Selfless
actions are impos-
sible.
sible.
Nietzsche - v15 - Will to Power - b
” In its
lowest form, the will to live at all costs-the
instinct of self-preservation.
(2) Subordination, with the view of satisfying
the will to power of a whole community; submis-
siveness, the making of one's self indispensable and
useful to him who has the power; love, a secret
path to the heart of the powerful, in order to be-
come his master.
(3) The feeling of duty, conscience, the imagin-
ary comfort of belonging to a higher order than
those who actually hold the reins of power; the
acknowledgment of an order of rank which allows
of judging even the more powerful; self-deprecia-
tion; the discovery of new codes of morality (of
which the Jews are a classical example).
775.
Praise and gratitude as forms of will to power. -
Praise and gratitude for harvests, for good weather,
victories, marriages, and peace—all festivals need
a subject on which feeling can be outpoured. The
desire is to make all good things that happen to
one appear as though they had been done to one:
people will have a donor. The same holds good
of the work of art: people are not satisfied with
it alone, they must praise the artist. —What, then,
is praise? It is a sort of compensation for benefits
received, a sort of giving back, a manifestation of
our power-for the man who praises assents to,
blesses, values, judges: he arrogates to himself the
right to give his consent to a thing, to be able to
.
## p. 220 (#250) ############################################
220
THE WILL TO POWER.
confer honours. An increased feeling of happiness
or of liveliness is also an increased feeling of power,
and it is as a result of this feeling that a man
praises (it is as the outcome of this feeling that
he invents a donor, a “subject"). Gratitude is
thus revenge of a lofty kind : it is most severely
exercised and demanded where equality and pride
both require to be upheld—that is to say, where
revenge is practised to its fullest extent.
776.
Concerning the Machiavellism of Power.
The will to power appears :
(a) Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds,
in the form of will to "freedom": the mere fact of
breaking loose from something seems to be an end
in itself (in a religio-moral sense : "One is only
answerable to one's own conscience"; "evangelical
freedom," etc. etc. ).
(6) In the case of a stronger species, ascending
to power, in the form of the will to overpower. If
this fails, then it shrinks to the “ will to justice”.
that is to say, to the will to the same measure of
rights as the ruling caste possesses.
© In the case of the strongest, richest, most
independent, and most courageous, in the form of
“ love of humanity,” of “love of the people," of the
“gospel,” of “truth,” of “God,” of “pity,” of “self-
sacrifice,” etc. etc. ; in the form of overpowering, of
deeds of capture, of imposing service on some one,
of an instinctive reckoning of one's self as part of a
great mass of power to which one attempts to give
»
## p. 221 (#251) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
221
a direction: the hero, the prophet, the Cæsar, the
Saviour, the bell-wether. (The love of the sexes
also belongs to this category; it will overpower
something, possess it utterly, and it looks like self-
abnegation. At bottom it is only the love of one's
instrument, of one's “horse”--the conviction that
things belong to one because one is in a position
to use them. )
Freedom,” “ Justice," “ Love"! ! !
777
Love. —Behold this love and pity of women-
what could be more egoistic ? . . . And when they
do sacrifice themselves and their honour or reputa-
tion, to whom do they sacrifice themselves ? To the
man? Is it not rather to an unbridled desire ?
These desires are quite as selfish, even though they
may be beneficial to others and provoke gratitude.
To what extent can such a hyperfcetation of
one valuation sanctify everything else! !
778.
“ Senses," “ Passions. "—When the fear of the
senses and of the passions and of the desires be-
comes so great as to warn us against them, it is
already a symptom of weakness: extreme measures
always characterise abnormal conditions. That
which is lacking here, or more precisely that which
is decaying, is the power to resist an impulse : when
one feels instinctively that one must yield,—that is
to say, that one must react,—then it is an excellent
thing to avoid opportunities (temptations).
## p. 222 (#252) ############################################
222
THE WILL TO POWER.
The stimulation of the senses is only a tempta-
tion in so far as those creatures are concerned
whose systems are easily swayed and influenced :
on the other hand, in the case of remarkable con-
stitutional obtuseness and hardness, strong stimuli
are necessary in order to set the functions in
motion. Dissipation can only be objected to in
the case of one who has no right to it; and almost
all passions have fallen into disrepute thanks to
those who were not strong enough to convert them
to their own advantage.
One should understand that passions are open
to the same objections as illnesses : yet we should
not be justified in doing without illnesses, and still
less without passions. We require the abnormal;
we give life a tremendous shock by means of these
great illnesses.
In detailthe following should be distinguished:-
(1) The dominating passion, which may even
bring the supremest form of health with it: in this
case the co-ordination of the internal system and
its functions to perform one task is best attained,
but this is almost a definition of health.
(2) The antagonism of the passions—the double,
treble, and multiple soul in one breast: * this is
very unhealthy; it is a sign of inner ruin and
of disintegration, betraying and promoting an
internal dualism and anarchy-unless, of course,
one passion becomes master. Return to health.
* This refers to Goethe's Faust. In Part I. , Act I. , Scene II. ,
we find Faust exclaiming in despair :“Two souls, alas ! within
my bosom throne! " See Theodore Martin's Faust, trans-
lated into English verse. -TR.
## p. 223 (#253) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
223
(3) The juxtaposition of passions without their
being either opposed or united with one another.
Very often transitory, and then, as soon as order is
established, this condition may be a healthy one.
A most interesting class of men belong to this
order, the chameleons; they are not necessarily at
loggerheads with themselves, they are both happy
and secure, but they cannot develop—their moods
lie side by side, even though they may seem to lie
far apart. They change, but they become nothing.
779.
i
!
The quantitative estimate of aims and its in-
fluence upon the valuing standpoint: the great
and the small criminal. The greatness or small-
ness of the aims will determine whether the doer
feels respect for himself with it all, or whether
he feels pusillanimous and miserable.
The degree of intellectuality manifested in the
means employed may likewise influence our valua-
tion. How differently the philosophical innovator,
experimenter, and man of violence stands out
against robbers, barbarians, adventurers ! —There
is a semblance of disinterestedness in the former.
Finally, noble manners, bearing, courage, self-
confidence,-how they alter the value of that
which is attained by means of them!
*
Concerning the optics of valuation :
The influence of the greatness or smallness of
the aims.
## p. 224 (#254) ############################################
224
THE WILL TO POWER.
The influence of the intellectuality of the means.
The influence of the behaviour in action.
The influence of success or failure.
The influence of opposing forces and their value.
The influence of that which is permitted and
that which is forbidden.
780.
The tricks by means of which actions, measures,
and passions are legitimised, which from an in-
dividual standpoint are no longer good form or
even in good taste :
Art, which allows us to enter such strange worlds,
makes them tasteful to us.
Historians prove its justification and reason;
travels, exoticism, psychology, penal codes, the
lunatic asylum, the criminal, sociology.
Impersonality (so that as media of a collective
whole we allow ourselves these passions and actions
-the Bar, juries, the bourgeois, the soldier, the
minister, the prince, society, “critics') makes us
feel that we are sacrificing something.
781.
Preoccupations concerning one's self and one's
eternal salvation are not expressive either of a
rich or of a self-confident nature, for the latter
lets all questions of eternal bliss go to the devil,
-it is not interested in such matters of happiness;
it is all power, deeds, desires; it imposes itself
upon things; it even violates things. The Chris-
## p. 225 (#255) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
225
/
tian is a romantic hypochondriac who does not
stand firmly on his legs.
Whenever hedonistic views come to the front,
one can always presuppose the existence of pain
and a certain ill-constitutedness.
782.
“The growing autonomy of the individual”.
Parisian philosophers like M. Fouillée talk of such
things: they would do well to study the race
moutonnière for a moment; for they belong to it.
For Heaven's sake open your eyes, ye sociologists
who deal with the future !
The individual grew
strong under quite opposite conditions : ye describe
the extremest weakening and impoverishment of
man; ye actually want this weakness and impover-
ishment, and ye apply the whole lying machinery
of the old ideal in order to achieve your end.
Ye
are so constituted that ye actually regard your
gregarious wants as an ideal ! Here we are in
the presence of an absolute lack of psychological
honesty.
783.
The two traits which characterise the modern
European are apparently antagonistic-individual-
ism and the demand for equal rights: this I am at
last beginning to understand. The individual is
an extremely vulnerable piece of vanity: this
vanity, when it is conscious of its high degree of
susceptibility to pain, demands that every one
should be made equal; that the individual should
only stand inter pares. But in this way a social
P
VOL. II.
## p. 226 (#256) ############################################
226
THE WILL TO POWER.
race is depicted in which, as a matter of fact, gifts
and powers are on the whole equally distributed.
The pride which would have loneliness and but
few appreciators is quite beyond comprehension :
really "great" successes are only attained through
the masses-indeed, we scarcely understand yet
that a mob success is in reality only a small suc-
cess; because pulchrum est paucorum hominum.
No morality will countenance order of rank
among men, and the jurists know nothing of a
communal conscience. The principle of indi-
vidualism rejects really great men, and demands
the most delicate vision for, and the speediest dis-
covery of, a talent among people who are almost
equal; and inasmuch as every one has some
modicum of talent in such late and civilised cul.
tures (and can, therefore, expect to receive his share
of honour), there is a more general buttering-up
of modest merits to-day than there has ever been.
· This gives the age the appearance of unlimited
justice. Its want of justice is to be found not in
its unbounded hatred of tyrants and demagogues,
even in the arts; but in its detestation of noble
natures who scorn the praise of the many. The
demand for equal rights (that is to say, the privi-
lege of sitting in judgment on everything and
everybody) is anti-aristocratic.
This age knows just as little concerning the
absorption of the individual, of his mergence into
a great type of men who do not want to be
personalities. It was this that formerly constituted
the distinction and the zeal of many lofty natures
(the greatest poets among them); or of the desire
## p. 227 (#257) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
227
to be a polis, as in Greece; or of Jesuitism, or of
the Prussian Staff Corps, and bureaucracy; or of
apprenticeship and a continuation of the tradition
of great masters: to all of which things, nor. -social
conditions and the absence of petty vanity are
necessary.
784.
Individualism is a modest and still unconscious
form of will to power; with it a single human unit
seems to think it sufficient to free himself from the
preponderating power of society (or of the State or
Church). He does not set himself up in opposi-
tion as a personality, but merely as a unit; he
represents the rights of all other individuals as
against the whole. That is to say, he instinc-
tively places himself on a level with every other
unit: what he combats he does not combat as a
person, but as a representative of units against a
mass.
Socialism is merely an agitatory measure of
individualism : it recognises the fact that in order
to attain to something, men must organise them-
selves into a general movement- into a “power. "
But what the Socialist requires is not society as
the object of the individual, but society as a means
of making many individuals possible: this is the
instinct of Socialists, though they frequently de-
ceive themselves on this point (apart from this,
however, in order to make their kind prevail, they
are compelled to deceive others to an enormous
extent). Altruistic moral preaching thus enters
into the service of individual egoism,-one of
## p. 228 (#258) ############################################
228
THE WILL TO POWER.
the most common frauds of the nineteenth
century.
Anarchy is also merely an agitatory measure of
Socialism; with it the Socialist inspires fear, with
fear he begins to fascinate and to terrorise: but
what he does above all is to draw all courageous
and reckless people to his side, even in the most
intellectual spheres.
In spite of all this, individualism is the most
modest stage of the will to power.
When one has reached a certain degree of inde-
pendence, one always longs for more : separation
in proportion to the degree of force; the individual
is no longer content to regard himself as equal
to everybody, he actually seeks for his peer-he
makes himself stand out from others. Individual-
ism is followed by a development in groups and
organs; correlative tendencies join up together and
become powerfully active: now there arise between
these centres of power, friction, war, a reconnoitring
of the forces on either side, reciprocity, under-
standings, and the regulation of mutual services.
Finally, there appears an order of rank.
Recapitulation-
1. The individuals emancipate themselves.
2. They make war, and ultimately agree con-
cerning equal rights (justice is made an end in itself).
3. Once this is reached, the actual differences in
degrees of power begin to make themselves felt,
and to greater extent than before the reason
being that on the whole peace is established, and
innumerable small centres of power begin to create
3
## p. 229 (#259) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
229
differences which formerly were scarcely notice-
able). Now the individuals begin to form groups,
these strive after privileges and preponderance,
and war starts afresh in a milder form.
People demand freedom only when they have
no power. Once power is obtained, a preponder-
ance thereof is the next thing to be coveted ; if
this is not achieved (owing to the fact that one is
still too weak for it), then “justice," i. e. “equality
of power ” become the objects of desire.
785.
The rectification of the concept"egoism. ”—When
one has discovered what an error the “individual”
is, and that every single creature represents the
whole process of evolution (not alone “inherited,"
but in “himself”), the individual then acquires an
inordinately great importance. The voice of in-
stinct is quite right here. When this instinct
tends to decline, i. e. when the individual begins
to seek his worth in his services to others, one may
be sure that exhaustion and degeneration have set
in. An altruistic attitude of mind, when it is funda-
mental and free from all hypocrisy, is the instinct
of creating a second value for one's self in the ser-
vice of other egoists. As a rule, however, it is
only apparent—a circuitous path to the preserva-
tion of one's own feelings of vitality and worth.
786.
The History of Moralisation and Demoralisation.
Proposition one. There are no such things as
## p. 230 (#260) ############################################
230
THE WILL TO POWER.
moral actions: they are purely imaginary. Not
only is it impossible to demonstrate their exist-
ence (a fact which Kant and Christianity, for
instance, both acknowledged)—but they are not
even possible. Owing to psychological misunder-
standing, a man invented an opposite to the instinc-
tive impulses of life, and believed that a new species
of instinct was thereby discovered : a primum mobile
was postulated which does not exist at all. Ac-
cording to the valuation which gave rise to the
antithesis "moral" and "immoral," one should
say: There is nothing else on earth but immoral
intentions and actions.
Proposition two. — The whole differentiation,
"moral" and "immoral," arises from the assump-
tion that both moral and immoral actions are the
result of a spontaneous will-in short, that such
a will exists; or in other words, that moral judg-
ments can only hold good with regard to intuitions
and actions that are free. But this whole order of
actions and intentions is purely imaginary: the
only world to which the moral standard could be
applied does not exist at all: there is no such
thing as a moral or an immoral action.
*
The psychological error out of which the anti-
thesis “moral” and “immoral” arose is : “selfless,"
“unselfish,” “self-denying"-all unreal and fan-
tastic.
A false dogmatism also clustered around the
concept "ego”; it was regarded as atomic, and
falsely opposed to a non-ego; it was also liberated
## p. 231 (#261) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
231
from Becoming, and declared to belong to the
sphere of Being. The false materialisation of the
ego: this owing to the belief in individual im-
mortality) was made an article of faith under the
pressure of religio-moral discipline. According to
this artificial liberation of the ego and its trans-
ference to the realm of the absolute, people
thought that they had arrived at an antithesis
in values which seemed quite irrefutable — the
single ego and the vast non-ego. It seemed
obvious that the value of the individual ego could
only exist in conjunction with the vast non-ego,
more particularly in the sense of being subject to
it and existing only for its sake. Here, of course,
,
the gregarious instinct determined the direction
of thought: nothing is more opposed to this
instinct than the sovereignty of the individual.
Supposing, however, that the ego be absolute, then
its value must lie in self-negation.
Thus: (1) the false emancipation of the “in-
dividual” as an atom;
(2) The gregarious self-conceit which abhors the
desire to remain an atom, and regards it as hostile.
(3) As a result: the overcoming of the individual
by changing his aim.
(4) At this point there appeared to be actions
that were self-effacing: around these actions a
whole sphere of antitheses was fancied.
(5) It was asked, in what sort of actions does
man most strongly assert himself? Around these
(sexuality, covetousness, lust for power, cruelty,
etc. etc. ) hate, contempt; and anathemas were
heaped : it was believed that there could be such
## p. 232 (#262) ############################################
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THE WILL TO POWER.
things as selfless impulses. Everything selfish
was condemned, everything unselfish was in
demand.
(6) And the result was: what had been done ?
A ban had been placed on the strongest, the most
natural, yea, the only genuine impulses; hencefor-
ward, in order that an action might be praiseworthy,
there must be no trace in it of any of those genuine
impulses—monstrous fraud in psychology. Every
kind of self-satisfaction” had to be remodelled
and made possible by means of misunderstanding
and adjusting one's self sub specie boni. Conversely:
that species which found its advantage in depriving
mankind of its self-satisfaction, the representatives
of the gregarious instincts, e. g. the priests and the
philosophers, were sufficiently crafty and psycho-
logically astute to show how selfishness ruled every-
where. The Christian conclusion from this was :
“ Everything is sin, even our virtues. Man is
utterly undesirable.
Selfless actions are impos-
sible. " Original sin. In short, once man had
opposed his instincts to a purely imaginary world
of the good, he concluded by despising himself as
incapable of performing "good" actions.
N. B. -In this way Christianity represents a step
forward in the sharpening of psychological insight:
La Rochefoucauld and Pascal. It perceived the
essential equality of human actions, and the equality
of their values as a whole (all immoral).
*
Now the first serious object was to rear men in
whom self-seeking impulses were extinguished:
## p. 233 (#263) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
233
priests, saints. And if people doubted that perfec-
tion was possible, they did not doubt what per-
fection was.
The psychology of the saint and of the priest
and of the "good"man, must naturally have seemed
purely phantasmagorical. The real motive of all
action had been declared bad: therefore, in order
to make action still possible, deeds had to be
prescribed which, though not possible, had to be
declared possible and sanctified. They now
honoured and idealised things with as much falsity
as they had previously slandered them.
Inveighing against the instincts of life came to
be regarded as holy and estimable. The priestly
ideal was: absolute chastity, absolute obedience,
absolute poverty! The lay ideal: alms, pity, self-
sacrifice, renunciation of the beautiful, of reason,
and of sensuality, and a dark frown for all the
strong qualities that existed.
An advance is made: the slandered instincts
attempt to re-establish their rights (0. 8. Luther's
Reformation, the coarsest form of moral falsehood
under the cover of " Evangelical freedom"), they
are rechristened with holy names.
The calumniated instincts try to demonstrate that
they are necessary in order that the virtuous
instincts may be possible. Il faut vivre, afin de
vivre pour autrui: egoism as a means to an end. *
*
Spencer's conclusion in the Data of Ethics. -TR.
## p. 234 (#264) ############################################
234
THE WILL TO POWER.
But people go still further : they try to grant
both the egoistic and altruistic impulses the right
to exist-equal rights for both—from the utili-
tarian standpoint.
People go further : they see greater utility in
placing the egoistic rights before the altruistic-
greater utility in the sense of more happiness for the
majority, or of the elevation of mankind, etc. etc.
Thus the rights of egoism begin to preponderate,
but under the cloak of an extremely altruistic
standpoint—the collective utility of humanity.
An attempt is made to reconcile the altruistic
mode of action with the natural order of things.
Altruism is sought in the very roots of life.
Altruism and egoism are both based upon the
essence of life and nature.
The disappearance of the opposition between
them is dreamt of as a future possibility. Con-
tinued adaptation, it is hoped, will merge the two
into one.
At last it is seen that altruistic actions are
merely a species of the egoistic—and that the
degree to which one loves and spends one's self is a
proof of the extent of one's individual power and
personality. In short, that the more evil man can
be made, the better he is, and that one cannot be
the one without the other. . . . At this point the
curtain rises which concealed the monstrous fraud
of the psychology that has prevailed hitherto.
Results. There are only immoral intentions and
actions; the so-called moral actions must be shown
## p. 235 (#265) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
235
to be immoral. All emotions are traced to a single
will, the will to power, and are called essentially
equal.
The concept of life: in the apparent
antithesis good and evil, degrees of power in the
instincts alone are expressed. A temporary order
of rank is established according to which certain
instincts are either controlled or enlisted in our
service. Morality is justified: economically, etc.
Against proposition two. -Determinism: the
attempt to rescue the moral world by transferring
it to the unknown.
Determinism is only a manner of allowing our-
selves to conjure our valuations away, once they
have lost their place in a world interpreted
mechanistically. Determinism must therefore be
attacked and undermined at all costs : just as our
right to distinguish between an absolute and
phenomenal world should be disputed.
787.
It is absolutely necessary to emancipate our-
selves from motives: otherwise we should not be
allowed to attempt to sacrifice ourselves or to
neglect ourselves ! Only the innocence of Be-
coming gives us the highest courage and the
highest freedom.
788.
A clean conscience must be restored to the evil
man_has this been my involuntary endeavour all
## p. 236 (#266) ############################################
236
THE WILL TO POWER.
the time? for I take as the evil man him who is
strong (Dostoievsky's belief concerning the con-
victs in prison should be referred to here).
789.
Our new “ freedom. ” What a feeling of relief
there is in the thought that we emancipated spirits
do not feel ourselves harnessed to any system of
teleological aims. Likewise that the concepts
reward and punishment have no roots in the
essence of existence! Likewise that good and
evil actions are not good or evil in themselves,
but only from the point of view of the self-pre-
servative tendencies of certain species of humanity !
Likewise that our speculations concerning pleasure
and pain are not of cosmic, far less then of meta-
physical, importance! (That form of pessimism
associated with the name of Hartmann, which
pledges itself to put even the pain and pleasure of
existence into the balance, with its arbitrary con-
finement in the prison and within the bounds of
pre-Copernican thought, would be something not
only retrogressive, but degenerate, unless it be
merely a bad joke on the part of a “Berliner. " *)
790.
If one is clear as to the “wherefore" of one's
life, then the “how” of it can take care of itself.
*“Berliner ”—The citizens of Berlin are renowned in
Germany for their poor jokes. -TR.
## p. 237 (#267) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
237
It is already even a sign of disbelief in the where-
fore and in the purpose and sense of life in fact,
it is a sign of a lack of will—when the value of
pleasure and pain step into the foreground, and
hedonistic and pessimistic teaching becomes pre-
valent; and self-abnegation, resignation, virtue,
objectivity,” may, at the very least, be signs that
the most important factor is beginning to make
its absence felt.
791.
Hitherto there has been no German culture. It
is no refutation of this assertion to say that there
have been great anchorites in Germany (Goethe,
for instance); for these had their own culture.
But it was precisely around them, as though around
mighty, defiant, and isolated rocks, that the remain-
ing spirit of Germany, as their antithesis, lay—that
is to say, as a soft, swampy, slippery soil, upon
which every step and every footprint of the rest
of Europe made an impression and created forms.
German culture was a thing devoid of character
and of almost unlimited yielding power.
792.
Germany, though very rich in clever and well-
informed scholars, has for some time been so ex-
cessively poor in great souls and in mighty minds,
that it almost seems to have forgotten what a great
soul or a mighty mind is; and to-day mediocre and
even ill-constituted men place themselves in the
market square without the suggestion of a con-
science-prick or a signofembarrassment, and declare
## p. 238 (#268) ############################################
238
THE WILL TO POWER.
themselves great men, reformers, etc. Take the
case of Eugen Dühring, for instance, a really clever
and well-informed scholar, but a man who betrays
with almost every word he says that he has a miser-
ably small soul, and that he is horribly tormented
by narrow envious feelings; moreover, that it is no
mighty overflowing, benevolent, and spendthrift
spirit that drives him on, but only the spirit of
ambition ! But to be ambitious in such an age as
this is much more unworthy of a philosopher than
ever it was : to-day, when it is the mob that rules,
when it is the mob that dispenses the honours.
793
My “future": a severe polytechnic education.
Conscription; so that as a rule every man of the
higher classes should be an officer, whatever else
he may be besides.
## p. 239 (#269) ############################################
-
1
IV.
THE WILL TO POWER IN ART.
794.
OUR religion, morality, and philosophy are
decadent human institutions.
The counter-agent: Art
795.
The Artist-philosopher. A higher concept of
art. Can man stand at so great a distance from
his fellows as to mould them? (Preliminary ex-
ercises thereto :-
1. To become a self-former, an anchorite.
2. To do what artists have done hitherto, i. e.
to reach a small degree of perfection in a certain
medium. )
796.
Art as it appears without the artist, i. e. as a
body, an organisation (the Prussian Officers' Corps,
the Order of the Jesuits). To what extent is the
artist merely a preliminary stage? The world
regarded as a self-generating work of art.
239
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240
THE WILL TO POWER.
797.
The phenomenon, "artist," is the easiest to see
through : from it one can look down upon the
fundamental instincts of power, of nature, etc. ;
even of religion and morality.
Play,” uselessness—as the ideal of him who is
overflowing with power, as the ideal of the child.
The childishness of God, παίς παίζων.
798.
Apollonian, Dionysian. There are two con-
ditions in which art manifests itself in man even
as a force of nature, and disposes of him whether
he consent or not : it may be as a constraint to
visionary states, or it may be an orgiastic impulse.
Both conditions are to be seen in normal life, but
they are then somewhat weaker : in dreams and
in moments of elation or intoxication.
But the same contrast exists between the dream
state and the state of intoxication: both of these
states let loose all manner of artistic powers with-
in us, but each unfetters powers of a different
kind. Dreamland gives us the power of vision, of
association, of poetry: intoxication gives us the
power of grand attitudes, of passion, of song, and
of dance.
66
* German :
Rausch. ”—There is no word in English for
the German expression "Rausch. " When Nietzsche uses it,
he means a sort of blend of our two words : intoxication and
elation. - TR.
:
## p. 241 (#271) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN ART.
241
799.
Sexuality and voluptuousness belong to the
Dionysiac intoxication : but neither of them is
lacking in the Apollonian state. There is also
a difference of tempo between the states. . . . The
extreme peace of certain feelings of intoxication (or,
more strictly, the slackening of the feeling of time,
and the reduction of the feeling of space) is wont
to reflect itself in the vision of the most restful
attitudes and states of the soul. The classical
style essentially represents repose, simplification,
foreshortening, and concentration-the highest feel-
ing of power is concentrated in the classical type.
To react with difficulty: great consciousness : no
feeling of strife.
800.
>
The feeling of intoxication is, as a matter of
fact, equivalent to a sensation of surplus power: it
is strongest in seasons of rut: new organs, new
accomplishments, new. colours, new forms.
Em-
bellishment is an outcome of increased power.
Embellishment is merely an expression of a
triumphant will, of an increased state of co-
ordination, of a harmony of all the strong desires,
of an infallible and perpendicular equilibrium.
Logical and geometrical simplification is the result
of an increase of power: conversely, the mere
aspect of such a simplification increases the sense
of power in the beholder. The zenith of
development: the grand style.
Ugliness signifies the decadence of a type: con-
Q
.
.
VOL. II.
## p. 242 (#272) ############################################
242
THE WILL TO POWER.
tradiction and faulty co-ordination among the in-
most desires—this means a decline in the organis-
ing power, or, psychologically speaking, in the “will. "
The condition of pleasure which is called in-
toxication is really an exalted feeling of power.
. . Sensations of space and time are altered;
inordinate distances are traversed by the eye, and
only then become visible; the extension of the
vision over greater masses and expanses; - the
refinement of the organ which apprehends the
smallest and most elusive things; divination, the
power of understanding at the slightest hint, at
the smallest suggestion ; intelligent sensitiveness;
strength as a feeling of dominion in the muscles,
as agility and love of movement, as dance, as
levity and quick time; strength as the love of
proving strength, as bravado, adventurousness,
fearlessness, indifference in regard to life and
death. . . All these elated moments of life
stimulate each other; the world of images and of
imagination of the one suffices as a suggestion for
the other : in this way states finally merge into
each other, which might do better to keep apart,
c. g. the feeling of religious intoxication and sexual
irritability (two very profound feelings, always
wonderfully co-ordinated. What is it that pleases
almost all pious women, old or young? Answer:
a saint with beautiful legs, still young, still in
nocent). Cruelty in tragedy and pity (likewise
normally correlated). Spring-time, dancing, music,
-all these things are but the display of one sex
before the other,--as also that "infinite yearning
of the heart" peculiar to Faust.
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THE WILL TO POWER IN ART.
243
Artists when they are worth anything at all are
men of strong propensities (even physically), with
surplus energy, powerful animals, sensual; without
a certain overheating of the sexual system a man
like Raphael is unthinkable. . . . To produce
music is also in a sense to produce children;
chastity is merely the economy of the artist, and
in all creative artists productiveness certainly
ceases with sexual potency. . . . Artists should
not see things as they are; they should see them
fuller, simpler, stronger: to this end, however, a
kind of youthfulness, of vernality, a sort of per-
petual elation, must be peculiar to their lives.
:
801.
The states in which we transfigure things and
make them fuller, and rhapsodise about them,
until they reflect our own fulness and love of life
back upon us: sexuality, intoxication, post-prandial
states, spring, triumph over our enemies, scorn,
bravado, cruelty, the ecstasy of religious feeling.
But three elements above all are active: sexuality,
intoxication, cruelty; all these belong to the oldest
festal joys of mankind, they also preponderate in
budding artists.
Conversely: there are things with which we
meet which already show us this transfiguration
and fulness, and the animal world's response
thereto is a state of excitement in the spheres
where these states of happiness originate.
blending of these very delicate shades of animal
well-being and desires is the æsthetic state. The
A
1
## p. 244 (#274) ############################################
244
THE WILL TO POWER.
latter only manifests itself in those natures which
are capable of that spendthrift and overflowing
fulness of bodily vigour; the latter is always the
primum mobile. The sober-minded man, the
tired man, the exhausted and dried-up man (e. g.
the scholar), can have no feeling for art, because
he does not possess the primitive force of art,
which is the tyranny of inner riches: he who
cannot give anything away cannot feel anything
either.
"Perfection. ”—In these states (more particularly
in the case of sexual love, there is an ingenuous
betrayal of what the profoundest instinct regards
as the highest, the most desirable, the most
valuable, the ascending movement of its type;
also of the condition towards which it is actually
striving. Perfection: the extraordinary expansion
of this instinct's feeling of power, its riches, its
necessary overflowing of all banks.
802.
Art reminds us of states of physical vigour: it
may be the overflow and bursting forth of bloom-
ing life in the world of pictures and desires; on
the other hand, it may be an excitation of the
physical functions by means of pictures and desires
of exalted life--an enhancement of the feeling of
life, the latter's stimulant.
To what extent can ugliness exercise this
power? In so far as it may communicate some-
thing of the triumphant energy of the artist who
has become master of the ugly and the repulsive;
## p. 245 (#275) ############################################
THE WILL TO POWER IN ART.
245
or in so far as it gently excites our lust of cruelty
(in some circumstances even the lust of doing
harm to ourselves, self-violence, and therewith the
feeling of power over ourselves).
803.
“Beauty" therefore is, to the artist, something
which is above all order of rank, because in beauty
contrasts are overcome, the highest sign of power
thus manifesting itself in the conquest of opposites;
and achieved without a feeling of tension : violence
being no longer necessary, everything submitting
and obeying so easily, and doing so with good
grace; this is what delights the powerful will of
the artist.
804.
The biological value of beauty and ugliness.
That which we feel instinctively opposed to us
æsthetically is, according to the longest experience
of mankind, felt to be harmful, dangerous, and
worthy of suspicion: the sudden utterance of the
æsthetic instinct, e. g, in the case of loathing, im-
plies an act of judgment. To this extent beauty
lies within the general category of the biological
values, useful, beneficent, and life - promoting:
thus, a host of stimuli which for ages have been
associated with, and remind us of, useful things
and conditions, give us the feeling of beauty, i.
lowest form, the will to live at all costs-the
instinct of self-preservation.
(2) Subordination, with the view of satisfying
the will to power of a whole community; submis-
siveness, the making of one's self indispensable and
useful to him who has the power; love, a secret
path to the heart of the powerful, in order to be-
come his master.
(3) The feeling of duty, conscience, the imagin-
ary comfort of belonging to a higher order than
those who actually hold the reins of power; the
acknowledgment of an order of rank which allows
of judging even the more powerful; self-deprecia-
tion; the discovery of new codes of morality (of
which the Jews are a classical example).
775.
Praise and gratitude as forms of will to power. -
Praise and gratitude for harvests, for good weather,
victories, marriages, and peace—all festivals need
a subject on which feeling can be outpoured. The
desire is to make all good things that happen to
one appear as though they had been done to one:
people will have a donor. The same holds good
of the work of art: people are not satisfied with
it alone, they must praise the artist. —What, then,
is praise? It is a sort of compensation for benefits
received, a sort of giving back, a manifestation of
our power-for the man who praises assents to,
blesses, values, judges: he arrogates to himself the
right to give his consent to a thing, to be able to
.
## p. 220 (#250) ############################################
220
THE WILL TO POWER.
confer honours. An increased feeling of happiness
or of liveliness is also an increased feeling of power,
and it is as a result of this feeling that a man
praises (it is as the outcome of this feeling that
he invents a donor, a “subject"). Gratitude is
thus revenge of a lofty kind : it is most severely
exercised and demanded where equality and pride
both require to be upheld—that is to say, where
revenge is practised to its fullest extent.
776.
Concerning the Machiavellism of Power.
The will to power appears :
(a) Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds,
in the form of will to "freedom": the mere fact of
breaking loose from something seems to be an end
in itself (in a religio-moral sense : "One is only
answerable to one's own conscience"; "evangelical
freedom," etc. etc. ).
(6) In the case of a stronger species, ascending
to power, in the form of the will to overpower. If
this fails, then it shrinks to the “ will to justice”.
that is to say, to the will to the same measure of
rights as the ruling caste possesses.
© In the case of the strongest, richest, most
independent, and most courageous, in the form of
“ love of humanity,” of “love of the people," of the
“gospel,” of “truth,” of “God,” of “pity,” of “self-
sacrifice,” etc. etc. ; in the form of overpowering, of
deeds of capture, of imposing service on some one,
of an instinctive reckoning of one's self as part of a
great mass of power to which one attempts to give
»
## p. 221 (#251) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
221
a direction: the hero, the prophet, the Cæsar, the
Saviour, the bell-wether. (The love of the sexes
also belongs to this category; it will overpower
something, possess it utterly, and it looks like self-
abnegation. At bottom it is only the love of one's
instrument, of one's “horse”--the conviction that
things belong to one because one is in a position
to use them. )
Freedom,” “ Justice," “ Love"! ! !
777
Love. —Behold this love and pity of women-
what could be more egoistic ? . . . And when they
do sacrifice themselves and their honour or reputa-
tion, to whom do they sacrifice themselves ? To the
man? Is it not rather to an unbridled desire ?
These desires are quite as selfish, even though they
may be beneficial to others and provoke gratitude.
To what extent can such a hyperfcetation of
one valuation sanctify everything else! !
778.
“ Senses," “ Passions. "—When the fear of the
senses and of the passions and of the desires be-
comes so great as to warn us against them, it is
already a symptom of weakness: extreme measures
always characterise abnormal conditions. That
which is lacking here, or more precisely that which
is decaying, is the power to resist an impulse : when
one feels instinctively that one must yield,—that is
to say, that one must react,—then it is an excellent
thing to avoid opportunities (temptations).
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THE WILL TO POWER.
The stimulation of the senses is only a tempta-
tion in so far as those creatures are concerned
whose systems are easily swayed and influenced :
on the other hand, in the case of remarkable con-
stitutional obtuseness and hardness, strong stimuli
are necessary in order to set the functions in
motion. Dissipation can only be objected to in
the case of one who has no right to it; and almost
all passions have fallen into disrepute thanks to
those who were not strong enough to convert them
to their own advantage.
One should understand that passions are open
to the same objections as illnesses : yet we should
not be justified in doing without illnesses, and still
less without passions. We require the abnormal;
we give life a tremendous shock by means of these
great illnesses.
In detailthe following should be distinguished:-
(1) The dominating passion, which may even
bring the supremest form of health with it: in this
case the co-ordination of the internal system and
its functions to perform one task is best attained,
but this is almost a definition of health.
(2) The antagonism of the passions—the double,
treble, and multiple soul in one breast: * this is
very unhealthy; it is a sign of inner ruin and
of disintegration, betraying and promoting an
internal dualism and anarchy-unless, of course,
one passion becomes master. Return to health.
* This refers to Goethe's Faust. In Part I. , Act I. , Scene II. ,
we find Faust exclaiming in despair :“Two souls, alas ! within
my bosom throne! " See Theodore Martin's Faust, trans-
lated into English verse. -TR.
## p. 223 (#253) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
223
(3) The juxtaposition of passions without their
being either opposed or united with one another.
Very often transitory, and then, as soon as order is
established, this condition may be a healthy one.
A most interesting class of men belong to this
order, the chameleons; they are not necessarily at
loggerheads with themselves, they are both happy
and secure, but they cannot develop—their moods
lie side by side, even though they may seem to lie
far apart. They change, but they become nothing.
779.
i
!
The quantitative estimate of aims and its in-
fluence upon the valuing standpoint: the great
and the small criminal. The greatness or small-
ness of the aims will determine whether the doer
feels respect for himself with it all, or whether
he feels pusillanimous and miserable.
The degree of intellectuality manifested in the
means employed may likewise influence our valua-
tion. How differently the philosophical innovator,
experimenter, and man of violence stands out
against robbers, barbarians, adventurers ! —There
is a semblance of disinterestedness in the former.
Finally, noble manners, bearing, courage, self-
confidence,-how they alter the value of that
which is attained by means of them!
*
Concerning the optics of valuation :
The influence of the greatness or smallness of
the aims.
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THE WILL TO POWER.
The influence of the intellectuality of the means.
The influence of the behaviour in action.
The influence of success or failure.
The influence of opposing forces and their value.
The influence of that which is permitted and
that which is forbidden.
780.
The tricks by means of which actions, measures,
and passions are legitimised, which from an in-
dividual standpoint are no longer good form or
even in good taste :
Art, which allows us to enter such strange worlds,
makes them tasteful to us.
Historians prove its justification and reason;
travels, exoticism, psychology, penal codes, the
lunatic asylum, the criminal, sociology.
Impersonality (so that as media of a collective
whole we allow ourselves these passions and actions
-the Bar, juries, the bourgeois, the soldier, the
minister, the prince, society, “critics') makes us
feel that we are sacrificing something.
781.
Preoccupations concerning one's self and one's
eternal salvation are not expressive either of a
rich or of a self-confident nature, for the latter
lets all questions of eternal bliss go to the devil,
-it is not interested in such matters of happiness;
it is all power, deeds, desires; it imposes itself
upon things; it even violates things. The Chris-
## p. 225 (#255) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
225
/
tian is a romantic hypochondriac who does not
stand firmly on his legs.
Whenever hedonistic views come to the front,
one can always presuppose the existence of pain
and a certain ill-constitutedness.
782.
“The growing autonomy of the individual”.
Parisian philosophers like M. Fouillée talk of such
things: they would do well to study the race
moutonnière for a moment; for they belong to it.
For Heaven's sake open your eyes, ye sociologists
who deal with the future !
The individual grew
strong under quite opposite conditions : ye describe
the extremest weakening and impoverishment of
man; ye actually want this weakness and impover-
ishment, and ye apply the whole lying machinery
of the old ideal in order to achieve your end.
Ye
are so constituted that ye actually regard your
gregarious wants as an ideal ! Here we are in
the presence of an absolute lack of psychological
honesty.
783.
The two traits which characterise the modern
European are apparently antagonistic-individual-
ism and the demand for equal rights: this I am at
last beginning to understand. The individual is
an extremely vulnerable piece of vanity: this
vanity, when it is conscious of its high degree of
susceptibility to pain, demands that every one
should be made equal; that the individual should
only stand inter pares. But in this way a social
P
VOL. II.
## p. 226 (#256) ############################################
226
THE WILL TO POWER.
race is depicted in which, as a matter of fact, gifts
and powers are on the whole equally distributed.
The pride which would have loneliness and but
few appreciators is quite beyond comprehension :
really "great" successes are only attained through
the masses-indeed, we scarcely understand yet
that a mob success is in reality only a small suc-
cess; because pulchrum est paucorum hominum.
No morality will countenance order of rank
among men, and the jurists know nothing of a
communal conscience. The principle of indi-
vidualism rejects really great men, and demands
the most delicate vision for, and the speediest dis-
covery of, a talent among people who are almost
equal; and inasmuch as every one has some
modicum of talent in such late and civilised cul.
tures (and can, therefore, expect to receive his share
of honour), there is a more general buttering-up
of modest merits to-day than there has ever been.
· This gives the age the appearance of unlimited
justice. Its want of justice is to be found not in
its unbounded hatred of tyrants and demagogues,
even in the arts; but in its detestation of noble
natures who scorn the praise of the many. The
demand for equal rights (that is to say, the privi-
lege of sitting in judgment on everything and
everybody) is anti-aristocratic.
This age knows just as little concerning the
absorption of the individual, of his mergence into
a great type of men who do not want to be
personalities. It was this that formerly constituted
the distinction and the zeal of many lofty natures
(the greatest poets among them); or of the desire
## p. 227 (#257) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
227
to be a polis, as in Greece; or of Jesuitism, or of
the Prussian Staff Corps, and bureaucracy; or of
apprenticeship and a continuation of the tradition
of great masters: to all of which things, nor. -social
conditions and the absence of petty vanity are
necessary.
784.
Individualism is a modest and still unconscious
form of will to power; with it a single human unit
seems to think it sufficient to free himself from the
preponderating power of society (or of the State or
Church). He does not set himself up in opposi-
tion as a personality, but merely as a unit; he
represents the rights of all other individuals as
against the whole. That is to say, he instinc-
tively places himself on a level with every other
unit: what he combats he does not combat as a
person, but as a representative of units against a
mass.
Socialism is merely an agitatory measure of
individualism : it recognises the fact that in order
to attain to something, men must organise them-
selves into a general movement- into a “power. "
But what the Socialist requires is not society as
the object of the individual, but society as a means
of making many individuals possible: this is the
instinct of Socialists, though they frequently de-
ceive themselves on this point (apart from this,
however, in order to make their kind prevail, they
are compelled to deceive others to an enormous
extent). Altruistic moral preaching thus enters
into the service of individual egoism,-one of
## p. 228 (#258) ############################################
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THE WILL TO POWER.
the most common frauds of the nineteenth
century.
Anarchy is also merely an agitatory measure of
Socialism; with it the Socialist inspires fear, with
fear he begins to fascinate and to terrorise: but
what he does above all is to draw all courageous
and reckless people to his side, even in the most
intellectual spheres.
In spite of all this, individualism is the most
modest stage of the will to power.
When one has reached a certain degree of inde-
pendence, one always longs for more : separation
in proportion to the degree of force; the individual
is no longer content to regard himself as equal
to everybody, he actually seeks for his peer-he
makes himself stand out from others. Individual-
ism is followed by a development in groups and
organs; correlative tendencies join up together and
become powerfully active: now there arise between
these centres of power, friction, war, a reconnoitring
of the forces on either side, reciprocity, under-
standings, and the regulation of mutual services.
Finally, there appears an order of rank.
Recapitulation-
1. The individuals emancipate themselves.
2. They make war, and ultimately agree con-
cerning equal rights (justice is made an end in itself).
3. Once this is reached, the actual differences in
degrees of power begin to make themselves felt,
and to greater extent than before the reason
being that on the whole peace is established, and
innumerable small centres of power begin to create
3
## p. 229 (#259) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
229
differences which formerly were scarcely notice-
able). Now the individuals begin to form groups,
these strive after privileges and preponderance,
and war starts afresh in a milder form.
People demand freedom only when they have
no power. Once power is obtained, a preponder-
ance thereof is the next thing to be coveted ; if
this is not achieved (owing to the fact that one is
still too weak for it), then “justice," i. e. “equality
of power ” become the objects of desire.
785.
The rectification of the concept"egoism. ”—When
one has discovered what an error the “individual”
is, and that every single creature represents the
whole process of evolution (not alone “inherited,"
but in “himself”), the individual then acquires an
inordinately great importance. The voice of in-
stinct is quite right here. When this instinct
tends to decline, i. e. when the individual begins
to seek his worth in his services to others, one may
be sure that exhaustion and degeneration have set
in. An altruistic attitude of mind, when it is funda-
mental and free from all hypocrisy, is the instinct
of creating a second value for one's self in the ser-
vice of other egoists. As a rule, however, it is
only apparent—a circuitous path to the preserva-
tion of one's own feelings of vitality and worth.
786.
The History of Moralisation and Demoralisation.
Proposition one. There are no such things as
## p. 230 (#260) ############################################
230
THE WILL TO POWER.
moral actions: they are purely imaginary. Not
only is it impossible to demonstrate their exist-
ence (a fact which Kant and Christianity, for
instance, both acknowledged)—but they are not
even possible. Owing to psychological misunder-
standing, a man invented an opposite to the instinc-
tive impulses of life, and believed that a new species
of instinct was thereby discovered : a primum mobile
was postulated which does not exist at all. Ac-
cording to the valuation which gave rise to the
antithesis "moral" and "immoral," one should
say: There is nothing else on earth but immoral
intentions and actions.
Proposition two. — The whole differentiation,
"moral" and "immoral," arises from the assump-
tion that both moral and immoral actions are the
result of a spontaneous will-in short, that such
a will exists; or in other words, that moral judg-
ments can only hold good with regard to intuitions
and actions that are free. But this whole order of
actions and intentions is purely imaginary: the
only world to which the moral standard could be
applied does not exist at all: there is no such
thing as a moral or an immoral action.
*
The psychological error out of which the anti-
thesis “moral” and “immoral” arose is : “selfless,"
“unselfish,” “self-denying"-all unreal and fan-
tastic.
A false dogmatism also clustered around the
concept "ego”; it was regarded as atomic, and
falsely opposed to a non-ego; it was also liberated
## p. 231 (#261) ############################################
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
231
from Becoming, and declared to belong to the
sphere of Being. The false materialisation of the
ego: this owing to the belief in individual im-
mortality) was made an article of faith under the
pressure of religio-moral discipline. According to
this artificial liberation of the ego and its trans-
ference to the realm of the absolute, people
thought that they had arrived at an antithesis
in values which seemed quite irrefutable — the
single ego and the vast non-ego. It seemed
obvious that the value of the individual ego could
only exist in conjunction with the vast non-ego,
more particularly in the sense of being subject to
it and existing only for its sake. Here, of course,
,
the gregarious instinct determined the direction
of thought: nothing is more opposed to this
instinct than the sovereignty of the individual.
Supposing, however, that the ego be absolute, then
its value must lie in self-negation.
Thus: (1) the false emancipation of the “in-
dividual” as an atom;
(2) The gregarious self-conceit which abhors the
desire to remain an atom, and regards it as hostile.
(3) As a result: the overcoming of the individual
by changing his aim.
(4) At this point there appeared to be actions
that were self-effacing: around these actions a
whole sphere of antitheses was fancied.
(5) It was asked, in what sort of actions does
man most strongly assert himself? Around these
(sexuality, covetousness, lust for power, cruelty,
etc. etc. ) hate, contempt; and anathemas were
heaped : it was believed that there could be such
## p. 232 (#262) ############################################
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THE WILL TO POWER.
things as selfless impulses. Everything selfish
was condemned, everything unselfish was in
demand.
(6) And the result was: what had been done ?
A ban had been placed on the strongest, the most
natural, yea, the only genuine impulses; hencefor-
ward, in order that an action might be praiseworthy,
there must be no trace in it of any of those genuine
impulses—monstrous fraud in psychology. Every
kind of self-satisfaction” had to be remodelled
and made possible by means of misunderstanding
and adjusting one's self sub specie boni. Conversely:
that species which found its advantage in depriving
mankind of its self-satisfaction, the representatives
of the gregarious instincts, e. g. the priests and the
philosophers, were sufficiently crafty and psycho-
logically astute to show how selfishness ruled every-
where. The Christian conclusion from this was :
“ Everything is sin, even our virtues. Man is
utterly undesirable.
Selfless actions are impos-
sible. " Original sin. In short, once man had
opposed his instincts to a purely imaginary world
of the good, he concluded by despising himself as
incapable of performing "good" actions.
N. B. -In this way Christianity represents a step
forward in the sharpening of psychological insight:
La Rochefoucauld and Pascal. It perceived the
essential equality of human actions, and the equality
of their values as a whole (all immoral).
*
Now the first serious object was to rear men in
whom self-seeking impulses were extinguished:
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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
233
priests, saints. And if people doubted that perfec-
tion was possible, they did not doubt what per-
fection was.
The psychology of the saint and of the priest
and of the "good"man, must naturally have seemed
purely phantasmagorical. The real motive of all
action had been declared bad: therefore, in order
to make action still possible, deeds had to be
prescribed which, though not possible, had to be
declared possible and sanctified. They now
honoured and idealised things with as much falsity
as they had previously slandered them.
Inveighing against the instincts of life came to
be regarded as holy and estimable. The priestly
ideal was: absolute chastity, absolute obedience,
absolute poverty! The lay ideal: alms, pity, self-
sacrifice, renunciation of the beautiful, of reason,
and of sensuality, and a dark frown for all the
strong qualities that existed.
An advance is made: the slandered instincts
attempt to re-establish their rights (0. 8. Luther's
Reformation, the coarsest form of moral falsehood
under the cover of " Evangelical freedom"), they
are rechristened with holy names.
The calumniated instincts try to demonstrate that
they are necessary in order that the virtuous
instincts may be possible. Il faut vivre, afin de
vivre pour autrui: egoism as a means to an end. *
*
Spencer's conclusion in the Data of Ethics. -TR.
## p. 234 (#264) ############################################
234
THE WILL TO POWER.
But people go still further : they try to grant
both the egoistic and altruistic impulses the right
to exist-equal rights for both—from the utili-
tarian standpoint.
People go further : they see greater utility in
placing the egoistic rights before the altruistic-
greater utility in the sense of more happiness for the
majority, or of the elevation of mankind, etc. etc.
Thus the rights of egoism begin to preponderate,
but under the cloak of an extremely altruistic
standpoint—the collective utility of humanity.
An attempt is made to reconcile the altruistic
mode of action with the natural order of things.
Altruism is sought in the very roots of life.
Altruism and egoism are both based upon the
essence of life and nature.
The disappearance of the opposition between
them is dreamt of as a future possibility. Con-
tinued adaptation, it is hoped, will merge the two
into one.
At last it is seen that altruistic actions are
merely a species of the egoistic—and that the
degree to which one loves and spends one's self is a
proof of the extent of one's individual power and
personality. In short, that the more evil man can
be made, the better he is, and that one cannot be
the one without the other. . . . At this point the
curtain rises which concealed the monstrous fraud
of the psychology that has prevailed hitherto.
Results. There are only immoral intentions and
actions; the so-called moral actions must be shown
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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
235
to be immoral. All emotions are traced to a single
will, the will to power, and are called essentially
equal.
The concept of life: in the apparent
antithesis good and evil, degrees of power in the
instincts alone are expressed. A temporary order
of rank is established according to which certain
instincts are either controlled or enlisted in our
service. Morality is justified: economically, etc.
Against proposition two. -Determinism: the
attempt to rescue the moral world by transferring
it to the unknown.
Determinism is only a manner of allowing our-
selves to conjure our valuations away, once they
have lost their place in a world interpreted
mechanistically. Determinism must therefore be
attacked and undermined at all costs : just as our
right to distinguish between an absolute and
phenomenal world should be disputed.
787.
It is absolutely necessary to emancipate our-
selves from motives: otherwise we should not be
allowed to attempt to sacrifice ourselves or to
neglect ourselves ! Only the innocence of Be-
coming gives us the highest courage and the
highest freedom.
788.
A clean conscience must be restored to the evil
man_has this been my involuntary endeavour all
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236
THE WILL TO POWER.
the time? for I take as the evil man him who is
strong (Dostoievsky's belief concerning the con-
victs in prison should be referred to here).
789.
Our new “ freedom. ” What a feeling of relief
there is in the thought that we emancipated spirits
do not feel ourselves harnessed to any system of
teleological aims. Likewise that the concepts
reward and punishment have no roots in the
essence of existence! Likewise that good and
evil actions are not good or evil in themselves,
but only from the point of view of the self-pre-
servative tendencies of certain species of humanity !
Likewise that our speculations concerning pleasure
and pain are not of cosmic, far less then of meta-
physical, importance! (That form of pessimism
associated with the name of Hartmann, which
pledges itself to put even the pain and pleasure of
existence into the balance, with its arbitrary con-
finement in the prison and within the bounds of
pre-Copernican thought, would be something not
only retrogressive, but degenerate, unless it be
merely a bad joke on the part of a “Berliner. " *)
790.
If one is clear as to the “wherefore" of one's
life, then the “how” of it can take care of itself.
*“Berliner ”—The citizens of Berlin are renowned in
Germany for their poor jokes. -TR.
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SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
237
It is already even a sign of disbelief in the where-
fore and in the purpose and sense of life in fact,
it is a sign of a lack of will—when the value of
pleasure and pain step into the foreground, and
hedonistic and pessimistic teaching becomes pre-
valent; and self-abnegation, resignation, virtue,
objectivity,” may, at the very least, be signs that
the most important factor is beginning to make
its absence felt.
791.
Hitherto there has been no German culture. It
is no refutation of this assertion to say that there
have been great anchorites in Germany (Goethe,
for instance); for these had their own culture.
But it was precisely around them, as though around
mighty, defiant, and isolated rocks, that the remain-
ing spirit of Germany, as their antithesis, lay—that
is to say, as a soft, swampy, slippery soil, upon
which every step and every footprint of the rest
of Europe made an impression and created forms.
German culture was a thing devoid of character
and of almost unlimited yielding power.
792.
Germany, though very rich in clever and well-
informed scholars, has for some time been so ex-
cessively poor in great souls and in mighty minds,
that it almost seems to have forgotten what a great
soul or a mighty mind is; and to-day mediocre and
even ill-constituted men place themselves in the
market square without the suggestion of a con-
science-prick or a signofembarrassment, and declare
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238
THE WILL TO POWER.
themselves great men, reformers, etc. Take the
case of Eugen Dühring, for instance, a really clever
and well-informed scholar, but a man who betrays
with almost every word he says that he has a miser-
ably small soul, and that he is horribly tormented
by narrow envious feelings; moreover, that it is no
mighty overflowing, benevolent, and spendthrift
spirit that drives him on, but only the spirit of
ambition ! But to be ambitious in such an age as
this is much more unworthy of a philosopher than
ever it was : to-day, when it is the mob that rules,
when it is the mob that dispenses the honours.
793
My “future": a severe polytechnic education.
Conscription; so that as a rule every man of the
higher classes should be an officer, whatever else
he may be besides.
## p. 239 (#269) ############################################
-
1
IV.
THE WILL TO POWER IN ART.
794.
OUR religion, morality, and philosophy are
decadent human institutions.
The counter-agent: Art
795.
The Artist-philosopher. A higher concept of
art. Can man stand at so great a distance from
his fellows as to mould them? (Preliminary ex-
ercises thereto :-
1. To become a self-former, an anchorite.
2. To do what artists have done hitherto, i. e.
to reach a small degree of perfection in a certain
medium. )
796.
Art as it appears without the artist, i. e. as a
body, an organisation (the Prussian Officers' Corps,
the Order of the Jesuits). To what extent is the
artist merely a preliminary stage? The world
regarded as a self-generating work of art.
239
## p. 240 (#270) ############################################
240
THE WILL TO POWER.
797.
The phenomenon, "artist," is the easiest to see
through : from it one can look down upon the
fundamental instincts of power, of nature, etc. ;
even of religion and morality.
Play,” uselessness—as the ideal of him who is
overflowing with power, as the ideal of the child.
The childishness of God, παίς παίζων.
798.
Apollonian, Dionysian. There are two con-
ditions in which art manifests itself in man even
as a force of nature, and disposes of him whether
he consent or not : it may be as a constraint to
visionary states, or it may be an orgiastic impulse.
Both conditions are to be seen in normal life, but
they are then somewhat weaker : in dreams and
in moments of elation or intoxication.
But the same contrast exists between the dream
state and the state of intoxication: both of these
states let loose all manner of artistic powers with-
in us, but each unfetters powers of a different
kind. Dreamland gives us the power of vision, of
association, of poetry: intoxication gives us the
power of grand attitudes, of passion, of song, and
of dance.
66
* German :
Rausch. ”—There is no word in English for
the German expression "Rausch. " When Nietzsche uses it,
he means a sort of blend of our two words : intoxication and
elation. - TR.
:
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THE WILL TO POWER IN ART.
241
799.
Sexuality and voluptuousness belong to the
Dionysiac intoxication : but neither of them is
lacking in the Apollonian state. There is also
a difference of tempo between the states. . . . The
extreme peace of certain feelings of intoxication (or,
more strictly, the slackening of the feeling of time,
and the reduction of the feeling of space) is wont
to reflect itself in the vision of the most restful
attitudes and states of the soul. The classical
style essentially represents repose, simplification,
foreshortening, and concentration-the highest feel-
ing of power is concentrated in the classical type.
To react with difficulty: great consciousness : no
feeling of strife.
800.
>
The feeling of intoxication is, as a matter of
fact, equivalent to a sensation of surplus power: it
is strongest in seasons of rut: new organs, new
accomplishments, new. colours, new forms.
Em-
bellishment is an outcome of increased power.
Embellishment is merely an expression of a
triumphant will, of an increased state of co-
ordination, of a harmony of all the strong desires,
of an infallible and perpendicular equilibrium.
Logical and geometrical simplification is the result
of an increase of power: conversely, the mere
aspect of such a simplification increases the sense
of power in the beholder. The zenith of
development: the grand style.
Ugliness signifies the decadence of a type: con-
Q
.
.
VOL. II.
## p. 242 (#272) ############################################
242
THE WILL TO POWER.
tradiction and faulty co-ordination among the in-
most desires—this means a decline in the organis-
ing power, or, psychologically speaking, in the “will. "
The condition of pleasure which is called in-
toxication is really an exalted feeling of power.
. . Sensations of space and time are altered;
inordinate distances are traversed by the eye, and
only then become visible; the extension of the
vision over greater masses and expanses; - the
refinement of the organ which apprehends the
smallest and most elusive things; divination, the
power of understanding at the slightest hint, at
the smallest suggestion ; intelligent sensitiveness;
strength as a feeling of dominion in the muscles,
as agility and love of movement, as dance, as
levity and quick time; strength as the love of
proving strength, as bravado, adventurousness,
fearlessness, indifference in regard to life and
death. . . All these elated moments of life
stimulate each other; the world of images and of
imagination of the one suffices as a suggestion for
the other : in this way states finally merge into
each other, which might do better to keep apart,
c. g. the feeling of religious intoxication and sexual
irritability (two very profound feelings, always
wonderfully co-ordinated. What is it that pleases
almost all pious women, old or young? Answer:
a saint with beautiful legs, still young, still in
nocent). Cruelty in tragedy and pity (likewise
normally correlated). Spring-time, dancing, music,
-all these things are but the display of one sex
before the other,--as also that "infinite yearning
of the heart" peculiar to Faust.
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THE WILL TO POWER IN ART.
243
Artists when they are worth anything at all are
men of strong propensities (even physically), with
surplus energy, powerful animals, sensual; without
a certain overheating of the sexual system a man
like Raphael is unthinkable. . . . To produce
music is also in a sense to produce children;
chastity is merely the economy of the artist, and
in all creative artists productiveness certainly
ceases with sexual potency. . . . Artists should
not see things as they are; they should see them
fuller, simpler, stronger: to this end, however, a
kind of youthfulness, of vernality, a sort of per-
petual elation, must be peculiar to their lives.
:
801.
The states in which we transfigure things and
make them fuller, and rhapsodise about them,
until they reflect our own fulness and love of life
back upon us: sexuality, intoxication, post-prandial
states, spring, triumph over our enemies, scorn,
bravado, cruelty, the ecstasy of religious feeling.
But three elements above all are active: sexuality,
intoxication, cruelty; all these belong to the oldest
festal joys of mankind, they also preponderate in
budding artists.
Conversely: there are things with which we
meet which already show us this transfiguration
and fulness, and the animal world's response
thereto is a state of excitement in the spheres
where these states of happiness originate.
blending of these very delicate shades of animal
well-being and desires is the æsthetic state. The
A
1
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THE WILL TO POWER.
latter only manifests itself in those natures which
are capable of that spendthrift and overflowing
fulness of bodily vigour; the latter is always the
primum mobile. The sober-minded man, the
tired man, the exhausted and dried-up man (e. g.
the scholar), can have no feeling for art, because
he does not possess the primitive force of art,
which is the tyranny of inner riches: he who
cannot give anything away cannot feel anything
either.
"Perfection. ”—In these states (more particularly
in the case of sexual love, there is an ingenuous
betrayal of what the profoundest instinct regards
as the highest, the most desirable, the most
valuable, the ascending movement of its type;
also of the condition towards which it is actually
striving. Perfection: the extraordinary expansion
of this instinct's feeling of power, its riches, its
necessary overflowing of all banks.
802.
Art reminds us of states of physical vigour: it
may be the overflow and bursting forth of bloom-
ing life in the world of pictures and desires; on
the other hand, it may be an excitation of the
physical functions by means of pictures and desires
of exalted life--an enhancement of the feeling of
life, the latter's stimulant.
To what extent can ugliness exercise this
power? In so far as it may communicate some-
thing of the triumphant energy of the artist who
has become master of the ugly and the repulsive;
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THE WILL TO POWER IN ART.
245
or in so far as it gently excites our lust of cruelty
(in some circumstances even the lust of doing
harm to ourselves, self-violence, and therewith the
feeling of power over ourselves).
803.
“Beauty" therefore is, to the artist, something
which is above all order of rank, because in beauty
contrasts are overcome, the highest sign of power
thus manifesting itself in the conquest of opposites;
and achieved without a feeling of tension : violence
being no longer necessary, everything submitting
and obeying so easily, and doing so with good
grace; this is what delights the powerful will of
the artist.
804.
The biological value of beauty and ugliness.
That which we feel instinctively opposed to us
æsthetically is, according to the longest experience
of mankind, felt to be harmful, dangerous, and
worthy of suspicion: the sudden utterance of the
æsthetic instinct, e. g, in the case of loathing, im-
plies an act of judgment. To this extent beauty
lies within the general category of the biological
values, useful, beneficent, and life - promoting:
thus, a host of stimuli which for ages have been
associated with, and remind us of, useful things
and conditions, give us the feeling of beauty, i.
