Now these
significations
do in truth frequently coincide.
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
And finally determine my cog nition by means of the predicate of the rule (this the conclusio), consequently, determine priori means of the reason.
The relations, therefore, which the major propo sition, as the rule, represents between cognition and its condition, constitute the different kinds of syllogisms.
These are just threefold -- analogously with all judgments, in so far as they differ in the mode of expressing the relation of cog nition in the understanding --namely, categorical, hypotheti, al
and disjunctive.
con-ieyutntia immediata -- there really be such thing, and
lie not contradiction in terms -- evideutly does not belong to the spbera of logic proper, the oliject-matter of which the syllogism, which always consists of three propositions, either in thought or expressed. This indeed
tantamount to declaring that there uo such mode ot reasoning. -- Tr.
? ? ? hi
*
by
is
is
1
A a
if
a is if,
a
is I
if H
is
it,
a
I I
a it
it a
I
a
by
it
it a is a
a by
a
is a
a
is
is is
it is
a
If
it, is
? 216 THAKSflCNDEKTAL DIALECTIC.
When, as often happens, the conclusion is a judgment which may follow from other given judgments, through which a per fectly different object is cogitated, I endeavour to discover in the understanding whether the assertion in this conclusion does not stand under certain conditions according to a general rule. If I find such a condition, and if the object mentioned in the conclusion can be subsumed under the given condition, then this conclusion follows from a rule which is also valid for other objects of cognition. From this we see that reason endeavours to subject the great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to the smallest possible number of principles (general conditions), and thus to produce in it the highest unity.
C.
Or THE PtTCE T7SE OF REASON.
Can we isolate reason, and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar
source of conceptions and judgments which spring from it alone, and through which it can be applied to objects; or is it merely a subordinate faculty, whose duty it is to give a certain form to given cognitions -- a form which is called logical, and through which the cognitions of the understanding are subor dinated to each other, and lower rules to higher (those, to wit, whose condition comprises in its sphere the condition of the others), in so far as this can be done by comparison ? This is the question which we have at present to answer. Manifold variety of rules and unity of principles is a requirement of rea son, for the purpose of bringing the understanding into complete accordance with itself, just as understanding subjects the manifold content of intuition to conceptions, and thereby introduces connection into it. But this principle prescribes no law to objects, and does not contain any ground of the possi bility of cognizing, or of determining them as such, but is merely a subjective law for the proper arrangement of the content of the understanding. The purpose of this law comparison of the conceptions of the understanding, to reduce them to the smallest possible number, although, at the same time, does not justify us demanding from objects them selves such an uniformity as might contribute to the convenience and the enlargement of the sphere of the understanding, or expecting that will itself thus receive from them objective
validity. In one w<<nL the question does reason in itselC
? ? ? is,
it
it
in
by in a
is,
? nrrBODucTion. --of the tube use of beaboit. 217
that does pure reason contain priori synthetical principles and rules, and what are those principles
The formal and logical procedure of reason syllogisms gives us sufficient information in regard to the ground on which the transcendental principle of reason in its pure syn thetical cognition will rest.
Reason, as observed in the syllogistic process, not appli cable to intuitions, for the purpose of subjecting tbem to rules -- for this the province of the understanding with its categories--
but to conceptions and judgments. If pure reason does apply to objects and the intuition of them, does so not immediately,
? but mediately-- through the understanding and its judgments, which have direct relation to the senses and their intuition, for
the purpose of determining their objects. The unity of reason therefore not the unity of possible experience, but essenti
ally different from this unity, which that of the understanding. That everything which happens has cause, not principle cognized and prescribed reason. This principle makes the unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason, which, without reference to possible experience, could never have produced means of mere conceptions any such synthe tical unity.
Reason, its logical use, endeavours to discover the general condition of its judgment (the conclusion), and syllogism itself nothing but judgment means of the subsumption of its condition under general rule (the major). Now as this rule may itself be subjected to the same process of reason, and thus the condition of the condition be sought (by means of prosyllogism) as long as the process can be con tinued, very manifest that the peculiar principle of reason in its logical use --to find for the conditioned cognition of the understanding the unconditioned whereby the unity of the former
completed.
But this logical maxim cannot be principle ofpure reason,
unless we admit that, the conditioned given, the whole ? eries of conditions subordinated to one another -- series which consequently itself unconditioned -- also given, that
contained in the object and its connection.
But this principle of pure reason evidently synthetical
for analytically, the conditioned certainly relates to some con dition, but not to the unconditioned. From this principle
? ? is
Is,
is
is
is
is,
is is
1
is if
a
a is
it
a ;a
is
it
is a
is
a a
a
is
a
by
is a
2.
1.
in
by a
by
a
is
in
? 218 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
also there must originate different synthetical proposition*, 0/ which the pure understanding is perfectly ignorant, for it has to do only with objects of a possible experience, the cognition and synthesis of which is always conditioned. The uncondi tioned, if it does really exist, must be especially considered in
to (he determinations which distinguish it from what ever is conditioned, and will thus afford us material for many & priori synthetical propositions.
The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason will, however, be transcendent in relation to phsenomena,
that is to say, it will be impossible to make any adequate empi rical use of this principle. It is therefore completely different from all principles of the understanding, the use made of which is entirely immanent, their object and purpose being merely the possibility of experience. Now our duty in the transcendental dialectic is as follows. To discover whether the principle, that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of phsenomena, or of thought in general) extends to the uncon ditioned, is objectively true, or not ; what consequences re sult therefrom affecting the empirical use of the understand ing, or rather whether there exists any such objectively valid proposition of reason, and whether it is not, on the contrary, a merely logical precept which directs us to ascend perpetually to still higher conditions, to approach completeness in the series of them, and thus to introduce into our cognition the highest possible unity of reason. We must ascertain, I say, whether this requirement of reason has not been regarded, by a misunderstanding, as a transcendental principle of pure reason, which postulates a thorough completeness in the series of conditions in objects themselves. We must show, more over, the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into syllo gisms, the major proposition of which pure reason has sup plied -- a proposition which has perhaps more of the character of apetitio than of ipos tula turn --and that proceed from experi ence upwards to its conditions. The solution of these pro blems is our task in transcendental dialectic, which we are about to expose even at its source, that lies deep in human reason. We shall divide it into two parts, the first of which will treat of the transcendent conceptions of pure reason, the second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms.
regard
? ? ? ? 219
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK I.
OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE SEASON.
The conceptions of pure reason -- we do not here speak of the possibility of them--are not obtained by reflection, but by inference or conclusion. The conceptions of understanding are also cogitated a priort antecedently to experience, and render it possible ; but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena, in so far as these must necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness. Through them alone are cognition and the determination of an object possible. It ia from them, accordingly, that we receive material for reasoning, and antecedently to them we possess no a priori conceptions of objects from which they might be deduced. On the other hand, the sole basis of their objective reality consists in the necessity imposed on them, as containing the intellectual form of all experience, of restricting their application and influence to the sphere of experience.
But the term, conception of reason or rational conception, itself indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of experience, because its object-matter is a cognition, of which every empirical cognition is but a part -- nay, the whole of possible experience may be itself but a part of -- cogni tion to which no actual experience ever fully attains, although
does always pertain to it. The aim of rational conceptions
the comprehension, as that of the conceptions of understand ing the understanding of perceptions. If they contain the unconditioned, they relate to that to which all experience sub ordinate, but which never itself an object of experience, -- that towards which reason tends in all its conclusions from ex perience, and the standard of which estimates the degree of their empirical use, but which never itself an element in an empirical synthesis. If, notwithstanding, such conceptions possess objective validity, they may be called conceptus ratio- cinati (conceptions legitimately concluded) in cases where they do not, they have been admitted on account cf hay ing the appearance of being correctly concluded, and may be called conceptus ratiocinantes (sophistical conceptious). But as this cau only be sufficiently demonstrated in that part
? ? ? it ;
is
by
is
is
is it is
it, a
? 220 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
of our treatise which relates to the dialectical conclusions of reason, we shall omit any consideration of it in this place. As we called the pure conceptions of the understanding cate gories, we shall also distinguish those of pure reason by a new name, and call them transcendental ideas. These terms, however, we must in the first place explain and justify.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK I.
Sect. I. --OfIdeas in General.
? Spite
guages possess, the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression exactly suited to his conception, for want of which he is unable to make himself intelligible either to others or to nimself. To coin new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom successful ; and, before recourse is taken to so desperate an expedient, it is advisable to examine the dead and learned languages, with the hope and the pro bability that we may there meet with some adequate expression of the notion we have in our minds. In this case, even if the original meaning of the word has become somewhat uncertain, from carelessness or want of caution on the part of the authors of -- always better to adhere to and confirm its proper
of the great wealth of words which European lan'
was formerly used in exactly this sense --than to make our labour
meaning even although may
Tain want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible. For this reason, when happens that there exists only
single word to express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual acceptation, thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate distinction of which from related conceptions
of great importance, we ought not to employ the expression improvideutly, or, for tlie sake of variety and elegance of style, use as synonyme for other cognate words. our duty, on the contrary, carefully to preserve its peculiar signification, as otherwise easily happens that when the attention of the reader no longer particularly attracted to the expression, and lost amid the multitude of other words of very differ ent import, the thought which conveyed, and which alone eonveyed, lost with it.
Plato employed the expression Idea way that plainly
be doubtful whether
? ? in a
is
is
it
it
it is a
it is
it a
by
it, it is
it
It is
is
it
it
? OF IDEAS IN GENERAL. 281
showed he meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, bat which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding, (with which Aristotle occupied himself,) in asmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experi ences, like the categories. In his view they flow from the highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human reason, which, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is obliged with great labour to recal by reminiscence --. which is called philosophy -- the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher attached to this
I shall content myself with remarking that it ia nothing unusual, in common conversatioi. as well as in written works, by comparing the thoughts which an author has de livered upon a subject, to understand him better than he un derstood himself, --inasmuch as he may not have sufficiently determined his conception, and thus have sometimes spoken, nay even thought, in opposition to his own opinions.
Plato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition has the feeling of a much higher vocation than that of merely spelling out phsenomena according to synthetical unity, for the purpose of being able to read them as experience, and that our reason naturally raises itself to cognitions far too elevated to admit of the possibility of an object given by experience corresponding to them--cognitions which are nevertheless real, and are not mere phantoms of the brain.
This philosopher found his ideas especially it all that is practical,* that which rests upon freedom, which in ita turn ranks under cognitions that are the peculiar product of reason. He who would derive from experience the con-
He certainly extended the application of his conception to speculative cognitions also, provided they were given pure and completely a priori, nay, even to mathematics, although this science cannot possess an object otherwhere than in pouitle experience. cannot follow him this, and as little can follow him in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or ia his hypostatization of them although, in truth, the elevaled and exag gerated language which he employed in describing them quite capable) of an interpretation more subdued and more in accordance with fact ant] the nature of things.
? expression.
? ? :
is
in
I
I
?
is,
? 222 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
ceptions of virtue, who would make (as many have really done) that, which at beat can but serve as an imperfectly illustrative example, a model for the formation of a perfectly adequate idea on the subject, would in fact transform virtue into a nonentity changeable according to time and circum stance, and utterly incapable of being employed as a rule. On the contrary, every one is conscious that, when any one is held up to him as a model of virtue, he compares this so-called model with the true original which he possesses in his own mind, and values him according to this standard. But this standard is the idea of virtue, in relation to which all possible objects of experience are indeed serviceable as examples- proofs of the practicability in a certain degree of that which the conception of virtue demands -- but certainly not as arche
That the actions of man will never be in perfect ac cordance with all the requirements of the pure ideas of reason, does not prove the thought to be chimerical. For only through this idea are all judgments as to moral merit or demerit pos sible ; it consequently lies at the foundation of every approach to moral perfection, however far removed from it the obstacles in human nature --indeterminable as to degree--may keep us.
? types.
The Platonic Republic has become proverbial as an ex
ample -- and a striking one -- of imaginary perfection, such as can exist only in the brain of the idle thinker ; and Brucker
ridicules the philosopher for maintaining that a prince can never govern well, unless he is participant in the ideas. But we should do better to follow up this thought, and, where this admirable thinker leaves us without assistance, employ new efforts to place it in clearer light, rather than carelessly fling it aside as useless, under the very miserable and pernicious pretext of impracticability. A constitution of the greatest possible human freedom according to laws, by \pMch the liberty of every individual can consist with the liberty ' every other, (not of the greatest possible happiness, for tliih follows neces sarily from the former ;) to say the least, necessary idea, which must be placed at the foundation not only of the first plan of the constitution of state, but of all its laws. And in this, not necessary at the outset to take account of the obstacles which lie in our way--obstacles which perhaps do not necessarily arise from the character of human nature, but rather from the previous neglect of true ideas in legislation.
? ? it is
a
is,
a
? OF IDEAS IN GENERAL. 223
For there is nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of a philosopher, man the vulgar appeal to a so-called adverse
which indeed would not have existed, if those institutions had been established at the proper time and in accordance with ideas ; whi'e instead of this, conceptions, crude for the very reason that they have been drawn from ex perience, have marred and frustrated all our better views and in tentions. The more legislation and government are in harmony
with this idea, the more rare do punishments become, and thus it is quite reasonable to maintain, as Plato did, that in a
perfect state no punishments at all would be necessary. Now although a perfect state may never exist, the idea is not on that account the less just, which holds up this Maximum as the archetype or standard of a constitution, in order to bring legislative government always nearer and nearer to the greatest possible perfection. For at what precise degree human nature must stop in its progress, and how wide must be the chasm which must necessarily exist between the idea and its realiza tion, are problems which no one can or ought to determine, --and for this reason, that it is the destination of freedom to overstep all assigned limits between itself and the idea.
But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and where ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects), that is to say, in the region of ethics, but also in regard to nature herself, Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas. A plant, an animal, the regular order of nature --probably also the disposition of the whole universe -- give manifest evidence that they are possible only by means of and according to ideas ; that, indeed, no one creature, under the individual conditions of its existence, perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind--just as little as man with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless he bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions ; that, notwithstanding, these ideas are in the highest sense individu ally, unchangeably and completely determined, and are the original causes of things ; and that the totality of connected objects in the universe is alone fully adequate to that idea.
Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in the writings ot this philosopher, the mental power exhibited in this ascent from the ectypal mode* of regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof according to ends, that
experience,
? ? ? is,
? TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
ideas, is an effort which deserves imitation and claims respect But as regards the principles of ethics, of legislation and of religion, spheres in which ideas alone render experience pos sible, although they never attain to full expression therein, he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit, which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very empirical rules, the validity of which as principles is destroyed by ideas. For as regards nature, experience presents us with rules and is the source of truth, but in relation to ethical laws experience is the parent of illusion, and it is in the highest
to limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought to do, from what is done.
We must, however, omit the consideration of these important subjects, the development of which is in reality the peculiar
duty and dignity of philosophy, and confine ourselves for the present to the more humble but not less useful task of pre paring a firm foundation for those majestic edifices of mora, science. For this foundation has been hitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which reason in its con fident but vain search for treasures has made in all directions. Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly acquainted with the transcendental use made of pure reason, its principles and ideas, that we may be able properly to determine and value its influence and real worth. But before bringing these introductory remarks to a close, I beg those who really have philosophy at heart --and their number is but small, -- if they shall find themselves convinced by the considerations follow
ing as well as by those above, to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea its original signification, and to take care that it be not lost among those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are loosely designated, -- that the interests of science may not thereby suffer. We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode of representation, without the necessity of encroaching upon terms which are proper to others. The following is a gradu ated list of them. The genus is representation in general
degree reprehensible
? Under it stands representation with consci ousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the
subject as a modification of its state, is a sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is a cognition {cognitio). A cognition is either an intuition or a conception (intuitus vel conceptus)
(representatio).
? ? ? OtT IDEAS IN (3EHE&AL. 225
The former has an immediate relation to the object and is singular and individual ; the latter has but a mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark which may be common to several things. A conception is either empirical or pure. A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understand ing alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image,* is called notio. A conception formed from notions, which transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason. To one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions, it must be quite intolerable to hear the
of the colour red called an idea. It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of understanding.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
BOOK I.
Sect. II. -- Of Transcendental Idea*.
representation
? Tkanscendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our cognition can contain the origin of pure con ceptions a priori, conceptions which represent objects ante cedently to all experience, or rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an empirical cognition of objects. The form of judgments -- converted into a conception
of the synthesis of intuitions -- produced the categories, which direct the employment of the understanding in experience. This consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms, when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule of the categories, will contain the origin of particular a priori conceptions, which we may call pure con ceptions of reason or transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the understanding in the totality of ex perience according to principles.
The function of reason in arguments consists in the uni versality of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a judgment which is determined a prion in the whole extent of its condition. The proposition. "Caius is mDrtal," is one which may be obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone ; but my wish is to find a
conception,
which contains the condition under which the
? All mathematical figures, for example. -- Tr.
Q
? ? ? 226
TBAJT8CENDJSNTAti DIALECTIC.
predicate of this judgment is given --in this case, the con ception of man -- and after subsuming under this condition, taken in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I determine according to it the cognition of the object thought, and say, "Cains is mortal. "
Hence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a pre dicate to a certain object, after having thought it in the major in its whole extent under a certain condition. This complete quantity of the extent in relation to such a condition is called universality (universalitas). To this corresponds totality (univerrltas) of conditions in the synthesis of intuitions. The transcendental conception of reason is therefore nothing else than the conception of the totality of the conditions of a given conditioned. Now as the unconditioned alone renders possible totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of con ditions is itself always unconditioned ; a pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained by means of the
? of the unconditioned, in so far as it contains a basi* for the synthesis of the conditioned.
To the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates by means of the categories, the number of pure rational conceptions will correspond. We must therefore seek for, first, an unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a subject ; secondly, of the hypothetical synthesis of the mem bers of a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system.
There are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, euch of which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the uncon ditioned -- one to the subject which cannot be employed as a predicate, another to the presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself, and the third to an aggregate of the mem bers of the complete division of a conception. Hence the pure rational conceptions of totality in the synthesis of con ditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of human reason --at least as modes of elevating the unity of the under standing to the unconditioned. They may have no valid application, corresponding to their transcendental employment, in amcrelo, and be thus of no greater utility than to direct the understanding how, while extending them as widely ni
possible, to maintain its exercise and application in perf1ct consistence and harmony.
conception
? ? ? Ctf 'fRiN8CEKDENTAL IDSAS.
227
But, while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the unconditioned as the common title of all conceptions of reason, we again light upon an expression, which we find it impossible to dispense with, and which nevertheless, owing to the ambiguity attaching to it from long abuse, we cannot employ with safety. The word absolute is one of the few words which, in its original signification, was perfectly adequate to the conception it was intended to convey --a conception which no other word in the same language exactly suits, and the loss -- or, which is the same thing, the incautious and loose employment -- of which must be followed by the loss of the conception itself. And, as it is a conception which occupies much of the attention of reason, its loss would be greatly to the detriment of all transcendental philosophy. The werd absolute is at present frequently used to denote that something can be predicated of a thing considered in itself and intrinsi cally. In this sense absolutely possible would signify that which is possible in itself {interne) --which fact, the least that one can predicate of an object. On the other hand,
sometimes employed to indicate that thing valid in
? all respects- -for example, absolute sovereignty.
vossible would in this sense signify that which
all relations 9X1. x ill every respect and this
can be predicated of the possibility of thing.
Now these significations do in truth frequently coincide. Thus, for example, that which intrinsically impossible, also impossible in all relations, that absolutely impossible. But in most cases they differ from each other toto caelo, and can no means conclude tnat, because thing itself possible, is also possible in all relations, and therefore absolutely. Nay, more, shall in the sequel show, that absolute necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity, and that therefore must not be considered as synonymous with it. Of an opposite which intrinsically impossible, we may affirm that in all respects impossible, and that con sequently the thing itself, of which this the opposite,
but cannot reason conversely and say, the opposite of that which absolutely necessary intrinsi
absolutely necessary
that that the absolute necessity of things an interna/- necessity. For this internal necessity
cally impossible,
certain cases mere empty word with which the least con
Absolutely
possible in the most that
? ? a
it it
is
is
Q2 is
I is it by
is
; is,
is is,
is is
is
in is
it
I
is
is, is is in
is
I
a
is in
a
a
;
? 228 fRASSCENDENTAL DIAtECTIC\
ception cannot be connected, while the conception of the necessity of a thing in all relations possesses very peculiar determinations. Now as the loss of a conception of great utility in speculative science cannot be a matter of indifference to the philosopher, I trust that the proper determination and careful preservation of the expression on which the conception depends will likewise be not indifferent to him.
In this enlarged signification then shall I employ the word absolute, in opposition to that which is valid only in some par ticular respect ; for the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is valid without any restriction whatever.
Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, and does not rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely, that in all respects and relations, uncon ditioned. For pure reason leaves to the understanding every thing that immediately relates to the object of intuition or rather to their synthesis imagination. The former restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment of the con ceptions of the understanding, and aims at carrying out the synthetical unity which cogitated in the category, even to the unconditioned. This unity may hence be called the rational unity* of phsenomena, as the other, which the category expresses, may be termed the unity of the understanding. * Reason, therefore, haa an immediate relation to the use of the understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the
ground of possible experience (for the conception of the ab solute totality of conditions not conception that can be employed in experience, because no experience uncon
ditioned), but solely for the purpose of directing to certain inity, of which the understanding has no conception, and the >>im of which to collect into an absolute whole all acts of
the understanding. Hence the objective employment of the pure conceptions of reason always transcendent, while that of the pure conceptions of the understanding must, according to their nature, be always immanent, inasmuch as they are
limited to possible experience.
understand idea necessary conception of reason, to
which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense. Accordingly, the pure conceptions of reason at present under consideration are transcendental ideas. They
? Vernunfteinheit, Yerstandeseinhcit.
? ? ? I
is
by
a
is
is
is, in
it
a is
is a
? OF TRANSCr. HDF. NTAL IDEAS.
229
are conceptions of pure reason, for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means of an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fictions, but natural and necessary products of reason, and have kence a necessary relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understand ing. And finally, they are transcendent, and overstep the limits of all experience, in which, consequently, no object can ever be presented that would be perfectly adequate to a tran scendental idea. When we use the word idea, we say, as regards its object (an object of the pure understanding), a great deal, but as regards its subject (that in respect of its reality under conditions of experience), exceedingly little, be cause the idea, as the conception of maximum, can never be completely and adequately presented in concreto. Now, as in the merely speculative employment of reason the latter
? properly the sole aim, and as in this case the approxi mation to conception, which never attained in practice,
the same thing as the conception were non-existent, -- commonly said of conception of this kind, only
an idea. So we might very well say, the absolute totality of all phenomena only an idea, for as we never can pre
sent an adequate representation of remains for us problem incapable of solution. On the other hand, as in the
practical use of the understanding we have only to do with action and practice according to rules, an idea of pure reason can always be given really in concreto, although only partially, nay, the indispensable condition of all practical employ ment of reason. The practice or execution of the idea always limited and defective, but nevertheless within indeter-
itly always under the influence of the conception of an absolute perfection. And thus the practical idea always in the highest degree fruitful, and in relation to real actions indispensably necessary. In the idea,
pure reason possesses even causality and the power of producing that which its conception contains. Hence we cannot say of wisdom, in disparaging way, it only an idea. For, for the very reason that the idea of the necessary unity of all possible aims, must be for all practical exertions and en deavours the primitive condition and rule-- rule which, not constitutive, at least limitative.
Now, although we must say of the transcendent. il concep-
? ? it is
it is
a
a
is
a
is
is
if is a
it is
it, it
a
is,
is
a if
it is is
is
it is
? 230 TRANSCENDENTAL T>1ALEOT:C.
bona of reason, they are oiuy ideas, we must not, on this account, look upon them as superfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be determined by them, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at the basis of the edifice of the understanding, as the canon for its extended and self-consistent exercise --a canon which, indeed, does not enable it to cognize more in an object than it would cognize by the help of its own conceptions, but which guides it more securely in its cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps render possible a transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego to the practical conceptions, and thus produce for even ethical ideas keeping, so to apeak, and connection with the speculative cognitions of reason. The explication of all this must be looked for in the sequel.
But setting aside, in conformity with our original purpose, the consideration of the practical ideas, we proceed to con template reason in its speculative use alone, nay, in a still more restricted sphere, to wit, in the transcendental use ; and here must strike into the same path which we followed in our deduction of the categories. That is to say, we shall consider the logical form of the cognition of reason, that we may see whether reason may not be thereby a source of conceptions which enable us to regard objects in themselves as determined synthetically h priori, in relation to one or other of the func tions of reason.
Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that of mediate judgment -- by means of the subsumption of the condition of
possible judgment under the condition of given judgment. The given judgment the general rule (major). The sub- sumption of the condition of another possible judgment under the condition of the rule the minor. The actual judgment, which enounces the assertion of the rule in the subsumed case, the conclusion (eoneluno). The rule predicates something generally under certain condition. The con dition of the rule satisfied in some particular case. follows, that what was valid in general under that condi tion must also be considered as valid the
? particular case which satisfies this condition. very plain that
reason attains to cognition, means of acts of the un derstanding which constitute series of conditions. Wheu
arrive at the proposition, "All bodies are changeable,"
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? Or TttANSCEXDENTAti IDEAS. 281
beginning with the more remote cognition, (in which the conception of body does not appear, but which nevertheless contains the condition of that conception), " All [that com pound changeable," by proceeding from this to less remote cognition, which stands under the condition of the former, " Bodies are compound," and hence to third, which at length connects for me the remote cognition (changeable) with the one before me, *' Consequently, bodies are change able," -- have arrived at cognition (conclusion) through series of conditions (premisses). Now every series, whose exponent (of the categorical or hypothetical judgment) given, can be continued consequently the same procedure of reason conducts us to the ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, which
series of syllogisms, that can be continued either on the side of the conditions (per prosy llogismos) or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos) to an indefinite extent.
But we very soon perceive that the chain or series of pro- syllogisms, that is, of deduced cognitions on the side of the grounds or conditions of given cognition, in other words, the ascending series of syllogisms must have very different relation to the faculty of reason from that of the descending series, that is, the progressive procedure of reason on the side of the conditioned by means of episyllogisms. For, as in the former case the cognition (conclusio) given only as con ditioned, reason can attain to this cognition only under the pre-supposition that all the members of the series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series of premisses), because only under this supposition the judgment we may be considering possible priori; while on the side of the conditioned or the inferences, only an incomplete and becoming, and not pre-supposed or given series, consequently only
? Hence, when cognition as conditioned, reason compelled to con sider the series of conditions in an ascending line as completed
potential progression, cogitated. contemplated
and given in their totality. But the very same cognition considered at the same time as the condition of other cognitions, which together constitute a series of inferences or consequences
descending line, reason may preserve perfect indifference, as to how far this progression may extend a parte posteriori, and whether the totality of this series possible, because stands in no need of such series for the purpose of arriving
at tlu>> conclusion before inasmuch as this conclusion
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? 232 CEUraCXKDEKTXL DIAXICTIO.
? ufficiently guaranteed and determined on grounds a part* priori. It may be the case, that upon the side of the con ditions the series of premisses has a first or highest condition, or it may not possess this, and so be a parte priori unlimited ; but it must nevertheless contain totality of conditions, even admitting that we never could succeed in completely appre
hending it ; and the whole series must be unconditionally true, if the conditioned, which is considered as an inference resulting from to be held as true. This requirement of reason, which announces its cognition as determined priori and as necessary, either in itself -- and in this case needs no grounds to rest upon -- or, deduced, as member of
of grounds, which itself unconditionally true.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK
Sect. III. --System Transcendental Ideas.
Ws are not at present engaged with logical dialectic which
makes complete abstraction of the content of cognition, and
aims only at unveiling the illusory appearance in the form syllogisms. Our subject transcendental dialectic, which must contain, completely priori, the origin of certain cognitions drawn from pure reason, and the origin of certain deduced con ceptions, the object of which cannot be given empirically, and which therefore lie beyond the sphere of the faculty of under standing. We have observed, from the natural relation which the transcendental use of our cognition, syllogisms as well as in judgments, most have to the logical, that there are three kinds of dialectical arguments, corresponding to the three
modes of conclusion, which reason attains to cognitions on principles and that in all the business of reason, to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, beyond which the understanding never proceeds, to the unconditioned which the understanding never can reach.
Now the most general relations which can exist in our
representations are, 1st, the relation to the subject 2nd, the
relation to objects, either as phenomena, or as objects of thought in general. If we connect this subdivision with tha main division, all the relations of our representations, of which we can form either conception or an idea, are threefold
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? SYSTEM 0T TRAN8CENDXHTAL IDEAS.
233
1. The relation to the subject; 2. The relation to the mani fold of the object as a phsenomenon ; 3. The relation to all things in general.
Now all pure conceptions have to do in general with the synthetical unity of representations: conceptions of pure reason,
(transcendental ideas) on the other hand, with the uncondi tional synthetical unity of all conditions. It follows that all transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three classes, the first of which contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of ihe thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the seriet of the conditions of a phsenomenon, the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general.
The thinking subject is the object-matter of Psychology; the sum total of nll phsenomena (the world) is the object- matter of Cosmology; and ihe thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that is cogitable (the being of all beings) is the object-matter of all Theology. Thus pure reason presents us with the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul ( psy- chologia rationalis), of a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis), and finally of a transcendental doctrine of God (theologia transcendentalis). Understanding cannot originate even the outline of any of these sciences, even when connected with the highest logical use of reason, that all cogitable syllogisms --for the purpose of proceeding from one
? to all others, even to the utmost limits of the empirical synthesis. They are, on the contrary, pure
and genuine products, or problems, of pure reason.
What modi of the pure conceptions of reason these trans
cendental ideas are, will be fully exposed in the following chapter. They follow the guiding thrend of the categories. For pure reason never relates immediately to objects, but to the conceptions of these contained in the understanding. In like manner, will be made manifest in the detailed explana tion of these ideas, --how reason, merely through the synthetical use of the same function which employs in categorical syllogism, necessarily attains to the conception of the absolute unity of the thinking subject, --how the logical procedure in hypothetical ideas necessarily produces the idea of -the ab solutely unconditioned m a series of given conditions, and finally, -- how the mere form of the disjunctive syllogism in volves the highest conception of bring ofall brings thought which at first sight seems the highest degree paradoxical.
object (phsenomenon)
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? 234 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
An objective deduction, such as we were able to present in
the case of the categories, is impossible as regards these trans cendental ideas. For they have, in truth, no relation to any
object, in experience, for the very reason that they are only ideas. But a subjective deduction of them from the nature of our reason is possible, and has been given in the present chapter.
It is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason
the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the condi tions, and that does not concern itself with the absolute com pleteness on the part of the conditioned. For of the former alone does she stand in need, in order to preposit the whole series of conditions, and thus present them to the understand ing priori. But we once have completely (and uncon ditionally) given condition, there no further necessity, pro ceeding with the series, for conception of reason for the understanding takes of itself every step downward, from the condition to the conditioned. Thus the transcendental ideas are available only for ascending in the series of conditions, till we reach the unconditioned, that is, principles. As regards descending to the conditioned, on the other hand, we find that there widely extensive logical use which reason makes of the laws of the understanding, but that transcendental use thereof impossible and, that when wc form an idea of the absolute totality of such synthesis, for example, of the whole series of all future changes in the world, this idea mere ens rationis, an arbitrary fiction of thought, and not neces sary presupposition of reason. For the possibility of the con ditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions, but not of its consequences. Consequently, this conception not trans cendental idea -- and with these alone that we are at present occupied.
Finally, obvious, that there exists among the trans cendental ideas certain connection and unity, and that pure reason, by means of them, collects all its cognitions into one
? From the cognition of self to the cognition of the world, and through these to the supreme being, the progres sion so natural, that seems to resemble the logical march uf reason from the premisses to the conclusion. * Now whether
The science of Metaphysics lias for the proper ohject of its inquiries os! t three grand ideas God, Freedom, and Immortality, and aim
system.
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? SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.
235
tliere lies unobserved at the foundation of these ideas an analogy of the same kind as exists between the logical ana transcen dental procedure of reason, is another of those questions, the answer to which we must not expect till we arrive at a more advanced stage in our inquiries. In this cursory and prelimi nary view, we have, meanwhile, reached our aim. For we have dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the transcen dental conceptions of reason, from their being commonly mixed up with other conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and not properly distinguished from the conceptions of the under standing ; we have exposed their origin, and thereby at the same time their determinate number, and presented them in a systematic connection, and have thus marked out and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II.
OF THE DIALECTICAL PBOCEDURF. OF PURE REASON.
It may be said that the object, of a merely transcendental idea is something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in fact, a conception of an object that ia adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being presented and in tuited in a possible experience. But we should express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we said that, we can have no knowledge of an object, which
at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with the first, must lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the other subjects with which it occupies itself, are merely means, for the attainment and realiza tion of these ideas. It does not require these ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the contrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A complete insight into and comprehension of them would render Theology, Ethict, and, through the conjunction of both. Religion, solely dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In a systematic representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrange ment -- the tyitt helical one -- would be the most suitable ; but in the in vestigation which must necessarily precede it, the analytical, which reverses this arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose, as in it w< should proceed from that which experience immediately presents to Bs>-- psychology, to cosmology, and thenre to theology.
? ? ? ? 23fi THAS9CE! TDENTAri DIALECTIC.
perfectly corresponds to an idea, althongh we may possess a problematical conception thereof.
Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical pre misses, and by means of which we conclude from some thing that we do know, to something of which we do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheVess, by an un avoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although indeed, as regards their origin, they are rery well entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of reason, but are neces sitated by its very nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.
Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corre sponding to the number of the ideas, which their conclusions present. In the argument or syllogism of the first class, I conclude, from the transcendental conception of the subject which contains no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I can not in this manner attain to a concep tion. This dialectical argument I shall call the Transcendental Paralogism. The second class of sophistical arguments is occu pied with the transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given phenomenon, and I conclude, from the fact that I have always a self-contradictory
of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon one side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which I have nevertheless no conception. The condition of reason in these dialectical arguments, I shall term the Antinomy of pure reason. Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument, I conclude, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in general, in so far as they can be given, the.
absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general; that from things which do not know in their mere transcendental conception, conclude being of all beings which know still less means of transcenderr
? conception
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tid conception, and of whose unconditioned necessity 1 can form no conception whatever. This dialectical argument I ? hall call the Ideal of pure reason.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II.
Chap. I. -- Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason,
The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a transcendental paralogism Las a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexcep tionable. In this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoid able, though not insoluble, mental illusion.
We now come to a conception, which was not inserted in the general list of transcendental conceptions, and yet must be reckoned with them, but at the same time without in the least altering, or indicating a deficiency in that table. This iIs the conception, or, if the term is preferred, the judgment, think. But it is readily perceived that this thought is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general, and consequently of transcendental conceptions also, and that it is therefore re garded as a transcendental conception, although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked, inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness.
At the same time, pure as this conception is from all empiri cal content (impressions of the senses), it enables us to distin guish two different kinds of objects. I, as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called body. Thus the expression, I, as a thinking being, designates the object-matter of psychology, which may be called the rational doctrine o(
of the soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me in concreto), may be concluded from this con ception J, in so far as it appears in all thought.
Now, the ratiotal doctrine of the soul is really an undo*.
? the soul, inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing
? ? ? 238 NUftSOm)E>TAIi DIALECttO.
taking of this kind. For if the smallest empirical element of
thought, if any particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced among the grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a rational, but an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before Ius a pretended science,
presses the perception of one's self, an internal experience is asserted, and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is founded upon not pure, but partly founded upon an empirical principle. For this internal perception nothing more than the mere apperception, think, which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible, in which we say, think substance, cause, &c. For internal experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general, and its relation to other perceptions, unless some particular distinction or determination thereof empirically given, cannot be re garded as empirical cognition, but as cognition of the empiri cal, and belongs to the investigation of the possibility of every experience, which certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience (for example, only pleasure or pain), that should be included in the general representation of self-con sciousness, would immediately change the rational into an empirical psychology.
think therefore the oiily text of rational psychology, from which must develope its whole system. manifest that this thought, when applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but transcendental predicates thereof be cause the least empirical predicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence of all experience.
and disjunctive.
con-ieyutntia immediata -- there really be such thing, and
lie not contradiction in terms -- evideutly does not belong to the spbera of logic proper, the oliject-matter of which the syllogism, which always consists of three propositions, either in thought or expressed. This indeed
tantamount to declaring that there uo such mode ot reasoning. -- Tr.
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? 216 THAKSflCNDEKTAL DIALECTIC.
When, as often happens, the conclusion is a judgment which may follow from other given judgments, through which a per fectly different object is cogitated, I endeavour to discover in the understanding whether the assertion in this conclusion does not stand under certain conditions according to a general rule. If I find such a condition, and if the object mentioned in the conclusion can be subsumed under the given condition, then this conclusion follows from a rule which is also valid for other objects of cognition. From this we see that reason endeavours to subject the great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to the smallest possible number of principles (general conditions), and thus to produce in it the highest unity.
C.
Or THE PtTCE T7SE OF REASON.
Can we isolate reason, and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar
source of conceptions and judgments which spring from it alone, and through which it can be applied to objects; or is it merely a subordinate faculty, whose duty it is to give a certain form to given cognitions -- a form which is called logical, and through which the cognitions of the understanding are subor dinated to each other, and lower rules to higher (those, to wit, whose condition comprises in its sphere the condition of the others), in so far as this can be done by comparison ? This is the question which we have at present to answer. Manifold variety of rules and unity of principles is a requirement of rea son, for the purpose of bringing the understanding into complete accordance with itself, just as understanding subjects the manifold content of intuition to conceptions, and thereby introduces connection into it. But this principle prescribes no law to objects, and does not contain any ground of the possi bility of cognizing, or of determining them as such, but is merely a subjective law for the proper arrangement of the content of the understanding. The purpose of this law comparison of the conceptions of the understanding, to reduce them to the smallest possible number, although, at the same time, does not justify us demanding from objects them selves such an uniformity as might contribute to the convenience and the enlargement of the sphere of the understanding, or expecting that will itself thus receive from them objective
validity. In one w<<nL the question does reason in itselC
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? nrrBODucTion. --of the tube use of beaboit. 217
that does pure reason contain priori synthetical principles and rules, and what are those principles
The formal and logical procedure of reason syllogisms gives us sufficient information in regard to the ground on which the transcendental principle of reason in its pure syn thetical cognition will rest.
Reason, as observed in the syllogistic process, not appli cable to intuitions, for the purpose of subjecting tbem to rules -- for this the province of the understanding with its categories--
but to conceptions and judgments. If pure reason does apply to objects and the intuition of them, does so not immediately,
? but mediately-- through the understanding and its judgments, which have direct relation to the senses and their intuition, for
the purpose of determining their objects. The unity of reason therefore not the unity of possible experience, but essenti
ally different from this unity, which that of the understanding. That everything which happens has cause, not principle cognized and prescribed reason. This principle makes the unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason, which, without reference to possible experience, could never have produced means of mere conceptions any such synthe tical unity.
Reason, its logical use, endeavours to discover the general condition of its judgment (the conclusion), and syllogism itself nothing but judgment means of the subsumption of its condition under general rule (the major). Now as this rule may itself be subjected to the same process of reason, and thus the condition of the condition be sought (by means of prosyllogism) as long as the process can be con tinued, very manifest that the peculiar principle of reason in its logical use --to find for the conditioned cognition of the understanding the unconditioned whereby the unity of the former
completed.
But this logical maxim cannot be principle ofpure reason,
unless we admit that, the conditioned given, the whole ? eries of conditions subordinated to one another -- series which consequently itself unconditioned -- also given, that
contained in the object and its connection.
But this principle of pure reason evidently synthetical
for analytically, the conditioned certainly relates to some con dition, but not to the unconditioned. From this principle
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? 218 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
also there must originate different synthetical proposition*, 0/ which the pure understanding is perfectly ignorant, for it has to do only with objects of a possible experience, the cognition and synthesis of which is always conditioned. The uncondi tioned, if it does really exist, must be especially considered in
to (he determinations which distinguish it from what ever is conditioned, and will thus afford us material for many & priori synthetical propositions.
The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason will, however, be transcendent in relation to phsenomena,
that is to say, it will be impossible to make any adequate empi rical use of this principle. It is therefore completely different from all principles of the understanding, the use made of which is entirely immanent, their object and purpose being merely the possibility of experience. Now our duty in the transcendental dialectic is as follows. To discover whether the principle, that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of phsenomena, or of thought in general) extends to the uncon ditioned, is objectively true, or not ; what consequences re sult therefrom affecting the empirical use of the understand ing, or rather whether there exists any such objectively valid proposition of reason, and whether it is not, on the contrary, a merely logical precept which directs us to ascend perpetually to still higher conditions, to approach completeness in the series of them, and thus to introduce into our cognition the highest possible unity of reason. We must ascertain, I say, whether this requirement of reason has not been regarded, by a misunderstanding, as a transcendental principle of pure reason, which postulates a thorough completeness in the series of conditions in objects themselves. We must show, more over, the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into syllo gisms, the major proposition of which pure reason has sup plied -- a proposition which has perhaps more of the character of apetitio than of ipos tula turn --and that proceed from experi ence upwards to its conditions. The solution of these pro blems is our task in transcendental dialectic, which we are about to expose even at its source, that lies deep in human reason. We shall divide it into two parts, the first of which will treat of the transcendent conceptions of pure reason, the second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms.
regard
? ? ? ? 219
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK I.
OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE SEASON.
The conceptions of pure reason -- we do not here speak of the possibility of them--are not obtained by reflection, but by inference or conclusion. The conceptions of understanding are also cogitated a priort antecedently to experience, and render it possible ; but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena, in so far as these must necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness. Through them alone are cognition and the determination of an object possible. It ia from them, accordingly, that we receive material for reasoning, and antecedently to them we possess no a priori conceptions of objects from which they might be deduced. On the other hand, the sole basis of their objective reality consists in the necessity imposed on them, as containing the intellectual form of all experience, of restricting their application and influence to the sphere of experience.
But the term, conception of reason or rational conception, itself indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of experience, because its object-matter is a cognition, of which every empirical cognition is but a part -- nay, the whole of possible experience may be itself but a part of -- cogni tion to which no actual experience ever fully attains, although
does always pertain to it. The aim of rational conceptions
the comprehension, as that of the conceptions of understand ing the understanding of perceptions. If they contain the unconditioned, they relate to that to which all experience sub ordinate, but which never itself an object of experience, -- that towards which reason tends in all its conclusions from ex perience, and the standard of which estimates the degree of their empirical use, but which never itself an element in an empirical synthesis. If, notwithstanding, such conceptions possess objective validity, they may be called conceptus ratio- cinati (conceptions legitimately concluded) in cases where they do not, they have been admitted on account cf hay ing the appearance of being correctly concluded, and may be called conceptus ratiocinantes (sophistical conceptious). But as this cau only be sufficiently demonstrated in that part
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? 220 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
of our treatise which relates to the dialectical conclusions of reason, we shall omit any consideration of it in this place. As we called the pure conceptions of the understanding cate gories, we shall also distinguish those of pure reason by a new name, and call them transcendental ideas. These terms, however, we must in the first place explain and justify.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK I.
Sect. I. --OfIdeas in General.
? Spite
guages possess, the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression exactly suited to his conception, for want of which he is unable to make himself intelligible either to others or to nimself. To coin new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom successful ; and, before recourse is taken to so desperate an expedient, it is advisable to examine the dead and learned languages, with the hope and the pro bability that we may there meet with some adequate expression of the notion we have in our minds. In this case, even if the original meaning of the word has become somewhat uncertain, from carelessness or want of caution on the part of the authors of -- always better to adhere to and confirm its proper
of the great wealth of words which European lan'
was formerly used in exactly this sense --than to make our labour
meaning even although may
Tain want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible. For this reason, when happens that there exists only
single word to express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual acceptation, thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate distinction of which from related conceptions
of great importance, we ought not to employ the expression improvideutly, or, for tlie sake of variety and elegance of style, use as synonyme for other cognate words. our duty, on the contrary, carefully to preserve its peculiar signification, as otherwise easily happens that when the attention of the reader no longer particularly attracted to the expression, and lost amid the multitude of other words of very differ ent import, the thought which conveyed, and which alone eonveyed, lost with it.
Plato employed the expression Idea way that plainly
be doubtful whether
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? OF IDEAS IN GENERAL. 281
showed he meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, bat which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding, (with which Aristotle occupied himself,) in asmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experi ences, like the categories. In his view they flow from the highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human reason, which, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is obliged with great labour to recal by reminiscence --. which is called philosophy -- the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher attached to this
I shall content myself with remarking that it ia nothing unusual, in common conversatioi. as well as in written works, by comparing the thoughts which an author has de livered upon a subject, to understand him better than he un derstood himself, --inasmuch as he may not have sufficiently determined his conception, and thus have sometimes spoken, nay even thought, in opposition to his own opinions.
Plato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition has the feeling of a much higher vocation than that of merely spelling out phsenomena according to synthetical unity, for the purpose of being able to read them as experience, and that our reason naturally raises itself to cognitions far too elevated to admit of the possibility of an object given by experience corresponding to them--cognitions which are nevertheless real, and are not mere phantoms of the brain.
This philosopher found his ideas especially it all that is practical,* that which rests upon freedom, which in ita turn ranks under cognitions that are the peculiar product of reason. He who would derive from experience the con-
He certainly extended the application of his conception to speculative cognitions also, provided they were given pure and completely a priori, nay, even to mathematics, although this science cannot possess an object otherwhere than in pouitle experience. cannot follow him this, and as little can follow him in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or ia his hypostatization of them although, in truth, the elevaled and exag gerated language which he employed in describing them quite capable) of an interpretation more subdued and more in accordance with fact ant] the nature of things.
? expression.
? ? :
is
in
I
I
?
is,
? 222 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
ceptions of virtue, who would make (as many have really done) that, which at beat can but serve as an imperfectly illustrative example, a model for the formation of a perfectly adequate idea on the subject, would in fact transform virtue into a nonentity changeable according to time and circum stance, and utterly incapable of being employed as a rule. On the contrary, every one is conscious that, when any one is held up to him as a model of virtue, he compares this so-called model with the true original which he possesses in his own mind, and values him according to this standard. But this standard is the idea of virtue, in relation to which all possible objects of experience are indeed serviceable as examples- proofs of the practicability in a certain degree of that which the conception of virtue demands -- but certainly not as arche
That the actions of man will never be in perfect ac cordance with all the requirements of the pure ideas of reason, does not prove the thought to be chimerical. For only through this idea are all judgments as to moral merit or demerit pos sible ; it consequently lies at the foundation of every approach to moral perfection, however far removed from it the obstacles in human nature --indeterminable as to degree--may keep us.
? types.
The Platonic Republic has become proverbial as an ex
ample -- and a striking one -- of imaginary perfection, such as can exist only in the brain of the idle thinker ; and Brucker
ridicules the philosopher for maintaining that a prince can never govern well, unless he is participant in the ideas. But we should do better to follow up this thought, and, where this admirable thinker leaves us without assistance, employ new efforts to place it in clearer light, rather than carelessly fling it aside as useless, under the very miserable and pernicious pretext of impracticability. A constitution of the greatest possible human freedom according to laws, by \pMch the liberty of every individual can consist with the liberty ' every other, (not of the greatest possible happiness, for tliih follows neces sarily from the former ;) to say the least, necessary idea, which must be placed at the foundation not only of the first plan of the constitution of state, but of all its laws. And in this, not necessary at the outset to take account of the obstacles which lie in our way--obstacles which perhaps do not necessarily arise from the character of human nature, but rather from the previous neglect of true ideas in legislation.
? ? it is
a
is,
a
? OF IDEAS IN GENERAL. 223
For there is nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of a philosopher, man the vulgar appeal to a so-called adverse
which indeed would not have existed, if those institutions had been established at the proper time and in accordance with ideas ; whi'e instead of this, conceptions, crude for the very reason that they have been drawn from ex perience, have marred and frustrated all our better views and in tentions. The more legislation and government are in harmony
with this idea, the more rare do punishments become, and thus it is quite reasonable to maintain, as Plato did, that in a
perfect state no punishments at all would be necessary. Now although a perfect state may never exist, the idea is not on that account the less just, which holds up this Maximum as the archetype or standard of a constitution, in order to bring legislative government always nearer and nearer to the greatest possible perfection. For at what precise degree human nature must stop in its progress, and how wide must be the chasm which must necessarily exist between the idea and its realiza tion, are problems which no one can or ought to determine, --and for this reason, that it is the destination of freedom to overstep all assigned limits between itself and the idea.
But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and where ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects), that is to say, in the region of ethics, but also in regard to nature herself, Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas. A plant, an animal, the regular order of nature --probably also the disposition of the whole universe -- give manifest evidence that they are possible only by means of and according to ideas ; that, indeed, no one creature, under the individual conditions of its existence, perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind--just as little as man with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless he bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions ; that, notwithstanding, these ideas are in the highest sense individu ally, unchangeably and completely determined, and are the original causes of things ; and that the totality of connected objects in the universe is alone fully adequate to that idea.
Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in the writings ot this philosopher, the mental power exhibited in this ascent from the ectypal mode* of regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof according to ends, that
experience,
? ? ? is,
? TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
ideas, is an effort which deserves imitation and claims respect But as regards the principles of ethics, of legislation and of religion, spheres in which ideas alone render experience pos sible, although they never attain to full expression therein, he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit, which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very empirical rules, the validity of which as principles is destroyed by ideas. For as regards nature, experience presents us with rules and is the source of truth, but in relation to ethical laws experience is the parent of illusion, and it is in the highest
to limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought to do, from what is done.
We must, however, omit the consideration of these important subjects, the development of which is in reality the peculiar
duty and dignity of philosophy, and confine ourselves for the present to the more humble but not less useful task of pre paring a firm foundation for those majestic edifices of mora, science. For this foundation has been hitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which reason in its con fident but vain search for treasures has made in all directions. Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly acquainted with the transcendental use made of pure reason, its principles and ideas, that we may be able properly to determine and value its influence and real worth. But before bringing these introductory remarks to a close, I beg those who really have philosophy at heart --and their number is but small, -- if they shall find themselves convinced by the considerations follow
ing as well as by those above, to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea its original signification, and to take care that it be not lost among those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are loosely designated, -- that the interests of science may not thereby suffer. We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode of representation, without the necessity of encroaching upon terms which are proper to others. The following is a gradu ated list of them. The genus is representation in general
degree reprehensible
? Under it stands representation with consci ousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the
subject as a modification of its state, is a sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is a cognition {cognitio). A cognition is either an intuition or a conception (intuitus vel conceptus)
(representatio).
? ? ? OtT IDEAS IN (3EHE&AL. 225
The former has an immediate relation to the object and is singular and individual ; the latter has but a mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark which may be common to several things. A conception is either empirical or pure. A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understand ing alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image,* is called notio. A conception formed from notions, which transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason. To one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions, it must be quite intolerable to hear the
of the colour red called an idea. It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of understanding.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
BOOK I.
Sect. II. -- Of Transcendental Idea*.
representation
? Tkanscendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our cognition can contain the origin of pure con ceptions a priori, conceptions which represent objects ante cedently to all experience, or rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an empirical cognition of objects. The form of judgments -- converted into a conception
of the synthesis of intuitions -- produced the categories, which direct the employment of the understanding in experience. This consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms, when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule of the categories, will contain the origin of particular a priori conceptions, which we may call pure con ceptions of reason or transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the understanding in the totality of ex perience according to principles.
The function of reason in arguments consists in the uni versality of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a judgment which is determined a prion in the whole extent of its condition. The proposition. "Caius is mDrtal," is one which may be obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone ; but my wish is to find a
conception,
which contains the condition under which the
? All mathematical figures, for example. -- Tr.
Q
? ? ? 226
TBAJT8CENDJSNTAti DIALECTIC.
predicate of this judgment is given --in this case, the con ception of man -- and after subsuming under this condition, taken in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I determine according to it the cognition of the object thought, and say, "Cains is mortal. "
Hence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a pre dicate to a certain object, after having thought it in the major in its whole extent under a certain condition. This complete quantity of the extent in relation to such a condition is called universality (universalitas). To this corresponds totality (univerrltas) of conditions in the synthesis of intuitions. The transcendental conception of reason is therefore nothing else than the conception of the totality of the conditions of a given conditioned. Now as the unconditioned alone renders possible totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of con ditions is itself always unconditioned ; a pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained by means of the
? of the unconditioned, in so far as it contains a basi* for the synthesis of the conditioned.
To the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates by means of the categories, the number of pure rational conceptions will correspond. We must therefore seek for, first, an unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a subject ; secondly, of the hypothetical synthesis of the mem bers of a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system.
There are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, euch of which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the uncon ditioned -- one to the subject which cannot be employed as a predicate, another to the presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself, and the third to an aggregate of the mem bers of the complete division of a conception. Hence the pure rational conceptions of totality in the synthesis of con ditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of human reason --at least as modes of elevating the unity of the under standing to the unconditioned. They may have no valid application, corresponding to their transcendental employment, in amcrelo, and be thus of no greater utility than to direct the understanding how, while extending them as widely ni
possible, to maintain its exercise and application in perf1ct consistence and harmony.
conception
? ? ? Ctf 'fRiN8CEKDENTAL IDSAS.
227
But, while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the unconditioned as the common title of all conceptions of reason, we again light upon an expression, which we find it impossible to dispense with, and which nevertheless, owing to the ambiguity attaching to it from long abuse, we cannot employ with safety. The word absolute is one of the few words which, in its original signification, was perfectly adequate to the conception it was intended to convey --a conception which no other word in the same language exactly suits, and the loss -- or, which is the same thing, the incautious and loose employment -- of which must be followed by the loss of the conception itself. And, as it is a conception which occupies much of the attention of reason, its loss would be greatly to the detriment of all transcendental philosophy. The werd absolute is at present frequently used to denote that something can be predicated of a thing considered in itself and intrinsi cally. In this sense absolutely possible would signify that which is possible in itself {interne) --which fact, the least that one can predicate of an object. On the other hand,
sometimes employed to indicate that thing valid in
? all respects- -for example, absolute sovereignty.
vossible would in this sense signify that which
all relations 9X1. x ill every respect and this
can be predicated of the possibility of thing.
Now these significations do in truth frequently coincide. Thus, for example, that which intrinsically impossible, also impossible in all relations, that absolutely impossible. But in most cases they differ from each other toto caelo, and can no means conclude tnat, because thing itself possible, is also possible in all relations, and therefore absolutely. Nay, more, shall in the sequel show, that absolute necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity, and that therefore must not be considered as synonymous with it. Of an opposite which intrinsically impossible, we may affirm that in all respects impossible, and that con sequently the thing itself, of which this the opposite,
but cannot reason conversely and say, the opposite of that which absolutely necessary intrinsi
absolutely necessary
that that the absolute necessity of things an interna/- necessity. For this internal necessity
cally impossible,
certain cases mere empty word with which the least con
Absolutely
possible in the most that
? ? a
it it
is
is
Q2 is
I is it by
is
; is,
is is,
is is
is
in is
it
I
is
is, is is in
is
I
a
is in
a
a
;
? 228 fRASSCENDENTAL DIAtECTIC\
ception cannot be connected, while the conception of the necessity of a thing in all relations possesses very peculiar determinations. Now as the loss of a conception of great utility in speculative science cannot be a matter of indifference to the philosopher, I trust that the proper determination and careful preservation of the expression on which the conception depends will likewise be not indifferent to him.
In this enlarged signification then shall I employ the word absolute, in opposition to that which is valid only in some par ticular respect ; for the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is valid without any restriction whatever.
Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, and does not rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely, that in all respects and relations, uncon ditioned. For pure reason leaves to the understanding every thing that immediately relates to the object of intuition or rather to their synthesis imagination. The former restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment of the con ceptions of the understanding, and aims at carrying out the synthetical unity which cogitated in the category, even to the unconditioned. This unity may hence be called the rational unity* of phsenomena, as the other, which the category expresses, may be termed the unity of the understanding. * Reason, therefore, haa an immediate relation to the use of the understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the
ground of possible experience (for the conception of the ab solute totality of conditions not conception that can be employed in experience, because no experience uncon
ditioned), but solely for the purpose of directing to certain inity, of which the understanding has no conception, and the >>im of which to collect into an absolute whole all acts of
the understanding. Hence the objective employment of the pure conceptions of reason always transcendent, while that of the pure conceptions of the understanding must, according to their nature, be always immanent, inasmuch as they are
limited to possible experience.
understand idea necessary conception of reason, to
which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense. Accordingly, the pure conceptions of reason at present under consideration are transcendental ideas. They
? Vernunfteinheit, Yerstandeseinhcit.
? ? ? I
is
by
a
is
is
is, in
it
a is
is a
? OF TRANSCr. HDF. NTAL IDEAS.
229
are conceptions of pure reason, for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means of an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fictions, but natural and necessary products of reason, and have kence a necessary relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understand ing. And finally, they are transcendent, and overstep the limits of all experience, in which, consequently, no object can ever be presented that would be perfectly adequate to a tran scendental idea. When we use the word idea, we say, as regards its object (an object of the pure understanding), a great deal, but as regards its subject (that in respect of its reality under conditions of experience), exceedingly little, be cause the idea, as the conception of maximum, can never be completely and adequately presented in concreto. Now, as in the merely speculative employment of reason the latter
? properly the sole aim, and as in this case the approxi mation to conception, which never attained in practice,
the same thing as the conception were non-existent, -- commonly said of conception of this kind, only
an idea. So we might very well say, the absolute totality of all phenomena only an idea, for as we never can pre
sent an adequate representation of remains for us problem incapable of solution. On the other hand, as in the
practical use of the understanding we have only to do with action and practice according to rules, an idea of pure reason can always be given really in concreto, although only partially, nay, the indispensable condition of all practical employ ment of reason. The practice or execution of the idea always limited and defective, but nevertheless within indeter-
itly always under the influence of the conception of an absolute perfection. And thus the practical idea always in the highest degree fruitful, and in relation to real actions indispensably necessary. In the idea,
pure reason possesses even causality and the power of producing that which its conception contains. Hence we cannot say of wisdom, in disparaging way, it only an idea. For, for the very reason that the idea of the necessary unity of all possible aims, must be for all practical exertions and en deavours the primitive condition and rule-- rule which, not constitutive, at least limitative.
Now, although we must say of the transcendent. il concep-
? ? it is
it is
a
a
is
a
is
is
if is a
it is
it, it
a
is,
is
a if
it is is
is
it is
? 230 TRANSCENDENTAL T>1ALEOT:C.
bona of reason, they are oiuy ideas, we must not, on this account, look upon them as superfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be determined by them, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at the basis of the edifice of the understanding, as the canon for its extended and self-consistent exercise --a canon which, indeed, does not enable it to cognize more in an object than it would cognize by the help of its own conceptions, but which guides it more securely in its cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps render possible a transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego to the practical conceptions, and thus produce for even ethical ideas keeping, so to apeak, and connection with the speculative cognitions of reason. The explication of all this must be looked for in the sequel.
But setting aside, in conformity with our original purpose, the consideration of the practical ideas, we proceed to con template reason in its speculative use alone, nay, in a still more restricted sphere, to wit, in the transcendental use ; and here must strike into the same path which we followed in our deduction of the categories. That is to say, we shall consider the logical form of the cognition of reason, that we may see whether reason may not be thereby a source of conceptions which enable us to regard objects in themselves as determined synthetically h priori, in relation to one or other of the func tions of reason.
Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that of mediate judgment -- by means of the subsumption of the condition of
possible judgment under the condition of given judgment. The given judgment the general rule (major). The sub- sumption of the condition of another possible judgment under the condition of the rule the minor. The actual judgment, which enounces the assertion of the rule in the subsumed case, the conclusion (eoneluno). The rule predicates something generally under certain condition. The con dition of the rule satisfied in some particular case. follows, that what was valid in general under that condi tion must also be considered as valid the
? particular case which satisfies this condition. very plain that
reason attains to cognition, means of acts of the un derstanding which constitute series of conditions. Wheu
arrive at the proposition, "All bodies are changeable,"
? ? Ia is
by
It
a
by
a
a
is
is is
It
is in
a
is,
? Or TttANSCEXDENTAti IDEAS. 281
beginning with the more remote cognition, (in which the conception of body does not appear, but which nevertheless contains the condition of that conception), " All [that com pound changeable," by proceeding from this to less remote cognition, which stands under the condition of the former, " Bodies are compound," and hence to third, which at length connects for me the remote cognition (changeable) with the one before me, *' Consequently, bodies are change able," -- have arrived at cognition (conclusion) through series of conditions (premisses). Now every series, whose exponent (of the categorical or hypothetical judgment) given, can be continued consequently the same procedure of reason conducts us to the ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, which
series of syllogisms, that can be continued either on the side of the conditions (per prosy llogismos) or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos) to an indefinite extent.
But we very soon perceive that the chain or series of pro- syllogisms, that is, of deduced cognitions on the side of the grounds or conditions of given cognition, in other words, the ascending series of syllogisms must have very different relation to the faculty of reason from that of the descending series, that is, the progressive procedure of reason on the side of the conditioned by means of episyllogisms. For, as in the former case the cognition (conclusio) given only as con ditioned, reason can attain to this cognition only under the pre-supposition that all the members of the series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series of premisses), because only under this supposition the judgment we may be considering possible priori; while on the side of the conditioned or the inferences, only an incomplete and becoming, and not pre-supposed or given series, consequently only
? Hence, when cognition as conditioned, reason compelled to con sider the series of conditions in an ascending line as completed
potential progression, cogitated. contemplated
and given in their totality. But the very same cognition considered at the same time as the condition of other cognitions, which together constitute a series of inferences or consequences
descending line, reason may preserve perfect indifference, as to how far this progression may extend a parte posteriori, and whether the totality of this series possible, because stands in no need of such series for the purpose of arriving
at tlu>> conclusion before inasmuch as this conclusion
? ? is
a
is
is
is
in a
is
is a
isit is a
isa
a
a
I
is
is
it,a a a a
if
a
;
a
a isj
? 232 CEUraCXKDEKTXL DIAXICTIO.
? ufficiently guaranteed and determined on grounds a part* priori. It may be the case, that upon the side of the con ditions the series of premisses has a first or highest condition, or it may not possess this, and so be a parte priori unlimited ; but it must nevertheless contain totality of conditions, even admitting that we never could succeed in completely appre
hending it ; and the whole series must be unconditionally true, if the conditioned, which is considered as an inference resulting from to be held as true. This requirement of reason, which announces its cognition as determined priori and as necessary, either in itself -- and in this case needs no grounds to rest upon -- or, deduced, as member of
of grounds, which itself unconditionally true.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK
Sect. III. --System Transcendental Ideas.
Ws are not at present engaged with logical dialectic which
makes complete abstraction of the content of cognition, and
aims only at unveiling the illusory appearance in the form syllogisms. Our subject transcendental dialectic, which must contain, completely priori, the origin of certain cognitions drawn from pure reason, and the origin of certain deduced con ceptions, the object of which cannot be given empirically, and which therefore lie beyond the sphere of the faculty of under standing. We have observed, from the natural relation which the transcendental use of our cognition, syllogisms as well as in judgments, most have to the logical, that there are three kinds of dialectical arguments, corresponding to the three
modes of conclusion, which reason attains to cognitions on principles and that in all the business of reason, to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, beyond which the understanding never proceeds, to the unconditioned which the understanding never can reach.
Now the most general relations which can exist in our
representations are, 1st, the relation to the subject 2nd, the
relation to objects, either as phenomena, or as objects of thought in general. If we connect this subdivision with tha main division, all the relations of our representations, of which we can form either conception or an idea, are threefold
? series
? ? a
d
is if it is
i
of
;
;
it is
I. a
is a
by
is
of
in
a it
a
a
it, is
? SYSTEM 0T TRAN8CENDXHTAL IDEAS.
233
1. The relation to the subject; 2. The relation to the mani fold of the object as a phsenomenon ; 3. The relation to all things in general.
Now all pure conceptions have to do in general with the synthetical unity of representations: conceptions of pure reason,
(transcendental ideas) on the other hand, with the uncondi tional synthetical unity of all conditions. It follows that all transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three classes, the first of which contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of ihe thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the seriet of the conditions of a phsenomenon, the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general.
The thinking subject is the object-matter of Psychology; the sum total of nll phsenomena (the world) is the object- matter of Cosmology; and ihe thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that is cogitable (the being of all beings) is the object-matter of all Theology. Thus pure reason presents us with the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul ( psy- chologia rationalis), of a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis), and finally of a transcendental doctrine of God (theologia transcendentalis). Understanding cannot originate even the outline of any of these sciences, even when connected with the highest logical use of reason, that all cogitable syllogisms --for the purpose of proceeding from one
? to all others, even to the utmost limits of the empirical synthesis. They are, on the contrary, pure
and genuine products, or problems, of pure reason.
What modi of the pure conceptions of reason these trans
cendental ideas are, will be fully exposed in the following chapter. They follow the guiding thrend of the categories. For pure reason never relates immediately to objects, but to the conceptions of these contained in the understanding. In like manner, will be made manifest in the detailed explana tion of these ideas, --how reason, merely through the synthetical use of the same function which employs in categorical syllogism, necessarily attains to the conception of the absolute unity of the thinking subject, --how the logical procedure in hypothetical ideas necessarily produces the idea of -the ab solutely unconditioned m a series of given conditions, and finally, -- how the mere form of the disjunctive syllogism in volves the highest conception of bring ofall brings thought which at first sight seems the highest degree paradoxical.
object (phsenomenon)
? ? in
a
: a
a
it
it
is,
? 234 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
An objective deduction, such as we were able to present in
the case of the categories, is impossible as regards these trans cendental ideas. For they have, in truth, no relation to any
object, in experience, for the very reason that they are only ideas. But a subjective deduction of them from the nature of our reason is possible, and has been given in the present chapter.
It is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason
the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the condi tions, and that does not concern itself with the absolute com pleteness on the part of the conditioned. For of the former alone does she stand in need, in order to preposit the whole series of conditions, and thus present them to the understand ing priori. But we once have completely (and uncon ditionally) given condition, there no further necessity, pro ceeding with the series, for conception of reason for the understanding takes of itself every step downward, from the condition to the conditioned. Thus the transcendental ideas are available only for ascending in the series of conditions, till we reach the unconditioned, that is, principles. As regards descending to the conditioned, on the other hand, we find that there widely extensive logical use which reason makes of the laws of the understanding, but that transcendental use thereof impossible and, that when wc form an idea of the absolute totality of such synthesis, for example, of the whole series of all future changes in the world, this idea mere ens rationis, an arbitrary fiction of thought, and not neces sary presupposition of reason. For the possibility of the con ditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions, but not of its consequences. Consequently, this conception not trans cendental idea -- and with these alone that we are at present occupied.
Finally, obvious, that there exists among the trans cendental ideas certain connection and unity, and that pure reason, by means of them, collects all its cognitions into one
? From the cognition of self to the cognition of the world, and through these to the supreme being, the progres sion so natural, that seems to resemble the logical march uf reason from the premisses to the conclusion. * Now whether
The science of Metaphysics lias for the proper ohject of its inquiries os! t three grand ideas God, Freedom, and Immortality, and aim
system.
? ? *
is
a
:
it
; a
if
it a is
it
it is
is
aais ;
it a in
i9 is a
a
a
is
a
is,
? SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.
235
tliere lies unobserved at the foundation of these ideas an analogy of the same kind as exists between the logical ana transcen dental procedure of reason, is another of those questions, the answer to which we must not expect till we arrive at a more advanced stage in our inquiries. In this cursory and prelimi nary view, we have, meanwhile, reached our aim. For we have dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the transcen dental conceptions of reason, from their being commonly mixed up with other conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and not properly distinguished from the conceptions of the under standing ; we have exposed their origin, and thereby at the same time their determinate number, and presented them in a systematic connection, and have thus marked out and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II.
OF THE DIALECTICAL PBOCEDURF. OF PURE REASON.
It may be said that the object, of a merely transcendental idea is something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in fact, a conception of an object that ia adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being presented and in tuited in a possible experience. But we should express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we said that, we can have no knowledge of an object, which
at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with the first, must lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the other subjects with which it occupies itself, are merely means, for the attainment and realiza tion of these ideas. It does not require these ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the contrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A complete insight into and comprehension of them would render Theology, Ethict, and, through the conjunction of both. Religion, solely dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In a systematic representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrange ment -- the tyitt helical one -- would be the most suitable ; but in the in vestigation which must necessarily precede it, the analytical, which reverses this arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose, as in it w< should proceed from that which experience immediately presents to Bs>-- psychology, to cosmology, and thenre to theology.
? ? ? ? 23fi THAS9CE! TDENTAri DIALECTIC.
perfectly corresponds to an idea, althongh we may possess a problematical conception thereof.
Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical pre misses, and by means of which we conclude from some thing that we do know, to something of which we do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheVess, by an un avoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although indeed, as regards their origin, they are rery well entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of reason, but are neces sitated by its very nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.
Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corre sponding to the number of the ideas, which their conclusions present. In the argument or syllogism of the first class, I conclude, from the transcendental conception of the subject which contains no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I can not in this manner attain to a concep tion. This dialectical argument I shall call the Transcendental Paralogism. The second class of sophistical arguments is occu pied with the transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given phenomenon, and I conclude, from the fact that I have always a self-contradictory
of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon one side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which I have nevertheless no conception. The condition of reason in these dialectical arguments, I shall term the Antinomy of pure reason. Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument, I conclude, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in general, in so far as they can be given, the.
absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general; that from things which do not know in their mere transcendental conception, conclude being of all beings which know still less means of transcenderr
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? at THi PAllALOOISMS OJr PURE fiEiSON. ft?
tid conception, and of whose unconditioned necessity 1 can form no conception whatever. This dialectical argument I ? hall call the Ideal of pure reason.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II.
Chap. I. -- Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason,
The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a transcendental paralogism Las a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexcep tionable. In this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoid able, though not insoluble, mental illusion.
We now come to a conception, which was not inserted in the general list of transcendental conceptions, and yet must be reckoned with them, but at the same time without in the least altering, or indicating a deficiency in that table. This iIs the conception, or, if the term is preferred, the judgment, think. But it is readily perceived that this thought is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general, and consequently of transcendental conceptions also, and that it is therefore re garded as a transcendental conception, although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked, inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness.
At the same time, pure as this conception is from all empiri cal content (impressions of the senses), it enables us to distin guish two different kinds of objects. I, as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called body. Thus the expression, I, as a thinking being, designates the object-matter of psychology, which may be called the rational doctrine o(
of the soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me in concreto), may be concluded from this con ception J, in so far as it appears in all thought.
Now, the ratiotal doctrine of the soul is really an undo*.
? the soul, inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing
? ? ? 238 NUftSOm)E>TAIi DIALECttO.
taking of this kind. For if the smallest empirical element of
thought, if any particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced among the grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a rational, but an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before Ius a pretended science,
presses the perception of one's self, an internal experience is asserted, and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is founded upon not pure, but partly founded upon an empirical principle. For this internal perception nothing more than the mere apperception, think, which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible, in which we say, think substance, cause, &c. For internal experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general, and its relation to other perceptions, unless some particular distinction or determination thereof empirically given, cannot be re garded as empirical cognition, but as cognition of the empiri cal, and belongs to the investigation of the possibility of every experience, which certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience (for example, only pleasure or pain), that should be included in the general representation of self-con sciousness, would immediately change the rational into an empirical psychology.
think therefore the oiily text of rational psychology, from which must develope its whole system. manifest that this thought, when applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but transcendental predicates thereof be cause the least empirical predicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence of all experience.
