(a)
depreciated
the joy living and the gratitude felt towards Life, etc.
Nietzsche - Works - v14 - Will to Power - a
?
?
2O8 THE WILL TO POWER.
and we should not raise a finger to destroy them. But what we do stand up against, is that ideal which, thanks to its morbid beauty and feminine seductiveness, thanks to its insidious and slanderous eloquence, appeals
to all the cowardices and
vanities of wearied souls,--and the strongest have
their moments of fatigue,--as though all that which seems most useful and desirable at such
moments--that is to say, confidence, artlessness, modesty, patience, love of one's like, resignation, submission to God, and a sort of self-surrender-- were useful and desirable per se; as though the puny, modest abortion which in these creatures takes the place of a soul, this virtuous, mediocre
animal and sheep of the flock--which deigns to
call itself man, were not only to take precedence of the stronger, more evil, more passionate, more
defiant, and more prodigal type of man, who by virtue of these very qualities is exposed to a
hundred times more dangers than the former, but were actually to stand as an ideal for man in general, as a goal, a measure--the highest de sideratum. The creation of this ideal was the
most appalling temptation that had ever been put in the way of mankind; for, with the stronger
and more successful exceptions, the lucky cases among men, which the will power and growth leads the whole species "man" one step farther forward, this type was threatened with disaster. By means the values this ideal, the growth such higher men would be checked
the root. For these men, owing their superior demands and duties, readily accept
? ? ? at
of
in
of to
to
it,
of
a to
? CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
2O9
more dangerous life (speaking economically, it is a case of an increase in the costs of the under
taking coinciding with a greater chance of failure).
What is it we combat in Christianity? That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their
spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting their proud assurance
into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows
how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect
them with disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, against themselves--
until the strong perish through their excessive
self-contempt and self-immolation: that gruesome
way of perishing, of which Pascal is the most famous example,
? VOL. O
? ? I. e.
? II.
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
I. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS.
2. 53.
THIS is an attempt at investigating morality
without being affected by charm, and not without some mistrust regard the beguiling
? beauty
which we can admire, which keeping with
its attitudes and looks. world
our capacity for worship--which demonstrating itself--in small things
this the Christian standpoint which to us all.
continually large:
common
But owing an increase our astuteness,
our mistrust, and our scientific spirit (also through more developed instinct for truth, which again due Christian influence), this interpre
tation has grown ever less and less tenable for us. The craftiest subterfuges: Kantian criticism.
The intellect not only denies itself every right interpret things that way, but also reject the interpretation once has been made. People
are satisfied with greater demand upon their credulity and faith, with renunciation all
? ? a
of
a
it
in
its
in
of
to
is or in
to
in
is
is a
to
in
to
in
is
in is
to A
of
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 2II
right to reason concerning the proof of their creed, with an intangible and superior "Ideal" (God) as a stop-gap.
The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the Platonic, a piece of romanticism and reaction, and
at the same time a symptom of the historical
sense of a new power: "Spirit" itself is the "self revealing and self-realising ideal": we believe
that in the "process of development" an ever
greater proportion of this ideal is being mani
fested--thus the ideal is being realised, faith is
vested in the future, into which all its noble
needs are projected, and in which they are being worshipped.
? In short:--
*
(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be
demonstrated by us (the concealed meaning
behind the whole of the epistemological move ment);
(2) God may be demonstrated, but as some thing evolving, and we are part of our
pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed
meaning behind the historical movement).
should be observed that criticism never
levelled the ideal itself, but only the
problem which gives rise
cerning the ideal--that yet been realised, why
small things great.
controversy con say, why has not
not demonstrable
makes all the difference: whether man recognises this state distress such owing
? ? It
It
in or of
as
a to
it
at is
it, as
>k
is
in
as
it to to is a
at
? 212 THE WILL TO POWER.
a passion or to a yearning in himself, or whether
it comes home to him as a problem which he arrives at only by straining his thinking powers
and his historical imagination to the utmost. Away from the religious and philosophical
points of view we find the same phenomena.
Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises the origin of moral valuations, though it believes
in them just as much as the Christian does. (What guilelessness! As if morality could remain
when the sanctioning deity is no longer present :
The belief in a "Beyond" is absolutely necessary,
if the faith in morality is to be maintained. )
Fundamental problem : whence comes this
almighty power of Faith? Whence this faith in morality ? (It is betrayed by the fact that even the fundamental conditions of life are falsely interpreted in favour of it: despite our knowledge of plants and animals. "Self-preser
vation": the Darwinian prospect of a reconcilia tion of the altruistic and egotistic principles. )
254.
An inquiry into the origin of our moral
valuation does diminish its prestige, and pre
pares the way critical attitude and spirit towards
? valuations and tables of law has
nothing to do with the criticism of them, though people persist in believing it has; the two matters quite apart, notwithstanding the fact that the knowledge the pudenda origo of
absolutely
? ? it.
lie
to a
of
a
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
213
What is the actual worth of our valuations and
tables of moral laws? What is the outcome of their dominion ? For whom ? In relation to what? --
answer: for Life. But what is Life A new and
more definite concept of what "Life" becomes
necessary here. My formula this concept is: Life Will to Power.
the meaning the very act of valuing
What
Does world,
historical movement. ) short: what
origin Or had no human "origin"? --
Answer: moral valuations are sort
ation, they constitute method
Interpretation itself symptom definite
does who lived
point
back another, metaphysical point down? (As Kant believed, period which preceded the great
? physiological conditions,
spiritual level ruling judgments. What that interprets 3-Our passions.
255.
upon physio logical conditions: the principal organic functions, more particularly, should considered necessary
and good. All virtues are really refined passions and elevated physiological conditions.
Pity and philanthropy may regarded the
All virtues should looked
developments
development
sexual relations,--justice the the passion for revenge,--virtue resistance, the will power
the love
honour an acknowledgment an equal,
an equally powerful, force.
explana interpreting.
also definite
? ? of
be to
or of
as as
is it
is its
as
as
of of of
in
in
a it
be
is a as a
In a
to of
of
be
of
it
as
of of
a of of
is,
or it
is
is
f
? 2I4
THE WILL TO POWER.
256.
Under "Morality" I understand a system of valuations which is in relation with the conditions
of a creature's life.
257.
Formerly it was said of every form of morality,
"Ye shall know them by their fruits. " I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and from
it I learn the Soil out of which it grew. "
258.
I have tried to understand all moral judgments as symptoms and a language of signs in which the processes of physiological prosperity or the reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions of preservation and growth, are betrayed--a mode of interpretation equal in worth to astrology, prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar to races, communities, and different stages of existence, as, for instance, youth or decay, etc. ).
Applying this principle to the morality of
Christian Europe more particularly, we find that
our moral values are signs of decline, of a dis belief in Life, and of a preparation for pes simism.
My leading doctrine is this: there are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of
Phenomena. The origin of this interpretation itself lies beyond the pale of morality.
What is the meaning of the fact that we have
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
2I5
imagined
of paramount importance: behind all other valuations those moral valuations stand com mandingly. Supposing they disappear, according to what standard shall we then measure ? And
then of what value would knowledge be, etc. etc. ? ? ?
259.
A point of view: in all valuations there is a
definite purpose: the preservation of an individ ual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a
belief, or a culture. --Thanks to the fact that people forget that all valuing has a purpose, one
and the same man may swarm with a host of contradictory valuations, and therefore with a host
of contradictory impulses. This is the expression
of disease in man as opposed to the health of animals, in which all the instincts answer certain definite purposes.
This creature full of contradictions, however,
has in his being a grand method of acquiring
knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates
himself to Justice--that is to say, to the ascertain
ing of principles beyond the valuations good and evil. The wisest man would thus be the richest in
contradictions, he would also be gifted with mental antennae wherewith he could understand
all kinds of men; and with it all he would have his great moments, when all the chords in his being would ring in splendid unison--the rarest
of accidents even in us! A sort of movement.
a contradiction in existence? This is
? planetary
? ? ? 216 THE WILL TO POWER.
26O.
"To will" is to will an object. But "object," as an idea, involves a valuation. Whence do valuations originate? Is a permanent norm, "pleasant or painful," their basis?
But in an incalculable number of cases we
first of make with valuation.
thing painful, by investing
The compass moral valuations: they play part almost every mental impression. To
the world coloured by them.
We have imagined the purpose and value
? all things: owing this we possess an enormous fund latent power: but the study compara tive values teaches us that values which were actually opposed
each other have been held high esteem, and that there have been many
tables laws (they could not, therefore, have been worth anything per se).
The analysis individual tables laws re vealed the fact that they were framed (often very
badly)
groups people,
the conditions of existence for limited ensure their maintenance.
Upon examining modern men, we found that
there are large number very different values hand, and that they no longer contain any
creative power--the fundamental principle: "the
condition existence" from the moral values. fluous and not nearly arbitrary matter. Chaos.
now quite divorced much more super painful. becomes an
Who creates the goal which stands above man
? ? so
It is is
of It
to
of as
of
of
in is
a
all
of
to
of to to ofa
a
of
of
in ofusait
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
Formerly morality was a preservative measure: but nobody wants to preserve any longer, there is nothing to
preserve. Thus we are reduced to an experi mental morality, each must postulate a goal for
kind and above the individual *
himself.
- 26 I.
What is the criterion of a moral action? (1) Its disinterestedness, (2) its universal acceptation,
etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races must
be studied and observed, and, in each case, the
criterion must be discovered, as also the thing
it expresses: a belief such as: "This particular
attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal condition of our existence. " Immoral means "that
which brings about ruin. " Now all societies in
which these principles were discovered have met
with their ruin: a few of these principles have
been used and used again, because every newly established community required them; this was
the case, for instance, with "Thou shalt not steal. "
In ages when people could not be expected to
show any marked social instinct (as, for instance,
in the age of the Roman Empire) the latter was,
religiously speaking, directed towards the idea of "spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical parlance,
towards "the greatest happiness. " For even the
philosophers of Greece did not feel any more for their Tro? Ats.
262.
The necessity of false values. --A judgment may be refuted when it is shown that it was
217
? ? ? ? 218 THE WILL TO POWER.
conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more eradicate false values than they can alter astig matism in a man's eyes.
The need of their existence must be understood :
they are the result of causes which have nothing to do with reasoning.
263.
To see and reveal the problem of morality seems to me to be the new task and the principal thing of all. I deny that this has been done by moral philosophies heretofore.
264.
How false and deceptive men have always
been concerning the fundamental facts of their
inner world ! Here to have no eye; here to
hold one's tongue, and here to open one's mouth.
265.
There seems to be no knowledge or conscious
ness of the many revolutions that have taken
place in moral judgments, and of the number
of times that "evil" has really and seriously
been christened "good" and vice versa? , I myself
pointed to one of these transformations with the words "Sittlichkeit der Sitte. " * Even conscience
* The morality of custom.
? ? ? ? \
A. Morality as the work of Immorality.
I. In order that moral values may attain to supremacy, a host of immoral forces and
passions must assist them.
2. The establishment of moral values is the
work of immoral passions and considera tions.
B. Morality as the work of error.
C. Morality gradually contradicts itself.
Requital--Truthfulness, Doubt, e? roxi, Judging. --The "Immorality" of belief in morality.
The steps:-- -
1. Absolute dominion of morality: bio logical phenomena measured and judged
. . . --> A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. A 219
-" a thing as a gregarious pang of conscience.
has changed its sphere: formerly there was
266.
? according
The attempt identify Life with morality
(symptom awakened scepticism: mor |ality must no longer be regarded
the opposite Life); many means are
its values.
sought--even
The opposition of Life and Morality.
Morality condemned and sentenced by Life.
D. To what extent was morality dangerous Life?
(a) depreciated the joy living and the gratitude felt towards Life, etc.
transcendental one.
? ? It
of
to
as
i 3.
i
of to to a of
2.
all
? 22O
THE WILL TO POWER.
(b) It checked the tendency to beautify and to ennoble Life.
(c) It checked the knowledge of Life.
(d) It checked the unfolding of Life, because it tried to set the highest phenomena thereof at variance with itself.
E. Contra-account: the usefulness of morality to Life.
(1) Morality may be a preservative measure for the general whole, it may be a pro
cess of uniting dispersed members: it
is useful as an agent in the production of the man who is a "tool. "
(2) Morality may be a preservative measure mitigating the inner danger threatening
man from the direction of his passions:
it is useful to "mediocre people. "
(3) Morality may be a preservative measure
resisting the life-poisoning influences of
profound sorrow and bitterness: it is
useful to the "sufferers. "
(4) Morality may be a preservative measure
opposed to the terrible outbursts of the mighty: it is useful to the "lowly. "
267.
It is an excellent thing when one can use the expressions "right" and "wrong" in a definite,
narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance in the sentence: "Do right and fear no one''; *
* "Thue Recht und scheue Niemand. "
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 22I
--that is to say, to do one's duty, according to the rough scheme of life within the limit of which a community exists. --Let us not think meanly of what a few thousand years of morality have inculcated upon our minds,
268.
Two types of morality must not be confounded:
the morality with which the instinct that has
remained healthy defends itself from incipient decadence, and the other morality by means of
which this decadence asserts itself, justifies itself, and leads downwards.
The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyran
nical (Stoicism itself was an example of the sort of "drag-chain" morality we speak of); the
other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it
has the women and "beautiful feelings" on its
side (Primitive Christianity was an example of this morality).
269.
I shall try to regard all moralising, with one glance, as a phenomenon--also as a riddle. Moral phenomena have preoccupied me like
riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply to the question: why should my neighbour's
welfare be of greater value to me than my own P and why is it that my neighbour himself should value his welfare differently from the way in which
? ? ? ? 222 THE WILL TO POWER.
I value it--that is to say, why should precisely
my welfare be paramount in his mind? What
is the meaning of this "Thou shalt," which is regarded as "given" even by philosophers them selves?
The seemingly insane idea that a man should esteem the act he performs for a fellow-creature,
higher than the one he performs for himself, and that the same fellow-creature should do so too
(that only those acts should be held to be good which are performed with an eye to the neighbour
reasons--namely, as the result of the social instinct which rests
and for his welfare) has its
? upon the valuation, that single individuals are of little importance although collectively their
importance is very great. This, of course, pre supposes that they constitute a community with
one feeling and one conscience pervading the whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for
keeping one's eyes in a certain direction; it is the will to a kind of optics which renders a view of one's self impossible.
My idea: goals are wanting, and these must be individuals. We see the general drift: every individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool. Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets-- is not every one he sees a slave? Whither? What is the purpose of it all?
27O.
How is it possible that a man can respect himself only in regard to moral values, that he
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
subordinates and despises everything in favour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation,
etc. ? as, for instance, Henri Fre? d. Amiel. What is the meaning of the moral idiosyncrasy P--I
mean this both in the psychological and physio logical sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal. In cases, then, in which other great qualities are
not wanting; and even in the case of Schopen
hauer, who obviously valued what he did not and could have . . . --is it not the result of
a merely mechanical moral interpretation of real states of pain and displeasure ? is it not a par ticular form of sensibility which does not happen to understand the cause of its many unpleasurable feelings, but thinks to explain them with moral hypotheses? In this way an occasional feeling of well-being and strength always appears under
the optics of a "clean conscience," flooded with light through the proximity of God and the consciousness of salvation. . . . Thus the moral idiosyncratist has (1) either acquired his real
worth in approximating to the virtuous type of society: "the good fellow," "the upright man"-- a sort of medium state of high respectability: mediocre in all his abilities, but honest, conscien tious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his aspira tions; (2) or, he imagines he has acquired that
worth, simply because he cannot otherwise under
stand all his states--he is unknown to himself;
he therefore interprets himself in this fashion. -- Morality is the only scheme of interpretation by
means of which this type of man can tolerate himself:--is it a form of pride?
223
? ? ? ? 2. 24
THE WILL TO POWER.
271.
The predominance of moral values. --The con quence of this predominance: the corruption of psychology, etc. ; the fatality which is associated
with it everywhere. What is the meaning of this predominance? What does it point to?
To a certain greater urgency of saying nay or
yea definitely in this domain. All sorts of im peratives have been used in order to make moral values appear as if they were for ever fixed:--they
have been enjoined for the longest period of time: they almost appear to be instinctive, like inner
commands. They are the expression of society's
Preservative measures, for they are felt to be almost beyond question. The practice--that is to say, the utility of being agreed concerning superior
values, has attained in this respect to a sort of
sanction. We observe that every care is taken
to paralyse reflection and criticism in this depart
ment:--look at Kant's attitude! not to speak of those who believe that it is immoral even to
prosecute "research" in these matters.
272.
My desire is to show the absolute homogeneity of all phenomena, and to ascribe to moral differ entiations but the value of perspective ; to show that all that which is praised as moral is essentially the same as that which is immoral, and was only
? ? ? ? Europeans
are the invalid: what an amount
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
225
made possible, according to the law of all moral development--that is to say, by means of immoral
artifices and with a view to immoral ends--just as all that which has been decried as immoral from the standpoint economics, both superior and essential; and how development leading
greater abundance life necessarily involves progress the realm immorality. "Truth," that the extent to which we allow ourselves to
comprehend this fact.
273.
But do not let fear: matter fact, we require great deal morality, order
? immoral parable:--
this subtle way; let me speak
physiologist interested certain illness, and an invalid who wishes to be cured of that
same illness, have not the same interests. Let suppose that the illness happens morality, --for morality an illness,--and that we
subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing we Europeans were, once, our own inquisitive
spectators and the physiologist above-mentioned
earnestly desire rid ourselves morality? Should we want to? This course irrespective the
question whether we should able do so-- whether we can be cured at all
VOL.
Should we under these circumstances
? ? I.
to
is
is
us of
at P of
? be
in a
as a
to
of
to be
in
of
of
of of -
of
!
of
in to abe
to is,
us
A
a
a is
in
in
? ? rs
226 THE WILL TO POWER.
2. THE HERD.
274.
Whose will to power is morality? --The common factor of all European history since the time of Socrates is the attempt to make the moral values
dominate all other values, in order that they
should not be only the leader and judge of life, but also of: (1) knowledge, (2) Art, (3) political
and social aspirations. "Amelioration" regarded as the only duty, everything else used as a means thereto (or as a force distributing, hindering, and endangering its realisation, and therefore to be
opposed and annihilated . . . ). --A similar move ment to be observed in China and India.
What is the meaning of this will to power on the part of moral values, which has played such a part in the world's prodigious evolutions?
Answer:-Three powers lie concealed behind it :
(1) The instinct of the herd opposed to the strong
and the independent; (2) the instinct of all
sufferers and abortions opposed the happy
and well-constituted; (3) the instinct the mediocre opposed the exceptions. --Enormous
advantage this movement, despite the cruelty,
falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped along (for the history the struggle morality
with the fundamental instincts life itself the greatest piece immorality that has ever
yet been witnessed earth
? ? on of
to
. .
. ).
of
is of in
of
it
of
of
all
to
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
275.
227
The fewest succeed in discovering a problem behind all that which constitutes our daily life, and
"Every man should be the preoccupation of his fellows"; he who thinks in this way deserves honour: no one ought to think of himself.
"Thou shalt": an impulse which, like the
sexual impulse, cannot fathom itself, is set apart and is not condemned as all the other instincts
are--on the contrary, it is made to be their standard and their judge!
The problem of "equality," in the face of the
fact that we all thirst for distinction: here, on the
contrary, we should demand of ourselves what we demand of others. That is so tasteless and
obviously insane; but--it is felt to be holy and
of a higher order. The fact that it is opposed to common sense is not even noticed.
Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered distinguishing, as are also the attempt to obey
morality implicitly, and the belief that one should be every one's equal in its presence.
The neglect and the surrender of Life and of well-being is held to be distinguished, as are also
the complete renunciation of individual valuations
and the severe exaction from every one of the same sacrifice. "The value of an action is once
to which we have become accustomed
the ages--our eye does not seem focussed for such things: at least, this seems to me to be the case in so far as our morality is concerned.
throughout
? ? ? ? 228 THE WILL TO POWER.
and for all fixed: every individual must submit to this valuation. "
We see: an authority speaks--who speaks? --
We must condone it in human pride, if man tried to make this authority as high as possible, for he
wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by the side of Thus--God speaks!
God was necessary an unconditional sanction which has no superior, "Categorical Imperator":
or, far people believed the authority
of reason, what was needed was "unitarian
metaphysics" by means which this view could be made logical.
Now, admitting that faith God dead: the question arises once more: "who speaks? " My answer, which take from biology and not from metaphysics, is: "the gregarious instinct speaks. " This what desires to be master: hence its "thou
shalt! "--it will allow the individual exist only part whole, only favour the whole,
hates those who detach themselves from every
thing--it turns the hatred all individuals against him.
276.
The whole the morality Europe based
upon the values which are useful the herd: the sorrow all higher and exceptional men
explained by the fact that everything which distinguishes them from others reaches their con sciousness the form feeling their own
smallness and egregiousness. the virtues of
? modern men which are the causes
pessimistic
? ? of
of
of to
is
a
of in
of a
it. as
of a
of in
as as a
It
is to
in
is is
of
I
of of
in
it
as a
is
in so
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
229
gloominess; the mediocre, like the herd, are not
troubled much with questions or with conscience --they are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong
men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are noted examples. ) The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd,
the more completely it is condemned.
277.
>**
The morality of truthfulness in the herd.
"Thou shalt be recognisable, thou shalt express
thy inner nature by means of clear and constant signs--otherwise thou art dangerous: and sup
posing thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is absolutely the worst thing for the herd. We
despise the secretive and those whom we cannot identify. --Consequently thou must regard thyself
as recognisable, thou mayest not remain concealed from thyself, thou mayest not even believe in the possibility of thy ever changing. " Thus, the in
sistence upon truthfulness has as its main object
the recognisability and the stability of the individual.
As a matter of fact, it is the object of education
to make each gregarious unit believe in a certain
definite dogma concerning the nature of man:
education first creates this dogma and thereupon exacts "truthfulness. "
278.
Within the confines of a herd or of a com
munity--that is to say, inter pares, the over-estima tion of truthfulness is very reasonable. A man
? ? ? ? 230
THE WILL TO POWER.
must not allow himself to be deceived--and con sequently he adopts as his own personal morality that he should deceive no one --a sort of mutual obligation among equals | In his dealings with
the outside world caution and danger demand that he should be on his guard against deception:
the first psychological condition of this attitude
would mean that he is also on his guard against
his inner self. Mistrust thus appears as the source of truthfulness.
2. 79.
A criticism of the virtues of the herd--Inertia
is active: (1) In confidence, because mistrust makes suspense, reflection, and observation necessary.
(2) In veneration, where the gulf that separates power is great and submission necessary: then,
so that fear may cease to exist, everybody tries to love and esteem, while the difference in power
is interpreted as a difference of value: and thus the relationship to the powerful no longer has any
thing revolting in (3) the sense truth.
know one's self on the same level with all, feel
? What truth? Truth that
things which causes the smallest amount mental exertion (apart from this, lying extremely fatiguing). (4) sympathy. relief
all feel, and accept belief which current; something passive
already
beside the activity which appropriates and continually carries
into practice the most individual rights valua tion (the latter process allows no repose). (5)
explanation
? ? a of
is In
In
to of of
it
is
to
In
of
to
of
as
is is is a
It
is
it. us
? whether be above something which
beneath its general level, antagonistic and dangerous
dealing with the ex
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
231
impartiality and coolness of judgment: people
scout the strain of being moved, and prefer to be detached and "objective. " (6) In uprightness:
people prefer to obey a law which is to hand rather than to create a new one, rather than to command themselves and others: the fear of commanding--it
is better to submit than to
rebel. (7) In toleration: the fear of exercising a right or of enforcing a judgment.
28O.
The instinct of the herd values the juste milieu and the average as the highest and most precious
of all things: the spot where the majority is to be found, and the air that it breathes there. In
this way it is the opponent of order rank; regards climb from the level the heights the same light descent from the majority the minority. The herd regards the exception,
? itself. Their trick
ceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the
wise, and the fruitful, persuade them be come guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen--in fact,
become their head-servants: thus they convert danger into thing which useful. the
middle,
nothing; here there not much room even for misunderstandings; here there equality; here man's individual existence not felt as reproach, but the right existence; here con
fear ceases: here man alone with
? ?
and we should not raise a finger to destroy them. But what we do stand up against, is that ideal which, thanks to its morbid beauty and feminine seductiveness, thanks to its insidious and slanderous eloquence, appeals
to all the cowardices and
vanities of wearied souls,--and the strongest have
their moments of fatigue,--as though all that which seems most useful and desirable at such
moments--that is to say, confidence, artlessness, modesty, patience, love of one's like, resignation, submission to God, and a sort of self-surrender-- were useful and desirable per se; as though the puny, modest abortion which in these creatures takes the place of a soul, this virtuous, mediocre
animal and sheep of the flock--which deigns to
call itself man, were not only to take precedence of the stronger, more evil, more passionate, more
defiant, and more prodigal type of man, who by virtue of these very qualities is exposed to a
hundred times more dangers than the former, but were actually to stand as an ideal for man in general, as a goal, a measure--the highest de sideratum. The creation of this ideal was the
most appalling temptation that had ever been put in the way of mankind; for, with the stronger
and more successful exceptions, the lucky cases among men, which the will power and growth leads the whole species "man" one step farther forward, this type was threatened with disaster. By means the values this ideal, the growth such higher men would be checked
the root. For these men, owing their superior demands and duties, readily accept
? ? ? at
of
in
of to
to
it,
of
a to
? CRITICISM OF RELIGION.
2O9
more dangerous life (speaking economically, it is a case of an increase in the costs of the under
taking coinciding with a greater chance of failure).
What is it we combat in Christianity? That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their
spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting their proud assurance
into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows
how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect
them with disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, against themselves--
until the strong perish through their excessive
self-contempt and self-immolation: that gruesome
way of perishing, of which Pascal is the most famous example,
? VOL. O
? ? I. e.
? II.
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
I. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS.
2. 53.
THIS is an attempt at investigating morality
without being affected by charm, and not without some mistrust regard the beguiling
? beauty
which we can admire, which keeping with
its attitudes and looks. world
our capacity for worship--which demonstrating itself--in small things
this the Christian standpoint which to us all.
continually large:
common
But owing an increase our astuteness,
our mistrust, and our scientific spirit (also through more developed instinct for truth, which again due Christian influence), this interpre
tation has grown ever less and less tenable for us. The craftiest subterfuges: Kantian criticism.
The intellect not only denies itself every right interpret things that way, but also reject the interpretation once has been made. People
are satisfied with greater demand upon their credulity and faith, with renunciation all
? ? a
of
a
it
in
its
in
of
to
is or in
to
in
is
is a
to
in
to
in
is
in is
to A
of
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 2II
right to reason concerning the proof of their creed, with an intangible and superior "Ideal" (God) as a stop-gap.
The Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the Platonic, a piece of romanticism and reaction, and
at the same time a symptom of the historical
sense of a new power: "Spirit" itself is the "self revealing and self-realising ideal": we believe
that in the "process of development" an ever
greater proportion of this ideal is being mani
fested--thus the ideal is being realised, faith is
vested in the future, into which all its noble
needs are projected, and in which they are being worshipped.
? In short:--
*
(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be
demonstrated by us (the concealed meaning
behind the whole of the epistemological move ment);
(2) God may be demonstrated, but as some thing evolving, and we are part of our
pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed
meaning behind the historical movement).
should be observed that criticism never
levelled the ideal itself, but only the
problem which gives rise
cerning the ideal--that yet been realised, why
small things great.
controversy con say, why has not
not demonstrable
makes all the difference: whether man recognises this state distress such owing
? ? It
It
in or of
as
a to
it
at is
it, as
>k
is
in
as
it to to is a
at
? 212 THE WILL TO POWER.
a passion or to a yearning in himself, or whether
it comes home to him as a problem which he arrives at only by straining his thinking powers
and his historical imagination to the utmost. Away from the religious and philosophical
points of view we find the same phenomena.
Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises the origin of moral valuations, though it believes
in them just as much as the Christian does. (What guilelessness! As if morality could remain
when the sanctioning deity is no longer present :
The belief in a "Beyond" is absolutely necessary,
if the faith in morality is to be maintained. )
Fundamental problem : whence comes this
almighty power of Faith? Whence this faith in morality ? (It is betrayed by the fact that even the fundamental conditions of life are falsely interpreted in favour of it: despite our knowledge of plants and animals. "Self-preser
vation": the Darwinian prospect of a reconcilia tion of the altruistic and egotistic principles. )
254.
An inquiry into the origin of our moral
valuation does diminish its prestige, and pre
pares the way critical attitude and spirit towards
? valuations and tables of law has
nothing to do with the criticism of them, though people persist in believing it has; the two matters quite apart, notwithstanding the fact that the knowledge the pudenda origo of
absolutely
? ? it.
lie
to a
of
a
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
213
What is the actual worth of our valuations and
tables of moral laws? What is the outcome of their dominion ? For whom ? In relation to what? --
answer: for Life. But what is Life A new and
more definite concept of what "Life" becomes
necessary here. My formula this concept is: Life Will to Power.
the meaning the very act of valuing
What
Does world,
historical movement. ) short: what
origin Or had no human "origin"? --
Answer: moral valuations are sort
ation, they constitute method
Interpretation itself symptom definite
does who lived
point
back another, metaphysical point down? (As Kant believed, period which preceded the great
? physiological conditions,
spiritual level ruling judgments. What that interprets 3-Our passions.
255.
upon physio logical conditions: the principal organic functions, more particularly, should considered necessary
and good. All virtues are really refined passions and elevated physiological conditions.
Pity and philanthropy may regarded the
All virtues should looked
developments
development
sexual relations,--justice the the passion for revenge,--virtue resistance, the will power
the love
honour an acknowledgment an equal,
an equally powerful, force.
explana interpreting.
also definite
? ? of
be to
or of
as as
is it
is its
as
as
of of of
in
in
a it
be
is a as a
In a
to of
of
be
of
it
as
of of
a of of
is,
or it
is
is
f
? 2I4
THE WILL TO POWER.
256.
Under "Morality" I understand a system of valuations which is in relation with the conditions
of a creature's life.
257.
Formerly it was said of every form of morality,
"Ye shall know them by their fruits. " I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and from
it I learn the Soil out of which it grew. "
258.
I have tried to understand all moral judgments as symptoms and a language of signs in which the processes of physiological prosperity or the reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions of preservation and growth, are betrayed--a mode of interpretation equal in worth to astrology, prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar to races, communities, and different stages of existence, as, for instance, youth or decay, etc. ).
Applying this principle to the morality of
Christian Europe more particularly, we find that
our moral values are signs of decline, of a dis belief in Life, and of a preparation for pes simism.
My leading doctrine is this: there are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of
Phenomena. The origin of this interpretation itself lies beyond the pale of morality.
What is the meaning of the fact that we have
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
2I5
imagined
of paramount importance: behind all other valuations those moral valuations stand com mandingly. Supposing they disappear, according to what standard shall we then measure ? And
then of what value would knowledge be, etc. etc. ? ? ?
259.
A point of view: in all valuations there is a
definite purpose: the preservation of an individ ual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a
belief, or a culture. --Thanks to the fact that people forget that all valuing has a purpose, one
and the same man may swarm with a host of contradictory valuations, and therefore with a host
of contradictory impulses. This is the expression
of disease in man as opposed to the health of animals, in which all the instincts answer certain definite purposes.
This creature full of contradictions, however,
has in his being a grand method of acquiring
knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates
himself to Justice--that is to say, to the ascertain
ing of principles beyond the valuations good and evil. The wisest man would thus be the richest in
contradictions, he would also be gifted with mental antennae wherewith he could understand
all kinds of men; and with it all he would have his great moments, when all the chords in his being would ring in splendid unison--the rarest
of accidents even in us! A sort of movement.
a contradiction in existence? This is
? planetary
? ? ? 216 THE WILL TO POWER.
26O.
"To will" is to will an object. But "object," as an idea, involves a valuation. Whence do valuations originate? Is a permanent norm, "pleasant or painful," their basis?
But in an incalculable number of cases we
first of make with valuation.
thing painful, by investing
The compass moral valuations: they play part almost every mental impression. To
the world coloured by them.
We have imagined the purpose and value
? all things: owing this we possess an enormous fund latent power: but the study compara tive values teaches us that values which were actually opposed
each other have been held high esteem, and that there have been many
tables laws (they could not, therefore, have been worth anything per se).
The analysis individual tables laws re vealed the fact that they were framed (often very
badly)
groups people,
the conditions of existence for limited ensure their maintenance.
Upon examining modern men, we found that
there are large number very different values hand, and that they no longer contain any
creative power--the fundamental principle: "the
condition existence" from the moral values. fluous and not nearly arbitrary matter. Chaos.
now quite divorced much more super painful. becomes an
Who creates the goal which stands above man
? ? so
It is is
of It
to
of as
of
of
in is
a
all
of
to
of to to ofa
a
of
of
in ofusait
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
Formerly morality was a preservative measure: but nobody wants to preserve any longer, there is nothing to
preserve. Thus we are reduced to an experi mental morality, each must postulate a goal for
kind and above the individual *
himself.
- 26 I.
What is the criterion of a moral action? (1) Its disinterestedness, (2) its universal acceptation,
etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races must
be studied and observed, and, in each case, the
criterion must be discovered, as also the thing
it expresses: a belief such as: "This particular
attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal condition of our existence. " Immoral means "that
which brings about ruin. " Now all societies in
which these principles were discovered have met
with their ruin: a few of these principles have
been used and used again, because every newly established community required them; this was
the case, for instance, with "Thou shalt not steal. "
In ages when people could not be expected to
show any marked social instinct (as, for instance,
in the age of the Roman Empire) the latter was,
religiously speaking, directed towards the idea of "spiritual salvation," or, in philosophical parlance,
towards "the greatest happiness. " For even the
philosophers of Greece did not feel any more for their Tro? Ats.
262.
The necessity of false values. --A judgment may be refuted when it is shown that it was
217
? ? ? ? 218 THE WILL TO POWER.
conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is not thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more eradicate false values than they can alter astig matism in a man's eyes.
The need of their existence must be understood :
they are the result of causes which have nothing to do with reasoning.
263.
To see and reveal the problem of morality seems to me to be the new task and the principal thing of all. I deny that this has been done by moral philosophies heretofore.
264.
How false and deceptive men have always
been concerning the fundamental facts of their
inner world ! Here to have no eye; here to
hold one's tongue, and here to open one's mouth.
265.
There seems to be no knowledge or conscious
ness of the many revolutions that have taken
place in moral judgments, and of the number
of times that "evil" has really and seriously
been christened "good" and vice versa? , I myself
pointed to one of these transformations with the words "Sittlichkeit der Sitte. " * Even conscience
* The morality of custom.
? ? ? ? \
A. Morality as the work of Immorality.
I. In order that moral values may attain to supremacy, a host of immoral forces and
passions must assist them.
2. The establishment of moral values is the
work of immoral passions and considera tions.
B. Morality as the work of error.
C. Morality gradually contradicts itself.
Requital--Truthfulness, Doubt, e? roxi, Judging. --The "Immorality" of belief in morality.
The steps:-- -
1. Absolute dominion of morality: bio logical phenomena measured and judged
. . . --> A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. A 219
-" a thing as a gregarious pang of conscience.
has changed its sphere: formerly there was
266.
? according
The attempt identify Life with morality
(symptom awakened scepticism: mor |ality must no longer be regarded
the opposite Life); many means are
its values.
sought--even
The opposition of Life and Morality.
Morality condemned and sentenced by Life.
D. To what extent was morality dangerous Life?
(a) depreciated the joy living and the gratitude felt towards Life, etc.
transcendental one.
? ? It
of
to
as
i 3.
i
of to to a of
2.
all
? 22O
THE WILL TO POWER.
(b) It checked the tendency to beautify and to ennoble Life.
(c) It checked the knowledge of Life.
(d) It checked the unfolding of Life, because it tried to set the highest phenomena thereof at variance with itself.
E. Contra-account: the usefulness of morality to Life.
(1) Morality may be a preservative measure for the general whole, it may be a pro
cess of uniting dispersed members: it
is useful as an agent in the production of the man who is a "tool. "
(2) Morality may be a preservative measure mitigating the inner danger threatening
man from the direction of his passions:
it is useful to "mediocre people. "
(3) Morality may be a preservative measure
resisting the life-poisoning influences of
profound sorrow and bitterness: it is
useful to the "sufferers. "
(4) Morality may be a preservative measure
opposed to the terrible outbursts of the mighty: it is useful to the "lowly. "
267.
It is an excellent thing when one can use the expressions "right" and "wrong" in a definite,
narrow, and "bourgeois" sense, as for instance in the sentence: "Do right and fear no one''; *
* "Thue Recht und scheue Niemand. "
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 22I
--that is to say, to do one's duty, according to the rough scheme of life within the limit of which a community exists. --Let us not think meanly of what a few thousand years of morality have inculcated upon our minds,
268.
Two types of morality must not be confounded:
the morality with which the instinct that has
remained healthy defends itself from incipient decadence, and the other morality by means of
which this decadence asserts itself, justifies itself, and leads downwards.
The first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyran
nical (Stoicism itself was an example of the sort of "drag-chain" morality we speak of); the
other is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it
has the women and "beautiful feelings" on its
side (Primitive Christianity was an example of this morality).
269.
I shall try to regard all moralising, with one glance, as a phenomenon--also as a riddle. Moral phenomena have preoccupied me like
riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply to the question: why should my neighbour's
welfare be of greater value to me than my own P and why is it that my neighbour himself should value his welfare differently from the way in which
? ? ? ? 222 THE WILL TO POWER.
I value it--that is to say, why should precisely
my welfare be paramount in his mind? What
is the meaning of this "Thou shalt," which is regarded as "given" even by philosophers them selves?
The seemingly insane idea that a man should esteem the act he performs for a fellow-creature,
higher than the one he performs for himself, and that the same fellow-creature should do so too
(that only those acts should be held to be good which are performed with an eye to the neighbour
reasons--namely, as the result of the social instinct which rests
and for his welfare) has its
? upon the valuation, that single individuals are of little importance although collectively their
importance is very great. This, of course, pre supposes that they constitute a community with
one feeling and one conscience pervading the whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for
keeping one's eyes in a certain direction; it is the will to a kind of optics which renders a view of one's self impossible.
My idea: goals are wanting, and these must be individuals. We see the general drift: every individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool. Let any one keep his eyes open in the streets-- is not every one he sees a slave? Whither? What is the purpose of it all?
27O.
How is it possible that a man can respect himself only in regard to moral values, that he
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
subordinates and despises everything in favour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation,
etc. ? as, for instance, Henri Fre? d. Amiel. What is the meaning of the moral idiosyncrasy P--I
mean this both in the psychological and physio logical sense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal. In cases, then, in which other great qualities are
not wanting; and even in the case of Schopen
hauer, who obviously valued what he did not and could have . . . --is it not the result of
a merely mechanical moral interpretation of real states of pain and displeasure ? is it not a par ticular form of sensibility which does not happen to understand the cause of its many unpleasurable feelings, but thinks to explain them with moral hypotheses? In this way an occasional feeling of well-being and strength always appears under
the optics of a "clean conscience," flooded with light through the proximity of God and the consciousness of salvation. . . . Thus the moral idiosyncratist has (1) either acquired his real
worth in approximating to the virtuous type of society: "the good fellow," "the upright man"-- a sort of medium state of high respectability: mediocre in all his abilities, but honest, conscien tious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his aspira tions; (2) or, he imagines he has acquired that
worth, simply because he cannot otherwise under
stand all his states--he is unknown to himself;
he therefore interprets himself in this fashion. -- Morality is the only scheme of interpretation by
means of which this type of man can tolerate himself:--is it a form of pride?
223
? ? ? ? 2. 24
THE WILL TO POWER.
271.
The predominance of moral values. --The con quence of this predominance: the corruption of psychology, etc. ; the fatality which is associated
with it everywhere. What is the meaning of this predominance? What does it point to?
To a certain greater urgency of saying nay or
yea definitely in this domain. All sorts of im peratives have been used in order to make moral values appear as if they were for ever fixed:--they
have been enjoined for the longest period of time: they almost appear to be instinctive, like inner
commands. They are the expression of society's
Preservative measures, for they are felt to be almost beyond question. The practice--that is to say, the utility of being agreed concerning superior
values, has attained in this respect to a sort of
sanction. We observe that every care is taken
to paralyse reflection and criticism in this depart
ment:--look at Kant's attitude! not to speak of those who believe that it is immoral even to
prosecute "research" in these matters.
272.
My desire is to show the absolute homogeneity of all phenomena, and to ascribe to moral differ entiations but the value of perspective ; to show that all that which is praised as moral is essentially the same as that which is immoral, and was only
? ? ? ? Europeans
are the invalid: what an amount
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
225
made possible, according to the law of all moral development--that is to say, by means of immoral
artifices and with a view to immoral ends--just as all that which has been decried as immoral from the standpoint economics, both superior and essential; and how development leading
greater abundance life necessarily involves progress the realm immorality. "Truth," that the extent to which we allow ourselves to
comprehend this fact.
273.
But do not let fear: matter fact, we require great deal morality, order
? immoral parable:--
this subtle way; let me speak
physiologist interested certain illness, and an invalid who wishes to be cured of that
same illness, have not the same interests. Let suppose that the illness happens morality, --for morality an illness,--and that we
subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing we Europeans were, once, our own inquisitive
spectators and the physiologist above-mentioned
earnestly desire rid ourselves morality? Should we want to? This course irrespective the
question whether we should able do so-- whether we can be cured at all
VOL.
Should we under these circumstances
? ? I.
to
is
is
us of
at P of
? be
in a
as a
to
of
to be
in
of
of
of of -
of
!
of
in to abe
to is,
us
A
a
a is
in
in
? ? rs
226 THE WILL TO POWER.
2. THE HERD.
274.
Whose will to power is morality? --The common factor of all European history since the time of Socrates is the attempt to make the moral values
dominate all other values, in order that they
should not be only the leader and judge of life, but also of: (1) knowledge, (2) Art, (3) political
and social aspirations. "Amelioration" regarded as the only duty, everything else used as a means thereto (or as a force distributing, hindering, and endangering its realisation, and therefore to be
opposed and annihilated . . . ). --A similar move ment to be observed in China and India.
What is the meaning of this will to power on the part of moral values, which has played such a part in the world's prodigious evolutions?
Answer:-Three powers lie concealed behind it :
(1) The instinct of the herd opposed to the strong
and the independent; (2) the instinct of all
sufferers and abortions opposed the happy
and well-constituted; (3) the instinct the mediocre opposed the exceptions. --Enormous
advantage this movement, despite the cruelty,
falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped along (for the history the struggle morality
with the fundamental instincts life itself the greatest piece immorality that has ever
yet been witnessed earth
? ? on of
to
. .
. ).
of
is of in
of
it
of
of
all
to
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
275.
227
The fewest succeed in discovering a problem behind all that which constitutes our daily life, and
"Every man should be the preoccupation of his fellows"; he who thinks in this way deserves honour: no one ought to think of himself.
"Thou shalt": an impulse which, like the
sexual impulse, cannot fathom itself, is set apart and is not condemned as all the other instincts
are--on the contrary, it is made to be their standard and their judge!
The problem of "equality," in the face of the
fact that we all thirst for distinction: here, on the
contrary, we should demand of ourselves what we demand of others. That is so tasteless and
obviously insane; but--it is felt to be holy and
of a higher order. The fact that it is opposed to common sense is not even noticed.
Self-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered distinguishing, as are also the attempt to obey
morality implicitly, and the belief that one should be every one's equal in its presence.
The neglect and the surrender of Life and of well-being is held to be distinguished, as are also
the complete renunciation of individual valuations
and the severe exaction from every one of the same sacrifice. "The value of an action is once
to which we have become accustomed
the ages--our eye does not seem focussed for such things: at least, this seems to me to be the case in so far as our morality is concerned.
throughout
? ? ? ? 228 THE WILL TO POWER.
and for all fixed: every individual must submit to this valuation. "
We see: an authority speaks--who speaks? --
We must condone it in human pride, if man tried to make this authority as high as possible, for he
wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by the side of Thus--God speaks!
God was necessary an unconditional sanction which has no superior, "Categorical Imperator":
or, far people believed the authority
of reason, what was needed was "unitarian
metaphysics" by means which this view could be made logical.
Now, admitting that faith God dead: the question arises once more: "who speaks? " My answer, which take from biology and not from metaphysics, is: "the gregarious instinct speaks. " This what desires to be master: hence its "thou
shalt! "--it will allow the individual exist only part whole, only favour the whole,
hates those who detach themselves from every
thing--it turns the hatred all individuals against him.
276.
The whole the morality Europe based
upon the values which are useful the herd: the sorrow all higher and exceptional men
explained by the fact that everything which distinguishes them from others reaches their con sciousness the form feeling their own
smallness and egregiousness. the virtues of
? modern men which are the causes
pessimistic
? ? of
of
of to
is
a
of in
of a
it. as
of a
of in
as as a
It
is to
in
is is
of
I
of of
in
it
as a
is
in so
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
229
gloominess; the mediocre, like the herd, are not
troubled much with questions or with conscience --they are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong
men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are noted examples. ) The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd,
the more completely it is condemned.
277.
>**
The morality of truthfulness in the herd.
"Thou shalt be recognisable, thou shalt express
thy inner nature by means of clear and constant signs--otherwise thou art dangerous: and sup
posing thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is absolutely the worst thing for the herd. We
despise the secretive and those whom we cannot identify. --Consequently thou must regard thyself
as recognisable, thou mayest not remain concealed from thyself, thou mayest not even believe in the possibility of thy ever changing. " Thus, the in
sistence upon truthfulness has as its main object
the recognisability and the stability of the individual.
As a matter of fact, it is the object of education
to make each gregarious unit believe in a certain
definite dogma concerning the nature of man:
education first creates this dogma and thereupon exacts "truthfulness. "
278.
Within the confines of a herd or of a com
munity--that is to say, inter pares, the over-estima tion of truthfulness is very reasonable. A man
? ? ? ? 230
THE WILL TO POWER.
must not allow himself to be deceived--and con sequently he adopts as his own personal morality that he should deceive no one --a sort of mutual obligation among equals | In his dealings with
the outside world caution and danger demand that he should be on his guard against deception:
the first psychological condition of this attitude
would mean that he is also on his guard against
his inner self. Mistrust thus appears as the source of truthfulness.
2. 79.
A criticism of the virtues of the herd--Inertia
is active: (1) In confidence, because mistrust makes suspense, reflection, and observation necessary.
(2) In veneration, where the gulf that separates power is great and submission necessary: then,
so that fear may cease to exist, everybody tries to love and esteem, while the difference in power
is interpreted as a difference of value: and thus the relationship to the powerful no longer has any
thing revolting in (3) the sense truth.
know one's self on the same level with all, feel
? What truth? Truth that
things which causes the smallest amount mental exertion (apart from this, lying extremely fatiguing). (4) sympathy. relief
all feel, and accept belief which current; something passive
already
beside the activity which appropriates and continually carries
into practice the most individual rights valua tion (the latter process allows no repose). (5)
explanation
? ? a of
is In
In
to of of
it
is
to
In
of
to
of
as
is is is a
It
is
it. us
? whether be above something which
beneath its general level, antagonistic and dangerous
dealing with the ex
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
231
impartiality and coolness of judgment: people
scout the strain of being moved, and prefer to be detached and "objective. " (6) In uprightness:
people prefer to obey a law which is to hand rather than to create a new one, rather than to command themselves and others: the fear of commanding--it
is better to submit than to
rebel. (7) In toleration: the fear of exercising a right or of enforcing a judgment.
28O.
The instinct of the herd values the juste milieu and the average as the highest and most precious
of all things: the spot where the majority is to be found, and the air that it breathes there. In
this way it is the opponent of order rank; regards climb from the level the heights the same light descent from the majority the minority. The herd regards the exception,
? itself. Their trick
ceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the
wise, and the fruitful, persuade them be come guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen--in fact,
become their head-servants: thus they convert danger into thing which useful. the
middle,
nothing; here there not much room even for misunderstandings; here there equality; here man's individual existence not felt as reproach, but the right existence; here con
fear ceases: here man alone with
? ?
