22);
and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex.
and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex.
Summa Theologica
For a gloss on Ps.
7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I put my
trust," says: "Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due; God by
creation, to Whom we owe latria. " Now the virtue directed to God as
Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as God.
Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8),
"to be loved is like being honored. " Now the charity with which we love
God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia
whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria with
which we honor God.
Objection 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an
image is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the
thing represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being
made to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis.
2:22,23) that "they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God
created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made
him. " Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God
is honored.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage due
to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey
their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from
latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God. "
I answer that, According to what has been stated above ([3164]Q[101],
A[3]), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there
must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is
due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is
competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has
absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly,
which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a
certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a
particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which pays
due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria, which
pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a species of
observance, because by observance we honor all those who excel in
dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of servants for
their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of
excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so
again latria is called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is
our Lord by way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the
power to create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this
gloss drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of
creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in respect
of lordship, which is communicated to a creature.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since
that which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone.
Wherefore the charity with which we love God is the same as that with
which we love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct
from charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved.
In like manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another
for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, latria and
dulia are not the same virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to
the thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an
image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the
movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to the
thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of dulia
regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in respect of
that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, yet in
showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God
actually.
Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion,
towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need not be
towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the image of
God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence
that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His image.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether dulia has various species?
Objection 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we
show honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under
different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in
the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is
divided into specifically different virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes,
as pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a
mean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having
a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being
the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species
of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia.
Objection 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the
image of God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational
creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted
by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we
must distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more
since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for instance,
to the wood of the Holy Cross.
On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not
divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia.
I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be
taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account
of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance,
and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken
in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one
another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as denoting
the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies servitude,
as stated above [3165](A[3]). Taken in this sense it is not divided
into different species, but is one of the species of observance,
mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason that a servant
reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer
under another, the disciple his master under another, and so on in
similar cases.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken
in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a
man by reason of his having an affinity to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an
irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are
naturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay
to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king's
robe receives the same honor as the king himself, according to
Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv).
__________________________________________________________________
OF OBEDIENCE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?
(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?
(3) Of its comparison with other virtues;
(4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things?
(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one man is bound to obey another?
Objection 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For
nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has so
ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus.
15:14, "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of
his own counsel. " Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.
Objection 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would
have to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his
rule of conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule
of human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.
Objection 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it
acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous.
Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good
deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less
acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is
not bound to obey another.
On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): "Obey your prelates and
be subject to them. "
I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things proceed from
natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In
natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their
actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God:
and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their
will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by
reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the
divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be
subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in
virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to
obey their superiors.
Reply to Objection 1: God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not
as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because,
unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity
to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from
his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in
doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying his
superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), "When we humbly give way to
another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts. "
Reply to Objection 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all
rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more
than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will
of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will
of this other man who obeys him.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In
one way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not
bound to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he
does it of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous,
praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the
will. Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt
will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially before
God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether obedience is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For
disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general
sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to disobey the
divine law. " Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or
moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not
comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since
it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more
obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a
special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own. " But
every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its
own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as
stated in Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Objection 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their
objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a
superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are
degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue,
comprising many special virtues.
On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice,
as stated above ([3166]Q[80]).
I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that have
a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to render
a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the
divinely established order of things, as shown above [3167](A[1]), and
therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order,
as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. [3168]FP, Q[5], A[5]].
Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of
its object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their
superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands
out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue,
and its specific object is a command tacit or express, because the
superior's will, however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a
man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by
obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his
superior's will.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object
from admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues
correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils
both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good end,
and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord.
Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in
acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts
of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above ([3169]FS, Q[96],
A[3]). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and
pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not evil
except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in
its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally the aspect
of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special
sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one perform
an act of justice or of some other virtue with the intention of
fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept
with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a
wide sense for the performance of any action that may be a matter of
precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any
intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue, and
disobedience a general sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its
direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether
expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior,
indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly,
according to Titus 3:1, "Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to
obey at a word," etc.
It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it
observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is
measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in so
far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he
ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion
([3170]Q[92], A[2]). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in
the person who retains another's property, and deficiency in the person
who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v,
4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of
him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in
fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior,
who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience will be
a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning
justice ([3171]Q[58], A[10]).
Reply to Objection 3: Obedience, like every virtue requires the will to
be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is
repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and
this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience make a man's
will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of
the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for
its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable
matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to
comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own will.
But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but,
considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as happens in
disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled
except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that
"obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable
matters," because, to wit, one's own will seems to tend principally,
not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the fulfilment of
one's own desire; but that "it increases in disagreeable or difficult
matters," because there one's own will tends to nothing beside the
precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances:
for, on the other hand, according to the judgment of God, Who searches
the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedience,
while holding its own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided the will
of him that obeys tend no less devotedly [*Cf. [3172] Q[82], A[2]] to
the fulfilment of the precept.
Reply to Objection 4: Reverence regards directly the person that
excels: wherefore it admits a various species according to the various
aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the
precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one
aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account of
reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one species,
though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues.
For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): "Obedience is better than
sacrifices. " Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which
is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above ([3173]Q[81],
A[6]). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when
ingrafted. " Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore
obedience is greater than all the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "evil should
never be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience
we should lay aside the good we are doing. " Now one does not lay aside
a thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose
sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other
virtues.
On the contrary, obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from
charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience should be
practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not
through fear of punishment, but through love of justice. " Therefore
charity is a greater virtue than obedience.
I answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemning God and adhering
to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man
contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is
greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man
contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue
derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from his
contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological,
virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the
moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in order
to adhere to God.
Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns
that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are three
kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God's sake. The lowest of
these are external goods, the goods of the body take the middle place,
and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the chief,
in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will, man makes use of all
other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience,
whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy
than the other moral virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of
God.
Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is rightly preferred
to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas by
obedience we slay our own will. " Wherefore even any other acts of
virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of
obedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to
give all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to
the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to
obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if
they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from
obedience. For it is written (1 Jn. 2:4,5): "He who saith that he
knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he
that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is
perfected": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes.
Reply to Objection 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays
worship and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained
under different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding
the aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far
as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a
way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence
for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it
proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains
to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore from
this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer
sacrifice, as well as because, "in a sacrifice we slay another's body,
whereas by obedience we slay our own will," as Gregory says (Moral.
xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been
better for Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals
of the Amalekites against the commandment of God.
Reply to Objection 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under
a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue
act causally or dispositively towards their generation and
preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. And
yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all virtues
absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of virtue
come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue
without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be
any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue
is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue is faith,
whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine authority, by
reason of which the power to command is competent to God. Secondly,
because infusion of grace and virtues may precede, even in point of
time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all
virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to
which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so
forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of
obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of
necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake
of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to
do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), "he
who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many
others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from
starvation, through being deprived of every good. " Thus the loss of one
good may be compensated by obedience and other goods.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things?
Objection 1: It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For it
is written (Mat. 9:30,31) that our Lord after healing the two blind men
commanded them, saying: "See that no man know this. But they going out
spread His fame abroad in all that country. " Yet they are not blamed
for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey God in
all things.
Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to
virtue. Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to
virtue: thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn.
22);
and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which
things are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who
was an adulteress (Osee 3), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore
God is not to be obeyed in all things.
Objection 3: Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine
will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things to
conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as stated
above ([3174]FS, Q[19], A[10]). Therefore man is not bound to obey God
in all things.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 24:7): "All things that the Lord
hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient. "
I answer that, As stated above [3175](A[1]), he who obeys is moved by
the command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by
their motive causes. Now just a God is the first mover of all things
that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as
shown above ([3176]FS, Q[9], A[6]). Therefore just as all natural
things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too
all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the
divine command.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the
miracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine
precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), "gave an example to His
servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and
yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that
others might profit by their example. "
Reply to Objection 2: Even as God does nothing contrary to nature
(since "the nature of a thing is what God does therein," according to a
gloss on Rom. 11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted
course of nature; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue
since virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity
with God's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary
to the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to
Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God
is the author of life an death. Nor again was it contrary to justice
that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians,
because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was
it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take an adulteress,
because God Himself is the ordainer of human generation, and the right
manner of intercourse with woman is that which He appoints. Hence it is
evident that the persons aforesaid did not sin, either by obeying God
or by willing to obey Him.
Reply to Objection 3: Though man is not always bound to will what God
wills, yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This
comes to man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man
is bound to obey God's commands in all things.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
Objection 1: It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors
in all things. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:20): "Children, obey your
parents in all things," and farther on (Col. 3:22): "Servants, obey in
all things your masters according to the flesh. " Therefore in like
manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.
Objection 2: Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects,
according to Dt. 5:5, "I was the mediator and stood between the Lord
and you at that time, to show you His words. " Now there is no going
from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands between.
Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of
God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 4:14): "You . . . received me as
an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus" and (1 Thess. 2:13): "When you
had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it, not
as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God. " Therefore
as man is bound to obey God in all things, so is he bound to obey his
superiors.
Objection 3: Further, just as religious in making their profession take
vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a
religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things.
Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 5:29): "We ought to obey God
rather than men. " Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior are
against God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all things.
I answer that, As stated above ([3177]AA[1],4), he who obeys is moved
at the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity
of justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its
mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by its
mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance arising
from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not burnt by
fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of
order in the movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is
subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is not subject
thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes subject to the
action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as regards being dried
up or consumed. In like manner there are two reasons, for which a
subject may not be bound to obey his superior in all things. First on
account of the command of a higher power. For as a gloss says on Rom.
13:2, "They that resist [Vulg. : 'He that resisteth'] the power, resist
the ordinance of God" (cf. St. Augustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). "If a
commissioner issue an order, are you to comply, if it is contrary to
the bidding of the proconsul? Again if the proconsul command one thing,
and the emperor another, will you hesitate, to disregard the former and
serve the latter? Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God
another, you must disregard the former and obey God. " Secondly, a
subject is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command him to
do something wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De
Beneficiis iii): "It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the
whole man: for the better part of him is excepted. " His body is
subjected and assigned to his master but his soul is his own.
Consequently in matters touching the internal movement of the will man
is not bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.
Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to
be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature all
men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching
the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support
of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are
not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the
question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of
virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal of
actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior
within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey
his general in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters
touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father
in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the
household; and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: When the Apostle says "in all things," he refers
to matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is subject to God simply as regards all
things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him
in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their
superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a particular
way, in respect of which the superior stands between God and his
subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is
immediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or by
the written law.
Reply to Objection 3: Religious profess obedience as to the regular
mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors:
wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong
to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for salvation.
If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to
the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be not
contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case
would be unlawful.
Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient
for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey:
secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly,
indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers?
Objection 1: It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the secular
power. For a gloss on Mat. 17:25, "Then the children are free," says:
"If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds sway over that
kingdom are free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway are
all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom. " Now Christians, by
their faith in Christ, are made children of God, according to Jn. 1:12:
"He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in
His name. " Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 7:4): "You . . . are become
dead to the law by the body of Christ," and the law mentioned here is
the divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are
subject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law of
the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become members
of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection, whereby
they were under the power of secular princes.
Objection 3: Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress
them with violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): "Without
justice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery? " Since therefore
the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with
injustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that
Christians ought not to obey secular princes.
On the contrary, It is written (Titus 3:1): "Admonish them to be
subject to princes and powers," and (1 Pet. 2:13,14): "Be ye subject .
. . to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the king
as excelling, or to governors as sent by him. "
I answer that, Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice,
according to Rom. 3:22, "The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ:"
wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of justice, but
strengthens it. " Now the order of justice requires that subjects obey
their superiors, else the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence
faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of
obeying secular princes.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3178](A[5]), subjection whereby
one man is bound to another regards the body; not the soul, which
retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the
grace of Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the
body, as the Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. 7:23) that in
his mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin.
Wherefore those that are made children of God by grace are free from
the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, whereby
they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes on 1 Tim.
6:1, "Whosoever are servants under the yoke," etc.
Reply to Objection 2: The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament,
and therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the
comparison with human law does not stand because thereby one man is
subject to another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his
fellow-man.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as
this is required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's
authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust,
his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in
order to avoid scandal or danger.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DISOBEDIENCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether disobedience is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For every
sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition given above
([3179]Q[104], A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore if disobedience were a mortal
sin, every sin would be mortal.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is
born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore
is disobedience.
Objection 3: Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does
not fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many
commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them. Therefore
if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot
avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned (Rom.
1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal sins.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[24], A[12]; [3180]FS, Q[72], A[5];
[3181]FS, Q[88], A[1]), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity
which is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and
our neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey His
commandments, as stated above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore to be
disobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is
contrary to the love of God.
Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to
superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior is
a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to Rom.
13:2, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. " It
is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws from the
superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is his due.
Reply to Objection 1: The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal
sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not
disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it.
Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially,
but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their
species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept,
not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is not
a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to
another species of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Vainglory desires display of excellence. And
since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject
to another's command, it follows that disobedience arises from
vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out
of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal.
Reply to Objection 3: No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore
if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects,
so that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin.
Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude of precepts.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins?
Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
For it is written (1 Kings 15:23): "It is like the sin of witchcraft to
rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey. " But idolatry
is the most grievous of sins, as stated above ([3182]Q[94], A[3]).
Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
Objection 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that
removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above ([3183]Q[14], A[2]). Now
disobedience makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything,
prevents a man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against
the Holy Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the
disobedience of one man, many were made sinners. " Now the cause is
seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a
more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby.
On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than
contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person of
the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is
not the most grievous of sins.
I answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one
disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the
part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take
every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a
higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower
authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher
authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more
grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to disobey
God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things commanded. For the
person commanding does not equally desire the fulfilment of all his
commands: since every such person desires above all the end, and that
which is nearest to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more
grievous, according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the
intention of the person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it
is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more grievous the
disobedience of that commandment, because since God's will is
essentially directed to the good, the greater the good the more does
God wish it to be fulfilled. Consequently he that disobeys the
commandment of the love of God sins more grievously than one who
disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the other
hand, man's will is not always directed to the greater good: hence,
when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is more grievous, not
through setting aside a greater good, but through setting aside that
which is more in the intention of the person commanding.
Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with
the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which
there is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of
disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart
from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this because
whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God's commandment.
And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin
is still more grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a
man's precept is less grievous than the sin which contemns the man who
made the precept, because reverence for the person commanding should
give rise to reverence for his command. In like manner a sin that
directly involves contempt of God, such as blasphemy, or the like, is
more grievous (even if we mentally separate the disobedience from the
sin) than would be a sin involving contempt of God's commandment alone.
Reply to Objection 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality
but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God
just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more.
Reply to Objection 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy
Ghost, but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the
contempt of any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy
Ghost, else the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy
Ghost, since any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin
against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which
lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins.
Reply to Objection 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin
was transmitted to a men, was not disobedience considered as a special
sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the
Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to
every sin.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude.
Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other
virtues?
(2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent?
(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?
(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?
(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor
received or the disposition of the giver?
(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue,
distinct from other virtue. For we have received the greatest benefits
from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God in
return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which we
repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore
thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues.
Objection 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative
justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of
giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which
belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not
a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for
the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues,
since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore
thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors
received, is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice
(De Invent.
trust," says: "Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due; God by
creation, to Whom we owe latria. " Now the virtue directed to God as
Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as God.
Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8),
"to be loved is like being honored. " Now the charity with which we love
God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia
whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria with
which we honor God.
Objection 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an
image is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the
thing represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being
made to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis.
2:22,23) that "they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God
created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made
him. " Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God
is honored.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage due
to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey
their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from
latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God. "
I answer that, According to what has been stated above ([3164]Q[101],
A[3]), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there
must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is
due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is
competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has
absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly,
which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a
certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a
particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which pays
due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria, which
pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a species of
observance, because by observance we honor all those who excel in
dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of servants for
their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of
excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so
again latria is called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is
our Lord by way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the
power to create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this
gloss drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of
creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in respect
of lordship, which is communicated to a creature.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since
that which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone.
Wherefore the charity with which we love God is the same as that with
which we love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct
from charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved.
In like manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another
for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, latria and
dulia are not the same virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to
the thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an
image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the
movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to the
thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of dulia
regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in respect of
that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, yet in
showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God
actually.
Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion,
towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need not be
towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the image of
God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence
that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His image.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether dulia has various species?
Objection 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we
show honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under
different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in
the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is
divided into specifically different virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes,
as pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a
mean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having
a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being
the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species
of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia.
Objection 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the
image of God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational
creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted
by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we
must distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more
since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for instance,
to the wood of the Holy Cross.
On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not
divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia.
I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be
taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account
of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance,
and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken
in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one
another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as denoting
the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies servitude,
as stated above [3165](A[3]). Taken in this sense it is not divided
into different species, but is one of the species of observance,
mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason that a servant
reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer
under another, the disciple his master under another, and so on in
similar cases.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken
in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a
man by reason of his having an affinity to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an
irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are
naturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay
to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king's
robe receives the same honor as the king himself, according to
Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv).
__________________________________________________________________
OF OBEDIENCE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?
(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?
(3) Of its comparison with other virtues;
(4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things?
(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one man is bound to obey another?
Objection 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For
nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has so
ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus.
15:14, "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of
his own counsel. " Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.
Objection 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would
have to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his
rule of conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule
of human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.
Objection 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it
acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous.
Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good
deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less
acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is
not bound to obey another.
On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): "Obey your prelates and
be subject to them. "
I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things proceed from
natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In
natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their
actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God:
and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their
will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by
reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the
divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be
subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in
virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to
obey their superiors.
Reply to Objection 1: God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not
as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because,
unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity
to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from
his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in
doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying his
superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), "When we humbly give way to
another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts. "
Reply to Objection 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all
rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more
than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will
of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will
of this other man who obeys him.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In
one way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not
bound to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he
does it of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous,
praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the
will. Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt
will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially before
God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether obedience is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For
disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general
sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to disobey the
divine law. " Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or
moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not
comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since
it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more
obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a
special virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own. " But
every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its
own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as
stated in Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.
Objection 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their
objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a
superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are
degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue,
comprising many special virtues.
On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice,
as stated above ([3166]Q[80]).
I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that have
a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to render
a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the
divinely established order of things, as shown above [3167](A[1]), and
therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order,
as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. [3168]FP, Q[5], A[5]].
Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of
its object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their
superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands
out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue,
and its specific object is a command tacit or express, because the
superior's will, however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a
man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by
obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his
superior's will.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object
from admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues
correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils
both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good end,
and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord.
Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in
acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts
of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above ([3169]FS, Q[96],
A[3]). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and
pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not evil
except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in
its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally the aspect
of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special
sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one perform
an act of justice or of some other virtue with the intention of
fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept
with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a
wide sense for the performance of any action that may be a matter of
precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any
intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue, and
disobedience a general sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its
direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether
expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior,
indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly,
according to Titus 3:1, "Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to
obey at a word," etc.
It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it
observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is
measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in so
far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he
ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion
([3170]Q[92], A[2]). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in
the person who retains another's property, and deficiency in the person
who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v,
4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of
him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in
fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior,
who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience will be
a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning
justice ([3171]Q[58], A[10]).
Reply to Objection 3: Obedience, like every virtue requires the will to
be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is
repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and
this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience make a man's
will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of
the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for
its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable
matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to
comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own will.
But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but,
considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as happens in
disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled
except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that
"obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable
matters," because, to wit, one's own will seems to tend principally,
not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the fulfilment of
one's own desire; but that "it increases in disagreeable or difficult
matters," because there one's own will tends to nothing beside the
precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances:
for, on the other hand, according to the judgment of God, Who searches
the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedience,
while holding its own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided the will
of him that obeys tend no less devotedly [*Cf. [3172] Q[82], A[2]] to
the fulfilment of the precept.
Reply to Objection 4: Reverence regards directly the person that
excels: wherefore it admits a various species according to the various
aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the
precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one
aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account of
reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one species,
though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues.
For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): "Obedience is better than
sacrifices. " Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which
is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above ([3173]Q[81],
A[6]). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when
ingrafted. " Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore
obedience is greater than all the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "evil should
never be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience
we should lay aside the good we are doing. " Now one does not lay aside
a thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose
sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other
virtues.
On the contrary, obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from
charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience should be
practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not
through fear of punishment, but through love of justice. " Therefore
charity is a greater virtue than obedience.
I answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemning God and adhering
to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man
contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is
greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man
contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue
derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from his
contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological,
virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the
moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in order
to adhere to God.
Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns
that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are three
kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God's sake. The lowest of
these are external goods, the goods of the body take the middle place,
and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the chief,
in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will, man makes use of all
other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience,
whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy
than the other moral virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of
God.
Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is rightly preferred
to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas by
obedience we slay our own will. " Wherefore even any other acts of
virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of
obedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to
give all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to
the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to
obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if
they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from
obedience. For it is written (1 Jn. 2:4,5): "He who saith that he
knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he
that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is
perfected": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes.
Reply to Objection 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays
worship and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained
under different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding
the aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far
as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a
way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence
for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it
proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains
to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore from
this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer
sacrifice, as well as because, "in a sacrifice we slay another's body,
whereas by obedience we slay our own will," as Gregory says (Moral.
xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been
better for Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals
of the Amalekites against the commandment of God.
Reply to Objection 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under
a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue
act causally or dispositively towards their generation and
preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. And
yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all virtues
absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of virtue
come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue
without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be
any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue
is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue is faith,
whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine authority, by
reason of which the power to command is competent to God. Secondly,
because infusion of grace and virtues may precede, even in point of
time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all
virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to
which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so
forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of
obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of
necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake
of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to
do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), "he
who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many
others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from
starvation, through being deprived of every good. " Thus the loss of one
good may be compensated by obedience and other goods.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things?
Objection 1: It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For it
is written (Mat. 9:30,31) that our Lord after healing the two blind men
commanded them, saying: "See that no man know this. But they going out
spread His fame abroad in all that country. " Yet they are not blamed
for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey God in
all things.
Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to
virtue. Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to
virtue: thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn.
22);
and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which
things are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who
was an adulteress (Osee 3), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore
God is not to be obeyed in all things.
Objection 3: Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine
will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things to
conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as stated
above ([3174]FS, Q[19], A[10]). Therefore man is not bound to obey God
in all things.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 24:7): "All things that the Lord
hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient. "
I answer that, As stated above [3175](A[1]), he who obeys is moved by
the command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by
their motive causes. Now just a God is the first mover of all things
that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as
shown above ([3176]FS, Q[9], A[6]). Therefore just as all natural
things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too
all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the
divine command.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the
miracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine
precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), "gave an example to His
servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and
yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that
others might profit by their example. "
Reply to Objection 2: Even as God does nothing contrary to nature
(since "the nature of a thing is what God does therein," according to a
gloss on Rom. 11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted
course of nature; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue
since virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity
with God's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary
to the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to
Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God
is the author of life an death. Nor again was it contrary to justice
that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians,
because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was
it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take an adulteress,
because God Himself is the ordainer of human generation, and the right
manner of intercourse with woman is that which He appoints. Hence it is
evident that the persons aforesaid did not sin, either by obeying God
or by willing to obey Him.
Reply to Objection 3: Though man is not always bound to will what God
wills, yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This
comes to man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man
is bound to obey God's commands in all things.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
Objection 1: It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors
in all things. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:20): "Children, obey your
parents in all things," and farther on (Col. 3:22): "Servants, obey in
all things your masters according to the flesh. " Therefore in like
manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.
Objection 2: Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects,
according to Dt. 5:5, "I was the mediator and stood between the Lord
and you at that time, to show you His words. " Now there is no going
from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands between.
Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of
God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 4:14): "You . . . received me as
an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus" and (1 Thess. 2:13): "When you
had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it, not
as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God. " Therefore
as man is bound to obey God in all things, so is he bound to obey his
superiors.
Objection 3: Further, just as religious in making their profession take
vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a
religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things.
Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 5:29): "We ought to obey God
rather than men. " Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior are
against God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all things.
I answer that, As stated above ([3177]AA[1],4), he who obeys is moved
at the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity
of justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its
mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by its
mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance arising
from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not burnt by
fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of
order in the movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is
subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is not subject
thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes subject to the
action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as regards being dried
up or consumed. In like manner there are two reasons, for which a
subject may not be bound to obey his superior in all things. First on
account of the command of a higher power. For as a gloss says on Rom.
13:2, "They that resist [Vulg. : 'He that resisteth'] the power, resist
the ordinance of God" (cf. St. Augustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). "If a
commissioner issue an order, are you to comply, if it is contrary to
the bidding of the proconsul? Again if the proconsul command one thing,
and the emperor another, will you hesitate, to disregard the former and
serve the latter? Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God
another, you must disregard the former and obey God. " Secondly, a
subject is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command him to
do something wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De
Beneficiis iii): "It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the
whole man: for the better part of him is excepted. " His body is
subjected and assigned to his master but his soul is his own.
Consequently in matters touching the internal movement of the will man
is not bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.
Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to
be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature all
men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching
the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support
of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are
not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the
question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of
virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal of
actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior
within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey
his general in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters
touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father
in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the
household; and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: When the Apostle says "in all things," he refers
to matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is subject to God simply as regards all
things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him
in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their
superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a particular
way, in respect of which the superior stands between God and his
subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is
immediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or by
the written law.
Reply to Objection 3: Religious profess obedience as to the regular
mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors:
wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong
to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for salvation.
If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to
the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be not
contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case
would be unlawful.
Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient
for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey:
secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly,
indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers?
Objection 1: It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the secular
power. For a gloss on Mat. 17:25, "Then the children are free," says:
"If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds sway over that
kingdom are free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway are
all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom. " Now Christians, by
their faith in Christ, are made children of God, according to Jn. 1:12:
"He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in
His name. " Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 7:4): "You . . . are become
dead to the law by the body of Christ," and the law mentioned here is
the divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are
subject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law of
the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become members
of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection, whereby
they were under the power of secular princes.
Objection 3: Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress
them with violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): "Without
justice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery? " Since therefore
the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with
injustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that
Christians ought not to obey secular princes.
On the contrary, It is written (Titus 3:1): "Admonish them to be
subject to princes and powers," and (1 Pet. 2:13,14): "Be ye subject .
. . to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the king
as excelling, or to governors as sent by him. "
I answer that, Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice,
according to Rom. 3:22, "The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ:"
wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of justice, but
strengthens it. " Now the order of justice requires that subjects obey
their superiors, else the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence
faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of
obeying secular princes.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3178](A[5]), subjection whereby
one man is bound to another regards the body; not the soul, which
retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the
grace of Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the
body, as the Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. 7:23) that in
his mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin.
Wherefore those that are made children of God by grace are free from
the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, whereby
they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes on 1 Tim.
6:1, "Whosoever are servants under the yoke," etc.
Reply to Objection 2: The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament,
and therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the
comparison with human law does not stand because thereby one man is
subject to another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his
fellow-man.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as
this is required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's
authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust,
his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in
order to avoid scandal or danger.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DISOBEDIENCE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether disobedience is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For every
sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition given above
([3179]Q[104], A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore if disobedience were a mortal
sin, every sin would be mortal.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is
born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore
is disobedience.
Objection 3: Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does
not fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many
commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them. Therefore
if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot
avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a
mortal sin.
On the contrary, The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned (Rom.
1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal sins.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[24], A[12]; [3180]FS, Q[72], A[5];
[3181]FS, Q[88], A[1]), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity
which is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and
our neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey His
commandments, as stated above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore to be
disobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is
contrary to the love of God.
Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to
superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior is
a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to Rom.
13:2, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. " It
is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws from the
superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is his due.
Reply to Objection 1: The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal
sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not
disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it.
Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially,
but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their
species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept,
not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is not
a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to
another species of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Vainglory desires display of excellence. And
since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject
to another's command, it follows that disobedience arises from
vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out
of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal.
Reply to Objection 3: No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore
if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects,
so that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin.
Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude of precepts.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins?
Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
For it is written (1 Kings 15:23): "It is like the sin of witchcraft to
rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey. " But idolatry
is the most grievous of sins, as stated above ([3182]Q[94], A[3]).
Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
Objection 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that
removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above ([3183]Q[14], A[2]). Now
disobedience makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything,
prevents a man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against
the Holy Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the
disobedience of one man, many were made sinners. " Now the cause is
seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a
more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby.
On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than
contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person of
the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is
not the most grievous of sins.
I answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one
disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the
part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take
every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a
higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower
authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher
authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more
grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to disobey
God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things commanded. For the
person commanding does not equally desire the fulfilment of all his
commands: since every such person desires above all the end, and that
which is nearest to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more
grievous, according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the
intention of the person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it
is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more grievous the
disobedience of that commandment, because since God's will is
essentially directed to the good, the greater the good the more does
God wish it to be fulfilled. Consequently he that disobeys the
commandment of the love of God sins more grievously than one who
disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the other
hand, man's will is not always directed to the greater good: hence,
when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is more grievous, not
through setting aside a greater good, but through setting aside that
which is more in the intention of the person commanding.
Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with
the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which
there is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of
disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart
from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this because
whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God's commandment.
And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin
is still more grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a
man's precept is less grievous than the sin which contemns the man who
made the precept, because reverence for the person commanding should
give rise to reverence for his command. In like manner a sin that
directly involves contempt of God, such as blasphemy, or the like, is
more grievous (even if we mentally separate the disobedience from the
sin) than would be a sin involving contempt of God's commandment alone.
Reply to Objection 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality
but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God
just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more.
Reply to Objection 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy
Ghost, but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the
contempt of any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy
Ghost, else the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy
Ghost, since any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin
against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which
lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins.
Reply to Objection 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin
was transmitted to a men, was not disobedience considered as a special
sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the
Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to
every sin.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude.
Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other
virtues?
(2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent?
(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?
(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?
(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor
received or the disposition of the giver?
(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue,
distinct from other virtue. For we have received the greatest benefits
from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God in
return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which we
repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore
thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues.
Objection 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative
justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of
giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which
belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not
a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for
the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues,
since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore
thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors
received, is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice
(De Invent.
