was
troubled in her European provinces by the raids of Avar tribes and these
tribesmen were fugitives from the Turk: Roman and Turk united could
free the Empire from the scourge. Such was the project. The attitude
of Rome's ministers was one of benevolent interest. They desired in-
formation but were unwilling to commit themselves; an embassy was
accordingly despatched to assure Dizabul of their friendship, but when
the Khan set off upon a campaign against Persia, Zemarchus with the
Roman forces began the long march back to Constantinople1. On the
journey he was forced to alter his route through fear of Persian ambushes
in Suania ; suspicions were clearly already aroused and it would seem that
for a time the negotiations with the Turks were dropped*. More than
this was needed to induce Chosroes to declare war.
In 571 Persian Armenia revolted and appealed to the Empire.
It would seem that Justin had been attempting to force upon his
Armenian subjects acceptance of the orthodox Chalcedonian doctrine,
and Chosroes in turn, on the advice of the magi, determined to impose
the worship of the sacred fire upon the whole of Persarmenia. The
Surena with 2000 armed horsemen was sent to Dovin with orders to
establish a fire temple in the city. The Catholicos objected that the
Armenians, though paying tribute to their Persian overlord, were yet
free to practise their own religion. The building of the temple was
however begun in spite of protests, but ten thousand armed Armenians
implored the Surena to lay the matter before Chosroes, and in face of
this force he was compelled to withdraw. Meanwhile, it appears, the
Armenians had secured from Justin a promise that they would be
welcomed within the boundaries of the Empire, and that religious
toleration would be granted them. On the return of the Surena in
command of 15,000 men with directions to carry into execution the
original design, 20,000 Armenians scattered the Persian forces and killed
the Surena, and his severed head was carried to the patrician Justinian
who was in readiness on the frontier at Theodosiopolis. At the same time
the Iberians, with their king Gorgenes, went over to the Romans. The
fugitives were well received; the nobles were given high positions and
estates, while the Roman province was excused three years' tribute.
It was just at this time (571-572) that a new payment to Persia fell
due under the terms of the peace of 561-562, Chosroes having insisted that
1 The embassy of Zemarchus is dated 572-573 by John of Ephesus, vi. 23.
1 The later embassy of Valentinus in 575-576 produced no lasting result. On the**
missions see J. Marquart, "Historische Glossen zu den altturkischen Inschriften,"
Vienna Oriental Journal, in. (1898), pp. 157-200.
## p. 271 (#303) ############################################
572-575] Justin determines on -war with Persia 271
previous instalments should be paid in advance. Sebocthes arrived
(probably early in 572) to remind the Emperor of his obligations. In
the judgment of Chosroes it was to Persia's present advantage that the
peace should remain unbroken. The disagreeable question of Suania
was shelved for the time, and Rome's claims were quietly ignored.
Sebocthes preserved a studied silence in relation to the disturbances in
Armenia and, when Justin mentioned that country, even appeared willing
to recognise the rights of the Christian inhabitants. On dismissal, how-
ever, he was warned by the Emperor that if a finger was raised against
Armenia it would be regarded as a hostile act. Justin indeed seems to
have been anxious to force Persia to take the aggressive. He chose this
moment of diplomatic tension to send the magistrianus Julian on a
mission to Arethas, then reigning in Abyssinia over the Axumite kingdom.
The envoy persuaded Arethas to break faith with his Persian suzerain,
to send his merchandise through the country of the Homerites by way of
the Nile to Egypt and to invade Persian territory. At the head of his
Saracens the king made a successful foray and dismissed Julian with
costly gifts and high honour1. Evidently Justin considered that Chosroes
was only waiting until the Roman gold had been safely received, and that
he would then declare war on the first favourable opportunity.
The Emperor determined to strike the first blow. The continuance
of the peace entailed heavy periodical payments, and throughout his
reign Justin was consistently opposed to enriching the Empire's enemies
at the expense of the national treasury. Though the subsidies paid to
Persia were to be devoted to the upkeep of the northern forts and the
guarding of the passes against eastern invaders, it was easy for any
unkindly critic to represent them as tribute paid by Rome to her rival'.
Again Justin had welcomed the Turkish overtures: the power which had
overthrown the Ephthalites would, he thought, be a formidable ally in
the coming struggle. Further, through the mistakes in diplomacy of his
own envoy, Suania had remained subject to Chosroes, and it was now
additionally necessary that the country should belong to the Empire,
since Persian ambushes rendered insecure the trade route to Turkish
territory from which so much was hoped. But above all the capital had
been deeply stirred by the oppression of the Armenians: Justin was
resolved to champion their cause and, as a Christian monarch, to challenge
the persecutor in their defence. When the ambassadors of the Frankish
Sigebert returned to Gaul early in 575 they were full of the sufferings of
the Armenians; it was to this cause, they told Gregory of Tours, that
the war with Persia was due.
1 This invasion is assigned by Theophanes (244-245) to the year 572. On this
account cf. G. Hertzsch, De Scriptoribus Rerum Imp. Tiberii Corutantini (Leipsic,
1882), p. 38.
8 Cf. the story in John of Ephesus, vi. 23.
## p. 272 (#304) ############################################
272 The Fall of Dara [569-574
The decisive step was taken in the late summer of 572 when, without
warning, Marcianus1, a first cousin of the Emperor on his mother's side,
invaded Arzanene. Justin had given orders for an immediate attack on
Nisibis, but precious time was wasted in fruitless negotiations with the
Persian marzpan, while Chosroes was informed of the danger, Nisibis
victualled and the Christians expelled. Very early in 578 Marcianus, at
the head of troops raised from Rome's Caucasian allies, won some slight
successes, but despatches from the capital insisted on the immediate
investment of Nisibis; the army encamped before the city at the end
of April 573. The Emperor however, suspecting his cousin's loyalty,
appointed Acacius Archelaus' as his successor. Although Nisibis was
about to capitulate, the new commander on his arrival brutally over-
threw the tent and standard of Marcianus, while the general himself with
rude violence was hurried away to Dara. The army, thinking itself
deserted, fled in wild confusion to Mardes, while Chosroes, who had
hastened to relieve Nisibis, now advanced to besiege Dara. At the same
time Adarmaanes marched into the defenceless province of Syria, captured
Antioch, Apamea and other towns, and rejoined Chosroes with a train
of 292,000 prisoners. After an investment of more than five months, on
15 Nov. 573, Dara fell through the negligence or treachery, men said,
of John, son of Timostratus. The city had been regarded as impreg-
nable; men seeking security in troublous times had made it the treasure
house of the Roman East, and the booty of the victors was immense.
On the news of this terrible disaster Justin ordered the shops to be shut
and all trade to cease in the capital; he himself never recovered from the
shock, but became a hopeless and violent imbecile. It seems that for five
years (presumably since 569) Justin had been ailing and suffering from
occasional mental weakness, but it was now clear that he was quite in-
capable of managing the Empire's affairs. Through the year 574 the
Empress in concert with Tiberius, the comes excubitorum, carried on the
government. They were faced with a difficult problem: Rome had been
the aggressor, could she be the first to propose terms of peace? Persia
however intervened, and sent a certain Jakobos, who knew both Greek and
Persian, to conclude a treaty. Rome, Chosroes argued, could not be
further humbled: she must accept the victor's conditions. The letter
was sent to the Empress owing to Justin's incapacity, and it was her
reply that Zacharias bore to the Persian court8.
Rome would pav
45,000 nomismata (metal value about i? 25,000) to secure peace for
a year in the East, though Armenia was not included in this arrange-
ment. If the Emperor recovered, a plenipotentiary should be sent to
1 Called Martinus in Theoph. 245, 25.
1 Theophanes of Byzantium is mistaken in thinking that the new commander was
Theodore, the son of Justinian.
3 Evagrius v. 12 (p. 208) must be regarded as a confusion with the later embassy
of A. n. 575.
## p. 273 (#305) ############################################
574] Policy of Tiberius II 273
determine all matters in dispute and to end the war. But Justin did
not recover, and by the masterful will of the Empress, Tiberius was
adopted as the Emperor's son and created Caesar in the presence of the
patriarch John and of the officials of the Court (Friday, 7 Dec. 574).
It was a scene which deeply impressed the imagination of contemporary
historians. Justin in a pathetic speech confessed with sincere contrition
his failure, and in this brief interval of unclouded mental vision warned
his successor of the dangers which surrounded the throne.
Tiberius, his position now established, at once busied himself with
the work of reorganisation. His assumption of power marks a change
of policy which is of the highest importance. The new Caesar, himself
by birth a Thracian, had seen service on the Danube, and realised that
from the military standpoint the intrarmgeant imperialism of Justin
was too heroic an ideal for the exhausted Empire. Years before he had
approved of terms of peace which would have given the Avars land on
which to settle within Rome's frontiers. Greek influence was every-
where on the increase; at all costs it was the Greek-speaking Asiatic
provinces which must be defended and retained. Persia was the formid-
able foe and it was her rivalry which was the dominating factor in the
situation. Tiberius had indeed with practical insight comprehended
Rome's true policy. Syrian chroniclers of a later day rightly appreciated
this: to them Tiberius stands at the head of a new imperial line, they
know him as the first of the Greek emperors. But if in his view the
Empire, though maintaining its hold on such bulwark cities as Sirmium,
was in the future to place no longer its chief reliance on those European
provinces from which he had himself sprung, the administration must
scrupulously abstain from arousing the hostility of the eastern nationali-
ties: religious persecution must cease and it must be unnecessary for his
subjects to seek under a foreign domination a wider tolerance and a more
spacious freedom for the profession of their own faith. The Monophysites
gratefully acknowledged that during his reign they found in the Emperor
a champion against their ecclesiastical oppressors. This was not all:
there are hints in our authorities which suggest that he regarded as ill-
timed the aristocratic sympathies of Justin, and strove to increase the
authority of the popular elements in the State. It is possible that
the demesmen, suppressed by Justinian after the Nika sedition and
cowed by Justin, owed to the policy of Tiberius some of the influence
which they exercised towards the close of the reign of Maurice. Even at
the risk of what might be judged financial improvidence, the autocrat
must strive to win the esteem, if not the affection, of his subjects.
Tiberius forthwith remitted a year's taxation and endeavoured to restore
the ravages which Adarmaanes had inflicted on Syria. At the same
time he began to remodel the army, attracting to the service of the
State sturdy barbarian soldiers wherever such could be found1.
1 Is not Theophanes 251,24 really summarising the Persian war as carried on by
C. MED. H. VOL. II. CH. IX. 18
## p. 274 (#306) ############################################
274 The Persian Flight from Melitene [575-577
Obviously the immediate question was the state of affairs in the
East. In the spring of 575 Tiberius sent Trajan, quaestor and
physician, with the former envoy Zacharias to obtain a cessation of
hostilities for three years both in the East and Armenia; if that was not
possible, then in the East excluding Armenia. Persia however insisted
that no truce could be granted for any less period than five years,
and the ambassadors therefore consented, subject to the approval of the
Emperor, to accept a truce of five years in the East alone, Rome under-
taking to pay annually 30,000 gold nomumata. These terms Tiberius
rejected: he wanted a truce for two years if possible, but in no event
would he accept an agreement which would tie his hands for more than
three years: by that time he hoped to be able successfully to withstand
Persia in the field. At last Chosroes agreed to a three years' treaty
which was only to affect the East and was not to include Armenia.
Meanwhile, before the result of the negotiations was known, Justinian,
son of the murdered Justin, was appointed general of the East. Early
in the summer, however, Chosroes with unexpected energy marched
north and invaded Armenia; Persarmenia returned to its allegiance,
and by way of the canton of Bagrevand he advanced into the Roman
province and encamped before Theodosiopolis. This city, the key of
Persarmenia and Iberia, he resolved to capture, and thence to proceed
to Caesarea, the metropolis of Cappadocia. The siege, however, was
soon abandoned, and near Sebaste the Persians met the Roman
army under Justinian, who had now assumed command in Armenia.
Personal jealousies paralysed the action of the imperial troops, and
the enemy was thus able to capture and burn Melitene. Then
the fortune of war turned. Chosroes was forced to flee across the
Euphrates and, with the Romans in hot pursuit, only escaped with
great loss over the mountains of Karcha. Justinian followed up this
advantage by spending the winter on Persian soil. His troops pillaged
and plundered unchecked, and in the spring of 576 he took up his
position on the frontier.
The shame of the flight from Melitene was a severe shock to Persian
pride, and there seemed every prospect that now at last peace would be
concluded. At Athraelon, near Dara, Mebodes met Rome's envoys John
and Peter, patricians and senators, together with Zacharias and Theodore,
count of the treasury. During the negotiations however Tamchosro
defeated Justinian in Armenia (576). Elated by this victory, the
Persians withdrew the concessions which they had already made. Still
all through the years 576-577 the plenipotentiaries discussed terms; two
points stood in the way of a final settlement: Persia claimed the right
Tiberius II and does not etc ovopa 18iov = his position was now legalised, aud as
Caesar he could raise troops in his own name? Finlay sees in the passage the
creation of a troop of Buncellarii.
## p. 275 (#307) ############################################
577-68i] Accession of Tiberius II 275
to punish those Armenian fugitives who in 571 had fled to the Empire,
and these Rome absolutely declined to surrender, while Chosroes in turn
persisted in his refusal to consider the cession of Dara which Tiberius
demanded. In 578, when the three years' truce had all but expired,
a new embassy headed by Trajan and Zacharias began the task
afresh.
Meanwhile, in 578, to put a stop to the mutual dissensions of the
Roman generals Tiberius appointed as commander-in-chief of the eastern
troops Maurice, a Cappadocian of Arabissus, descended, it was said, from
the aristocracy of old Rome1, who had formerly served as the Emperor's
notariws and whom, on becoming Caesar, he had created comes excubitorum.
With the means supplied to him by Tiberius, Maurice at once began to
raise a formidable army; he enrolled men from his own native country,
and enlisted recruits from Syria, Iberia, and the province of Hanzit.
With these forces he successfully invaded Arzanene, captured the strong
fortress of Aphoumon, and carried back with him thousands of Persians
and much spoil.
In the autumn of this year (578) Justin, who had temporarily
recovered his reason, crowned Tiberius Emperor (26 Sept. ) and eight days
later, on 4 Oct. , his troubled life was ended.
Tiberius now as ever sought military triumphs only as a means to
diplomatic ends. In consequence of the victories of the summer he had
in his hands numerous important captives, some of them even connexions
of the royal house. He at once despatched Zacharias and a general,
Theodore by name, giving them full powers to conclude peace and
offering to return the prisoners of war. The Emperor professed himself
prepared to surrender Iberia and Persarmenia (but not those refugees
who had fled to the shelter of the Empire), to evacuate Arzanene and
to restore the fortress of Aphoumon, while in return Dara was to be given
back to the Empire. Tiberius was desirous of arriving at a speedy
agreement, so that the enemy might not gain time for collecting rein-
forcements. Despite the delay of a counter mission from Persia there
was every prospect that Rome's conditions would be accepted, when in
the early spring of 579 Chosroes died and was succeeded on the throne
by Ormizd. Though the Emperor was willing to offer the same terms,
Ormizd procrastinated, while making every effort to provision Dara
and Nisibis and to raise fresh levies. At length he definitely refused to
surrender Dara and stipulated anew for an annual money payment
(summer, 579). The military and diplomatic operations of the years
579-581, though interesting enough in themselves, did not really alter
the general position of affairs.
Thus inconclusively dragged on the long hostilities between the rival
powers in the East, but in Europe the Avars had grown discontented
1 A later tradition connects him with Armenia: cf. B. Z. xix. (1910), p. 649.
ch. ix. 18—2
## p. 276 (#308) ############################################
276 Surrender of Sirmium [580-582
with the Empire's subsidies. Targitius was sent in 580 to receive the
tribute, but immediately after the envoy's departure Baian started with
his rude flotilla down the Danube and, marching over the neck of
country between that river and the Save, appeared before Sirmium and
there began to construct a bridge. When the Roman general in
the neighbouring fortress of Singidunum protested at this violation of
the peace the Khagan claimed that his sole aim was to cross the Save in
order to march through the territory of the Empire, recross the Danube
with the help of the Roman fleet, and thus attack the common enemy,
the Slav invaders, who had refused to render to the Avars their annual
tribute. Sirmium was without stores of provisions and had no effective
garrison. Tiberius had relied upon the continuance of the peace and all
his available troops were in Armenia and Mesopotamia. When Baian's
ambassador arrived in the capital, the Emperor could only temporise:
he himself was preparing an expedition against the Slavs, but for the
present he would suggest that the moment was ill-chosen for a campaign,
since the Turks were occupying the Chersonese (Bosporos had fallen into
their hands in 576) and might shortly advance westward. The Avar
envoy was not slow to appreciate the true position, but on the return
journey he and the attendant Romans were slain by a band of Slav
pillagers—this fact casually mentioned gives us some idea of the con-
dition at this time of the open country-side in the Danubian provinces.
Meanwhile Baian had been pressing forward the building of the bridge
over the Save, and Solachos, the new Avar ambassador, now threw off
the mask and demanded the evacuation of Sirmium. "I would sooner
give your master,11 Tiberius replied, "one of my two daughters to wife
than I would of my own free will surrender Sirmium. 11 The Danube
and the Save were held by the enemy, and the Emperor had no army,
but through Illyria and Dalmatia officers were sent to conduct the
defence. On the islands of Casia and Carbonaria Theognis met the
Khagan, but negotiations were fruitless. For two years, despite fearful
hardships, the city resisted, but the governor was incompetent, and the
troops under Theognis inadequate, and at last, some short time before his
death, Tiberius, to save the citizens, sacrificed Sirmium. The inhabitants
were granted life, but all their possessions were left in the hands of the
barbarians, who also exacted the sum of 240,000 nomismata as payment
for the three years1 arrears (580-582) due under the terms of the former
agreement which was still to remain in force.
It was during the investment of Sirmium that the Slavs seized their
golden hour. They poured over Thrace and Thessaly, scouring the
Roman provinces as far as the Long Walls—a flood of murder and of
ravage: the black horror of their onset still darkens the pages of John
of Ephesus.
In the year which saw the fall of Sirmium (582) Tiberius died. Feeling
that his end was near, on 5 Aug. he created Maurice Caesar and gave
## p. 277 (#309) ############################################
582-586] Accession of Maurice 277
to him the name of Tiberius1; at the same time the Emperor's elder
daughter was named Constantina and betrothed to Maurice. Eight
days later, before an assemblage of representatives of army, church and
people, Tiberius crowned the Caesar Emperor (13 Aug. ) and on 14 Aug.
582, in the palace of the Hebdomon, he breathed his last. The marriage
of Maurice followed hard on the funeral of his father-in-law. We would
gladly have learned more of the policy and aims of'Tiberius. We can
but dimly divine in him a practical statesman who with sure prescience
had seen what was possible of achievement and where the Empire's true
future lay. He fought not for conquest but for peace, he struggled to
win from Persia a recognition that Rome was her peer, that on a basis of
security the Empire might work out its internal union and concentrate
its strength around the shores of the eastern Mediterranean. "The
sins of men," says the chronicler, "were the reason for his short reign.
Men were not worthy of so good an emperor. "
"Make your rule my fairest epitaph" were the words of Tiberius
to Maurice, and the new monarch undertook his task in a spirit of high
seriousness. At his accession Maurice appointed John Mystakon com-
mander-in-chief of the eastern armies, and this position he held until
584, when he was superseded by Philippicus, the Emperor's brother-in-
law. The details of the military operations during the years 582-585
cannot be given here it may be sufficient to state that their general
result was indecisive—most of the time was spent in the capture or
defence of isolated fortresses or in raids upon the enemy's territory'.
No pitched battle of any importance occurred till 586. Philippicus
had met Mebodes at Amida in order to discuss terms of peace, but
Persia had demanded a money payment, and such a condition Maurice
would not accept. The Roman general, finding that negotiations were
useless, led his forces to Mount Izala, and at Solochon the armies engaged.
The Persians were led by Kardarigan, while Mebodes commanded on
the right wing and Aphraates, a cousin of Kardarigan, on the left.
Philippicus was persuaded not to adventure his life in the forefront of the
battle, so that the Roman centre was entrusted to Heraclius, the father of
the future emperor. Vitalius faced Aphraates, while Wilfred, the praefect
of Emesa, and Apsich the Hun opposed Mebodes. On a Sunday morning
the engagement began: the right wing routed Aphraates, but was with
1 It would seem that Germanus was also created Caesar but declined the responsi-
bilities which Maurice was prepared to assume.
1 A short chronological note may however be of service. 582, autumn: John
Mystakon commander-in-chief in Armenia: Roman success on Nymphius turned
into a rout through jealousy of Hours. 583: Capture of fort of Akbas, near
Martyropolis, by Rome. Peace negotiations between Rome and Persia. 584:
Marriage of Philippicus to Gordia, sister of Maurice: Philippicus appointed to
succeed John in the East. He fortifies Monokarton and ravages country round
Nisibis. 585: Philippicus ill: retires to Martyropolis. Stephanus and the Hun
Apsich successfully defend Monokarton.
## p. 278 (#310) ############################################
278 Mutiny of the Eastern Army [586-588
difficulty recalled from its capture of the Persian baggage; the defeated
troops now strengthened the enemy's centre and some of the Roman
horse were forced to dismount to steady the ranks under Heraclius.
But during a desperate hand-to-hand struggle the cavalry charged
the Persians and the day was won: the left wing pursued the troops
under Mebodes as far as Dara. Philippicus then began the siege of
the fortress of Chlorfiara, but his position was turned by the forces under
Kardarigan; a sudden panic seized the Roman commander, who fled
precipitately under cover of night to Aphoumon. The enemy, suspecting
treachery, advanced with caution, but encountered no resistance, while the
seizure of the Roman baggage-train relieved them from threatened
starvation. Across the Nymphius by Amida to Mount Izala Philippicus
retreated: here the forts were strengthened and the command given to
Heraclius, who in late autumn led a pillaging expedition across the Tigris.
The flight of Philippicus may well have been due, at least in part, to
a fresh attack of illness, for in 587 he was unable to take the field, and
when he started for the capital, Heraclius was left as commander in the
East and at once began to restore order and discipline among the Roman
troops.
Maurice's well-intentioned passion for economy had led him to issue
an order that the soldiers' pay should be reduced by a quarter; Philippicus
clearly felt that this was a highly dangerous and inexpedient measure—
the army's anger might lead to the proclamation of a rival emperor; he
delayed the publication of the edict, and it was probably with a view of
explaining the whole situation to his master that, despite his illness, he
set out for Constantinople. On his journey, however, he learned that he
had been superseded and that Priscus had been appointed commander-
in-chief. If Maurice had ceased to trust his brother-in-law let the new
general do what he could: Philippicus would no longer stay his hand.
From Tarsus he ordered Heraclius to leave the army in the hands of
Narses, governor of Constantina, and himself to retire to Armenia; he
further directed the publication of the fatal edict.
Early in 588 Priscus arrived in Antioch. The Roman forces were to
concentrate in Monokarton; and from Edessa he made his way,accompanied
by the bishop of Damascus, towards the camp with the view of celebrating
Easter amongst his men. But when the troops came forth to meet him,
his haughtiness and failure to observe the customary military usages
disgusted the army and at this critical moment a report spread that their
pay was to be reduced. A mutiny forced Priscus to take refuge in
Constantina, and the fears of Philippicus proved well founded. Ger-
manus, commander in the Lebanon district of Phoenicia, was against his
own will proclaimed emperor, though he exacted an oath that the
soldiers would not plunder the luckless provincials. A riot at Constantina,
where the Emperor's statues were overthrown, drove the fugitive Priscus
to Edessa, and thence he was hounded forth to seek shelter in the capital.
## p. 279 (#311) ############################################
588-590] Fall of Martyropolis 279
Maurice's only course was to reappoint Philippicustothesupreme command
in the East, but the army, which had elected its own officers, was not to
be thus easily pacified: the troops solemnly swore that they would never
receive the nominee of an emperor whom they no longer acknowledged.
Meanwhile, as was but natural, Persia seized her opportunity and invested
Constantina, but Germanus prevailed upon his men to take action and
the city was relieved. The soldiers1 resentment was lessened by the
skilful diplomacy of Aristobulus, who brought gifts from Constantinople,
and Germanus was able to invade Persia with a force of 4000 men.
Though checked by Marouzas, he retired in safety to the Nymphius, and
at Martyropolis Marouzas was defeated and killed by the united Roman
forces: three thousand captives were taken, among them many prominent
Persians, while the spoils and standards were sent to Maurice. This was
the signal that the army was once more prepared to acknowledge the
Emperor, and all would have been well had not Maurice felt it necessary
to insist that Philippicus should again be accepted by the troops as their
general. This however they refused to do, even when Andreas, captain
of the imperial shield-bearers, was sent to them; and only after a year's
cessation of hostilities (588-589) was the army, through the personal
influence of Gregory, bishop of Antioch, persuaded to obey its former
commander (Easter 590). Philippicus did not long enjoy his triumph.
About this time Martyropolis fell by treachery into Persian hands, and
with the spring of 590' the Roman forces marched into Armenia to
recover the city. When he failed in this Philippicus was superseded by
Comentiolus, and although the latter was unsuccessful, Heraclius won
a brilliant victory and captured the enemy's camp.
It is at first sight somewhat surprising that the Persians had remained
inactive during the year 589, but we know that they were fully engaged
with internal difficulties. The violence of Ormizd had, it seems, caused
a dangerous revolt in Kusistan and Kerman, and in face of this peril
Persia accepted an offer of help from the Turks. Once admitted into
Khorasan, Schaweh Schah disregarded his promises and advanced south-
wards in the direction of the capital, but was met by Bahrain Cobin, the
governor of Media, and was defeated in the mountains of Ghilan. The
power of the Turks was broken: they could no longer exact, but were
bound to pay, an annual tribute. After this signal success Bahrain
Cobin undertook an invasion of Roman territory in the Caucasus district;
the Persians encountered no resistance, for the imperial forces were con-
centrated in Armenia. Maurice sent Romanus to engage the enemy in
Albania, and in the valley of one of the streams flowing into the Araxes
Bahrain was so severely worsted that he was in consequence removed
from his command by Ormizd. Thus disgraced he determined to seize the
1 This is not the usually accepted chronology. The present writer hopes shortly
to support the view here taken in a paper on the literary construction of the history
of Theophylactus Simocatta.
## p. 280 (#312) ############################################
280 Chosroes restored by Maurice [591-600
crown for himself but veiled his real plan under the pretext of champion-
ing the cause of Chosroes, Ormizd's eldest son1. At the same time a plot
was formed in the palace, and Bahram was forestalled: the conspirators
dethroned the king and Chosroes was crowned at Ctesiphon. But after
the assassination of Ormizd the new monarch was unable to maintain
his position: his troops deserted to Bahram, and he was forced to throw
himself upon the mercy of the Emperor. As a helpless fugitive the
King of kings arrived at Circesium and craved Rome's protection, offer-
ing in return to restore the lost Armenian provinces and to surrender
Martyropolis and Dara. Despite the counsels of the senate, Maurice
saw in this strange reversal of fortune a chance to terminate a war which
was draining the Empire's strength: his resolve to accede to his enemy's
request was at once a courageous and a statesmanlike action. He
furnished Chosroes with men and money, Narses took command of the
troops and John Mystakon marched from Armenia to join the army.
The two forces met at Sargana (probably Sirgan, in the plain of Ushnei1)
and in the neighbourhood of Ganzaca (Takhti-Soleiman) defeated and
put to flight Bahram, while Chosroes recovered his throne without further
resistance. The new monarch kept his promises to Rome and surrounded
himself with a Roman body-guard (591). By this interposition Maurice
had restored the Empire's frontier5 and had ended the long-drawu struggle
in the East.
In 592 therefore he could transport his army into Europe, and was able
to employ his whole military force in the Danubian provinces. Maurice
himself went with the troops as far as Anchialus, when he was recalled
by the presence of a Persian embassy in the capital. The chronology of
the next few years is confused and it is impossible to give here a detailed
account of the campaigns. Their general object was to maintain the
Danube as the frontier line against the Avars and to restrict the forays
of the Slavs. In this Priscus met with considerable success, but Peter,
Maurice's brother, who superseded him in 597, displayed hopeless
incompetency and Priscus was reappointed4. In 600 Comentiolus.
who was, it would appear, in command against his own will, entered
into communications with the Khagan in order to secure the dis-
comfiture of the Roman forces: he was, in fact, anxious to prove that
the attempt to defend the northern frontier was labour lost. He
ultimately fled headlong to the capital and only the personal inter-
ference of the Emperor stifled the inquiry into his treachery. On this
1 There seems no sufficient evidence for the theory that Bahram Cobin relied on
a legitimist claim as representing the prae-Sassanid dynasty.
2 See H. C. Rawliuson, "Memoir on the site of the Atropatenian Ecbatana,"
Journal of the Royal Geographical Society (1840), pp. 71 ff.
3 See maps by H. Hiibschmann in "Die altarmenischen Ortsnamen," Indoger-
manUche Forschungen, xvi. (1904), and in Gelzer's Oeorgius Oyprhu.
4 For the siege of Thessalonica in this year, cf. Wroth, op. cit. i. p. xri.
## p. 281 (#313) ############################################
600-602] Campaigns on the Danube Frontier 281
occasion the panic in Constantinople was such that the city guard—the
Brjfioi—were sent by Maurice to man the Long Walls1.
