No More Learning

CÆSAR’S HABITS WHEN IN CAMPAIGN. 452

IV. CONSULSHIP OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS. 453

V. MOTION OF TREBONIUS ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCES. 456

VI. POMPEY’S SUMPTUARY LAW. 461

VII. DEPARTURE OF CRASSUS FOR SYRIA. 462

VIII. CATO PROPOSES TO DELIVER CÆSAR TO THE GERMANS. 464


CHAPTER V.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 700.

I. SECOND DESCENT IN ENGLAND. 467

II. DISPLACEMENT OF THE ARMY. DISASTER OF SABINUS. 468

III. L. DOMITIUS AHENOBARBUS AND APPIUS CLAUDIUS PULCHER,
CONSULS. 470

IV. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PTOLEMY IN EGYPT. 472

V. CORRUPTION OF THE ELECTIONS. 474

VI. DEATH OF CÆSAR’S DAUGHTER. 476

VII. CÆSAR’S BUILDINGS AT ROME. 477

VIII. HIS RELATIONS WITH CICERO. 478


CHAPTER VI.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 701.

I. EXPEDITION TO THE NORTH OF GAUL. SECOND PASSAGE OF
THE RHINE. 484

II. PURSUIT OF AMBIORIX. 485

III. C. DOMITIUS CALVINUS AND M. VALERIUS MESSALA, CONSULS. 486

IV. EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS AGAINST THE PARTHIANS, AND HIS
DEATH. 488

V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF CRASSUS. 499


CHAPTER VII.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 702.

I. MURDER OF CLODIUS. 501

II. THE REPUBLIC IS DECLARED IN DANGER. 505

III. POMPEY SOLE CONSUL. 506

IV. TRIAL OF MILO. 508

V. POMPEY TAKES AS HIS ASSOCIATE CÆCILIUS METELLUS PIUS
SCIPIO. 514

VI. INSURRECTION OF GAUL, AND CAMPAIGN OF 702. 516


CHAPTER VIII.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 703.

I. NEW TROUBLES IN GAUL, AND THE CAMPAIGN ON THE AISNE. 528

II. CÆSAR’S POLICY IN GAUL AND AT ROME. 530

III. SULPICIUS RUFUS AND M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS, CONSULS. 536

IV. SPIRIT WHICH ANIMATES CÆSAR’S ADVERSARIES. 538

V. THE QUESTION OF RIGHT BETWEEN THE SENATE AND CÆSAR. 542

VI. INTRIGUES TO DEPRIVE CÆSAR OF HIS COMMAND. 548


CHAPTER IX.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 704.

I. C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS AND L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS, CONSULS. 554

II. CÆSAR REPAIRS TO THE CISALPINE. 559

III. POMPEY RECEIVES OVATIONS, AND ASKS CÆSAR TO RETURN HIS
TWO LEGIONS. 564

IV. THE SENATE VOTES IMPARTIALLY. 569

V. VIOLENT MEASURES ADOPTED AGAINST CÆSAR. 570

VI. STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION. 572


CHAPTER X.

EVENTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 705.

I. C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS AND L. CORNELIUS LENTULUS, CONSULS. 579

II. LENTULUS CARRIES THE SENATE AGAINST CÆSAR. 581

III. CÆSAR HARANGUES HIS TROOPS. 588

IV. CÆSAR IS DRIVEN TO CIVIL WAR. 590

V. CÆSAR CROSSES THE RUBICON. 592



APPENDIX.


APPENDIX A.

CONCORDANCE OF DATES OF THE ANCIENT ROMAN CALENDAR WITH THE
JULIAN STYLE, FOR THE YEARS OF ROME 691-709. 595


APPENDIX B.

CONCORDANCE OF ROMAN AND MODERN HOURS, FOR THE YEAR OF
ROME 699 (55 B. C. ) AND FOR THE LATITUDE OF PARIS. 638


APPENDIX C.

LIST OF ANCIENT COINS FOUND IN THE EXCAVATIONS AT ALISE.
PAGE

NOTE ON THE ANCIENT COINS COLLECTED IN THE EXCAVATIONS AT ALISE. 640

COINS STRUCK IN THE MINT AT ROME. 642

COINS STRUCK IN SOUTHERN ITALY. 644

COINS STRUCK OUT OF ITALY. 644

GAULISH COINS (FROM CAMP D, ON THE BANKS OF THE OSE). 645


APPENDIX D.

NOTICE ON CÆSAR’S LIEUTENANTS.

1. T. ATTIUS LABIENUS. 648

2. PUBLIUS LUCINIUS CRASSUS. 648

3. L. ARUNCULEIUS COTTA. 649

4. QUINTUS TITURIUS SABINUS. 649

5. Q. PEDIUS. 649

6. SERVIUS SULPICIUS GALBA. 649

7. DECIMUS JUNIUS BRUTUS. 650

8. PUBLIUS SULPICIUS RUFUS. 651

9. LUCIUS MUNATIUS PLANCUS. 652

10. MARCUS LICINIUS CRASSUS. 652

11. CAIUS FABIUS. 653

12. L. ROSCIUS. 653

13. TITUS SEXTIUS. 653

14. Q. TULLIUS CICERO. 654

15. CAIUS TREBONIUS. 655

16. MINUCIUS BASILUS. 656

17. C. ANTISTIUS REGINUS. 656

18. M. SILANUS. 656

19. C. CANINIUS REBILUS. 656

20. M. SEMPRONIUS RUTILUS. 657

21. MARCUS ANTONIUS (MARK ANTONY). 657

22. PUBLIUS VATINIUS. 657

28. Q. FUFIUS CALENUS. 658

24. L. CÆSAR. 658




LIST OF PLATES TO VOLUME II.

PAGE
1. GENERAL MAP OF GAUL 15

2. GENERAL MAP OF THE PEOPLES OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR 23

3. COURSE OF THE RHONE, FROM GENEVA TO THE PAS DE L’ECLUSE 54

4. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 696 60

5. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE HELVETII 78

6. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF ARIOVISTUS 97

7. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 697 107

8. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE 110

9. CAMP OF CÆSAR ON THE AISNE 111

10. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE 121

11. PLAN OF THE OPPIDUM OF THE ADUATUCI 129

12. MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE VENETI 137

13. EXPEDITION OF SABINUS TO THE UNELLI 145

14. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 699 153

15. BRIDGE OF PILES BUILT ON THE RHINE 162

16. MAP OF BRITAIN FOR THE TWO EXPEDITIONS 175

17. PLAN OF DOVER 176

18. PLAN OF ADUATUCA 231

19.
GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 702 277

20. PLAN OF AVARICUM 288

21. PLAN OF GERGOVIA 304

22. CAMP OF CÆSAR AT GERGOVIA 307

23. MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF LABIENUS AT LUTETIA 325

24. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE VINGEANNE 334

25. PLAN OF ALESIA 340

26. VIEWS OF MONT AUXOIS 343

27. DETAILS OF THE ROMAN WORKS AT ALESIA 345

28. _Idem_ 346

29. MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELLOVACI 370

30. CAMP OF CÆSAR AT MONT SAINT-PIERRE 372

31. PLAN OF UXELLODUNUM 384

32. DETAILS OF THE ROMAN WORKS AT UXELLODUNUM 390




JULIUS CÆSAR.


BOOK III.

THE WARS IN GAUL, AFTER THE “COMMENTARIES. ”




CHAPTER I.

POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GALLIC WAR.


[Sidenote: Enterprising Character of the Gauls. ]

I. There are peoples whose existence in the past only reveals itself by
certain brilliant apparitions, unequivocal proofs of an energy which had
been previously unknown. During the interval their history is involved
in obscurity, and they resemble those long-silent volcanoes, which we
should take to be extinct but for the eruptions which, at periods far
apart, occur and expose to view the fire which smoulders in their bosom.
Such had been the Gauls.

The accounts of their ancient expeditions bear witness to an
organisation already powerful, and to an ardent spirit of enterprise.
Not to speak of migrations which date back perhaps nine or ten centuries
before our era, we see, at the moment when Rome was beginning to aim at
greatness, the Celts spreading themselves beyond their frontiers. In the
time of Tarquin the Elder (Years of Rome, 138 to 176), two expeditions
started from Celtic Gaul: one proceeded across the Rhine and Southern
Germany, to descend upon Illyria and Pannonia (now _Western Hungary_);
the other, scaling the Alps, established itself in Italy, in the country
lying between those mountains and the Po. [1] The invaders soon
transferred themselves to the right bank of that river, and nearly the
whole of the territory comprised between the Alps and the Apennines took
the name of _Cisalpine Gaul_. More than two centuries afterwards, the
descendants of those Gauls marched upon Rome, and burnt it all but the
Capitol. [2] Still a century later (475), we see new bands issuing from
Gaul, reaching Thrace by the valley of the Danube,[3] ravaging Northern
Greece, and bringing back to Toulouse the gold plundered from the Temple
of Delphi. [4] Others, arriving at Byzantium,[5] pass into Asia,
establish their dominion over the whole region on this side Mount
Taurus, since called _Gallo-Græcia_, or _Galatia_, and maintain in it a
sort of military feudalism until the time of the war of Antiochus. [6]

These facts, obscure as they may be in history, prove the spirit of
adventure and the warlike genius of the Gaulish race, which thus, in
fact, inspired a general terror. During nearly two centuries, from 364
to 531, Rome struggled against the Cisalpine Gauls, and more than once
the defeat of her armies placed her existence in danger. It was, as it
were, foot by foot that the Romans effected the conquest of Northern
Italy, strengthening it as they proceeded by the establishment of
colonies.

Let us here give a recapitulation of the principal wars against the
Gauls, Cisalpine and Transalpine, ich have already been spoken of in the
first volume of the present work. In 531 the Romans took the offensive,
crossed the Po, and subjugated a great part of the Cisalpine. But hardly
had the north of Italy been placed under the supremacy of the Republic,
when Hannibal’s invasion (536) caused anew an insurrection of the
inhabitants of those countries, who helped to increase the numbers of
his army; and even when that great captain was obliged to quit Italy,
they continued to defend their independence during thirty-four years.
The struggle, renewed in 554, ended only in 588, for we will not take
into account the partial insurrections which followed. During this time,
Rome had not only to combat the Cisalpines, assisted by the Gauls from
beyond the Alps, but also to make war upon the men of their race in Asia
(565) and in Illyria. In this last-mentioned province the colony of
Aquileia was founded (571), and several wild tribes of Liguria, who held
the defiles of the Alps, were subjugated (588).

[Sidenote: Wars of the Romans beyond the Alps. ]

II. In 600, the Romans, called to the assistance of the Greek town of
Marseilles, which was attacked by the Oxybii and the Deciates, Ligurian
tribes of the Maritime Alps,[7] for the first time carried their arms
to the other side of the Alps. They followed the course of the Corniche,
and crossed the Var; but it took, according to Strabo, a struggle of
eighty years before they obtained from the Ligures an extent of twelve
stadia (2·22 kils. ), a narrow passage on the coast of the sea, to enable
them to pass through Gaul into Spain. [8] Nevertheless, the legions
pushed their encroachments between the Rhone and the Alps. The conquered
territory was given to the people of Marseilles, who soon, attacked
again by the peoples of the Maritime Alps, implored a second time the
support of Rome. In 629, the Consul M. Fulvius Flaccus was sent against
the Salluvii; and, three years afterwards,[9] the proconsul C. Sextius
Calvinus drove them back far from the sea-coast, and founded the town of
Aix (_Aquæ Sextiæ_). [10]

The Romans, by protecting the people of Marseilles, had extended their
dominion on the coast; by contracting other alliances, they penetrated
into the interior. The Ædui were at war with the Allobroges and the
Arverni. The proconsul Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus united with the former,
and defeated the Allobroges, in 633, at Vindalium, on the Sorgue
(_Sulgas_), not far from the Rhone. Subsequently, Q. Fabius Maximus,
grandson of Paulus Æmilius, gained, at the confluence of the Isère and
the Rhone, a decisive victory over the Allobroges, and over Bituitus,
king of the Arverni. By this success Q. Fabius gained the surname of
_Allobrogicus_. [11] The Arverni pretended to be descendants of the
Trojans, and boasted a common origin with the Romans;[12] they remained
independent, but their dominion, which extended from the banks of the
Rhine to the neighbourhood of Narbonne and Marseilles, was limited to
their ancient territory. The Ruteni, who had been their allies against
Fabius, obtained similarly the condition of not being subjected to the
Roman power, and were exempted from all tribute. [13]

In 636, the Consul Q. Marcius Rex founded the colony of Narbo Marcius,
which gave its name to the Roman province called _Narbonensis_. [14]

The movement which had long thrust the peoples of the north towards the
south had slackened during several centuries, but in the seventh century
of the foundation of Rome it seems to have re-commenced with greater
intensity than ever. The Cimbri and the Teutones,[15] after ravaging
Noricum and Illyria, and defeating the army of Papirius Carbo sent to
protect Italy (641), had marched across Rhætia, and penetrated by the
valley of the Rhine to the country of the Helvetii. They drew with them
a part of that people, spread into Gaul, and for several years carried
there terror and desolation. The Belgæ alone offered a vigorous
resistance. Rome, to protect her province, sent against them, or against
the tribes of the Helvetii, their allies, five generals, who were
successively vanquished: the Consul M. Junius Silanus, in 645; M.
Aurelius Scaurus, in 646; L. Cassius Longinus, in 647;[16] lastly, in
the year 649, the proconsul Q. Servilius Cæpio[17] and Cn. Manlius
Maximus. The two last each lost his army. [18] The very existence of Rome
was threatened.

Marius, by the victories gained at Aix over the Teutones (652), and at
the Campi Raudii, not far from the Adige, over the Cimbri (653),
destroyed the barbarians and saved Italy.

The ancients often confounded the Gauls with the Cimbri and Teutones;
sprung from a common origin, these peoples formed, as it were, the
rear-guard of the great army of invasion which, at an unknown epoch, had
brought the Celts into Gaul from the shores of the Black Sea.
Sallust[19] ascribes to the Gauls the defeats of Q. Cæpio and Cn.
Manlius, and Cicero[20] designates under the same name the barbarians
who were destroyed by Marius. The fact is that all the peoples of the
north were always ready to unite in the same effort when it was proposed
to throw themselves upon the south of Europe.

From 653 to 684, the Romans, occupied with intestine wars, dreamt not of
increasing their power beyond the Alps; and, when internal peace was
restored, their generals, such as Sylla, Metellus Creticus, Lucullus,
and Pompey, preferred the easy and lucrative conquests of the East. The
vanquished peoples were abandoned by the Senate to the exactions of
governors, which explains the readiness with which the deputies of the
Allobroges entered, in 691, into Catiline’s conspiracy; fear led them to
denounce the plot, but they experienced no gratitude for their
revelations. [21]

The Allobroges rose, seized the town of Vienne,[22] which was devoted to
the Romans, and surprised, in 693, Manlius Lentinus, lieutenant of C.
Pomptinus, governor of the Narbonnese. Nevertheless, some time after,
the latter finally defeated and subdued them. “Until the time of Cæsar,”
says Cicero, “our generals were satisfied with repelling the Gauls,
thinking more of putting a stop to their aggressions than of carrying
the war among them. Marius himself did not penetrate to their towns and
homes, but confined himself to opposing a barrier to these torrents of
peoples which were inundating Italy. C. Pomptinus, who suppressed the
war raised by the Allobroges, rested after his victory. Cæsar alone
resolved to subject Gaul to our dominion. ”[23]


[Sidenote: Continual Pre-occupation of the Romans in regard to the
Gauls. ]

III. It results from this summary of facts that the constant thought of
the Romans was, during several centuries, to resist the Celtic peoples
established on either side of the Alps. Ancient authors proclaim aloud
the fear which held Rome constantly on the watch. “The Romans,” says
Sallust, “had then, as in our days, the opinion that all other peoples
must yield to their courage; but that with the Gauls it was no longer
for glory, but for safety, that they had to fight. ”[24] On his part,
Cicero expresses himself thus: “From the beginning of our Republic, all
our wise men have looked upon Gaul as _the most redoubtable enemy of
Rome_. But the strength and multitude of those peoples had prevented us
until now from combating them all. ”[25]

In 694, it will be remembered, rumours of an invasion of the Helvetii
prevailed at Rome. All political pre-occupation ceased at once, and
resort was had to the exceptional measures adopted under such
circumstances. [26] In fact, as a principle, whenever a war against the
Gauls was imminent, a dictator was immediately nominated, and a levy _en
masse_ ordered. From that time no one was exempted from military
service; and, as a provision against an attack of those barbarians, a
special treasure had been deposited in the Capitol, which it was
forbidden to touch except in that eventuality. [27] Accordingly, when, in
705, Cæsar seized upon it, he replied to the protests of the tribunes
that, since Gaul was subjugated, this treasure had become useless. [28]

War against the peoples beyond the Alps was thus, for Rome, the
consequence of a long antagonism, which must necessarily end in a
desperate struggle, and the ruin of one of the two adversaries. This
explains, at the same time, both Cæsar’s ardour and the enthusiasm
excited by his successes. Wars undertaken in accord with the traditional
sentiment of a country have alone the privilege of moving deeply the
fibre of the people, and the importance of a victory is measured by the
greatness of the disaster which would have followed a defeat. Since the
fall of Carthage, the conquests in Spain, in Africa, in Syria, in Asia,
and in Greece, enlarged the Republic, but did not consolidate it, and a
check in those different parts of the world would have diminished the
power of Rome without compromising it. With the peoples of the North, on
the contrary, her existence was at stake, and upon her reverses equally
as upon her successes depended the triumph of barbarism or civilisation.
If Cæsar had been vanquished by the Helvetii or the Germans, who can say
what would have become of Rome, assailed by the numberless hordes of the
North rushing eagerly upon Italy?

And thus no war excited the public feeling so intensely as that of Gaul.
Though Pompey had carried the Roman eagles to the shores of the Caspian
Sea, and, by the tributes he had imposed on the vanquished, doubled the
revenues of the State, his triumphs had only obtained ten days of
thanksgivings. The Senate decreed fifteen,[29] and even twenty,[30] for
Cæsar’s victories, and, in honour of them, the people offered sacrifices
during sixty days. [31]

When, therefore, Suetonius ascribes the inspiration of the campaigns of
this great man to the mere desire of enriching himself with plunder, he
is false to history and to good sense, and assigns the most vulgar
motive to a noble design. When other historians ascribe to Cæsar the
sole intention of seeking in Gaul a means of rising to the supreme power
by civil war, they show, as we have remarked elsewhere, a distorted
view; they judge events by their final result, instead of calmly
estimating the causes which have produced them.

The sequel of this history will prove that all the responsibility of the
civil war belongs not to Cæsar, but to Pompey. And although the former
had his eyes incessantly fixed on his enemies at Rome, none the less for
that he pursued his conquests, without making them subordinate to his
personal interests. If he had sought only his own elevation in his
military successes, he would have followed an entirely opposite course.
We should not have seen him sustain during eight years a desperate
struggle, and incur the risks of enterprises such as those of Great
Britain and Germany. After his first campaigns, he need only have
returned to Rome to profit by the advantages he had acquired; for, as
Cicero says,[32] “he had already done enough for his glory, if he had
not done enough for the Republic;” and the same orator adds: “Why would
Cæsar himself remain in his province, if it were not to deliver to the
Roman people complete a work which was already nearly finished? Is he
retained by the agreeableness of the country, by the beauty of the
towns, by the politeness and amenity of the individuals and peoples, by
the lust of victory, by the desire of extending the limits of our
empire? Is there anything more uncultivated than those countries, ruder
than those towns, more ferocious than those peoples, and more admirable
than the multiplicity of Cæsar’s victories? Can he find limits farther
off than the ocean? Would his return to his country offend either the
people who sent him or the Senate which has loaded him with honours?
Would his absence increase the desire we have to see him? Would it not
rather contribute, through lapse of time, to make people forget him, and
to cause the laurels to fade which he had gathered in the midst of the
greatest perils? If, then, there any who love not Cæsar, it is not their
policy to obtain his recall from his province, because that would be to
recall him to glory, to triumph, to the congratulations and supreme
honours of the Senate, to the favour of the equestrian order, to the
affection of the people. ”[33]

Thus, after the end of 698, he might have led his army back into Italy,
claimed triumph, and obtained power, without having to seize upon it, as
Sylla, Marius, Cinna, and even Crassus and Pompey, had done.

If Cæsar had accepted the government of Gaul with the sole aim of having
an army devoted to his designs, it must be admitted that so experienced
a general would have taken, to commence a civil war, the simplest of the
measures suggested by prudence: instead of separating himself from his
army, he would have kept it with him, or, at least, brought it near to
Italy, and distributed it in such a manner that he could re-assemble it
quickly; he would have preserved, from the immense booty taken in Gaul,
sums sufficient to supply the expenses of the war. Cæsar, on the
contrary, as we shall see in the sequel, sends first to Pompey, without
hesitation, two legions which are required from him under the pretext of
the expedition against the Parthians. He undertakes to disband his
troops if Pompey will do the same, and he arrives at Ravenna at the head
of a single legion, leaving the others beyond the Alps, distributed from
the Sambre as far as the Saône. [34] He keeps within the limit of his
government without making any preparation which indicates hostile
intentions,[35] wishing, as Hirtius says, to settle the quarrel by
justice rather than by arms. [36] In fact, he has collected so little
money in the military chest, that his soldiers club together to procure
him the sums necessary for his enterprise, and that all voluntarily
renounce their pay. [37] Cæsar offers Pompey an unconditional
reconciliation, and it is only when he sees his advances rejected, and
his adversaries meditating his ruin, that he boldly faces the forces of
the Senate, and passes the Rubicon. It was not, then, the supreme power
which Cæsar went into Gaul to seek, but the pure and elevated glory
which arises from a national war, made in the traditional interest of
the country.


[Sidenote: Plan followed in the Relation of the War in Gaul. ]

IV. In reproducing in the following chapters the relation of the war in
Gaul, we have borne in mind the words of Cicero. “Cæsar,” he says, “has
written memoirs worthy of great praise. Deprived of all oratorical art,
his style, like a handsome body stripped of clothing, presents itself
naked, upright, and graceful. In his desire to furnish materials to
future historians, he has, perhaps, done a thing agreeable to the little
minds who will be tempted to load these natural graces with frivolous
ornaments; but he has for ever deprived men of sense of the desire of
writing, for nothing is more agreeable in history than a correct and
luminous brevity. ”[38] Hirtius, on his part, expresses himself in the
following terms: “These memoirs enjoy an approval so general, that Cæsar
has much more taken from others than given to them the power of writing
the history of the events which they recount. We have still more reasons
than all others for admiring it, for others know only how correct and
accurate this book is; we know the facility and rapidity with which it
was composed. ”[39]

If we would act upon the advice of these writers, we must digress as
little as possible from the “Commentaries,” but without restricting
ourselves to a literal translation. We have, then, adopted the narrative
of Cæsar, though sometimes changing the order of the matter: we have
abridged passages where there was a prodigality of details, and
developed those which required elucidation. In order to indicate in a
more precise manner the localities which witnessed so many battles, we
have employed the modern names, especially in cases where ancient
geography did not furnish corresponding names.

The investigation of the battle-fields and siege operations has led to
the discovery of visible and certain traces of the Roman entrenchments.
The reader, by comparing the plans of the excavations with the text,
will be convinced of the rigorous accuracy of Cæsar in describing the
countries he passed over, and the works he caused to be executed.




CHAPTER II.

STATE OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR.

(See Plate I. )


[Sidenote: Geographical Description. ]

I. Transalpine Gaul had for its boundaries the ocean, the Pyrenees, the
Mediterranean, the Alps, and the Rhine. This portion of Europe, so well
marked out by nature, comprised what is now France, nearly the whole of
Switzerland, the Rhine Provinces, Belgium, and the south of Holland. It
had the form of an irregular pentagon, and the country of the Carnutes
(the _Orléanais_) was considered to be its centre. [40]

An uninterrupted chain of heights divided Gaul, as it divides modern
France, from north to south, into two parts. This line commences at the
Monts Corbières, at the foot of the Eastern Pyrenees, is continued by
the Southern Cévennes and by the mountains of the Vivarais, Lyonnais,
and Beaujolais (called the Northern Cévennes), and declines continually
with the mountains of the Charolais and the Côte-d’Or, until it reaches
the plateau of Langres; after quitting this plateau, it leaves to the
east the Monts Faucilles, which unite it to the Vosges, and, inclining
towards the north-west, it follows, across the mountains of the Meuse,
the western crests of the Argonne and the Ardennes, and terminates, in
decreasing undulations, towards Cape Griz-Nez, in the Pas-de-Calais.

This long and tortuous ridge, more or less interrupted, which may be
called the backbone of the country, is the great line of the watershed.
It separates two slopes. On the eastern slope flow the Rhine and the
Rhone, in opposite directions, the first towards the Northern Sea, the
second towards the Mediterranean; on the western slope rise the Seine,
the Loire, and the Garonne, which go to throw themselves into the ocean.
These rivers flow at the bottom of vast basins, the bounds of which, as
is well known, are indicated by the lines of elevations connecting the
sources of all the tributaries of the principal stream.

The basin of the Rhine is separated from that of the Rhone by the Monts
Faucilles, the southern extremity of the Vosges, called _Le trouée de
Belfort_, the Jura, the Jorat (the heights which surround the Lake of
Geneva on the north), and the lofty chain of the Helvetic Alps. In its
upper part, it embraces nearly all Switzerland, of which the Rhine forms
the northern boundary, in its course, from east to west, from the Lake
of Constance to Bâle. Near this town the river turns abruptly towards
the north. The basin widens, limited to the east by the mountains which
separate it from the Danube and the Weser; to the west, by the northern
part of the great line of watershed (the mountains of the Meuse, the
Argonne, and the western Ardennes). It is intersected, from Mayence to
Bonn, by chains nearly parallel to the course of the river, which
separate its tributaries. From Bonn to the point where the Rhine divides
into two arms, the basin opens still more; it is flat, and has no
longer a definite boundary. The southern arm bore already, in the time
of Cæsar, the name of _Waal_ (Vahalis), and united with the Meuse[41]
below Nimeguen. To the west of the basin of the Rhine, the Scheldt forms
a secondary basin.

The basin of the Rhone, in which is comprised that of the Saône, is
sharply bounded on the north by the southern extremity of the Vosges and
the Monts Faucilles; on the west, by the plateau of Langres, the
Côte-d’Or, and the Cévennes; on the east, by the Jura, the Jorat, and
the Alps. The Rhone crosses the Valais and the Lake of Geneva, follows
an irregular course as far as Lyons, and runs thence from north to south
to the Mediterranean. Among the most important of its secondary basins,
we may reckon those of the Aude, the Hérault, and the Var.

The three great basins of the western slope are comprised between the
line of watershed of Gaul and the ocean. They are separated from each
other by two chains branching from this line, and running from the
south-east to the north-west. The basin of the Seine, which includes
that of the Somme, is separated from the basin of the Loire by a line of
heights which branches from the Côte-d’Or under the name of the
mountains of the Morvan, and is continued by the very low hills of Le
Perche to the extremity of Normandy. A series of heights, extending from
north to south, from the hills of Le Perche to Nantes, enclose the basin
of the Loire to the west, and leave outside the secondary basins of
Brittany.

The basin of the Loire is separated from that of the Garonne by a long
chain starting from Mont Lozère, comprising the mountains of Auvergne,
those of the Limousin, the hills of Poitou, and the plateau of Gatine,
and ending in flat country towards the coasts of La Vendée.

The basin of the Garonne, situated to the south of that of the Loire,
extends to the Pyrenees. It comprises the secondary basins of the Adour
and the Charente.

The vast country we have thus described is protected on the north, west,
and south by two seas, and by the Pyrenees. On the east, where it is
exposed to invasions, Nature, not satisfied with the defences she had
given it in the Rhine and the Alps, has further retrenched it behind
three groups of interior mountains--first, the Vosges; second, the Jura;
third, the mountains of Forez, the mountains of Auvergne, and the
Cévennes.

The Vosges run parallel to the Rhine, and are like a rampart in the rear
of that river.

The Jura, separated from the Vosges by _the Gap (trouée) of Belfort_,
rises like a barrier in the interval left between the Rhine and the
Rhone, preventing, as far as Lyons, the waters of this latter river from
uniting with those of the Saône.

The Cévennes and the mountains of Auvergne and Forez form, in the
southern centre of Gaul, a sort of citadel, of which the Rhone might be
considered as the advanced fosse. The ridges of this group of mountains
start from a common centre, take opposite directions, and form the
valleys whence flow, to the north, the Allier and the Loire; to the
west, the Dordogne, the Lot, the Aveyron, and the Tarn; to the south,
the Ardèche, the Gard, and the Hérault.

The valleys, watered by navigable rivers, presented--thanks to the
fruitfulness of their soil and to their easy access--natural ways of
communication, favourable both to commerce and to war. To the north, the
valley of the Meuse; to the east, the valley of the Rhine, conducting to
that of the Saône, and thence to that of the Rhone, were the grand
routes which armies followed to invade the south. Strabo, therefore,
remarks justly that Sequania (_Franche-Comté_) has always been the road
of the Germanic invasions from Gaul into Italy. [42] From east to west
the principal chain of the watershed might easily be crossed in its less
elevated parts, such as the plateau of Langres and the mountains of
Charolais, which have since furnished a passage to the Central Canal.
Lastly, to penetrate from Italy into Gaul, the great lines of invasion
were the valley of the Rhone and the valley of the Garonne, by which the
mountainous mass of the Cévennes, Auvergne, and Forez is turned.

Gaul presented the same contrast of climates which we observe between
the north and south of France. While the Roman province enjoyed a mild
temperature and an extreme fertility,[43] the central and northern part
was covered with vast forests, which rendered the climate colder than it
is at present;[44] yet the centre produced in abundance wheat, rye,
millet, and barley. [45] The greatest of all these forests was that of
the Ardennes. It extended, beginning from the Rhine, over a space of two
hundred miles, on one side to the frontier of the Remi, crossing the
country of the Treviri; and, on another side, to the Scheldt, across the
country of the Nervii. [46] The “Commentaries” speak also of forests
existing among the Carnutes,[47] in the neighbourhood of the Saône,[48]
among the Menapii[49] and the Morini,[50] and among the Eburones. [51] In
the north the breeding of cattle was the principal occupation,[52] and
the pastures of Belgic Gaul produced a race of excellent horses. [53] In
the centre and in the south the richness of the soil was augmented by
productive mines of gold, silver, copper, iron, and lead. [54]

The country was, without any doubt, intersected by carriage roads, since
the Gauls possessed a great number of all sorts of wagons,[55] since
there still remain traces of Celtic roads, and since Cæsar makes known
the existence of bridges on the Aisne,[56] the Rhone,[57] the Loire,[58]
the Allier,[59] and the Seine. [60]

It is difficult to ascertain exactly the number of the population; yet
we may presume, from the contingents furnished by the different states,
that it amounted to more than seven millions of souls. [61]


[Sidenote: Political Divisions. ]

II. Gaul, according to Cæsar, was divided into three great regions,
distinct by language, manners, and laws: to the north, Belgic Gaul,
between the Seine, the Marne, and the Rhine; in the centre, Celtic Gaul,
between the Garonne and the Seine, extending from the ocean to the Alps,
and comprising Helvetia; to the south, Aquitaine, between the Garonne
and the Pyrenees. [62] (_See Plate 2.