No More Learning

Some say therefore that the instant in which the bread was last, and
the instant in which the body of Christ is first, are indeed two in
comparison with the things measured, but are one comparatively to the
time measuring; as when two lines touch, there are two points on the
part of the two lines, but one point on the part of the place
containing them. But here there is no likeness, because instant and
time is not the intrinsic measure of particular movements, as a line
and point are of a body, but only the extrinsic measure, as place is to
bodies.

Hence others say that it is the same instant in fact, but another
according to reason. But according to this it would follow that things
really opposite would exist together; for diversity of reason does not
change a thing objectively.

And therefore it must be said that this change, as stated above, is
wrought by Christ's words which are spoken by the priest, so that the
last instant of pronouncing the words is the first instant in which
Christ's body is in the sacrament; and that the substance of the bread
is there during the whole preceding time. Of this time no instant is to
be taken as proximately preceding the last one, because time is not
made up of successive instants, as is proved in Phys. vi. And therefore
a first instant can be assigned in which Christ's body is present; but
a last instant cannot be assigned in which the substance of bread is
there, but a last time can be assigned. And the same holds good in
natural changes, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. viii).

Reply to Objection 2: In instantaneous changes a thing is "in
becoming," and is "in being" simultaneously; just as becoming
illuminated and to be actually illuminated are simultaneous: for in
such, a thing is said to be "in being" according as it now is; but to
be "in becoming," according as it was not before.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 1), this change comes about
in the last instant of the pronouncing of the words, for then the
meaning of the words is finished, which meaning is efficacious in the
forms of the sacraments. And therefore it does not follow that this
change is successive.
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Whether this proposition is false: "The body of Christ is made out of
bread"?

Objection 1: It seems that this proposition is false: "The body of
Christ is made out of bread. " For everything out of which another is
made, is that which is made the other; but not conversely: for we say
that a black thing is made out of a white thing, and that a white thing
is made black: and although we may say that a man becomes black still
we do not say that a black thing is made out of a man, as is shown in
Phys. i. If it be true, then, that Christ's body is made out of bread,
it will be true to say that bread is made the body of Christ. But this
seems to be false, because the bread is not the subject of the making,
but rather its term. Therefore, it is not said truly that Christ's body
is made out of bread.

Objection 2: Further, the term of "becoming" is something that is, or
something that is "made. " But this proposition is never true: "The
bread is the body of Christ"; or "The bread is made the body of
Christ"; or again, "The bread will be the body of Christ. " Therefore it
seems that not even this is true: "The body of Christ is made out of
bread. "

Objection 3: Further, everything out of which another is made is
converted into that which is made from it. But this proposition seems
to be false: "The bread is converted into the body of Christ," because
such conversion seems to be more miraculous than the creation of the
world, in which it is not said that non-being is converted into being.
Therefore it seems that this proposition likewise is false: "The body
of Christ is made out of bread. "

Objection 4: Further, that out of which something is made, can be that
thing. But this proposition is false: "Bread can be the body of
Christ. " Therefore this is likewise false: "The body of Christ is made
out of bread. "

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "When the consecration
takes place, the body of Christ is made out of the bread. "

I answer that, This conversion of bread into the body of Christ has
something in common with creation, and with natural transmutation, and
in some respect differs from both. For the order of the terms is common
to these three; that is, that after one thing there is another (for, in
creation there is being after non-being; in this sacrament, Christ's
body after the substance of bread; in natural transmutation white after
black, or fire after air); and that the aforesaid terms are not
coexistent.

Now the conversion, of which we are speaking, has this in common with
creation, that in neither of them is there any common subject belonging
to either of the extremes; the contrary of which appears in every
natural transmutation.

Again, this conversion has something in common with natural
transmutation in two respects, although not in the same fashion. First
of all because in both, one of the extremes passes into the other, as
bread into Christ's body, and air into fire; whereas non-being is not
converted into being. But this comes to pass differently on the one
side and on the other; for in this sacrament the whole substance of the
bread passes into the whole body of Christ; whereas in natural
transmutation the matter of the one receives the form of the other, the
previous form being laid aside. Secondly, they have this in common,
that on both sides something remains the same; whereas this does not
happen in creation: yet differently; for the same matter or subject
remains in natural transmutation; whereas in this sacrament the same
accidents remain.

From these observations we can gather the various ways of speaking in
such matters. For, because in no one of the aforesaid three things are
the extremes coexistent, therefore in none of them can one extreme be
predicated of the other by the substantive verb of the present tense:
for we do not say, "Non-being is being" or, "Bread is the body of
Christ," or, "Air is fire," or, "White is black. " Yet because of the
relationship of the extremes in all of them we can use the preposition
"ex" [out of], which denotes order; for we can truly and properly say
that "being is made out of non-being," and "out of bread, the body of
Christ," and "out of air, fire," and "out of white, black. " But because
in creation one of the extremes does not pass into the other, we cannot
use the word "conversion" in creation, so as to say that "non-being is
converted into being": we can, however, use the word in this sacrament,
just as in natural transmutation. But since in this sacrament the whole
substance is converted into the whole substance, on that account this
conversion is properly termed transubstantiation.

Again, since there is no subject of this conversion, the things which
are true in natural conversion by reason of the subject, are not to be
granted in this conversion. And in the first place indeed it is evident
that potentiality to the opposite follows a subject, by reason whereof
we say that "a white thing can be black," or that "air can be fire";
although the latter is not so proper as the former: for the subject of
whiteness, in which there is potentiality to blackness, is the whole
substance of the white thing; since whiteness is not a part thereof;
whereas the subject of the form of air is part thereof: hence when it
is said, "Air can be fire," it is verified by synecdoche by reason of
the part. But in this conversion, and similarly in creation, because
there is no subject, it is not said that one extreme can be the other,
as that "non-being can be being," or that "bread can be the body of
Christ": and for the same reason it cannot be properly said that "being
is made of [de] non-being," or that "the body of Christ is made of
bread," because this preposition "of" [de] denotes a consubstantial
cause, which consubstantiality of the extremes in natural
transmutations is considered according to something common in the
subject. And for the same reason it is not granted that "bread will be
the body of Christ," or that it "may become the body of Christ," just
as it is not granted in creation that "non-being will be being," or
that "non-being may become being," because this manner of speaking is
verified in natural transmutations by reason of the subject: for
instance, when we say that "a white thing becomes black," or "a white
thing will be black. "

Nevertheless, since in this sacrament, after the change, something
remains the same, namely, the accidents of the bread, as stated above
[4543](A[5]), some of these expressions may be admitted by way of
similitude, namely, that "bread is the body of Christ," or, "bread will
be the body of Christ," or "the body of Christ is made of bread";
provided that by the word "bread" is not understood the substance of
bread, but in general "that which is contained under the species of
bread," under which species there is first contained the substance of
bread, and afterwards the body of Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: That out of which something else is made,
sometimes implies together with the subject, one of the extremes of the
transmutation, as when it is said "a black thing is made out of a white
one"; but sometimes it implies only the opposite or the extreme, as
when it is said---"out of morning comes the day. " And so it is not
granted that the latter becomes the former, that is, "that morning
becomes the day. " So likewise in the matter in hand, although it may be
said properly that "the body of Christ is made out of bread," yet it is
not said properly that "bread becomes the body of Christ," except by
similitude, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: That out of which another is made, will sometimes
be that other because of the subject which is implied. And therefore,
since there is no subject of this change, the comparison does not hold.

Reply to Objection 3: In this change there are many more difficulties
than in creation, in which there is but this one difficulty, that
something is made out of nothing; yet this belongs to the proper mode
of production of the first cause, which presupposes nothing else. But
in this conversion not only is it difficult for this whole to be
changed into that whole, so that nothing of the former may remain
(which does not belong to the common mode of production of a cause),
but furthermore it has this difficulty that the accidents remain while
the substance is destroyed, and many other difficulties of which we
shall treat hereafter ([4544]Q[77]). Nevertheless the word "conversion"
is admitted in this sacrament, but not in creation, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: As was observed above, potentiality belongs to
the subject, whereas there is no subject in this conversion. And
therefore it is not granted that bread can be the body of Christ: for
this conversion does not come about by the passive potentiality of the
creature, but solely by the active power of the Creator.
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OF THE WAY IN WHICH CHRIST IS IN THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the manner in which Christ exists in this
sacrament; and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the whole Christ is under this sacrament?

(2) Whether the entire Christ is under each species of the sacrament?

(3) Whether the entire Christ is under every part of the species?

(4) Whether all the dimensions of Christ's body are in this sacrament?

(5) Whether the body of Christ is in this sacrament locally?

(6) Whether after the consecration, the body of Christ is moved when
the host or chalice is moved?

(7) Whether Christ's body, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by
the eye?

(8) Whether the true body of Christ remains in this sacrament when He
is seen under the appearance of a child or of flesh?
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Whether the whole Christ is contained under this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the whole Christ is not contained under this
sacrament, because Christ begins to be in this sacrament by conversion
of the bread and wine. But it is evident that the bread and wine cannot
be changed either into the Godhead or into the soul of Christ. Since
therefore Christ exists in three substances, namely, the Godhead, soul
and body, as shown above ([4545]Q[2], A[5];[4546] Q[5], AA[1],3), it
seems that the entire Christ is not under this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, Christ is in this sacrament, forasmuch as it is
ordained to the refection of the faithful, which consists in food and
drink, as stated above ([4547]Q[74], A[1]). But our Lord said (Jn.
6:56): "My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed. "
Therefore, only the flesh and blood of Christ are contained in this
sacrament. But there are many other parts of Christ's body, for
instance, the nerves, bones, and such like. Therefore the entire Christ
is not contained under this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, a body of greater quantity cannot be contained
under the measure of a lesser. But the measure of the bread and wine is
much smaller than the measure of Christ's body. Therefore it is
impossible that the entire Christ be contained under this sacrament.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Officiis): "Christ is in this
sacrament. "

I answer that, It is absolutely necessary to confess according to
Catholic faith that the entire Christ is in this sacrament. Yet we must
know that there is something of Christ in this sacrament in a twofold
manner: first, as it were, by the power of the sacrament; secondly,
from natural concomitance. By the power of the sacrament, there is
under the species of this sacrament that into which the pre-existing
substance of the bread and wine is changed, as expressed by the words
of the form, which are effective in this as in the other sacraments;
for instance, by the words: "This is My body," or, "This is My blood. "
But from natural concomitance there is also in this sacrament that
which is really united with that thing wherein the aforesaid conversion
is terminated. For if any two things be really united, then wherever
the one is really, there must the other also be: since things really
united together are only distinguished by an operation of the mind.

Reply to Objection 1: Because the change of the bread and wine is not
terminated at the Godhead or the soul of Christ, it follows as a
consequence that the Godhead or the soul of Christ is in this sacrament
not by the power of the sacrament, but from real concomitance. For
since the Godhead never set aside the assumed body, wherever the body
of Christ is, there, of necessity, must the Godhead be; and therefore
it is necessary for the Godhead to be in this sacrament concomitantly
with His body. Hence we read in the profession of faith at Ephesus (P.
I. , chap. xxvi): "We are made partakers of the body and blood of
Christ, not as taking common flesh, nor as of a holy man united to the
Word in dignity, but the truly life-giving flesh of the Word Himself. "

On the other hand, His soul was truly separated from His body, as
stated above ([4548]Q[50], A[5]). And therefore had this sacrament been
celebrated during those three days when He was dead, the soul of Christ
would not have been there, neither by the power of the sacrament, nor
from real concomitance. But since "Christ rising from the dead dieth
now no more" (Rom. 6:9), His soul is always really united with His
body. And therefore in this sacrament the body indeed of Christ is
present by the power of the sacrament, but His soul from real
concomitance.

Reply to Objection 2: By the power of the sacrament there is contained
under it, as to the species of the bread, not only the flesh, but the
entire body of Christ, that is, the bones the nerves, and the like. And
this is apparent from the form of this sacrament, wherein it is not
said: "This is My flesh," but "This is My body. " Accordingly, when our
Lord said (Jn. 6:56): "My flesh is meat indeed," there the word flesh
is put for the entire body, because according to human custom it seems
to be more adapted for eating, as men commonly are fed on the flesh of
animals, but not on the bones or the like.

Reply to Objection 3: As has been already stated ([4549]Q[75], A[5]),
after the consecration of the bread into the body of Christ, or of the
wine into His blood, the accidents of both remain. From which it is
evident that the dimensions of the bread or wine are not changed into
the dimensions of the body of Christ, but substance into substance. And
so the substance of Christ's body or blood is under this sacrament by
the power of the sacrament, but not the dimensions of Christ's body or
blood. Hence it is clear that the body of Christ is in this sacrament
"by way of substance," and not by way of quantity. But the proper
totality of substance is contained indifferently in a small or large
quantity; as the whole nature of air in a great or small amount of air,
and the whole nature of a man in a big or small individual. Wherefore,
after the consecration, the whole substance of Christ's body and blood
is contained in this sacrament, just as the whole substance of the
bread and wine was contained there before the consecration.
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Whether the whole Christ is contained under each species of this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the whole Christ is not contained under both
species of this sacrament. For this sacrament is ordained for the
salvation of the faithful, not by virtue of the species, but by virtue
of what is contained under the species, because the species were there
even before the consecration, from which comes the power of this
sacrament. If nothing, then, be contained under one species, but what
is contained under the other, and if the whole Christ be contained
under both, it seems that one of them is superfluous in this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, it was stated above (A[1], ad 1) that all the
other parts of the body, such as the bones, nerves, and the like, are
comprised under the name of flesh. But the blood is one of the parts of
the human body, as Aristotle proves (De Anima Histor. i). If, then,
Christ's blood be contained under the species of bread, just as the
other parts of the body are contained there, the blood ought not to be
consecrated apart, just as no other part of the body is consecrated
separately.

Objection 3: Further, what is once "in being" cannot be again "in
becoming. " But Christ's body has already begun to be in this sacrament
by the consecration of the bread. Therefore, it cannot begin again to
be there by the consecration of the wine; and so Christ's body will not
be contained under the species of the wine, and accordingly neither the
entire Christ. Therefore the whole Christ is not contained under each
species.

On the contrary, The gloss on 1 Cor. 11:25, commenting on the word
"Chalice," says that "under each species," namely, of the bread and
wine, "the same is received"; and thus it seems that Christ is entire
under each species.

I answer that, After what we have said above [4550](A[1]), it must be
held most certainly that the whole Christ is under each sacramental
species yet not alike in each. For the body of Christ is indeed present
under the species of bread by the power of the sacrament, while the
blood is there from real concomitance, as stated above (A[1], ad 1) in
regard to the soul and Godhead of Christ; and under the species of wine
the blood is present by the power of the sacrament, and His body by
real concomitance, as is also His soul and Godhead: because now
Christ's blood is not separated from His body, as it was at the time of
His Passion and death. Hence if this sacrament had been celebrated
then, the body of Christ would have been under the species of the
bread, but without the blood; and, under the species of the wine, the
blood would have been present without the body, as it was then, in
fact.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the whole Christ is under each species,
yet it is so not without purpose. For in the first place this serves to
represent Christ's Passion, in which the blood was separated from the
body; hence in the form for the consecration of the blood mention is
made of its shedding. Secondly, it is in keeping with the use of this
sacrament, that Christ's body be shown apart to the faithful as food,
and the blood as drink. Thirdly, it is in keeping with its effect, in
which sense it was stated above ([4551]Q[74], A[1]) that "the body is
offered for the salvation of the body, and the blood for the salvation
of the soul. "

Reply to Objection 2: In Christ's Passion, of which this is the
memorial, the other parts of the body were not separated from one
another, as the blood was, but the body remained entire, according to
Ex. 12:46: "You shall not break a bone thereof. " And therefore in this
sacrament the blood is consecrated apart from the body, but no other
part is consecrated separately from the rest.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the body of Christ is not under
the species of wine by the power of the sacrament, but by real
concomitance: and therefore by the consecration of the wine the body of
Christ is not there of itself, but concomitantly.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ is entire under every part of the species of the bread and
wine?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ is not entire under every part of the
species of bread and wine. Because those species can be divided
infinitely. If therefore Christ be entirely under every part of the
said species, it would follow that He is in this sacrament an infinite
number of times: which is unreasonable; because the infinite is
repugnant not only to nature, but likewise to grace.

Objection 2: Further, since Christ's is an organic body, it has parts
determinately distant. for a determinate distance of the individual
parts from each other is of the very nature of an organic body, as that
of eye from eye, and eye from ear. But this could not be so, if Christ
were entire under every part of the species; for every part would have
to be under every other part, and so where one part would be, there
another part would be. It cannot be then that the entire Christ is
under every part of the host or of the wine contained in the chalice.

Objection 3: Further, Christ's body always retains the true nature of a
body, nor is it ever changed into a spirit. Now it is the nature of a
body for it to be "quantity having position" (Predic. iv). But it
belongs to the nature of this quantity that the various parts exist in
various parts of place. Therefore, apparently it is impossible for the
entire Christ to be under every part of the species.

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (Gregory, Sacramentarium):
"Each receives Christ the Lord, Who is entire under every morsel, nor
is He less in each portion, but bestows Himself entire under each. "

I answer that, As was observed above (A[1], ad 3), because the
substance of Christ's body is in this sacrament by the power of the
sacrament, while dimensive quantity is there by reason of real
concomitance, consequently Christ's body is in this sacrament
substantively, that is, in the way in which substance is under
dimensions, but not after the manner of dimensions, which means, not in
the way in which the dimensive quantity of a body is under the
dimensive quantity of place.

Now it is evident that the whole nature of a substance is under every
part of the dimensions under which it is contained; just as the entire
nature of air is under every part of air, and the entire nature of
bread under every part of bread; and this indifferently, whether the
dimensions be actually divided (as when the air is divided or the bread
cut), or whether they be actually undivided, but potentially divisible.
And therefore it is manifest that the entire Christ is under every part
of the species of the bread, even while the host remains entire, and
not merely when it is broken, as some say, giving the example of an
image which appears in a mirror, which appears as one in the unbroken
mirror, whereas when the mirror is broken, there is an image in each
part of the broken mirror: for the comparison is not perfect, because
the multiplying of such images results in the broken mirror on account
of the various reflections in the various parts of the mirror; but here
there is only one consecration, whereby Christ's body is in this
sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: Number follows division, and therefore so long as
quantity remains actually undivided, neither is the substance of any
thing several times under its proper dimensions, nor is Christ's body
several times under the dimensions of the bread; and consequently not
an infinite number of times, but just as many times as it is divided
into parts.

Reply to Objection 2: The determinate distance of parts in an organic
body is based upon its dimensive quantity; but the nature of substance
precedes even dimensive quantity. And since the conversion of the
substance of the bread is terminated at the substance of the body of
Christ, and since according to the manner of substance the body of
Christ is properly and directly in this sacrament; such distance of
parts is indeed in Christ's true body, which, however, is not compared
to this sacrament according to such distance, but according to the
manner of its substance, as stated above (A[1], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 3: This argument is based on the nature of a body,
arising from dimensive quantity. But it was said above (ad 2) that
Christ's body is compared with this sacrament not by reason of
dimensive quantity, but by reason of its substance, as already stated.
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Whether the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's
body is not in this sacrament. For it was said [4552](A[3]) that
Christ's entire body is contained under every part of the consecrated
host. But no dimensive quantity is contained entirely in any whole, and
in its every part. Therefore it is impossible for the entire dimensive
quantity of Christ's body to be there.

Objection 2: Further, it is impossible for two dimensive quantities to
be together, even though one be separate from its subject, and the
other in a natural body, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph.
iii). But the dimensive quantity of the bread remains in this
sacrament, as is evident to our senses. Consequently, the dimensive
quantity of Christ's body is not there.

Objection 3: Further, if two unequal dimensive quantities be set side
by side, the greater will overlap the lesser. But the dimensive
quantity of Christ's body is considerably larger than the dimensive
quantity of the consecrated host according to every dimension.
Therefore, if the dimensive quantity of Christ's body be in this
sacrament together with the dimensive quantity of the host, the
dimensive quantity of Christ's body is extended beyond the quantity of
the host, which nevertheless is not without the substance of Christ's
body. Therefore, the substance of Christ's body will be in this
sacrament even outside the species of the bread, which is unreasonable,
since the substance of Christ's body is in this sacrament, only by the
consecration of the bread, as stated above [4553](A[2]). Consequently,
it is impossible for the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body to
be in this sacrament.

On the contrary, The existence of the dimensive quantity of any body
cannot be separated from the existence of its substance. But in this
sacrament the entire substance of Christ's body is present, as stated
above ([4554]AA[1],3). Therefore the entire dimensive quantity of
Christ's body is in this sacrament.

I answer that, As stated above [4555](A[1]), any part of Christ is in
this sacrament in two ways: in one way, by the power of the sacrament;
in another, from real concomitance. By the power of the sacrament the
dimensive quantity of Christ's body is not in this sacrament; for, by
the power of the sacrament that is present in this sacrament, whereat
the conversion is terminated. But the conversion which takes place in
this sacrament is terminated directly at the substance of Christ's
body, and not at its dimensions; which is evident from the fact that
the dimensive quantity of the bread remains after the consecration,
while only the substance of the bread passes away.

Nevertheless, since the substance of Christ's body is not really
deprived of its dimensive quantity and its other accidents, hence it
comes that by reason of real concomitance the whole dimensive quantity
of Christ's body and all its other accidents are in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: The manner of being of every thing is determined
by what belongs to it of itself, and not according to what is coupled
accidentally with it: thus an object is present to the sight, according
as it is white, and not according as it is sweet, although the same
object may be both white and sweet; hence sweetness is in the sight
after the manner of whiteness, and not after that of sweetness. Since,
then, the substance of Christ's body is present on the altar by the
power of this sacrament, while its dimensive quantity is there
concomitantly and as it were accidentally, therefore the dimensive
quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament, not according to its
proper manner (namely, that the whole is in the whole, and the
individual parts in individual parts), but after the manner of
substance, whose nature is for the whole to be in the whole, and the
whole in every part.

Reply to Objection 2: Two dimensive quantities cannot naturally be in
the same subject at the same time, so that each be there according to
the proper manner of dimensive quantity. But in this sacrament the
dimensive quantity of the bread is there after its proper manner, that
is, according to commensuration: not so the dimensive quantity of
Christ's body, for that is there after the manner of substance, as
stated above (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: The dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in
this sacrament not by way of commensuration, which is proper to
quantity, and to which it belongs for the greater to be extended beyond
the lesser; but in the way mentioned above (ad 1,2).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a place?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a
place. Because, to be in a place definitively or circumscriptively
belongs to being in a place. But Christ's body seems to be definitively
in this sacrament, because it is so present where the species of the
bread and wine are, that it is nowhere else upon the altar: likewise it
seems to be there circumscriptively, because it is so contained under
the species of the consecrated host, that it neither exceeds it nor is
exceeded by it. Therefore Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a
place.

Objection 2: Further, the place of the bread and wine is not empty,
because nature abhors a vacuum; nor is the substance of the bread
there, as stated above ([4556]Q[75], A[2]); but only the body of Christ
is there. Consequently the body of Christ fills that place. But
whatever fills a place is there locally. Therefore the body of Christ
is in this sacrament locally.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above [4557](A[4]), the body of Christ
is in this sacrament with its dimensive quantity, and with all its
accidents. But to be in a place is an accident of a body; hence "where"
is numbered among the nine kinds of accidents. Therefore Christ's body
is in this sacrament locally.

On the contrary, The place and the object placed must be equal, as is
clear from the Philosopher (Phys. iv). But the place, where this
sacrament is, is much less than the body of Christ. Therefore Christ's
body is not in this sacrament as in a place.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]), Christ's body is in
this sacrament not after the proper manner of dimensive quantity, but
rather after the manner of substance. But every body occupying a place
is in the place according to the manner of dimensive quantity, namely,
inasmuch as it is commensurate with the place according to its
dimensive quantity. Hence it remains that Christ's body is not in this
sacrament as in a place, but after the manner of substance, that is to
say, in that way in which substance is contained by dimensions; because
the substance of Christ's body succeeds the substance of bread in this
sacrament: hence as the substance of bread was not locally under its
dimensions, but after the manner of substance, so neither is the
substance of Christ's body. Nevertheless the substance of Christ's body
is not the subject of those dimensions, as was the substance of the
bread: and therefore the substance of the bread was there locally by
reason of its dimensions, because it was compared with that place
through the medium of its own dimensions; but the substance of Christ's
body is compared with that place through the medium of foreign
dimensions, so that, on the contrary, the proper dimensions of Christ's
body are compared with that place through the medium of substance;
which is contrary to the notion of a located body.

Hence in no way is Christ's body locally in this sacrament.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's body is not in this sacrament
definitively, because then it would be only on the particular altar
where this sacrament is performed: whereas it is in heaven under its
own species, and on many other altars under the sacramental species.
Likewise it is evident that it is not in this sacrament
circumscriptively, because it is not there according to the
commensuration of its own quantity, as stated above. But that it is not
outside the superficies of the sacrament, nor on any other part of the
altar, is due not to its being there definitively or circumscriptively,
but to its being there by consecration and conversion of the bread and
wine, as stated above [4558](A[1]; Q[15], A[2], sqq. ).

Reply to Objection 2: The place in which Christ's body is, is not
empty; nor yet is it properly filled with the substance of Christ's
body, which is not there locally, as stated above; but it is filled
with the sacramental species, which have to fill the place either
because of the nature of dimensions, or at least miraculously, as they
also subsist miraculously after the fashion of substance.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above [4559](A[4]), the accidents of
Christ's body are in this sacrament by real concomitance. And therefore
those accidents of Christ's body which are intrinsic to it are in this
sacrament. But to be in a place is an accident when compared with the
extrinsic container. And therefore it is not necessary for Christ to be
in this sacrament as in a place.
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Whether Christ's body is in this sacrament movably?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ's body is movably in this sacrament,
because the Philosopher says (Topic. ii) that "when we are moved, the
things within us are moved": and this is true even of the soul's
spiritual substance. "But Christ is in this sacrament," as shown above
([4560]Q[74], A[1] ). Therefore He is moved when it is moved.

Objection 2: Further, the truth ought to correspond with the figure.
But, according to the commandment (Ex. 12:10), concerning the Paschal
Lamb, a figure of this sacrament, "there remained nothing until the
morning. " Neither, therefore, if this sacrament be reserved until
morning, will Christ's body be there; and so it is not immovably in
this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, if Christ's body were to remain under this
sacrament even until the morrow, for the same reason it will remain
there during all coming time; for it cannot be said that it ceases to
be there when the species pass, because the existence of Christ's body
is not dependent on those species. Yet Christ does not remain in this
sacrament for all coming time. It seems, then, that straightway on the
morrow, or after a short time, He ceases to be under this sacrament.
And so it seems that Christ is in this sacrament movably.

On the contrary, it is impossible for the same thing to be in motion
and at rest, else contradictories would be verified of the same
subject. But Christ's body is at rest in heaven. Therefore it is not
movably in this sacrament.

I answer that, When any thing is one, as to subject, and manifold in
being, there is nothing to hinder it from being moved in one respect,
and yet to remain at rest in another just as it is one thing for a body
to be white, and another thing, to be large; hence it can be moved as
to its whiteness, and yet continue unmoved as to its magnitude. But in
Christ, being in Himself and being under the sacrament are not the same
thing, because when we say that He is under this sacrament, we express
a kind of relationship to this sacrament. According to this being,
then, Christ is not moved locally of Himself, but only accidentally,
because Christ is not in this sacrament as in a place, as stated above
[4561](A[5]). But what is not in a place, is not moved of itself
locally, but only according to the motion of the subject in which it
is.

In the same way neither is it moved of itself according to the being
which it has in this sacrament, by any other change whatever, as for
instance, that it ceases to be under this sacrament: because whatever
possesses unfailing existence of itself, cannot be the principle of
failing; but when something else fails, then it ceases to be in it;
just as God, Whose existence is unfailing and immortal, ceases to be in
some corruptible creature because such corruptible creature ceases to
exist. And in this way, since Christ has unfailing and incorruptible
being, He ceases to be under this sacrament, not because He ceases to
be, nor yet by local movement of His own, as is clear from what has
been said, but only by the fact that the sacramental species cease to
exist.

Hence it is clear that Christ, strictly speaking is immovably in this
sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument deals with accidental movement,
whereby things within us are moved together with us. But with things
which can of themselves be in a place, like bodies, it is otherwise
than with things which cannot of themselves be in a place, such as
forms and spiritual substances. And to this mode can be reduced what we
say of Christ, being moved accidentally, according to the existence
which He has in this sacrament, in which He is not present as in a
place.

Reply to Objection 2: It was this argument which seems to have
convinced those who held that Christ's body does not remain under this
sacrament if it be reserved until the morrow. It is against these that
Cyril says (Ep. lxxxiii): "Some are so foolish as to say that the
mystical blessing departs from the sacrament, if any of its fragments
remain until the next day: for Christ's consecrated body is not
changed, and the power of the blessing, and the life-giving grace is
perpetually in it. " Thus are all other consecrations irremovable so
long as the consecrated things endure; on which account they are not
repeated. And although the truth corresponds with the figure, still the
figure cannot equal it.

Reply to Objection 3: The body of Christ remains in this sacrament not
only until the morrow, but also in the future, so long as the
sacramental species remain: and when they cease, Christ's body ceases
to be under them, not because it depends on them, but because the
relationship of Christ's body to those species is taken away, in the
same way as God ceases to be the Lord of a creature which ceases to
exist.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the body of Christ, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by any
eye, at least by a glorified one?

Objection 1: It seems that the body of Christ, as it is in this
sacrament, can be seen by the eye, at least by a glorified one. For our
eyes are hindered from beholding Christ's body in this sacrament, on
account of the sacramental species veiling it. But the glorified eye
cannot be hindered by anything from seeing bodies as they are.
Therefore, the glorified eye can see Christ's body as it is in this
sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, the glorified bodies of the saints will be "made
like to the body" of Christ's "glory," according to Phil. 3:21. But
Christ's eye beholds Himself as He is in this sacrament. Therefore, for
the same reason, every other glorified eye can see Him.

Objection 3: Further, in the resurrection the saints will be equal to
the angels, according to Lk. 20:36. But the angels see the body of
Christ as it is in this sacrament, for even the devils are found to pay
reverence thereto, and to fear it. Therefore, for like reason, the
glorified eye can see Christ as He is in this sacrament.

On the contrary, As long as a thing remains the same, it cannot at the
same time be seen by the same eye under diverse species. But the
glorified eye sees Christ always, as He is in His own species,
according to Is. 33:17: "(His eyes) shall see the king in his beauty. "
It seems, then, that it does not see Christ, as He is under the species
of this sacrament.

I answer that, The eye is of two kinds, namely, the bodily eye properly
so-called, and the intellectual eye, so-called by similitude. But
Christ's body as it is in this sacrament cannot be seen by any bodily
eye. First of all, because a body which is visible brings about an
alteration in the medium, through its accidents. Now the accidents of
Christ's body are in this sacrament by means of the substance; so that
the accidents of Christ's body have no immediate relationship either to
this sacrament or to adjacent bodies; consequently they do not act on
the medium so as to be seen by any corporeal eye. Secondly, because, as
stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]), Christ's body is substantially present
in this sacrament. But substance, as such, is not visible to the bodily
eye, nor does it come under any one of the senses, nor under the
imagination, but solely under the intellect, whose object is "what a
thing is" (De Anima iii). And therefore, properly speaking, Christ's
body, according to the mode of being which it has in this sacrament, is
perceptible neither by the sense nor by the imagination, but only by
the intellect, which is called the spiritual eye.

Moreover it is perceived differently by different intellects. For since
the way in which Christ is in this sacrament is entirely supernatural,
it is visible in itself to a supernatural, i. e. the Divine, intellect,
and consequently to a beatified intellect, of angel or of man, which,
through the participated glory of the Divine intellect, sees all
supernatural things in the vision of the Divine Essence. But it can be
seen by a wayfarer through faith alone, like other supernatural things.
And not even the angelic intellect of its own natural power is capable
of beholding it; consequently the devils cannot by their intellect
perceive Christ in this sacrament, except through faith, to which they
do not pay willing assent; yet they are convinced of it from the
evidence of signs, according to James 2:19: "The devils believe, and
tremble. "

Reply to Objection 1: Our bodily eye, on account of the sacramental
species, is hindered from beholding the body of Christ underlying them,
not merely as by way of veil (just as we are hindered from seeing what
is covered with any corporeal veil), but also because Christ's body
bears a relation to the medium surrounding this sacrament, not through
its own accidents, but through the sacramental species.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ's own bodily eye sees Himself existing
under the sacrament, yet it cannot see the way in which it exists under
the sacrament, because that belongs to the intellect. But it is not the
same with any other glorified eye, because Christ's eye is under this
sacrament, in which no other glorified eye is conformed to it.

Reply to Objection 3: No angel, good or bad, can see anything with a
bodily eye, but only with the mental eye. Hence there is no parallel
reason, as is evident from what was said above.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ's body is truly there when flesh or a child appears
miraculously in this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ's body is not truly there when flesh
or a child appears miraculously in this sacrament. Because His body
ceases to be under this sacrament when the sacramental species cease to
be present, as stated above [4562](A[6]). But when flesh or a child
appears, the sacramental species cease to be present. Therefore
Christ's body is not truly there.

Objection 2: Further, wherever Christ's body is, it is there either
under its own species, or under those of the sacrament. But when such
apparitions occur, it is evident that Christ is not present under His
own species, because the entire Christ is contained in this sacrament,
and He remains entire under the form in which He ascended to heaven:
yet what appears miraculously in this sacrament is sometimes seen as a
small particle of flesh, or at times as a small child. Now it is
evident that He is not there under the sacramental species, which is
that of bread or wine. Consequently, it seems that Christ's body is not
there in any way.

Objection 3: Further, Christ's body begins to be in this sacrament by
consecration and conversion, as was said above ([4563]Q[75],
AA[2],3,4). But the flesh and blood which appear by miracle are not
consecrated, nor are they converted into Christ's true body and blood.
Therefore the body or the blood of Christ is not under those species.

On the contrary, When such apparition takes place, the same reverence
is shown to it as was shown at first, which would not be done if Christ
were not truly there, to Whom we show reverence of "latria. " Therefore,
when such apparition occurs, Christ is under the sacrament.

I answer that, Such apparition comes about in two ways, when
occasionally in this sacrament flesh, or blood, or a child, is seen.
Sometimes it happens on the part of the beholders, whose eyes are so
affected as if they outwardly saw flesh, or blood, or a child, while no
change takes place in the sacrament. And this seems to happen when to
one person it is seen under the species of flesh or of a child, while
to others it is seen as before under the species of bread; or when to
the same individual it appears for an hour under the appearance of
flesh or a child, and afterwards under the appearance of bread. Nor is
there any deception there, as occurs in the feats of magicians, because
such species is divinely formed in the eye in order to represent some
truth, namely, for the purpose of showing that Christ's body is truly
under this sacrament; just as Christ without deception appeared to the
disciples who were going to Emmaus. For Augustine says (De Qq. Evang.
ii) that "when our pretense is referred to some significance, it is not
a lie, but a figure of the truth. " And since in this way no change is
made in the sacrament, it is manifest that, when such apparition
occurs, Christ does not cease to be under this sacrament.

But it sometimes happens that such apparition comes about not merely by
a change wrought in the beholders, but by an appearance which really
exists outwardly. And this indeed is seen to happen when it is beheld
by everyone under such an appearance, and it remains so not for an
hour, but for a considerable time; and, in this case some think that it
is the proper species of Christ's body. Nor does it matter that
sometimes Christ's entire body is not seen there, but part of His
flesh, or else that it is not seen in youthful guise. but in the
semblance of a child, because it lies within the power of a glorified
body for it to be seen by a non-glorified eye either entirely or in
part, and under its own semblance or in strange guise, as will be said
later ([4564]XP, Q[85], AA[2],3).

But this seems unlikely. First of all, because Christ's body under its
proper species can be seen only in one place, wherein it is
definitively contained. Hence since it is seen in its proper species,
and is adored in heaven, it is not seen under its proper species in
this sacrament. Secondly, because a glorified body, which appears at
will, disappears when it wills after the apparition; thus it is related
(Lk. 24:31) that our Lord "vanished out of sight" of the disciples. But
that which appears under the likeness of flesh in this sacrament,
continues for a long time; indeed, one reads of its being sometimes
enclosed, and, by order of many bishops, preserved in a pyx, which it
would be wicked to think of Christ under His proper semblance.

Consequently, it remains to be said, that, while the dimensions remain
the same as before, there is a miraculous change wrought in the other
accidents, such as shape, color, and the rest, so that flesh, or blood,
or a child, is seen. And, as was said already, this is not deception,
because it is done "to represent the truth," namely, to show by this
miraculous apparition that Christ's body and blood are truly in this
sacrament. And thus it is clear that as the dimensions remain, which
are the foundation of the other accidents, as we shall see later on
([4565]Q[77], A[2]), the body of Christ truly remains in this
sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: When such apparition takes place, the sacramental
species sometimes continue entire in themselves; and sometimes only as
to that which is principal, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, during such apparitions Christ's
proper semblance is not seen, but a species miraculously formed either
in the eyes of the beholders, or in the sacramental dimensions
themselves, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 3: The dimensions of the consecrated bread and wine
continue, while a miraculous change is wrought in the other accidents,
as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE ACCIDENTS WHICH REMAIN IN THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the accidents which remain in this sacrament;
under which head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the accidents which remain are without a subject?

(2) Whether dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents?

(3) Whether such accidents can affect an extrinsic body?

(4) Whether they can be corrupted?

(5) Whether anything can be generated from them?

(6) Whether they can nourish?

(7) Of the breaking of the consecrated bread?

(8) Whether anything can be mixed with the consecrated wine?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject?

Objection 1: It seems that the accidents do not remain in this
sacrament without a subject, because there ought not to be anything
disorderly or deceitful in this sacrament of truth. But for accidents
to be without a subject is contrary to the order which God established
in nature; and furthermore it seems to savor of deceit, since accidents
are naturally the signs of the nature of the subject. Therefore the
accidents are not without a subject in this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, not even by miracle can the definition of a thing
be severed from it, or the definition of another thing be applied to
it; for instance, that, while man remains a man, he can be an
irrational animal. For it would follow that contradictories can exist
at the one time: for the "definition of a thing is what its name
expresses," as is said in Metaph. iv. But it belongs to the definition
of an accident for it to be in a subject, while the definition of
substance is that it must subsist of itself, and not in another.
Therefore it cannot come to pass, even by miracle, that the accidents
exist without a subject in this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, an accident is individuated by its subject. If
therefore the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject,
they will not be individual, but general, which is clearly false,
because thus they would not be sensible, but merely intelligible.

Objection 4: Further, the accidents after the consecration of this
sacrament do not obtain any composition. But before the consecration
they were not composed either of matter and form, nor of existence [quo
est] and essence [quod est]. Therefore, even after consecration they
are not composite in either of these ways. But this is unreasonable,
for thus they would be simpler than angels, whereas at the same time
these accidents are perceptible to the senses. Therefore, in this
sacrament the accidents do not remain without a subject.

On the contrary, Gregory says in an Easter Homily (Lanfranc, De Corp.
et Sang. Dom. xx) that "the sacramental species are the names of those
things which were there before, namely, of the bread and wine. "
Therefore since the substance of the bread and the wine does not
remain, it seems that these species remain without a subject.

I answer that, The species of the bread and wine, which are perceived
by our senses to remain in this sacrament after consecration, are not
subjected in the substance of the bread and wine, for that does not
remain, as stated above ([4566]Q[75], A[2]); nor in the substantial
form, for that does not remain ([4567]Q[75], A[6]), and if it did
remain, "it could not be a subject," as Boethius declares (De Trin. i).
Furthermore it is manifest that these accidents are not subjected in
the substance of Christ's body and blood, because the substance of the
human body cannot in any way be affected by such accidents; nor is it
possible for Christ's glorious and impassible body to be altered so as
to receive these qualities.

Now there are some who say that they are in the surrounding atmosphere
as in a subject. But even this cannot be: in the first place, because
atmosphere is not susceptive of such accidents. Secondly, because these
accidents are not where the atmosphere is, nay more, the atmosphere is
displaced by the motion of these species. Thirdly, because accidents do
not pass from subject to subject, so that the same identical accident
which was first in one subject be afterwards in another; because an
accident is individuated by the subject; hence it cannot come to pass
for an accident remaining identically the same to be at one time in one
subject, and at another time in another. Fourthly, since the atmosphere
is not deprived of its own accidents, it would have at the one time its
own accidents and others foreign to it. Nor can it be maintained that
this is done miraculously in virtue of the consecration, because the
words of consecration do not signify this, and they effect only what
they signify.

Therefore it follows that the accidents continue in this sacrament
without a subject. This can be done by Divine power: for since an
effect depends more upon the first cause than on the second, God Who is
the first cause both of substance and accident, can by His unlimited
power preserve an accident in existence when the substance is withdrawn
whereby it was preserved in existence as by its proper cause, just as
without natural causes He can produce other effects of natural causes,
even as He formed a human body in the Virgin's womb, "without the seed
of man" (Hymn for Christmas, First Vespers).

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to hinder the common law of
nature from ordaining a thing, the contrary of which is nevertheless
ordained by a special privilege of grace, as is evident in the raising
of the dead, and in the restoring of sight to the blind: even thus in
human affairs, to some individuals some things are granted by special
privilege which are outside the common law. And so, even though it be
according to the common law of nature for an accident to be in a
subject, still for a special reason, according to the order of grace,
the accidents exist in this sacrament without a subject, on account of
the reasons given above ([4568]Q[75] , A[5]).

Reply to Objection 2: Since being is not a genus, then being cannot be
of itself the essence of either substance or accident. Consequently,
the definition of substance is not---"a being of itself without a
subject," nor is the definition of accident---"a being in a subject";
but it belongs to the quiddity or essence of substance "to have
existence not in a subject"; while it belongs to the quiddity or
essence of accident "to have existence in a subject. " But in this
sacrament it is not in virtue of their essence that accidents are not
in a subject, but through the Divine power sustaining them; and
consequently they do not cease to be accidents, because neither is the
definition of accident withdrawn from them, nor does the definition of
substance apply to them.

Reply to Objection 3: These accidents acquired individual being in the
substance of the bread and wine; and when this substance is changed
into the body and blood of Christ, they remain in that individuated
being which they possessed before, hence they are individual and
sensible.

Reply to Objection 4: These accidents had no being of their own nor
other accidents, so long as the substance of the bread and wine
remained; but their subjects had "such" being through them, just as
snow is "white" through whiteness. But after the consecration the
accidents which remain have being; hence they are compounded of
existence and essence, as was said of the angels, in the [4569]FP,
Q[50], A[2], ad 3; and besides they have composition of quantitative
parts.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine is the
subject of the other accidents?

Objection 1: It seems that in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of
the bread or wine is not the subject of the other accidents. For
accident is not the subject of accident; because no form can be a
subject, since to be a subject is a property of matter. But dimensive
quantity is an accident. Therefore dimensive quantity cannot be the
subject of the other accidents.

Objection 2: Further, just as quantity is individuated by substance, so
also are the other accidents. If, then, the dimensive quantity of the
bread or wine remains individuated according to the being it had
before, in which it is preserved, for like reason the other accidents
remain individuated according to the existence which they had before in
the substance. Therefore they are not in dimensive quantity as in a
subject, since every accident is individuated by its own subject.

Objection 3: Further, among the other accidents that remain, of the
bread and wine, the senses perceive also rarity and density, which
cannot be in dimensive quantity existing outside matter; because a
thing is rare which has little matter under great dimensions. while a
thing is dense which has much matter under small dimensions, as is said
in Phys. iv. It does not seem, then, that dimensive quantity can be the
subject of the accidents which remain in this sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, quantity abstract from matter seems to be
mathematical quantity, which is not the subject of sensible qualities.
Since, then, the remaining accidents in this sacrament are sensible, it
seems that in this sacrament they cannot be subjected in the dimensive
quantity of the bread and wine that remains after consecration.

On the contrary, Qualities are divisible only accidentally, that is, by
reason of the subject. But the qualities remaining in this sacrament
are divided by the division of dimensive quantity, as is evident
through our senses. Therefore, dimensive quantity is the subject of the
accidents which remain in this sacrament.

I answer that, It is necessary to say that the other accidents which
remain in this sacrament are subjected in the dimensive quantity of the
bread and wine that remains: first of all, because something having
quantity and color and affected by other accidents is perceived by the
senses; nor is sense deceived in such. Secondly, because the first
disposition of matter is dimensive quantity, hence Plato also assigned
"great" and "small" as the first differences of matter (Aristotle,
Metaph. iv). And because the first subject is matter, the consequence
is that all other accidents are related to their subject through the
medium of dimensive quantity; just as the first subject of color is
said to be the surface, on which account some have maintained that
dimensions are the substances of bodies, as is said in Metaph. iii. And
since, when the subject is withdrawn, the accidents remain according to
the being which they had before, it follows that all accidents remain
founded upon dimensive quantity.

Thirdly, because, since the subject is the principle of individuation
of the accidents, it is necessary for what is admitted as the subject
of some accidents to be somehow the principle of individuation: for it
is of the very notion of an individual that it cannot be in several;
and this happens in two ways. First, because it is not natural to it to
be in any one; and in this way immaterial separated forms, subsisting
of themselves, are also individuals of themselves. Secondly, because a
form, be it substantial or accidental, is naturally in someone indeed,
not in several, as this whiteness, which is in this body. As to the
first, matter is the principle of individuation of all inherent forms,
because, since these forms, considered in themselves, are naturally in
something as in a subject, from the very fact that one of them is
received in matter, which is not in another, it follows that neither
can the form itself thus existing be in another. As to the second, it
must be maintained that the principle of individuation is dimensive
quantity. For that something is naturally in another one solely, is due
to the fact that that other is undivided in itself, and distinct from
all others. But it is on account of quantity that substance can be
divided, as is said in Phys. i. And therefore dimensive quantity itself
is a particular principle of individuation in forms of this kind,
namely, inasmuch as forms numerically distinct are in different parts
of the matter. Hence also dimensive quantity has of itself a kind of
individuation, so that we can imagine several lines of the same
species, differing in position, which is included in the notion of this
quantity; for it belongs to dimension for it to be "quantity having
position" (Aristotle, Categor. iv), and therefore dimensive quantity
can be the subject of the other accidents, rather than the other way
about.

Reply to Objection 1: One accident cannot of itself be the subject of
another, because it does not exist of itself. But inasmuch as an
accident is received in another thing, one is said to be the subject of
the other, inasmuch as one is received in a subject through another, as
the surface is said to be the subject of color. Hence when God makes an
accident to exist of itself, it can also be of itself the subject of
another.

Reply to Objection 2: The other accidents, even as they were in the
substance of the bread, were individuated by means of dimensive
quantity, as stated above. And therefore dimensive quantity is the
subject of the other accidents remaining in this sacrament, rather than
conversely.