No More Learning

Spirit. And why only half credible?
I. Because I do not yet see why precisely such a presen-
tation--a presentation of a mass extended through space--
should arise.
Spirit. Thou hast already seen that it is only thine own
sensation which thou extendest through space; and thou
hast had some forebodings that it is by this extension in
space alone that thy sensation becomes transformed for thee
into something sensible. We have therefore to do at present
only with space itself, and to explain its origin in conscious-
ness.
I. So it is.
Spirit. Let us then make the attempt . I know that thou
canst not become conscious of thy intelligent activity as
such, in so far as it remains in its original and unchangeable
unity;--i. e. in the condition which begins with thy very be-
ing, and can never be destroyed without at the same time
destroying that being;--and such a consciousness therefore
I do not ascribe to thee. But thou canst become conscious
of it in so far as it passes from one state of transition to
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
29-S
another within the limits of this unchangeable unity.
When thou dost represent it to thyself in the performance
of this function, how does it appear to thee--this internal
spiritual activity?
I. My spiritual faculty appears as if in a state of internal
motion, swiftly passing from one point to another;--in
short, as an extended line. A definite thought makes a
point in this line.
Spirit. And why as an extended line?
I. Can I give a reason for that beyond the circle of which
I cannot go without at the same time overstepping the
limits of my own existence 1 It is so, absolutely. Spirit. Thus, then, does a particular act of thy conscious-
ness appear to thee. But what shape then is assumed, not
by thy produced, but by thy inherited, knowledge, of which
all specific thought is but the revival and farther definition?
--how does this present itself to thee? Under what image
does it appear?
I. Evidently as something in which one may draw lines
and make points in all directions, namely, as space.
Spirit. Now then, it will be entirely clear to thee, how
that, which really proceeds from thyself, may nevertheless,
appear to thee as an existence external to thyself,--nay,
must necessarily appear so.
Thou hast penetrated to the true source of the presenta-
tion of things out of thyself. This presentation is not per-
ception, for thou perceivest thyself only;--as little is it
thought, for things do not appear to thee as mere results of
thought. It is an actual, and indeed absolute and immediate consciousness of an existence out of thyself, just as per-
ception is an immediate consciousness of thine own condi-
tion. Do not permit thyself to be perplexed by sophists and
half-philosophers; things do not appear to thee through any
representation;--of the thing that exists, and that can exist,
thou art immediately conscious;--and there is no other
thing than that of which thou art conscious. Thou thyself
art the thing; thou thyself, by virtue of thy finitude--the
innermost law of thy being--art thus presented before thy-
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? 294
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
self, and projected out of thyself; and all that thou perceiv-
est out of thyself is still--thyself only. This consciousness
has been well named Intuition^ In all consciousnes I con-
template myself, forT am myself:--to the subjective, con-
scious being, consciousness is self-contemplation. And the
objective, that which is contemplated and of which I am
conscious, is also myself,--the same self which contemplates,
but now floating as an objective presentation before the
subjective. In this respect, consciousness is an active retro-
spect of my own intuitions; an observation of myself from
my own position; a projection of myself out of myself by
means of the only mode of action which is properly mine,--
perception. I am a living faculty of vision. I see (conscious-
ness) my own vision (the thing of which lam conscious. )
Hence this object is also thoroughly transparent to_thy_
mind's eye, because it is thy mind itself. Thou dividest,
limitest, determinest, the possible forms of things, and the
relations of these forms, previous to all perception . No
wonder,--for in so doing thou dividest, limitest, and deter-
minest thine own knowledge, which undoubtedly is suffi-
ciently known to thee. Thus does a knowledge of things
become possible. It is not in the things, and cannot pro-
ceed out of them. It proceeds from thee, and is indeed
thine own nature.
There is no outward sense, for there is no outward per-
ception. There is, however, an outward intuition;--not of
things, but this outward intuition--this knowledge appar-
ently external to the subjective being, and hovering before
it,--is itself the thing, and there is no other. By means of
this outward intuition are perception and sense regarded
as external. It remains eternally true, for it is proved,--
that I see or feel a surface,--my sight or feeling takes the
shape of the sight or feeling of a surface. Space,--illumina-
ted, transparent, palpable, penetrable space,--the purest
image of my knowledge, is not seen, but is an intuitive pos-
session of my own mind; in it even my faculty of vision it-
self is contained. The light is not out of, but in me, and I
myself am the light. Thou hast already answered my quest-
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
295
ion, "How dost thou know of thy sensations, of thy seeing,
feeling, &c. ? " by saying that thou hast an immediate know-
ledge or consciousness of them. Now, perhaps, thou wilt be
able to define more exactly this immediate consciousness
of sensation.
I. It must be a two-fold consciousness. Sensation is it- \self an immediate consciousness; for I am sensible of my
own sensation. But from this there arises no knowledge of
outward existence, but only the feeling of my own state. I
am however, originally, not merely a sensitive, but also an
intuitive being; not merely a practical being, but also
an intelligence. I intuitively contemplate my sensation
itself, and thus there arises from myself and my own nature,
the cognition of an existence. Sensation becomes transform-
ed into its own object; my affections, as red, smooth, and
the like, into a something red, smooth, &c. out of myself; and
this something, and my relative sensation, I intuitively con-//' itemplate in space, because the intuition itself is space.
Thus does it become clear why I believe that I see or feel
surfaces, which, in fact, I neither see nor feeL I intuitively
regard my own sensation of sight or touch, as the sight or touch of a surface. y'
Spirit. Thou hast well understood me, or rather thyself.
I. But now it is not at all by means of an inference,
either recognised or unrecognised, from the principle of
causality, that the thing is originated for me; it floats im-
mediately before me, and is presented to my consciousness
without any process of reasoning. I cannot say, as I have
formerly said, that perception becomes transformed into a
something perceivable, for the perceivable, as such, has pre-
cedence in consciousness. It is not with an affection of my-
self, as red, smooth, or the like, that consciousness begins,
but with a red, smooth object out of myself.
Spirit. If, however, thou wert obliged to explain what is
red, smooth, and the like, couldst thou possibly make any
other reply than that it was that by which thou wert affect-
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? 2! )C
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
ed in a certain manner that thou namest red, smooth, &c. ?
I. Certainly not,--if you were to ask me, and I were to
enter upon the question and attempt an explanation. But
originally no one asks me the question, nor do I ask it of
myself. I forget myself entirely, and lose myself in my in-
tuition of the object; become conscious, not of my own state,
but only of an existence out of myself. Red, green, and the
like, are properties of the thing; it is red or green, and this
is all. There can be no farther explanation, any more than
there can be a farther explanation of these affections in me,
on which we have already agreed. This is most obvious in
the sensation of sight. Colour appears as something out of
myself; and the common understanding of man, if left to it-
self, and without farther reflection, would scarcely be per-
suaded to describe red, green, &c. as that which excited
within him a specific affection.
Spirit. But, doubtless, it would if asked regarding sweet
or sour. It is not our business at present to inquire whe-
ther the impression made by means of sight be a pure sen-
sation, or whether it may be not rather be a middle term
between sensation and intuition, and the bond by which
they are united in our minds. But I admit thy assertion,
and it is extremely welcome to me. Thou canst, indeed,
lose thyself in the intuition; and unless thou directest par-
ticular attention to thyself, or takest an interest in some
external action, thou dost so, naturally and necessarily. This
is the remark to which the defenders of a groundless con-
sciousness of external things appeal, when it is shown that
the principle of causality, by which the existence of such
things might be inferred, exists only in ourselves; they deny
that any such inference is made, and, in so far as they refer
to actual consciousness in particular cases, this cannot be
disputed. These same defenders, when the nature of intui-
tion is explained to them from the laws of intelligence it-
self, themselves draw this inference anew, and never weary
of repeating that there must be something external to us
which compels us to this belief.
I. Do not trouble thyself about them at present, but in-
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? BOOK IL KNOWLEDGE.
297
struct me. I have no preconceived opinion, and seek for
truth only.
Spirit. Nevertheless, intuition necessarily proceeds from
the perception of thine own state, although thou art not al-
ways clearly conscious of this perception, as thou hast al-
ready seen. Even in that consciousness in which thou losest
thyself in the object, there is always something which is only
possible by means of an unrecognised reference to thyself,
and close observation of thine own state.
I. Consequently, at all times and places the conscious-
ness of existence out of myself must be accompanied by an
unobserved consciousness of myself?
Spirit. Just so.
I. The former being determined through the latter,--as
it actually is?
Spirit. That is my meaning.
I. Prove this to me, and I shall be satisfied.
Spirit. Dost thou imagine only things in general as
placed in space, or each of them individually as occupying a
certain portion of space?
/. The latter,--each thing has its determinate bulk.
Spirit. And do different things occupy the same part of
space?
I. By no means; they exclude each other. They are be-
side, over or under, behind or before, each other;--nearer to
me, or further from me. ,
Spirit. And how dost thou come to this measurement
and arrangement of them in space? Is it by sensation?
I. How could that be, since space itself is no sensation?
Spirit. Or intuition?
I. This cannot be. Intuition is immediate and infal-
lible. What is contained in it does not appear as produced,
and cannot deceive. But I must train myself to estimate,
measure and deliberate upon, the size of an object, its dis-
tance, its position with respect to other objects. It is a
truth known to every beginner, that we originally see all
objects in the same line; that we learn to estimate their
greater or lesser distances; that the child attempts to grasp
Qa
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? 2. 98
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
distant objects as if they lay immediately before his eyes;
and that one born blind who should suddenly receive sight
would do the same. This conception of distances is there-
fore a judgment;--no intuition, but an arrangement of my
different intuitions by means of the understanding, I may
err in my estimate of the size, distance, &c. of an object; and
the so-called optical deceptions are not deceptions of sight,
but erroneous judgments formed concerning the size of the
object, concerning the size of its different parts in relation
to each other, and consequently concerning its true figure
and its distance from me and from other objects. But it
does really exist in space, as I contemplate it, and the
colours which I see in it are likewise really seen by me;--
and here there is no deception.
Spirit. And what then is the principle of this judgment,
--to take the most distinct and easy case,--thy judgment
of the proximity or distance of objects,--how dost thou esti-
mate this distance?
I. Doubtless by the greater strength or feebleness of im-
pressions otherwise equal. I see before me two objects of
the same red colour. The one whose colour I see more vi-
vidly, I regard as the nearer: that whose colour seems to me
fainter, as the more distant, and as so much the more dis-
tant as the colour seems fainter.
Spirit. Thus thou dost estimate the distance according to
the degree of strength or weakness in the sensation; and
this strength or weakness itself,--dost thou also estimate it?
I.
Obviously only in so far as I take note of my own af-
fections, and even of very slight differences in these. --Thou
hast conquered! All consciousness of objects out of myself
is determined by the clearness and exactitude of my con-
sciousness of my own states, and in this consciousness there
is always a conclusion drawn from the effect in myself to a
cause out of myself.
Spirit. Thou art quickly vanquished; and I must now
myself carry forward, in thy place, the controversy against
myself. My argument can only apply to those cases in
which an actual and deliberate estimate of the uise, dia-
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
299
tance, and position, of objects takes place, and in which
thou art conscious of making such an estimate. Thou wilt
however admit that this is by no means the common case,
and that for the most part thou rather becomest conscious
of the size, distance, &c. of an object at the very same un-
divided moment in which thou becomest conscious of the
object itself.
I. When once we learn to estimate the distances of ob-
jects by the strength of the impression, the rapidity of this
judgment is merely the consequence of its frequent exercise.
I have learnt, by a lifelong experience, rapidly to observe
the strength of the impression and thereby to estimate the
distance. My present conception is founded upon a combi-
nation, formerly made, of sensation, intuition, and previous
judgments; although at the moment I am conscious only of
the present conception. I no longer apprehend generally
red, green, or the like, out of myself, but a red or a green at
this, that, or the other distance; but this last addition is merely
a renewal of a judgment formerly arrived at by deliberate
reflection.
Spirit. Has it not then, at length, become clear to thee
whether thou discoverest the existence of things out of thy-
self by intuition, or by reasoning, or both,--and in how far
by each of these?
J. Perfectly; and I believe that I have now attained the
fullest insight into the origin of my conceptions of objects
out of myself.
1. I am absolutely conscious of myself, because I am this
I,--myself; and that partly as a practical being,
partly as an intelligence. The first consciousness is
Sensation, the second Intuition--unlimited space.
2. I cannot comprehend the unlimited, for I am finite. I
therefore set apart, in thought, a certain portion of
universal space, and place the former in a certain re-
lation to the latter.
3. The measure of this limited portion of space is the ex-
tent of my own sensibility, according to a principle
which may be thus expressed :--Whatever affects me
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? 300
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
in such or such a manner is to be placed, in space, in
such or such relations to the other things which
-->affect me.
The properties or attributes of the object proceed from
the perception of my own internal state; the space which it
fills, from intuitive contemplation. By a process of thought,
both are conjoined; the former being added to the latter.
It is so, assuredly, as we have said before:--that which is
merely a state or affection of myself, by being transferred or
projected into space becomes an attribute of the object; but
it is so projected into space, not by intuition, but by thought,
by measuring, regulating thought. Not that this act is to
be regarded as an intellectual discovery or creation; but
only as a more exact definition, by means of thought, of
something which is already given in sensation and intuition,
independent of all thought.
Spirit. Whatever affects me in such or such a manner is
to be placed in such or such relations:--thus dost thou rea-
son in defining and arranging objects in space. But does
not the declaration that a thing affects thee in a certain
manner, include the assumption that it affects thee gene-
rally?
I. Undoubtedly.
Spirit. And is any presentation of an external object pos-
sible, which is not in this manner limited and defined in
space?
/. No; for no object exists in space generally, but each
one in a determinate portion of space.
Spirit. So that in fact, whether thou art conscious of it or
not, every external object is assumed by thee as affecting
thyself, as certainly as it is assumed as filling a determinate
portion of space?
/. That follows, certainly.
Spirit. And what kind of presentation is that of an object
affecting thyself?
I. Evidently a thought; and indeed a thought founded
on the principle of causality already mentioned. I see now,
still more clearly, that the consciousness of the object is en-
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
301
grafted on my self-consciousness in two ways,--partly by in-
tuition, and partly by thought founded on the principle of
causality. The object, however strange it may seem, is at
once the immediate object of my consciousness, and the re-
sult of deliberate thought.
Spirit. In different respects, however. Thou must be
capable of being conscious of this thought of the object?
I. Doubtless; although usually I am not so.
Spirit. Therefore to thy passive state, thy affection, thou
dost superadd in thought an activity out of thyself, such as
thou hast above described in the case of thy thought accord-
ing to the principle of causality?
I. Yes.
Spirit. And with the same meaning and the same valid-
ity as thou didst describe it above. Thou thinkest so once
for all, and must think so; thou canst not alter it, and canst
know nothing more than that thou dost think so?
I. Nothing more. We have already investigated all this
thoroughly.
Spirit. I said, thou dost assume an object:--in so far as
it is so assumed, it is a product of thy own thought only?
I. Certainly, for this follows from the former.
Spirit. And what now is this object which is thus as-
sumed according to the principle of causality?
I. A power out of myself.
Spirit. Which is neither revealed to thee by sensation
nor by intuition?
I. No; I always remain perfectly conscious that I do not
perceive it immediately, but only by means of its manifesta-
tions; although I ascribe to it an existence independent of
myself. I am affected, there must therefore be something that affects me,--such is my thought.
Spirit. The object which is revealed to thee in intuition,
and that which thou assumest by reasoning, are thus very
different things. That which is actually and immediately
present before thee, spread out in space, is the object of in-
tuition; the internal force within it, which is not present
before thee, but whose existence thou art led to assert only
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? 302
THE VuCATION OF MAN.
by a process of reasoning, is the object of the understanding.
I. The internal force within it, saidst thou;--and now I
bethink me, thou art right. I place this force also in space,
and superadd it to the mass by which I regard space as filled.
Spirit. And what then, according to thy view, is the na-
ture of the relation subsisting between this force and the
mass?
/. The mass, with its properties, is itself the result and
manifestation of the inward force. This force has two modes
of operation:--one whereby it maintains itself, and assumes
this particular form in which it appears; another upon me,
by which it affects me in a particular manner.
Spirit. Thou hast formerly sought for another substratum
for sensible attributes or qualities than the space which
contains them; something besides this space, permanent
amid the vicissitudes of perpetual change.
I. Yes, and this permanent substratum is found. It is
? . force itself. This remains for ever the same amid all
change, and it is this which assumes and supports all sen-
sible attributes or qualities.
Spirit. Let us cast a glance back on all that we have now
established. Thou feelest thyself in a certain state, affected
in a certain manner, which thou callest red, smooth, sweet,
and so on. Of this thou knowest nothing, but simply that
thou feelest, and feelest in this particular manner. Or dost
thou know more than this? Is there in mere sensation any-
thing more than mere sensation?
I. No.
Spirit. Further, it is by thine own nature as an intelli-
gence, that there is space spread out before thee;--or dost
thou know anything more than this concerning space?
/. By no means.
Spirit. Between that state of simple sensation, and this
space which is spread out before thee, there is not the
smallest connexion except that they are both present in thy
consciousness. Or dost thou perceive any other connexion
between them?
/. I see none.
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
303
Spirit. But thou art a thinking, as well as a sensitive and
intuitive, being; and yet neither dost thou know anything
more of this matter, than that so thou art. Thou dost not
merely feel thy sensible state,--thou canst also conceive of
it in thought; but it affords thee no complete thought; thou
art compelled to add something to it, an external founda-
tion, a foreign power. Or dost thou know more of it than
that thou dost so think, and that thou art compelled so to
think?
I. I can know nothing more respecting it. I cannot pro-
ceed beyond my thought; for simply because I think it
does it become my thought and fall under the inevitable
laws of my being.
Spirit. Through this thought of thine, there first arises a
connexion between thy own state which thou feelest, and the space which thou dost intuitively contemplate; thou
supposest in the latter the foundation of the former. Is it
not so?
J. It is so. Thou hast clearly proved that I produce this
connexion in my consciousness by my own thought only,
and that such a connexion is neither directly felt, nor in-
tuitively perceived. But of any connexion beyond the lim-
its of my consciousness I cannot speak; I cannot even de-
scribe such a connexion in any manner of way; for even in
speaking of it I must be conscious of it; and, since this con-
sciousness can only be a thought, the connexion itself could
be nothing more than a thought; and this is precisely the
same connexion which occurs in my ordinary natural con-
sciousness, and no other. I cannot proceed a hair's-breadth
beyond this consciousness, any more than I can spring out
of myself. All attempts to conceive of an absolute con-
nexion between things in themselves, and the / in itself, are
but attempts to ignore our own thought,--a strange forget-
fulness of the undeniable fact that we can have no thought
without having--thought it. A thing in itself is a thought;
--this, namely, that there is a great thought which yet no
man has ever comprehended.
Spirit. From thee then I need fear no objection to the
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? 304
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
principle now established:--thatjour consciousness of things
out of ourselves is absolutely nothing more than the product of
our own presentative facuttyj and that, with regard to exter-
nal things, we can produce in this way nothing more than
simply what we know, i. \e. what is established by means of
our consciousness itself, aVthe result of our being possessed
of consciousness generally, and of this particular determinate
consciousness subject to such and such laws. I. I cannot refute this. It is so.
Spirit. Thou canst not then object to the bolder state-
ment of the same proposition; that in that which we call
knowledge and observation of outward things, we at all
times recognise and observe ourselves only; and that in all
our consciousness we know of nothing whatever but of our-
selves and of our own determinate states.
I say, thou wilt not be able to advance aught against this
proposition; for if the external world generally arises for us
only through our own consciousness, what is particular and
multiform in this external world can arise in no other way;
and if the connexion between what is external to us and
ourselves is merely a connexion in our own thought, then is
the connexion of the multifarious objects of the external
world among themselves undoubtedly this and no other. As
clearly as I have now pointed out to thee the origin of this
system of objects beyond thyself and their relation to thee,
could I also show thee the law according to which there
arises an infinite multiplicity of such objects, mutually con-
nected, reciprocally determining each other with rigid ne-
cessity, and thus forming a complete world-system, as thou
thyself hast well described it; and I only spare myself this
task because I find that thou hast already admitted the con-
clusion for the sake of which alone I should have under-
taken it.
I. I see it all, and must assent to it.
Spirit. And with this insight, mortal, be free, and for ever
released from the fear which has degraded and tormented
thee!