Objection
2: Further, nothing can be its own form.
Summa Theologica
Secondly, because every composite is posterior to
its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first
being, as shown above ([11]Q[2], A[3]). Thirdly, because every
composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite
unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown
above ([12]Q[2], A[3]), since He is the first efficient cause.
Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and
actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts
actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole.
Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one
of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar
parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot,
a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something
which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part
of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain
things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of
the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no
part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is
something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of
whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself,
as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the
essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing
besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute
being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument,
when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made up of
things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that
are dim. "
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused
things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to
be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from
its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ([13]Q[4], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 2: With us composite things are better than simple
things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in
one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine
goodness is found in one simple thing ([14]Q[4], A[1] and [15]Q[6],
A[2]).
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Whether God enters into the composition of other things?
Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other
things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things
is that which is above being---the Godhead. " But the being of all
things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters
into the composition of other things.
Objection 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. ,
[*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated
form. " But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some
compound.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from
each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no
way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But
primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does
God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some
differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary
matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each
other.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
touching Him," i. e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part
with part. "
Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with
them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).
I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have
affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De
Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those
who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others
have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was
the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of
Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all
these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to
enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a
material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause.
Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of
the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But
primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical
with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the
latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient
cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which
enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and
essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not
act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God
cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound
can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form,
though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is
merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to
actuality, as is clear from the foregoing ([16]Q[3], A[1]): while a
form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that
which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise
is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior
to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is
absolutely primal being ([17]Q[2], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things, as
their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.
Reply to Objection 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that
is part of a compound.
Reply to Objection 3: Simple things do not differ by added
differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse
differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which
differences, however, do not differ from each other by other
differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they
are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but
things which are different differ by something. " Therefore, strictly
speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very
being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.
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THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)
Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's
perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called
good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the
divine goodness.
Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is perfect?
(2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the
perfections of all things?
(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?
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Whether God is perfect?
Objection 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we
say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit
God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.
Objection 2: Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the
beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of
animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.
Objection 3: Further, as shown above ([18]Q[3], A[4]), God's essence is
existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most
universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is
imperfect.
On the contrary, It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly
Father is perfect" (Mat. 5:48).
I answer that, As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient
philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate
"best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that
the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a
material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is
merely potential, the first material principle must be simply
potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not
material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most
perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as
such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle
must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is
perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that
perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our
lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God. " For that
which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because
created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are
brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not
wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.
Reply to Objection 2: The material principle which with us is found to
be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by
something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life
reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from
which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be
that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into
act by some being already actual.
Reply to Objection 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for
it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for
nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is
that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not
compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather
as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the
existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a
formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which
exists.
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Whether the perfections of all things are in God?
Objection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in
God. For God is simple, as shown above ([19]Q[3], A[7]); whereas the
perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections
of all things are not in God.
Objection 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of
things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its
specific difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided,
and "species" constituted, are opposed to each other. Therefore because
opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the
perfections of all things are not in God.
Objection 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely
exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore life
is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the
essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the
perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one
existence prepossesses all things. "
I answer that, All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken
of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator,
Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be
seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists
in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same
formality, if it is a univocal agent---as when man reproduces man; or
in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent---thus in the sun
is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is
plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause: and
although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to
pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect,
and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the
efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more
perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause of
things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more
eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of
God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He
is all, as the cause of all. " Secondly, from what has been already
proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent ([20]Q[3], A[4]).
Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of
being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole
perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its
full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the
virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is
subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be
wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the
perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they
have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection
of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is
implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists not
in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely,
without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards he adds that, "He is the
very existence to subsisting things. "
Reply to Objection 1: Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom.
v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself
first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and
diverse qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a kind of natural
unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and
in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without
injury to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply to the Second
Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that,
although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if
they are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living
thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things
also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although
therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that
which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of
existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and
wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to
Him who is subsisting being itself.
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Whether any creature can be like God?
Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is
written (Ps. 85:8): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O
Lord. " But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are
called participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be
said to be like God.
Objection 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no
comparison between things in a different "genus. " Therefore neither can
there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like
whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as God: since God is
no "genus," as shown above ([21]Q[3], A[5]). Therefore no creature is
like God.
Objection 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in
form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone,
essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.
Objection 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for
like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will
be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To
whom have you likened God? " (Is. 40:18).
On the contrary, It is written: "Let us make man to our image and
likeness" (Gn. 1:26), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to
Him" (1 Jn. 3:2).
I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication
in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in
form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same
form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode;
and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness;
as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and this
is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things as
alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though
not according to the same measure, but according to more or less, as
something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and
this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are said to be
alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same
formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent
reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts
according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way
resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in
the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form
between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same
formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent
and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a
likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as
things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as
like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its
specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is
an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still more
distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to
participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same
specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of
analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things,
so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal
principle of all being.
Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ
declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all
likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God:
like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly
imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their
cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that which is less
white falls short of that which is more white; but because they are not
in agreement, specifically or generically.
Reply to Objection 2: God is not related to creatures as though
belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus,"
and as the principle of all "genera. "
Reply to Objection 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on
account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same
genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is
essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
Reply to Objection 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are in
some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like
creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual
likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between
a cause and that which is caused. " For, we say that a statue is like a
man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of as in some
sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.
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OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)
We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the
goodness of God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?
(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?
(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?
(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?
(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?
(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the
pleasant?
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Whether goodness differs really from being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For
Boethius says (De Hebdom. ): "I perceive that in nature the fact that
things are good is one thing: that they are is another. " Therefore
goodness and being really differ.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called
good which has the form of being", according to the commentary on De
Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
Objection 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be
more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that,
"inasmuch as we exist we are good. "
I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only
in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of
goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire. " Now it is
clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for
all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it
is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it
exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear
from the foregoing ([22]Q[3], A[4]; [23]Q[4], A[1]). Hence it is clear
that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the
aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.
Reply to Objection 1: Although goodness and being are the same really,
nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a
thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that
something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to
potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being,
accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in
potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial being.
Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being
simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being
relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white
does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a
thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But
goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of
ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said
to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it
ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some
perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only
relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i. e.
substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good
relatively (i. e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete
actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply.
Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom. ), "I perceive that in nature
the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another,"
is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being
simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply
exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply---in
such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good,
and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness
signifies complete actuality.
Reply to Objection 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less
according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to
knowledge or virtue.
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Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For
names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified
by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place,
amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His
being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Objection 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in
idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius
notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and
non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone. "
Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.
Objection 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But
goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the
aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it
is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been
born" (Mat. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Objection 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life,
knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence
is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible.
Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.
On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of
created things is being. "
I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning
signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of
the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that
is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the
first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is
knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the
proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as sound
is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to
goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom.
i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he
says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since
it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the
causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act
except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence
the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is
prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names
signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again,
according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary
matter from privation, said that matter was non-being, goodness is more
extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in
goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not
participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. Therefore
Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).
Reply to Objection 2: The same solution is applied to this objection.
Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing
things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it
can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply
those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not
actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only
actual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even
those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being
implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or
exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which
are actual.
Reply to Objection 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only
relatively---i. e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be
removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot
be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some
being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only
relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one
cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as
relatively good.
Reply to Objection 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so
far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being
is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and
consequently nothing is good except being.
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Whether every being is good?
Objection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is
something superadded to being, as is clear from A[1]. But whatever is
added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc.
Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.
Objection 2: Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good
and good evil" (Is. 5:20). But some things are called evil. Therefore
not every being is good.
Objection 3: Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter
does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore
primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore
not every being is good.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in
mathematics goodness does not exist. " But mathematics are entities;
otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every
being is good.
On the contrary, Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now
every creature of God is good (1 Tim. 4:4): and God is the greatest
good. Therefore every being is good.
I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being,
has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some
sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness,
as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every being as such is
good.
Reply to Objection 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything
included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature.
Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the
aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being,
whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.
Reply to Objection 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as
being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be
evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil,
because it lacks the power to see well.
Reply to Objection 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so it
is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists,
primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the
privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a
certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for,
goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to
desire.
Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as
realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted;
but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted
from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,
which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that
there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of
goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as
was said in the preceding article.
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Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final
cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty. " But beauty has the aspect of
a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.
Objection 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and
are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we
exist because God is good. " But we owe our existence to God as the
efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient
cause.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of
which something is. " Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final
cause.
I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and
since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies
the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes
the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see
that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e. g.
heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the
heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing,
goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act;
secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes
the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take
place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being;
secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect
in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the
Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality of
goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical
fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the
form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ
logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness
being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an
end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the
other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due
proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in
what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason,
just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by
assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs
to the nature of a formal cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the
sense that an end is said to move.
Reply to Objection 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as
he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever
powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good
understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as
to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good"
has reference to the final cause.
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Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in
mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But
mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it
is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and
weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode
and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the
mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it
rest and stability. " Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist
in mode, species and order.
Objection 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good.
Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The
same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.
Objection 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order.
But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of
goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
Objection 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness
cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species
and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order.
Objection 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight,
number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But
not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says
(Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not to have been created
in number, weight and measure. " Therefore the essence of goodness does
not consist in mode, species and order.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These
three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in
everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are
very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do
not exist at all, there can be nothing good. " But this would not be
unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence
of goodness consists in mode, species and order.
I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect;
for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above [24]AA[1],3). Now
a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode
of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and
since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain
things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good
it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon
that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of
its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by
the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the
form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in
its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species,
for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a
number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a
definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an
inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for
everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that
which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and
order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in
perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.
Reply to Objection 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it
is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.
Reply to Objection 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and
to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but
because it is through them that other things are both beings and good.
Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they
are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by
something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus
whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything else;
but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object
that is white.
Reply to Objection 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence, according
to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has
a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on;
according to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of
some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is
sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species and order, but only
such as follow upon the being of sight.
its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first
being, as shown above ([11]Q[2], A[3]). Thirdly, because every
composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite
unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown
above ([12]Q[2], A[3]), since He is the first efficient cause.
Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and
actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts
actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole.
Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one
of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar
parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot,
a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something
which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part
of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain
things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of
the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no
part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is
something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of
whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself,
as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the
essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing
besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute
being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument,
when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made up of
things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that
are dim. "
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused
things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to
be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from
its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ([13]Q[4], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 2: With us composite things are better than simple
things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in
one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine
goodness is found in one simple thing ([14]Q[4], A[1] and [15]Q[6],
A[2]).
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Whether God enters into the composition of other things?
Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other
things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things
is that which is above being---the Godhead. " But the being of all
things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters
into the composition of other things.
Objection 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. ,
[*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated
form. " But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some
compound.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from
each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no
way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But
primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does
God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some
differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary
matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each
other.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
touching Him," i. e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part
with part. "
Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with
them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).
I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have
affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De
Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those
who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others
have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was
the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of
Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all
these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to
enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a
material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause.
Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of
the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But
primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical
with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the
latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient
cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which
enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and
essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not
act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God
cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound
can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form,
though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is
merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to
actuality, as is clear from the foregoing ([16]Q[3], A[1]): while a
form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that
which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise
is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior
to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is
absolutely primal being ([17]Q[2], A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things, as
their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.
Reply to Objection 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that
is part of a compound.
Reply to Objection 3: Simple things do not differ by added
differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse
differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which
differences, however, do not differ from each other by other
differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they
are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but
things which are different differ by something. " Therefore, strictly
speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very
being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.
__________________________________________________________________
THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)
Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's
perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called
good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the
divine goodness.
Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is perfect?
(2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the
perfections of all things?
(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?
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Whether God is perfect?
Objection 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we
say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit
God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.
Objection 2: Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the
beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of
animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.
Objection 3: Further, as shown above ([18]Q[3], A[4]), God's essence is
existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most
universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is
imperfect.
On the contrary, It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly
Father is perfect" (Mat. 5:48).
I answer that, As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient
philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate
"best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that
the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a
material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is
merely potential, the first material principle must be simply
potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not
material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most
perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as
such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle
must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is
perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that
perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our
lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God. " For that
which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because
created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are
brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not
wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.
Reply to Objection 2: The material principle which with us is found to
be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by
something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life
reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from
which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be
that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into
act by some being already actual.
Reply to Objection 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for
it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for
nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is
that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not
compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather
as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the
existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a
formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which
exists.
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Whether the perfections of all things are in God?
Objection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in
God. For God is simple, as shown above ([19]Q[3], A[7]); whereas the
perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections
of all things are not in God.
Objection 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of
things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its
specific difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided,
and "species" constituted, are opposed to each other. Therefore because
opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the
perfections of all things are not in God.
Objection 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely
exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore life
is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the
essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the
perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one
existence prepossesses all things. "
I answer that, All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken
of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator,
Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be
seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists
in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same
formality, if it is a univocal agent---as when man reproduces man; or
in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent---thus in the sun
is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is
plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause: and
although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to
pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect,
and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the
efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more
perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause of
things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more
eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of
God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He
is all, as the cause of all. " Secondly, from what has been already
proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent ([20]Q[3], A[4]).
Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of
being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole
perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its
full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the
virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is
subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be
wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the
perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they
have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection
of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is
implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists not
in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely,
without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards he adds that, "He is the
very existence to subsisting things. "
Reply to Objection 1: Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom.
v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself
first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and
diverse qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a kind of natural
unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and
in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without
injury to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply to the Second
Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that,
although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if
they are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living
thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things
also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although
therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that
which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of
existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and
wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to
Him who is subsisting being itself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any creature can be like God?
Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is
written (Ps. 85:8): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O
Lord. " But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are
called participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be
said to be like God.
Objection 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no
comparison between things in a different "genus. " Therefore neither can
there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like
whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as God: since God is
no "genus," as shown above ([21]Q[3], A[5]). Therefore no creature is
like God.
Objection 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in
form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone,
essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.
Objection 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for
like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will
be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To
whom have you likened God? " (Is. 40:18).
On the contrary, It is written: "Let us make man to our image and
likeness" (Gn. 1:26), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to
Him" (1 Jn. 3:2).
I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication
in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in
form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same
form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode;
and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness;
as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and this
is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things as
alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though
not according to the same measure, but according to more or less, as
something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and
this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are said to be
alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same
formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent
reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts
according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way
resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in
the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form
between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same
formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent
and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a
likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as
things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as
like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its
specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is
an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still more
distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to
participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same
specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of
analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things,
so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal
principle of all being.
Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ
declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all
likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God:
like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly
imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their
cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that which is less
white falls short of that which is more white; but because they are not
in agreement, specifically or generically.
Reply to Objection 2: God is not related to creatures as though
belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus,"
and as the principle of all "genera. "
Reply to Objection 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on
account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same
genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is
essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
Reply to Objection 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are in
some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like
creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual
likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between
a cause and that which is caused. " For, we say that a statue is like a
man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of as in some
sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.
__________________________________________________________________
OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)
We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the
goodness of God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?
(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?
(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?
(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?
(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?
(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the
pleasant?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether goodness differs really from being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For
Boethius says (De Hebdom. ): "I perceive that in nature the fact that
things are good is one thing: that they are is another. " Therefore
goodness and being really differ.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called
good which has the form of being", according to the commentary on De
Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
Objection 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be
more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that,
"inasmuch as we exist we are good. "
I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only
in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of
goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire. " Now it is
clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for
all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it
is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it
exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear
from the foregoing ([22]Q[3], A[4]; [23]Q[4], A[1]). Hence it is clear
that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the
aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.
Reply to Objection 1: Although goodness and being are the same really,
nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a
thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that
something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to
potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being,
accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in
potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial being.
Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being
simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being
relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white
does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a
thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But
goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of
ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said
to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it
ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some
perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only
relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i. e.
substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good
relatively (i. e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete
actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply.
Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom. ), "I perceive that in nature
the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another,"
is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being
simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply
exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply---in
such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good,
and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness
signifies complete actuality.
Reply to Objection 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less
according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to
knowledge or virtue.
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Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For
names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified
by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place,
amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His
being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Objection 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in
idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius
notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and
non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone. "
Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.
Objection 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But
goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the
aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it
is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been
born" (Mat. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Objection 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life,
knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence
is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible.
Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.
On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of
created things is being. "
I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning
signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of
the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that
is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the
first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is
knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the
proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as sound
is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to
goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom.
i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he
says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since
it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the
causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act
except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence
the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is
prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names
signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again,
according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary
matter from privation, said that matter was non-being, goodness is more
extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in
goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not
participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. Therefore
Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).
Reply to Objection 2: The same solution is applied to this objection.
Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing
things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it
can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply
those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not
actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only
actual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even
those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being
implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or
exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which
are actual.
Reply to Objection 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only
relatively---i. e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be
removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot
be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some
being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only
relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one
cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as
relatively good.
Reply to Objection 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so
far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being
is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and
consequently nothing is good except being.
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Whether every being is good?
Objection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is
something superadded to being, as is clear from A[1]. But whatever is
added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc.
Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.
Objection 2: Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good
and good evil" (Is. 5:20). But some things are called evil. Therefore
not every being is good.
Objection 3: Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter
does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore
primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore
not every being is good.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in
mathematics goodness does not exist. " But mathematics are entities;
otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every
being is good.
On the contrary, Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now
every creature of God is good (1 Tim. 4:4): and God is the greatest
good. Therefore every being is good.
I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being,
has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some
sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness,
as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every being as such is
good.
Reply to Objection 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything
included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature.
Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the
aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being,
whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.
Reply to Objection 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as
being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be
evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil,
because it lacks the power to see well.
Reply to Objection 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so it
is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists,
primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the
privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a
certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for,
goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to
desire.
Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as
realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted;
but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted
from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,
which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that
there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of
goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as
was said in the preceding article.
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Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final
cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty. " But beauty has the aspect of
a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.
Objection 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and
are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we
exist because God is good. " But we owe our existence to God as the
efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient
cause.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of
which something is. " Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final
cause.
I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and
since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies
the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes
the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see
that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e. g.
heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the
heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing,
goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act;
secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes
the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take
place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being;
secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect
in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the
Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality of
goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical
fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the
form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ
logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness
being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an
end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the
other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due
proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in
what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason,
just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by
assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs
to the nature of a formal cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the
sense that an end is said to move.
Reply to Objection 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as
he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever
powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good
understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as
to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good"
has reference to the final cause.
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Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in
mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But
mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it
is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and
weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode
and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the
mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it
rest and stability. " Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist
in mode, species and order.
Objection 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good.
Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The
same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.
Objection 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order.
But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of
goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
Objection 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness
cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species
and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order.
Objection 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight,
number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But
not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says
(Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not to have been created
in number, weight and measure. " Therefore the essence of goodness does
not consist in mode, species and order.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These
three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in
everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are
very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do
not exist at all, there can be nothing good. " But this would not be
unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence
of goodness consists in mode, species and order.
I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect;
for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above [24]AA[1],3). Now
a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode
of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and
since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain
things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good
it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon
that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of
its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by
the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the
form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in
its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species,
for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a
number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a
definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an
inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for
everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that
which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and
order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in
perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.
Reply to Objection 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it
is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.
Reply to Objection 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and
to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but
because it is through them that other things are both beings and good.
Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they
are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by
something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus
whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything else;
but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object
that is white.
Reply to Objection 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence, according
to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has
a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on;
according to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of
some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is
sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species and order, but only
such as follow upon the being of sight.
