No More Learning

German fascism was more than just an impudent grasp for “world domination”; its mythological engine was driven by a racist chiliasm – to use Jacob Taubes’s terms, it was driven by a theo-zoology that employed the means of a religious biopolitics to stir up the masses to an unprec- edented destructiveness. With its essential gesture, it performed the rebellion against the Judeo-Christian-liberal tradition of Europe; as a war against Judaism, it was an attempt to outbid the status of Jewry as a chosen people through German self-proclamation.
Against such a background, historico-philosophical aspirations are from the outset to be understated. Based on German premises, it would be suspect to have no difficulties with the philosophy of history. This does not just mean that the notorious “German spirit” was ripe for an analytical cooling. More important is the fact that a historico-philosophical warning has imprinted itself in the national memory; more precisely, a warning against manically lived historicism and a dread of the violence that can stem from taking historico-religious interpretive models of the world literally. Thinking after 1945 means carrying a millennium on one’s back; in this position, no de-Germanization can make a difference. A certain post-millenarian nervousness has been part of the regional character here since the end of the Third Reich. Through all justified and necessary efforts to be a “normal democracy,” the German resignation from historico-religious presumption shines through – imperceptibly, but significantly. It is a specialty of post-fascist Germans to consciously not be a chosen people any longer. In this way, they present themselves anew as a negative unicum. From their manic historicism, they have retreated into a post-historical modesty; they now practice the powerful melancholy of the day after. They have developed a relationship to the missions of history
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that resembles that of a sober alcoholic to their former drug. It may be assumed that, until further notice, they will adhere to an experience that lies ahead of those people that are still undertaking missions, still manic, still making history. Through an unprecedented defeat, they have been brought to the unwanted but valid insight that national identities and ethnic missions are in principle nothing more than violent and violence-producing collective autohypnosis. Under its effect, the historical actors rush to the stage, guided by self-insinuations, to conquer their place in the world-historical sun. If we soberly take stock of the infernal adventure of the Germans, we create an ability to see through the dealings of history-making nations that make us shudder: “history” could now be understood as that which results from competing social manias, driven by the real-theatrical competition between autohypnotic imperial collec- tives, each of whom want to play out their world delirium to the end and lead it to supremacy. Even if we do not dare say it out loud, it is one of the psycho-historical peculiarities of post-fascist German intelligence to possess a sensorium for those tendencies that conjure up new life-threatening equations between real-theater and real- politics (to whom it may concern . . . ). 8
Meanwhile, no one can accuse the Germans of not wanting to learn the Western lesson. As special students of modernism, they have understood that life in the twentieth century can mean nothing more than self-assertion in a “risky and ultimately meaningless world” (Gehlen). In two generations, we have rebuilt ourselves to profanation for all intents and purposes. No doubt about it, in hollow offensiveness we have caught up with the top of the world; when it comes to translating a lack of perspective into mobilization, we follow closely behind the major powers; in our self-doubt we have even become an exporting nation and German melancholy enjoys international prestige; all over the world, “Made in Germany” stands for a state of mind, thanks to which feelings of meaninglessness are translated into a willingness to perform. Thus we have found our connection to kinetic modernity, to the mediocre and-so-on that dreams of catastrophic interruption, to the acceler- ating escalators, which automatically keep moving without a need for vision and approval.
But if post-modern modernity currently suffers from doomsday nightmares, it is because it can tell that the ability to withstand the extreme is beginning to disappear. For years now, anthologies and special booklets on the apocalypse have been published all over the world. In other words, contemporaries are noting with interest that the removal of a deadline on the world process is failing. This gives us pause for thought, because it threatens the temporal-logical
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core of the enterprise called the modern age. The energies that once dared to carry out the infinite project of modernity on the finite base of the earth feel suddenly dramatically scarce. An awareness of being pressed for time threatens everything far more than the mid-term. The modern-day program for deadline extension once again transforms into doomsday thinking, where the impossibility to escape the logic of time makes itself deeply felt. There is even much to suggest that the sharpest edges of the last-days problematic have yet to appear before us. We are not, as it turns out, done with the fact that the wartime allies removed the hysterical millennium of Central European fascism from the world in 1945. The long postwar peace gave the victors time to settle into the irony of their victory. After the fall of the monster, it had to slowly become apparent that great powers in the modern age represent crypto-millenarian structures per se. This can also be seen both in the alcoholic-athletic millennium of the socialist republics of workers, peasants, and functionaries and in the melancholy baroque lifestyle millennium of North-Western European welfare states. For the hysterical Protestantism of the philanthropic World Mission of “America,” this is true in a special way. Each of these entities discreetly claims a last-days status in the sense that none of them can imagine a future that would be different from their respective self-extension into infinity. Thus, as citizens of Eastern or Western great power complexes, we have reached the limits of the “classical” realm of history, and therefore cannot imagine any other morning than that of escalators, that is, the dynamic perpetuation of the conditions of movement and eternal life that the relevant mobilizers have meanwhile reached at the national or multinational level. What is the point of these reflections? It becomes apparent in the assumption that these kinds of observations reveal the temporal-logical reason for our present crisis: the conceivability of world time under the Old European historical drama patterns is approaching utter depletion. For this reason, European intelligence – where it does not evade with decisions and confessions – has been living for some time now with the awareness that it no longer has any positive terms for “what is really happening. ” We feel it in our nerve endings that as modernity began, so did the final act of classically conceived world time – this act is a phase that no longer wants to be a phase, but an indefinite continuum that perpetuates itself through the status quo in an irrevocable permanent self-affirmation.
Whoever has this perception of time in themselves – be it concept- ualized or not – cannot be perturbed by the fact that advanced modernity simultaneously displays both claustrophobic and agora- phobic reactions. To a world that can neither date or narrate itself,
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every now is too cramped and too vast, while a need for space immediately merges into a fear of limitlessness. The idea that every- thing ends in a big bang is no more frightening than the thought that everything goes on forever.
At this point, does it make sense to ask if we can “find a way out” from the interior of the late-modern last days state of mind? Isn’t it nonsense to think that we may find an “exit” into the post- historical open? Is there not an inadmissible combination of spatial images with concepts of time in such phrases? What kind of sense can speculation have of whether there is an outer realm in relation to world history up to now? Is a form of time conceivable that would be open as a dimension of depth of an essentially post-historical species life? And how should the actors of the current history finale depart from the stage of the Judeo-Christian-Western world period, when it is clear that their whole way of being and justification for existence is based on such moral-historico-dramatic concepts?
In these questions, the uncanny comes together with what is difficult to imagine. They condense three hypotheses, and each carries a dizzying historico-philosophical risk: first, that so-called “world history” in itself is the psycho-political and geopolitical result of a history-making script that was first designed in Persian- Jewish court metaphysics and then acted out by the monotheistic nations; secondly, that a more long-term future is only open to a historically highly mobilized humanity if it revises its previously valid historical script and post-historically breaks character; thirdly, that the Old European salvation-, reason-, integration-, and exoner- ation-historical conception of the world can actually be overridden and neutralized by a new, explicitly non-history-making world time schema. These theses are difficult to conceive of if their logic of time goes against the grain of a reason that represents worlds in a modern way; they are uncanny to the extent that within them everything is focused on defending the historic time bomb that ticks towards the end of the world.
The critique of historical reason – so far almost exclusively a domain of peaceful Dilthey researchers – suddenly proves to be the core of the question regarding “fate” in an age where it has been replaced by history. A critique of historical reason must therefore ultimately mean a critique of eschatological reason: that is, at the same time a critique of time-conceiving thinking, aim-thinking, anticipatory reason which imagines the end states, dramaturgical reason which stages the world process in a final act as it is written – in short, critique of the history-making reason that leads to the mobilization of the planet. All these critiques strive towards a post- historical process thinking that seeks to model the movement of the
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world within time minus apocalypses, final acts, consummations, arrival fantasies, final judgments, and last kingdom thoughts.
What concept of history is being used here? The world history set in motion as a drama striving to the end is linked to the fates of a super-subject that grasps all events with a continued historical effect as its own “inner context” and carries them on. For the seat of this historico-dramatic subject, only outstanding figures of salvation history or reason history are eligible: a chosen people, a world spirit, a proceeding species reason, a learning world-state central system. The content of a story belonging to such figures consists solely in the self-creation and self-realization of the subject on the world stage. Because history, understood as such, can simply be nothing more than a self-realization drama at the highest level, the whole striving, recognition, and action of the subject of history must remain curved into the interior of its self-accomplishment. Let’s assume for a moment that this super-subject acted through the brains of the current mobilization carriers and said “I” and “we” through their mouths. For this subject, who of course says “for me” and “for us,” the only possible reality is consequently that which belongs to its own realization. Thus, to count as “real,” something must be attributable to the occurrences in which our salvation, reason, wealth, and life alleviation, to cite Bloch, are brought forth. Dramatic world time is pure self-realization time for the super- subject. For it/me/us, the world is nothing but stage and resource, fuel and building material for the progressive mobilization of the self that is realized in the movement towards further movement. Because the super-subject can in principle have nothing outside itself, it practically acts in a cosmopolitan sense. It realizes itself by tirelessly maintaining its cosmopolitan stride.
But as long as this historical drama that strives for generalization in a cosmopolitan way is in motion, the earth must stay reduced to a mere setting. Because the enterprise that is history implies from the outset the self-bending of the history-making agent nations, it is established in the script of this theatrical piece that the setting called earth must turn out to be a mere background for a histori- cally demanding process-progress. History is a priori the play that makes its bill without the stage. It stems from the anti-symbiotic catastrophe that leads humans to “step out” of society. It is only through the anti-symbiotic revolution that leads to history that the human being turns into an ontological animal – something that says what is and what will become different. Because history executes its dramatic content after the exodus from symbioses of a mobilizing humanity, it is nothing other than metaphysics in action, detachment of nature through technology, staging of the
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epistemic-messianic process against the background of a serving and see-through earth. The drama’s indifference to its setting is codified in the logic of mobilization. It is only at the moment when the play threatens to ruin the stage that the players are forced into a new self-perception. Historically moved humanity had to wait for the imperialisms of modern times, the industrial age, and planetary media civilization before seeing the truth about its own enterprise through the crisis of its fundamental position. It has had to produce the informational pantheism of news culture and the mercantile pantheism of monetized total circulation9 in order to see that it always bumps into itself when it crosses a limit – all transcendence leads to an accelerated autism.
A post-historical era would reveal its beginning through an extro- version of the players towards their stage. After the history-making staging of one’s own, the discovery of the forgotten real other is once again possible and overdue. But if we are talking about extro- version, we do not mean another willful turn towards an additional attack space, but rather care towards what has previously been taken for granted as that which merely underlies. This extroversion becomes unavoidable nowadays to the extent that what merely seems to underlie is beginning to slip away from us. Astronautics and ecology – the two ways of seeing that stand out in the current “self-thematization” of humanity – provide us with disturbing images with respect to the (fall of) earth. Since we have been able to see our planet with satellite eyes from the outside, the previously basic has become a quintessential problem case.
Our extroversion is first initiated by the catastrophe of the under- lying: very obviously, the earth cannot provide for much longer what it seemed to up until now. It is overwhelmed by the role expected of it; that of theatrum cosmopoliticum. Its historical assignments: to serve as base camps for the historic exodus; to be available as a source of construction and fuel; to being the scene and object of geopolitical exploitation – these are no longer compatible with the earth’s existence for the foreseeable future. A veritable post-story therefore begins with the growth of the earth out of its histori- cally acquired annihilation definitions. It is hardly necessary to say that these conceptions of the earth are those of the so-called “high cultures,” the height of which is consistently measured by the vastness of their repulsion from the earth-symbiotic state. It is no coincidence that cosmopolitanism is the criterion of victorious high culture; even less coincidental is the fact that the word “world- citizen,” “cosmopolite,” was initially a prophetic Cynical joke that was to assume a world-historical seriousness. Meanwhile, the most pronounced citizens of the world hardly still live on this earth – they
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have become inhabitants of the country of “complexity,” members of the Grande Vitesse class, hasty through-travelers in this “Hotel Earth. ”
By contrast, the behavior of an earth-citizen would be one that sees the planet as more than an indifferent stage for the production of “our” play, in which we act as subjects of great promises and justifications: redemption, self-realization, time saved. It is with good reason that German parlance reserved the term “citizens of the earth” (Erdenbürger) for newborns, as if to mark the only moment in the life of the individual in which they are granted a hint of superiority over the historical world. Perhaps it is not entirely meaningless that it was an astronaut, Edgar Mitchell (“the sixth man on the moon”), who gave the term new content when he described the sentiments of those returned from outer space: “Each man comes back with a feeling he is no longer only an American citizen; he is a planetary citizen. ” Should there really be an era “after history,” its opening would be inseparable from the advent of the earth out of its historical way of being as curtain and raw material and with its illumination as the content of human devotion and care. The earth as a global object, previously lifted and hidden in the darkness of our closeness to it, has since been brought before itself through a series of technically historical “levers” and “spins”; it now sees itself with artificial and natural eyes on. This changes all the premises of the historical game. What was once the scene becomes the theme of the plot. What served as a background comes to the forefront. What was present as a raw material emerges as product. What was previously stage becomes the play itself. Such are the axioms of a post-historical dramaturgy in which the rules of the game are formulated according to a corresponding post- politics. Whatever may be played “on” the old earth stage, it itself is increasingly providing the subject matter of the plays. But it can already be said that “world history” as a time project for the acting out of spiritual and moral missions in front of natural and physical backgrounds is an exhausted idea. If philosophy of history is still to be good for something, then surely it is to comment on the meaning of the exhaustion of the history-making idea. This critical theory of history sabotages world-historical dramaturgy, just as history previously stepped into the world as an initiative for the sabotaging of fate. After the force of fate, a world-historical compulsion is now to be subverted – the play does not have to be played to the end. This insight comes too soon from the perspective of a history that wants to culminate; only through its seduction, however, is it able to postpone the annihilating culmination. By coming too soon, it stands with respect to temporal logic in the right place to disrupt the
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automatisms at whose entrance it would be too late. That is why it remains superfluous to wait for the dawn of apocalyptic anger, nor will anyone experience the Victory Day of a last kingdom. What emerges before us in the logic of procedural time can only be an era without the metaphysical difference between timeless earth stage and historical human drama. For us, the old “nature” no longer exists as a massive pedestal of cosmic pre-performance that would be preset for all human time. For us, the earth is no longer the endlessly patient “building and carrying” that it appeared to be to almost all previous generations. It is precisely through the historical process and its two main events, large-scale technology and the human rights mission, that the earth has been destabilized in its carrying. What once meant nature and was placed in opposition to cultural institutions as a pre-human totality has since been included within the maelstrom of human constructions. If what was once called “nature” had managed to stay alive, its existence would no longer be due to its self-sufficiency – it lost that a few centuries ago via its apprehension by a technically powerful scientific spirit. It can only survive thanks to a new world-building gesture, carried out by people for whom it has become evident that looking after the stage is the play itself.
To what extent do the outlines of a post-historical principle of reality surface in these considerations? By principle of reality we mean the obligations of thought and behavior that develop in human cultures under the afflux of chronic stress and danger. By bowing to the principium realitatis, consciousness adjusted to the burdensome and risky nature of existence. Because there are funda- mentally different attitudes to difficulty and risk, there are more than superficial differences between human cultures. It is even more clear than in their deeply different languages that different cultures manifest their mode of being in the world through the very different ways they bear its weight. Each culture develops its special gesture to master the heavy and precarious, its own style of dealing with the inevitable, its own cunning in the repeal of the unbreakable, its own rules of play for making the unbearable bearable. That is why it is true for all cultures what Herbert Marcuse tries to demonstrate for the modern world: the principle of reality is not only and not for all times identical to the indomitable law of need that restricts and burdens lives in cruel indifference. The approaches to what we now call history in the singular lie in the universally instigated struggles of civilizations against the burdening character of world conditions, and if the compass of all truly history-making traveling beings points to the pole of freedom, it is because freedom is inextricably
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associated with relief in the imaginations of “developed” civiliza- tions. Europe became “the mother of revolutions” because it is the original theatrical continent, the primary scene of an ontological revolt against the weight of the world, the stage of an inner-worldly liberation project that advertises with the promise to break the foreign rule of a dejected need of life through self-determined work.
In the principle of reality of the Christian age, the hopes of the individual were primarily directed to their personal redemption and with a psycho-politics of patience, converted into a willingness to endure the given. But a salvational-dramatic time arc was also extended, which virtually forced all of humanity into a political- theological community of destiny. In this way, an imperial, expansive history-making motif was formed into the Christian modeling of the principle of reality. From the sixteenth century, the explosive power of this is reflected in the Catholically legitimized imperialisms through which the planetary stride of Christianity begins. At the same time, ascetic Protestantism began a new salvation-economic offensive in which economic success impulses were linked to religious election motifs. Both arrangements, Catholicizing geopolitics and Protestant Profit Yoga, pair earthly traffic forces with sacred commands. From then on, the path is open for modern kinetic pantheism, which uses capitals, texts, vehicles, and radio waves to strive for the total lique- faction of all that is solid and standing.
It is only in the success story of this kinetic pantheism that the ominous “project of modernity” becomes possible. If modernity is indeed a project, and not just drift and growth, it has a great ambition to claim reality as its own design. Where essential modernity reigns, reality only rhymes with self-realization. That is why reality in the old-ontological sense is an unacceptable, reactionary word to modern ears. Those who live inside the Western modernization cyclone, spoiled by success, are already taking part in a revolution of relief that has long since overtaken all traditional standards for what is unavoidable and to be withstood. The classical components of the old principle of reality: unbendingness of the law, unpredictability of fate, intransigence of suffering – within modernity, all are, if not rendered ineffective, then certainly reduced to a residual size. The ontological revolt of modernity sets a threefold upheaval in motion against these “constants”: a mobilization revolution; a safeguarding revolution; a revolution of motion generation and unburdening. Revolutionary modernity can dream of the establishment of a “world” in which all independent resistance to the sovereign outlet of the mobilized self would have been lifted because it rejects reality – the unstoppable resistance per se – as a reactionary principle. In the kinetic pantheism of such an accomplished modernity, as
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the young Schelling suspected, infinite self-activity would coincide with absolute calmness, neo-worldly prometheanism would descend into epicurean detachment, principled activism would have to melt into an ultimate quietism. Only under the pull of such pantheisti- cally paradisiacal alluring images could the modern philosophy of progress break the old principle of reality and replace the ages-old politics of guilt with an unprecedented impatient politics of disin- hibition and unburdening. These, too, are reasons to characterize modernity as a stealthy eschaton: its principle of reality can be about nothing more than the last effort at a happiness-political removal of what still requires effort.
What the Christian-medieval version of the principle of reality has in common with modern times is that both perceive nature as an ahistorical background of human drama – even if modernity no longer sees it as a history of salvation, but a program for self-preser- vation, progress, and self-enhancement. Even where these specifically history-making versions of the reality principle are in force, human actors remain introverted in their worries of redemption and relief. Their drama takes place against a natural backdrop and on a planetary stage, drawing from a natural fund and disassembling uncovered physical riches for the benefit of human assembling. Pushed by archaic fear and inspired by modern design power, the subjects of the modern project draw basic raw materials and energy sources into their pragmatic dramas as props, that is, as mobile acces- sories. Their “work” transforms “matter” into consumables for their great scenarios, which revolve around world domination, humani- zation, growth, self-realization, redemption, and relief. Wherever history is made in this sense, there can be no question of an appre- ciation of the earth as a “reality” in its own right. It is always used like a self-evident, non-dramatic basis for unlikely, dramatic super- structures and expeditions. But this attitude of laying claim is now on the verge of disaster. What currently creates epochs is the revenge of the former background on the depicted figures and frameworks: the background has emerged from its inconspicuousness and quit its assigned position as supplier of self-evident things. The old ecology of stage and play is out of joint. It is now no longer possible to place ruthlessly risky cultural figures on endlessly resilient natural slides. The slide itself demands that its previously overlooked improb- ability enter into the figures it carries and be considered in them. It might even seem that nature took revenge on history by having its own fragility suddenly surpass the riskiness of the historical structure. Thus, the due de-dramatization of history gives prelude to the rediscovery of a dramatic nature. If humanity were to awaken from its historical narcissism, it would discover that it no longer has
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a mission other than to make the concern of an overly finite nature its own. By way of historical mobilization successes, nature and civilization have grown together into a common improbability. To perceive reality under such conditions is to profess solidarity in the improbable. Where this perception is clarified, an earth-bourgeois ethos spontaneously arises. The maxim of human action must now always be able to lead to the avoidance of further blind impositions on the carrying capacity of the earth. The old base, contrary to its name, cannot easily be claimed as a basis that bears any structure. Meanwhile, it depends for its part on the “adherence” of construc- tions to the fundamental nature of their basic situation and on being let to be more than a self-evident underlying of things. Just as everything that is built up has always been in need of a basis, so too has the basis become construction-dependent. Since then, an abyssal caveat has been mixed into the horizontal position of the basic: even what is lying down can still fall. Cultural theory crosses an epochal threshold as soon as it understands the new fact from which to begin, namely that base and construction irrevocably form a community of fragility from now on. From that moment on, the world-historical drama is translated back into prehistoric perspec- tives. Global history is transformed from the singular cosmopolitan self-realization project into a pluralistic earth-bourgeois household problem. This obtains via force a philosophical economy of ecology. The fact that the earth explodes today as the “whole house” of life is itself the result of the singular, globalizing, dramatic history. The historical large-scale attempt to establish the “house of man” on a universal scale has caused both deserts and islands of prosperity to grow. Again, this is just another way of saying that it turned out differently with the historical enterprise than we thought. Can history itself be thought of as the event in which things have to turn out differently? Is it predestined for failure as long as it makes its calculation without movement? Doesn’t the phenomenon of history result a priori from the conflict between project and drift, step and fall? If it behaves in this way, then the sharpness of this contradiction would also be a measure of the distance between the initial inten- tions and the final results within the historical process. That could not be any bigger today. Because the distance between what was wanted and what occurred lays painfully open in the consciousness of contemporaries, the supposition arises in their minds that it could all go terribly wrong with the entire historical world. We no longer feel comfortable in our historical skin since history increasingly turns out to be the means by which it all goes wrong “in the end. ”
But since when did the risk of it all going wrong (turning out “false”) come into play – where did the danger of falsification come
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from? With such questions, current thinking repeats a concern for the truth and untruth of the whole, through the appearance of which the highly cultural level of human thought is announced. In the sheer question of how what came to be could come to be, that is, in the pre-Socratic explosion of the question of “emergence as such,” the truth problem arises as vehemently as possible before the world-imagining consciousness. The question of truth becomes the no longer provable problem in the history-founding moment where the impression comes to the forefront of the threat that it could all go wrong with the way of the world. Does an original correspondence between the consciousness of human history and the risk of falsehood (i. e. wrongness) in the course of the world therefore exist? Perhaps the opposite is more correct: that the aberrations of the world course are linked from the very beginning to the emergence of imaginatively gifted beings whose answer to the depressing evidence of their false life is a series of history-making drafts of a true world that is to be sought. Unmistakably, all paths to the false, fake, and wrong converge in the human – that homo sapiens sapiens who at the beginning of their high-cultural era is gripped by the compulsion to ask after the truth. For this being, the partiality of the question becomes inescapable because they learn from their own upsets that they are the being who does not fit. The question of truth dawns on them because they discover themselves in the focal point of the palpably wrong. It is only in their ability to get it completely wrong that humans become aware of an ontological privilege that the philosophers have wrapped into that darkly dazzling word “freedom. ” Freedom is not only serenity towards the real, in which – as Heidegger wisely indicated – the “essence of truth” lies, but also the disembarkation into the risk- filled, which includes multiple experiences of the false and fake since the ominous “going astray” manifests itself in a variety of ways: from the abyss of the fearsome strangeness between soul and world to the “regional” variants of falseness which we know as dissonance, misfit, faltering, dissent, unfoundedness, and forfeit. Early on, the first philosophies moved humans themselves towards the source of the First Wrong, or directly identified them with it: be it that they attached themselves to the wrong principle in the primal dispute between light and dark, helped the actually unjustified to a deceptive existence via an existing error, or broke out of an initial state of unity by way of collapse, hubris, rebellion, or forgetting. It is only once spirit has been impregnated by falseness that it recognizes itself in the conspicuous urge to set up its existence on safe founda- tions.
As it builds its structures, it thus wants to use the substance from which indestructible certainty is made. That substance is truth,
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because it promises to be what preserves itself in a collapse, what stays as opposed to flees, what is fundamental in contrast to what is imposed. Truth is the axe with which the continuum of beings will be split into the primary and the secondary – absolute principles and secondary cases, sure origins and endangered derivatives, eternal axioms and fleeting connections. By way of metaphysical shamanism, human acts and institutions ought to be “set up” on primordial models and first foundations, so that a transfer of being, power, and safety can arise from the ground up. The more fragile the foundation, the more strenuous the base-laying magic spell.
The metaphysical ways of thinking, as handed down from their beginnings in the axes of time, testify to a shocking increase in consciousness from the disintegration tendency of man-made orders. The oldest documents of these logics that search within an absolute halt necessarily stem from the early days of states and countries. Where power grows to gasping heights for the first time, people, as rulers as well as victims, begin to gain experiences with a new quality of risk. That is why the state, metaphysics, and fear of falling are formations of the same age. At the time when these phenomena take shape, the mythical memories of Golden Ages and Paradise Expulsions also find the form in which they have been handed down to this day. Such narratives testify to the moment when a consciousness captured by the pull of history looks back and gets overwhelmed by the evidence that whatever makes history is worse than what does not. To plunge forward into time is to progress downward into the wrong: this is a primordial self-interpretation of the life that has become historic. The myth of the Golden Age presupposes the historically powerful distinction between a high time and a declining one. It contrasts prehistoric homeostasis with historical descent. While “in the beginning” the measure of things consisted of voluntary nature, gentleness, and durability, as a result of the myth, the old “world order” corrodes itself in a progressive decay down to iron conditions. Here, coercion, brutalization, and uncertainty are so characteristic that, as soon as it is mentioned, we know immediately: this concerns us. What’s more, history-affirming pragmatic thinking seeks to dismiss these myths as a first romance. The correct skeptical remark that, in reality, there never “was” a Golden Age of humanity is meaningless alongside the fact that some cultures that drift into history have truly found their way through the ages of the world to be one of decline. This inner view of the historical existence was occasionally able to get a few words in edgewise, where the need to praise what happened was not totally effective. This marked the scene of an initial cultural criticism. These cannot be separated from the realistic, if futile, lament about
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the risks and deformations of a life oriented towards politics. Even Daniel’s vision of the colossus on clay feet – a historical prophetic image of the effect of a self-making history – shows how, in the erection period of the high culture consciousness, the insight into the connection between increased power and increasing fragility emerged at the same time. Almost two and a half millennia after Daniel, this connection is more visible than ever, with the difference that, in addition to the classical arthritis of the great powers, new aspects of fragility have emerged that seem so pregnant with disaster that they make the downfall of the Mesopotamian Empire appear somatically soothing. “World history” as a process/progress that sets up risky cultural figures on the stable foundations of nature and truth has meanwhile come close to a point where it has to swear an oath of disclosure as a wrong history.
As the basic gesture of metaphysical as well as technical constructing, erecting to stand upright is at the same time the history-making wrongness which draws the foundation into the fate of untenable structures. This is why the world history of human falsehood is both more than and different from an exception of biological law, according to which the mis-adaptation of species is evolutionarily countered with their extinction. When it comes to humans – the constructive, ontological animal – a fulfilled wrong history would not only lead to a collapse of the set-up and the extinction of the species, it would also drag the foundations into the demise of the superstructures and allow what underlies the set-up to be part of its collapse. If the erection of structures wants to be more than just a daring straightening up of one’s posture, but rather strives towards a “safeguarding of establishments,” it turns into a gesture of the first error; it ends up there because it compulsively performs a gesture of denial against an already experienced fall. In the form of this gesture, it is at the heart of what subjectivity means. The basic statement is the criminal lie of the active subject, which, at the height of its unfolding, covers the whole earth with untenable structures. With respect to the erected structure, it is not the vertical pull that is false – a pull that cannot be removed from the thought of a right human mobility. The forgery arises from the securely standing pose, which wants to give the uninsured life a stand of its own on unwavering foundations. “If it had been possible to build the Tower of Babel without climbing it, it would have been permitted. ”10
The earth, as a locality for the symbioses of common improbabil- ities, is not a principle, not a fundament. The way the earth sustains living forms has nothing to do with the relationship between base and building. Its sustaining of them is a making possible, not a
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securing. This sustaining enfolds alongside the gestures of birth – bearing, bringing forth, raising up, setting free. There is no basis for any type of grounding in the play of these gestures – supporting and daring are one and the same in them; in coming to be, passing away comes to be known at the same time. It is only through the gestures of a production of safeguards that stir up in the metaphysical animal that the historically powerful opposition between ecology and ontology arises. It is only through the securing gestures of production that rouse from within the metaphysical animal that the history-making contrast between the ecological and the ontological breaks up. Ecology adheres to the naturalness of nature11 by recog- nizing the state of being sustained and supported in all occurring life forms. On the other hand, ontology is entangled in the architec- tural adventure of high cultures: it executes the compulsion for ever more universal production, which Heidegger defined as the fate of the “Gestell” – a placing to stand upright and an enframing. 12 If a fateful greatness is recognized in the empowerment to construction, it is because with the emancipation of constructing, the compulsion to make history and suffer has also come into force at the same time. That is why history remains until the end only the continuation of the fall from symbiosis by other means. It does on a large scale what the individual life tries do on a smaller one – transform separation into autonomy, fall into construction, disaster into project. It is always the anti-symbiotic powers that make history in the true sense of the word. History is the effort to rework the disadvantage of being born into an advantage of self-realization. Only when the discontent with self-generation begins to border on the unbearable will humans also regain the advantage of being born.
For an Ontology of Still-Being
In Paradise, I would not last a “season” or even a day; then how account for my nostalgia for it? I don’t account for it, it has inhabited me always, it was part of me before I was.
E. M. Cioran, The Trouble with Being Born13
Ever since the first historical human being lifted their head, times have been stubbornly interesting. Not a day goes by without a disaster, not a year without novelty, no generation without depar- tures towards hope against one’s better judgment. High culture may speak of itself because it moves very much in the element of “event. ” As long as it sets up worlds that want to continue being narrated, it insists on being made from the stuff of heroic epics and novel series.
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The degree to which high culture is interesting corresponds precisely to the degree of civilizational mobilization – the interesting is the psychological interest rate of the catastrophe. Once the interesting drug called history has grasped the entire psyche, it appears as something we can no longer imagine being without. Overwhelmed by its own movement, the thinking avalanche sets itself in motion, following a self-potentializing dynamic that is peculiar to the subjects of the world process who are on their way to more power and skill. Where the very historicity of existence becomes unfastened, it takes on the structure of a history-making history – it continually acquires its agents, through which it continually keeps going and casts itself forward in an increasingly heightened way. That is why the essential historical consciousness is not so much defined by traditionalism (which essentially remains ahistorical) but the tradition of mobili- zation. History organizes itself like a rally in time, which searches for its route from stage to stage even if it often gets the impression that there is no more path to continue on. The history-making teams have fallen as willfully as the suicidal mob of the Paris–Dakar rally. Frenetically, they are on their way from Babylon to Megalopolis, and time and again they find their manic whisperers indulging them in the idea of being race leaders and sponsors in the formidable enterprise – prophets, philosophers of history, moralists, theorists of learning, great men of the highest mission. Just as the interesting is the psychological interest rate of the catastrophe, so too are the missions its loans. Where history has begun as a self-fulfilling mission, the not-yet-structure begins to reign, mobilizing life with unfulfilled orders. The mission-dynamic constitution of essential history condemns any historically achieved state of affairs to embarrass itself before what has not yet been achieved. Everything that is now is latently destroyed by being measured against what is still to come: because the appearance of the not-yet-being always prevails for the utopian-missionary gaze of current beings, the real is degraded to the mere appearance of a being that first has arrived in order to exist. The already-arrived is obliterated by the not-yet- fulfilled. In the process, the insatiable hunger for the future grows.
The ontology of the not-yet-being – magnificently defined by Ernst Bloch – gives away the secret of the historical mobilization of the world. It outlines an ontology of the becoming being, which determines the world process as a genre drama that lifts itself upwards to the highest leitmotifs. This processes from within itself the agents, engines, and motivations as a by-product, through which it can then launch itself into even further spaces of not-yet-being. As the ontology of the revolutionary world movement, Bloch’s teaching, which has not yet become a utopian goal, rationalizes
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world history as a space of increase in an infinite mission: where the world was, God should become. But because the real world must never be directly divine, but at most provide the initial letter of the divine name, the becoming-God of the world is at the same time given to infinite postponement. Thus, the currently real ontologi- cally finds itself in a quandary: as a “comprising of,” it is obsolete and devalued from the outset; as a mobilization-making mass, it is placed at the disposal of benefiting accelerated improvements, which time and again lead to the incorrigible.
In the ontology of not-yet-being, the restlessness of historical injured life is theorized as a history-making hope. With the help of a mission-ontological boost, the drivenness transforms itself into promise and charges back into itself as a will to non-release. It is this self-drive that turns suffering from reality into an engine for the departure into the New World of modern times. If the ontological definition of modern times as a being-towards-movement has become universal for us in this matter, it is due to the fact that modern times are synonymous with the phenomenon that it is only a few centuries ago that enterprising humans were able to achieve an effective interconnection of mission motifs and technical success machines. This success, which triggered avalanches of further success, meanwhile spins over into its own successes. Since the beginning of modern times, historical acceleration phenomena have experienced a nuclear-like increase. This means nothing more than that the self-intensification loops responsible for modern mobilizations have become conclusive on a broad front in recent centuries. Only when imagination principally imagines itself (as in the transcendental philosophies), the will wills itself (as in the pragmatic power ontologies), productivity is produced (as in the liberal or socialistically motivated industrial systems), and creativity is created (as in psycho-technical stimulation of “ingenious” obses- sions) – only then will history makers be systematically launched and mobilizers published in series. These dangerously multiplied perpetrators are increasingly responsive to each other and to their offensive projects and campaigns. The “events” generated by them condense into a catastrophic jelly. The apparent learning process is turning into a real nuclear process. The further this escalates, the more desperate the Old Enlightenment affirmations sound which claim that humanity today still moves within a prehistory of itself. History’s conception as an infinite mission now forces its agents into great bold positions: while most signs in the world point to a not-long-now, they must stubbornly hold onto the still-not-yet. But maybe they’re right. Between the previous not-yet and the imminent no-more, we poor interim devils are only left with the unhappy
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awareness that we have always lived in the wrong time. We are too late for the first paradise and too early for the second. A history that can until the last only be a pre-history of fulfilled times is for us nothing other than a lost time.
What was claimed at the beginning of the book on modernity – that it represents the paradoxical program to carry out an infinite project on a finite basis – can now be said about history as a whole, insofar as it proceeds in an anthropogonic exodus, as a utopian way home and an apocalyptic mobilization. The history-making tension between the design and the foundation, between the driving and the persisting, is not only based on the non-relationship between the infinite and finite, the utopian and the topical. Far more powerfully effective in it is the act of confusing the memory of an intra-uterine, a-cosmically blessed existence with the anticipation of an extra-uterine, worldly-real universal happiness. In the historical ontological phantasm of the self-illuminating not-yet, an a-cosmic past is projected onto a cosmic future, the intra-uterine dowry is hallucinated as an outer defiant world. But then history can be nothing other than the endless birth struggle of a phantasmagorical human body that is abandoned by the inner-motherly homeland and exposed to non-motherly foreignness. There it has to throw itself into the enterprise of turning the foreign into a home. But the foreign never quite wants to be the same as that which is our own and our home. Because the a-cosmic cannot be “realized” in the cosmic – because world-less limbo is never the result of worldwide effort – the historic departure towards the realization of the real home must be an extermination campaign against the immediately present, cosmic, outer, others. The matricide undertaken to extort a return to the womb is the logical and objective consequence of this “world-historical” directive of the experimentum mundi.
Once the a-cosmic character of the utopian ideal becomes clear, we can see through the temporal-logical deception upon which the ontology of the not-yet-being rests. The miraculous pull of the very other – that storm from paradise that drives into the wings of Walter Benjamin’s angel of history14 – comes from a “place” that does not lie before us but behind us. That is why today’s search for the future is a catastrophic misunderstanding – the paradise- political raid of nature as raw material which does not know how things happen to it – paradise now. “This cannot be achieved with the nature that is given, but also not, as empty dreams of soul would claim, without nature. The dream of a better life means at long last, in toto, a new world, that is, again a setting, a cosmic country. ”15 As soon as the deception is lifted, the temporal sense of the utopian changes: it is not approaching towards us from the future; rather,
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it is the light of the “still” that is cast from an undeniably given life also into the ungiven. That is why the “still” is more powerful than the not-yet. The spirit of utopia belongs less to the self-illuminating becoming of something better than to the still itself luminiferous still-being of what has been begun. Nothing is revealed within it, but it has an afterglow. From this correction onward, no one can get near the utopian “small town” if they approach it as if it were something that has yet to be opened: the utopian “place” can only be “arrived at” by a “turn” back into the still open. Those who come into the still open are not pursuing something distant, but allow themselves to be caught up with by the unreachably near. In the still-being, the true spirit of utopia blows, which must not want its own “realization” without misunderstanding itself. Freed from the illusions of attainment, the incomparable unplace proves to be a resting point. Because utopia can no longer be thought of as a goal or mission statement, the previously mobilizing itself now becomes the seat of demobilization. Only those who know what it means to have nothing left to do have a criterion for the right mobility. Instead of mass mobilizations forward, fully movable floating in the here and now becomes possible. The way of critique passes over into a critique of the way. The not yet achieved gets to know the truly achievable in the still-being. Thus, the idea of critique must be based on a newly understood spirit of utopia. In doing so, critique as ability to make a difference discovers its premise in the possibility of having nothing to critique. The difference between difference and non-difference sets the “more thoughtful thinking” in motion, which can stay moving even if the totality-theoretical phantasm of an identification of identity and non-identity should prove unfeasible. As critiquing subjects, we are not only the bearers of the ability to make distinctions, but rather much more still those who are themselves differentiated and who think from a place of separation – only because we, as differentiated ones, as individualized spirits, can presuppose the fetal non-differentiation are we as born subjects differentiation-competent. However, the first difference, which makes a distinction as such, is due not to the use of discernment, but to the miraculous catastrophe of the coming-into-the-world. While monistic metaphysicians absorb the Absolute into a fetal imagination in order to absorb the worldly other into the world-less One, dramatic critique follows the coming-into-the-world of that which thinks; on the screen of fetal remembrance, it carries on the adventure of being different. That is why a real critical theory, should it exist one day, will be identical to authentic mysticism. As a living difference between worldlessness and worldliness, the unique existence will become aware of its
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being-in-the-world. The spirit of cosmopolitanism will come to see itself as an enlightened a-cosmism. Only the mystical path will then still be open. As a critique of the path, it leads to where we are.
Notes
Premises
1 [The original German title of this book is Eurotaoismus: Zur Kritik der politischen Kinetik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989). ]
2 In the following, especially pp. 66ff.
3 Cf. Peter Sloterdijk, Zur Welt kommen – Zur Sprache kommen
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988).
4 [Franz Kafka, A Hunger Artist and Other Stories, trans. Joyce Crick
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 192. ]
Chapter 1 The Modern Age as Mobilization
1 [The original German edition was published in 1989. ]
2 Unless we accept the identification of the world with the adversary par excellence – as Ernst Bloch did in his old age when he at last put his gnostic cards on the table: see Experimentum Mundi: Frage, Kategorien des Herausbringens, Praxis (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975), Chapter 45, “Aufklärung und Teufelsglaube, die Fortdauer des
Widersacherischen. ”
3 It was Marx who first saw through the moral mystification of the
kinetic. He found not so much that Kant’s “moral law” falls into the interiority of a sense of duty, but that it is conscience that allows itself to be mobilized as a duty to revolution. The categorical imperative is therefore less an ethical sentence than a kinetic sentence: it says less about what you should do than what you have to overthrow in order to be able to do it, namely all circumstances that inhibit human kinetic.
4 [Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 29. ]
5 Traditionally, spirit has a precarious relationship with movement – except that we say of it that it blows where it wants to (which is probably to be understood as a compliment to the inspired and also
Notes to pp. 9–25 155
meant to explain that there is nothing we can do in the event of a lull). If we want to understand this relationship in positive terms, it could be provisionally characterized by five criteria: contextuality (spirit is aware of the goings-on outside itself), self-perception (it intuits itself), self-limitation (it realizes when it is enough), reversibility (it has “play,” it can do what it can, back and forth), and spontaneity (it is capable not only of carrying on as before, but also of starting afresh, even surprising itself if necessary). These criteria only jointly guarantee the effect of the spiritual – separated from each other, they guarantee only intelligent stupidities (e. g. our life as it is).
6 [Novalis, Philosophical Writings, trans. Margaret Mahony Stoljar (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p. 144. ]
7 The posthumously published small work by Jacob Taubes, Ad Carl Schmitt – Gegenstrebige Fügung (Berlin: Merve, 1987), is an example of a free handling of another evil man of the twentieth century, namely Carl Schmitt, the thinker of world war.
8 One may note that these sentences are not formulated in the spirit of utopia, but in the spirit of system function theory, which is known to serve “conservative” interests, but here only the bare minimum of preservation, self-preservation as a non-suicide.
9 In Jacques Derrida’s original formulation – il n’ya pas de hors-texte – the same sounds somewhat more appetizing; one hears the suspending (in our terms: de-mobilizing) function of the thesis. See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
10 [Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 6. ]
11 In this context, we must draw attention to the little-known work by Dieter Claessens, Das Konkrete und das Abstrakte: Soziologische Skizzen zur Anthropologie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980), which raises the question of the encroaching of an evolutionary wisdom in the sense of a “withdrawal of untenable positions” without concession to the romantic demonization of technology.
12 [Paul Valéry, “The European,” in History and Politics, trans. Denise Folliot and Jackson Matthews, The Collected Works, Vol. 10 (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1962), p. 323. ]
13 [Horace, Satires and Epistles, trans. John Davie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 99. ]
14 The French Indian connoisseur Raymond Schwab was, among other things, the first to draw a parallel between the adventures of Indology and the philological sensations of Renaissance Hellenism. Cf. The Oriental Renaissance: Europe’s Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680–1880, trans. Gene Patterson-King and Victor Reinking (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
15 Otto Petras, Post Christum: Streifzüge durch die geistige Wirklichkeit (Berlin: Widerstands-Verlag, 1935), p. 11. In our final essay (pp. 129ff. ), compare the remarks about Paul as the initiator of the Holy Mobilization on Christian world history. Both references, which refer to Petras as well as to Paul, are based on suggestions with which Jacob Taubes conveyed to the author a concept of the span of Jewish
156 Notes to pp. 29–35
historical theology. See Jacob Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, trans.
David Ratmoko (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 16 [Novalis, Philosophical Writings, p. 111. ]
Chapter 2 The Other Change: On the Philosophical Situation of Alternative Movements
1 [Robert Musil, The Enthusiasts, trans. Andrea Simon (New York: Performing Arts Journal Publications, 1983), p. 34. ]
2 There is only one significant attempt to take the term “panic” philosophically seriously, the one that Hermann Broch made in his Massenwahntheorie: Beiträge zur einer Psychologie der Politik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979). This attempt was born from the impression of fascism. Broch diagnoses that the real fears that affected large parts of the Central European population, especially the German population, after the First World War triggered pre-panicked condi- tions. In these, full-panicked energies already announce their eruption. Full panic means negative ecstasy; in it, a metaphysical despair is experi- enced: constriction of the self in world loss, doomsday plight, deadly isolation. Human activity is capable of the worst under the influence of “panicked” conditions – especially when the panicked energy channels itself forward into delusional programs of a breakthrough. The only counterpower that can absorb these energies, according to Broch, is the rational ecstasy in which the individual is restrained to the insight: I am the world. For Broch, it is a criterion of authentic religion that it overcomes the existential primal in rational ecstasies, while it is typical of demonic revival movements that they seduce one with destructive intoxications. Only from rational ecstasies can people make life covenants in the face of death: at first a religious, then immediately also a politically moral social contract with all contemporaries.
These speculations can be continued today in a birth-psychoanalytic way. A political perinatalism is necessary. The moment of coming into the world is at the same time a moment of fear of death for human children; it contains a lifelong, effective reservoir of panic.