The knowledge of dharmas, in the Pathway of Meditation, when it bears on
Extinction
and the Path, is opposed to the three spheres.
AbhidharmakosabhasyamVol-4VasubandhuPoussinPruden1991
m.
Homage to the Buddha.
We have spoken of the ksantis or Patiences (vi. 25d) and of the
jndnas or Knowledges (vi. 26b), of samyagdrsti or Right Views (vi. 50c) and of samyagjndna or Right Knowledge (vi. 76c). Are the Patiences actually Knowledges, and isn't Right Knowledge identical to Right Views?
la. The pure Patiences are not a type of Knowledge. 2
The eight types of pure Patience which form part of the Path of Seeing (dbhisamaydntika, vi. 25d-26c) are not, by their nature, knowledge;3 for, at the moment of patience, the defilement of doubt, which each Patience abandons, is not already abandoned. But Knowledge is certain: it is produced when doubt is abandoned These eight types of Patience are Seeing, because, by their nature, they are examination. 4 In opposition to the pure Patiences which are Seeing and are not Knowledge,
lb. The prajnd of destruction and of non-arising is not seeing. 5
The knowledge of destruction (ksayajndna) and the knowledge of Non-Arising {anutpadajrlana, vi. 67a-b)--when they constitute Bodhi--are not Seeing, because they do not include examination, and because the intention of inquiry is not in them. 6
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lc. All other pure prajnd is both one and the other.
Besides the Patiences and the two Knowledges named above, pure prajnd is at one and the same time both seeing and knowledge, for it includes examination, and is therefore seeing; it is free from doubt, and is therefore knowledge. This refers to the eight abhtsamaya knowledges (duhkhe jridna, etc. , vi. 26) [and also to all prajnd of the pure Path of Meditation up to the Knowledge of Extinction].
Id. All other prajfid is knowledge.
All other prajnd which is not pure, but worldly or impure [i. e. , prajnd associated with the five sense consciousnesses,etc, and prajnd associated with the mental consciousness].
le. Six are also seeing.
Six impure prajnds are at one and the same time knowledge and seeing, namely the mental prajnd associated with the five defilements which are views by nature {satkayadrsti, etc. , v7) and, sixth, good prajnd, which is right worldly views (laukiki sam-
yagdrsti, i. 4l).
***
7
How many knowledges are there? There are ten; but, in short
there are only two:
2a. Knowledge is pure or impure.
All the Knowledges are subsumed into two types of knowledge,
? impure or worldly knowledge, and pure or supermundane knowledge. Of these two knowledges,
8 2b. The first is called conventional.
Impure Knowledge is called "knowledge conforming to worldly conventions. "
Why?
Because from usage it bears on (dlambate) things which exist 9
conventionally: a jug, clothing, male, female, etc. [We say "from usage," because it also bears on the real characteristics of things, unique characteristics and common characteristics, vii. 10b].
2c-d. Pure knowledge is of two types, a knowledge of 10
dharmas and inferential knowledge.
These two knowledges with the preceeding make three knowledges: worldly, conventional knowledge, a knowledge of dharmas, and inferential knowledge. Among these,
11 3a. Conventional knowledge bears on all.
All the conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are the object of conventional knowledge.
3b-c. The knowledge of dharmas has for its object the Suffering, etc. , of Kamadhatu.
The knowledge of dharmas has Suffering, the Arising of Suffering, the Extinction of Suffering, and the Path leading to the Extinction of Suffering of Kamadhatu for its object.
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? ? -d. Inferential knowledge bears on Suffering, etc. , of the higher spheres.
Inferential knowledge has the Suffering, the Origin of Suffering. . . of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu for its object.
4a-b. When one takes into consideration the distinction of the Truths, these two knowledges, make up four knowl- edges.
Namely: the knowledge of Suffering (which includes the knowledge of the dharmas of Suffering and the inferential knowledge of Suffering), the knowledge of Origin, the knowledge of Extinction, and the knowledge of the Path, because these two knowledges have Suffering, its Origin, etc. , for their object.
4b-c. These two knowledges, fourfold, are termed the knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Ari- sing. 12
The knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge, which are as we have just seen fourfold by reason of their objects, are, among the Arhats, when they are not of the nature of Seeing,13 called the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
4d-5a. At the moment when they arise, they are inferential knowledges of Suffering and Origin.
The Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Ar- ising, at the moment when they first arise are, by their nature, inferential knowledge of Suffering and of its Origin in the higher
? spheres, because they have for their object the skandhas of 14 15
Bhavagra under the aspects of Suffering and Origin. These two knowledges therefore have the same object.
The Knowledge of Destruction follows Vajropamasamadhi (vi. 44d); and the Knowledge of Non-Arising follows the Knowledge of Destruction.
Does Vajropamasamadhi have the same object as these two knowledges at the moment of their arising?
When it has Suffering and Origin for its object, yes; when it has Extinction and the Path for its object, no.
5b. The knowledge of the mind of another follows from four.
The knowledge of the mind of another follows four knowl-
edges, a knowledge of the dharmas, inferential knowledge, a 16
knowledge of the Path, and conventional knowledge.
5c-d. It does not know a mind in a higher sphere, faculties,
17 personalities, nor the past and future.
A mind is superior either from the point of view of its bhilmi, from the point of view of its indriyas, or from the point of view of its personality.
The knowledge of the mind of another of a lower sphere does not know a mind in a higher sphere.
The knowledge of the mind of another of a saint with weak faculties, namely a Sraddhadhimukta or a Samayavimukta (vi. 31c), does not know the mind of a saint of strong faculties, namely a Drstiprapta or a Asamayavimukta.
The knowledge of the mind of another of a lower saint does not know the mind of a higher saint: in order, Anagamin, Arhat,
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Pratyekabuddha, Samyaksambuddha.
When the mind of another is either past or future, the knowledge of a mind of another does not know it, for this knowledge has a present mind for its object.
Does the mind of another avoid being in the sphere of the knowledge of the mind of another in other cases as well?
6a-b. The knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowl- edges do not know one another.
The knowledge of the mind of another, when it is by its nature a knowledge of dharmas, is not capable of knowing the mind of another which is by nature inferential knowledge; when it is inferential by nature, it is not capable of knowing the mind of another which is by nature a series of dharmas.
Why?
Because these two knowledges have for their object the dharmas which are opposed to Kamadhatu and to the higher spheres respectfully.
#**
There is no knowledge of the mind of another in the Path of Seeing. That is to say, an ascetic, while he cultivates the Path of Seeing, is not endowed with the knowledge of the mind of another, because the duration of the Path of Seeing is much reduced, and because the Seeing of the Truths is rapid. But the mind of another which is found in the Path of Seeing can be the object of the knowledge of the mind of another.
When one desires to know, through the knowledge of the mind of another, the mind of another which is found in the Path of Seeing, one cultivates a preparatory exercise:
18
? 6b-d. The Sravaka knows two moment of Seeing; the Pratyekabuddha, three; the Buddha, without preparation, all.
When a Sravaka cultivates the knowledge of the mind of
another in the desire to see the mind of an ascetic in the Path of
Seeing, he obtains some knowing of the first two moments, the
Patience of the Knowledge of the dharmas of Suffering and the 19
knowledge of dharmas -- but not the following moments (the Patience of the Inferential Knowledge of Suffering. . . )--because the knowledge of the inferential part (Suffering in the higher spheres) of the Path of Seeing supposes a different preparatory exercise. Thus, if this Sravaka then begins a new exercise in order to obtain the knowledge of the inferential part, the ascetic whom he examines has already arrived at the fifteenth moment when this new preparatory exercise [which lasts thirteen moments] is finished. The whole interval between the twelfth and the sixteenth moment therefore is not in the sphere of the knowledge of the mind of another of the Sravaka (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 515c7).
In the same circumstances, the Pratyekabuddha knows three moments, namely the first two and the eighth; because the required preparatory exercise, after the consciousness of the first two moments, for the knowledge of the inferential part, is, among the Pratyekabuddhas, weak.
According to other masters, he knows the first two moments
20 and the fifteenth.
The Buddha, through simple desire, and without preparatory exercise, knows the mind of another in all the moments of the Path of Seeing.
***
What are the characteristics of the Knowledge of Destruction
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? and of
the Knowledge of Non-Arising?
7. The knowledge of destruction is, with respect to the Truths, the certitude that they are known, abandoned, etc. ; the knowledge of non-arising is the certitude that they are
21 no longer to be known, to be abandoned, etc.
22
Chapter Seven
"What is the knowledge of extinction? When one knows within himself that 'Suffering is completely known by me, its Origin is abandoned by me, its Extinction has been actualized by me, the Path has been cultivated
According to the MulaSastra,
23
by me/ then the knowledge which results from this {tad updddya 24
yaj jndnam), the seeing, the knowing, the intuition, the 25
intelligence, the discernment, the clarity, the insight, is what is called the Knowledge of Destruction. " "What is the Knowledge of Non-Arising? When one knows within himself that 'Suffering is completely known by me and is no longer to be known. . . the Path is no longer to be cultivated', then this knowledge. . . is what is called the Knowledge of Non-Arising. " [See the definition vii. 12a-b. ]
###
But how can one, through a pure knowledge, have such a
26 knowledge?
The Masters of KaSmir explain: Two conventional knowledges
are consecutive to two pure knowledges: "Suffering is known by
me. . . ; Suffering is known by me and is no longer to be known. " It is
by reason of the characteristic of these two conventional knowl-
edges that the Sustra defines the two pure knowledges. [This is
27
why the Sastra says: tad updddya. . . ] 28
According to other masters, the ascetic knows, through a pure knowledge, that he knows Suffering, etc.
? But we have said that the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising are not seeing, or views. How can the Sustra define them as views?
29 The Sastra employs the term "view" through stylistic habit,
using again the formula employed in the definition of the other knowledges (the knowledge of Suffering,etc). Or rather, by reason of their characteristic of being directly perceived, these two knowledges are qualified as seeing. It is by reason of this
30 characteristic of being directly perceived that it says in the Sastra,
31 "Knowledge is seeing. "
***
There are ten knowledges: a knowledge of dharmas, inferential
knowledge, worldly, conventional knowledge, the knowledge of
the mind of another, the knowledge of Suffering, the knowledge of
Origin, the knowledge of Extinction, the knowledge of the Path,
the Knowledge of Destruction, and the Knowledge of Non-Ari-
32 sing.
33 How are they included in one another?
1. Conventional knowledge is made up of one knowledge,
namely the conventional knowledge, and one part of another
knowledge [namely the impure part of the knowledge of the mind
34 of another].
2. A knowledge of dharrnas is made up of one full knowledge and one part of seven other knowledges, namely the Kdmadhdtu part of the knowledge of suffering, of origin, of extinction, and of the Path, the knowledge of the mind of another, the Knowledge of Destruction, and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
3. So too inferential knowledge, by replacing "the Kumadhatu
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part" with "the part relating to the two higher spheres (=Rupad- hatu and Arupyadhatu). "
4. The knowledge of suffering is made up of one knowledge and one part of four other knowledges--that part of the knowl- edge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising which have the Truth of Suffering for their objects.
5-6. The knowledge of origin and of extinction are explained according to the same principle.
7. A knowledge of the Path is made up of one knowledge and one part of five knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the Knowledge of Destruction, the knowledge of Non-Arising, and the knowledge of the mind of another.
8. The knowledge of the mind of another is made up of one knowledge and one part of four knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, a knowledge of the Path, and conventional knowledge.
9. The Knowledge of Destruction is made up of one knowledge and one part of six knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the knowledge of suffering, of origin, of
35 extinction, and of the Path.
10. So too the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
How are the knowledges, which are twofold (pure and impure) distributed into ten knowledges?
8. The knowledges are ten in number; the distinction is established by reason of their nature, their opposition, their aspect, their aspect and their object, their preparatory exercises, the achievement of their task, and the extension of their cause.
1. By reason of its nature, there is conventional knowledge,
36 because it is not absolute knowledge.
? _ The Knowledges 1097 2. By reason of their opposition, there is knowledge of the
dharmas and inferential knowledge: the first is opposed to 37
Kamadhatu, and the second is opposed to the higher spheres.
3. By reason of their aspect (dkdratas, vii. 13), there is a
knowledge of Suffering and a knowledge of Origin: these two
knowledges have the same object (i. e. , the pancopdddnaskandhas, 38
vi. English trans, p. 898 and 908), but differ in their aspects.
4. By reason of their aspect and their object (dlambana), there is a knowledge of Extinction and a knowledge of the Path which differ in their aspects as well as in their objects.
5. By reason of their preparatory exercises, there is the knowledge of the mind of another. Without doubt this knowledge extends also to the mental states {caittas) of another, but the preparatory exercise bears on the mind {citta)\ also, even though it may know the caittas, it is termed paracittajnana (the knowledge of the mind of another) by reason of its preparatory exercise.
6. Because "that which should have been done has been done/' there is the Knowledge of Destruction: this knowledge is the first knowledge to arise in a series in which "that which should have been done has been done. " [The Knowledge of Non-Arising arises in a similar series, but later. ]
7. By reason of the extension of its causes, there is the Knowledge of Non-Arising, for it has for its causes (=sabhd- gahetu) all the pure knowledges, up to and including the Knowledge of Destruction.
***
We have said that the knowledge of the dharmas [that is to say: a. bearing on the Four Truths, b. in the Path of Seeing and in the Path of Meditation] is opposed to all of Kamadhatu [that is to say it "opposes" the five categories of defilements, those abandoned through the Seeing of the Four Truths and through Meditation, of Kamadhatu]. Furthermore
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9a-c.
The knowledge of dharmas, in the Pathway of Meditation, when it bears on Extinction and the Path, is opposed to the three spheres.
A knowledge of dharmas with respect to Extinction and the Path, realized in the course of the Path of Meditation is opposed to the three spheres--that is to say, these two knowledges oppose the defilements of the higher spheres which are abandoned through Meditation. 39
9d. Inferential knowledge is not opposed to Kumadhatu. In none of its branches (Suffering, etc. ) is inferential knowl-
edge opposed ? the defilements of Kamadhatu. What are the aspects of the ten knowledges?
lOa-b. A knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge have sixteen aspects.
The sixteen aspects which will be explained later (vii. 13a).
lOb-c. Conventional knowledge is the same and otherwise.
Conventional knowledge has the sixteen aspects; it also takes up others, for it grasps unique characteristics, common characteris- tics, etc. 40
? ? -d. Four, because of the aspect of their Truth. 41
A knowledge of Suffering, Origin, Extinction, and the Path, bearing on the aspects of their Truths, each have four aspects.
lla-b. So too, when it is pure, the knowledge of the mind of another. 42
? The knowledge of the mind of another, in its impure part (vii. 5b-6, note 16), bears on the aspects of its Truth; it therefore has four aspects. This part of the knowledge of the mind of another is, in fact, made up of the knowledge of the Path.
llb-c. When it is impure, it has for its aspects the unique
43 characteristics of its object.
When the knowledge of the mind of another is impure, it grasps the unique characteristics of its object (jneya), namely the mind and the mental states of another. Its aspects are in conformity with these unique characteristics; therefore they are not included in the sixteen.
Pure or impure
44 Ud. It has for its sphere an individual object.
When it bears on a mind, it does not bear on a mental state (caitta); when it bears on a certain mental state (vedand for example), it does not bear on any other one (samjnd, for example).
If this is the case, why did the Blessed One say, "He knows in truth the mind which is sardga (possesses craving) as being
45
sardga", since the knowledge of the mind of another does not
know minds and mental states (craving, etc. ) at one and the same
time, in the same way that one does not grasp the cloth and its
46 stain at one and the same time?
The expression sardga, possessing craving, has two meanings. 47
A mind is sardga because it is "mixed" with craving, or because it 48
is "united" to craving.
The mind associated with craving (ii. 53c), that is to say, which is presently in the prey of craving, is sardga for two reasons; it is mixed with craving, and it is united to craving.
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49
Certain masters
sardgacitta solely designates a mind mixed with craving, that is to say, a mind associated with craving. As for the vigatardga mind, a mind without craving, this is, according to these masters, the mind opposed to craving. In fact, they say, if the mind not associated with craving were called vigataraga, the mind associated with the other defilements (hatred, etc. ) would be also termed vigataraga, for they are not associated with craving.
Objection: In this hypothesis a non-defiled, indeterminate mind (ii. 71b) is not sardga, since it is not associated with craving; it is not vigataraga, since it is not opposed to craving. As a consequence we must admit that what the other masters (the Abhidharmikas) say, that the mind is sardga through the fact of being united to craving, without it necessarily being mixed with craving. In this same way we must explain the other expressions of the Sutra up to "possessing delusion'' (samoha) and "not possessing delusion" (vigatamoha). [See above, note 45. ]
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] A good mind is called concentrated
51
because it is not turned away from its object. A defiled mind is
distracted, because it is associated with distraction.
The Westerners, or Masters of Gandhara, say: A mind
52
Any other impure mind united to craving.
50
is solely sardga to the extent that it is
associated with laziness is concentrated; other defiled mind.
a distracted mind is any
think that the Sutra, by the expression
[The Vaibhasikas] do not admit this definition. They say: In this system, the same mind, namely a defiled mind associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted. Further, this system contradicts the Mulasdstra (according to the Japanese editor, Jndnaprasthana, 15. 9), which
? says, "He knows in truth the concentrated (samksipta) mind, endowed with the four knowledges, a knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, worldly conventional knowledge, and a knowledge of the Path" (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 950c8). [See below, p. 1102 - 3. ]
###
A defiled mind is sunken down, because it is associated with
53 indolence.
A good mind is "well in hand", because it is associated with
54 correct effort.
A defiled mind is called small, because it is beloved by small
persons. A good mind is called large, because it is beloved by great
55 persons.
Or rather the two minds, a defiled mind and a good mind, are called small and great because their roots, their worth, their followings, their entourage, and their forces, are respectively, small or great.
In fact, 1. a defiled mind is of small roots, having two roots, delusion, plus anger or greed: a good mind is always associated with three roots of good; 2. a defiled mind is of small worth, being obtained without effort: a good mind is of great worth, being realized at the cost of great effort; 3. a defiled mind has a small following, for a defiled mind is not accompanied by the acquisition
56
of a future mind of the same type;
following, being accompanied by the acquisition of future mind
of the same type; 4. a defiled mind has a small following, being surrounded only by three skandhas, vedand, samjnd, and samskdras; a good mind has a great following, for it always includes rupa {dhydndndsmvasamvara, iv. 4a, 26); 5. a defiled mind is of small
a good mind has a great 57
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force, for the roots of good, cut off, are reborn (ii, 36, English trans, p. 210 iv. 80c); a good mind is of great force, for the Patience of the Knowledge of the dharmas concerned with Suffering definitively cuts off ten latent defilements {anusayas vi. English trans, p. 943).
This is why a defiled mind is called small, and a good mind, great.
***
The defiled mind is sa-uttara, because it is associated with frivolity {auddhatya)\ the good mind is anuttara, because it is
58 opposed to frivolity.
Calm and not calm minds are explained in the same way.
***
A defiled mind is non-absorbed, because it is associated with distraction; a good mind is absorbed, because it is opposed to distraction.
A defiled mind is uncultivated, because the two cultivations (vii. 27) are absent. A good mind is cultivated, for the contrary reason.
A defiled mind is undelivered, not being delivered in and of
59 itself, nor delivered with regard to the series in which it arises. A
good mind can be delivered in and of itself and from the point of view of the series in which it arises.
Such is the explanation of the Vaibhasikas.
This explanation, [say the Sautrantikas,] does not conform to the Sutra and it does not take into account the meaning of the terms.
? i. How does it not conform to the Sutra?
The Sutra says, "What is a mind internally concentrated? A mind which is accompanied by torpor and laziness, or a mind internally accompanied by calm but not insight. "
"What is a mind externally distracted? A mind which is
dispersed towards the five objects of pleasure, or which is
60
externally accompanied by insight, but not by calm. " [It, results
from this text that a mind associated with laziness can be concentrated. ]
But, [the Vaibhasikas answer,] we have said (p. 1100, line 21) that if a mind associated with laziness is concentrated, a defiled (and consequently distracted) mind, when it is associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted.
Yes, you have said this, but it does not hold. In fact, we can only
affirm that a defiled mind, when it is associated with laziness, is
61 distracted.
But, [answer the Vaibhasikas,] your thesis contradicts the Sastra!
62 It may. But it is better to contradict a Sastra than a Sutra.
ii. How does this explanation lack the proper meaning of the different terms?
Because it gives the characteristics of different minds--dis- tracted, sunken-down, small, not calm, non-absorbed, uncultivated, and undelivered on the one hand, and concentrated, well in hand,
63 etc. , on the other hand--without noting their differences.
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] It is false that we do not indicate the special sense of the different terms. The quality of "defiled" of distracted minds, etc. , is the same; but we explain the particular defects of these different defiled minds. In the same way we explain the particular qualities of the different good minds, in which their good qualities are not differentiated.
We answer that the meaning of the different terms is not correctly established because you fail to eliminate the objection of
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contradiction with the Sutra. [The Sutra, in fact, says that a mind
accompanied by torpor and laziness is concentrated. A mind united with laziness, and defiled through union with torpor, is concen- trated, but it cannot be good, for torpor is a klesamahdbhumika. ]
And if, [as the Vaibhasikas believe], the Sutra designates, by
65
the sunken-down mind,
separately of a sunken-down mind and a small mind. Now it distinguishes them, for it says, "When the mind is sunken down, or fears becoming sunken down, this is not a proper time to cultivate the prasrabdhi, samddhi, and upeksa parts of Bodhi. When the mind is small or fears becoming small, this is not a fitting moment
66 to cultivate the dharmavicaya, virya, and priti parts of Bodhi. "
Objection [of the Vaibhasikas:] Is the cultivation of the parts of
67
Bodhi partial in the case which concerns us? [Must we believe
a small mind, it would not speak
that at a certain moment one cultivates prasrabdhi, samddhi, 69
upeksa, and at another moment dharmavicaya, virya, and priti? ]
No. When the text says "cultivation", it does not signify the fact of actualizing, but the fact of fixing the attention on, or taking as an object.
69
[Answer of the Vaibhasikas:] The mind in which indolence
dominates and in which frivolity is reduced is called "sunken
down" (lina). The mind in which frivolity dominates and in which
indolence is reduced is called "small" {uddhata). These two minds
are therefore distinct, and the Sutra can speak of them separately
without contradicting our system. But, taking into consideration
the fact that these two defilements, indolence and frivolity, coexist
in a single mental heap, we say that the mind which is sunken
70 down is small.
71
We do not pretend to challenge a text of intentional meaning; but such is not the intention of the Sutra [i. e. , to designate a mind in which indolence dominates as sunken down. . . ]
***
? In the thesis presented above (p. 1099, line 23) that all minds "united with craving" (rdgasamyukta) "possess craving" (sardga), what is the meaning of the expression rdgasamyukta, united with craving?
1. If a mind is united with craving, and as a consequence possesses craving, because the possession of craving continues in the series in which this mind is produced, then the mind of an imperfect saint or Saiksa, even when it is pure, will be termed "possessing craving", since the craving has not been completely
72 expelled from the series of the Saiksa.
2. If a mind is both united with craving and possesses craving
through the fact of being the object (dlambana) of the "active 73
craving" ,thentheimpuremindofanArhatwillpossesscraving,
since this mind can be the object of the craving of another
74 person.
If you do not admit that the mind of an Arhat can be grasped as an object through the craving of another person, how can this mind be termed impure?
Would you say that it is impure, not because it is the object of the craving of another, but because it is the object of a "general defilement" (sdmdnyaklesa, v. 12, namely of ignorance or delusion) of another? In this hypothesis, do not say that this mind is sardga, that it "possesses craving"; say rather that it is samoha, that it "possesses moha," since it is the object of the moha or ignorance of another.
But, we would say, none of these proposed explanations is valid. In fact the knowledge of the mind of another does not bear on the "possessions" which can be found in the series of another. Consequently when I know that the mind of another person possesses craving, this mind of another does not possess craving because it is "united with craving" in the sense that it is accompanied by the possession of craving, or in the sense that it is found in the series in which this possession has not been expelled.
The knowledge of the mind of another no longer knows the craving which would be the object of the mind of another.
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Therefore a mind is not termed saraga through the fact of ragasamyoga, through the fact of being "united with raga" in the proposed twofold sense.
[Objection:]
75
***
If this is the case, what is a saraga mind?
[Vasubandhu:] One should determine the intention of the Sutra. A saraga mind or one "possessing craving" is not a ragasarhyukta mind, a mind "united to craving", but a ragasarh- prayukta mind, a mind "associated with craving," a mind in which craving presently exists. Vigataraga, "without craving" is a mind which is not associated with craving, even when this mind will be accompanied by the possession of craving.
[Objection:] The expression vigataraga cannot have this meaning; for another Sutra says that a mind which is without craving {vigataraga), without anger (vigatadvesa), and without ignorance (vigatamoha), does not fall back into threefold existence. Now if this mind is accompanied by the possession of craving, etc. , it will fall back again.
[Vasubandhu:] In this other Sutra, "a mind without craving" (vigataraga citta) signifies "a mind which is not accompanied by the possession of craving" (vigatardgaprdpti citta).
[Objection:] Have you not refuted your own opinion? We said in fact (page 1100, line 5) that if one calls a mind without craving vigataraga, that is, a mind in which craving is not presently active, then one should term all minds associated with another defilement vigataraga. But one does not say that a mind associated with hatred is vigataraga, "without craving. "
[Vasubandhu:] There is nothing wrong with saying that a mind without craving is vigataraga. But one does not consider a mind without craving but associated with hatred as being vigataraga, but rather as "possessing hatred" (sadvesa), distin- guishing it through its specific characteristic which is one of being
? "associated with hatred. "
When the knowledge of the mind of another attains its object, namely the mind of another person, does it attain this mind of another as this latter knows it?
No. When one knows the mind of another, one does not see the object of this mind; one does not see this mind as it itself knows something: one knows only that it is defiled, etc. ; one does not know the object, color, etc. , by reason of which it is defiled. If it were otherwise, the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on rupa, etc. , and would no longer be the knowledge of the mind of another; the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on itself: for the person whose mind I know can at the same moment know my mind.
The characteristics of the knowledge of the mind of another are set: it knows the individual characteristics of a thing (the dravya-svalaksana) but not its general, conventionally true characteristics (its samvrtisat-sdmdnyalaksana)\ it knows mind and mental states but not physical matter, the present but not the past or future, of another but not of oneself, of the sphere of Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu, but not of Ampyadhatu; or rather the pure mind and mental states, of the category to which he himself belongs: pure, he knows a pure mind and mental states; impure, he knows an impure mind and mental states. The knowledge of the mind of another is incompatible with the Path of Seeing and the Uninterrupted Path (dnantaryamdrga), with the Samadhi of Emptiness and the Samadhi of No-Marks, and with the Knowl- edge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising. Other conditions are not excluded: the knowledge of the mind of another is compatible with the Path of Meditation (the Path of Liberation, vimuktimdrga, and the Path of Distinction, visesamdrga), with the Uncommitted Samadhi (apranihitasamddhi), etc.
The teaching of the knowledge of the mind of another is ended.
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12a-b. The other has fourteen aspects by excluding the aspect of emptiness and the aspect of non-self.
The "others" are the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
Both have fourteen aspects (vii. 13a), excluding the aspect of
emptiness and the aspect of non-self. In fact, these two Knowl-
76
edges, even though they are of the absolute level of truth, are also
77
included in the conventional level of truth (vi. 4);
therefore foreign to the aspects of emptiness and non-self. When an ascetic departs from the contemplation in which the knowl- edges of the absolute truth are realized, through the force of these
78
knowledges, later knowledges
conventional level of truth: "my births are cut off, the religious life has been fully cultivated, I have done what should have been done,
79
and I do not know of any more existences for me. " The two
knowledges, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising, therefore participate in the conventional level of truth, not in and of themselves or through definition, but through their outflowing.
Are there any pure aspects outside of these sixteen aspects?
12c. There are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.
The Masters of Kasmir say that there are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.
12d. Some others, according to the Sustra, affirm that there are.
are produced which are of the
they are
? _ The Knowledges 1109
The Foreign Masters maintain the opposite opinion. [For the opinion of "the other masters," see p. 1094, line 27].
80
The Mulasdstra says,
belonging to Kamadhatu through a mind not included among the Dhutus (that is to say, pure)? One can distinguish them as they are, as impermanent, suffering, empty, impersonal, cause, proximate cause, near cause, specificing cause; there is this characteristic (sthdna), there is this cause (vastu). "
One should thus consider the specific aspects through the expressions asty etat sthdnam, asty etad vastu, as two pure aspects which are added to the eight aspects of suffering and origin.
According to the Masters of Kasmir, the Sastra does not teach the existence of these two additional aspects. One should understand, ". .
We have spoken of the ksantis or Patiences (vi. 25d) and of the
jndnas or Knowledges (vi. 26b), of samyagdrsti or Right Views (vi. 50c) and of samyagjndna or Right Knowledge (vi. 76c). Are the Patiences actually Knowledges, and isn't Right Knowledge identical to Right Views?
la. The pure Patiences are not a type of Knowledge. 2
The eight types of pure Patience which form part of the Path of Seeing (dbhisamaydntika, vi. 25d-26c) are not, by their nature, knowledge;3 for, at the moment of patience, the defilement of doubt, which each Patience abandons, is not already abandoned. But Knowledge is certain: it is produced when doubt is abandoned These eight types of Patience are Seeing, because, by their nature, they are examination. 4 In opposition to the pure Patiences which are Seeing and are not Knowledge,
lb. The prajnd of destruction and of non-arising is not seeing. 5
The knowledge of destruction (ksayajndna) and the knowledge of Non-Arising {anutpadajrlana, vi. 67a-b)--when they constitute Bodhi--are not Seeing, because they do not include examination, and because the intention of inquiry is not in them. 6
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lc. All other pure prajnd is both one and the other.
Besides the Patiences and the two Knowledges named above, pure prajnd is at one and the same time both seeing and knowledge, for it includes examination, and is therefore seeing; it is free from doubt, and is therefore knowledge. This refers to the eight abhtsamaya knowledges (duhkhe jridna, etc. , vi. 26) [and also to all prajnd of the pure Path of Meditation up to the Knowledge of Extinction].
Id. All other prajfid is knowledge.
All other prajnd which is not pure, but worldly or impure [i. e. , prajnd associated with the five sense consciousnesses,etc, and prajnd associated with the mental consciousness].
le. Six are also seeing.
Six impure prajnds are at one and the same time knowledge and seeing, namely the mental prajnd associated with the five defilements which are views by nature {satkayadrsti, etc. , v7) and, sixth, good prajnd, which is right worldly views (laukiki sam-
yagdrsti, i. 4l).
***
7
How many knowledges are there? There are ten; but, in short
there are only two:
2a. Knowledge is pure or impure.
All the Knowledges are subsumed into two types of knowledge,
? impure or worldly knowledge, and pure or supermundane knowledge. Of these two knowledges,
8 2b. The first is called conventional.
Impure Knowledge is called "knowledge conforming to worldly conventions. "
Why?
Because from usage it bears on (dlambate) things which exist 9
conventionally: a jug, clothing, male, female, etc. [We say "from usage," because it also bears on the real characteristics of things, unique characteristics and common characteristics, vii. 10b].
2c-d. Pure knowledge is of two types, a knowledge of 10
dharmas and inferential knowledge.
These two knowledges with the preceeding make three knowledges: worldly, conventional knowledge, a knowledge of dharmas, and inferential knowledge. Among these,
11 3a. Conventional knowledge bears on all.
All the conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are the object of conventional knowledge.
3b-c. The knowledge of dharmas has for its object the Suffering, etc. , of Kamadhatu.
The knowledge of dharmas has Suffering, the Arising of Suffering, the Extinction of Suffering, and the Path leading to the Extinction of Suffering of Kamadhatu for its object.
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? ? -d. Inferential knowledge bears on Suffering, etc. , of the higher spheres.
Inferential knowledge has the Suffering, the Origin of Suffering. . . of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu for its object.
4a-b. When one takes into consideration the distinction of the Truths, these two knowledges, make up four knowl- edges.
Namely: the knowledge of Suffering (which includes the knowledge of the dharmas of Suffering and the inferential knowledge of Suffering), the knowledge of Origin, the knowledge of Extinction, and the knowledge of the Path, because these two knowledges have Suffering, its Origin, etc. , for their object.
4b-c. These two knowledges, fourfold, are termed the knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Ari- sing. 12
The knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge, which are as we have just seen fourfold by reason of their objects, are, among the Arhats, when they are not of the nature of Seeing,13 called the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
4d-5a. At the moment when they arise, they are inferential knowledges of Suffering and Origin.
The Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Ar- ising, at the moment when they first arise are, by their nature, inferential knowledge of Suffering and of its Origin in the higher
? spheres, because they have for their object the skandhas of 14 15
Bhavagra under the aspects of Suffering and Origin. These two knowledges therefore have the same object.
The Knowledge of Destruction follows Vajropamasamadhi (vi. 44d); and the Knowledge of Non-Arising follows the Knowledge of Destruction.
Does Vajropamasamadhi have the same object as these two knowledges at the moment of their arising?
When it has Suffering and Origin for its object, yes; when it has Extinction and the Path for its object, no.
5b. The knowledge of the mind of another follows from four.
The knowledge of the mind of another follows four knowl-
edges, a knowledge of the dharmas, inferential knowledge, a 16
knowledge of the Path, and conventional knowledge.
5c-d. It does not know a mind in a higher sphere, faculties,
17 personalities, nor the past and future.
A mind is superior either from the point of view of its bhilmi, from the point of view of its indriyas, or from the point of view of its personality.
The knowledge of the mind of another of a lower sphere does not know a mind in a higher sphere.
The knowledge of the mind of another of a saint with weak faculties, namely a Sraddhadhimukta or a Samayavimukta (vi. 31c), does not know the mind of a saint of strong faculties, namely a Drstiprapta or a Asamayavimukta.
The knowledge of the mind of another of a lower saint does not know the mind of a higher saint: in order, Anagamin, Arhat,
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Pratyekabuddha, Samyaksambuddha.
When the mind of another is either past or future, the knowledge of a mind of another does not know it, for this knowledge has a present mind for its object.
Does the mind of another avoid being in the sphere of the knowledge of the mind of another in other cases as well?
6a-b. The knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowl- edges do not know one another.
The knowledge of the mind of another, when it is by its nature a knowledge of dharmas, is not capable of knowing the mind of another which is by nature inferential knowledge; when it is inferential by nature, it is not capable of knowing the mind of another which is by nature a series of dharmas.
Why?
Because these two knowledges have for their object the dharmas which are opposed to Kamadhatu and to the higher spheres respectfully.
#**
There is no knowledge of the mind of another in the Path of Seeing. That is to say, an ascetic, while he cultivates the Path of Seeing, is not endowed with the knowledge of the mind of another, because the duration of the Path of Seeing is much reduced, and because the Seeing of the Truths is rapid. But the mind of another which is found in the Path of Seeing can be the object of the knowledge of the mind of another.
When one desires to know, through the knowledge of the mind of another, the mind of another which is found in the Path of Seeing, one cultivates a preparatory exercise:
18
? 6b-d. The Sravaka knows two moment of Seeing; the Pratyekabuddha, three; the Buddha, without preparation, all.
When a Sravaka cultivates the knowledge of the mind of
another in the desire to see the mind of an ascetic in the Path of
Seeing, he obtains some knowing of the first two moments, the
Patience of the Knowledge of the dharmas of Suffering and the 19
knowledge of dharmas -- but not the following moments (the Patience of the Inferential Knowledge of Suffering. . . )--because the knowledge of the inferential part (Suffering in the higher spheres) of the Path of Seeing supposes a different preparatory exercise. Thus, if this Sravaka then begins a new exercise in order to obtain the knowledge of the inferential part, the ascetic whom he examines has already arrived at the fifteenth moment when this new preparatory exercise [which lasts thirteen moments] is finished. The whole interval between the twelfth and the sixteenth moment therefore is not in the sphere of the knowledge of the mind of another of the Sravaka (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 515c7).
In the same circumstances, the Pratyekabuddha knows three moments, namely the first two and the eighth; because the required preparatory exercise, after the consciousness of the first two moments, for the knowledge of the inferential part, is, among the Pratyekabuddhas, weak.
According to other masters, he knows the first two moments
20 and the fifteenth.
The Buddha, through simple desire, and without preparatory exercise, knows the mind of another in all the moments of the Path of Seeing.
***
What are the characteristics of the Knowledge of Destruction
The Knowledges 1093
? and of
the Knowledge of Non-Arising?
7. The knowledge of destruction is, with respect to the Truths, the certitude that they are known, abandoned, etc. ; the knowledge of non-arising is the certitude that they are
21 no longer to be known, to be abandoned, etc.
22
Chapter Seven
"What is the knowledge of extinction? When one knows within himself that 'Suffering is completely known by me, its Origin is abandoned by me, its Extinction has been actualized by me, the Path has been cultivated
According to the MulaSastra,
23
by me/ then the knowledge which results from this {tad updddya 24
yaj jndnam), the seeing, the knowing, the intuition, the 25
intelligence, the discernment, the clarity, the insight, is what is called the Knowledge of Destruction. " "What is the Knowledge of Non-Arising? When one knows within himself that 'Suffering is completely known by me and is no longer to be known. . . the Path is no longer to be cultivated', then this knowledge. . . is what is called the Knowledge of Non-Arising. " [See the definition vii. 12a-b. ]
###
But how can one, through a pure knowledge, have such a
26 knowledge?
The Masters of KaSmir explain: Two conventional knowledges
are consecutive to two pure knowledges: "Suffering is known by
me. . . ; Suffering is known by me and is no longer to be known. " It is
by reason of the characteristic of these two conventional knowl-
edges that the Sustra defines the two pure knowledges. [This is
27
why the Sastra says: tad updddya. . . ] 28
According to other masters, the ascetic knows, through a pure knowledge, that he knows Suffering, etc.
? But we have said that the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising are not seeing, or views. How can the Sustra define them as views?
29 The Sastra employs the term "view" through stylistic habit,
using again the formula employed in the definition of the other knowledges (the knowledge of Suffering,etc). Or rather, by reason of their characteristic of being directly perceived, these two knowledges are qualified as seeing. It is by reason of this
30 characteristic of being directly perceived that it says in the Sastra,
31 "Knowledge is seeing. "
***
There are ten knowledges: a knowledge of dharmas, inferential
knowledge, worldly, conventional knowledge, the knowledge of
the mind of another, the knowledge of Suffering, the knowledge of
Origin, the knowledge of Extinction, the knowledge of the Path,
the Knowledge of Destruction, and the Knowledge of Non-Ari-
32 sing.
33 How are they included in one another?
1. Conventional knowledge is made up of one knowledge,
namely the conventional knowledge, and one part of another
knowledge [namely the impure part of the knowledge of the mind
34 of another].
2. A knowledge of dharrnas is made up of one full knowledge and one part of seven other knowledges, namely the Kdmadhdtu part of the knowledge of suffering, of origin, of extinction, and of the Path, the knowledge of the mind of another, the Knowledge of Destruction, and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
3. So too inferential knowledge, by replacing "the Kumadhatu
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part" with "the part relating to the two higher spheres (=Rupad- hatu and Arupyadhatu). "
4. The knowledge of suffering is made up of one knowledge and one part of four other knowledges--that part of the knowl- edge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising which have the Truth of Suffering for their objects.
5-6. The knowledge of origin and of extinction are explained according to the same principle.
7. A knowledge of the Path is made up of one knowledge and one part of five knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the Knowledge of Destruction, the knowledge of Non-Arising, and the knowledge of the mind of another.
8. The knowledge of the mind of another is made up of one knowledge and one part of four knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, a knowledge of the Path, and conventional knowledge.
9. The Knowledge of Destruction is made up of one knowledge and one part of six knowledges: the knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, the knowledge of suffering, of origin, of
35 extinction, and of the Path.
10. So too the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
How are the knowledges, which are twofold (pure and impure) distributed into ten knowledges?
8. The knowledges are ten in number; the distinction is established by reason of their nature, their opposition, their aspect, their aspect and their object, their preparatory exercises, the achievement of their task, and the extension of their cause.
1. By reason of its nature, there is conventional knowledge,
36 because it is not absolute knowledge.
? _ The Knowledges 1097 2. By reason of their opposition, there is knowledge of the
dharmas and inferential knowledge: the first is opposed to 37
Kamadhatu, and the second is opposed to the higher spheres.
3. By reason of their aspect (dkdratas, vii. 13), there is a
knowledge of Suffering and a knowledge of Origin: these two
knowledges have the same object (i. e. , the pancopdddnaskandhas, 38
vi. English trans, p. 898 and 908), but differ in their aspects.
4. By reason of their aspect and their object (dlambana), there is a knowledge of Extinction and a knowledge of the Path which differ in their aspects as well as in their objects.
5. By reason of their preparatory exercises, there is the knowledge of the mind of another. Without doubt this knowledge extends also to the mental states {caittas) of another, but the preparatory exercise bears on the mind {citta)\ also, even though it may know the caittas, it is termed paracittajnana (the knowledge of the mind of another) by reason of its preparatory exercise.
6. Because "that which should have been done has been done/' there is the Knowledge of Destruction: this knowledge is the first knowledge to arise in a series in which "that which should have been done has been done. " [The Knowledge of Non-Arising arises in a similar series, but later. ]
7. By reason of the extension of its causes, there is the Knowledge of Non-Arising, for it has for its causes (=sabhd- gahetu) all the pure knowledges, up to and including the Knowledge of Destruction.
***
We have said that the knowledge of the dharmas [that is to say: a. bearing on the Four Truths, b. in the Path of Seeing and in the Path of Meditation] is opposed to all of Kamadhatu [that is to say it "opposes" the five categories of defilements, those abandoned through the Seeing of the Four Truths and through Meditation, of Kamadhatu]. Furthermore
? 1098 Chapter Seven
9a-c.
The knowledge of dharmas, in the Pathway of Meditation, when it bears on Extinction and the Path, is opposed to the three spheres.
A knowledge of dharmas with respect to Extinction and the Path, realized in the course of the Path of Meditation is opposed to the three spheres--that is to say, these two knowledges oppose the defilements of the higher spheres which are abandoned through Meditation. 39
9d. Inferential knowledge is not opposed to Kumadhatu. In none of its branches (Suffering, etc. ) is inferential knowl-
edge opposed ? the defilements of Kamadhatu. What are the aspects of the ten knowledges?
lOa-b. A knowledge of dharmas and inferential knowledge have sixteen aspects.
The sixteen aspects which will be explained later (vii. 13a).
lOb-c. Conventional knowledge is the same and otherwise.
Conventional knowledge has the sixteen aspects; it also takes up others, for it grasps unique characteristics, common characteris- tics, etc. 40
? ? -d. Four, because of the aspect of their Truth. 41
A knowledge of Suffering, Origin, Extinction, and the Path, bearing on the aspects of their Truths, each have four aspects.
lla-b. So too, when it is pure, the knowledge of the mind of another. 42
? The knowledge of the mind of another, in its impure part (vii. 5b-6, note 16), bears on the aspects of its Truth; it therefore has four aspects. This part of the knowledge of the mind of another is, in fact, made up of the knowledge of the Path.
llb-c. When it is impure, it has for its aspects the unique
43 characteristics of its object.
When the knowledge of the mind of another is impure, it grasps the unique characteristics of its object (jneya), namely the mind and the mental states of another. Its aspects are in conformity with these unique characteristics; therefore they are not included in the sixteen.
Pure or impure
44 Ud. It has for its sphere an individual object.
When it bears on a mind, it does not bear on a mental state (caitta); when it bears on a certain mental state (vedand for example), it does not bear on any other one (samjnd, for example).
If this is the case, why did the Blessed One say, "He knows in truth the mind which is sardga (possesses craving) as being
45
sardga", since the knowledge of the mind of another does not
know minds and mental states (craving, etc. ) at one and the same
time, in the same way that one does not grasp the cloth and its
46 stain at one and the same time?
The expression sardga, possessing craving, has two meanings. 47
A mind is sardga because it is "mixed" with craving, or because it 48
is "united" to craving.
The mind associated with craving (ii. 53c), that is to say, which is presently in the prey of craving, is sardga for two reasons; it is mixed with craving, and it is united to craving.
The Knowledges 1Q99
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49
Certain masters
sardgacitta solely designates a mind mixed with craving, that is to say, a mind associated with craving. As for the vigatardga mind, a mind without craving, this is, according to these masters, the mind opposed to craving. In fact, they say, if the mind not associated with craving were called vigataraga, the mind associated with the other defilements (hatred, etc. ) would be also termed vigataraga, for they are not associated with craving.
Objection: In this hypothesis a non-defiled, indeterminate mind (ii. 71b) is not sardga, since it is not associated with craving; it is not vigataraga, since it is not opposed to craving. As a consequence we must admit that what the other masters (the Abhidharmikas) say, that the mind is sardga through the fact of being united to craving, without it necessarily being mixed with craving. In this same way we must explain the other expressions of the Sutra up to "possessing delusion'' (samoha) and "not possessing delusion" (vigatamoha). [See above, note 45. ]
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] A good mind is called concentrated
51
because it is not turned away from its object. A defiled mind is
distracted, because it is associated with distraction.
The Westerners, or Masters of Gandhara, say: A mind
52
Any other impure mind united to craving.
50
is solely sardga to the extent that it is
associated with laziness is concentrated; other defiled mind.
a distracted mind is any
think that the Sutra, by the expression
[The Vaibhasikas] do not admit this definition. They say: In this system, the same mind, namely a defiled mind associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted. Further, this system contradicts the Mulasdstra (according to the Japanese editor, Jndnaprasthana, 15. 9), which
? says, "He knows in truth the concentrated (samksipta) mind, endowed with the four knowledges, a knowledge of dharmas, inferential knowledge, worldly conventional knowledge, and a knowledge of the Path" (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 950c8). [See below, p. 1102 - 3. ]
###
A defiled mind is sunken down, because it is associated with
53 indolence.
A good mind is "well in hand", because it is associated with
54 correct effort.
A defiled mind is called small, because it is beloved by small
persons. A good mind is called large, because it is beloved by great
55 persons.
Or rather the two minds, a defiled mind and a good mind, are called small and great because their roots, their worth, their followings, their entourage, and their forces, are respectively, small or great.
In fact, 1. a defiled mind is of small roots, having two roots, delusion, plus anger or greed: a good mind is always associated with three roots of good; 2. a defiled mind is of small worth, being obtained without effort: a good mind is of great worth, being realized at the cost of great effort; 3. a defiled mind has a small following, for a defiled mind is not accompanied by the acquisition
56
of a future mind of the same type;
following, being accompanied by the acquisition of future mind
of the same type; 4. a defiled mind has a small following, being surrounded only by three skandhas, vedand, samjnd, and samskdras; a good mind has a great following, for it always includes rupa {dhydndndsmvasamvara, iv. 4a, 26); 5. a defiled mind is of small
a good mind has a great 57
? 1102 Chapter Seven .
force, for the roots of good, cut off, are reborn (ii, 36, English trans, p. 210 iv. 80c); a good mind is of great force, for the Patience of the Knowledge of the dharmas concerned with Suffering definitively cuts off ten latent defilements {anusayas vi. English trans, p. 943).
This is why a defiled mind is called small, and a good mind, great.
***
The defiled mind is sa-uttara, because it is associated with frivolity {auddhatya)\ the good mind is anuttara, because it is
58 opposed to frivolity.
Calm and not calm minds are explained in the same way.
***
A defiled mind is non-absorbed, because it is associated with distraction; a good mind is absorbed, because it is opposed to distraction.
A defiled mind is uncultivated, because the two cultivations (vii. 27) are absent. A good mind is cultivated, for the contrary reason.
A defiled mind is undelivered, not being delivered in and of
59 itself, nor delivered with regard to the series in which it arises. A
good mind can be delivered in and of itself and from the point of view of the series in which it arises.
Such is the explanation of the Vaibhasikas.
This explanation, [say the Sautrantikas,] does not conform to the Sutra and it does not take into account the meaning of the terms.
? i. How does it not conform to the Sutra?
The Sutra says, "What is a mind internally concentrated? A mind which is accompanied by torpor and laziness, or a mind internally accompanied by calm but not insight. "
"What is a mind externally distracted? A mind which is
dispersed towards the five objects of pleasure, or which is
60
externally accompanied by insight, but not by calm. " [It, results
from this text that a mind associated with laziness can be concentrated. ]
But, [the Vaibhasikas answer,] we have said (p. 1100, line 21) that if a mind associated with laziness is concentrated, a defiled (and consequently distracted) mind, when it is associated with laziness, will be at one and the same time concentrated and distracted.
Yes, you have said this, but it does not hold. In fact, we can only
affirm that a defiled mind, when it is associated with laziness, is
61 distracted.
But, [answer the Vaibhasikas,] your thesis contradicts the Sastra!
62 It may. But it is better to contradict a Sastra than a Sutra.
ii. How does this explanation lack the proper meaning of the different terms?
Because it gives the characteristics of different minds--dis- tracted, sunken-down, small, not calm, non-absorbed, uncultivated, and undelivered on the one hand, and concentrated, well in hand,
63 etc. , on the other hand--without noting their differences.
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] It is false that we do not indicate the special sense of the different terms. The quality of "defiled" of distracted minds, etc. , is the same; but we explain the particular defects of these different defiled minds. In the same way we explain the particular qualities of the different good minds, in which their good qualities are not differentiated.
We answer that the meaning of the different terms is not correctly established because you fail to eliminate the objection of
The Knowledges 1103
? 64
contradiction with the Sutra. [The Sutra, in fact, says that a mind
accompanied by torpor and laziness is concentrated. A mind united with laziness, and defiled through union with torpor, is concen- trated, but it cannot be good, for torpor is a klesamahdbhumika. ]
And if, [as the Vaibhasikas believe], the Sutra designates, by
65
the sunken-down mind,
separately of a sunken-down mind and a small mind. Now it distinguishes them, for it says, "When the mind is sunken down, or fears becoming sunken down, this is not a proper time to cultivate the prasrabdhi, samddhi, and upeksa parts of Bodhi. When the mind is small or fears becoming small, this is not a fitting moment
66 to cultivate the dharmavicaya, virya, and priti parts of Bodhi. "
Objection [of the Vaibhasikas:] Is the cultivation of the parts of
67
Bodhi partial in the case which concerns us? [Must we believe
a small mind, it would not speak
that at a certain moment one cultivates prasrabdhi, samddhi, 69
upeksa, and at another moment dharmavicaya, virya, and priti? ]
No. When the text says "cultivation", it does not signify the fact of actualizing, but the fact of fixing the attention on, or taking as an object.
69
[Answer of the Vaibhasikas:] The mind in which indolence
dominates and in which frivolity is reduced is called "sunken
down" (lina). The mind in which frivolity dominates and in which
indolence is reduced is called "small" {uddhata). These two minds
are therefore distinct, and the Sutra can speak of them separately
without contradicting our system. But, taking into consideration
the fact that these two defilements, indolence and frivolity, coexist
in a single mental heap, we say that the mind which is sunken
70 down is small.
71
We do not pretend to challenge a text of intentional meaning; but such is not the intention of the Sutra [i. e. , to designate a mind in which indolence dominates as sunken down. . . ]
***
? In the thesis presented above (p. 1099, line 23) that all minds "united with craving" (rdgasamyukta) "possess craving" (sardga), what is the meaning of the expression rdgasamyukta, united with craving?
1. If a mind is united with craving, and as a consequence possesses craving, because the possession of craving continues in the series in which this mind is produced, then the mind of an imperfect saint or Saiksa, even when it is pure, will be termed "possessing craving", since the craving has not been completely
72 expelled from the series of the Saiksa.
2. If a mind is both united with craving and possesses craving
through the fact of being the object (dlambana) of the "active 73
craving" ,thentheimpuremindofanArhatwillpossesscraving,
since this mind can be the object of the craving of another
74 person.
If you do not admit that the mind of an Arhat can be grasped as an object through the craving of another person, how can this mind be termed impure?
Would you say that it is impure, not because it is the object of the craving of another, but because it is the object of a "general defilement" (sdmdnyaklesa, v. 12, namely of ignorance or delusion) of another? In this hypothesis, do not say that this mind is sardga, that it "possesses craving"; say rather that it is samoha, that it "possesses moha," since it is the object of the moha or ignorance of another.
But, we would say, none of these proposed explanations is valid. In fact the knowledge of the mind of another does not bear on the "possessions" which can be found in the series of another. Consequently when I know that the mind of another person possesses craving, this mind of another does not possess craving because it is "united with craving" in the sense that it is accompanied by the possession of craving, or in the sense that it is found in the series in which this possession has not been expelled.
The knowledge of the mind of another no longer knows the craving which would be the object of the mind of another.
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Therefore a mind is not termed saraga through the fact of ragasamyoga, through the fact of being "united with raga" in the proposed twofold sense.
[Objection:]
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***
If this is the case, what is a saraga mind?
[Vasubandhu:] One should determine the intention of the Sutra. A saraga mind or one "possessing craving" is not a ragasarhyukta mind, a mind "united to craving", but a ragasarh- prayukta mind, a mind "associated with craving," a mind in which craving presently exists. Vigataraga, "without craving" is a mind which is not associated with craving, even when this mind will be accompanied by the possession of craving.
[Objection:] The expression vigataraga cannot have this meaning; for another Sutra says that a mind which is without craving {vigataraga), without anger (vigatadvesa), and without ignorance (vigatamoha), does not fall back into threefold existence. Now if this mind is accompanied by the possession of craving, etc. , it will fall back again.
[Vasubandhu:] In this other Sutra, "a mind without craving" (vigataraga citta) signifies "a mind which is not accompanied by the possession of craving" (vigatardgaprdpti citta).
[Objection:] Have you not refuted your own opinion? We said in fact (page 1100, line 5) that if one calls a mind without craving vigataraga, that is, a mind in which craving is not presently active, then one should term all minds associated with another defilement vigataraga. But one does not say that a mind associated with hatred is vigataraga, "without craving. "
[Vasubandhu:] There is nothing wrong with saying that a mind without craving is vigataraga. But one does not consider a mind without craving but associated with hatred as being vigataraga, but rather as "possessing hatred" (sadvesa), distin- guishing it through its specific characteristic which is one of being
? "associated with hatred. "
When the knowledge of the mind of another attains its object, namely the mind of another person, does it attain this mind of another as this latter knows it?
No. When one knows the mind of another, one does not see the object of this mind; one does not see this mind as it itself knows something: one knows only that it is defiled, etc. ; one does not know the object, color, etc. , by reason of which it is defiled. If it were otherwise, the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on rupa, etc. , and would no longer be the knowledge of the mind of another; the knowledge of the mind of another would bear on itself: for the person whose mind I know can at the same moment know my mind.
The characteristics of the knowledge of the mind of another are set: it knows the individual characteristics of a thing (the dravya-svalaksana) but not its general, conventionally true characteristics (its samvrtisat-sdmdnyalaksana)\ it knows mind and mental states but not physical matter, the present but not the past or future, of another but not of oneself, of the sphere of Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu, but not of Ampyadhatu; or rather the pure mind and mental states, of the category to which he himself belongs: pure, he knows a pure mind and mental states; impure, he knows an impure mind and mental states. The knowledge of the mind of another is incompatible with the Path of Seeing and the Uninterrupted Path (dnantaryamdrga), with the Samadhi of Emptiness and the Samadhi of No-Marks, and with the Knowl- edge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising. Other conditions are not excluded: the knowledge of the mind of another is compatible with the Path of Meditation (the Path of Liberation, vimuktimdrga, and the Path of Distinction, visesamdrga), with the Uncommitted Samadhi (apranihitasamddhi), etc.
The teaching of the knowledge of the mind of another is ended.
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12a-b. The other has fourteen aspects by excluding the aspect of emptiness and the aspect of non-self.
The "others" are the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising.
Both have fourteen aspects (vii. 13a), excluding the aspect of
emptiness and the aspect of non-self. In fact, these two Knowl-
76
edges, even though they are of the absolute level of truth, are also
77
included in the conventional level of truth (vi. 4);
therefore foreign to the aspects of emptiness and non-self. When an ascetic departs from the contemplation in which the knowl- edges of the absolute truth are realized, through the force of these
78
knowledges, later knowledges
conventional level of truth: "my births are cut off, the religious life has been fully cultivated, I have done what should have been done,
79
and I do not know of any more existences for me. " The two
knowledges, the Knowledge of Destruction and the Knowledge of Non-Arising, therefore participate in the conventional level of truth, not in and of themselves or through definition, but through their outflowing.
Are there any pure aspects outside of these sixteen aspects?
12c. There are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.
The Masters of Kasmir say that there are no pure aspects outside of the sixteen.
12d. Some others, according to the Sustra, affirm that there are.
are produced which are of the
they are
? _ The Knowledges 1109
The Foreign Masters maintain the opposite opinion. [For the opinion of "the other masters," see p. 1094, line 27].
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The Mulasdstra says,
belonging to Kamadhatu through a mind not included among the Dhutus (that is to say, pure)? One can distinguish them as they are, as impermanent, suffering, empty, impersonal, cause, proximate cause, near cause, specificing cause; there is this characteristic (sthdna), there is this cause (vastu). "
One should thus consider the specific aspects through the expressions asty etat sthdnam, asty etad vastu, as two pure aspects which are added to the eight aspects of suffering and origin.
According to the Masters of Kasmir, the Sastra does not teach the existence of these two additional aspects. One should understand, ". .
