We may also reply
that in such a case confession of one's sin is according to the natural
law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to confess in a court
of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying his
sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing.
that in such a case confession of one's sin is according to the natural
law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to confess in a court
of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying his
sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing.
Summa Theologica
30:25): "For sadness hath killed many, and
there is no profit in it. " Moreover the Philosopher says the same
(Ethic. vii, 13,14; x, 5). Therefore one should not grieve for sin any
longer than suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already
blotted out after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore it is not
expedient to grieve any longer.
Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in Cant. ): "Sorrow is a
good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with
wormwood. " Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve
continually.
On the contrary, Augustine [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an
unknown author] says: "The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice
in his grief. "
Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible,
those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is sorrow for sin, as
is shown by the words of Mat. 5:5, "Blessed are they that mourn. "
Therefore it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.
I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that
in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethic. ii,
6,7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure
seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance,
there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to
its duration, except in so far as the act of one virtue hinders the act
of another which is more urgent for the time being. Consequently the
more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better
it is, provided he exercises the acts of other virtues when and how he
ought to. On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both
in intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow,
which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so
ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long,
man fall into despair, cowardice, and such like vices.
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to
worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has
sorrow itself for object.
Reply to Objection 2: The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy:
and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we
should make moderate use, according as the end, for which it is
assumed, demands.
Reply to Objection 3: Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.
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Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that our souls are contrite for sins even
after this life. For the love of charity causes displeasure at sin.
Now, after this life, charity remains in some, both as to its act and
as to its habit, since "charity never falleth away. " Therefore the
displeasure at the sin committed, which is the essence of contrition,
remains.
Objection 2: Further, we should grieve more for sin than for
punishment. But the souls in purgatory grieve for their sensible
punishment and for the delay of glory. Much more, therefore, do they
grieve for the sins they committed.
Objection 3: Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies for sin. But
satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power of contrition.
Therefore contrition remains after this life.
On the contrary, contrition is a part of the sacrament of Penance. But
the sacraments do not endure after this life. Neither, therefore, does
contrition.
Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both guilt and
punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory could have contrition,
it would be possible for their debt of punishment to be remitted
through the power of their contrition, so that they would be delivered
from their sensible pain, which is false.
I answer that, Three things are to be observed in contrition: first,
its genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for it is an act of virtue
quickened by charity; thirdly, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious
and sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory.
Accordingly, after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly
country, cannot have contrition, because they are void of sorrow by
reason of the fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, have no
contrition, for although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which
quickens sorrow; while those which are in purgatory have a sorrow for
their sins, that is quickened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for
they are not in the state of meriting. In this life, however, all these
three can be found.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity does not cause this sorrow, save in those
who are capable of it; but the fulness of joy in the Blessed excludes
all capability of sorrow from them: wherefore, though they have
charity, they have no contrition.
Reply to Objection 2: The souls in purgatory grieve for their sins; but
their sorrow is not contrition, because it lacks the efficacy of
contrition.
Reply to Objection 3: The pain which the souls suffer in purgatory,
cannot, properly speaking, be called satisfaction, because satisfaction
demands a meritorious work; yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the
punishment due may be called satisfaction.
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OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition?
(2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?
(3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?
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Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the forgiveness of sin is not the
effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. But we are somewhat
the cause of contrition, since it is an act of our own. Therefore
contrition is not the cause of forgiveness.
Objection 2: Further, contrition is an act of virtue. Now virtue
follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue and sin are not together
in the soul. Therefore contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness
of sin.
Objection 3: Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to receiving the
Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Communion before going to
confession. Therefore they have not yet received the forgiveness of
their sins.
On the contrary, a gloss on Ps. 50:19, "A sacrifice to God is an
afflicted spirit," says: "A hearty contrition is the sacrifice by which
sins are loosed. "
Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted by the same
causes, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2. Now sin is committed through the
heart's inordinate love. Therefore it is destroyed by sorrow caused by
the heart's ordinate love; and consequently contrition blots out sin.
I answer that, Contrition can be considered in two ways, either as part
of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is the
cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as
part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an instrument for the
forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments
(cf. Sent. iv, D, 1, Q[1], A[4]: [4831]TP, Q[62], A[1]); while, as an
act of virtue, it is the quasi-material cause of sin's forgiveness. For
a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification,
and a disposition is reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to
denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise
in the case of an agent's disposition to act, because this is reduced
to the genus of efficient cause.
Reply to Objection 1: God alone is the principal efficient cause of the
forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive cause can be from us also, and
likewise the sacramental cause, since the sacramental forms are words
uttered by us, having an instrumental power of conferring grace whereby
sins are forgiven.
Reply to Objection 2: The forgiveness of sin precedes virtue and the
infusion of grace, in one way, and, in another, follows: and in so far
as it follows, the act elicited by the virtue can be a cause of the
forgiveness of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The dispensation of the Eucharist belongs to the
ministers of the Church: wherefore a man should not go to Communion
until his sin has been forgiven through the ministers of the Church,
although his sin may be forgiven him before God.
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Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?
Objection 1: It would seem that contrition cannot take away the debt of
punishment entirely. For satisfaction and confession are ordained for
man's deliverance from the debt of punishment. Now no man is so
perfectly contrite as not to be bound to confession and satisfaction.
Therefore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire debt
of punishment.
Objection 2: Further, in Penance the punishment should in some way
compensate for the sin. Now some sins are accomplished by members of
the body. Therefore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that
"by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented" (Wis.
11:17), it seems that the punishment for suchlike sins can never be
remitted by contrition.
Objection 3: Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. Now an
infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, sins. Therefore
contrition can never be so great as to remit the whole punishment.
On the contrary, The affections of the heart are more acceptable to God
than external acts. Now man is absolved from both punishment and guilt
by means of external actions; and therefore he is also by means of the
heart's affections, such as contrition is.
Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to whom it was said
(Lk. 23:43): "This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise," on account
of his one act of repentance.
As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always taken away by
contrition, this question has already been considered above (Sent. iv,
D, 14, Q[2], AA[1],2; [4832]TP, Q[86], A[4]), where the same question
was raised with regard to Penance.
I answer that, The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways.
First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and in
this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the
contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the removal of guilt,
but also the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of the
sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition: and since this
sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense as to suffice
for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: A man cannot be sure that his contrition suffices
for the remission of both punishment and guilt: wherefore he is bound
to confess and to make satisfaction, especially since his contrition
would not be true contrition, unless he had the purpose of confessing
united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into effect, on
account of the precept given concerning confession.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as inward joy redounds into the outward
parts of the body, so does interior sorrow show itself in the exterior
members: wherefore it is written (Prov. 17:22): "A sorrowful spirit
drieth up the bones. "
Reply to Objection 3: Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in
its intensity, even as the punishment due for mortal sin is finite; yet
it derives infinite power from charity, whereby it is quickened, and so
it avails for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
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Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that slight contrition does not suffice to
blot out great sins. For contrition is the remedy for sin. Now a bodily
remedy, that heals a lesser bodily infirmity, does not suffice to heal
a greater. Therefore the least contrition does not suffice to blot out
very great sins.
Objection 2: Further, it was stated above ([4833]Q[3], A[3]) that for
greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Now contrition does
not blot out sin, unless it fulfills the requisite conditions.
Therefore the least contrition does not blot out all sins.
On the contrary, Every sanctifying grace blots out every mortal sin,
because it is incompatible therewith. Now every contrition is quickened
by sanctifying grace. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all
sins.
I answer that, As we have often said ([4834]Q[1], A[2], ad 1;[4835]
Q[3], A[1];[4836] Q[4] , A[1]), contrition includes a twofold sorrow.
One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can
be so slight as not to suffice for real contrition, e. g. if a sin were
less displeasing to a man, than separation from his last end ought to
be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity.
The other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no
hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself, belong
essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor
again is it under our control. Accordingly we must say that sorrow,
however slight it be, provided it suffice for true contrition, blots
out all sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual remedies derive infinite efficacy from
the infinite power which operates in them: wherefore the remedy which
suffices for healing a slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin.
This is seen in Baptism which looses great and small: and the same
applies to contrition provided it fulfill the necessary conditions.
Reply to Objection 2: It follows of necessity that a man grieves more
for a greater sin than for a lesser, according as it is more repugnant
to the love which causes his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of
sorrow for a greater sin, as another has for a lesser, this would
suffice for the remission of the sin.
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OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider confession, about which there are six points for
our consideration: (1) The necessity of confession; (2) Its nature; (3)
Its minister; (4) Its quality; (5) Its effect; (6) The seal of
confession.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation?
(2) Whether confession is according to the natural law?
(3) Whether all are bound to confession?
(4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty?
(5) Whether one is bound to confess at once?
(6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man?
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Whether confession is necessary for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not necessary for
salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is ordained for the sake of the
remission of sin. But sin is sufficiently remitted by the infusion of
grace. Therefore confession is not necessary in order to do penance for
one's sins.
Objection 2: Further, we read of some being forgiven their sins without
confession, e. g. Peter, Magdalen and Paul. But the grace that remits
sins is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore neither is
it necessary for salvation now that man should confess.
Objection 3: Further, a sin which is contracted from another, should
receive its remedy from another. Therefore actual sin, which a man has
committed through his own act, must take its remedy from the man
himself. Now Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore
confession is not necessary for salvation.
Objection 4: Further, confession is necessary for a judicial sentence,
in order that punishment may be inflicted in proportion to the offense.
Now a man is able to inflict on himself a greater punishment than even
that which might be inflicted on him by another. Therefore it seems
that confession is not necessary for salvation.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. i): "If you want the
physician to be of assistance to you, you must make your disease known
to him. " But it is necessary for salvation that man should take
medicine for his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation that man
should make his disease known by means of confession.
Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the accused.
Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought not to be his own judge,
but should be judged by another and consequently ought to confess to
him.
I answer that, Christ's Passion, without whose power, neither original
nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the
reception of the sacraments which derive their efficacy from it.
Wherefore for the remission of both actual and original sin, a
sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at
least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament actually,
through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently
those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin which is
incompatible with salvation, are necessary for salvation: and so just
as Baptism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for
salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance. And just as a man
through asking to be baptized, submits to the ministers of the Church,
to whom the dispensation of that sacrament belongs, even so, by
confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that,
through the sacrament of Penance dispensed by him, he may receive the
pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless
he be acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the
penitent's confession. Wherefore confession is necessary for the
salvation of a man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The infusion of grace suffices for the remission
of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, the sinner still owes a
debt of temporal punishment. Moreover, the sacraments of grace are
ordained in order that man may receive the infusion of grace, and
before he receives them, either actually or in his intention, he does
not receive grace. This is evident in the case of Baptism, and applies
to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates his temporal
punishment by undergoing the shame of confession, by the power of the
keys to which he submits, and by the enjoined satisfaction which the
priest moderates according to the kind of sins made known to him in
confession. Nevertheless the fact that confession is necessary for
salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for sins,
because this punishment to which one remains bound after the remission
of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way of salvation remains open,
without such punishment being expiated in this life: but it is due to
its conducing to the remission of sin, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although we do not read that they confessed, it
may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded
in writing. Moreover Christ has the power of excellence in the
sacraments; so that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament
without using the things which belong to the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin that is contracted from another, viz.
original sin, can be remedied by an entirely extrinsic cause, as in the
case of infants: whereas actual sin, which a man commits of himself,
cannot be expiated, without some operation on the part of the sinner.
Nevertheless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself,
though he was sufficient to sin by himself, because sin is finite on
the part of the thing to which it turns, in which respect the sinner
returns to self; while, on the part of the aversion, sin derives
infinity, in which respect the remission of sin must needs begin from
someone else, because "that which is last in order of generation is
first in the order of intention" (Ethic. iii). Consequently actual sin
also must needs take its remedy from another.
Reply to Objection 4: Satisfaction would not suffice for the expiation
of sin's punishment, by reason of the severity of the punishment which
is enjoined in satisfaction, but it does suffice as being a part of the
sacrament having the sacramental power; wherefore it ought to be
imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and consequently
confession is necessary.
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Whether confession is according to the natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is according to the natural
law. For Adam and Cain were bound to none but the precepts of the
natural law, and yet they are reproached for not confessing their sin.
Therefore confession of sin is according to the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, those precepts which are common to the Old and
New Law are according to the natural law. But confession was prescribed
in the Old Law, as may be gathered from Is. 43:26: "Tell, if thou hast
anything to justify thyself. " Therefore it is according to the natural
law.
Objection 3: Further, Job was subject only to the natural law. But he
confessed his sins, as appears from his words (Job 31:33) "If, as a
man, I have hid my sin. " Therefore confession is according to the
natural law.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v. ) that the natural law is the
same in all. But confession is not in all in the same way. Therefore it
is not according to the natural law. Further, confession is made to one
who has the keys. But the keys of the Church are not an institution of
the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession.
I answer that, The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they
ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge
of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the
sacraments. And since "the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but
a product of a certain innate power," as Tully states (De Inv. Rhet.
ii), consequently the sacraments are not part of the natural law, but
of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however, is
sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from
its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things
are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature.
But such things are above nature as God reserves to Himself; and these
are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of
miracles, or in the revelation of mysteries, or in the institution of
the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is
according to Divine, but not according to natural law.
Reply to Objection 1: Adam is reproached for not confessing his sin
before God: because the confession which is made to God by the
acknowledgment of one's sin, is according to the natural law. whereas
here we are speaking of confession made to a man.
We may also reply
that in such a case confession of one's sin is according to the natural
law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to confess in a court
of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying his
sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made
voluntarily to a man in order to receive from God the forgiveness of
one's sins, is not according to the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the natural law avail in the same
way in the law of Moses and in the New Law. But although there was a
kind of confession in the law of Moses, yet it was not after the same
manner as in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for in the law
of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one's sin inwardly before
God; while in the law of Moses it was necessary for a man to declare
his sin by some external sign, as by making a sin-offering, whereby the
fact of his having sinned became known to another man; but it was not
necessary for him to make known what particular sin he had committed,
or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law.
Reply to Objection 3: Job is speaking of the man who hides his sin by
denying it or excusing himself when he is accused thereof, as we may
gather from a gloss [*Cf. Gregory, Moral. xxii, 9] on the passage.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all are bound to confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for
Jerome says on Is. 3:9 ("They have proclaimed abroad"), "their sin,"
etc. : "Penance is the second plank after shipwreck. " But some have not
suffered shipwreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting
them, and consequently neither is confession which is a part of
Penance.
Objection 2: Further, it is to the judge that confession should be made
in any court. But some have no judge over them. Therefore they are not
bound to confession.
Objection 3: Further, some have none but venial sins. Now a man is not
bound to confess such sins. Therefore not everyone is bound to
confession.
On the contrary, Confession is condivided with satisfaction and
contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore
all are bound to confession also.
Further, this appears from the Decretals (De Poenit. et Remiss. xii),
where it is stated that "all of either sex are bound to confess their
sins as soon as they shall come to the age of discretion. "
I answer that, We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the
Divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in this
way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into
mortal sin after Baptism; secondly, by a precept of positive law, and
in this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid down in the
general council (Lateran iv, Can. 21) under Innocent III, both in order
that everyone may acknowledge himself to be a sinner, because "all have
sinned and need the grace of God" (Rom. 3:23); and that the Eucharist
may be approached with greater reverence; and lastly, that parish
priests may know their flock, lest a wolf may hide therein.
Reply to Objection 1: Although it is possible for a man, in this mortal
life, to avoid shipwreck, i. e. mortal sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot
avoid venial sins, which dispose him to shipwreck, and against which
also Penance is ordained; wherefore there is still room for Penance,
and consequently for confession, even in those who do not commit mortal
sins.
Reply to Objection 2: All must acknowledge Christ as their judge, to
Whom they must confess in the person of His vicar; and although the
latter may be the inferior if the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the
superior, in so far as the penitent is a sinner, while the confessor is
the minister of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is bound to confess his venial sins, not in
virtue of the sacrament, but by the institution of the Church, and
that, when he has no other sins to confess. We may also, with others,
answer that the Decretal quoted above does not bind others than those
who have mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that it
orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot apply to venial sins,
because no one can confess all his venial sins. Accordingly, a man who
has no mortal sins to confess, is not bound to confess his venial sins,
but it suffices for the fulfillment of the commandment of the Church
that he present himself before the priest, and declare himself to be
unconscious of any mortal sin: and this will count for his confession.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful for a man to confess a sin
which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (Regist. xii), "it is
the mark of a good conscience to acknowledge a fault where there is
none. " Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience to accuse oneself
of those sins which one has not committed.
Objection 2: Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than
another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be praised.
But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he thinks he
is. Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed a more grievous
sin than one has.
Objection 3: Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it be
mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess it as
mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he has
not committed.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction originates from confession. But a
man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed. Therefore
he can also confess a sin which he has not done.
On the contrary, Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells an
untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since every
untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he has
not committed.
Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of a
crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses. Now the
witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man
ought not to accuse himself of a sin which is not on his conscience.
I answer that, The penitent should, by his confession, make his state
known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other
than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does
not make his state known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore his
confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words
must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him only of what
is on his conscience.
Reply to Objection 1: To acknowledge a fault where there is none, may
be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of the
act, and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an
erroneous conscience, to acknowledge having done what one has not done.
Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and thus the
saying of Gregory is true, because a just man fears lest, in any act
which is good in itself, there should be any defect on his part. thus
it is written (Job 9:28): "I feared all my works. " Wherefore it is also
the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words
of this fear which he holds in his thoughts.
From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since a
just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not as though he had
committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in those
things which he seems to do well, he may by pride sin more grievously.
Reply to Objection 3: When a man doubts whether a certain sin be
mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt,
because he sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while
doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to
chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that
which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, however, affirm
that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to
the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and
what is not.
Reply to Objection 4: A man does not commit a falsehood by making
satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone
confesses a sin which he thinks he has not committed. And if he
mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he
does not lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession
thereof tally with his conscience.
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Whether one is bound to confess at once?
Objection 1: It would seem that one is bound to confess at once. For
Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii): "The contempt of confession is
inexcusable, unless there be an urgent reason for delay. " But everyone
is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is bound to confess as
soon as possible.
Objection 2: Further, everyone is bound to do more to avoid spiritual
disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now if a man who is sick in body
were to delay sending for the physician, it would be detrimental to his
health. Therefore it seems that it must needs be detrimental to a man's
health if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be one
at hand.
Objection 3: Further, that which is due always, is due at once. But man
owes confession to God always. Therefore he is bound to confess at
once.
On the contrary, A fixed time both for confession and for receiving the
Eucharist is determined by the Decretals (Cap. Omnis utriusque sexus:
De Poenit. et Remiss. ). Now a man does not sin by failing to receive
the Eucharist before the fixed time. Therefore he does not sin if he
does not confess before that time.
Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a commandment bids us to
do. If therefore a man is bound to confess at once, and omits to do so,
with a priest at hand, he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner
at any other time, and so on, so that he would fall into many mortal
sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems unreasonable.
I answer that, As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a
man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition,
viz. when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger
of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless his sin be
forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be
bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at hand, he is bound to confess
or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to contrition and to
have the purpose of confessing.
But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. First,
accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do something which he cannot do
without committing a mortal sin, unless he go to confession first: for
then he is bound to confess; for instance, if he has to receive the
Eucharist, to which no one can approach, after committing a mortal sin,
without confessing first, if a priest be at hand, and there be no
urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church obliges all to confess
once a year; because she commands all to receive Holy Communion once a
year, viz. at Easter, wherefore all must go to confession before that
time.
Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confession; and here the
same reason applies to delay of confession as to delay of Baptism,
because both are necessary sacraments. Now a man is not bound to
receive Baptism as soon as he makes up his mind to be baptized; and so
he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: nor is
there any fixed time beyond which, if he defer Baptism, he would incur
a mortal sin. Nevertheless the delay of Baptism may amount to a mortal
sin, or it may not, and this depends on the cause of the delay, since,
as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, text. 15), the will does not defer
doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable cause. Wherefore if
the cause of the delay of Baptism has a mortal sin connected with it,
e. g. if a man put off being baptized through contempt, or some like
motive, the delay will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same
seems to apply to confession which is not more necessary than Baptism.
Moreover, since man is bound to fulfill in this life those things that
are necessary for salvation, therefore, if he be in danger of death, he
is bound, even absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to
receive Baptism. For this reason too, James proclaimed at the same time
the commandment about making confession and that about receiving
Extreme Unction (James 5:14, 16). Therefore the opinion seems probable
of those who say that a man is not bound to confess at once, though it
is dangerous to delay.
Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to confess at once,
as soon as he has a reasonable and proper opportunity. Nor does it
matter that the Decretal fixes the time limit to an annual confession,
because the Church does not favor delay, but forbids the neglect
involved in a further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who
delays is excused, not from sin in the tribunal of conscience; but from
punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that such a person would
not be deprived of proper burial if he were to die before that time.
But this seems too severe, because affirmative precepts bind, not at
once, but at a fixed time; and this, not because it is most convenient
to fulfill them then (for in that case if a man were not to give alms
of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in need, he would
commit a mortal sin, which is false), but because the time involves
urgency. Consequently, if he does not confess at the very first
opportunity, it does not follow that he commits a mortal sin, even
though he does not await a better opportunity. unless it becomes urgent
for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor is it on
account of the Church's indulgence that he is not bound to confess at
once, but on account of the nature of an affirmative precept, so that
before the commandment was made, there was still less obligation.
Others again say that secular persons are not bound to confess before
Lent, which is the time of penance for them; but that religious are
bound to confess at once, because, for them, all time is a time for
penance. But this is not to the point; for religious have no
obligations besides those of other men, with the exception of such as
they are bound to by vow.
Reply to Objection 1: Hugh is speaking of those who die without this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary for bodily health that the
physician be sent for at once, except when there is necessity for being
healed: and the same applies to spiritual disease.
Reply to Objection 3: The retaining of another's property against the
owner's will is contrary to a negative precept, which binds always and
for always, and therefore one is always bound to make immediate
restitution. It is not the same with the fulfillment of an affirmative
precept, which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is not
bound to fulfill it at once.
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Whether one can be dispensed from confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that one can be dispensed from confessing
his sins to a man. For precepts of positive law are subject to
dispensation by the prelates of the Church. Now such is confession, as
appears from what was said above [4837](A[3]). Therefore one may be
dispensed from confession.
Objection 2: Further, a man can grant a dispensation in that which was
instituted by a man. But we read of confession being instituted, not by
God, but by a man (James 5:16): "Confess your sins, one to another. "
Now the Pope has the power of dispensation in things instituted by the
apostles, as appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore he can also
dispense a man from confessing.
On the contrary, Penance, whereof confession is a part, is a necessary
sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since therefore no one can be dispensed
from Baptism, neither can one be dispensed from confession.
I answer that, The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church
which is founded by God. Wherefore they need to be appointed by the
Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation
is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the Church is founded
on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power
to publish new articles of faith, or to do away with those which are
already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to abolish those
that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which
belongs to Christ alone, Who is the foundation of the Church.
Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be
saved without Baptism, nor that he be saved without confession, in so
far as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however,
dispense from confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of
the commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay confession
longer than the limit prescribed by the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the Divine law do not bind less
than those of the natural law: wherefore, just as no dispensation is
possible from the natural law, so neither can there be from positive
Divine law.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept about confession was not instituted
by a man first of all, though it was promulgated by James: it was
instituted by God, and although we do not read it explicitly, yet it
was somewhat foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being
prepared by John's Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed their
sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the priests, and
though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood
of the New Testament was foreshadowed in them.
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OF THE NATURE OF CONFESSION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the nature of confession, under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?
(2) Whether confession is an act of virtue?
(3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?
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Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that Augustine defines confession
unfittingly, when he says (Super Ps. 21) that confession "lays bare the
hidden disease by the hope of pardon. " For the disease against which
confession is ordained, is sin. Now sin is sometimes manifest.
Therefore it should not be said that confession is the remedy for a
"hidden" disease.
Objection 2: Further, the beginning of penance is fear. But confession
is a part of Penance. Therefore fear rather than "hope" should be set
down as the cause of confession.
Objection 3: Further, that which is placed under a seal, is not laid
bare, but closed up. But the sin which is confessed is placed under the
seal of confession. Therefore sin is not laid bare in confession, but
closed up.
Objection 4: Further, other definitions are to be found differing from
the above. For Gregory says (Hom. xl in Evang. ) that confession is "the
uncovering of sins, and the opening of the wound. " Others say that
"confession is a legal declaration of our sins in the presence of a
priest. " Others define it thus: "Confession is the sinner's sacramental
self-accusation through shame for what he has done, which through the
keys of the Church makes satisfaction for his sins, and binds him to
perform the penance imposed on him. " Therefore it seems that the
definition in question is insufficient, since it does not include all
that these include.
I answer that, Several things offer themselves to our notice in the act
of confession: first, the very substance or genus of the act, which is
a kind of manifestation; secondly, the matter manifested, viz. sin;
thirdly, the person to whom the manifestation is made, viz. the priest;
fourthly, its cause, viz. hope of pardon; fifthly, its effect, viz.
release from part of the punishment, and the obligation to pay the
other part. Accordingly the first definition, given by Augustine,
indicates the substance of the act, by saying that "it lays bare"---the
matter of confession, by saying that it is a "hidden disease"---its
cause, which is "the hope of pardon"; while the other definitions
include one or other of the five things aforesaid, as may be seen by
anyone who considers the matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the priest, as a man, may sometimes have
knowledge of the penitent's sin, yet he does not know it as a vicar of
Christ (even as a judge sometimes knows a thing, as a man, of which he
is ignorant, as a judge), and in this respect it is made known to him
by confession. or we may reply that although the external act may be in
the open, yet the internal act, which is the cause of the external act,
is hidden; so that it needs to be revealed by confession.
Reply to Objection 2: Confession presupposes charity, which gives us
life, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now it is in contrition
that charity is given; while servile fear, which is void of hope, is
previous to charity: yet he that has charity is moved more by hope than
by fear. Hence hope rather than fear is set down as the cause of
confession.
Reply to Objection 3: In every confession sin is laid bare to the
priest, and closed to others by the seal of confession.
Reply to Objection 4: It is not necessary that every definition should
include everything connected with the thing defined: and for this
reason we find some definitions or descriptions that indicate one
cause, and some that indicate another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession is an act of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of virtue. For
every act of virtue belongs to the natural law, since "we are naturally
capable of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). But
confession does not belong to the natural law. Therefore it is not an
act of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, an act of virtue is more befitting one who is
innocent than one who has sinned. But the confession of a sin, which is
the confession of which we are speaking now, cannot be befitting an
innocent man. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the grace which is in the sacraments differs
somewhat from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts. But
confession is part of a sacrament. Therefore it is not an act of
virtue.
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But
confession comes under a precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is
meritorious, for "it opens the gate of heaven," as the Master says
(Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore it seems that it is an act of virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([4838]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7; [4839]SS,
Q[80]; [4840]SS, Q[85] , A[3]; [4841]SS, Q[109], A[3]), for an act to
belong to a virtue it suffices that it be of such a nature as to imply
some condition belonging to virtue. Now, although confession does not
include everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name
implies the manifestation of that which a man has on his conscience:
for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man professes with his lips
what he does not hold in his heart, it is not a confession but a
fiction. Now to express in words what one has in one's thoughts is a
condition of virtue; and, consequently, confession is a good thing
generically, and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it
be devoid of other due circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Natural reason, in a general way, inclines a man
to make confession in the proper way, to confess as he ought, what he
ought, and when he ought, and in this way confession belongs to the
natural law. But it belongs to the Divine law to determine the
circumstances, when, how, what, and to whom, with regard to the
confession of which we are speaking now. Accordingly it is evident that
the natural law inclines a man to confession, by means of the Divine
law, which determines the circumstances, as is the case with all
matters belonging to the positive law.
Reply to Objection 2: Although an innocent man may have the habit of
the virtue whose object is a sin already committed, he has not the act,
so long as he remains innocent. Wherefore the confession of sins, of
which confession we are speaking now, is not befitting an innocent man,
though it is an act of virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Though the grace of the sacraments differs from
the grace of the virtues, they are not contrary but disparate; hence
there is nothing to prevent that which is an act of virtue, in so far
as it proceeds from the free-will quickened by grace, from being a
sacrament, or part of a sacrament, in so far as it is ordained as a
remedy for sin.
there is no profit in it. " Moreover the Philosopher says the same
(Ethic. vii, 13,14; x, 5). Therefore one should not grieve for sin any
longer than suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already
blotted out after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore it is not
expedient to grieve any longer.
Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in Cant. ): "Sorrow is a
good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with
wormwood. " Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve
continually.
On the contrary, Augustine [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an
unknown author] says: "The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice
in his grief. "
Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible,
those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is sorrow for sin, as
is shown by the words of Mat. 5:5, "Blessed are they that mourn. "
Therefore it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.
I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that
in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethic. ii,
6,7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure
seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance,
there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to
its duration, except in so far as the act of one virtue hinders the act
of another which is more urgent for the time being. Consequently the
more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better
it is, provided he exercises the acts of other virtues when and how he
ought to. On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both
in intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow,
which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so
ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long,
man fall into despair, cowardice, and such like vices.
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to
worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has
sorrow itself for object.
Reply to Objection 2: The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy:
and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we
should make moderate use, according as the end, for which it is
assumed, demands.
Reply to Objection 3: Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that our souls are contrite for sins even
after this life. For the love of charity causes displeasure at sin.
Now, after this life, charity remains in some, both as to its act and
as to its habit, since "charity never falleth away. " Therefore the
displeasure at the sin committed, which is the essence of contrition,
remains.
Objection 2: Further, we should grieve more for sin than for
punishment. But the souls in purgatory grieve for their sensible
punishment and for the delay of glory. Much more, therefore, do they
grieve for the sins they committed.
Objection 3: Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies for sin. But
satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power of contrition.
Therefore contrition remains after this life.
On the contrary, contrition is a part of the sacrament of Penance. But
the sacraments do not endure after this life. Neither, therefore, does
contrition.
Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both guilt and
punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory could have contrition,
it would be possible for their debt of punishment to be remitted
through the power of their contrition, so that they would be delivered
from their sensible pain, which is false.
I answer that, Three things are to be observed in contrition: first,
its genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for it is an act of virtue
quickened by charity; thirdly, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious
and sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory.
Accordingly, after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly
country, cannot have contrition, because they are void of sorrow by
reason of the fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, have no
contrition, for although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which
quickens sorrow; while those which are in purgatory have a sorrow for
their sins, that is quickened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for
they are not in the state of meriting. In this life, however, all these
three can be found.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity does not cause this sorrow, save in those
who are capable of it; but the fulness of joy in the Blessed excludes
all capability of sorrow from them: wherefore, though they have
charity, they have no contrition.
Reply to Objection 2: The souls in purgatory grieve for their sins; but
their sorrow is not contrition, because it lacks the efficacy of
contrition.
Reply to Objection 3: The pain which the souls suffer in purgatory,
cannot, properly speaking, be called satisfaction, because satisfaction
demands a meritorious work; yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the
punishment due may be called satisfaction.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition?
(2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?
(3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the forgiveness of sin is not the
effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. But we are somewhat
the cause of contrition, since it is an act of our own. Therefore
contrition is not the cause of forgiveness.
Objection 2: Further, contrition is an act of virtue. Now virtue
follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue and sin are not together
in the soul. Therefore contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness
of sin.
Objection 3: Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to receiving the
Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Communion before going to
confession. Therefore they have not yet received the forgiveness of
their sins.
On the contrary, a gloss on Ps. 50:19, "A sacrifice to God is an
afflicted spirit," says: "A hearty contrition is the sacrifice by which
sins are loosed. "
Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted by the same
causes, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2. Now sin is committed through the
heart's inordinate love. Therefore it is destroyed by sorrow caused by
the heart's ordinate love; and consequently contrition blots out sin.
I answer that, Contrition can be considered in two ways, either as part
of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is the
cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as
part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an instrument for the
forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments
(cf. Sent. iv, D, 1, Q[1], A[4]: [4831]TP, Q[62], A[1]); while, as an
act of virtue, it is the quasi-material cause of sin's forgiveness. For
a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification,
and a disposition is reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to
denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise
in the case of an agent's disposition to act, because this is reduced
to the genus of efficient cause.
Reply to Objection 1: God alone is the principal efficient cause of the
forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive cause can be from us also, and
likewise the sacramental cause, since the sacramental forms are words
uttered by us, having an instrumental power of conferring grace whereby
sins are forgiven.
Reply to Objection 2: The forgiveness of sin precedes virtue and the
infusion of grace, in one way, and, in another, follows: and in so far
as it follows, the act elicited by the virtue can be a cause of the
forgiveness of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The dispensation of the Eucharist belongs to the
ministers of the Church: wherefore a man should not go to Communion
until his sin has been forgiven through the ministers of the Church,
although his sin may be forgiven him before God.
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Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?
Objection 1: It would seem that contrition cannot take away the debt of
punishment entirely. For satisfaction and confession are ordained for
man's deliverance from the debt of punishment. Now no man is so
perfectly contrite as not to be bound to confession and satisfaction.
Therefore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire debt
of punishment.
Objection 2: Further, in Penance the punishment should in some way
compensate for the sin. Now some sins are accomplished by members of
the body. Therefore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that
"by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented" (Wis.
11:17), it seems that the punishment for suchlike sins can never be
remitted by contrition.
Objection 3: Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. Now an
infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, sins. Therefore
contrition can never be so great as to remit the whole punishment.
On the contrary, The affections of the heart are more acceptable to God
than external acts. Now man is absolved from both punishment and guilt
by means of external actions; and therefore he is also by means of the
heart's affections, such as contrition is.
Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to whom it was said
(Lk. 23:43): "This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise," on account
of his one act of repentance.
As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always taken away by
contrition, this question has already been considered above (Sent. iv,
D, 14, Q[2], AA[1],2; [4832]TP, Q[86], A[4]), where the same question
was raised with regard to Penance.
I answer that, The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways.
First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and in
this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the
contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the removal of guilt,
but also the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of the
sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition: and since this
sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense as to suffice
for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: A man cannot be sure that his contrition suffices
for the remission of both punishment and guilt: wherefore he is bound
to confess and to make satisfaction, especially since his contrition
would not be true contrition, unless he had the purpose of confessing
united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into effect, on
account of the precept given concerning confession.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as inward joy redounds into the outward
parts of the body, so does interior sorrow show itself in the exterior
members: wherefore it is written (Prov. 17:22): "A sorrowful spirit
drieth up the bones. "
Reply to Objection 3: Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in
its intensity, even as the punishment due for mortal sin is finite; yet
it derives infinite power from charity, whereby it is quickened, and so
it avails for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that slight contrition does not suffice to
blot out great sins. For contrition is the remedy for sin. Now a bodily
remedy, that heals a lesser bodily infirmity, does not suffice to heal
a greater. Therefore the least contrition does not suffice to blot out
very great sins.
Objection 2: Further, it was stated above ([4833]Q[3], A[3]) that for
greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Now contrition does
not blot out sin, unless it fulfills the requisite conditions.
Therefore the least contrition does not blot out all sins.
On the contrary, Every sanctifying grace blots out every mortal sin,
because it is incompatible therewith. Now every contrition is quickened
by sanctifying grace. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all
sins.
I answer that, As we have often said ([4834]Q[1], A[2], ad 1;[4835]
Q[3], A[1];[4836] Q[4] , A[1]), contrition includes a twofold sorrow.
One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can
be so slight as not to suffice for real contrition, e. g. if a sin were
less displeasing to a man, than separation from his last end ought to
be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity.
The other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no
hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself, belong
essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor
again is it under our control. Accordingly we must say that sorrow,
however slight it be, provided it suffice for true contrition, blots
out all sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual remedies derive infinite efficacy from
the infinite power which operates in them: wherefore the remedy which
suffices for healing a slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin.
This is seen in Baptism which looses great and small: and the same
applies to contrition provided it fulfill the necessary conditions.
Reply to Objection 2: It follows of necessity that a man grieves more
for a greater sin than for a lesser, according as it is more repugnant
to the love which causes his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of
sorrow for a greater sin, as another has for a lesser, this would
suffice for the remission of the sin.
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OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider confession, about which there are six points for
our consideration: (1) The necessity of confession; (2) Its nature; (3)
Its minister; (4) Its quality; (5) Its effect; (6) The seal of
confession.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation?
(2) Whether confession is according to the natural law?
(3) Whether all are bound to confession?
(4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty?
(5) Whether one is bound to confess at once?
(6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man?
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Whether confession is necessary for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not necessary for
salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is ordained for the sake of the
remission of sin. But sin is sufficiently remitted by the infusion of
grace. Therefore confession is not necessary in order to do penance for
one's sins.
Objection 2: Further, we read of some being forgiven their sins without
confession, e. g. Peter, Magdalen and Paul. But the grace that remits
sins is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore neither is
it necessary for salvation now that man should confess.
Objection 3: Further, a sin which is contracted from another, should
receive its remedy from another. Therefore actual sin, which a man has
committed through his own act, must take its remedy from the man
himself. Now Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore
confession is not necessary for salvation.
Objection 4: Further, confession is necessary for a judicial sentence,
in order that punishment may be inflicted in proportion to the offense.
Now a man is able to inflict on himself a greater punishment than even
that which might be inflicted on him by another. Therefore it seems
that confession is not necessary for salvation.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. i): "If you want the
physician to be of assistance to you, you must make your disease known
to him. " But it is necessary for salvation that man should take
medicine for his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation that man
should make his disease known by means of confession.
Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the accused.
Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought not to be his own judge,
but should be judged by another and consequently ought to confess to
him.
I answer that, Christ's Passion, without whose power, neither original
nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the
reception of the sacraments which derive their efficacy from it.
Wherefore for the remission of both actual and original sin, a
sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at
least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament actually,
through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently
those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin which is
incompatible with salvation, are necessary for salvation: and so just
as Baptism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for
salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance. And just as a man
through asking to be baptized, submits to the ministers of the Church,
to whom the dispensation of that sacrament belongs, even so, by
confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that,
through the sacrament of Penance dispensed by him, he may receive the
pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless
he be acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the
penitent's confession. Wherefore confession is necessary for the
salvation of a man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The infusion of grace suffices for the remission
of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, the sinner still owes a
debt of temporal punishment. Moreover, the sacraments of grace are
ordained in order that man may receive the infusion of grace, and
before he receives them, either actually or in his intention, he does
not receive grace. This is evident in the case of Baptism, and applies
to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates his temporal
punishment by undergoing the shame of confession, by the power of the
keys to which he submits, and by the enjoined satisfaction which the
priest moderates according to the kind of sins made known to him in
confession. Nevertheless the fact that confession is necessary for
salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for sins,
because this punishment to which one remains bound after the remission
of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way of salvation remains open,
without such punishment being expiated in this life: but it is due to
its conducing to the remission of sin, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although we do not read that they confessed, it
may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded
in writing. Moreover Christ has the power of excellence in the
sacraments; so that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament
without using the things which belong to the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin that is contracted from another, viz.
original sin, can be remedied by an entirely extrinsic cause, as in the
case of infants: whereas actual sin, which a man commits of himself,
cannot be expiated, without some operation on the part of the sinner.
Nevertheless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself,
though he was sufficient to sin by himself, because sin is finite on
the part of the thing to which it turns, in which respect the sinner
returns to self; while, on the part of the aversion, sin derives
infinity, in which respect the remission of sin must needs begin from
someone else, because "that which is last in order of generation is
first in the order of intention" (Ethic. iii). Consequently actual sin
also must needs take its remedy from another.
Reply to Objection 4: Satisfaction would not suffice for the expiation
of sin's punishment, by reason of the severity of the punishment which
is enjoined in satisfaction, but it does suffice as being a part of the
sacrament having the sacramental power; wherefore it ought to be
imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and consequently
confession is necessary.
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Whether confession is according to the natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is according to the natural
law. For Adam and Cain were bound to none but the precepts of the
natural law, and yet they are reproached for not confessing their sin.
Therefore confession of sin is according to the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, those precepts which are common to the Old and
New Law are according to the natural law. But confession was prescribed
in the Old Law, as may be gathered from Is. 43:26: "Tell, if thou hast
anything to justify thyself. " Therefore it is according to the natural
law.
Objection 3: Further, Job was subject only to the natural law. But he
confessed his sins, as appears from his words (Job 31:33) "If, as a
man, I have hid my sin. " Therefore confession is according to the
natural law.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v. ) that the natural law is the
same in all. But confession is not in all in the same way. Therefore it
is not according to the natural law. Further, confession is made to one
who has the keys. But the keys of the Church are not an institution of
the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession.
I answer that, The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they
ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge
of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the
sacraments. And since "the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but
a product of a certain innate power," as Tully states (De Inv. Rhet.
ii), consequently the sacraments are not part of the natural law, but
of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however, is
sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from
its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things
are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature.
But such things are above nature as God reserves to Himself; and these
are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of
miracles, or in the revelation of mysteries, or in the institution of
the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is
according to Divine, but not according to natural law.
Reply to Objection 1: Adam is reproached for not confessing his sin
before God: because the confession which is made to God by the
acknowledgment of one's sin, is according to the natural law. whereas
here we are speaking of confession made to a man.
We may also reply
that in such a case confession of one's sin is according to the natural
law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to confess in a court
of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying his
sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made
voluntarily to a man in order to receive from God the forgiveness of
one's sins, is not according to the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the natural law avail in the same
way in the law of Moses and in the New Law. But although there was a
kind of confession in the law of Moses, yet it was not after the same
manner as in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for in the law
of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one's sin inwardly before
God; while in the law of Moses it was necessary for a man to declare
his sin by some external sign, as by making a sin-offering, whereby the
fact of his having sinned became known to another man; but it was not
necessary for him to make known what particular sin he had committed,
or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law.
Reply to Objection 3: Job is speaking of the man who hides his sin by
denying it or excusing himself when he is accused thereof, as we may
gather from a gloss [*Cf. Gregory, Moral. xxii, 9] on the passage.
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Whether all are bound to confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for
Jerome says on Is. 3:9 ("They have proclaimed abroad"), "their sin,"
etc. : "Penance is the second plank after shipwreck. " But some have not
suffered shipwreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting
them, and consequently neither is confession which is a part of
Penance.
Objection 2: Further, it is to the judge that confession should be made
in any court. But some have no judge over them. Therefore they are not
bound to confession.
Objection 3: Further, some have none but venial sins. Now a man is not
bound to confess such sins. Therefore not everyone is bound to
confession.
On the contrary, Confession is condivided with satisfaction and
contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore
all are bound to confession also.
Further, this appears from the Decretals (De Poenit. et Remiss. xii),
where it is stated that "all of either sex are bound to confess their
sins as soon as they shall come to the age of discretion. "
I answer that, We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the
Divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in this
way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into
mortal sin after Baptism; secondly, by a precept of positive law, and
in this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid down in the
general council (Lateran iv, Can. 21) under Innocent III, both in order
that everyone may acknowledge himself to be a sinner, because "all have
sinned and need the grace of God" (Rom. 3:23); and that the Eucharist
may be approached with greater reverence; and lastly, that parish
priests may know their flock, lest a wolf may hide therein.
Reply to Objection 1: Although it is possible for a man, in this mortal
life, to avoid shipwreck, i. e. mortal sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot
avoid venial sins, which dispose him to shipwreck, and against which
also Penance is ordained; wherefore there is still room for Penance,
and consequently for confession, even in those who do not commit mortal
sins.
Reply to Objection 2: All must acknowledge Christ as their judge, to
Whom they must confess in the person of His vicar; and although the
latter may be the inferior if the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the
superior, in so far as the penitent is a sinner, while the confessor is
the minister of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is bound to confess his venial sins, not in
virtue of the sacrament, but by the institution of the Church, and
that, when he has no other sins to confess. We may also, with others,
answer that the Decretal quoted above does not bind others than those
who have mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that it
orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot apply to venial sins,
because no one can confess all his venial sins. Accordingly, a man who
has no mortal sins to confess, is not bound to confess his venial sins,
but it suffices for the fulfillment of the commandment of the Church
that he present himself before the priest, and declare himself to be
unconscious of any mortal sin: and this will count for his confession.
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Whether it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful for a man to confess a sin
which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (Regist. xii), "it is
the mark of a good conscience to acknowledge a fault where there is
none. " Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience to accuse oneself
of those sins which one has not committed.
Objection 2: Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than
another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be praised.
But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he thinks he
is. Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed a more grievous
sin than one has.
Objection 3: Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it be
mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess it as
mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he has
not committed.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction originates from confession. But a
man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed. Therefore
he can also confess a sin which he has not done.
On the contrary, Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells an
untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since every
untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he has
not committed.
Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of a
crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses. Now the
witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man
ought not to accuse himself of a sin which is not on his conscience.
I answer that, The penitent should, by his confession, make his state
known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other
than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does
not make his state known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore his
confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words
must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him only of what
is on his conscience.
Reply to Objection 1: To acknowledge a fault where there is none, may
be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of the
act, and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an
erroneous conscience, to acknowledge having done what one has not done.
Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and thus the
saying of Gregory is true, because a just man fears lest, in any act
which is good in itself, there should be any defect on his part. thus
it is written (Job 9:28): "I feared all my works. " Wherefore it is also
the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words
of this fear which he holds in his thoughts.
From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since a
just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not as though he had
committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in those
things which he seems to do well, he may by pride sin more grievously.
Reply to Objection 3: When a man doubts whether a certain sin be
mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt,
because he sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while
doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to
chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that
which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, however, affirm
that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to
the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and
what is not.
Reply to Objection 4: A man does not commit a falsehood by making
satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone
confesses a sin which he thinks he has not committed. And if he
mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he
does not lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession
thereof tally with his conscience.
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Whether one is bound to confess at once?
Objection 1: It would seem that one is bound to confess at once. For
Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii): "The contempt of confession is
inexcusable, unless there be an urgent reason for delay. " But everyone
is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is bound to confess as
soon as possible.
Objection 2: Further, everyone is bound to do more to avoid spiritual
disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now if a man who is sick in body
were to delay sending for the physician, it would be detrimental to his
health. Therefore it seems that it must needs be detrimental to a man's
health if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be one
at hand.
Objection 3: Further, that which is due always, is due at once. But man
owes confession to God always. Therefore he is bound to confess at
once.
On the contrary, A fixed time both for confession and for receiving the
Eucharist is determined by the Decretals (Cap. Omnis utriusque sexus:
De Poenit. et Remiss. ). Now a man does not sin by failing to receive
the Eucharist before the fixed time. Therefore he does not sin if he
does not confess before that time.
Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a commandment bids us to
do. If therefore a man is bound to confess at once, and omits to do so,
with a priest at hand, he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner
at any other time, and so on, so that he would fall into many mortal
sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems unreasonable.
I answer that, As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a
man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition,
viz. when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger
of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless his sin be
forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be
bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at hand, he is bound to confess
or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to contrition and to
have the purpose of confessing.
But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. First,
accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do something which he cannot do
without committing a mortal sin, unless he go to confession first: for
then he is bound to confess; for instance, if he has to receive the
Eucharist, to which no one can approach, after committing a mortal sin,
without confessing first, if a priest be at hand, and there be no
urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church obliges all to confess
once a year; because she commands all to receive Holy Communion once a
year, viz. at Easter, wherefore all must go to confession before that
time.
Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confession; and here the
same reason applies to delay of confession as to delay of Baptism,
because both are necessary sacraments. Now a man is not bound to
receive Baptism as soon as he makes up his mind to be baptized; and so
he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: nor is
there any fixed time beyond which, if he defer Baptism, he would incur
a mortal sin. Nevertheless the delay of Baptism may amount to a mortal
sin, or it may not, and this depends on the cause of the delay, since,
as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, text. 15), the will does not defer
doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable cause. Wherefore if
the cause of the delay of Baptism has a mortal sin connected with it,
e. g. if a man put off being baptized through contempt, or some like
motive, the delay will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same
seems to apply to confession which is not more necessary than Baptism.
Moreover, since man is bound to fulfill in this life those things that
are necessary for salvation, therefore, if he be in danger of death, he
is bound, even absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to
receive Baptism. For this reason too, James proclaimed at the same time
the commandment about making confession and that about receiving
Extreme Unction (James 5:14, 16). Therefore the opinion seems probable
of those who say that a man is not bound to confess at once, though it
is dangerous to delay.
Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to confess at once,
as soon as he has a reasonable and proper opportunity. Nor does it
matter that the Decretal fixes the time limit to an annual confession,
because the Church does not favor delay, but forbids the neglect
involved in a further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who
delays is excused, not from sin in the tribunal of conscience; but from
punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that such a person would
not be deprived of proper burial if he were to die before that time.
But this seems too severe, because affirmative precepts bind, not at
once, but at a fixed time; and this, not because it is most convenient
to fulfill them then (for in that case if a man were not to give alms
of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in need, he would
commit a mortal sin, which is false), but because the time involves
urgency. Consequently, if he does not confess at the very first
opportunity, it does not follow that he commits a mortal sin, even
though he does not await a better opportunity. unless it becomes urgent
for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor is it on
account of the Church's indulgence that he is not bound to confess at
once, but on account of the nature of an affirmative precept, so that
before the commandment was made, there was still less obligation.
Others again say that secular persons are not bound to confess before
Lent, which is the time of penance for them; but that religious are
bound to confess at once, because, for them, all time is a time for
penance. But this is not to the point; for religious have no
obligations besides those of other men, with the exception of such as
they are bound to by vow.
Reply to Objection 1: Hugh is speaking of those who die without this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary for bodily health that the
physician be sent for at once, except when there is necessity for being
healed: and the same applies to spiritual disease.
Reply to Objection 3: The retaining of another's property against the
owner's will is contrary to a negative precept, which binds always and
for always, and therefore one is always bound to make immediate
restitution. It is not the same with the fulfillment of an affirmative
precept, which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is not
bound to fulfill it at once.
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Whether one can be dispensed from confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that one can be dispensed from confessing
his sins to a man. For precepts of positive law are subject to
dispensation by the prelates of the Church. Now such is confession, as
appears from what was said above [4837](A[3]). Therefore one may be
dispensed from confession.
Objection 2: Further, a man can grant a dispensation in that which was
instituted by a man. But we read of confession being instituted, not by
God, but by a man (James 5:16): "Confess your sins, one to another. "
Now the Pope has the power of dispensation in things instituted by the
apostles, as appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore he can also
dispense a man from confessing.
On the contrary, Penance, whereof confession is a part, is a necessary
sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since therefore no one can be dispensed
from Baptism, neither can one be dispensed from confession.
I answer that, The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church
which is founded by God. Wherefore they need to be appointed by the
Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation
is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the Church is founded
on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power
to publish new articles of faith, or to do away with those which are
already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to abolish those
that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which
belongs to Christ alone, Who is the foundation of the Church.
Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be
saved without Baptism, nor that he be saved without confession, in so
far as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however,
dispense from confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of
the commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay confession
longer than the limit prescribed by the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the Divine law do not bind less
than those of the natural law: wherefore, just as no dispensation is
possible from the natural law, so neither can there be from positive
Divine law.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept about confession was not instituted
by a man first of all, though it was promulgated by James: it was
instituted by God, and although we do not read it explicitly, yet it
was somewhat foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being
prepared by John's Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed their
sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the priests, and
though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood
of the New Testament was foreshadowed in them.
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OF THE NATURE OF CONFESSION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the nature of confession, under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?
(2) Whether confession is an act of virtue?
(3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?
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Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that Augustine defines confession
unfittingly, when he says (Super Ps. 21) that confession "lays bare the
hidden disease by the hope of pardon. " For the disease against which
confession is ordained, is sin. Now sin is sometimes manifest.
Therefore it should not be said that confession is the remedy for a
"hidden" disease.
Objection 2: Further, the beginning of penance is fear. But confession
is a part of Penance. Therefore fear rather than "hope" should be set
down as the cause of confession.
Objection 3: Further, that which is placed under a seal, is not laid
bare, but closed up. But the sin which is confessed is placed under the
seal of confession. Therefore sin is not laid bare in confession, but
closed up.
Objection 4: Further, other definitions are to be found differing from
the above. For Gregory says (Hom. xl in Evang. ) that confession is "the
uncovering of sins, and the opening of the wound. " Others say that
"confession is a legal declaration of our sins in the presence of a
priest. " Others define it thus: "Confession is the sinner's sacramental
self-accusation through shame for what he has done, which through the
keys of the Church makes satisfaction for his sins, and binds him to
perform the penance imposed on him. " Therefore it seems that the
definition in question is insufficient, since it does not include all
that these include.
I answer that, Several things offer themselves to our notice in the act
of confession: first, the very substance or genus of the act, which is
a kind of manifestation; secondly, the matter manifested, viz. sin;
thirdly, the person to whom the manifestation is made, viz. the priest;
fourthly, its cause, viz. hope of pardon; fifthly, its effect, viz.
release from part of the punishment, and the obligation to pay the
other part. Accordingly the first definition, given by Augustine,
indicates the substance of the act, by saying that "it lays bare"---the
matter of confession, by saying that it is a "hidden disease"---its
cause, which is "the hope of pardon"; while the other definitions
include one or other of the five things aforesaid, as may be seen by
anyone who considers the matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the priest, as a man, may sometimes have
knowledge of the penitent's sin, yet he does not know it as a vicar of
Christ (even as a judge sometimes knows a thing, as a man, of which he
is ignorant, as a judge), and in this respect it is made known to him
by confession. or we may reply that although the external act may be in
the open, yet the internal act, which is the cause of the external act,
is hidden; so that it needs to be revealed by confession.
Reply to Objection 2: Confession presupposes charity, which gives us
life, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now it is in contrition
that charity is given; while servile fear, which is void of hope, is
previous to charity: yet he that has charity is moved more by hope than
by fear. Hence hope rather than fear is set down as the cause of
confession.
Reply to Objection 3: In every confession sin is laid bare to the
priest, and closed to others by the seal of confession.
Reply to Objection 4: It is not necessary that every definition should
include everything connected with the thing defined: and for this
reason we find some definitions or descriptions that indicate one
cause, and some that indicate another.
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Whether confession is an act of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of virtue. For
every act of virtue belongs to the natural law, since "we are naturally
capable of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). But
confession does not belong to the natural law. Therefore it is not an
act of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, an act of virtue is more befitting one who is
innocent than one who has sinned. But the confession of a sin, which is
the confession of which we are speaking now, cannot be befitting an
innocent man. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the grace which is in the sacraments differs
somewhat from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts. But
confession is part of a sacrament. Therefore it is not an act of
virtue.
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But
confession comes under a precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is
meritorious, for "it opens the gate of heaven," as the Master says
(Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore it seems that it is an act of virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([4838]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7; [4839]SS,
Q[80]; [4840]SS, Q[85] , A[3]; [4841]SS, Q[109], A[3]), for an act to
belong to a virtue it suffices that it be of such a nature as to imply
some condition belonging to virtue. Now, although confession does not
include everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name
implies the manifestation of that which a man has on his conscience:
for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man professes with his lips
what he does not hold in his heart, it is not a confession but a
fiction. Now to express in words what one has in one's thoughts is a
condition of virtue; and, consequently, confession is a good thing
generically, and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it
be devoid of other due circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Natural reason, in a general way, inclines a man
to make confession in the proper way, to confess as he ought, what he
ought, and when he ought, and in this way confession belongs to the
natural law. But it belongs to the Divine law to determine the
circumstances, when, how, what, and to whom, with regard to the
confession of which we are speaking now. Accordingly it is evident that
the natural law inclines a man to confession, by means of the Divine
law, which determines the circumstances, as is the case with all
matters belonging to the positive law.
Reply to Objection 2: Although an innocent man may have the habit of
the virtue whose object is a sin already committed, he has not the act,
so long as he remains innocent. Wherefore the confession of sins, of
which confession we are speaking now, is not befitting an innocent man,
though it is an act of virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Though the grace of the sacraments differs from
the grace of the virtues, they are not contrary but disparate; hence
there is nothing to prevent that which is an act of virtue, in so far
as it proceeds from the free-will quickened by grace, from being a
sacrament, or part of a sacrament, in so far as it is ordained as a
remedy for sin.
