No More Learning

A crowd of people
assembled similarly in that town; some were drawn thither by the
prestige of Cæsar’s glory, others by his well-known generosity, all by
the vague instinct which, in moments of crisis, points to the place
where strength exists, and gives a presentiment of the side from which
safety is to come. The Roman people sent him a deputation of
senators. [635] All the most illustrious and powerful personages in Rome,
such as Pompey, Crassus, Appius, governor of Sardinia, Nepos, proconsul
of Spain,[636] came to show their warm admiration for him and invoke his
support;[637] even women repaired to Lucca, and the concourse was so
great that as many as 200 senators were seen there at a time; 120
lictors, the obligatory escort of the first magistrates,[638] besieged
the door of the proconsul. “Already,” Appius writes, “he disposed of
everything by his ascendance, by his riches, and by the affectionate
eagerness with which he conferred obligations upon everybody. ”[639]

What took place in this interview? No one knows; but we may conjecture
from the events which were the immediate consequences of it. It is
evident, in the first place, that Crassus and Pompey, who had recently
quarrelled, were reconciled by Cæsar, who, no doubt, placed before their
eyes the arguments most calculated to reconcile them: “The public
interest required it; they alone could put an end to the state of
anarchy which afflicted the capital; in a country which was a prey to
vulgar ambitions, it required, to control them, ambitions which were
greater, but, at the same time, purer and more honourable; they must
easily have seen that it was not in the power of a man like Cicero, with
his tergiversations, his cowardice, and his vanity, or Cato, with his
stoicism, belonging to another age, or Domitius Ahenobarbus, with his
implacable hatred and his selfish passions, to restore order, or put an
end to the divisions of opinion. In order to obtain these results, it
was necessary that Crassus and Pompey should labour resolutely to obtain
the consulship. [640] As to himself, he only asked to remain at the head
of his army, and complete the conquest he had undertaken. Gaul was
vanquished, but not subjugated. Some years were still necessary to
establish there the Roman domination. This fickle and warlike people,
always ready for revolt, was secretly incited and openly supported by
two neighbouring nations, the Britons and the Germans. In the last war
against the Belgæ, the promoters of the rising, according to the
confession of the Bellovaci, had clearly shown, by taking refuge in
Britain after their defeat, whence came the provocation. Even at this
very moment, the insurrection which was in preparation among the tribes
of the Veneti, on the shores of the ocean, was instigated by these same
islanders. As to the Germans, the defeat of Ariovistus had not
discouraged them; and several contingents of that nation were lately
found with the troops of Hainault. He intends to chastise these two
peoples, and to carry his arms beyond the Rhine as well as beyond the
sea; let them, then, leave him to finish his enterprise. Already the
Alps are levelled; the barbarians, who, hardly forty-four years ago,
were ravaging Italy, are driven back into their deserts and forests. A
few years more, and fear or hope, punishments or recompenses, arms or
laws, will have bound for ever Gaul to the empire. ”[641]

Language like this could not fail to be understood by Pompey and by
Crassus. People are easily persuaded when the public interest offers
itself through the prism of self-love and personal interest. Beyond the
consulship, Crassus and Pompey saw at once the government of provinces
and the command of armies. As to Cæsar, the logical realisation of his
desires was the prolongation of his powers. Only one difficulty lay in
the way of the execution of this plan. The period of the elections was
near at hand, and neither Pompey nor Crassus had taken steps to offer
themselves as candidates for the consulship within the time fixed by the
law; but it had been so usual for many years to delay the comitia, under
frivolous pretexts, that the same thing might easily be done on the
present occasion with a more legitimate object.

Cæsar promised to support their election with all his power, by his
recommendations, and by sending his soldiers on leave to vote in the
comitia. In fact, his soldiers, either recruited from the veterans whom
he had carried from Rome, or among Roman citizens established in great
numbers in Cisalpine Gaul, had the right to give their vote in Rome, and
enjoy the legitimate influence which is the reward of a life of dangers
and self-denial. Cicero assures us of this in these words: “Do you
consider, in seeking the consulship, as a weak support the will of the
soldiers, so powerful by their number and by the influence which they
exercise in their families? Moreover, what authority must the vote of
our warriors have over the whole Roman people in the question of
nominating a consul! For, in the consular comitia, it is the generals
they choose, and not the rhetoricians. It is a very powerful
recommendation to be able to say, I was wounded, he has restored me to
life; he shared the booty with me. It was under him that we captured the
enemy’s camp, that we gave battle; he never required from the soldier
more labour than he took upon himself; his success is as great as his
courage. Can you imagine what a favourable influence such discourses
have upon people’s minds? ”[642] Thus Cæsar conformed to the established
practice, in allowing his soldiers to exercise their rights of citizens.


[Sidenote: Consequences of the interview at Lucca. Conduct of Cicero. ]

VI. The result of the interview at Lucca had been to unite in a common
feeling the most important men in the Republic. Some historians have
seen in it a mysterious conspiracy, and they have not hesitated to
qualify it with the name of _triumvirate_, a denomination as
inapplicable to this agreement as to that which took place in 694. An
interview in the midst of so many illustrious citizens, who have
assembled from all sides to salute a victorious general, had hardly the
appearance of a mystery, and the mutual understanding of some men of
influence in the same political thought was not a conspiracy. Some
authors have, nevertheless, pretended that the Senate, informed of this
plot devised in Cisalpine Gaul, had expressed its indignation; but there
is nothing to support this allegation; if it had been the case, would
they, a few months after the interview at Lucca, have granted Cæsar
everything he desired, and rejected everything that was displeasing to
him? We see, indeed, that at the annual distribution of the governments
of provinces, the senators hostile to Cæsar proposed that he should be
deprived of his command, or, at least, of the part of his command
decreed by the Senate. [643] Yet, not only was this proposal rejected,
but the Senate gave him ten lieutenants and subsidies to pay the legions
he had raised on his own authority, in addition to the four legions
originally placed at his disposal by the Senate. In fact, the triumphs
of Cæsar had excited people’s minds. Public opinion, that irresistible
force in all times, had declared loudly for him, and his popularity
reflected upon Pompey and Crassus. [644] The Senate had then silenced
its animosity, and even Cæsar showed himself full of deference for that
assembly. [645]

It must be said, in praise of humanity, that true glory possesses the
privilege of rallying all generous hearts; only men who are madly in
love with themselves, or hardened by party fanaticism, can resist this
general attraction towards those who constitute the greatness of their
country. At this period, with the exception of a few spiteful and
intractable individuals, the greater part of the senators felt the
general impulse, as we learn from the orations of Cicero. [646]

But if, on one side, the members of this pretended triumvirate are
represented as closely leagued together against the Republic, on the
other, Dio Cassius asserts that, at this time, Pompey and Crassus were
conspiring against Cæsar. This opinion has no better foundation. We see,
on the contrary, by a letter of Cicero, how warmly Pompey at that time
advocated the party of his father-in-law. Pompey, when he was leaving
Lucca, met with Quintus Cicero, and, addressing him with warmth, he bade
him remind his brother of his past engagements: “Cicero ought not to
forget that what Pompey had done for his recall was also the work of
Cæsar, whose acts he had promised not to attack; if he would not serve
him, at least let him abstain from all hostility. ”[647] These reproaches
did not remain without effect. Cicero, very apt to turn to the side of
fortune, wrote to Atticus: “There is an end to everything; and since
those who are without power will have me no longer, I will seek friends
among those who have the power. ”[648]

He had already acted with the senators in voting thanks for Cæsar’s
victories, since which he had employed all his efforts in seconding
every proposal in favour of the conqueror of Gaul. As the part Cicero
acted on this occasion has had a particular importance, it will not be
uninteresting to quote his words: “Could I be the enemy of a man whose
couriers and letters, in concert with his renown, make our ears listen
every day to the names of so many peoples, of so many nations, of so
many countries which he has added to our empire? I am inflamed with
enthusiasm, senators, and you are the less inclined to doubt it, since
you are animated by the same sentiments. [649] He has combated, with the
greatest success, the most warlike and powerful nations of the Germans
and Helvetii; he has overthrown, subdued, and driven back the others,
and has accustomed them to obey the Roman people. Countries, which no
history, no relation, no public report had hitherto brought to our
knowledge, have been overrun by our general, our troops, our arms. We
had formerly but one way into Gaul; the other parts were occupied by
peoples who were either enemies of this empire, or little to be
trusted, or unknown, or at least ferocious, barbarous, and warlike;
there was no one who was not desirous of seeing them vanquished and
subdued. [650] A report has been recently presented to us on the pay of
the troops. I was not satisfied with giving my opinion, but I laboured
to secure its adoption; I replied at great length to those who held a
contrary opinion; I assisted in drawing up the decree; then, again, I
granted more to the person than to I know not what necessity. I thought
that, even without such a succour of money, with the mere produce of the
booty, Cæsar might have maintained his army and terminated the war; but
I did not consider that we ought, by a narrow parsimony, to diminish the
lustre and glory of his triumph.

“Moreover, there has been a question of giving Cæsar ten lieutenants:
some absolutely opposed the grant, others required precedents; these
would have put off the consideration to another day; those granted it,
without employing flattering terms. Under these circumstances, from the
manner in which I spoke, everybody understood that, while I sought to
serve the interests of the Republic, I did still more to honour Cæsar. ”

In another speech, the same orator exclaims: “The Senate has decreed
Cæsar public prayers in the most honourable form, and for a number of
days hitherto without example. In spite of the exhausted state of the
treasury, it has provided for the pay of his victorious army; it has
decided that ten lieutenants shall be given to the general, and that,
by derogation of the law Sempronia, a successor should not be sent him.
It was I who moved these measures, and who spoke in support of them;
and, rather than listen to my old disagreement with Cæsar, I lent myself
to what is demanded, under present circumstances, by the interest of the
Republic and the need of peace. ”[651]

But if in public Cicero expressed himself with so much clearness, in his
private intercourse he was still tender of the opinion of his former
friends. It is, indeed, the only manner in which we can explain a
contradiction too glaring even in a temper so inconstant. In fact, at
the moment when he was boasting openly of the services he had assisted
in rendering to Cæsar, he wrote to his friend P. Lentulus, proconsul in
Cilicia: “They have just granted Cæsar subsidies and ten lieutenants,
and they have paid no regard to the law Sempronia, which required that a
successor should be given to him. But it is too sorrowful a subject, and
I will not dwell upon it. ”[652]


[Sidenote: Intrigues of Pompey and Crassus to obtain the Consulship. ]

VII. From what precedes, it is evident that unpopularity did not fall
upon Cæsar, but upon the means employed by Crassus and Pompey for the
purpose of obtaining the consulship.

They made use of Caius Cato, kinsman of the Stoic, and of other men
equally undeserving of esteem, to cause delay in the time of holding the
comitia, and thus lead to the creation of an interrex,[653] which would
facilitate their election, since the consuls, who were the ordinary
presidents of the assembly of the people, were opposed to them.

The relations of the events of this period present great confusion. Dio
Cassius informs us that, in the sequel of violent disputes in the curia,
between Pompey, who had recently returned from Sardinia, and the Consul
Marcellinus, the Senate, in sign of its displeasure, decreed that it
would go into mourning, as for a public calamity, and immediately
carried the decree into effect. Caius Cato opposed his veto. Then the
Consul Cn. Marcellinus, at the head of the Senate, proceeded to the
Forum, and harangued the people to ask it for the comitia, without
success probably, since the senators returned immediately to the place
of their session. Clodius, who, since the conference of Lucca, had
become more intimate with Pompey, appeared suddenly among the crowd,
interrupted the consul, and bantered him on this display of untimely
mourning. In the public place Clodius would easily carry the approval of
the multitude; but when he attempted to return to the Senate, he
encountered the most resolute opposition. The senators rushed to meet
him and prevent him from entering; many of the knights assailed him with
insults; they would have treated him still worse, had not the populace
rushed to his aid and delivered him, threatening to commit to the flames
the entire assembly. [654]

On another hand, Pompey, with more authority and less violence,
protested against the last senatus-consultus. Lentulus Marcellinus,
addressing him in full Senate, demanded if it were true, as reported,
that he aimed at the consulship. “As yet I know not what I shall do,”
replied Pompey, roughly. Then, perceiving the bad impression caused by
these disdainful words, he added immediately, “For the good citizens,
there is no use in my being consul; against the factious, perhaps I am
necessary. ”[655] To a similar question, Crassus replied, modestly, “that
he was ready to do whatever would be useful to the Republic. ” Then
Lentulus bursting into reproaches against Pompey’s ambition, the latter
interrupted him insolently. “Remember,” he said, “that thou art indebted
to me for everything. Thou wast dumb, I made thee a talker; thou wast a
greedy beggar, I turned thee into a glutton, who vomits to eat again. ”
This language will give an idea of the violence of political passions at
that period. The senators, and Marcellinus himself, seeing that they
could not contend against the influence of these two men, withdrew.
During the rest of the year they took no part in public affairs; they
confined themselves to wearing mourning, and absenting themselves from
the festivals of the people.


[Sidenote: Campaign against the Peoples on the Shores of the Ocean. ]

VII. While Pompey and Crassus, in accord with the convention of Lucca,
employed all the means in their power to arrive at the consulship, Cæsar
had his regards still fixed on a conquest which every year seemed
achieved, yet every year it had to be commenced again. If the Gauls,
divided into so many different peoples, were incapable of uniting for
their common defence, they did not allow themselves to be discouraged by
a single misfortune. Hardly were they crushed on one point, when the
standard of insurrection was raised somewhere else.

In 698, the agitation showed itself first along the shores of the ocean,
from the Loire to the Seine. The peoples of the Morbihan, masters of a
considerable fleet, and possessing the exterior trade, placed themselves
at the head of the movement. They entered into alliance with all the
peoples who dwelt on the coasts between the Loire and the Scheldt, and
sent for assistance from England, with which country they were in
constant relation. Under these circumstances, Cæsar foresaw that it was
on the sea that he must curb the spirit of these maritime peoples. He
gave orders for the building of ships on the Loire, demanded others from
the peoples of the Charente and the Gironde, and sent from Italy Decimus
Brutus with galleys and sailors. As soon as the season permitted, he
repaired in person to the neighbourhood of Nantes, not far from Angers,
where Publius Crassus was in winter quarters with the 7th legion. From
the moment of his arrival his attention extended over the vast territory
where he was to establish the domination of Rome. With this aim, he
distributed his troops as follows: Labienus is sent with the cavalry to
the east, in the direction of Trèves, to hold the Germans in check; on
his way, he will confirm the fidelity of the people of Champagne and
their neighbours; P. Crassus is sent towards Aquitaine, to subdue that
country; Sabinus towards Normandy, to combat the insurgents of the
Cotentin; Cæsar reserves for himself the operations in the Morbihan.
After besieging, not without great difficulties, several small
fortresses which, placed at the extremity of promontories, were
surrounded with water at high tide, he resolved to wait for his fleet,
and took a position on the coast, at Saint-Gildas, to the south of
Vannes. Decimus Brutus led his vessels out of the Loire, encountered the
enemy in sight of the Roman army, and, by a concurrence of fortunate
circumstances, destroyed the Gaulish fleet; the flower of Brittany
perished in the combat. The Morbihan and the neighbouring states
submitted, and, nevertheless, the conqueror put to death all the
principal citizens.

Cæsar’s conduct towards the inhabitants of this province has been justly
blamed by the Emperor Napoleon I. “These people,” he says, “had not
revolted; they had furnished hostages, and had promised to live
peaceably; but they were in possession of all their liberty and all
their rights. They had given Cæsar cause to make war upon them, no
doubt, but not to violate international law in regard to them, and to
commit so atrocious an abuse of victory. This conduct was not just, and
it was still less politic. Such means never answer their object, they
exasperate and revolt nations. The punishment of particular chiefs is
all that justice and policy permit. ”[656]

While Brittany was vanquished on the sea, Sabinus gained a decisive
victory over the peoples of Normandy, near Avranches; and, at the same
time, Publius Crassus reduced Aquitaine. Although this young lieutenant
of Cæsar had only a single legion, a corps of cavalry, and some
auxiliaries, he gained possession of the strong fortress of Sos, and
inflicted a sanguinary defeat on the peoples situated between the
Garonne and the Adour. His glory was the greater, as the Aquitanians had
called to their assistance the Spanish chiefs, the wreck of that famous
army which Sertorius had so long formed on the model of the Roman
tactics.

Although the season was far advanced, Cæsar still resolved to subjugate
the peoples of Brabant and the Boulonnais, and marched against them. The
Gauls retired into their forests; he was then obliged to clear a road in
the woods by cutting down the trees, which, placed to the right and
left, formed on each side a rampart against the enemy. The bad state of
the weather obliged him to retire before he had completed his task.

In this campaign of 698, most of the countries which extend from the
mouth of the Adour to that of the Scheldt had felt the weight of the
Roman arms. The sea was free; Cæsar was at liberty to attempt a descent
upon England.




CHAPTER IV.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 699.


[Sidenote: Campaign against the Usipetes and the Tencteri. ]

I. The successes of the preceding campaign, and the existence of a Roman
fleet in the waters of the Morbihan, must have given Cæsar the hope that
nothing henceforth would prevent an expedition against Great Britain;
yet new events came to delay his projects.

In the winter between 698 and 699, the Usipetes and the Tencteri,
peoples of German origin, to escape the oppression of the Suevi, passed
the Rhine not far from its mouth, towards Xanten and Clèves. They
numbered 400,000, of all ages and both sexes; they sought new lands to
settle in, and, in the spring of 699, the head of the emigration had
already reached the country where now stand Aix-la-Chapelle and Liége.
Cæsar, alarmed at this event, starts for the army sooner than usual,
proceeds to Amiens, there assembles his troops, and finds the Gaulish
chiefs profoundly shaken in their fidelity by the approach of these new
barbarians, whose co-operation they hope to obtain. He confirms their
feeling of duty, obtains a contingent of cavalry, marches to encounter
the Usipetes and the Tencteri, and arrives on the Meuse, which he
crosses at Maëstricht. These latter, on hearing of the approach of the
Roman army, had concentrated in Southern Gueldres. Established on the
river Niers, in the plains of Goch, they send a deputation to Cæsar, who
had arrived near Venloo, to ask him not to attack them, but to allow
them to keep the lands they had conquered. The Roman general refuses,
and continues his march. After new conferences, the object of which, on
the part of the Germans, was to give their cavalry, sent beyond the
Meuse, time to return, a truce of one day is accepted. Cæsar declares,
nevertheless, that he will advance to Niers. Suddenly, however, his
vanguard is treacherously attacked in its march and routed by the German
cavalry; he then believes himself freed from his engagements; and when
next day the deputies come to excuse this perfidious aggression, he has
them arrested, falls unexpectedly on the camp of the Germans, and
pursues them without remission to the confluence of the Rhine and the
Meuse (towards the place occupied now by Fort Saint-André), where these
unfortunate people nearly all perish.

In the sequel of this exploit, which brought him little glory, and in
which doubt has been thrown on his good faith, Cæsar resolved to cross
the Rhine, on the pretence of claiming from the Sicambri the cavalry of
the Usipetes and the Tencteri, who had taken refuge among them, but, in
reality, to intimidate the Germans, and make them abandon the practice
of seconding the insurrections in Gaul. He therefore proceeded up the
valley of the Rhine, and arrived at Bonn, opposite the territory of the
Ubii, a people which had already solicited his alliance and support
against the Suevi. He caused to be built in ten days a bridge of piles,
which he crossed with his troops, but he did not penetrate far into
Germany: unable to come up with either the Sicambri or the Suevi, who
had withdrawn into the interior of their country, he re-crossed to the
left bank, and caused the bridge to be broken.


[Sidenote: First Descent in England. ]

II. Though the summer was already advanced, Cæsar determined to take
advantage of the time which still remained to pass into England and
visit that island, concerning which people had but confused notions, and
which was only known to the Romans by the intervention of the islanders
in all the wars in Gaul. He therefore started from Bonn, travelled
towards Boulogne, marking out, as we might say, the road which
subsequently Augustus ordered to be constructed between those two towns,
and collected in that port the ships of the neighbouring coasts and the
fleet which, the year before, had vanquished that of the Morbihan. After
sending one of his officers to assure himself of the point of landing,
he started from Boulogne, in the night of the 24th to the 25th of
August, with two legions, reconnoitred in his turn the coast of Dover,
and landed at Deal. The shore was covered with armed men, who offered a
vigorous opposition to the landing of the Roman army, which, having
repulsed them, established itself on land near the sea. The Britons,
astonished at such boldness, came from all sides to implore peace and
make their submission. But the elements conspired against the invaders,
and a dreadful tempest destroyed the transport ships and galleys. At the
news of this disaster, the Britons raised their heads again; on their
side the Roman soldiers, far from desponding, hastened to repair their
ships with so much zeal that, out of eighty, sixty-eight were made fit
for sea again. Not far from Cæsar’s camp, the Britons one day drew a
legion into an ambuscade; this led to a general battle, in which the
Romans were victorious. Then Cæsar, hurried by the approach of the
equinox, treated with the chiefs of some tribes, received hostages, and
crossed again to the continent on the 12th of September, having remained
eighteen days only in England. On the day after his arrival at Boulogne,
the two legions he brought with him were dispatched against the people
of the territory of Boulogne, who had taken refuge, since the preceding
year, in the marshes of their country; other troops were sent to
chastise the inhabitants of Brabant. After these expeditions, Cæsar
placed his legions in winter quarters among the Belgæ, and then departed
to visit the opposite part of his vast command, namely, Illyria, where
also he had to protect the Roman frontiers against the incursion of the
barbarians.


[Sidenote: Cæsar’s Habits when in Campaign. ]

We are astonished, in reading the “Commentaries”, at the ease with which
Cæsar repaired every year from Gaul into Italy, or into Illyria. There
must have been relays established on the principal lines along which he
had to travel, not only for his own use, but also for the couriers who
carried dispatches. We have seen that, in 696, Cæsar passed in eight
days from the banks of the Tiber to Geneva. According to Suetonius, he
travelled 100 miles a day, or 150 kilometres in twenty-four hours,
which makes a little more than six kilometres an hour. The couriers took
twenty-eight or thirty days to go from England to Rome. Plutarch informs
us that, in order to lose no time, Cæsar travelled by night, sleeping in
a chariot or litter. [657] By day he had with him a secretary, who wrote
under his dictation, and he was followed by a soldier who carried his
sword. In his military marches he went sometimes on horseback, but most
frequently he preceded the soldiers on foot, and, with head uncovered,
he gave no care either to sun or rain. [658]

In the midst of the most perilous enterprises, he found time to
correspond with men of influence, and even to read poems which Cicero
sent him, to whom he sent back his opinions and criticisms;[659] his
mind was incessantly occupied with the events which were passing in
Rome.


[Sidenote: Consulship of Pompey and Crassus. ]

IV. At the beginning of the year 699, the consuls were not yet
nominated. In such circumstances, the Senate appointed _interreges_,
who, invested with the consular powers, succeeded each other in office
every five days. It was by favour of this interregnum that the comitia
were held. The result was foreseen. Besides their immense _clientelle_,
Pompey and Crassus were assured of the support of Cæsar, who, as we
have said, had taken care to send on leave a great number of his
legionaries to vote. [660] They arrived in charge of Publius Crassus, son
of the triumvir, whose exploits in Aquitaine had given him celebrity.

The only candidate of the previous year, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus,
excited by Cato, his brother-in-law, persisted in his candidature to the
last moment. Starting before daybreak to the comitia, with M. Cato and
many of his clients, he and his followers were exposed to violent
attacks. The slave who walked before him with a lantern in his hand was
killed, and Cato wounded. Domitius was seized with terror, and sought
shelter in his house. The interrex who presided over the comitia
proclaimed, without opposition, Crassus and Pompey consuls.

The arrangements concluded at Lucca had thus succeeded, and the ambition
of the three eminent personages who absorbed public attention was
satisfied; but the aim of this ambition varied according to their
several tempers. Crassus only desired the command of an army, in order
to increase his reputation and his immense riches. Pompey, without deep
convictions, placed his vanity in being the first man of the Republic.
Cæsar, the head of the popular party, aspired to power, in order, above
all other considerations, to ensure the triumph of his cause. The way
which would offer itself to his mind was not to excite civil war, but to
obtain his own nomination several times to the consulship; the great
citizens who had preceded him had followed no other way, and the there
is a natural tendency to take for our example that which has been
successful in the past. The glory acquired in Gaul assured Cæsar
beforehand of the public favour, which was to carry him again to the
first magistracy. Nevertheless, to dispel the obstacles continually
raised by a powerful party, it was necessary to remove hostile
competitors from important offices; to gain the support of distinguished
men, such as Cicero; and, as everything was venal, to buy, with the
produce of the booty he made by war, the consciences which were for
sale. This course, seconded by Pompey and Crassus, promised success.

Pompey, always under the influence of his wife’s charms, appeared to
rest satisfied with the part which was assigned to him. Had he been free
from all engagement, and obeyed his own instincts, he would have
embraced the cause of the Senate rather than that which he was
sustaining; for men of a nature so vain as his, prefer the flattering
adherence of the aristocracy in the middle of which they live, to the
expression of the approbation of the people, which rarely reaches their
ears. Dragged on by the force of circumstances, he was obliged to
wrestle against those who stood in his way; and the more the opposition
showed itself ardent, the more he gave way to the violence of his
temper. Legality, moreover, was observed by nobody, as the following
incident proves. Cato aspired to the prætorship. On the day of the
comitia, the first century, to which the epithet of _prœrogativæ_ was
given, and the suffrage of which exercised a great influence over the
others, voted for him. Pompey, not doubting the same result from the
other centuries, declared suddenly that he heard a clap of
thunder,[661] and dismissed the assembly. Some days afterwards, by
purchasing votes and employing all the means of intimidation at their
disposal, the new consuls caused P. Vatinius, the author of the motion
which, in 695, procured for Cæsar the government of the Cisalpine
province, to be elected prætor, in the place of M. Cato.
[662] Most of
the other magistrates were similarly chosen among their creatures, and
there were only two tribunes of the people, C. Ateius Capito and P.
Aquilius Gallus, to represent the opposition. All these elections were
conducted with a certain degree of order, troubled only once in the
comitia for the ædileship. A battle took place in the Campus Martius, in
which there were killed and wounded. Pompey rushed into the middle of
the riot to appease it, and had his toga covered with blood. His slaves
took it to his house to bring another. At the view of this blood, Julia,
who was in an advanced state of pregnancy, believed that her husband had
been slain, and suffered a miscarriage. This accident injured her
health, but was not, as has been stated, the cause of her death, which
occurred only in the year following. [663]


[Sidenote: Motion of Trebonius on the Government of the Provinces. ]

V. There was no further resistance to the two consuls. The factions
appeared to be vanquished. Cicero himself and Clodius became reconciled,
and, through the mediation of Pompey and Crassus, promised reciprocal
concessions. [664] The moment had arrived for presenting the law which
was to give provinces and armies to the two first magistrates of the
Republic: the latter wished the motion to come from a tribune of the
people, and they had entrusted it to C. Trebonius, who was subsequently
one of Cæsar’s lieutenants. The Senate had not proceeded to the
distribution of provinces before the consular elections, as the law
required. Trebonius, following the example given a few years before, in
the case of the government of Gaul, addressed the people, and took the
initiative of the two motions, one relating to Pompey and Crassus, the
other to Cæsar.

The provinces destined for the two consuls, on quitting office, were not
named separately for each, but Pompey and Crassus were to arrange the
partition between them: Dio Cassius even pretends that they drew lots.
This assertion appears to be incorrect. An insurrection of the Vaccæi
and the reduction of the revolt of Clunia[665] served as a pretext to
ask that Spain should be given to Pompey with four legions; Crassus was
to have Syria and the neighbouring states, with a considerable army. The
name of Parthians was not pronounced, but everybody knew why Crassus
coveted Syria. [666] Although advanced in age (he was sixty years old),
he dreamt of making the conquest of the countries which extend from the
Euphrates to the Indus. [667] As to Cæsar, he was to be continued in his
province. The duration of these governments was for five years; they
conferred the power of raising Roman or allied troops, and of making
war or peace.

The propositions of Trebonius were warmly combated by M. Cato, by
Favonius, and by two other tribunes of the people, Ateius and Aquilius
Gallus. “But Favonius,” says Plutarch, “was listened to by nobody; some
were retained by their respect for Pompey and Crassus, the greater
number sought to please Cæsar, and remained quiet, placing all their
hopes in him. ”[668] The enemies of the consuls in the Senate were
intimidated, and kept silence. Cicero, to avoid the discussion, had
retired to the country.

In the assembly of the people, M. Cato spoke against the project of law
of Trebonius, or rather he employed the two hours allowed him in
declamations on the conduct of the depositaries of power. When the two
hours were expired, Trebonius, who presided over the assembly, enjoined
him to quit the tribune. Cato refused to obey; one of the tribune’s
lictors dragged him from it; he slipped from him, and a moment after
re-appeared on the rostra, trying to speak again. Trebonius ordered him
to be taken to prison, and, to obtain possession of his person, it
required a regular contest; but, in the midst of this tumult, Cato had
gained what he wanted, namely, to make them lose a day. [669]

A second assembly had better success. Considerable sums had been
distributed among the tribes, and armed bands were in readiness to
interfere in case of need. The opposition, on their side, had omitted
no preparation for disputing the victory. The tribune P. Aquilius,
fearing that they might prevent him from approaching the public place,
conceived the idea of hiding himself the previous evening in the Curia
Hostilia, which opened upon the Forum. Trebonius, informed of this,
caused the doors to be locked, and kept him in all the night and the
next day. [670] M. Cato, Favonius, and Ateius succeeded with great
difficulty in reaching the Forum; but, unable to force a way through the
crowd up to the rostra, they mounted on the shoulders of some of their
clients, and began to shout that _Jupiter was thundering_, and that
there could be no deliberation. But it was all in vain; always repulsed,
but always protesting, they gave up the contest when Trebonius had
proclaimed that the law was accepted by the people. [671] One of its
provisions decreed that Pompey should remain at Rome after his
consulship, and that he should govern his province of Spain through his
lieutenants. The vote was published in the midst of the most stormy
tumult. Ateius was wounded in the fray, which cost the lives of several
citizens; this was a thing then too frequent to produce any great
sensation.

Such was the memorable struggle now commenced at Rome between the
consuls and the opposition. If we judge only from certain acts of
violence related by the historians, we are at first tempted to accuse
Crassus and Pompey of having had recourse to a strange abuse of force;
but a more attentive examination proves that they were, so to say,
constrained to it by the turbulent intrigues of a factious minority. In
fact, these same historians, who describe complacently the means of
culpable compulsion employed by the candidates for the consulship, allow
contrary assertions to escape them here and there in the sequel, which
help to deface the disagreeable impression made by their narrative.
Thus, according to Cicero, public opinion blamed the hostility which was
exercised against Pompey and Crassus. [672] Plutarch, after presenting
under the most unfavourable colours the manœuvres of the consuls for
the distribution of the governments of the provinces, adds: “This
partition pleased all parties. The people desired that Pompey might not
be sent away from Rome. ”[673]

Cæsar might hope that the consulship of Pompey and Crassus would restore
order and the supremacy of the laws: it did nothing of the sort. After
having themselves so often violated legality and corrupted the
elections, they sought to remedy the evil, which they had contributed to
aggravate, by proposing severe measures against corruption; this tardy
homage rendered to public morality was destined to remain without
effect, like all the remedies which had hitherto been employed.


[Sidenote: Pompey’s Sumptuary Law. ]

VI. They sought to repress extravagance by a sumptuary law, but a speech
of Hortensius was sufficient to cause its rejection. The orator, after a
brilliant picture of the greatness of the Republic, and of the progress
of civilisation, of which Rome was the centre, proceeded to laud the
consuls for their magnificence, and for the noble use they made of their
immense riches. [674] And, in fact, at that very moment Pompey was
building the theatre which bore his name, and was giving public games,
in which it seemed his wish to surpass the acts of sumptuous
extravagance of the most prodigal courtiers of the Roman people. [675] In
these games, which lasted several days, 500 lions and eighteen elephants
were slain. This spectacle inspired the mob with admiration; but it was
remarked that, usually insensible to the death of the gladiators who
expired under their eyes, they were affected by the cries of pain of the
elephants. Cicero, who was present at these festivals, places, in the
relation he addresses to one of his friends, the men and the animals on
the same footing, and displays no more regret for the one than for the
other, the spirit of humanity was still so little developed! [676]

The splendour of these games had dazzled Rome and Italy, and restored to
Pompey a great part of his prestige; but the levies of troops, which he
was obliged to order soon afterwards, caused great discontent. Several
tribunes vainly opposed their veto; they were obliged to renounce a
struggle which had Pompey, and especially Crassus, to sustain it.


[Sidenote: Departure of Crassus for Syria. ]

VII. Without waiting for the end of his consulship, Crassus determined
on quitting Rome; he left in the last days of October. [677] As we have
said, it was not the government of Syria which excited his ardour; his
aim was to carry the war into the country of the Parthians, in order to
acquire new glory, and obtain possession of the treasures of those rich
countries.

The idea of this expedition was not new. The Parthians had long awakened
the jealousy of Rome. They had extended their frontiers from the
Caucasus to the Euphrates,[678] and considerably increased their
importance; their chief assumed, like Agamemnon, the title of _king of
kings_. It is true that the part of Mesopotamia taken from the Parthians
by Tigranes had been restored to them by Lucullus, and Pompey had
renewed the treaty which made the Euphrates the frontier of the empire
of the Arsacides. But this treaty had not always been respected, for it
was not one of the habits of the Republic to suffer a too powerful
neighbour. Nevertheless, different circumstances might, at this moment,
lead the Senate to make war upon the Parthians. While A. Gabinius
exercised the command in Syria, Mithridates, dethroned, on account of
his cruelty, by his younger brother Orodes, had invoked the support of
the proconsul; and the latter was on the point of giving it, when Pompey
sent him orders to repair first into Egypt to replace Ptolemy on his
throne. Mithridates, besieged in Babylon, had surrendered to his
brother, who had caused him to be put to death. [679] On another hand,
the Parthians were always at war with the kings of Armenia, allies of
the Romans. The Senate, had it the wish, was not, therefore, in want of
pretexts for declaring war. It had to avenge the death of a friendly
pretender, and to sustain a threatened ally. To what point could the law
of nations be invoked? That is doubtful; but, for several centuries, the
Republic had been in the habit of consulting its own interests much more
than justice, and the war against the Parthians was quite as legitimate
as the wars against Perseus, Antiochus, or Carthage.

Nevertheless, this enterprise encountered a warm opposition at Rome; the
party hostile to the consuls feared the glory which it might reflect
upon Crassus, and many prudent minds dreaded the perils of so distant an
expedition; but Cæsar, who had inherited that passion of the ancient
Romans who dreamt for their town the empire of the world, encouraged
Crassus in his projects, and, in the winter of 700, he sent Publius to
his father, with 1,000 picked Gaulish cavalry.

Inauspicious auguries marked the departure of the proconsul. The two
tribunes of the people, C. Ateius Capito and P. Aquilius Gallus,
adherents of the party of the nobles, opposed it. They had succeeded in
imparting their sentiments to many of their fellow-citizens. Crassus,
intimidated, took with him Pompey, whose ascendency over the people was
so powerful that his presence was sufficient to put a stop to all
hostile manifestation. Ateius Capito was not discouraged; he gave orders
to an usher to place Crassus under arrest at the moment when he was
leaving Rome. The other tribune prevented this act of violence. Then,
seeing that all his efforts had failed, he had recourse to an extreme
measure: he sent for a chafing-dish, and threw perfumes into it, while
he pronounced against Crassus the most terrible curses. These
imprecations were of a nature to strike the superstitious minds of the
Romans. People did not fail to call them to memory afterwards, when news
came of the Syrian disasters.


[Sidenote: Cato proposes to deliver Cæsar to the Germans. ]

VIII. About the same time, the news arrived at Rome of the defeat of the
Usipetes and Tencteri, of the passage of the Rhine, and of the descent
in Britain; they excited a warm enthusiasm, and the Senate decreed
twenty days of thanksgiving. [680] The last expedition especially made a
great impression on people’s minds; it was like the discovery of a new
world; the national pride was flattered at learning that the legions had
penetrated into an unknown country, from which immense advantages for
the Republic were promised. [681] Yet all were not dazzled by the
military successes; some pretended that Cæsar had crossed, not the
ocean, but a mere pool,[682] and Cato, persevering in his hatred,
proposed to deliver him to the Germans. He accused him of having
attacked them at the moment when they were sending deputies, and, by
this violation of the law of nations, drawn upon Rome the anger of
Heaven; “they must,” he said, “turn it upon the head of the perfidious
general:” an impotent diatribe, which did not prevail against the public
feeling! [683] Yet, as soon as Cæsar was informed of it, too sensitive,
perhaps, to the insult, he wrote to the Senate a letter full of
invectives and accusations against Cato. The latter at first repelled
them calmly; then, taking advantage of the circumstance, he began to
paint, in the darkest colours, Cæsar’s pretended designs. “It was,” he
said, “neither the Germans nor the Gauls they had to fear, but this
ambitious man, whose designs were apparent to everybody. ” These words
produced a strong impression on an auditory already prejudiced
unfavourably. Nevertheless, the fear of the public opinion prevented any
decision; for, according to Plutarch, “Cato made no impression outside
the Senate; the people desired that Cæsar should be raised to the
highest power, and the Senate, though it was of the same opinion as
Cato, dared not to act, through fear of the people. ”[684]




CHAPTER V.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 700


[Sidenote: Second Descent in England. ]

I. The expedition to England, in 699, may be said to have been only a
reconnoitring visit, showing the necessity of more numerous forces and
more considerable preparations to subjugate the warlike people of Great
Britain. Accordingly, before starting for Italy, Cæsar gave orders to
build on the coast, and especially at the mouth of the Seine, a great
number of ships fitted for the transport of troops. In the month of June
he left Italy, visited his stocks where the vessels were building,
appointed Boulogne as the general rendezvous of his fleet, and, while it
was assembling, marched rapidly, with four legions, towards the country
of the Treviri, where the inhabitants, who had rebelled against his
orders, were divided into two parties, having at their head, one
Indutiomarus, and the other Cingetorix. He gave the power to the latter,
who was favourable to the Romans. After having thus calmed the agitation
of that country, Cæsar repaired at once to Boulogne, where he found 800
ships ready to put to sea; he embarked with five legions and 2,000
cavalry, and, without any resistance, landed, as in the year before,
near Deal. A first successful combat, not far from Kingston, engaged him
to continue his advance, when he received information that a tempest
had just destroyed part of his fleet; he then returned to the coast,
took the measures necessary for repairing this new disaster, caused all
his ships to be drawn on land, and surrounded them with a retrenchment
adjoining to the camp. He next marched towards the Thames. On his way he
encountered the Britons, who, vanquished in two successive combats, had
nevertheless more than once scattered trouble and disorder through the
ranks of the legions, thanks to their chariots; these engines of war,
mixed with the cavalry, spread terror and disconcerted the Roman
tactics. Cæsar forced the passage of the Thames at Sunbury, went to
attack the citadel of Cassivellaunus near St. Albans, and obtained
possession of it. Several tribes, situated to the south of that river,
made their submission. Then, dreading the approach of the equinox, and
especially the troubles which might break out in Gaul during his
absence, he returned to the continent.


[Sidenote: Displacement of the Army. Disaster of Sabinus. ]

II. Immediately on his return, he placed his legions in winter quarters:
Sabinus and Cotta at Tongres; Cicero at Charleroi; Labienus at
Lavacherie, on the Ourthe; Fabius at Saint-Pol; Trebonius at Amiens;
Crassus at Montdidier; Plancus at Champlieu; and, lastly, Roscius in the
country of Séez. This displacement of the army, rendered necessary by
the difficulty of provisioning it, separated by great distances the
quarters from each other, though all, except that of Roscius, were
comprised in a radius of 100 miles.

As in the preceding years, Cæsar believed he might repair into Italy;
but Gaul still chafed under the yoke of the foreigner, and, while the
people of Orleans massacred Tasgetius, who had been given them for their
king three years before, events of a more serious character were in
preparation in the countries situate between the Rhine and the Meuse.
The people of Liége, led by Ambiorix and Cativolcus, revolt and attack,
at Tongres, the camp occupied by Sabinus and Cotta with fifteen cohorts.
Unable to take it by assault, they have recourse to stratagem: they
spread abroad the report of the departure of Cæsar, and of the revolt of
the whole of Gaul; they offer the two lieutenants to let them go,
without obstacle, to rejoin the nearest winter quarters. Sabinus
assembles a council of war, in which Cotta, an old experienced soldier,
refused all arrangement with the enemy; but, as often happens in such
meetings, the majority rallies to the least energetic opinion; the
fifteen cohorts, trusting in the promise of the Gauls, abandon their
impregnable position, and begin their march. On arriving at the defile
of Lowaige, they are attacked and massacred by the barbarians, who had
placed themselves in an ambuscade in the woods. Ambiorix, emboldened by
this success, raises all the peoples on his way, and hastens, at
Charleroi, to attack the camp of Cicero. The legion, though taken
unexpectedly, defends itself bravely, but the Gauls have learnt from
deserters the art of besieging fortresses in the Roman manner; they
raise towers, construct covered galleries, and surround the camp with a
countervallation. Meanwhile Cicero has found the means of informing
Cæsar of his critical position. The latter was at Amiens; the morrow of
the day on which he receives this news, he starts with two legions, and
sends a Gaul to announce his approach. The assailants, informed on their
part of Cæsar’s march, abandon the siege, and go to meet him. The two
armies encounter near the little stream of the Haine, at fourteen
kilomètres from Charleroi. Shut up in his retrenchments on Mont
Sainte-Aldegonde, Cæsar counterfeits fear, in order to provoke the Gauls
to attack him; and when they rush upon the ramparts to storm them, he
sallies out through all the gates, puts the enemies to the rout, and
strews the ground with their dead. The same day he rejoins Cicero,
congratulates the soldiers on their courage, and his lieutenant for
having been faithful to the Roman principle of never entering into
negotiation with an enemy in arms. For the moment this victory defeated
at one blow the aggressive attempts of the populations on the banks of
the Rhine against Labienus, and those of the maritime peoples on the
coasts of the Straits against Roscius; but soon new disturbances arose:
the inhabitants of the state of Sens expelled Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had
given them for king; and, a little later, Labienus was forced to combat
the inhabitants of the country of Trèves, whom he defeated in an
engagement in which Indutiomarus was slain. With the exception of the
peoples of Burgundy and Champagne, all Gaul was in fermentation, which
obliged Cæsar to pass the winter in it.


[Sidenote: L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and Appius Claudius Pulcher,
Consuls. ]

III. During this time, the struggle of parties continued at Rome, and
Pompey, charged with the supplying of provisions, having under his
orders lieutenants and legions, posted himself at the gates of the town;
his presence in Italy, a pledge of order and tranquillity, was accepted
by all good citizens. [685] His influence was, as Cæsar thought, to
paralyse that of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had obtained the
consulship. In fact, when on the preceding occasion Crassus and Pompey
placed themselves on the ranks as candidates for the consulship, the
opposite party, hopeless of defeating both, had sought the admission of
at least one of their candidates. They tried again the manœuvre they
had employed in 695, by which they succeeded in the nomination of
Bibulus as the colleague of Cæsar. The attempt had failed; but, at the
moment when the question of the election of consuls for the year 700 was
agitated, the aristocratic party, having no longer to contend against
persons of such eminence as Crassus and Pompey, obtained without
difficulty the election of Ahenobarbus. This latter represented alone,
in that high magistracy, the passions hostile to the triumvirs, since
his colleague Appius Claudius Pulcher was still, at that epoch,
favourable to Cæsar.

The authority of the consuls, whoever they might be, was powerless for
remedying the demoralisation of the upper classes, which was revealed by
numerous symptoms at Rome as well as in the provinces. Cicero himself,
as the following event proves, treated legality with contempt when it
interfered with his affections or political opinions.


[Sidenote: Re-establishment of Ptolemy in Egypt. ]

IV. The Sibylline oracle, it will be remembered, had forbidden recourse
to arms for the purpose of restoring Ptolemy, King of Egypt, to his
states. In spite of this prohibition, Cicero, as early as the year 698,
had engaged P. Lentulus, proconsul in Cilicia and in Cyprus, to
re-establish him by force, and, to encourage this enterprise, he had
suggested to him the prospect of impunity in success, without, however,
concealing from him that, in case of reverse, the legal question, as
well, as the religious question, would assume a threatening form. [686]
Lentulus had thought it prudent to abstain; but Gabinius, proconsul in
Syria in the following year, had not shown the same degree of scruple.
Bribed by the king, some said, but, as others said, having received
orders from Pompey, he had left his son in Syria with a few troops, and
had marched with his legions towards Egypt.

After having, on his way, plundered Judæa, and sent prisoner to Rome its
king Aristobulus, he crossed the desert, and arrived before Pelusium. A
certain Archelaus, who was looked upon as a good general, and had served
under Mithridates, was detained in Syria. Gabinius, informed that Queen
Berenice wished to place him at the head of her army, and that she
offered a large sum of money for his ransom, immediately set him at
liberty, showing thereby as much avidity for riches as contempt for the
Egyptians. He defeated them in several battles, slew Archelaus, and
entered Alexandria, where he re-established Ptolemy on the throne, and
the latter, it is said, gave him 10,000 talents. [687] In this
expedition, Mark Antony, who was soon to be Cæsar’s quæstor, commanded
the cavalry; he distinguished himself by his intrepidity and by his
military talent. [688] This was the commencement of his fortune.

Gabinius, if we believe Dio Cassius, took good care not to send an
account of his conduct, but it was not long in becoming known, and he
was compelled to return to Rome, where serious accusations awaited him.
Unfortunately for him, when the period of his trial came on, Pompey, his
protector, was no longer consul.

Gabinius had to undergo in succession two accusations: he was acquitted
of the first, on the double head of sacrilege and high treason, because
he paid heavy bribes to his judges. [689] As to the second accusation,
relating to acts of extortion, he experienced more difficulties. Pompey,
who had been obliged to absent himself, in order to provide for the
provisioning with which he was charged, hastened to the gates of Rome,
which his office of proconsul did not allow him to enter, convoked an
assembly of the people outside the Pomœrium, employed all his
authority, and even read letters from Cæsar, in favour of the accused.
Still more, he begged Cicero to undertake his defence, and Cicero
accepted the task, forgetting the invectives with which he had
overwhelmed Gabinius before the Senate. All these efforts failed: it was
necessary to yield to the rage of the public opinion, skilfully excited
by the enemies of Gabinius; and the latter, condemned, went into exile,
where he remained until Cæsar’s dictatorship. [690]


[Sidenote: Corruption of the Elections. ]

V. We are astonished to see personages such as Pompey and Cæsar
protecting men who seem to have borne such bad character as Gabinius;
but, to judge with impartiality the men of that period, we must not
forget, in the first place, that there were very few without blemish,
and, further, that the political parties never hesitated in throwing
upon their adversaries the most odious calumnies. Gabinius, belonging to
the popular faction, and the partisan of Pompey, had incurred the hatred
of the aristocracy and of the farmers of the revenues. The nobles never
pardoned him for being the author of the law which had entrusted to
Pompey the command of the expedition against the pirates, and for having
shown, during his proconsulship in Syria, want of deference in regard to
the Senate. So that assembly refused, in 698, to order thanksgivings for
his victories. [691] The farmers of the revenues bore ill-will towards
him on account of his decrees against usury,[692] and his solicitude for
the interests of his province. [693] This proconsul, who is represented
as an adventurer pillaging those under his administration, appears to
have governed Judæa with justice, and to have restored with skill, on
his return from Egypt, the order which had been disturbed during his
absence. His military capacity cannot be called in doubt. In speaking of
him, the historian Josephus closes with these words his account of the
battle against the Nabathæi: “This great captain, after so many
exploits, returned to Rome, and Crassus succeeded him in the government
of Syria. ”[694] Nevertheless, it is very probable that Gabinius was not
more scrupulous than the other proconsuls in matter of probity; for, if
corruption then displayed itself with impudence in the provinces, it was
perhaps still more shameless in Rome. The following is a striking
example. Two candidates for the consulship, Domitius Calvinus and
Memmius Gemellus, united their clients and resources of all kinds to
obtain the first magistracy. In their desire to procure the support of
Ahenobarbus and Claudius Pulcher, the consuls in office, they engaged by
writing to secure for them, on their quitting office, the provinces they
desired, and that by a double fraud: they promised first to bring three
augurs to affirm the existence of a supposititious curiate law, and then
to find two consulars who would declare that they had assisted at the
regulation relative to the distribution of the provinces; in case of
non-performance, there was stipulated, for the profit of the consuls,
400,000 sestertii. [695] This shameless traffic and others of the same
kind, in which were compromised Æmilius Scaurus and Valerius Messala,
had caused the interest of money to be doubled. [696] The bargain would
probably have been carried out, if, in consequence of a quarrel between
the two consuls, Memmius had not denounced the convention in full
Senate, and produced the contract. The scandal was enormous, but it
remained unpunished as regarded the consuls.

Memmius, formerly Cæsar’s enemy, had recently joined his party;
nevertheless, the latter, incensed at his impudence, blamed his conduct,
and abandoned him; Memmius was exiled. [697] As to Domitius, he was, it
is true, accused of solicitation, and the Senate intended absolutely to
close the consulship against him by deciding that the consular comitia
should not be held until after judgment had been given on his trial.

All these facts bear witness to the decay of society, for the moral
degradation of the individuals must infallibly bring with it the
abasement of the institutions.


[Sidenote: Death of Cæsar’s Daughter. ]

VI. Towards the month of August of the year 700, Cæsar lost his mother
Aurelia, and, a few days afterwards, his daughter Julia. The latter,
whose health had been declining since the troubles of the preceding
year, had become pregnant; she died in giving birth to a son, which did
not survive. Cæsar was painfully affected by this misfortune,[698] of
which he received the news during his expedition to Britain. [699] Pompey
was desirous of burying his wife in his estate of Alba; but the populace
opposed it, carried the body to the Campus Martius, and insisted on its
being buried there. By that rare privilege reserved to illustrious men,
the people sought, according to Plutarch, to honour rather the daughter
of Cæsar than the wife of Pompey. [700] This death broke one of the ties
which united the two most important men of the Republic.