Now man's
happiness
is twofold, as was also stated above ([1575]Q[5],
A[5]).
A[5]).
Summa Theologica
vi, 2.
Therefore
there are only two cardinal virtues.
Objection 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher
than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to
rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that
there are many more principal virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of
good works is built on four virtues. "
I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal
principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either
way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as
defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as
existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal
virtue, called "Prudence. " Secondly, according as the reason puts its
order into something else; either into operations, and then we have
"Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need
of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their
thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions
inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a
curb, which we call "Temperance. " Secondly, by the passions withdrawing
us from following the dictate of reason, e. g. through fear of danger or
toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason
dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is "Fortitude. "
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of
virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz.
the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by
"Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is
threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty,
subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of
"Fortitude. "
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues
simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.
Reply to Objection 2: That part of the soul which is rational by
participation is threefold, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks
before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject
and as to the formal principle.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?
Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called
principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the
principal in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all
the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any
be called a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should
above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for
Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev. ) that "he who gathers the other virtues
without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind. "
Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.
Objection 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal.
But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: "Patience hath a
perfect work. " Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal
virtue.
On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De
Invent. Rhet. ii).
I answer that, As stated above [1569](A[2]), these four are reckoned as
cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as
we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain
acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is
found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its
judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined by
reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found
chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person,
and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found
chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the
pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good
defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in
perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.
Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways.
First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they
are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all
the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in
reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue
that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice;
every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called
temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any
passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, as
also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this
way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all the
objections fail.
Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated,
each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus
they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are
called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of
the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which
commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between
equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the
pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against
dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: because the other
virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called
principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse
and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1):
"There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no
perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound
fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice,
without prudence, fortitude and temperance. " But this would not be so,
if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the
different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore
the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the
function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of
temperance is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic.
xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself,
and is not weakened and bent by any enticement. " And of temperance he
says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the manner and order in
all things that we decide to do and say. " Therefore it seems that these
virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the
necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should have
knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular
end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act with firmness
and steadfastness. " But the first of these seems to belong to prudence
which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; the second, i. e.
choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his passions on
the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man
should act for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude,
which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and
steadfastness, belongs to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is
general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct
from one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are
four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he
applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same
four virtues are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above [1570](A[3]), these four virtues are
understood differently by various writers. For some take them as
signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in
all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain
rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a
certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any
matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions
or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a
disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in
accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil
involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this
way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct
virtuous habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from
the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a certain
firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said,
belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a "virtue," it is
directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this,
we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a
"moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in
all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to
belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion,
which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction
from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to
reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way
of a kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations.
According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct
from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one
another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit,
and virtue, and moral virtue.
Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according
as they have their special determinate matter; each of its own matter,
in which special commendation is given to that general condition from
which the virtue's name is taken as stated above [1571](A[3]). In this
way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits,
differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the
first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues
qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of
prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are
directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest,
for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less
difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of
touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to
do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of
death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense
fortitude is said to be temperate. Again, temperance is said to be
brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far,
to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers
of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to
remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De
Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear,
and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust,
after showing himself to be unconquered by toil. "
From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance
observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by
the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are
taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense
that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down
by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may,
however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues,
perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly
divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and
social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the
"exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God. " Now the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice,
fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God. " Therefore these virtues
cannot be exemplar.
Objection 2: Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without
any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul
that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it
has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the
passions; it does not have to conquer them. " Now it was stated above
([1572]Q[59], A[5]) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without
passions. Therefore there is no such thing as "perfect" virtue.
Objection 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs
and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God. " But it seems
wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that it is
not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he
despises what most men admire, viz. power and office. " Therefore there
are no "perfecting" virtues.
Objection 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of their
country and for the safety of the city. " But it is only legal justice
that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social. "
On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus,
together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The
four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social*
virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes purgatoriae:
literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect
[*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul]
virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues. '" [*Cf. Chrysostom's
fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the
modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds
within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and
suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common
weal. "]
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs
to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is
God: if we follow Him we shall live aright. " Consequently the exemplar
of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist
the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as
existing originally in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so
that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while
temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is
that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His
unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in
His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).
Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on
Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him
according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues;
since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the
conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been
speaking of these virtues until now.
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to
Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as
Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as
your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mat. 5:48), we must needs place some
virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues
which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of
movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way
and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called
"perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of
God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the
thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows,
neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being
afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and
justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow
the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who
have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the
"perfect virtues. " Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of
God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of
passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto
by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the
Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues
according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about
buying and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires;
for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.
Reply to Objection 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men
living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues
of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence
Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social
virtues check the passions," i. e. they bring them to the relative mean;
"the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them"; "the
third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is
impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind,"
viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking
of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.
Reply to Objection 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids
is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little
earlier: "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of
their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also
to those who have retired from public life on account of failing
health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded
to others the power and renown of authority. " This agrees with what
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a
hallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this
burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of
truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the
pressure of charity. "
Reply to Objection 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal
directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into
the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v,
1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we
understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but
also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, or
even towards one individual.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?
(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual
and moral virtues?
(3) How many, and which are they?
(4) Of their order.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are any theological virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues.
For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a
perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which
is disposed according to nature. " But that which is Divine is above
man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a
man.
Objection 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But
the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above ([1573]Q[61], A[5]),
which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are
not virtues of man.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because
they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all
things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed
to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any
habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now
the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and
charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq. ): "Ye that fear the Lord
believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him. "
Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God.
Therefore they are theological virtues.
I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he
is directed to happiness, as was explained above ([1574]Q[5], A[7]).
Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above ([1575]Q[5],
A[5]). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which
man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a
happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the
power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about
which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers
of the Divine nature. " And because such happiness surpasses the
capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to
act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to
this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God
some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural
happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of
his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like
principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their
object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly,
because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these
virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained
in Holy Writ.
Reply to Objection 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain
thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological
virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as
kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion,
man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that
these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of
which he is made a partaker.
Reply to Objection 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though
God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us
virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but
exemplate virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to
God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in
proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their
nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the
object of supernatural happiness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral
virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not
distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological
virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as
to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues
which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the
virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore,
the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and
intellectual virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us
to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs
us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it
considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not
distinct from the intellectual virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the
four cardinal virtues are the "order of love. " Now love is charity,
which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not
distinct from the theological.
On the contrary, That which is above man's nature is distinct from that
which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above
man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in
proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above ([1576]Q[58], A[3]).
Therefore they are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above ([1577]Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits are
specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal
difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues
is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge
of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and
moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore
the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and
intellectual virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's
intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the
theological virtues, supernaturally.
Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7)
reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as
they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on
the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always
charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of
love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of
the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called,
then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each
cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and
cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; Q[28], A[6], ad
2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of
charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity
essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way,
as we shall show further on (Q[65], AA[2],5; [1578]SS, Q[23], A[7]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological
virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not
fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological
virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural
inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues
directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz.
the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but one
theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the
intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the
intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is
imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral
virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion.
Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God.
Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective
part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be
only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other,
the will.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain
faith, hope, charity, these three. "
I answer that, As stated above [1579](A[1]), the theological virtues
direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural
inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter
happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or
intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles
which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which
are reason's starting-point, both in speculative and in practical
matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends
naturally to good as defined by reason.
But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness,
according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither
hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared
for them that love Him. " Consequently in respect of both the above
things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to
direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man
receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means of a
Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith.
Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that end as
something attainable---and this pertains to hope---and as to a certain
spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into
that end---and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is
moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement
is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellect requires intelligible species
whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in
addition to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it
to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the
end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power
is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be
directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there was
need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection:
since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed.
Hence faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall
short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are
above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in
proportion to man, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: "The weakness of God is
stronger than men. "
Reply to Objection 3: Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement
to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there
must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely,
hope and charity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is
not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes
that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues,
according to Eph. 3:17: "Being rooted and founded in charity. "
Therefore charity precedes the others.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man
cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and
loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping. " Therefore it seems that
faith precedes charity, and charity hope.
Objection 3: Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as
stated above (A[2], ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it is a
passion, as stated above ([1580]Q[25], A[2]). Therefore charity, which
is love, precedes hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle enumerates them thus (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now
there remain faith, hope, charity. "
I answer that, Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of
perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes
form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith
precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: because habits are
all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to
anything, either by hoping or loving, unless that thing be apprehended
by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith that the intellect
apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of
generation, faith precedes hope and charity. In like manner a man loves
a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact
that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone, he
looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the
very reason that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so
that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards their
respective acts.
But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope:
because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive from
charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the
mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of
them all, as we shall state further on ([1581]SS, Q[23], A[8]).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man
hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this
belongs to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible
for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not already
possessed, but which he hopes to possess.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1582]Q[40], A[7]), in treating
of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object,
viz. the good hoped for. With regard to this, love always precedes
hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope
also regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some
good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though
afterwards hope is increased by love. Because from the fact that a man
thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love
him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in
him.
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OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?
(2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?
(3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?
(4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as
infused virtue?
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Whether virtue is in us by nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and
are equally in all of us. " And Antony says in his sermon to the monks:
"If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if it follow nature it
is virtuous. " Moreover, a gloss on Mat. 4:23, "Jesus went about," etc. ,
says: "He taught them natural virtues, i. e. chastity, justice,
humility, which man possesses naturally. "
Objection 2: Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason,
as was clearly shown above ([1583]Q[55], A[4], ad 2). But that which
accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's
nature. Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
Objection 3: Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be
natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written
(Job 31:18): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out
with me from my mother's womb. " Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
On the contrary, Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and
is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts
remain, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all
men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.
I answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained
by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, who
upheld the theory of "latent forms" [*Anaxagoras; Cf. [1584]FP, Q[45],
A[8]; Q[65], A[4]]. Others held that forms are entirely from without,
those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated from
some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly
from within, in so far as they pre-exist potentially in matter; and
partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the
agent.
In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they
are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences would
pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and
virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body, are
removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being
polished. This was the opinion of the Platonists. Others said that they
are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active
intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and
virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted to them, but
not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher
(Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth.
To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in
which something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to his
specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And,
since each thing derives its species from its form, and its
individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational
soul, while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him in respect
of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific
nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular
temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of his individual
nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body,
considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a way, to the
soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular
soul.
In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in
respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be
found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both
knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral
virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for
good in accordance with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the
individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in the body,
some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to
wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts of the body,
according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or
hindered in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the
rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In
this way one man has a natural aptitude for science, another for
fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual
and moral virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively,
but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while the
perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of
action, but on various modes, in respect of the various matters, which
constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various
circumstances.
It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according
to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except the
theological virtues, which are entirely from without.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two
argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature, inasmuch
as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the
sense that, owing to the natural disposition which the body has from
birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately,
another for some other virtue.
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Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?
Objection 1: It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by
habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi
cvi. ] commenting on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin,"
says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good
without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking,
virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people. " Now faith cannot
be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by God, according to
Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith. " Therefore no acquired
virtue can be in us by habituation.
Objection 2: Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are
incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God,
according to Wis. 8:21: "I knew that I could not otherwise be
continent, except God gave it. " Therefore neither can any virtues be
caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God.
Objection 3: Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the
perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its
cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more
efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much
more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.
I answer that, We have spoken above ([1585]Q[51], AA[2],3) in a general
way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a
special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note
that, as stated above ([1586]Q[55], AA[3],4), man's virtue perfects him
in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode,
species, and order," as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in
"number, weight, and measure," as expressed in Wis. 11:21, man's good
must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is
twofold, as stated above ([1587]Q[19], AA[3],4), viz. human reason and
Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more
things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the
Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.
It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined
according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts:
inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the
aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs
man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason,
cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but
is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in
giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, "which
God works in us without us" (Super Ps. 118, Serm. xxvi). It is also of
these virtues that the First Objection holds good.
Reply to Objection 2: Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused
virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But
actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue;
because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as stated
above ([1588]Q[49], A[3]): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit
of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is
directly contrary to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal
sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered
from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in
the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason.
There are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without
grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological
virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will
be more fully explained later ([1589]Q[109], A[4]).
there are only two cardinal virtues.
Objection 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher
than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to
rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that
there are many more principal virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of
good works is built on four virtues. "
I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal
principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either
way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as
defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as
existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal
virtue, called "Prudence. " Secondly, according as the reason puts its
order into something else; either into operations, and then we have
"Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need
of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their
thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions
inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a
curb, which we call "Temperance. " Secondly, by the passions withdrawing
us from following the dictate of reason, e. g. through fear of danger or
toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason
dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is "Fortitude. "
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of
virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz.
the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by
"Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is
threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty,
subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of
"Fortitude. "
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues
simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.
Reply to Objection 2: That part of the soul which is rational by
participation is threefold, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks
before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject
and as to the formal principle.
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Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?
Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called
principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the
principal in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all
the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any
be called a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should
above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for
Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev. ) that "he who gathers the other virtues
without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind. "
Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.
Objection 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal.
But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: "Patience hath a
perfect work. " Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal
virtue.
On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De
Invent. Rhet. ii).
I answer that, As stated above [1569](A[2]), these four are reckoned as
cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as
we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain
acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is
found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its
judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined by
reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found
chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person,
and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found
chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the
pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good
defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in
perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.
Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways.
First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they
are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all
the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in
reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue
that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice;
every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called
temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any
passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, as
also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this
way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all the
objections fail.
Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated,
each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus
they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are
called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of
the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which
commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between
equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the
pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against
dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: because the other
virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called
principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.
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Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse
and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1):
"There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no
perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound
fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice,
without prudence, fortitude and temperance. " But this would not be so,
if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the
different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore
the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the
function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of
temperance is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic.
xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself,
and is not weakened and bent by any enticement. " And of temperance he
says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the manner and order in
all things that we decide to do and say. " Therefore it seems that these
virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the
necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should have
knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular
end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act with firmness
and steadfastness. " But the first of these seems to belong to prudence
which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; the second, i. e.
choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his passions on
the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man
should act for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude,
which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and
steadfastness, belongs to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is
general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct
from one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are
four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he
applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same
four virtues are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above [1570](A[3]), these four virtues are
understood differently by various writers. For some take them as
signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in
all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain
rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a
certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any
matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions
or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a
disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in
accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil
involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this
way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct
virtuous habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from
the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a certain
firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said,
belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a "virtue," it is
directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this,
we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a
"moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in
all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to
belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion,
which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction
from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to
reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way
of a kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations.
According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct
from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one
another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit,
and virtue, and moral virtue.
Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according
as they have their special determinate matter; each of its own matter,
in which special commendation is given to that general condition from
which the virtue's name is taken as stated above [1571](A[3]). In this
way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits,
differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the
first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues
qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of
prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are
directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest,
for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less
difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of
touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to
do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of
death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense
fortitude is said to be temperate. Again, temperance is said to be
brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far,
to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers
of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to
remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De
Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear,
and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust,
after showing himself to be unconquered by toil. "
From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance
observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by
the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are
taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense
that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down
by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may,
however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.
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Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues,
perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly
divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and
social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the
"exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God. " Now the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice,
fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God. " Therefore these virtues
cannot be exemplar.
Objection 2: Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without
any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul
that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it
has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the
passions; it does not have to conquer them. " Now it was stated above
([1572]Q[59], A[5]) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without
passions. Therefore there is no such thing as "perfect" virtue.
Objection 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs
and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God. " But it seems
wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that it is
not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he
despises what most men admire, viz. power and office. " Therefore there
are no "perfecting" virtues.
Objection 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of their
country and for the safety of the city. " But it is only legal justice
that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social. "
On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus,
together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The
four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social*
virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes purgatoriae:
literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect
[*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul]
virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues. '" [*Cf. Chrysostom's
fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the
modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds
within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and
suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common
weal. "]
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs
to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is
God: if we follow Him we shall live aright. " Consequently the exemplar
of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist
the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as
existing originally in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so
that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while
temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is
that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His
unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in
His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).
Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on
Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him
according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues;
since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the
conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been
speaking of these virtues until now.
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to
Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as
Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as
your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mat. 5:48), we must needs place some
virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues
which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of
movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way
and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called
"perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of
God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the
thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows,
neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being
afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and
justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow
the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who
have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the
"perfect virtues. " Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of
God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of
passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto
by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the
Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues
according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about
buying and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires;
for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.
Reply to Objection 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men
living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues
of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence
Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social
virtues check the passions," i. e. they bring them to the relative mean;
"the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them"; "the
third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is
impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind,"
viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking
of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.
Reply to Objection 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids
is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little
earlier: "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of
their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also
to those who have retired from public life on account of failing
health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded
to others the power and renown of authority. " This agrees with what
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a
hallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this
burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of
truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the
pressure of charity. "
Reply to Objection 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal
directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into
the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v,
1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we
understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but
also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, or
even towards one individual.
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OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?
(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual
and moral virtues?
(3) How many, and which are they?
(4) Of their order.
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Whether there are any theological virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues.
For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a
perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which
is disposed according to nature. " But that which is Divine is above
man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a
man.
Objection 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But
the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above ([1573]Q[61], A[5]),
which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are
not virtues of man.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because
they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all
things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed
to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any
habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now
the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and
charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq. ): "Ye that fear the Lord
believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him. "
Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God.
Therefore they are theological virtues.
I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he
is directed to happiness, as was explained above ([1574]Q[5], A[7]).
Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above ([1575]Q[5],
A[5]). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which
man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a
happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the
power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about
which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers
of the Divine nature. " And because such happiness surpasses the
capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to
act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to
this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God
some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural
happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of
his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like
principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their
object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly,
because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these
virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained
in Holy Writ.
Reply to Objection 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain
thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological
virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as
kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion,
man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that
these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of
which he is made a partaker.
Reply to Objection 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though
God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us
virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but
exemplate virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to
God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in
proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their
nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the
object of supernatural happiness.
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Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral
virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not
distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological
virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as
to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues
which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the
virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore,
the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and
intellectual virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us
to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs
us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it
considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not
distinct from the intellectual virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the
four cardinal virtues are the "order of love. " Now love is charity,
which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not
distinct from the theological.
On the contrary, That which is above man's nature is distinct from that
which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above
man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in
proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above ([1576]Q[58], A[3]).
Therefore they are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above ([1577]Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits are
specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal
difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues
is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge
of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and
moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore
the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and
intellectual virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's
intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the
theological virtues, supernaturally.
Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7)
reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as
they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on
the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always
charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of
love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of
the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called,
then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each
cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and
cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; Q[28], A[6], ad
2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of
charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity
essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way,
as we shall show further on (Q[65], AA[2],5; [1578]SS, Q[23], A[7]).
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Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological
virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not
fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological
virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural
inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues
directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz.
the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but one
theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the
intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the
intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is
imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral
virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion.
Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God.
Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective
part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be
only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other,
the will.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain
faith, hope, charity, these three. "
I answer that, As stated above [1579](A[1]), the theological virtues
direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural
inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter
happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or
intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles
which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which
are reason's starting-point, both in speculative and in practical
matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends
naturally to good as defined by reason.
But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness,
according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither
hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared
for them that love Him. " Consequently in respect of both the above
things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to
direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man
receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means of a
Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith.
Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that end as
something attainable---and this pertains to hope---and as to a certain
spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into
that end---and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is
moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement
is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellect requires intelligible species
whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in
addition to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it
to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the
end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power
is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be
directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there was
need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection:
since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed.
Hence faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall
short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are
above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in
proportion to man, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: "The weakness of God is
stronger than men. "
Reply to Objection 3: Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement
to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there
must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely,
hope and charity.
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Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is
not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes
that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues,
according to Eph. 3:17: "Being rooted and founded in charity. "
Therefore charity precedes the others.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man
cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and
loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping. " Therefore it seems that
faith precedes charity, and charity hope.
Objection 3: Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as
stated above (A[2], ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it is a
passion, as stated above ([1580]Q[25], A[2]). Therefore charity, which
is love, precedes hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle enumerates them thus (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now
there remain faith, hope, charity. "
I answer that, Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of
perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes
form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith
precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: because habits are
all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to
anything, either by hoping or loving, unless that thing be apprehended
by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith that the intellect
apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of
generation, faith precedes hope and charity. In like manner a man loves
a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact
that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone, he
looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the
very reason that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so
that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards their
respective acts.
But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope:
because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive from
charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the
mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of
them all, as we shall state further on ([1581]SS, Q[23], A[8]).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man
hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this
belongs to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible
for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not already
possessed, but which he hopes to possess.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1582]Q[40], A[7]), in treating
of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object,
viz. the good hoped for. With regard to this, love always precedes
hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope
also regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some
good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though
afterwards hope is increased by love. Because from the fact that a man
thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love
him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in
him.
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OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?
(2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?
(3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?
(4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as
infused virtue?
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Whether virtue is in us by nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and
are equally in all of us. " And Antony says in his sermon to the monks:
"If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if it follow nature it
is virtuous. " Moreover, a gloss on Mat. 4:23, "Jesus went about," etc. ,
says: "He taught them natural virtues, i. e. chastity, justice,
humility, which man possesses naturally. "
Objection 2: Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason,
as was clearly shown above ([1583]Q[55], A[4], ad 2). But that which
accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's
nature. Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
Objection 3: Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be
natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written
(Job 31:18): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out
with me from my mother's womb. " Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
On the contrary, Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and
is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts
remain, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all
men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.
I answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained
by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, who
upheld the theory of "latent forms" [*Anaxagoras; Cf. [1584]FP, Q[45],
A[8]; Q[65], A[4]]. Others held that forms are entirely from without,
those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated from
some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly
from within, in so far as they pre-exist potentially in matter; and
partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the
agent.
In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they
are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences would
pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and
virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body, are
removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being
polished. This was the opinion of the Platonists. Others said that they
are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active
intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and
virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted to them, but
not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher
(Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth.
To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in
which something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to his
specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And,
since each thing derives its species from its form, and its
individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational
soul, while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him in respect
of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific
nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular
temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of his individual
nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body,
considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a way, to the
soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular
soul.
In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in
respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be
found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both
knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral
virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for
good in accordance with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the
individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in the body,
some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to
wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts of the body,
according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or
hindered in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the
rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In
this way one man has a natural aptitude for science, another for
fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual
and moral virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively,
but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while the
perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of
action, but on various modes, in respect of the various matters, which
constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various
circumstances.
It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according
to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except the
theological virtues, which are entirely from without.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two
argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature, inasmuch
as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the
sense that, owing to the natural disposition which the body has from
birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately,
another for some other virtue.
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Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?
Objection 1: It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by
habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi
cvi. ] commenting on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin,"
says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good
without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking,
virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people. " Now faith cannot
be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by God, according to
Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith. " Therefore no acquired
virtue can be in us by habituation.
Objection 2: Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are
incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God,
according to Wis. 8:21: "I knew that I could not otherwise be
continent, except God gave it. " Therefore neither can any virtues be
caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God.
Objection 3: Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the
perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its
cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more
efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much
more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.
I answer that, We have spoken above ([1585]Q[51], AA[2],3) in a general
way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a
special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note
that, as stated above ([1586]Q[55], AA[3],4), man's virtue perfects him
in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode,
species, and order," as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in
"number, weight, and measure," as expressed in Wis. 11:21, man's good
must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is
twofold, as stated above ([1587]Q[19], AA[3],4), viz. human reason and
Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more
things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the
Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.
It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined
according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts:
inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the
aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs
man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason,
cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but
is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in
giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, "which
God works in us without us" (Super Ps. 118, Serm. xxvi). It is also of
these virtues that the First Objection holds good.
Reply to Objection 2: Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused
virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But
actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue;
because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as stated
above ([1588]Q[49], A[3]): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit
of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is
directly contrary to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal
sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered
from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in
the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason.
There are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without
grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological
virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will
be more fully explained later ([1589]Q[109], A[4]).
