)
Two celebrated English astronomers, Halley and Mr.
Two celebrated English astronomers, Halley and Mr.
Napoleon - History of Julius Caesar - b
The ships of
all the neighbouring regions, and the fleet constructed in the previous
year for the war against the Veneti, were collected there.
The news of his project having been carried into Britain by the
merchants, the deputies of several nations in the island came with
offers of submission. Cæsar received them with kindness; and on their
return he sent with them Commius, whom he had previously made king of
the Atrebates. This man, whose courage, prudence, and devotion he
appreciated, enjoyed great credit among the Britons. He directed him to
visit the greatest possible number of tribes, to keep them in good
feelings, and to announce his speedy arrival.
While Cæsar remained among the Morini, waiting the completion of the
preparations for his expedition, he received a deputation which came in
the name of a great part of the inhabitants to justify their past
conduct. He accepted their explanations readily, unwilling to leave
enemies behind him. Moreover, the season was too far advanced to allow
of combating the Morini, and their entire subjection was not a matter of
sufficient importance to divert him from his enterprise against Britain:
he was satisfied with exacting numerous hostages. Meanwhile Volusenus
returned, at the end of five days, to report the result of his mission:
as he had not ventured to land, he had only performed it imperfectly.
The forces destined for the expedition consisted of two legions, the 7th
and the 10th, commanded probably by Galba and Labienus, and of a
detachment of cavalry, which made about 12,000 legionaries and 450
horses.
Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta received the command of
the troops left on the continent to occupy the territory of the Menapii
and that of the country of the Morini which had not submitted. The
lieutenant P. Sulpicius Rufus was charged with the guard of the port
with a sufficient force.
They had succeeded in collecting eighty transport ships, judged capable
of containing the two legions of the expedition, with all their baggage,
and a certain number of galleys, which were distributed among the
quæstor, the lieutenants, and the prefects. Eighteen other vessels,
destined for the cavalry, were detained by contrary winds in a little
port (that of _Ambleteuse_) situated eight miles to the north of
Boulogne. [351] (_See Plate 16. _)
Having made these dispositions, Cæsar, taking advantage of a favourable
wind, started in the night between the 24th and 25th of August (we shall
endeavour to justify this date farther on), towards midnight, after
giving orders to the cavalry to proceed to the port above
(_Ambleteuse_); he reached the coast of Britain at the fourth hour of
the day (ten o’clock in the forenoon), opposite the cliffs of Dover. The
cavalry, which had embarked but slowly, had not been able to join him.
From his ship Cæsar perceived the cliffs covered with armed men. At this
spot the sea was so close to these cliffs that a dart thrown from the
heights could reach the beach. [352] The place appeared to him in no
respect convenient for landing. This description agrees with that which
Q. Cicero gave to his brother, of “coasts surmounted by immense
rocks. ”[353] (_See Plate 17. _) Cæsar cast anchor, and waited in vain
until the fifth hour (half-past three) (see the Concordance of Hours,
_Appendix B_), for the arrival of the vessels which were delayed. In the
interval, he called together his lieutenants and the tribunes of the
soldiers, communicated to them his plans as well as the information
brought by Volusenus, and urged upon them the instantaneous execution of
his orders on a simple sign, as maritime war required, in which the
manœuvres must be as rapid as they are varied. It is probable that
Cæsar had till then kept secret the point of landing.
When he had dismissed them, towards half-past three o’clock, the wind
and tide having become favourable at the same time, he gave the signal
for raising their anchors, and, after proceeding about seven miles to
the east, as far as the extremity of the cliffs, and having, according
to Dio Cassius, doubled a lofty promontory,[354] the point of the South
Foreland (_see Plate 16_), he stopped before the open and level shore
which extends from the castle of Walmer to Deal.
From the heights of Dover it was easy for the Britons to trace the
movement of the fleet; guessing that it was making for the point where
the cliffs ended, they hastened thither, preceded by their cavalry and
their chariots, which they used constantly in their battles. They
arrived in time to oppose the landing, which had to be risked under the
most difficult circumstances. The ships, on account of their magnitude,
could only cast anchor in the deep water; the soldiers, on an unknown
coast, with their hands embarrassed, their bodies loaded with the weight
of their arms, were obliged to throw themselves into the waves, find a
footing, and combat. The enemy, on the contrary, with the free use of
their limbs, acquainted with the ground, and posted on the edge of the
water, or a little way in advance in the sea, threw their missiles with
confidence, and pushed forward their docile and well-disciplined horses
into the midst of the waves. Thus the Romans, disconcerted by this
concurrence of unforeseen circumstances, and strangers to this kind of
combat, did not carry to it their usual ardour and zeal.
In this situation, Cæsar detached from the line of transport ships the
galleys--lighter ships, and of a form which was new to the
barbarians--and directed them by force of rowing upon the enemy’s
uncovered flank (that is, on his right side), in order to drive him from
his position by means of slings, arrows, and darts thrown from the
machines. This manœuvre was of great assistance; for the Britons,
struck with the look of the galleys, the movement of the oars, and the
novel effect of the machines, halted and drew back a little. Still the
Romans hesitated, on account of the depth of the water, to leap out of
the ships, when the standard-bearer of the 10th legion, invoking the
gods with a loud voice, and exhorting his comrades to defend the eagle,
leaps into the sea and induces them to follow. [355] This example is
imitated by the legionaries embarked in the nearest ships, and the
combat begins. It was obstinate. The Romans being unable to keep their
ranks, or gain a solid footing, or rally round their ensigns, the
confusion was extreme; all those who leapt out of the ships to gain the
land singly, were surrounded by the barbarian cavalry, to whom the
shallows were known, and, when they were collected in mass, the enemy,
taking them on the uncovered flank, overwhelmed them with missiles. On
seeing this, Cæsar caused the galleys’ boats and the small vessels which
served to light the fleet to be filled with soldiers, and sent them
wherever the danger required. Soon the Romans, having succeeded in
establishing themselves on firm ground, formed their ranks, rushed upon
the enemy, and put him to flight; but a long pursuit was impossible for
want of cavalry, which, through contrary winds in the passage, had not
been able to reach Britain. In this alone fortune failed Cæsar.
In this combat, in which, no doubt, many acts of courage remained
unknown, a legionary, whose name, Cæsius Scæva, has been preserved by
Valerius Maximus, distinguished himself in a very remarkable manner.
Having thrown himself into a boat with four men, he had reached a
rock,[356] whence, with his comrades, he threw missiles against the
enemy; but the ebb rendered the space between the rock and the land
fordable. The barbarians then rushed to them in a crowd. His companions
took refuge in their boat; he, firm to his post, made an heroic defence,
and killed several of his enemies; at last, having his thigh
transpierced with an arrow, his face bruised by the blow of a stone, his
helmet broken to pieces, his buckler covered with holes, he trusted
himself to the mercy of the waves, and swam back towards his companions.
When he saw his general, instead of boasting of his conduct, he sought
his pardon for returning without his buckler. It was, in fact, a
disgrace among the ancients to lose that defensive arm; but Cæsar loaded
him with praise, and rewarded him with the grade of a centurion.
The landing having been effected, the Romans established their camp near
the sea, and, as everything leads us to believe, on the height of
Walmer. The galleys were hauled on the strand, and the transport ships
left at anchor not far from the shore.
The enemies, who had rallied after their defeat, decided on peace. They
joined with their deputies; sent, to solicit it, some of the Morini,
with whom they lived on friendly terms,[357] and Commius, the King of
the Atrebates, who had been previously sent on a mission to Britain. The
barbarians had seized his person the moment he landed, and loaded him
with fetters. After the combat, they set him at liberty, and came to ask
pardon for this offence, throwing the fault upon the multitude. Cæsar
reproached them with having received him as an enemy, after they had, of
their own motion, sent deputies to him on the continent to treat of
peace. Nevertheless, he pardoned them, but required hostages; part of
these were delivered to him immediately, and the rest promised within a
few days. Meanwhile they returned to their homes, and from all sides the
chiefs came to implore the protection of the conqueror.
Peace seemed to be established. The army had been four days in Britain,
and the eighteen ships which carried the cavalry, quitting the upper
port with a light breeze, approached the coast, and were already in view
of the camp, when suddenly a violent tempest arose which drove them out
of their course. Some were carried back to the point whence they had
started, whilst others were driven towards the south of the island,
where they cast anchor; but, beaten by the waves, they were obliged, in
the midst of a stormy night, to put to sea and regain the continent.
This night, between the 30th and 31st of August, coincided with full
moon; the Romans were ignorant of the fact that this was the period of
the highest tides on the ocean. The water soon submerged the galleys
which had been drawn upon the dry beach, and the transport ships which
had remained at anchor, yielding to the tempest, were broken on the
coast or disabled. The consternation became general; the Romans were in
want of everything at once, both of the means of transport, of materials
for repairing their ships, and even of provisions; for Cæsar, not
intending to winter in Britain, had carried thither no supplies.
At the moment of this disaster, the chiefs of the Britains had again
assembled to carry out the conditions imposed upon them; but, informed
of the critical position of the Romans, and judging the small number of
the invaders by the diminutive proportions of their camp, which was the
more contracted as the legions had embarked without baggage[358] they
determined on again resorting to arms. The opportunity seemed favourable
for intercepting provisions, and prolonging the struggle till winter, in
the firm conviction that, if they annihilated the Romans and cut them
off from all retreat, nobody would dare in future to carry the war into
Britain.
A new league is forming. The barbarian chiefs depart one after another
from the Roman camp, and secretly recall the men they had sent away.
Cæsar as yet was ignorant of their design; but their delay in delivering
the rest of the hostages, and the disaster which had befallen his fleet,
soon led him to anticipate what would happen. He therefore took his
measures to meet all eventualities. Every day the two legions repaired
in turn to the country to reap; the fleet was repaired with the timber
and copper of the ships which had suffered most, and the materials of
which they were in want were brought over from the continent. Thanks to
the extreme zeal of the soldiers, all the ships were set afloat again,
with the exception of twelve, which reduced the fleet to sixty-eight
vessels instead of eighty, its number when it left Gaul.
During the execution of these works, Britons came backwards and forwards
to the camp freely, and nothing predicted the approach of hostilities;
but one day, when the seventh legion, according to custom, had proceeded
to no great distance from the camp to cut wheat, the soldiers on guard
before the gates suddenly came to announce that a thick cloud of dust
arose in the direction taken by the legion. Cæsar, suspecting some
attack from the barbarians, assembles the cohorts on guard, orders two
others to replace them, and the rest of the troops to arm and follow him
without delay, and hurries forward in the direction indicated. What had
happened was this. The Britons, foreseeing that the Romans would repair
to the only spot which remained to reap (_pars una erat reliqua_), had
concealed themselves the previous night in the forests. After waiting
till the soldiers of the 7th legion had laid aside their arms and begun
to cut the grain, they had fallen upon them unexpectedly, and, while the
legionaries in disorder were forming, they had surrounded them with
their cavalry and chariots.
This strange manner of combating had thrown the soldiers of the 7th
legion into disorder. Closely surrounded, and resisting with difficulty
under a shower of missiles, they would perhaps have succumbed, when
Cæsar appeared at the head of his cohorts; his presence restored
confidence to his own men and checked the enemy. Nevertheless, he did
not judge it prudent to risk a battle, and, after remaining a certain
length of time in position, he withdrew his troops. The 7th legion had
experienced considerable loss. [359] Continual rains, during some days,
rendered all operations impossible; but eventually the barbarians,
believing that the moment had arrived to recover their liberty,
assembled from all parts, and marched against the camp.
Deprived of cavalry, Cæsar foresaw well that it would go the same with
this combat as with the preceding, and that the enemy, when repulsed,
would escape easily by flight; nevertheless, as he had at his disposal
thirty horses brought into Britain by Commius, he believed that he could
use them with advantage;[360] he drew up his legions in battle at the
head of the camp, and ordered them to march forward. The enemy did not
sustain the shock long, and dispersed; the legionaries pursued them as
quickly and as far as their arms permitted; they returned to the camp,
after having made a great slaughter, and ravaged everything within a
vast circuit.
The same day, the barbarians sent deputies to ask for peace. Cæsar
doubled the number of hostages he had required before, and ordered them
to be brought to him on the continent. In all Britain, two states only
obeyed this order.
As the equinox approached, he was unwilling to expose vessels ill
repaired to a navigation in winter. He took advantage of favourable
weather, set sail a little after midnight, and regained Gaul with all
his ships without the least loss. Two transport vessels only were unable
to enter the port of Boulogne with the fleet, and were carried a little
lower towards the south. They had on board about 300 soldiers, who, once
landed, marched to rejoin the army. In their way, the Morini, seduced by
the prospect of plunder, attacked them by surprise, and soon, increasing
to the number of 6,000, succeeded in surrounding them. The Romans formed
in a circle; in vain their assailants offered them their lives if they
would surrender. They defended themselves valiantly during more than
four hours, until the arrival of all the cavalry, which Cæsar sent to
their succour. Seized with terror, the Morini threw down their arms, and
were nearly all massacred. [361]
[Sidenote: Chastisement of the Morini and Menapii. ]
VI. On the day after the return of the army to the continent, Labienus
received orders to reduce, with the two legions brought back from
Britain, the revolted Morini, whom the marshes, dried up by the summer
heats, no longer sheltered from attack, as they had done the year
before. On another side, Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Cotta rejoined
Cæsar, after laying waste and burning the territory of the Menapii, who
had taken refuge in the depths of their forests. The army was
established in winter quarters among the Belgæ. The Senate, when it
received the news of these successes, decreed twenty days of
thanksgiving. [362]
[Sidenote: Order for Rebuilding the Fleet. Departure for Illyria. ]
VII. Before he left for Italy, Cæsar ordered his lieutenants to repair
the old ships, and to construct during the winter a greater number, of
which he fixed the form and dimensions. That it might be easier to load
them and draw them on land, he recommended them to be made a little
lower than those which were in use in Italy; this disposition presented
no inconvenience, for he had remarked that the waves of the channel rose
to a less elevation than those of the Mediterranean, which he attributed
wrongly to the frequency of the motions of the tide and ebb. He desired
also to have greater breadth in the vessels on account of the baggage
and beasts of burden he had to transport, and ordered them to be
arranged so as to be able to employ oars, the use of which was
facilitated by the small elevation of the side-planks. According to Dio
Cassius, these ships held the mean between the light vessels of the
Romans and the transport ships of the Gauls. [363] He procured from Spain
all the rigging necessary for the equipment of these vessels.
Having given these instructions, Cæsar went into Italy to hold the
assembly of Citerior Gaul, and afterwards started for Illyria, on the
news that the Pirustes (_peoples of the Carnic Alps_) were laying the
frontier waste. Immediately on his arrival, by prompt and energetic
measures, he put a stop to these disorders, and re-established
tranquillity. [364]
[Sidenote: Points of Embarking and Landing. Date of the Arrival in
Britain. ]
VIII. We have indicated, in the preceding pages, Boulogne as the port at
which Cæsar embarked, and Deal as the point where he landed in Britain.
Before explaining our reasons, it will not be useless to state that in
this first expedition, as well as in the second, the account of which
will follow, the places of embarking and landing were the same. In the
first place, the terms used in the “Commentaries” lead us to suppose it;
next, as we will endeavour to prove, he could only start from Boulogne;
and lastly, according to the relation of Dio Cassius, he landed on both
occasions at the same spot. [365] It is, then, convenient to treat here
the question for both expeditions, and to anticipate in regard to
certain facts.
Writers of great repute have placed the Portus Itius, some at Wissant,
others at Calais, Etaples, or Mardyke; but the Emperor Napoleon I, in
his _Précis des Guerres de César_, has not hesitated in preferring
Boulogne. It will be easy for us to prove in effect that the port of
Boulogne is the _Portus Itius_, which alone answers the necessities of
the text, and at the same time satisfies the requirements of a
considerable expedition. [366]
To proceed logically, let us suppose the absence of all kind of data.
The only means to approach the truth would then be to adopt, as the
place where Cæsar embarked, the port mentioned most anciently by
historians; for, in all probability, the point of the coast rendered
famous by the first expeditions to Britain would have been chosen in
preference for subsequent voyages. Now, as early as the reign of
Augustus, Agrippa caused a road to be constructed, which went from Lyons
to the ocean, across the country of the Bellovaci and the Ambiani,[367]
and was to end at Gesoriacum (_Boulogne_), since the Itinerary of
Antoninus traces it thus. [368] It was at Boulogne that Caligula caused a
pharos to be raised,[369] and that Claudius embarked for Britain. [370]
It was thence that Lupicinus, under the Emperor Julian,[371] and
Theodosius, under the Emperor Valentinian,[372] Constantius
Chlorus,[373] and lastly, in 893, the Danes,[374] set sail. This port,
then, was known and frequented a short time after Cæsar, and continued
to be used during the following centuries, while Wissant and Calais are
only mentioned by historians three or four centuries later. Lastly, at
Boulogne, Roman antiquities are found in abundance; none exist at Calais
or Wissant. Cæsar’s camp, of which certain authors speak as situated
near Wissant, is only a small modern redoubt, incapable of containing
more than 200 men.
To this first presumption in favour of Boulogne we may add another: the
ancient authors speak only of a single port on the coast of Gaul nearest
to Britain; therefore, they very probably give different names to the
same place, among which names figures that of _Gesoriacum_. Florus[375]
calls the place where Cæsar embarked the port of the Morini. Strabo[376]
says that this port was called _Itius_; Pomponius Mela, who lived less
than a century after Cæsar, cites _Gesoriacum_ as the port of the Morini
best known;[377] Pliny expresses himself in analogous terms. [378]
Let us now show that the port of Boulogne agrees with the conditions
specified in the “Commentaries. ”
1. Cæsar, in his first expedition, repaired _to the country of the
Morini, whence the passage from Gaul to Britain is shortest_. Now,
Boulogne is actually situated on the territory of that people which,
occupying the western part of the department of the Pas-de-Calais, was
the nearest to England.
2. In his second expedition, Cæsar _embarked at the port Itius, which he
had found to offer the most convenient passage for proceeding to
Britain, distant from the continent about thirty Roman miles_. Now, even
at the present day, it is from Boulogne that the passage is easiest to
arrive in England, because the favourable winds are more frequent than
at Wissant and Calais. As to _the distance of about thirty miles_
(forty-four kilometres), Cæsar gives it evidently as representing the
distance from Britain to the _Portus Itius_: it is exactly the distance
from Boulogne to Dover, whereas Wissant and Calais are farther from
Dover, the one twenty, the other twenty-three Roman miles.
3. _To the north, at eight miles’ distance from the Portus Itius,
existed another port, where the cavalry embarked_. Boulogne is the only
port on this coast at eight miles from which, towards the north, we meet
with another, that of Ambleteuse. The distance of eight miles is exact,
not as a bird flies, but following the course of the hills. To the north
of Wissant, on the contrary, there is only Sangatte or Calais. Now
Sangatte is six Roman miles from Wissant, and Calais eleven.
4. _The eighteen ships of the upper port were prevented by contrary
winds from rallying the fleet at the principal port_. We understand
easily that these ships, detained at Ambleteuse by winds from the
south-west or west-south-west, which prevail frequently in the Channel,
were unable to rally the fleet at Boulogne. As to the two ships of
burthen, which, at the return of the first expedition, could not make
land in the same port as the fleet, but were dragged by the current more
to the south, nothing is said in the “Commentaries” which would show
that they entered a port; it is probable, indeed, that they were driven
upon the shore. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that they may have
landed in the little fishers’ ports of Hardelot and Camiers. (_See
Plate_ 15. )
We see from what precedes that the port of Boulogne agrees with the text
of the “Commentaries. ” But the peremptory reason why, in our opinion,
the port where Cæsar embarked is certainly that of Boulogne, is, that it
would have been impossible to prepare elsewhere an expedition against
England, Boulogne being the only place which united the conditions
indispensable for collecting the fleet and embarking the troops. In
fact, it required a port capable of containing either eighty transport
ships and galleys, as in the first expedition, or 800 ships, as in the
second; and extensive enough to allow the ships to approach the banks
and embark the troops in a single tide. Now these conditions could only
be fulfilled where a river sufficiently deep, flowing into the sea,
formed a natural port; and, on the part of the coasts nearest to
England, we find only at Boulogne a river, the Liane, which presents all
these advantages. Moreover, it must not be forgotten, all the coast has
been buried in sand. It appears that it is not more than a century and
a half that the natural basin of Boulogne has been partly filled; and,
according to tradition and geological observations, the coast advanced
more than two kilomètres, forming two jetties, between which the high
tide filled the valley of the Liane to a distance of four kilomètres
inland.
None of the ports situated to the north of Boulogne could serve as the
basis of Cæsar’s expedition, for none could receive so great a number of
vessels, and we cannot suppose that Cæsar would have left them on the
open coast, during more than a month, exposed to the tempests of the
ocean, which were so fatal to him on the coasts of Britain.
Boulogne was the only point of the coast where Cæsar could place in
safety his depôts, his supplies, and his spare stores. The heights which
command the port offered advantageous positions for establishing his
camps,[379] and the little river Liane allowed him to bring with ease
the timber and provisions he required. At Calais he would have found
nothing but flats and marshes, at Wissant nothing but sands, as
indicated by etymology of the word (_white sand_).
It is worthy of remark, that the reasons which determined Cæsar to start
from Boulogne were the same which decided the choice of Napoleon I. in
1804. In spite of the difference in the times and in the armies, the
nautical and practical conditions had undergone no change. “The Emperor
chose Boulogne,” says M. Thiers, “because that port had long been
pointed out as the best point of departure of an expedition directed
against England; he chose Boulogne, because its port is formed by the
little river Liane, which allowed him, with some labour, to place in
safety from 1,200 to 1,300 vessels. ”
We may point out, as another similarity, that certain flat boats,
constructed by order of the Emperor, had nearly the same dimensions as
those employed by Cæsar. “There required,” says the historian of the
‘Consulate and the Empire,’ “boats which would not need more, when they
were laden, than seven or eight feet of water to float, and which would
go with oars, so as to pass, either in calm or fog, and strand without
breaking on the flat English shores. The great gun-boats carried four
pieces of large bore, and were rigged like brigs, that is, with two
masts, manœuvred by twenty-four sailors, and capable of carrying a
company of a hundred men, with its staff, and its arms and munitions. . . .
These boats offered a vexatious inconvenience, that of falling to the
leeward, that is, yielding to the currents. This was the result of their
clumsy build, which presented more hold to the water than their masts to
the wind. ”[380]
Cæsar’s ships experienced the same inconvenience, and, drawn away by the
currents in his second expedition, they went to the leeward rather far
in the north.
We have seen that Cæsar’s transport boats were flat-bottomed, that they
could go either with sails or oars; carry if necessary 150 men, and be
loaded and drawn on dry ground with promptness (_ad celeritatem
onerandi subductionesque_). They had thus a great analogy with the
flat-bottomed boats of 1804. But there is more, for the Emperor Napoleon
had found it expedient to imitate the Roman galleys. “He had seen the
necessity,” says M. Thiers, “of constructing boats still lighter and
more movable than the preceding, drawing only two or three feet of
water, and calculated for landing anywhere. They were large boats,
narrow, sixty feet long, having a movable deck which could be laid or
withdrawn at will, and were distinguished from the others by the name of
pinnaces. These large boats were provided with sixty oars, carried at
need a light sail, and moved with extreme swiftness. When sixty
soldiers, practised in handling the oar as well as the sailors, set them
in motion, they glided over the sea like the light boats dropped from
the sides of our great vessels, and surprised the eye by the rapidity of
their course. ”
The point of landing has been equally the subject of a host of contrary
suppositions. St. Leonards, near Hastings, Richborough (_Rutupiœ_),
near Sandwich, Lymne, near Hythe, and Deal, have all been proposed.
The first of these localities, we think, must be rejected, for it
answers none of the conditions of the relation given in the
“Commentaries,” which inform us that, in the second expedition, the
fleet sailed with a gentle wind from the south-west. Now, this is the
least favourable of all winds for taking the direction of Hastings, when
starting from the coasts of the department of the Pas-de-Calais. In this
same passage, Cæsar, after having been drawn away from his course during
four hours of the night, perceived, at daybreak, that he had left
Britain to his left. This fact cannot possibly be explained if he had
intended to land at St. Leonards. As to Richborough, this locality is
much too far to the north. Why should Cæsar have gone so far as
Sandwich, since he could have landed at Walmer and Deal? Lymne, or
rather Romney Marsh, will suit no better. This shore is altogether unfit
for a landing-place, and none of the details furnished by the
“Commentaries” can be made to suit it. [381]
There remains Deal; but before describing this place, we must examine
if, on his first passage, when Cæsar sailed, after remaining five days
opposite the cliffs of Dover, the current of which he took advantage
carried him towards the north or towards the south. (_See Page_ 177.
)
Two celebrated English astronomers, Halley and Mr. Airy, have studied
this question; but they agree neither on the place where Cæsar embarked,
nor on that where he landed. We may, nevertheless, arrive at a solution
of this problem by seeking the day on which Cæsar landed. The year of
the expedition is known by the consulate of Pompey and Crassus--it was
the year 699. The month in which the departure took place is known by
the following data, derived from the “Commentaries;” the fine season was
near its end, _exuigua parte œstatis reliqua_ (IV. 20); the wheat had
been reaped everywhere, except in one single spot, _omni ex reliquis
partibus demesso frumento, una pars erat reliqua_ (IV. 32); the equinox
was near at hand, _propinqua die œquinoctii_ (IV. 36). These data
point sufficiently clearly to the month of August. Lastly, we have,
relative to the day of landing, the following indications:--After four
days past since his arrival in Britain. . . . there arose suddenly so
violent a tempest. . . . That same night it was full moon, which is the
period of the highest tides of the ocean, _Post diem quartam, quam est
in Britanniam ventum_([382]). . . . _tanta tempestas subita coorta est. . . .
Eadem nocte accidit, ut esset luna plena, qui dies maritimos æstus
maximos in Oceano efficere consuevit_.
According to this, we consider that the tempest took place after four
days, counted from the day of landing; that the full moon fell on the
following night; and lastly, that this period coincided not with the
highest _tide_, but with the highest _tides_ of the ocean. Thus we
believe that it would be sufficient for ascertaining the exact day of
landing, to take the sixth day which preceded the full moon of the month
of August, 699; now this phenomenon, according to astronomical tables,
happened on the 31st, towards three o’clock in the morning. On the eve,
that is, on the 30th, the tempest had occurred; four full days had
passed since the landing; this takes us back to the 25th. Cæsar then
landed on the 25th of August. Mr. Airy, it is true, has interpreted the
text altogether differently from our explanation: he believes that the
expression _post diem quartum_ may be taken in Latin for the third day;
on another hand, he doubts if Cæsar had in his army almanacks by which
he could know the exact day of the full moon; lastly, as the highest
tide takes place a day and a half after the full moon, he affirms that
Cæsar, placing these two phenomena at the same moment, must have been
mistaken, either in the day of the full moon, or in that of the highest
tide; and he concludes from this that the landing may have taken place
on the second, third, or fourth day before the full moon.
Our reasoning has another basis. Let us first state that at that time
the science of astronomy permitted people to know certain epochs of the
moon, since, more than a hundred years before, during the war against
Perseus, a tribune of the army of Paulus Æmilius announced on the
previous day to his soldiers an eclipse of the moon, in order to
counteract the effect of their superstitious fears. [383] Let us remark
also, that Cæsar, who subsequently reformed the calendar, was well
informed in the astronomical knowledge of his time, already carried to a
very high point of advance by Hipparchus, and that he took especial
interest in it, since he discovered, by means of water-clocks, that the
nights were shorter in Britain than in Italy.
Everything, then, authorises us in the belief that Cæsar, when he
embarked for an unknown country, where he might have to make night
marches, must have taken precautions for knowing the course of the moon,
and furnished himself with calendars. But we have put the question
independently of these considerations, by seeking among the days which
preceded the full moon of the end of August, 699, which was the one in
which the shifting of the currents of which Cæsar speaks could have been
produced at the hour indicated in the “Commentaries. ”
Supposing, then, the fleet of Cæsar at anchor at a distance of half a
mile opposite Dover, as it experienced the effect of the shifting of the
currents towards half-past three o’clock in the afternoon, the question
becomes reduced to that of determining the day of the end of the month
of August when this phenomenon took place at the above hour. We know
that in the Channel the sea produces, in rising and falling, two
alternate currents, one directed from the west to the east, called
_flux_ (_flot_), or current of the rising tide; the other directed from
the east to the west, named _reflux_ (_jusant_), or current of the
falling tide. In the sea opposite Dover, at a distance of half a mile
from the coast, the flux begins usually to be sensible two hours before
high tide at Dover, and the reflux four hours after.
So that, if we find a day before the full moon of the 31st of August,
699, on which it was high tide at Dover, either at half-past five in the
afternoon or at midday, that will be the day of landing; and further, we
shall know whether the current carried Cæsar towards the east or towards
the west. Now, we may admit, according to astronomical data, that the
tides of the days which preceded the full moon of the 31st of August,
699, were sensibly the same as those of the days which preceded the full
moon of the 4th of September, 1857; and, as it was the sixth day before
the full moon of the 4th of September, 1857, that it was high tide at
Dover towards half-past five in the afternoon (_see the Annuaire des
Marées des Côtes de France for the year_ 1857),[384] we are led to
conclude that the same phenomenon was produced also at Dover on the
sixth day before the 31st of August, 699; and that it was on the 25th of
August that Cæsar arrived in Britain, his fleet being carried forward by
the current of the rising tide.
This last conclusion, by obliging us to seek the point of landing to the
north of Dover, constitutes the strongest theoretic presumption in
favour of Deal. Let us now examine if Deal satisfies the requirements of
the Latin text.
The cliffs which border the coasts of England towards the southern part
of the county of Kent form, from Folkestone to the castle of Walmer, a
vast quarter of a circle, convex towards the sea, abrupt on nearly all
points; they present several bays or creeks, as at Folkestone, at Dover,
at St. Margaret’s, and at Oldstairs, and, diminishing by degrees in
elevation, terminate at the castle of Walmer. From this point,
proceeding towards the north, the coast is flat, and favourable for
landing on an extent of several leagues.
The country situated to the west of Walmer and Deal is itself flat as
far as the view can reach, or presents only gentle undulations of
ground. We may add that it produces, in great quantities, wheat of
excellent quality, and that the nature of the soil leads us to believe
that it was the same at a remote period. These different conditions
rendered the shore of Walmer and Deal the best place of landing for the
Roman army.
Its situation, moreover, agrees fully with the narrative of the
“Commentaries. ” In the first expedition, the Roman fleet, starting from
the cliffs of Dover and doubling the point of the South Foreland, may
have made the passage of seven miles in an hour; it would thus have
come to anchor opposite the present village of Walmer. The Britons,
starting from Dover, might have made a march of eight kilomètres quickly
enough to oppose the landing of the Romans. (_See Plate_ 16. )
The combat which followed was certainly fought on the part of the shore
which extends from Walmer Castle to Deal. At present the whole extent of
this coast is covered with buildings, so that it is impossible to say
what was its exact form nineteen centuries ago; but, from a view of the
locality, we can understand without difficulty the different
circumstances of the combat described in Book IV. of the “Commentaries. ”
Four days completed after the arrival of Cæsar in Britain, a tempest
dispersed the eighteen ships which, after quitting Ambleteuse, had
arrived just within sight of the Roman camp. All the sailors of the
Channel who have been consulted believe it possible that the same
hurricane, according to the text, might have driven one part of the
ships towards the South Foreland and the other part towards the coast of
Boulogne and Ambleteuse. The conformation of the ground itself indicates
the site of the Roman camp on the height where the village of Walmer
rises. It was situated there at a distance of 1,000 or 1,200 mètres from
the beach, in a position which commanded the surrounding country. And it
is thus easy to understand, from the aspect of the locality, the details
relative to the episode of the 7th legion, surprised while it was
mowing. [385] It might be objected that at Deal the Roman camp was not
near to a water-course, but they could dig wells, which is the only
method by which the numerous population of Deal at the present day
obtain water.
From all that has just been said, the following facts appear to us to be
established in regard to the first expedition. Cæsar, after causing all
his flotilla to go out of the port the day before, started in the night
between the 24th and 25th of August, towards midnight, from the coast of
Boulogne, and arrived opposite Dover towards six o’clock in the morning.
He remained at anchor until half-past three in the afternoon, and then,
having wind and tide in his favour, he moved a distance of seven miles
and arrived near Deal, probably between Deal and Walmer Castle, at
half-past four. As in the month of August twilight lasts till after
half-past seven, and its effect may be prolonged by the moon, which at
that hour was in the middle of the heaven, Cæsar had still four hours
left for landing, driving back the Britons, and establishing himself on
the British soil. As the sea began to ebb towards half-past five, this
explains the anecdote of Cæsius Scæva told by Valerius Maximus; for,
towards seven o’clock, the rocks called the _Malms_ might be left
uncovered by the ebb of the tide.
After four entire days, reckoned from the moment of landing, that is, on
the 30th of August, the tempest arose, and full moon occurred in the
following night.
This first expedition, which Cæsar had undertaken too late in the
season, and with too few troops, could not lead to great results. He
himself declares that he only sought to make an appearance in Britain.
In fact, he did not remove from the coast, and he left the island
towards the 17th of September, having remained there only twenty-three
days. [386]
[Sidenote: _Résumé_ of the Dates of the Campaign of 699. ]
IX. We recapitulate as follows the probable dates of the campaign of
699:--
Cæsar crosses the mountains
_earlier than usual_. April 10.
His arrival at the army between the
Loire and the Seine. April 22.
Abode with the army, and informations.
From April 22 to May 10.
March to between the Meuse and the
Rhine From May 11 to May 28.
Victory over the Usipetes and Tencteri June 4.
Arrival at Bonn for the passage of the
Rhine June 11.
Construction of the bridge of piles (10
days) From June 12 to June 21.
The campaign beyond the Rhine (18
days) From June 22 to July 9.
March from Bonn to Boulogne,
From July 11 to July 28.
Preparations for the expedition to Britain
From July 28 to August 24.
Departure. Night between Aug. 24 and Aug. 25.
Landing. August 25.
The tempest. August 30.
Duration of the abode in Britain (18
days). From August 25 to Sept. 12.
Return to Gaul. Sept. 12.
Autumnal equinox. Sept. 26.
CHAPTER VIII
(Year of Rome 700. )
(BOOK V. OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)
MARCH AGAINST THE TREVIRI--SECOND DESCENT IN BRITAIN.
[Sidenote: Inspection of the Fleet. March against the Treviri. ]
I. Cæsar, after having appeased the troubles of Illyria, and passed some
time in Italy, rejoined the army in the country of the Belgæ, at the
beginning of June in the year 700. Immediately on his arrival, he
visited all his quarters, and the naval arsenal established, according
to Strabo, at the mouth of the Seine. [387] He found his fleet ready for
sea. In spite of the scarcity of necessary materials, the soldiers had
laboured in building it with the greatest zeal. He rewarded them with
commendations, complimented those who had directed the works, and
appointed for the general rendezvous the Portus Itius (_Boulogne_).
The concentration of the fleet required a considerable length of time,
of which Cæsar took advantage to prevent the effects of the agitation
which had shown itself among the Treviri. These populations, rebelling
against his orders, and suspected of having called the Germans from
beyond the Rhine, did not send their representatives to the assemblies.
Cæsar marched against them with four legions, without baggage, and 800
cavalry, and left troops in sufficient number to protect the fleet.
The Treviri possessed, in addition to a considerable infantry, a more
numerous cavalry than any other people in Gaul. They were divided into
two factions, whose chiefs, Indutiomarus and his son-in-law Cingetorix,
disputed the chief power. The latter was no sooner informed of the
approach of the legions, than he repaired to Cæsar, and assured him that
he would not fail in his duties towards the Roman people. Indutiomarus,
on the contrary, raised troops, and caused to be placed in safety, in
the immense forest of the Ardennes, which extended across the country of
the Treviri from the Rhine to the territory of the Remi, all those whose
age rendered them incapable of carrying arms. But when he saw several
chiefs (_principes_), drawn by their alliance with Cingetorix or
intimidated by the approach of the Romans, treat with Cæsar, fearing to
be abandoned by all, he made his submission. Although Cæsar put no faith
in his sincerity, yet, as he did not want to pass the fine season among
the Treviri, and as he was desirous of hastening to Boulogne, where all
was ready for the expedition into Britain, he was satisfied with
exacting 200 hostages, among whom were the son and all the kindred of
Indutiomarus, and, after having assembled the principal chiefs, he
conferred the authority on Cingetorix. This preference accorded to a
rival turned Indutiomarus into an irreconcileable enemy. [388]
[Sidenote: Departure for the Isle of Britain. ]
II. Hoping that he had pacified the country by these measures, Cæsar
proceeded with his four legions to the Portus Itius. His fleet,
perfectly equipped, was ready to sail. Including the vessels of the
preceding years, it was composed of six hundred transport ships and
twenty-eight galleys. It wanted only forty ships built in the country of
the Meldæ,[389] which a tempest had driven back to their point of
departure; adding to it a certain number of light barques which many
chiefs had caused to be built for their own personal usage, the total
amounted to 800 sail. [390] The Roman army concentrated at Boulogne
consisted of eight legions and 4,000 cavalry raised in the whole of Gaul
and in Spain;[391] but the expeditionary body was composed only of five
legions and 2,000 cavalry. Labienus received orders to remain on the
coast of the Channel with three legions, and one-half of the cavalry, to
guard the ports, provide for the supply of the troops, keep watch upon
Gaul, and act according to circumstances. Cæsar had convoked the
principal citizens, of each people (_principes ex omnibus civitatibus_),
and left upon the continent but the small number of those of whose
fidelity he was assured, taking with him the others as pledges of
tranquillity during his absence. Dumnorix, who commanded the Æduan
cavalry in the expedition, was of all the chiefs the one it was most
important to carry with him. Restless, ambitious, and distinguished by
his courage and credit, this man had tried every means in vain to obtain
permission to remain in his country. Irritated by the refusal, he became
a conspirator, and said openly that Cæsar only dragged the nobles into
Britain to sacrifice them. These plots were known and watched with care.
It was the end of June. The wind from the north-west, which on this
coast blows habitually at this period of the year, retarded the
departure of the fleet twenty-five days; at length a favourable wind
rose, and the army received orders to embark. In the middle of the
bustle and confusion of starting, Dumnorix left the camp secretly with
the Æduan cavalry, and took the road for his own country. When this was
known, the embarkment was suspended, and a great part of the cavalry
went in pursuit of the fugitive, with orders to bring him back dead or
alive. Dumnorix, soon overtaken, resists, and is surrounded and slain.
The Æduan cavalry all returned to the camp.
On the 20th of July, we believe, the fleet raised anchor at sunset, with
a light breeze from the south-west. This wind having ceased towards
midnight, the fleet was carried rather far out of its route by the
current of the rising tide. At daybreak, Cæsar perceived that he had
left Britain to his left. (_See Plate_ 16. ) But then came on the
shifting of the current, of which he took advantage, and, aided by the
reflux (_jusant_), laboured with all oars to gain the part of the isle
found, in the preceding year, to offer an easy landing. Under these
circumstances, the soldiers, with a persevering energy, succeeded, by
means of their oars, in giving to the transport ships, in spite of their
heaviness, the speed of galleys. The army landed, towards noon, on
several points at once,[392] without any appearance of the enemy.
Prisoners reported subsequently that the barbarians, terrified at the
view of so great a number of ships, had withdrawn to the heights. [393]
[Sidenote: March into the interior of the Country. ]
III. Having effected the landing, Cæsar established his camp in a good
position, near the sea. [394] The fleet, left at anchor near the shore,
on a level beach without shoals, under the command of Atrius, inspired
him with no uneasiness. [395] As soon as he knew where the enemy was
posted, he began his march at the third watch (midnight), leaving ten
cohorts[396] and 300 cavalry to guard the fleet. After having proceeded
during the night about twelve miles, the Romans at daybreak came in
sight of the barbarians, posted on the heights of Kingston, beyond a
stream of water now called the Little Stour. [397] These caused their
cavalry and chariots to advance as far as the bank of the stream,
seeking, from their commanding position, to dispute the passage; but,
repulsed by the cavalry, they withdrew into a forest where there was a
place singularly fortified by nature and art, a refuge constructed in
former times in their intestine wars. [398] Numerous _abatis_ of felled
trees closed all the avenues. The Romans pushed the enemy up to the
border of the wood, and made an attempt to carry the position. The
Britons issued forth in small groups to defend the approaches of their
_oppidum_; but the soldiers of the 7th legion, having formed the
tortoise and pushed a terrace up to the inclosure, obtained possession
of the retrenchment, and drove them out of the wood without sensible
loss. Cæsar prevented the pursuit; he was unacquainted with the country,
and wished to employ the rest of the day in fortifying his camp. [399]
[Sidenote: Destruction of a part of the Fleet. ]
IV. Next morning, he divided the infantry and cavalry into three bodies,
and sent them separately in pursuit of the enemy. The troops had
advanced a considerable distance, and already the hindmost of the
fugitives were in view, when a party of cavalry, despatched by Q.
Atrius, came to announce that, in the preceding night, a violent
tempest had damaged and thrown on shore nearly all the vessels. Neither
anchors nor cordage had been strong enough to resist; the efforts of
pilots and sailors had been powerless, and the shocks of the vessels
against one another had caused serious loss. At this news, Cæsar called
in his troops, ordered them to limit their efforts to repulsing the
enemy as they retired, and hurried on before them to his fleet. He
verified the correctness of the losses which were announced: about forty
ships were destroyed, and the repair of the others required a long
labour. He took the workmen attached to the legions, and brought others
from the continent; wrote to Labienus to build, with his troops, the
greatest number of ships possible; and lastly, in order to place his
fleet in safety from all danger, he resolved, in spite of the labour it
must entail upon him, to haul all the vessels on land, and inclose them
in the camp by a new retrenchment. [400] The soldiers employed ten entire
days in this work, without interruption, even during the night. [401]
[Sidenote: Cæsar resumes the offensive. ]
V. The vessels once placed on dry ground and surrounded with substantial
defences, Cæsar left in the camp the same troops as before, and
returned towards the localities where he had been obliged to abandon the
pursuit of the Britons. He found them collected in great number. The
general direction of the war had been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose
states were separated from the maritime districts by the Thames, a river
which was about eighty miles distant from the coast. [402] This chief had
heretofore had to sustain continual wars against the other peoples of
the island; but, in face of the danger, all, with unanimous accord,
agreed in giving him the command.
The enemy’s cavalry, with the war-chariots, attacked vigorously the
cavalry in its march; they were everywhere beaten and driven back into
the woods or to the heights. A short time after, while the Romans were
labouring without distrust at their retrenchments, the Britons suddenly
issued from the woods and attacked their advanced posts. The struggle
becoming obstinate, Cæsar sent forward two picked cohorts, the first of
two legions. They had hardly taken their position, leaving a slight
interval between them, when the barbarians, manœuvring with their
chariots according to custom, so intimidated the Romans by this mode of
fighting, that they passed and repassed with impunity across the
interval between the cohorts. The enemy was only repulsed on the arrival
of re-enforcements. Q. Laberius Durus, a military tribune, perished in
this action.
The description of this battle, as given in the “Commentaries,” has been
differently understood. According to Dio Cassius, the Britons had at
first thrown the ranks of the Romans into disorder by means of their
chariots; but Cæsar, to baffle this manœuvre, had opened for them a
free passage by placing his cohorts at greater intervals. He would thus
have repeated the dispositions taken by Scipio at the battle of Zama, to
protect him against the Carthaginian elephants.
This engagement, which took place before the camp and under the eyes of
the army, showed how little the Roman tactics were fitted for this kind
of warfare. The legionary, heavily armed, and accustomed to combat in
line, could neither pursue the enemy in his retreat, nor move too far
from his ensigns. There existed a still greater disadvantage for the
cavalry. The Britons, by a simulated flight, drew them away from the
legionaries, and then, jumping down from their chariots, engaged on foot
in an unequal struggle; for, always supported by their cavalry, they
were as dangerous in the attack as in the defence. [403]
The following day, the enemies took a position far from the camp, on the
heights; they only showed themselves in small parties, isolated,
harassing the cavalry with less ardour than before. But, towards the
middle of the day, Cæsar having sent three legions and the cavalry,
under the orders of the lieutenant C. Trebonius, to forage, they rushed
from all sides upon the foragers with such impetuosity, that they
approached the eagles and legions which had remained under arms. The
infantry repulsed them vigorously, and, though they usually left to the
cavalry the care of the pursuit, this time they did not cease to drive
them before them till the cavalry, feeling themselves supported, came
themselves to complete the rout. These left them time neither to rally
nor to halt, nor to descend from their chariots, but made a great
carnage of them. After this defeat, the Britons resolved to combat no
more with their forces united, but to confine themselves to harassing
the Roman army, so as to drag on the war in length. [404]
[Sidenote: March towards the Thames.
all the neighbouring regions, and the fleet constructed in the previous
year for the war against the Veneti, were collected there.
The news of his project having been carried into Britain by the
merchants, the deputies of several nations in the island came with
offers of submission. Cæsar received them with kindness; and on their
return he sent with them Commius, whom he had previously made king of
the Atrebates. This man, whose courage, prudence, and devotion he
appreciated, enjoyed great credit among the Britons. He directed him to
visit the greatest possible number of tribes, to keep them in good
feelings, and to announce his speedy arrival.
While Cæsar remained among the Morini, waiting the completion of the
preparations for his expedition, he received a deputation which came in
the name of a great part of the inhabitants to justify their past
conduct. He accepted their explanations readily, unwilling to leave
enemies behind him. Moreover, the season was too far advanced to allow
of combating the Morini, and their entire subjection was not a matter of
sufficient importance to divert him from his enterprise against Britain:
he was satisfied with exacting numerous hostages. Meanwhile Volusenus
returned, at the end of five days, to report the result of his mission:
as he had not ventured to land, he had only performed it imperfectly.
The forces destined for the expedition consisted of two legions, the 7th
and the 10th, commanded probably by Galba and Labienus, and of a
detachment of cavalry, which made about 12,000 legionaries and 450
horses.
Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta received the command of
the troops left on the continent to occupy the territory of the Menapii
and that of the country of the Morini which had not submitted. The
lieutenant P. Sulpicius Rufus was charged with the guard of the port
with a sufficient force.
They had succeeded in collecting eighty transport ships, judged capable
of containing the two legions of the expedition, with all their baggage,
and a certain number of galleys, which were distributed among the
quæstor, the lieutenants, and the prefects. Eighteen other vessels,
destined for the cavalry, were detained by contrary winds in a little
port (that of _Ambleteuse_) situated eight miles to the north of
Boulogne. [351] (_See Plate 16. _)
Having made these dispositions, Cæsar, taking advantage of a favourable
wind, started in the night between the 24th and 25th of August (we shall
endeavour to justify this date farther on), towards midnight, after
giving orders to the cavalry to proceed to the port above
(_Ambleteuse_); he reached the coast of Britain at the fourth hour of
the day (ten o’clock in the forenoon), opposite the cliffs of Dover. The
cavalry, which had embarked but slowly, had not been able to join him.
From his ship Cæsar perceived the cliffs covered with armed men. At this
spot the sea was so close to these cliffs that a dart thrown from the
heights could reach the beach. [352] The place appeared to him in no
respect convenient for landing. This description agrees with that which
Q. Cicero gave to his brother, of “coasts surmounted by immense
rocks. ”[353] (_See Plate 17. _) Cæsar cast anchor, and waited in vain
until the fifth hour (half-past three) (see the Concordance of Hours,
_Appendix B_), for the arrival of the vessels which were delayed. In the
interval, he called together his lieutenants and the tribunes of the
soldiers, communicated to them his plans as well as the information
brought by Volusenus, and urged upon them the instantaneous execution of
his orders on a simple sign, as maritime war required, in which the
manœuvres must be as rapid as they are varied. It is probable that
Cæsar had till then kept secret the point of landing.
When he had dismissed them, towards half-past three o’clock, the wind
and tide having become favourable at the same time, he gave the signal
for raising their anchors, and, after proceeding about seven miles to
the east, as far as the extremity of the cliffs, and having, according
to Dio Cassius, doubled a lofty promontory,[354] the point of the South
Foreland (_see Plate 16_), he stopped before the open and level shore
which extends from the castle of Walmer to Deal.
From the heights of Dover it was easy for the Britons to trace the
movement of the fleet; guessing that it was making for the point where
the cliffs ended, they hastened thither, preceded by their cavalry and
their chariots, which they used constantly in their battles. They
arrived in time to oppose the landing, which had to be risked under the
most difficult circumstances. The ships, on account of their magnitude,
could only cast anchor in the deep water; the soldiers, on an unknown
coast, with their hands embarrassed, their bodies loaded with the weight
of their arms, were obliged to throw themselves into the waves, find a
footing, and combat. The enemy, on the contrary, with the free use of
their limbs, acquainted with the ground, and posted on the edge of the
water, or a little way in advance in the sea, threw their missiles with
confidence, and pushed forward their docile and well-disciplined horses
into the midst of the waves. Thus the Romans, disconcerted by this
concurrence of unforeseen circumstances, and strangers to this kind of
combat, did not carry to it their usual ardour and zeal.
In this situation, Cæsar detached from the line of transport ships the
galleys--lighter ships, and of a form which was new to the
barbarians--and directed them by force of rowing upon the enemy’s
uncovered flank (that is, on his right side), in order to drive him from
his position by means of slings, arrows, and darts thrown from the
machines. This manœuvre was of great assistance; for the Britons,
struck with the look of the galleys, the movement of the oars, and the
novel effect of the machines, halted and drew back a little. Still the
Romans hesitated, on account of the depth of the water, to leap out of
the ships, when the standard-bearer of the 10th legion, invoking the
gods with a loud voice, and exhorting his comrades to defend the eagle,
leaps into the sea and induces them to follow. [355] This example is
imitated by the legionaries embarked in the nearest ships, and the
combat begins. It was obstinate. The Romans being unable to keep their
ranks, or gain a solid footing, or rally round their ensigns, the
confusion was extreme; all those who leapt out of the ships to gain the
land singly, were surrounded by the barbarian cavalry, to whom the
shallows were known, and, when they were collected in mass, the enemy,
taking them on the uncovered flank, overwhelmed them with missiles. On
seeing this, Cæsar caused the galleys’ boats and the small vessels which
served to light the fleet to be filled with soldiers, and sent them
wherever the danger required. Soon the Romans, having succeeded in
establishing themselves on firm ground, formed their ranks, rushed upon
the enemy, and put him to flight; but a long pursuit was impossible for
want of cavalry, which, through contrary winds in the passage, had not
been able to reach Britain. In this alone fortune failed Cæsar.
In this combat, in which, no doubt, many acts of courage remained
unknown, a legionary, whose name, Cæsius Scæva, has been preserved by
Valerius Maximus, distinguished himself in a very remarkable manner.
Having thrown himself into a boat with four men, he had reached a
rock,[356] whence, with his comrades, he threw missiles against the
enemy; but the ebb rendered the space between the rock and the land
fordable. The barbarians then rushed to them in a crowd. His companions
took refuge in their boat; he, firm to his post, made an heroic defence,
and killed several of his enemies; at last, having his thigh
transpierced with an arrow, his face bruised by the blow of a stone, his
helmet broken to pieces, his buckler covered with holes, he trusted
himself to the mercy of the waves, and swam back towards his companions.
When he saw his general, instead of boasting of his conduct, he sought
his pardon for returning without his buckler. It was, in fact, a
disgrace among the ancients to lose that defensive arm; but Cæsar loaded
him with praise, and rewarded him with the grade of a centurion.
The landing having been effected, the Romans established their camp near
the sea, and, as everything leads us to believe, on the height of
Walmer. The galleys were hauled on the strand, and the transport ships
left at anchor not far from the shore.
The enemies, who had rallied after their defeat, decided on peace. They
joined with their deputies; sent, to solicit it, some of the Morini,
with whom they lived on friendly terms,[357] and Commius, the King of
the Atrebates, who had been previously sent on a mission to Britain. The
barbarians had seized his person the moment he landed, and loaded him
with fetters. After the combat, they set him at liberty, and came to ask
pardon for this offence, throwing the fault upon the multitude. Cæsar
reproached them with having received him as an enemy, after they had, of
their own motion, sent deputies to him on the continent to treat of
peace. Nevertheless, he pardoned them, but required hostages; part of
these were delivered to him immediately, and the rest promised within a
few days. Meanwhile they returned to their homes, and from all sides the
chiefs came to implore the protection of the conqueror.
Peace seemed to be established. The army had been four days in Britain,
and the eighteen ships which carried the cavalry, quitting the upper
port with a light breeze, approached the coast, and were already in view
of the camp, when suddenly a violent tempest arose which drove them out
of their course. Some were carried back to the point whence they had
started, whilst others were driven towards the south of the island,
where they cast anchor; but, beaten by the waves, they were obliged, in
the midst of a stormy night, to put to sea and regain the continent.
This night, between the 30th and 31st of August, coincided with full
moon; the Romans were ignorant of the fact that this was the period of
the highest tides on the ocean. The water soon submerged the galleys
which had been drawn upon the dry beach, and the transport ships which
had remained at anchor, yielding to the tempest, were broken on the
coast or disabled. The consternation became general; the Romans were in
want of everything at once, both of the means of transport, of materials
for repairing their ships, and even of provisions; for Cæsar, not
intending to winter in Britain, had carried thither no supplies.
At the moment of this disaster, the chiefs of the Britains had again
assembled to carry out the conditions imposed upon them; but, informed
of the critical position of the Romans, and judging the small number of
the invaders by the diminutive proportions of their camp, which was the
more contracted as the legions had embarked without baggage[358] they
determined on again resorting to arms. The opportunity seemed favourable
for intercepting provisions, and prolonging the struggle till winter, in
the firm conviction that, if they annihilated the Romans and cut them
off from all retreat, nobody would dare in future to carry the war into
Britain.
A new league is forming. The barbarian chiefs depart one after another
from the Roman camp, and secretly recall the men they had sent away.
Cæsar as yet was ignorant of their design; but their delay in delivering
the rest of the hostages, and the disaster which had befallen his fleet,
soon led him to anticipate what would happen. He therefore took his
measures to meet all eventualities. Every day the two legions repaired
in turn to the country to reap; the fleet was repaired with the timber
and copper of the ships which had suffered most, and the materials of
which they were in want were brought over from the continent. Thanks to
the extreme zeal of the soldiers, all the ships were set afloat again,
with the exception of twelve, which reduced the fleet to sixty-eight
vessels instead of eighty, its number when it left Gaul.
During the execution of these works, Britons came backwards and forwards
to the camp freely, and nothing predicted the approach of hostilities;
but one day, when the seventh legion, according to custom, had proceeded
to no great distance from the camp to cut wheat, the soldiers on guard
before the gates suddenly came to announce that a thick cloud of dust
arose in the direction taken by the legion. Cæsar, suspecting some
attack from the barbarians, assembles the cohorts on guard, orders two
others to replace them, and the rest of the troops to arm and follow him
without delay, and hurries forward in the direction indicated. What had
happened was this. The Britons, foreseeing that the Romans would repair
to the only spot which remained to reap (_pars una erat reliqua_), had
concealed themselves the previous night in the forests. After waiting
till the soldiers of the 7th legion had laid aside their arms and begun
to cut the grain, they had fallen upon them unexpectedly, and, while the
legionaries in disorder were forming, they had surrounded them with
their cavalry and chariots.
This strange manner of combating had thrown the soldiers of the 7th
legion into disorder. Closely surrounded, and resisting with difficulty
under a shower of missiles, they would perhaps have succumbed, when
Cæsar appeared at the head of his cohorts; his presence restored
confidence to his own men and checked the enemy. Nevertheless, he did
not judge it prudent to risk a battle, and, after remaining a certain
length of time in position, he withdrew his troops. The 7th legion had
experienced considerable loss. [359] Continual rains, during some days,
rendered all operations impossible; but eventually the barbarians,
believing that the moment had arrived to recover their liberty,
assembled from all parts, and marched against the camp.
Deprived of cavalry, Cæsar foresaw well that it would go the same with
this combat as with the preceding, and that the enemy, when repulsed,
would escape easily by flight; nevertheless, as he had at his disposal
thirty horses brought into Britain by Commius, he believed that he could
use them with advantage;[360] he drew up his legions in battle at the
head of the camp, and ordered them to march forward. The enemy did not
sustain the shock long, and dispersed; the legionaries pursued them as
quickly and as far as their arms permitted; they returned to the camp,
after having made a great slaughter, and ravaged everything within a
vast circuit.
The same day, the barbarians sent deputies to ask for peace. Cæsar
doubled the number of hostages he had required before, and ordered them
to be brought to him on the continent. In all Britain, two states only
obeyed this order.
As the equinox approached, he was unwilling to expose vessels ill
repaired to a navigation in winter. He took advantage of favourable
weather, set sail a little after midnight, and regained Gaul with all
his ships without the least loss. Two transport vessels only were unable
to enter the port of Boulogne with the fleet, and were carried a little
lower towards the south. They had on board about 300 soldiers, who, once
landed, marched to rejoin the army. In their way, the Morini, seduced by
the prospect of plunder, attacked them by surprise, and soon, increasing
to the number of 6,000, succeeded in surrounding them. The Romans formed
in a circle; in vain their assailants offered them their lives if they
would surrender. They defended themselves valiantly during more than
four hours, until the arrival of all the cavalry, which Cæsar sent to
their succour. Seized with terror, the Morini threw down their arms, and
were nearly all massacred. [361]
[Sidenote: Chastisement of the Morini and Menapii. ]
VI. On the day after the return of the army to the continent, Labienus
received orders to reduce, with the two legions brought back from
Britain, the revolted Morini, whom the marshes, dried up by the summer
heats, no longer sheltered from attack, as they had done the year
before. On another side, Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Cotta rejoined
Cæsar, after laying waste and burning the territory of the Menapii, who
had taken refuge in the depths of their forests. The army was
established in winter quarters among the Belgæ. The Senate, when it
received the news of these successes, decreed twenty days of
thanksgiving. [362]
[Sidenote: Order for Rebuilding the Fleet. Departure for Illyria. ]
VII. Before he left for Italy, Cæsar ordered his lieutenants to repair
the old ships, and to construct during the winter a greater number, of
which he fixed the form and dimensions. That it might be easier to load
them and draw them on land, he recommended them to be made a little
lower than those which were in use in Italy; this disposition presented
no inconvenience, for he had remarked that the waves of the channel rose
to a less elevation than those of the Mediterranean, which he attributed
wrongly to the frequency of the motions of the tide and ebb. He desired
also to have greater breadth in the vessels on account of the baggage
and beasts of burden he had to transport, and ordered them to be
arranged so as to be able to employ oars, the use of which was
facilitated by the small elevation of the side-planks. According to Dio
Cassius, these ships held the mean between the light vessels of the
Romans and the transport ships of the Gauls. [363] He procured from Spain
all the rigging necessary for the equipment of these vessels.
Having given these instructions, Cæsar went into Italy to hold the
assembly of Citerior Gaul, and afterwards started for Illyria, on the
news that the Pirustes (_peoples of the Carnic Alps_) were laying the
frontier waste. Immediately on his arrival, by prompt and energetic
measures, he put a stop to these disorders, and re-established
tranquillity. [364]
[Sidenote: Points of Embarking and Landing. Date of the Arrival in
Britain. ]
VIII. We have indicated, in the preceding pages, Boulogne as the port at
which Cæsar embarked, and Deal as the point where he landed in Britain.
Before explaining our reasons, it will not be useless to state that in
this first expedition, as well as in the second, the account of which
will follow, the places of embarking and landing were the same. In the
first place, the terms used in the “Commentaries” lead us to suppose it;
next, as we will endeavour to prove, he could only start from Boulogne;
and lastly, according to the relation of Dio Cassius, he landed on both
occasions at the same spot. [365] It is, then, convenient to treat here
the question for both expeditions, and to anticipate in regard to
certain facts.
Writers of great repute have placed the Portus Itius, some at Wissant,
others at Calais, Etaples, or Mardyke; but the Emperor Napoleon I, in
his _Précis des Guerres de César_, has not hesitated in preferring
Boulogne. It will be easy for us to prove in effect that the port of
Boulogne is the _Portus Itius_, which alone answers the necessities of
the text, and at the same time satisfies the requirements of a
considerable expedition. [366]
To proceed logically, let us suppose the absence of all kind of data.
The only means to approach the truth would then be to adopt, as the
place where Cæsar embarked, the port mentioned most anciently by
historians; for, in all probability, the point of the coast rendered
famous by the first expeditions to Britain would have been chosen in
preference for subsequent voyages. Now, as early as the reign of
Augustus, Agrippa caused a road to be constructed, which went from Lyons
to the ocean, across the country of the Bellovaci and the Ambiani,[367]
and was to end at Gesoriacum (_Boulogne_), since the Itinerary of
Antoninus traces it thus. [368] It was at Boulogne that Caligula caused a
pharos to be raised,[369] and that Claudius embarked for Britain. [370]
It was thence that Lupicinus, under the Emperor Julian,[371] and
Theodosius, under the Emperor Valentinian,[372] Constantius
Chlorus,[373] and lastly, in 893, the Danes,[374] set sail. This port,
then, was known and frequented a short time after Cæsar, and continued
to be used during the following centuries, while Wissant and Calais are
only mentioned by historians three or four centuries later. Lastly, at
Boulogne, Roman antiquities are found in abundance; none exist at Calais
or Wissant. Cæsar’s camp, of which certain authors speak as situated
near Wissant, is only a small modern redoubt, incapable of containing
more than 200 men.
To this first presumption in favour of Boulogne we may add another: the
ancient authors speak only of a single port on the coast of Gaul nearest
to Britain; therefore, they very probably give different names to the
same place, among which names figures that of _Gesoriacum_. Florus[375]
calls the place where Cæsar embarked the port of the Morini. Strabo[376]
says that this port was called _Itius_; Pomponius Mela, who lived less
than a century after Cæsar, cites _Gesoriacum_ as the port of the Morini
best known;[377] Pliny expresses himself in analogous terms. [378]
Let us now show that the port of Boulogne agrees with the conditions
specified in the “Commentaries. ”
1. Cæsar, in his first expedition, repaired _to the country of the
Morini, whence the passage from Gaul to Britain is shortest_. Now,
Boulogne is actually situated on the territory of that people which,
occupying the western part of the department of the Pas-de-Calais, was
the nearest to England.
2. In his second expedition, Cæsar _embarked at the port Itius, which he
had found to offer the most convenient passage for proceeding to
Britain, distant from the continent about thirty Roman miles_. Now, even
at the present day, it is from Boulogne that the passage is easiest to
arrive in England, because the favourable winds are more frequent than
at Wissant and Calais. As to _the distance of about thirty miles_
(forty-four kilometres), Cæsar gives it evidently as representing the
distance from Britain to the _Portus Itius_: it is exactly the distance
from Boulogne to Dover, whereas Wissant and Calais are farther from
Dover, the one twenty, the other twenty-three Roman miles.
3. _To the north, at eight miles’ distance from the Portus Itius,
existed another port, where the cavalry embarked_. Boulogne is the only
port on this coast at eight miles from which, towards the north, we meet
with another, that of Ambleteuse. The distance of eight miles is exact,
not as a bird flies, but following the course of the hills. To the north
of Wissant, on the contrary, there is only Sangatte or Calais. Now
Sangatte is six Roman miles from Wissant, and Calais eleven.
4. _The eighteen ships of the upper port were prevented by contrary
winds from rallying the fleet at the principal port_. We understand
easily that these ships, detained at Ambleteuse by winds from the
south-west or west-south-west, which prevail frequently in the Channel,
were unable to rally the fleet at Boulogne. As to the two ships of
burthen, which, at the return of the first expedition, could not make
land in the same port as the fleet, but were dragged by the current more
to the south, nothing is said in the “Commentaries” which would show
that they entered a port; it is probable, indeed, that they were driven
upon the shore. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that they may have
landed in the little fishers’ ports of Hardelot and Camiers. (_See
Plate_ 15. )
We see from what precedes that the port of Boulogne agrees with the text
of the “Commentaries. ” But the peremptory reason why, in our opinion,
the port where Cæsar embarked is certainly that of Boulogne, is, that it
would have been impossible to prepare elsewhere an expedition against
England, Boulogne being the only place which united the conditions
indispensable for collecting the fleet and embarking the troops. In
fact, it required a port capable of containing either eighty transport
ships and galleys, as in the first expedition, or 800 ships, as in the
second; and extensive enough to allow the ships to approach the banks
and embark the troops in a single tide. Now these conditions could only
be fulfilled where a river sufficiently deep, flowing into the sea,
formed a natural port; and, on the part of the coasts nearest to
England, we find only at Boulogne a river, the Liane, which presents all
these advantages. Moreover, it must not be forgotten, all the coast has
been buried in sand. It appears that it is not more than a century and
a half that the natural basin of Boulogne has been partly filled; and,
according to tradition and geological observations, the coast advanced
more than two kilomètres, forming two jetties, between which the high
tide filled the valley of the Liane to a distance of four kilomètres
inland.
None of the ports situated to the north of Boulogne could serve as the
basis of Cæsar’s expedition, for none could receive so great a number of
vessels, and we cannot suppose that Cæsar would have left them on the
open coast, during more than a month, exposed to the tempests of the
ocean, which were so fatal to him on the coasts of Britain.
Boulogne was the only point of the coast where Cæsar could place in
safety his depôts, his supplies, and his spare stores. The heights which
command the port offered advantageous positions for establishing his
camps,[379] and the little river Liane allowed him to bring with ease
the timber and provisions he required. At Calais he would have found
nothing but flats and marshes, at Wissant nothing but sands, as
indicated by etymology of the word (_white sand_).
It is worthy of remark, that the reasons which determined Cæsar to start
from Boulogne were the same which decided the choice of Napoleon I. in
1804. In spite of the difference in the times and in the armies, the
nautical and practical conditions had undergone no change. “The Emperor
chose Boulogne,” says M. Thiers, “because that port had long been
pointed out as the best point of departure of an expedition directed
against England; he chose Boulogne, because its port is formed by the
little river Liane, which allowed him, with some labour, to place in
safety from 1,200 to 1,300 vessels. ”
We may point out, as another similarity, that certain flat boats,
constructed by order of the Emperor, had nearly the same dimensions as
those employed by Cæsar. “There required,” says the historian of the
‘Consulate and the Empire,’ “boats which would not need more, when they
were laden, than seven or eight feet of water to float, and which would
go with oars, so as to pass, either in calm or fog, and strand without
breaking on the flat English shores. The great gun-boats carried four
pieces of large bore, and were rigged like brigs, that is, with two
masts, manœuvred by twenty-four sailors, and capable of carrying a
company of a hundred men, with its staff, and its arms and munitions. . . .
These boats offered a vexatious inconvenience, that of falling to the
leeward, that is, yielding to the currents. This was the result of their
clumsy build, which presented more hold to the water than their masts to
the wind. ”[380]
Cæsar’s ships experienced the same inconvenience, and, drawn away by the
currents in his second expedition, they went to the leeward rather far
in the north.
We have seen that Cæsar’s transport boats were flat-bottomed, that they
could go either with sails or oars; carry if necessary 150 men, and be
loaded and drawn on dry ground with promptness (_ad celeritatem
onerandi subductionesque_). They had thus a great analogy with the
flat-bottomed boats of 1804. But there is more, for the Emperor Napoleon
had found it expedient to imitate the Roman galleys. “He had seen the
necessity,” says M. Thiers, “of constructing boats still lighter and
more movable than the preceding, drawing only two or three feet of
water, and calculated for landing anywhere. They were large boats,
narrow, sixty feet long, having a movable deck which could be laid or
withdrawn at will, and were distinguished from the others by the name of
pinnaces. These large boats were provided with sixty oars, carried at
need a light sail, and moved with extreme swiftness. When sixty
soldiers, practised in handling the oar as well as the sailors, set them
in motion, they glided over the sea like the light boats dropped from
the sides of our great vessels, and surprised the eye by the rapidity of
their course. ”
The point of landing has been equally the subject of a host of contrary
suppositions. St. Leonards, near Hastings, Richborough (_Rutupiœ_),
near Sandwich, Lymne, near Hythe, and Deal, have all been proposed.
The first of these localities, we think, must be rejected, for it
answers none of the conditions of the relation given in the
“Commentaries,” which inform us that, in the second expedition, the
fleet sailed with a gentle wind from the south-west. Now, this is the
least favourable of all winds for taking the direction of Hastings, when
starting from the coasts of the department of the Pas-de-Calais. In this
same passage, Cæsar, after having been drawn away from his course during
four hours of the night, perceived, at daybreak, that he had left
Britain to his left. This fact cannot possibly be explained if he had
intended to land at St. Leonards. As to Richborough, this locality is
much too far to the north. Why should Cæsar have gone so far as
Sandwich, since he could have landed at Walmer and Deal? Lymne, or
rather Romney Marsh, will suit no better. This shore is altogether unfit
for a landing-place, and none of the details furnished by the
“Commentaries” can be made to suit it. [381]
There remains Deal; but before describing this place, we must examine
if, on his first passage, when Cæsar sailed, after remaining five days
opposite the cliffs of Dover, the current of which he took advantage
carried him towards the north or towards the south. (_See Page_ 177.
)
Two celebrated English astronomers, Halley and Mr. Airy, have studied
this question; but they agree neither on the place where Cæsar embarked,
nor on that where he landed. We may, nevertheless, arrive at a solution
of this problem by seeking the day on which Cæsar landed. The year of
the expedition is known by the consulate of Pompey and Crassus--it was
the year 699. The month in which the departure took place is known by
the following data, derived from the “Commentaries;” the fine season was
near its end, _exuigua parte œstatis reliqua_ (IV. 20); the wheat had
been reaped everywhere, except in one single spot, _omni ex reliquis
partibus demesso frumento, una pars erat reliqua_ (IV. 32); the equinox
was near at hand, _propinqua die œquinoctii_ (IV. 36). These data
point sufficiently clearly to the month of August. Lastly, we have,
relative to the day of landing, the following indications:--After four
days past since his arrival in Britain. . . . there arose suddenly so
violent a tempest. . . . That same night it was full moon, which is the
period of the highest tides of the ocean, _Post diem quartam, quam est
in Britanniam ventum_([382]). . . . _tanta tempestas subita coorta est. . . .
Eadem nocte accidit, ut esset luna plena, qui dies maritimos æstus
maximos in Oceano efficere consuevit_.
According to this, we consider that the tempest took place after four
days, counted from the day of landing; that the full moon fell on the
following night; and lastly, that this period coincided not with the
highest _tide_, but with the highest _tides_ of the ocean. Thus we
believe that it would be sufficient for ascertaining the exact day of
landing, to take the sixth day which preceded the full moon of the month
of August, 699; now this phenomenon, according to astronomical tables,
happened on the 31st, towards three o’clock in the morning. On the eve,
that is, on the 30th, the tempest had occurred; four full days had
passed since the landing; this takes us back to the 25th. Cæsar then
landed on the 25th of August. Mr. Airy, it is true, has interpreted the
text altogether differently from our explanation: he believes that the
expression _post diem quartum_ may be taken in Latin for the third day;
on another hand, he doubts if Cæsar had in his army almanacks by which
he could know the exact day of the full moon; lastly, as the highest
tide takes place a day and a half after the full moon, he affirms that
Cæsar, placing these two phenomena at the same moment, must have been
mistaken, either in the day of the full moon, or in that of the highest
tide; and he concludes from this that the landing may have taken place
on the second, third, or fourth day before the full moon.
Our reasoning has another basis. Let us first state that at that time
the science of astronomy permitted people to know certain epochs of the
moon, since, more than a hundred years before, during the war against
Perseus, a tribune of the army of Paulus Æmilius announced on the
previous day to his soldiers an eclipse of the moon, in order to
counteract the effect of their superstitious fears. [383] Let us remark
also, that Cæsar, who subsequently reformed the calendar, was well
informed in the astronomical knowledge of his time, already carried to a
very high point of advance by Hipparchus, and that he took especial
interest in it, since he discovered, by means of water-clocks, that the
nights were shorter in Britain than in Italy.
Everything, then, authorises us in the belief that Cæsar, when he
embarked for an unknown country, where he might have to make night
marches, must have taken precautions for knowing the course of the moon,
and furnished himself with calendars. But we have put the question
independently of these considerations, by seeking among the days which
preceded the full moon of the end of August, 699, which was the one in
which the shifting of the currents of which Cæsar speaks could have been
produced at the hour indicated in the “Commentaries. ”
Supposing, then, the fleet of Cæsar at anchor at a distance of half a
mile opposite Dover, as it experienced the effect of the shifting of the
currents towards half-past three o’clock in the afternoon, the question
becomes reduced to that of determining the day of the end of the month
of August when this phenomenon took place at the above hour. We know
that in the Channel the sea produces, in rising and falling, two
alternate currents, one directed from the west to the east, called
_flux_ (_flot_), or current of the rising tide; the other directed from
the east to the west, named _reflux_ (_jusant_), or current of the
falling tide. In the sea opposite Dover, at a distance of half a mile
from the coast, the flux begins usually to be sensible two hours before
high tide at Dover, and the reflux four hours after.
So that, if we find a day before the full moon of the 31st of August,
699, on which it was high tide at Dover, either at half-past five in the
afternoon or at midday, that will be the day of landing; and further, we
shall know whether the current carried Cæsar towards the east or towards
the west. Now, we may admit, according to astronomical data, that the
tides of the days which preceded the full moon of the 31st of August,
699, were sensibly the same as those of the days which preceded the full
moon of the 4th of September, 1857; and, as it was the sixth day before
the full moon of the 4th of September, 1857, that it was high tide at
Dover towards half-past five in the afternoon (_see the Annuaire des
Marées des Côtes de France for the year_ 1857),[384] we are led to
conclude that the same phenomenon was produced also at Dover on the
sixth day before the 31st of August, 699; and that it was on the 25th of
August that Cæsar arrived in Britain, his fleet being carried forward by
the current of the rising tide.
This last conclusion, by obliging us to seek the point of landing to the
north of Dover, constitutes the strongest theoretic presumption in
favour of Deal. Let us now examine if Deal satisfies the requirements of
the Latin text.
The cliffs which border the coasts of England towards the southern part
of the county of Kent form, from Folkestone to the castle of Walmer, a
vast quarter of a circle, convex towards the sea, abrupt on nearly all
points; they present several bays or creeks, as at Folkestone, at Dover,
at St. Margaret’s, and at Oldstairs, and, diminishing by degrees in
elevation, terminate at the castle of Walmer. From this point,
proceeding towards the north, the coast is flat, and favourable for
landing on an extent of several leagues.
The country situated to the west of Walmer and Deal is itself flat as
far as the view can reach, or presents only gentle undulations of
ground. We may add that it produces, in great quantities, wheat of
excellent quality, and that the nature of the soil leads us to believe
that it was the same at a remote period. These different conditions
rendered the shore of Walmer and Deal the best place of landing for the
Roman army.
Its situation, moreover, agrees fully with the narrative of the
“Commentaries. ” In the first expedition, the Roman fleet, starting from
the cliffs of Dover and doubling the point of the South Foreland, may
have made the passage of seven miles in an hour; it would thus have
come to anchor opposite the present village of Walmer. The Britons,
starting from Dover, might have made a march of eight kilomètres quickly
enough to oppose the landing of the Romans. (_See Plate_ 16. )
The combat which followed was certainly fought on the part of the shore
which extends from Walmer Castle to Deal. At present the whole extent of
this coast is covered with buildings, so that it is impossible to say
what was its exact form nineteen centuries ago; but, from a view of the
locality, we can understand without difficulty the different
circumstances of the combat described in Book IV. of the “Commentaries. ”
Four days completed after the arrival of Cæsar in Britain, a tempest
dispersed the eighteen ships which, after quitting Ambleteuse, had
arrived just within sight of the Roman camp. All the sailors of the
Channel who have been consulted believe it possible that the same
hurricane, according to the text, might have driven one part of the
ships towards the South Foreland and the other part towards the coast of
Boulogne and Ambleteuse. The conformation of the ground itself indicates
the site of the Roman camp on the height where the village of Walmer
rises. It was situated there at a distance of 1,000 or 1,200 mètres from
the beach, in a position which commanded the surrounding country. And it
is thus easy to understand, from the aspect of the locality, the details
relative to the episode of the 7th legion, surprised while it was
mowing. [385] It might be objected that at Deal the Roman camp was not
near to a water-course, but they could dig wells, which is the only
method by which the numerous population of Deal at the present day
obtain water.
From all that has just been said, the following facts appear to us to be
established in regard to the first expedition. Cæsar, after causing all
his flotilla to go out of the port the day before, started in the night
between the 24th and 25th of August, towards midnight, from the coast of
Boulogne, and arrived opposite Dover towards six o’clock in the morning.
He remained at anchor until half-past three in the afternoon, and then,
having wind and tide in his favour, he moved a distance of seven miles
and arrived near Deal, probably between Deal and Walmer Castle, at
half-past four. As in the month of August twilight lasts till after
half-past seven, and its effect may be prolonged by the moon, which at
that hour was in the middle of the heaven, Cæsar had still four hours
left for landing, driving back the Britons, and establishing himself on
the British soil. As the sea began to ebb towards half-past five, this
explains the anecdote of Cæsius Scæva told by Valerius Maximus; for,
towards seven o’clock, the rocks called the _Malms_ might be left
uncovered by the ebb of the tide.
After four entire days, reckoned from the moment of landing, that is, on
the 30th of August, the tempest arose, and full moon occurred in the
following night.
This first expedition, which Cæsar had undertaken too late in the
season, and with too few troops, could not lead to great results. He
himself declares that he only sought to make an appearance in Britain.
In fact, he did not remove from the coast, and he left the island
towards the 17th of September, having remained there only twenty-three
days. [386]
[Sidenote: _Résumé_ of the Dates of the Campaign of 699. ]
IX. We recapitulate as follows the probable dates of the campaign of
699:--
Cæsar crosses the mountains
_earlier than usual_. April 10.
His arrival at the army between the
Loire and the Seine. April 22.
Abode with the army, and informations.
From April 22 to May 10.
March to between the Meuse and the
Rhine From May 11 to May 28.
Victory over the Usipetes and Tencteri June 4.
Arrival at Bonn for the passage of the
Rhine June 11.
Construction of the bridge of piles (10
days) From June 12 to June 21.
The campaign beyond the Rhine (18
days) From June 22 to July 9.
March from Bonn to Boulogne,
From July 11 to July 28.
Preparations for the expedition to Britain
From July 28 to August 24.
Departure. Night between Aug. 24 and Aug. 25.
Landing. August 25.
The tempest. August 30.
Duration of the abode in Britain (18
days). From August 25 to Sept. 12.
Return to Gaul. Sept. 12.
Autumnal equinox. Sept. 26.
CHAPTER VIII
(Year of Rome 700. )
(BOOK V. OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)
MARCH AGAINST THE TREVIRI--SECOND DESCENT IN BRITAIN.
[Sidenote: Inspection of the Fleet. March against the Treviri. ]
I. Cæsar, after having appeased the troubles of Illyria, and passed some
time in Italy, rejoined the army in the country of the Belgæ, at the
beginning of June in the year 700. Immediately on his arrival, he
visited all his quarters, and the naval arsenal established, according
to Strabo, at the mouth of the Seine. [387] He found his fleet ready for
sea. In spite of the scarcity of necessary materials, the soldiers had
laboured in building it with the greatest zeal. He rewarded them with
commendations, complimented those who had directed the works, and
appointed for the general rendezvous the Portus Itius (_Boulogne_).
The concentration of the fleet required a considerable length of time,
of which Cæsar took advantage to prevent the effects of the agitation
which had shown itself among the Treviri. These populations, rebelling
against his orders, and suspected of having called the Germans from
beyond the Rhine, did not send their representatives to the assemblies.
Cæsar marched against them with four legions, without baggage, and 800
cavalry, and left troops in sufficient number to protect the fleet.
The Treviri possessed, in addition to a considerable infantry, a more
numerous cavalry than any other people in Gaul. They were divided into
two factions, whose chiefs, Indutiomarus and his son-in-law Cingetorix,
disputed the chief power. The latter was no sooner informed of the
approach of the legions, than he repaired to Cæsar, and assured him that
he would not fail in his duties towards the Roman people. Indutiomarus,
on the contrary, raised troops, and caused to be placed in safety, in
the immense forest of the Ardennes, which extended across the country of
the Treviri from the Rhine to the territory of the Remi, all those whose
age rendered them incapable of carrying arms. But when he saw several
chiefs (_principes_), drawn by their alliance with Cingetorix or
intimidated by the approach of the Romans, treat with Cæsar, fearing to
be abandoned by all, he made his submission. Although Cæsar put no faith
in his sincerity, yet, as he did not want to pass the fine season among
the Treviri, and as he was desirous of hastening to Boulogne, where all
was ready for the expedition into Britain, he was satisfied with
exacting 200 hostages, among whom were the son and all the kindred of
Indutiomarus, and, after having assembled the principal chiefs, he
conferred the authority on Cingetorix. This preference accorded to a
rival turned Indutiomarus into an irreconcileable enemy. [388]
[Sidenote: Departure for the Isle of Britain. ]
II. Hoping that he had pacified the country by these measures, Cæsar
proceeded with his four legions to the Portus Itius. His fleet,
perfectly equipped, was ready to sail. Including the vessels of the
preceding years, it was composed of six hundred transport ships and
twenty-eight galleys. It wanted only forty ships built in the country of
the Meldæ,[389] which a tempest had driven back to their point of
departure; adding to it a certain number of light barques which many
chiefs had caused to be built for their own personal usage, the total
amounted to 800 sail. [390] The Roman army concentrated at Boulogne
consisted of eight legions and 4,000 cavalry raised in the whole of Gaul
and in Spain;[391] but the expeditionary body was composed only of five
legions and 2,000 cavalry. Labienus received orders to remain on the
coast of the Channel with three legions, and one-half of the cavalry, to
guard the ports, provide for the supply of the troops, keep watch upon
Gaul, and act according to circumstances. Cæsar had convoked the
principal citizens, of each people (_principes ex omnibus civitatibus_),
and left upon the continent but the small number of those of whose
fidelity he was assured, taking with him the others as pledges of
tranquillity during his absence. Dumnorix, who commanded the Æduan
cavalry in the expedition, was of all the chiefs the one it was most
important to carry with him. Restless, ambitious, and distinguished by
his courage and credit, this man had tried every means in vain to obtain
permission to remain in his country. Irritated by the refusal, he became
a conspirator, and said openly that Cæsar only dragged the nobles into
Britain to sacrifice them. These plots were known and watched with care.
It was the end of June. The wind from the north-west, which on this
coast blows habitually at this period of the year, retarded the
departure of the fleet twenty-five days; at length a favourable wind
rose, and the army received orders to embark. In the middle of the
bustle and confusion of starting, Dumnorix left the camp secretly with
the Æduan cavalry, and took the road for his own country. When this was
known, the embarkment was suspended, and a great part of the cavalry
went in pursuit of the fugitive, with orders to bring him back dead or
alive. Dumnorix, soon overtaken, resists, and is surrounded and slain.
The Æduan cavalry all returned to the camp.
On the 20th of July, we believe, the fleet raised anchor at sunset, with
a light breeze from the south-west. This wind having ceased towards
midnight, the fleet was carried rather far out of its route by the
current of the rising tide. At daybreak, Cæsar perceived that he had
left Britain to his left. (_See Plate_ 16. ) But then came on the
shifting of the current, of which he took advantage, and, aided by the
reflux (_jusant_), laboured with all oars to gain the part of the isle
found, in the preceding year, to offer an easy landing. Under these
circumstances, the soldiers, with a persevering energy, succeeded, by
means of their oars, in giving to the transport ships, in spite of their
heaviness, the speed of galleys. The army landed, towards noon, on
several points at once,[392] without any appearance of the enemy.
Prisoners reported subsequently that the barbarians, terrified at the
view of so great a number of ships, had withdrawn to the heights. [393]
[Sidenote: March into the interior of the Country. ]
III. Having effected the landing, Cæsar established his camp in a good
position, near the sea. [394] The fleet, left at anchor near the shore,
on a level beach without shoals, under the command of Atrius, inspired
him with no uneasiness. [395] As soon as he knew where the enemy was
posted, he began his march at the third watch (midnight), leaving ten
cohorts[396] and 300 cavalry to guard the fleet. After having proceeded
during the night about twelve miles, the Romans at daybreak came in
sight of the barbarians, posted on the heights of Kingston, beyond a
stream of water now called the Little Stour. [397] These caused their
cavalry and chariots to advance as far as the bank of the stream,
seeking, from their commanding position, to dispute the passage; but,
repulsed by the cavalry, they withdrew into a forest where there was a
place singularly fortified by nature and art, a refuge constructed in
former times in their intestine wars. [398] Numerous _abatis_ of felled
trees closed all the avenues. The Romans pushed the enemy up to the
border of the wood, and made an attempt to carry the position. The
Britons issued forth in small groups to defend the approaches of their
_oppidum_; but the soldiers of the 7th legion, having formed the
tortoise and pushed a terrace up to the inclosure, obtained possession
of the retrenchment, and drove them out of the wood without sensible
loss. Cæsar prevented the pursuit; he was unacquainted with the country,
and wished to employ the rest of the day in fortifying his camp. [399]
[Sidenote: Destruction of a part of the Fleet. ]
IV. Next morning, he divided the infantry and cavalry into three bodies,
and sent them separately in pursuit of the enemy. The troops had
advanced a considerable distance, and already the hindmost of the
fugitives were in view, when a party of cavalry, despatched by Q.
Atrius, came to announce that, in the preceding night, a violent
tempest had damaged and thrown on shore nearly all the vessels. Neither
anchors nor cordage had been strong enough to resist; the efforts of
pilots and sailors had been powerless, and the shocks of the vessels
against one another had caused serious loss. At this news, Cæsar called
in his troops, ordered them to limit their efforts to repulsing the
enemy as they retired, and hurried on before them to his fleet. He
verified the correctness of the losses which were announced: about forty
ships were destroyed, and the repair of the others required a long
labour. He took the workmen attached to the legions, and brought others
from the continent; wrote to Labienus to build, with his troops, the
greatest number of ships possible; and lastly, in order to place his
fleet in safety from all danger, he resolved, in spite of the labour it
must entail upon him, to haul all the vessels on land, and inclose them
in the camp by a new retrenchment. [400] The soldiers employed ten entire
days in this work, without interruption, even during the night. [401]
[Sidenote: Cæsar resumes the offensive. ]
V. The vessels once placed on dry ground and surrounded with substantial
defences, Cæsar left in the camp the same troops as before, and
returned towards the localities where he had been obliged to abandon the
pursuit of the Britons. He found them collected in great number. The
general direction of the war had been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose
states were separated from the maritime districts by the Thames, a river
which was about eighty miles distant from the coast. [402] This chief had
heretofore had to sustain continual wars against the other peoples of
the island; but, in face of the danger, all, with unanimous accord,
agreed in giving him the command.
The enemy’s cavalry, with the war-chariots, attacked vigorously the
cavalry in its march; they were everywhere beaten and driven back into
the woods or to the heights. A short time after, while the Romans were
labouring without distrust at their retrenchments, the Britons suddenly
issued from the woods and attacked their advanced posts. The struggle
becoming obstinate, Cæsar sent forward two picked cohorts, the first of
two legions. They had hardly taken their position, leaving a slight
interval between them, when the barbarians, manœuvring with their
chariots according to custom, so intimidated the Romans by this mode of
fighting, that they passed and repassed with impunity across the
interval between the cohorts. The enemy was only repulsed on the arrival
of re-enforcements. Q. Laberius Durus, a military tribune, perished in
this action.
The description of this battle, as given in the “Commentaries,” has been
differently understood. According to Dio Cassius, the Britons had at
first thrown the ranks of the Romans into disorder by means of their
chariots; but Cæsar, to baffle this manœuvre, had opened for them a
free passage by placing his cohorts at greater intervals. He would thus
have repeated the dispositions taken by Scipio at the battle of Zama, to
protect him against the Carthaginian elephants.
This engagement, which took place before the camp and under the eyes of
the army, showed how little the Roman tactics were fitted for this kind
of warfare. The legionary, heavily armed, and accustomed to combat in
line, could neither pursue the enemy in his retreat, nor move too far
from his ensigns. There existed a still greater disadvantage for the
cavalry. The Britons, by a simulated flight, drew them away from the
legionaries, and then, jumping down from their chariots, engaged on foot
in an unequal struggle; for, always supported by their cavalry, they
were as dangerous in the attack as in the defence. [403]
The following day, the enemies took a position far from the camp, on the
heights; they only showed themselves in small parties, isolated,
harassing the cavalry with less ardour than before. But, towards the
middle of the day, Cæsar having sent three legions and the cavalry,
under the orders of the lieutenant C. Trebonius, to forage, they rushed
from all sides upon the foragers with such impetuosity, that they
approached the eagles and legions which had remained under arms. The
infantry repulsed them vigorously, and, though they usually left to the
cavalry the care of the pursuit, this time they did not cease to drive
them before them till the cavalry, feeling themselves supported, came
themselves to complete the rout. These left them time neither to rally
nor to halt, nor to descend from their chariots, but made a great
carnage of them. After this defeat, the Britons resolved to combat no
more with their forces united, but to confine themselves to harassing
the Roman army, so as to drag on the war in length. [404]
[Sidenote: March towards the Thames.
