In 1862, Bis-
marck had attained the supreme conviction that he could
both save his beloved Prussia and solve the German pro-
blem, and that no one else could do both.
marck had attained the supreme conviction that he could
both save his beloved Prussia and solve the German pro-
blem, and that no one else could do both.
Robertson - Bismarck
'
And he stated his own theory of political government when
he said:--
'History provides us with the most brilliant and grand,
though not the most beneficial, phenomenon in a special
degree under the mark of absolutism, but we can find more
numerous examples of lasting political prosperity and
power in States subject to the influence of a hereditary
aristocracy . . . the brilliant memories of the German
Empire point to a powerful Imperial nobility. The
mediaeval prosperity of our cities began to wither at the
time when the patrician families went down before the
pressure of the Guilds . . . England trod a happier path;
she had no Richelieu who cut off the heads in which a
hereditary wisdom resides to an exceptional degree. The
B. E
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? 66
BISMARCK
character of the English Revolution is Freedom, of the
French, Equality . . . French Equality is the will-of-the-
wisp, daughter of Envy and Greed, pursued without
success by that richly gifted nation for sixty years through
blood and madness. Let us refuse to join in that pursuit
on the false supposition that it is popular. '
Radowitz's resignation and the collapse of his policy
filled Bismarck with such joy that he danced on his chair
round his room three times. The humiliating convention
of Olmiitz occasioned the most weighty and remarkable
speech he had yet made. Nothing was easier, he pointed
out, than to make war; but, with an indirect allusion to
Frederick the Great:--
'The one sound basis of a great Power which differen-
tiates it essentially from the petty State, is political egoism
and not romanticism, and it is unworthy of a great State
to fight for what is not connected with its interest. . . .
Woe to the statesman who at this time has not sought a
reason for going to war which after the war will no less
stand the test. '
He rejected the idea that honour required Prussia ' to
play the Don Quixote all over Germany on behalf of
sickly demagogues, who imagined their local constitutions
in danger. ' And then he came to close grips with his real
gravamen against the whole policy of the Erfurt Union.
The Union involved nothing less than the destruction
of Prussia's independence, not by the princes, but by the
parliaments of the petty States. A war by Prussia to main-
tain the Union could only recall to his mind the English-
man who overpowered the sentinel in order that he might
vindicate the right of every free Briton to commit suicide
in the sentry-box.
In this speech Bismarck, for all its lucid trenchancy of
expression, was groping his way to settled principles of
foreign policy. It was not the interest of Prussia to fight
'as the shameful ally of democracy' against Austria: she
could attain her objects by co-operation with, not by
opposition to, Austria, and the identity of Prussian and
Austrian interests made war unjustifiable in 1850. Bis-
marck was also answering in advance the critics who have
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? THE JUNKER POLITICIAN 67
urged that twenty years later it was this same Bismarck
who practically carried out Radowitz's programme--the
unification of North Germany under Prussia's presidency
--and only carried it out at the price Radowitz was not
allowed to pay in 1850, war with Austria and her allies,
the German kingdoms. The criticism ignores the deep-
seated grounds of Bismarck's opposition to Radowitz's
policy. In 1850, Prussia's one possible ally was Liberalism
in Germany: a Prussian victory would be not a victory
for Prussia's independence and position as a great state,
but for Liberalism. The Liberals, not Prussia, would give
the law to Prussia and Germany. But war was only a
continuance of policy--a policy based on specific Prussian
interests--to enable Prussia to establish the relations on
which she wished to live in peace with her neighbours and
rivals. The last thing that the Bismarck of 1850 or of.
1866 desired or regarded as a real Prussian interest, was
the triumph of Liberalism. Moreover, in 1850 Radowitz,
in Bismarck's judgment, miscalculated. Behind Austria
and her German allies stood the sinister strength of a
Russia which had struck down Hungary, and was about to
impose its will in Schleswig-Holstein. Across the Rhine
was a revolutionary France, ready to intervene. In 1866
France's neutrality had been secured, a crippled Russia
was benevolently neutral, Italy was Prussia's ally. A vic-
torious Prussia would annex Schleswig-Holstein and more.
In brief, between the statecraft of Radowitz and that of
Bismarck there was no identity in temper, methods,
principles, or aims. The two men interpreted the interest
of Prussia and of Germany as differently as two opposed
minds could.
In 1850, his whole argument hinged on the contention
that the Union of Erfurt was a false step in the wrong
direction, and rested on the fundamental and explicit
assumption that the historic Prussia could secure 'her
interests and her honour' by the loyal co-operation of
Austria and Prussia. The words were Bismarck's, but the
voice was the voice of the Gerlachs and the cosmopolitan
Conservatives who saw in a renewed Holy Alliance with
Austria the salvation of Prussia and the defeat of the
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BISMARCK
Revolution. In 1850 ' the terrible Junker ' had not pene-
trated to the heart either of Germany or of Austria, nor had
he defined for himself, except in a superficial and conven-
tional way, ' the interest, the egoism' which ought to be
the sole basis of Prussian policy. But, as yet, he was not
aware that his knowledge was very limited and his inter-
pretation shallow and retarding.
Generally for Germany, the restoration of the old Diet
in 1851 registered two decisive defeats--the defeat of the
Revolution, and of Prussia. Liberalism in alliance with
Nationalism set out, through revolution, to achieve uni-
fication, and to create a truly federal organisation with
democratic and responsible parliamentary government,
under an imperial and limited monarchy, the whole de-
fined and embodied in a written constitution. The
Liberal majority in the National Assembly at Frankfurt had
rejected the programme of Radical Republicanism. It had
also rejected the programme of the Great German Party
(Gross-Deutschland). The German provinces of Austria,
included in the old Bund, were excluded. The organi-
sation of the excluded Austria was left to Austria, and the
political and fiscal relations between the new German
Empire (KleinrDeutschland) and the reconstituted Austrian
Empire were reserved for later diplomatic arrangements.
But the authors of the Constitution of 1848 contemplated
not merely a political alliance, but a spiritual and moral
union wider and deeper than the formal bargain of a
treaty--the creation of a central Germanic Europe, finding
its expression in the material framework of constitutional
and economic organisation, and guaranteed by a com-
munity of purpose in the intellectual and political life of
two self-governing and democratic empires.
This comprehensive scheme, the work of high-minded
and able men, was a noble and imaginative effort in con-
structive statesmanship, which bears the stamp of the
idealism and an inspiring belief in the capacities of a race
for achieving salvation when men build on the uplands,
and not the lowlands, of human endeavour. What con-
structive statesmanship, indeed, has ever achieved per-
manent results on the theory that the spiritual and in-
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? THE JUNKER POLITICIAN 69
tellectual consciousness of nationhood can be satisfied or
stifled by economic and material well-being alone? Had
the unification of 1848 been given a fair trial it would
have moulded the German mind and directed German
destinies and ambitions into paths of self-development
of incalculable benefit to Germany and the world.
Its failure was a tragedy for German and European
civilisation.
That failure is commonly ascribed to the academic
amateurism of its authors, who wasted their time in thresh-
ing out fundamental rights when apparently they should
have been cutting off heads or shooting down opposition,
or lynching the King of Prussia. Such criticism is really
amateur, Philistine, and ignorant of what revolution by
Liberal methods from an old to a new system implies. As
if the task of devising a federal unification of the Germany
of 1848 and of solving the German problem could have
been accomplished by any brain or any action in a few
weeks, least of all by force.
In 1866, Bismarck with the experience of 1848 and
twenty years of earnest constructive thought by many
brains at his disposal, with Austria and her German allies
prostrate, with a Prussian monarch wholly on his side and
a victorious Prussian army at his beck and call, took ten
months to work out, impose and bring into operation a
unification, not of all Germany, but of the north alone--
and Bismarck had been preparing for the task for four
unrelenting years.
The remarkable feature of 1848, in reality, was the
rapidity with which in the smoke and dust of a bewildering
revolution the liberal majority hammered out by argument
and under the conditions of government by public meeting,
a scheme of unification that probed deeper and was more
complete than the constitution of 1867. The men who
could accomplish that, in spite of their lack of training in
public affairs, were not unfitted to be leaders and teachers
in self-government, or to make the policy and control the
destinies of a great nation.
What they did lack was an army and the executive
organs of government, and before they could create them
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BISMARCK
they were crushed not by Germany, nor the princes, but
by Russia and Austria--the two foreign States to which
Liberalism and Nationalism, as Germans understood them,
were anathema. The hero of the reaction was Nicholas i. ,
without whose aid Schwarzenberg and Windischgratz
could not have mastered Prague and Vienna, nor dictated
the surrenders of Vilagos, Olmiitz, and Novara. Liberal-
ism went down. Radical Republicanism does not appear
again as a force to be reckoned with, except perhaps in
sporadic and convulsive efforts in Wurttemberg. But
Liberalism was not killed, neither was its twin, Nationalism.
The defeat and failure of Prussia--also at the hands of
Russia and Austria--was the second outstanding fact in
1851. Prussia, unlike the Liberals of Frankfurt, had both
an army and executive organs of government. Unlike
Austria and almost every other German State, she had not
been mastered by the Revolution. The strength of the
monarchy and the grip of the royal autocracy on the army
and the governing class were as convincingly revealed, as
after the disaster of Jena. But from the March Days until
Olmiitz Prussia was hopelessly divided. The Liberals
under G. von Vincke, the Moderate Conservatives under
Brandenburg, the Constitutionalists led by Radowitz.
the Junker Camarilla, under the Gerlachs, the Militarists
thirsting for a coup d'Etat in the manner of Schwarzenberg,
Windischgratz and Haynau, the pure Particularists exem-
plified in Prince William, ' the Cartridge Prince,' the heir
to the throne, to whom first and foremost Prussia was a
Grossmacht, which must fight for honour and independence,
the Poles in Prussian Poland crying out for national inde-
pendence, the clericals from the Rhenish districts to whom
the secular omnipotence of the autocracy was as dangerous
as the secular atheism of the Revolution, and the Com-
munists of the Vorwarts, founded by Karl Marx from
Prussian Trier and Engels from Prussian Barmen--the
men who created both the socialism of Lassalle and Bebel
--all these whirled in vortices of varying strength round
the King, who could have led if he could have made up his
mind, or could have been deprived of a mind to make up
But Frederick William persistently refused either to frame
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? THE JUNKER POLITICIAN 71
a policy for himself or to carry through a policy ready-
made by any one else. The result was that Prussia failed
to satisfy any single party at home, or the German dynas-
ties and Austria without. The monarchical state cut a
sorry figure in the March Days, in the Schleswig-Holstein
fiasco, in the imposition of a badly drafted, inconsistent,
and mongrel constitution, in the refusal of the Imperial
Crown, in the hasty and ill-prepared Union schemes, in
the Hesse-Cassel business, in the desertion of Radowitz,
in the defiance of, and undignified surrender to, Austria at
Olmutz. Prussia, in short, failed everybody in turn, and
all parties had to drink of the bitter cup that her monarch
ceaselessly brewed. Her prestige both at home and abroad
had sunk to'a low level, and the fall was not arrested in
1851.
These three years had, moreover, laid bare three impres-
sive facts: the categorical refusal of Austria to allow
Prussia either to usurp the Austrian leadership or to exer-
cise an independent initiative in a limited and defined
German sphere, the jealousy and fear of Prussia felt by the
middle States in particular, the appeal to Prussia, as the
sole hope, by all to whom the old system was intolerable.
All three were the expression of forces and ambitions,
separate in their origin and ends from the struggle between
Liberalism and Conservatism, or between the ideals of the
national and the dynastic and territorial State. Hanover,
Bavaria, Wurttemburg, and Saxony--the four kingdoms
--did not take up and then desert the scheme of the Erfurt
Union from fear of Liberalism or attachment to Conser-
vatism. The denunciation of Prussia as aiming at a
League of Secession (Sonderbund) was made, curiously
enough, in the name of German unity--unity through
the dynasties--but Austria and the middle States increas-
ingly felt that the Union would only end as the Zollverein
had done, in an organisation controlled by its most power-
ful member. While Bismarck saw in the scheme the stain
of a sinister surrender to democracy, the Four Kingdoms
saw in it the sinister supremacy of the militarist police
State of Prussia--an instrument for mediatising the poli-
tical independence of the sovereign princedoms; and the
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? 72
BISMARCK
truculent pride of Prussian Junkertum was more terrifying
than the levelling doctrines of Prussian Liberals and South
German Democrats. It was not only on the Liberal benches
of the Landtag that Bismarck's stark Prussianism was
neither forgiven nor forgotten, and his defiant prediction
that the day would come when Prussian Junkertum would
justify its claims, was not a day desired at Dresden, Munich,
Herrenhausen, and Stuttgart--least of all at Vienna. The
Liberals had turned a suppliant appeal for Prussia's
strength. To the profound relief of the middle States
and of Austria, Prussia refused to fight either for herself
or for anybody else. She meekly agreed to re-enter the
restored confederation, and to accept as a principle of
conduct that co-operation with Austria, which since 1815
had been simply a euphemism for subordination and self-
effacement.
The Austrians and the middle States miscalculated,
because they ignored the Revolution and its results. The
Prussia that re-entered the dynastic family party, termed
the Federal Diet at Frankfurt, was not the Prussia of 1847.
Since 1851 Prussia had a written constitution, a Parliament
of Two Houses, a franchise, if a restricted one, a budget
which had to be voted by the Lower House, even if she
had not been given a ministry responsible to the Landtag.
In a word, she had the organs through which the consti-
tutional party could organise, develop, and focus the shat-
tered Liberalism of 1848 and link it up with the shattered
Liberalism from the Memel to the Donnersberg. And
neither the Camarilla nor the Haynaus, neither the Stahls of
the Kreuzzeitung, nor a Schwarzenberg, nor a Bach could
prevent the Prussian intellectuals from thinking, or could
muzzle the Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit--the freedom to
teach and to learn? of the universities, or prohibit men
like Gneist, Sybel, Virchow, Vincke, Forckenbeck, Unruh,
from working and corresponding with a Bennigsen, a
Roggenbach, a von der Pfordten, a Bassermann, or a
Stockmar in Hanover, Bavaria, Baden and Coburg. More
dangerous still, they could not keep even the Junkers from
reading and thinking, and one Junker in particular, Otto
von Bismarck-Schonhausen.
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? THE JUNKER POLITICIAN 73
It was no less a miscalculation to infer that the Euro-
pean situation would retain the features of 1848-51--a
happy and 'healthy' antipathy to revolution and a magic
power to re-establish reaction, that Russian absolutism
would invariably be proof against Austrian ingratitude
and treachery, that Italy would fail to produce a states-
man, and always end in a Novara, that the young and new
Emperor of Austria, Francis Joseph, would exchange dy-
nastic selfishness for wisdom, that Prussia would always be
governed by a Frederick William iv. and a Manteuffel, and
be hypnotised by a Camarilla, and that the Eastern Ques-
tion and Schleswig-Holstein would not again trouble the
Chancelleries. Liberalism and Nationalism were like the
gout, always causing local pains, neglect or mistreatment
of which would drive them into attacking the heart.
In May 1851, Germany could read that his Majesty the
King of Prussia had been pleased to appoint Herr von
Bismarck-Schonhausen to be Councillor of Legation, and
on July 15 to be the Prussian federal representative and
plenipotentiary, at the Frankfurt Diet. Germany knew
little and cared less about the revived Diet. It was on the
point of forgetting Bismarck. That an irreconcilable
Junker should represent reactionary Prussia in the obsolete
Federal Diet was in the nature of things. The making of
a statesman who would solve the German problem was the
last result Germany looked for from Junkertum, Prussia,
and Frankfurt.
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? CHAPTER III
THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN, 1851-1862
? I. Bismarck at Frankfurt, 1851-1859
The eleven years from May 1851, when Bismarck was sent
to Frankfurt, to September 1862, when he became Minister-
President of Prussia, are not great years in the history of
Prussia, but they are great years in the history of Europe,
in which the stage was prepared for the drama in which
Bismarck made himself the leading figure. In the de-
velopment of his personality, the crystallisation of the
principles of his statecraft, they are the central, critical,
and decisive period.
Emphasis of this conclusion does not imply that in 1862,
when this second phase ended, Bismarck had already
reached the mastery of technique and the maturity of ex-
perience and conviction which high and responsible office
alone could consummate; nor that in 1862 his develop-
ment was arrested and that he had nothing more to learn;
still less that he came into power with a cut-and-dried
programme, and merely required the opportunity and the
political authority to carry it out. Such a conclusion
would ignore the opportunism, which he rightly and
proudly regarded as one of the most conspicuous features
--one of the idies mattresses of his statecraft--and rob of all
significance another and no less justifiable claim that he
was a learner all his life.
The results of this decade must be sought in the
subtle, gradual, but profound changes in Bismarck him-
self. They can only be measured by comparing the man
who went to Frankfurt with the man who deliberately
accepted the challenge that the Minister-Presidency
thrust upon him in 1862. Frankfurt provided the
74
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 75
indispensable experience for interpreting the full signi-
ficance of the German problem for Germany and Prussia.
The ministerial posts at Petersburg and Paris enabled him
to complete the experience by correlating it to the know-
ledge of the political conditions of the European situation.
This knowledge of the tides, rocks, shallows, and winds he
had hitherto conspicuously lacked. To-day we are able
to trace from original and unimpeachable sources the
process of its acquisition and the sediment of conviction
that it slowly deposited. By 1862 he had decided that
there was a German, and not merely a Prussian, problem
to be solved; that the negative and defensive Junkertum
of 1848-51 would not do, and that Prussia must find a
Prussian solution that was also applicable to Germany.
A new diplomacy, new principles of action, a new atti-
tude of mind, and a new interpretation of Prussia's interest
therefore, were imperatively required to rescue her from
the blunders of the past and the menace of the future--
surrender to Liberalism or surrender to Austria.
Last and not least, the man Bismarck became inspired
with the ambition to devise and execute the new policy.
The growth, scope, and quality of a man's ambition are
always as decisive as the increase of his knowledge and the
development of his intellectual powers.
In 1862, Bis-
marck had attained the supreme conviction that he could
both save his beloved Prussia and solve the German pro-
blem, and that no one else could do both. Character and
creed harmonised in a final union.
The European framework throughout this critical,phase
of development is important. In 1851, the coup cPEtat at
Paris and the proclamation of the Empire in the following
year made a violent rupture in the stratification of Europe.
Henceforward the seismographs of the Chancelleries were
nervously watched for the red record of further upheavals
that would test the stability of every State. The advent
of Cavour to office and the inauguration of the Risorgi-
mento at Turin, were even more important than the down-
fall of the French Republic and the inauguration of the
neo-Caesarism at Paris, but 'the man of December,' the
sphinx without a secret, held Europe spell-bound. The
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? 76
BISMARCK
greatness and significance of Cavour were ignored or under-
rated and misinterpreted until his death revealed what
Italy and Europe had lost. The watershed of the nine-
teenth century was, in fact, crossed in the Crimean War,
in which the sound British fear of Russian autocracy and
of the terrorism of Europe by Nicholas 1. leaped into
flame. The struggle between a Liberal West and the
Russia of 1854, fought out in the Crimea, not merely in-
volved Great Britain and Russia in bitter antagonism for
two generations, but thrust the Near Eastern Question
into a prominence that it never again lost; it broke up
the entente between Austria and Russia; it brought Great
Britain and Italy together, and, curiously enough, made
an Anglo-French entente very difficult to maintain. Most
important as an immediate result was the crippling of
Russia's strength and ability to buttress up the monarchies,
legitimism and autocracy of Central Europe; the Crimean
War, the Treaty of Paris,- the death of Nicholas 1. , and the
internal situation in Russia deprived Alexander n. of the
desire or the capacity to repeat the policy of his inflexible
predecessor.
At the Congress of Paris the diplomatic salute was taken
by Napoleon in. , though Cavour compelled the nervous
diplomatists of 1856 to recognise that the Italian Question
was a malady, calling for surgery, and not for opiates and
soothing poultices. Every Foreign Office in Europe, in-
cluding that of the Vatican, was now ruefully aware that
the Near Eastern Question brought the Habsburg dynasty,
ruling over its mosaic of denationalised and submerged
races, in whom the memories of 1848 continued sullenly
to glow, into irreconcilable collision with Russia. No
Foreign Office was more painfully aware than that of the
Vatican (except, perhaps, the series of distracted ministers
who came, tried and failed at the Ball-Platz in Vienna)
that the Italian Question opened up issues far wider and of
deeper import than maintenance of the Treaties of 1815,
the continuance of the Austrian flag on the citadel at
Milan and on the Piazza di San Marco at Venice, or the
barbarism of a Bomba at Naples. Ultramontanism was
the weapon of the Papacy, and was rightly so named, for
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 77
its strength lay beyond the Western Alps, where it had
planted itself in the Tuileries, and had its unofficial legate,
the Empress, at the table and couch of the Emperor;
beyond the Northern Alps, its roots were deep in the
separatist and clerical Bavaria, in the mediaeval 'Priests'
Alley' of the Main, in Rhenish Prussia, and in Prussian
Poland, whose nobles rubbed shoulders with the Prussian
Junkers in the cabinet of the King, and whose ladies whis-
pered in the drawing-room of the Queen of Prussia.
Across the Eastern Alps, in the city of St. Stephen, what
more devoted son was there than the Habsburg who was
Apostolical King of Hungary? In these years the offen-
sive strategy was being constructed that leads from the
Proclamation of the Immaculate Conception of the
Blessed Virgin in 1854 to the Syllabus of 1864 and the
Vatican Decrees of 1870.
Liberalism and Nationalism, in their slow, but steady
renaissance from the debacle of 1848, had the constructive
and reconstructed reply of the counter-Reformation to
reckon with sooner or later. Prussia had already crossed
swords with the claims of the Roman Catholic Church as
a cosmopolitan organisation in her Rhenish Provinces in
the decade between 1830 and 1840, and had failed to
secure a decision in favour of the omnipotent and secular
State. The Kulturkampf of 1873 lay, not in the logic of
history so much as in the logic of the humanist mind, once
Austria and Austrianism had been overthrown and the
Tuileries were in flames, Napoleon an -exile at Chislehurst
and the Bourbons nerveless emigrSs at Frohsdorf. Liberal-
ism, Nationalism, and Prussianism in combination made
the Kulturkampf a foregone conclusion. But it was
Cavour, the Risorgimento, and the Liberal unification of
Italy--with the Rome of the Papacy omitted, but depen-
dent henceforward on the stability of the Second Empire
--that opened the battle by challenging the alleged right
of an ecclesiastical sovereign to bar the consummation of
Nationalism in a modern State.
The compact of Plombieres led to the Annus Mirabilis
of 1859. Magenta and Solferino, despite Villa Franca,
followed by Garibaldi's expedition of The Thousand, and
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BISMARCK
the collapse of the dynasties in Italy, set every Liberal and
Nationalist pulse beating feverishly throughout Europe.
At Kiel and Rendsburg, in the Duchies of Schleswig-
Holstein, at Posen, Warsaw, Cracow, and Lemberg in dis-
membered Poland, at Bucharest and Jassy in the Danubian
principalities, at Buda-Pesth in Hungary, no less than in
the universities and capital of a federated but disunited
Germany, the vital spark of faith and hope burned in reply
to the beacons lit in Turin, Florence, and Palermo.
'Italy's year' coincided with a change of sovereign at
Berlin, when Prince William became regent for his brother
(October 26, 1858), and with the advent of a Liberal
Ministry in Great Britain, whose action quietly but de-
cisively checkmated an Austrian counter-stroke against
the unification of the Italian South with the North.
The intellectual movement was no less impressive. It
was the period when the modern mind of the nineteenth
century was being made. The year 1859 is memorable for
Darwin's Origin of Species, but between the years 1854
and 1870 the annals of Europe are studded with famous
names and remarkable achievements in every department
of intellectual and imaginative effort--Tennyson, Brown-
ing, Swinburne, Stubbs, Herbert Spencer, Carlyle, Lister,
Clerk-Maxwell and the Pre-Raphaelites in England,
Pasteur, Victor Hugo, Taine, Flaubert, Sainte-Beuve and
the Barbizon School in France; Virchow, Helmholtz,
Mommsen, Sybel, Droysen, Wagner, Brahms and Karl
Marx in Germany. And if the United States had done
nothing but produce Abraham Lincoln, Grant and Lee,
it had accomplished much. Had the United States not
proclaimed in memory of ' its honoured dead . . . that we
here highly resolve . . . that government of the people, by
the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth'?
Europe since 1849 had been gripped in the years of
Arctic reaction. Warm water was once more steadily
flowing beneath the frozen surface, and great fissures
were now cracking through; the floes, loosened and
sapped from beneath were grinding, packing, breaking
away, and toppling over. 'The God of battles,' Bismarck
had predicted in 1849, 'would throw the iron dice that
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN
would decide. ' The first casts of those iron dice had been
thrown at Inkerman, the Malakoff Redoubt, and at
Solferino.
Prussia since 1851 had endured a drab and fatigued re-
action, administered by timid and second-rate ministers.
The hand of the police and the Minister of the Interior
was heavy on personal liberty, the freedom of the press,
and everything and everybody suspected of Liberal views,
which were identified with revolution. But, despite
every discouragement, the constitutional Liberals retained
their hold on the middle class, and in the Lower House of
the Landtag they consolidated a critical and earnest oppo-
sition, which in both sections of the party--the Moderates
and the Radicals--was affiliated by a common programme
with Liberalism in Hanover, the Saxon principalities,
Baden, and the more democratic South. As in Italy under
the Risorgimento official Liberalism, though without office
quietly shed the idea of reform by revolution.
The dividing lines in the opposition to the dominant
system were determined rather by the differences between
a moderate Liberalism and a drastic Radicalism; the old
revolutionary party was substituting economic Socialism
for political Jacobinism, finding its inspiration not in the
school of Mazzini, but in that of Marx, and transforming
the struggle for political rights into the class war, the piti-
less contest of an exploited industrial proletariat against
the organisation of society under capitalist direction and
for capitalist ends. Constitutional Liberalism tended more
and more to be the creed of a middle class, the importance
of which was enhanced by economic development; it
steadily aimed not at overthrowing the dynasties but at
converting them, at victory by persuasion and moral pene-
tration, at unification by agreement expressed through
all the organs of the national life, the universities, the
parliaments, the press, the machinery of parties, and an
irresistible public opinion, disciplined into the possession
of a common will. It was this programme and method on
which Bismarck poured contempt.
Frederick William iv. , who had never owned a will, was
now rapidly losing his mind. The Regency of 1858 under
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? 8o
BISMARCK
Prince William, inaugurated the ' new era. ' The repres-
sive internal administration was relaxed: a ministry with
strong Liberal leanings under Prince Anthony of Hohen-
zollern was formed; and on August 14, 1859,tne German
National Union, founded by Bennigsen of Hanover, issued
from Eisenach an authoritative programme for the united
constitutional and democratic parties. It demanded a
national and independent German foreign policy, a strong
and constitutional central administration for the whole
of Germany in the place of the Diet; and, most significant
of all, it insisted that this Central Power, vested with mili-
tary and diplomatic control, must be in the hands of
Prussia, and that the initiative to establish it must come
from Prussia. All Liberals and Democrats were urged
henceforward to work for the establishment of German
unity on a constitutional basis under Prussian direction
and control--a Prussia to be Liberalised by its assumption
. of the directorship.
The Nationalist passion, vibrating in this remarkable
document, is no less noticeable than its stress on constitu-
tional rights. In 1859, Liberalism and Nationalism looked
with eager hope to the Prussia of the 'new era. ' Two
appointments, however, might have given pause to all
who dreamed of the Prussian army as an instrument for
the Eisenach programme. In 1858, Colonel von Moltke
had been appointed Chief of the General Staff--though
not yet the important office it subsequently became--and
Albrecht von Roon, the intimate friend of Bismarck, and
an unflinching Conservative, replaced the Liberal General
Bonin as Minister of War. Moltke, though the public did
not know it yet, was the ablest of the Clausewitz School.
Roon as a minister regarded himself as the Greek horse
introduced by Providence into the Liberal Troy. And he
was determined, like our George n. , to keep the army free
from the interference of the scoundrels in the House of
Commons.
The National Union concentrated public attention on
the urgency of national unification, the abolition of the
Federal Diet, and a national and united foreign policy in
view of the danger from France and the attitude of Austria.
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 81
The cry from Schleswig-Holstein was becoming louder
every year. What the Danubian principalities were to the
Eastern Question, the Duchies were to the German pro-
blem. They concentrated the local malady in a European
framework, and no single European Power could move
without tripping over treaties and conventions, and with-
out stirring the jealousy and fear of every other Power.
The Danish Radicals at Copenhagen were bent, like the
Sublime Porte, on playing off the Powers against each
other, and by the equilibrium of a skilfully poised selfish-
ness achieving their own ends. Bennigsen, Duncker,
Brockhaus, and the other distinguished signatories of the
Eisenach Programme agreed with the diplomatist who
said that the reform of the Diet was like cutting off the
hump on a hunchback--fatal to the hunchback and useless
to the surgeon. By ending and not mending could Ger-
many alone obtain a truly national and vigorously executed
foreign policy on behalf of German interests. When the
National Union traced the root of all difficulties to Vienna
they went to the heart of the matter.
Amongst the bad sleepers of Europe none slept so badly
as Francis Joseph, and on his dynastic bed the Habsburg
ruler threshed restlessly from left to right and from right
to left, and could find no repose. Within his dominions
it was indeed constitutions, counter-constitutions, recon-
stitutions, order, counter-order, disorder. The Crimean
War placed Austria at the parting of the ways; the com-
pact of Plombieres and the war of 1859 aggravated the
dilemma. The retention of her supremacy in Italy con-
flicted with the retention of her presidency in Germany;
jealousy of Prussia demanded an understanding with
France; Milan and Venetia involved her in war with
Turin and Napoleon; she broke with Russia in order to
keep in close touch with the Western Powers and prevent
a Russian protectorate of the Danubian principalities and
the Balkans; but German Nationalism demanded oppo-
sition to France: the middle German States expected
Austria to save them from a Prussian hegemony; German
Liberalism called for the abolition of the Bund and the Diet,
and would only support Austria if she made concessions
B. F
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? 82
BISMARCK
fatal to her control in Germany and suicidal in Italy and
Hungary. 'There is only one statesman in Europe,'
Metternich had said in 1856, 'M. de Cavour, and he is
against us. ' Cavour was the most brilliant and effective
Liberal statesman in Europe since Canning: his death in
1861 was a tragic blow to the whole cause of Liberalism
on the Continent; and it came at the unhappy moment
when Liberalism in Germany needed genius outside
Germany as an ally. Russell and Palmerston were not a
compensation for Cavour. Nor did Cavour's death bring
relief to Austria. Had Metternich lived to 1861 he might
have repeated his judgment: 'There is only one states-
man in Europe, Herr von Bismarck, and he is against us. '
Bismarck asserted more than once that when he went to
Frankfurt in May 1851, he was 'an Austrian with the
political views that I brought, so to speak from my home,
sharpened by the struggle with the attacks of the Revo-
lution of 1848 against principles that I valued'; and he
maintained that his personal political convictions coin-
cided with his official instructions in the determination
to carry out the policy outlined in his Olmiitz speech.
Prussia was to accept the presidential authority of Austria,
and to co-operate loyally on terms of equality with Austria
in all German affairs, on the basis of common Conservative
principles with common Conservative ends. The char-
acter of this union and the calculable results of its efficacy
reconciled him to the ' surrender ' involved in the Con-
vention of Olmiitz. But Bismarck in 1851 was not an
'Austrian' in the sense that he was prepared to sacrifice
the interest of Prussia to Austrian supremacy. His
Prussian Junkertum and the unlimited independence of his
own personality would have forbidden the surrender, even
if he had not clearly indicated that the egoism and interest
of Prussia must be the sole basis of her policy. Equality
with Austria within the Diet was an essential for Prussia;
she was not a Hanover, a Saxony, or a Bavaria, still less a
Baden or a Hesse-Cassel.
The eight years at Frankfurt were for Bismarck a period
of continuous disillusion and enlightenment--disillusion
as to the interpretation that Austria placed on the co-
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN
83
operation of Prussia, enlightenment as to the principles
which Austrian policy implied. The successors of
Schwarzenberg at Vienna, not unnaturally, calculated on
the humiliated Prussia of 1851. Austria lived in the past
because it was impossible to live for a new future without
jettisoning the only principles that kept the Empire of
Francis Joseph together. But the Ball-Platz did not
reckon on Bismarck. As early as 1851 a dispatch to Berlin
struck a note of warning. Bismarck was at the outset in-
ferior to the Austrian representatives in knowledge of the
ground and in technique; he had not at his disposal the
public or personal prestige, the machinery and the count-
less levers--ultramontane, dynastic, Conservative, and
social--by which Austria, entrenched in an historic ascend-
ancy, worked the middle and petty States to her will.
The two famous incidents of the cigar and the shirt-
sleeves delighted all the gossip-mongers of the higher dip-
lomacy. Hitherto, no one but 'Austria' dared smoke at
the meetings; but Bismarck lit his cigar at once, and before
long even the petty 'States followed his example. Re-
ceived by Count von Thurn in his shirt-sleeves, Bismarck
pulled off his coat. 'I agree,' he said, 'it is a hot day. '
These were trifles, but precious trifles. What was more
important was the thoroughness with which he mastered
his new profession. As with agriculture so with diplo-
macy, he was determined to penetrate to the heart of the
business. 'No human being,' he wrote to his wife, ' not
even the most malicious sceptic of a democrat, would
believe the. charlatanry and imposture hidden in this
Diplomacy. ' His power of work was inexhaustible; his
physique responded to any strain he chose to put on it,
and his brains were far superior to those of his rivals. It
is clear from his official reports, written with a verve, vivid-
ness, and command of the subject-matter that have made
them classical documents in German history, and from
his private correspondence, that he was reading, studying
and reflecting on much outside his official duties.
Frankfurt was not an education in itself; most of Bis-
marck's contemporaries there learned little that they did
not know already, and most of which was useless, or forgot
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? 8+
BISMARCK
what they had already learned; but Bismarck by self-
imposed toil turned the sand of routine into the gold
of political experience. He studied everything--men,
women, machinery. His dispatches are filled with vivid
vignettes--penetrating miniature and character sketches
of the diplomatists who made the Frankfurt world--de-
scriptions of a ball or a reception, in which he will note how
the celebrated actress, Henrietta Sontag, now the Countess
Rossi, has improved her face-powder since he saw her in
Berlin; or, with brief scorn, point out that the morals of
this or that figure in their society offends his German
standards. Bismarck knew that whatever the malicious
gossip of idle and irresponsible tongues might say of him-
self or his political methods his private life and personal
probity were invulnerable. His zeal and industry set him
tracking down Austrian intrigues in hidden bypaths and
the green-rooms of the political stage. It was at Frank-
furt that he learned to look for the ubiquitous and secret
hand of clerical and ultramontane wire-pullers, and to
understand how public opinion could be manipulated
through newspapers, if skilfully worked. This side of his
activities laid bare many sordid secrets, and the acquisition
and the experience weakened his belief--never very
strong--in human nature. The marked contempt of later
years for the sincerity of public opinion, for newspapers,
for journalists, who could always be bought, for all the
dark magic of an official press bureau, for diplomatic re-
connaissances by the circulation of lies, for lashing up
public sentiment by dictated paragraphs inserted in
avowedly independent journals--the whole sinister and
dirty stock-in-trade that exploited the servility and cun-
ning of a Busch or subsidised with appropriated funds a
Counter-Reptile-Press--all this can be traced to his
Frankfurt period. The vengeance that a policy of reality
--Realpolitik--exacts from its disciples is the necessity of
using an unclean world as it would use you, and of assum-
ing that the psychology of a nation is that of Tammany
Hall. Yet unquestionably as Bismarck was tainted and
degraded by the development of the coarser and more
brutal fibres in his autocratic personality, he never him-
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 85
self mistook intrigue for diplomacy, nor made the coining
of phrases a substitute for a policy. He evinced at Frank-
furt one of the most striking and permanent of his char-
acteristics. Passionate by nature, with a nervous system
that strung itself beyond the pitch of every affair or crisis,
he always remained uncannily cool in thought.
And he stated his own theory of political government when
he said:--
'History provides us with the most brilliant and grand,
though not the most beneficial, phenomenon in a special
degree under the mark of absolutism, but we can find more
numerous examples of lasting political prosperity and
power in States subject to the influence of a hereditary
aristocracy . . . the brilliant memories of the German
Empire point to a powerful Imperial nobility. The
mediaeval prosperity of our cities began to wither at the
time when the patrician families went down before the
pressure of the Guilds . . . England trod a happier path;
she had no Richelieu who cut off the heads in which a
hereditary wisdom resides to an exceptional degree. The
B. E
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? 66
BISMARCK
character of the English Revolution is Freedom, of the
French, Equality . . . French Equality is the will-of-the-
wisp, daughter of Envy and Greed, pursued without
success by that richly gifted nation for sixty years through
blood and madness. Let us refuse to join in that pursuit
on the false supposition that it is popular. '
Radowitz's resignation and the collapse of his policy
filled Bismarck with such joy that he danced on his chair
round his room three times. The humiliating convention
of Olmiitz occasioned the most weighty and remarkable
speech he had yet made. Nothing was easier, he pointed
out, than to make war; but, with an indirect allusion to
Frederick the Great:--
'The one sound basis of a great Power which differen-
tiates it essentially from the petty State, is political egoism
and not romanticism, and it is unworthy of a great State
to fight for what is not connected with its interest. . . .
Woe to the statesman who at this time has not sought a
reason for going to war which after the war will no less
stand the test. '
He rejected the idea that honour required Prussia ' to
play the Don Quixote all over Germany on behalf of
sickly demagogues, who imagined their local constitutions
in danger. ' And then he came to close grips with his real
gravamen against the whole policy of the Erfurt Union.
The Union involved nothing less than the destruction
of Prussia's independence, not by the princes, but by the
parliaments of the petty States. A war by Prussia to main-
tain the Union could only recall to his mind the English-
man who overpowered the sentinel in order that he might
vindicate the right of every free Briton to commit suicide
in the sentry-box.
In this speech Bismarck, for all its lucid trenchancy of
expression, was groping his way to settled principles of
foreign policy. It was not the interest of Prussia to fight
'as the shameful ally of democracy' against Austria: she
could attain her objects by co-operation with, not by
opposition to, Austria, and the identity of Prussian and
Austrian interests made war unjustifiable in 1850. Bis-
marck was also answering in advance the critics who have
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? THE JUNKER POLITICIAN 67
urged that twenty years later it was this same Bismarck
who practically carried out Radowitz's programme--the
unification of North Germany under Prussia's presidency
--and only carried it out at the price Radowitz was not
allowed to pay in 1850, war with Austria and her allies,
the German kingdoms. The criticism ignores the deep-
seated grounds of Bismarck's opposition to Radowitz's
policy. In 1850, Prussia's one possible ally was Liberalism
in Germany: a Prussian victory would be not a victory
for Prussia's independence and position as a great state,
but for Liberalism. The Liberals, not Prussia, would give
the law to Prussia and Germany. But war was only a
continuance of policy--a policy based on specific Prussian
interests--to enable Prussia to establish the relations on
which she wished to live in peace with her neighbours and
rivals. The last thing that the Bismarck of 1850 or of.
1866 desired or regarded as a real Prussian interest, was
the triumph of Liberalism. Moreover, in 1850 Radowitz,
in Bismarck's judgment, miscalculated. Behind Austria
and her German allies stood the sinister strength of a
Russia which had struck down Hungary, and was about to
impose its will in Schleswig-Holstein. Across the Rhine
was a revolutionary France, ready to intervene. In 1866
France's neutrality had been secured, a crippled Russia
was benevolently neutral, Italy was Prussia's ally. A vic-
torious Prussia would annex Schleswig-Holstein and more.
In brief, between the statecraft of Radowitz and that of
Bismarck there was no identity in temper, methods,
principles, or aims. The two men interpreted the interest
of Prussia and of Germany as differently as two opposed
minds could.
In 1850, his whole argument hinged on the contention
that the Union of Erfurt was a false step in the wrong
direction, and rested on the fundamental and explicit
assumption that the historic Prussia could secure 'her
interests and her honour' by the loyal co-operation of
Austria and Prussia. The words were Bismarck's, but the
voice was the voice of the Gerlachs and the cosmopolitan
Conservatives who saw in a renewed Holy Alliance with
Austria the salvation of Prussia and the defeat of the
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? 68
BISMARCK
Revolution. In 1850 ' the terrible Junker ' had not pene-
trated to the heart either of Germany or of Austria, nor had
he defined for himself, except in a superficial and conven-
tional way, ' the interest, the egoism' which ought to be
the sole basis of Prussian policy. But, as yet, he was not
aware that his knowledge was very limited and his inter-
pretation shallow and retarding.
Generally for Germany, the restoration of the old Diet
in 1851 registered two decisive defeats--the defeat of the
Revolution, and of Prussia. Liberalism in alliance with
Nationalism set out, through revolution, to achieve uni-
fication, and to create a truly federal organisation with
democratic and responsible parliamentary government,
under an imperial and limited monarchy, the whole de-
fined and embodied in a written constitution. The
Liberal majority in the National Assembly at Frankfurt had
rejected the programme of Radical Republicanism. It had
also rejected the programme of the Great German Party
(Gross-Deutschland). The German provinces of Austria,
included in the old Bund, were excluded. The organi-
sation of the excluded Austria was left to Austria, and the
political and fiscal relations between the new German
Empire (KleinrDeutschland) and the reconstituted Austrian
Empire were reserved for later diplomatic arrangements.
But the authors of the Constitution of 1848 contemplated
not merely a political alliance, but a spiritual and moral
union wider and deeper than the formal bargain of a
treaty--the creation of a central Germanic Europe, finding
its expression in the material framework of constitutional
and economic organisation, and guaranteed by a com-
munity of purpose in the intellectual and political life of
two self-governing and democratic empires.
This comprehensive scheme, the work of high-minded
and able men, was a noble and imaginative effort in con-
structive statesmanship, which bears the stamp of the
idealism and an inspiring belief in the capacities of a race
for achieving salvation when men build on the uplands,
and not the lowlands, of human endeavour. What con-
structive statesmanship, indeed, has ever achieved per-
manent results on the theory that the spiritual and in-
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? THE JUNKER POLITICIAN 69
tellectual consciousness of nationhood can be satisfied or
stifled by economic and material well-being alone? Had
the unification of 1848 been given a fair trial it would
have moulded the German mind and directed German
destinies and ambitions into paths of self-development
of incalculable benefit to Germany and the world.
Its failure was a tragedy for German and European
civilisation.
That failure is commonly ascribed to the academic
amateurism of its authors, who wasted their time in thresh-
ing out fundamental rights when apparently they should
have been cutting off heads or shooting down opposition,
or lynching the King of Prussia. Such criticism is really
amateur, Philistine, and ignorant of what revolution by
Liberal methods from an old to a new system implies. As
if the task of devising a federal unification of the Germany
of 1848 and of solving the German problem could have
been accomplished by any brain or any action in a few
weeks, least of all by force.
In 1866, Bismarck with the experience of 1848 and
twenty years of earnest constructive thought by many
brains at his disposal, with Austria and her German allies
prostrate, with a Prussian monarch wholly on his side and
a victorious Prussian army at his beck and call, took ten
months to work out, impose and bring into operation a
unification, not of all Germany, but of the north alone--
and Bismarck had been preparing for the task for four
unrelenting years.
The remarkable feature of 1848, in reality, was the
rapidity with which in the smoke and dust of a bewildering
revolution the liberal majority hammered out by argument
and under the conditions of government by public meeting,
a scheme of unification that probed deeper and was more
complete than the constitution of 1867. The men who
could accomplish that, in spite of their lack of training in
public affairs, were not unfitted to be leaders and teachers
in self-government, or to make the policy and control the
destinies of a great nation.
What they did lack was an army and the executive
organs of government, and before they could create them
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BISMARCK
they were crushed not by Germany, nor the princes, but
by Russia and Austria--the two foreign States to which
Liberalism and Nationalism, as Germans understood them,
were anathema. The hero of the reaction was Nicholas i. ,
without whose aid Schwarzenberg and Windischgratz
could not have mastered Prague and Vienna, nor dictated
the surrenders of Vilagos, Olmiitz, and Novara. Liberal-
ism went down. Radical Republicanism does not appear
again as a force to be reckoned with, except perhaps in
sporadic and convulsive efforts in Wurttemberg. But
Liberalism was not killed, neither was its twin, Nationalism.
The defeat and failure of Prussia--also at the hands of
Russia and Austria--was the second outstanding fact in
1851. Prussia, unlike the Liberals of Frankfurt, had both
an army and executive organs of government. Unlike
Austria and almost every other German State, she had not
been mastered by the Revolution. The strength of the
monarchy and the grip of the royal autocracy on the army
and the governing class were as convincingly revealed, as
after the disaster of Jena. But from the March Days until
Olmiitz Prussia was hopelessly divided. The Liberals
under G. von Vincke, the Moderate Conservatives under
Brandenburg, the Constitutionalists led by Radowitz.
the Junker Camarilla, under the Gerlachs, the Militarists
thirsting for a coup d'Etat in the manner of Schwarzenberg,
Windischgratz and Haynau, the pure Particularists exem-
plified in Prince William, ' the Cartridge Prince,' the heir
to the throne, to whom first and foremost Prussia was a
Grossmacht, which must fight for honour and independence,
the Poles in Prussian Poland crying out for national inde-
pendence, the clericals from the Rhenish districts to whom
the secular omnipotence of the autocracy was as dangerous
as the secular atheism of the Revolution, and the Com-
munists of the Vorwarts, founded by Karl Marx from
Prussian Trier and Engels from Prussian Barmen--the
men who created both the socialism of Lassalle and Bebel
--all these whirled in vortices of varying strength round
the King, who could have led if he could have made up his
mind, or could have been deprived of a mind to make up
But Frederick William persistently refused either to frame
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? THE JUNKER POLITICIAN 71
a policy for himself or to carry through a policy ready-
made by any one else. The result was that Prussia failed
to satisfy any single party at home, or the German dynas-
ties and Austria without. The monarchical state cut a
sorry figure in the March Days, in the Schleswig-Holstein
fiasco, in the imposition of a badly drafted, inconsistent,
and mongrel constitution, in the refusal of the Imperial
Crown, in the hasty and ill-prepared Union schemes, in
the Hesse-Cassel business, in the desertion of Radowitz,
in the defiance of, and undignified surrender to, Austria at
Olmutz. Prussia, in short, failed everybody in turn, and
all parties had to drink of the bitter cup that her monarch
ceaselessly brewed. Her prestige both at home and abroad
had sunk to'a low level, and the fall was not arrested in
1851.
These three years had, moreover, laid bare three impres-
sive facts: the categorical refusal of Austria to allow
Prussia either to usurp the Austrian leadership or to exer-
cise an independent initiative in a limited and defined
German sphere, the jealousy and fear of Prussia felt by the
middle States in particular, the appeal to Prussia, as the
sole hope, by all to whom the old system was intolerable.
All three were the expression of forces and ambitions,
separate in their origin and ends from the struggle between
Liberalism and Conservatism, or between the ideals of the
national and the dynastic and territorial State. Hanover,
Bavaria, Wurttemburg, and Saxony--the four kingdoms
--did not take up and then desert the scheme of the Erfurt
Union from fear of Liberalism or attachment to Conser-
vatism. The denunciation of Prussia as aiming at a
League of Secession (Sonderbund) was made, curiously
enough, in the name of German unity--unity through
the dynasties--but Austria and the middle States increas-
ingly felt that the Union would only end as the Zollverein
had done, in an organisation controlled by its most power-
ful member. While Bismarck saw in the scheme the stain
of a sinister surrender to democracy, the Four Kingdoms
saw in it the sinister supremacy of the militarist police
State of Prussia--an instrument for mediatising the poli-
tical independence of the sovereign princedoms; and the
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BISMARCK
truculent pride of Prussian Junkertum was more terrifying
than the levelling doctrines of Prussian Liberals and South
German Democrats. It was not only on the Liberal benches
of the Landtag that Bismarck's stark Prussianism was
neither forgiven nor forgotten, and his defiant prediction
that the day would come when Prussian Junkertum would
justify its claims, was not a day desired at Dresden, Munich,
Herrenhausen, and Stuttgart--least of all at Vienna. The
Liberals had turned a suppliant appeal for Prussia's
strength. To the profound relief of the middle States
and of Austria, Prussia refused to fight either for herself
or for anybody else. She meekly agreed to re-enter the
restored confederation, and to accept as a principle of
conduct that co-operation with Austria, which since 1815
had been simply a euphemism for subordination and self-
effacement.
The Austrians and the middle States miscalculated,
because they ignored the Revolution and its results. The
Prussia that re-entered the dynastic family party, termed
the Federal Diet at Frankfurt, was not the Prussia of 1847.
Since 1851 Prussia had a written constitution, a Parliament
of Two Houses, a franchise, if a restricted one, a budget
which had to be voted by the Lower House, even if she
had not been given a ministry responsible to the Landtag.
In a word, she had the organs through which the consti-
tutional party could organise, develop, and focus the shat-
tered Liberalism of 1848 and link it up with the shattered
Liberalism from the Memel to the Donnersberg. And
neither the Camarilla nor the Haynaus, neither the Stahls of
the Kreuzzeitung, nor a Schwarzenberg, nor a Bach could
prevent the Prussian intellectuals from thinking, or could
muzzle the Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit--the freedom to
teach and to learn? of the universities, or prohibit men
like Gneist, Sybel, Virchow, Vincke, Forckenbeck, Unruh,
from working and corresponding with a Bennigsen, a
Roggenbach, a von der Pfordten, a Bassermann, or a
Stockmar in Hanover, Bavaria, Baden and Coburg. More
dangerous still, they could not keep even the Junkers from
reading and thinking, and one Junker in particular, Otto
von Bismarck-Schonhausen.
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? THE JUNKER POLITICIAN 73
It was no less a miscalculation to infer that the Euro-
pean situation would retain the features of 1848-51--a
happy and 'healthy' antipathy to revolution and a magic
power to re-establish reaction, that Russian absolutism
would invariably be proof against Austrian ingratitude
and treachery, that Italy would fail to produce a states-
man, and always end in a Novara, that the young and new
Emperor of Austria, Francis Joseph, would exchange dy-
nastic selfishness for wisdom, that Prussia would always be
governed by a Frederick William iv. and a Manteuffel, and
be hypnotised by a Camarilla, and that the Eastern Ques-
tion and Schleswig-Holstein would not again trouble the
Chancelleries. Liberalism and Nationalism were like the
gout, always causing local pains, neglect or mistreatment
of which would drive them into attacking the heart.
In May 1851, Germany could read that his Majesty the
King of Prussia had been pleased to appoint Herr von
Bismarck-Schonhausen to be Councillor of Legation, and
on July 15 to be the Prussian federal representative and
plenipotentiary, at the Frankfurt Diet. Germany knew
little and cared less about the revived Diet. It was on the
point of forgetting Bismarck. That an irreconcilable
Junker should represent reactionary Prussia in the obsolete
Federal Diet was in the nature of things. The making of
a statesman who would solve the German problem was the
last result Germany looked for from Junkertum, Prussia,
and Frankfurt.
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? CHAPTER III
THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN, 1851-1862
? I. Bismarck at Frankfurt, 1851-1859
The eleven years from May 1851, when Bismarck was sent
to Frankfurt, to September 1862, when he became Minister-
President of Prussia, are not great years in the history of
Prussia, but they are great years in the history of Europe,
in which the stage was prepared for the drama in which
Bismarck made himself the leading figure. In the de-
velopment of his personality, the crystallisation of the
principles of his statecraft, they are the central, critical,
and decisive period.
Emphasis of this conclusion does not imply that in 1862,
when this second phase ended, Bismarck had already
reached the mastery of technique and the maturity of ex-
perience and conviction which high and responsible office
alone could consummate; nor that in 1862 his develop-
ment was arrested and that he had nothing more to learn;
still less that he came into power with a cut-and-dried
programme, and merely required the opportunity and the
political authority to carry it out. Such a conclusion
would ignore the opportunism, which he rightly and
proudly regarded as one of the most conspicuous features
--one of the idies mattresses of his statecraft--and rob of all
significance another and no less justifiable claim that he
was a learner all his life.
The results of this decade must be sought in the
subtle, gradual, but profound changes in Bismarck him-
self. They can only be measured by comparing the man
who went to Frankfurt with the man who deliberately
accepted the challenge that the Minister-Presidency
thrust upon him in 1862. Frankfurt provided the
74
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 75
indispensable experience for interpreting the full signi-
ficance of the German problem for Germany and Prussia.
The ministerial posts at Petersburg and Paris enabled him
to complete the experience by correlating it to the know-
ledge of the political conditions of the European situation.
This knowledge of the tides, rocks, shallows, and winds he
had hitherto conspicuously lacked. To-day we are able
to trace from original and unimpeachable sources the
process of its acquisition and the sediment of conviction
that it slowly deposited. By 1862 he had decided that
there was a German, and not merely a Prussian, problem
to be solved; that the negative and defensive Junkertum
of 1848-51 would not do, and that Prussia must find a
Prussian solution that was also applicable to Germany.
A new diplomacy, new principles of action, a new atti-
tude of mind, and a new interpretation of Prussia's interest
therefore, were imperatively required to rescue her from
the blunders of the past and the menace of the future--
surrender to Liberalism or surrender to Austria.
Last and not least, the man Bismarck became inspired
with the ambition to devise and execute the new policy.
The growth, scope, and quality of a man's ambition are
always as decisive as the increase of his knowledge and the
development of his intellectual powers.
In 1862, Bis-
marck had attained the supreme conviction that he could
both save his beloved Prussia and solve the German pro-
blem, and that no one else could do both. Character and
creed harmonised in a final union.
The European framework throughout this critical,phase
of development is important. In 1851, the coup cPEtat at
Paris and the proclamation of the Empire in the following
year made a violent rupture in the stratification of Europe.
Henceforward the seismographs of the Chancelleries were
nervously watched for the red record of further upheavals
that would test the stability of every State. The advent
of Cavour to office and the inauguration of the Risorgi-
mento at Turin, were even more important than the down-
fall of the French Republic and the inauguration of the
neo-Caesarism at Paris, but 'the man of December,' the
sphinx without a secret, held Europe spell-bound. The
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? 76
BISMARCK
greatness and significance of Cavour were ignored or under-
rated and misinterpreted until his death revealed what
Italy and Europe had lost. The watershed of the nine-
teenth century was, in fact, crossed in the Crimean War,
in which the sound British fear of Russian autocracy and
of the terrorism of Europe by Nicholas 1. leaped into
flame. The struggle between a Liberal West and the
Russia of 1854, fought out in the Crimea, not merely in-
volved Great Britain and Russia in bitter antagonism for
two generations, but thrust the Near Eastern Question
into a prominence that it never again lost; it broke up
the entente between Austria and Russia; it brought Great
Britain and Italy together, and, curiously enough, made
an Anglo-French entente very difficult to maintain. Most
important as an immediate result was the crippling of
Russia's strength and ability to buttress up the monarchies,
legitimism and autocracy of Central Europe; the Crimean
War, the Treaty of Paris,- the death of Nicholas 1. , and the
internal situation in Russia deprived Alexander n. of the
desire or the capacity to repeat the policy of his inflexible
predecessor.
At the Congress of Paris the diplomatic salute was taken
by Napoleon in. , though Cavour compelled the nervous
diplomatists of 1856 to recognise that the Italian Question
was a malady, calling for surgery, and not for opiates and
soothing poultices. Every Foreign Office in Europe, in-
cluding that of the Vatican, was now ruefully aware that
the Near Eastern Question brought the Habsburg dynasty,
ruling over its mosaic of denationalised and submerged
races, in whom the memories of 1848 continued sullenly
to glow, into irreconcilable collision with Russia. No
Foreign Office was more painfully aware than that of the
Vatican (except, perhaps, the series of distracted ministers
who came, tried and failed at the Ball-Platz in Vienna)
that the Italian Question opened up issues far wider and of
deeper import than maintenance of the Treaties of 1815,
the continuance of the Austrian flag on the citadel at
Milan and on the Piazza di San Marco at Venice, or the
barbarism of a Bomba at Naples. Ultramontanism was
the weapon of the Papacy, and was rightly so named, for
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 77
its strength lay beyond the Western Alps, where it had
planted itself in the Tuileries, and had its unofficial legate,
the Empress, at the table and couch of the Emperor;
beyond the Northern Alps, its roots were deep in the
separatist and clerical Bavaria, in the mediaeval 'Priests'
Alley' of the Main, in Rhenish Prussia, and in Prussian
Poland, whose nobles rubbed shoulders with the Prussian
Junkers in the cabinet of the King, and whose ladies whis-
pered in the drawing-room of the Queen of Prussia.
Across the Eastern Alps, in the city of St. Stephen, what
more devoted son was there than the Habsburg who was
Apostolical King of Hungary? In these years the offen-
sive strategy was being constructed that leads from the
Proclamation of the Immaculate Conception of the
Blessed Virgin in 1854 to the Syllabus of 1864 and the
Vatican Decrees of 1870.
Liberalism and Nationalism, in their slow, but steady
renaissance from the debacle of 1848, had the constructive
and reconstructed reply of the counter-Reformation to
reckon with sooner or later. Prussia had already crossed
swords with the claims of the Roman Catholic Church as
a cosmopolitan organisation in her Rhenish Provinces in
the decade between 1830 and 1840, and had failed to
secure a decision in favour of the omnipotent and secular
State. The Kulturkampf of 1873 lay, not in the logic of
history so much as in the logic of the humanist mind, once
Austria and Austrianism had been overthrown and the
Tuileries were in flames, Napoleon an -exile at Chislehurst
and the Bourbons nerveless emigrSs at Frohsdorf. Liberal-
ism, Nationalism, and Prussianism in combination made
the Kulturkampf a foregone conclusion. But it was
Cavour, the Risorgimento, and the Liberal unification of
Italy--with the Rome of the Papacy omitted, but depen-
dent henceforward on the stability of the Second Empire
--that opened the battle by challenging the alleged right
of an ecclesiastical sovereign to bar the consummation of
Nationalism in a modern State.
The compact of Plombieres led to the Annus Mirabilis
of 1859. Magenta and Solferino, despite Villa Franca,
followed by Garibaldi's expedition of The Thousand, and
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? 78
BISMARCK
the collapse of the dynasties in Italy, set every Liberal and
Nationalist pulse beating feverishly throughout Europe.
At Kiel and Rendsburg, in the Duchies of Schleswig-
Holstein, at Posen, Warsaw, Cracow, and Lemberg in dis-
membered Poland, at Bucharest and Jassy in the Danubian
principalities, at Buda-Pesth in Hungary, no less than in
the universities and capital of a federated but disunited
Germany, the vital spark of faith and hope burned in reply
to the beacons lit in Turin, Florence, and Palermo.
'Italy's year' coincided with a change of sovereign at
Berlin, when Prince William became regent for his brother
(October 26, 1858), and with the advent of a Liberal
Ministry in Great Britain, whose action quietly but de-
cisively checkmated an Austrian counter-stroke against
the unification of the Italian South with the North.
The intellectual movement was no less impressive. It
was the period when the modern mind of the nineteenth
century was being made. The year 1859 is memorable for
Darwin's Origin of Species, but between the years 1854
and 1870 the annals of Europe are studded with famous
names and remarkable achievements in every department
of intellectual and imaginative effort--Tennyson, Brown-
ing, Swinburne, Stubbs, Herbert Spencer, Carlyle, Lister,
Clerk-Maxwell and the Pre-Raphaelites in England,
Pasteur, Victor Hugo, Taine, Flaubert, Sainte-Beuve and
the Barbizon School in France; Virchow, Helmholtz,
Mommsen, Sybel, Droysen, Wagner, Brahms and Karl
Marx in Germany. And if the United States had done
nothing but produce Abraham Lincoln, Grant and Lee,
it had accomplished much. Had the United States not
proclaimed in memory of ' its honoured dead . . . that we
here highly resolve . . . that government of the people, by
the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth'?
Europe since 1849 had been gripped in the years of
Arctic reaction. Warm water was once more steadily
flowing beneath the frozen surface, and great fissures
were now cracking through; the floes, loosened and
sapped from beneath were grinding, packing, breaking
away, and toppling over. 'The God of battles,' Bismarck
had predicted in 1849, 'would throw the iron dice that
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN
would decide. ' The first casts of those iron dice had been
thrown at Inkerman, the Malakoff Redoubt, and at
Solferino.
Prussia since 1851 had endured a drab and fatigued re-
action, administered by timid and second-rate ministers.
The hand of the police and the Minister of the Interior
was heavy on personal liberty, the freedom of the press,
and everything and everybody suspected of Liberal views,
which were identified with revolution. But, despite
every discouragement, the constitutional Liberals retained
their hold on the middle class, and in the Lower House of
the Landtag they consolidated a critical and earnest oppo-
sition, which in both sections of the party--the Moderates
and the Radicals--was affiliated by a common programme
with Liberalism in Hanover, the Saxon principalities,
Baden, and the more democratic South. As in Italy under
the Risorgimento official Liberalism, though without office
quietly shed the idea of reform by revolution.
The dividing lines in the opposition to the dominant
system were determined rather by the differences between
a moderate Liberalism and a drastic Radicalism; the old
revolutionary party was substituting economic Socialism
for political Jacobinism, finding its inspiration not in the
school of Mazzini, but in that of Marx, and transforming
the struggle for political rights into the class war, the piti-
less contest of an exploited industrial proletariat against
the organisation of society under capitalist direction and
for capitalist ends. Constitutional Liberalism tended more
and more to be the creed of a middle class, the importance
of which was enhanced by economic development; it
steadily aimed not at overthrowing the dynasties but at
converting them, at victory by persuasion and moral pene-
tration, at unification by agreement expressed through
all the organs of the national life, the universities, the
parliaments, the press, the machinery of parties, and an
irresistible public opinion, disciplined into the possession
of a common will. It was this programme and method on
which Bismarck poured contempt.
Frederick William iv. , who had never owned a will, was
now rapidly losing his mind. The Regency of 1858 under
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? 8o
BISMARCK
Prince William, inaugurated the ' new era. ' The repres-
sive internal administration was relaxed: a ministry with
strong Liberal leanings under Prince Anthony of Hohen-
zollern was formed; and on August 14, 1859,tne German
National Union, founded by Bennigsen of Hanover, issued
from Eisenach an authoritative programme for the united
constitutional and democratic parties. It demanded a
national and independent German foreign policy, a strong
and constitutional central administration for the whole
of Germany in the place of the Diet; and, most significant
of all, it insisted that this Central Power, vested with mili-
tary and diplomatic control, must be in the hands of
Prussia, and that the initiative to establish it must come
from Prussia. All Liberals and Democrats were urged
henceforward to work for the establishment of German
unity on a constitutional basis under Prussian direction
and control--a Prussia to be Liberalised by its assumption
. of the directorship.
The Nationalist passion, vibrating in this remarkable
document, is no less noticeable than its stress on constitu-
tional rights. In 1859, Liberalism and Nationalism looked
with eager hope to the Prussia of the 'new era. ' Two
appointments, however, might have given pause to all
who dreamed of the Prussian army as an instrument for
the Eisenach programme. In 1858, Colonel von Moltke
had been appointed Chief of the General Staff--though
not yet the important office it subsequently became--and
Albrecht von Roon, the intimate friend of Bismarck, and
an unflinching Conservative, replaced the Liberal General
Bonin as Minister of War. Moltke, though the public did
not know it yet, was the ablest of the Clausewitz School.
Roon as a minister regarded himself as the Greek horse
introduced by Providence into the Liberal Troy. And he
was determined, like our George n. , to keep the army free
from the interference of the scoundrels in the House of
Commons.
The National Union concentrated public attention on
the urgency of national unification, the abolition of the
Federal Diet, and a national and united foreign policy in
view of the danger from France and the attitude of Austria.
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 81
The cry from Schleswig-Holstein was becoming louder
every year. What the Danubian principalities were to the
Eastern Question, the Duchies were to the German pro-
blem. They concentrated the local malady in a European
framework, and no single European Power could move
without tripping over treaties and conventions, and with-
out stirring the jealousy and fear of every other Power.
The Danish Radicals at Copenhagen were bent, like the
Sublime Porte, on playing off the Powers against each
other, and by the equilibrium of a skilfully poised selfish-
ness achieving their own ends. Bennigsen, Duncker,
Brockhaus, and the other distinguished signatories of the
Eisenach Programme agreed with the diplomatist who
said that the reform of the Diet was like cutting off the
hump on a hunchback--fatal to the hunchback and useless
to the surgeon. By ending and not mending could Ger-
many alone obtain a truly national and vigorously executed
foreign policy on behalf of German interests. When the
National Union traced the root of all difficulties to Vienna
they went to the heart of the matter.
Amongst the bad sleepers of Europe none slept so badly
as Francis Joseph, and on his dynastic bed the Habsburg
ruler threshed restlessly from left to right and from right
to left, and could find no repose. Within his dominions
it was indeed constitutions, counter-constitutions, recon-
stitutions, order, counter-order, disorder. The Crimean
War placed Austria at the parting of the ways; the com-
pact of Plombieres and the war of 1859 aggravated the
dilemma. The retention of her supremacy in Italy con-
flicted with the retention of her presidency in Germany;
jealousy of Prussia demanded an understanding with
France; Milan and Venetia involved her in war with
Turin and Napoleon; she broke with Russia in order to
keep in close touch with the Western Powers and prevent
a Russian protectorate of the Danubian principalities and
the Balkans; but German Nationalism demanded oppo-
sition to France: the middle German States expected
Austria to save them from a Prussian hegemony; German
Liberalism called for the abolition of the Bund and the Diet,
and would only support Austria if she made concessions
B. F
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? 82
BISMARCK
fatal to her control in Germany and suicidal in Italy and
Hungary. 'There is only one statesman in Europe,'
Metternich had said in 1856, 'M. de Cavour, and he is
against us. ' Cavour was the most brilliant and effective
Liberal statesman in Europe since Canning: his death in
1861 was a tragic blow to the whole cause of Liberalism
on the Continent; and it came at the unhappy moment
when Liberalism in Germany needed genius outside
Germany as an ally. Russell and Palmerston were not a
compensation for Cavour. Nor did Cavour's death bring
relief to Austria. Had Metternich lived to 1861 he might
have repeated his judgment: 'There is only one states-
man in Europe, Herr von Bismarck, and he is against us. '
Bismarck asserted more than once that when he went to
Frankfurt in May 1851, he was 'an Austrian with the
political views that I brought, so to speak from my home,
sharpened by the struggle with the attacks of the Revo-
lution of 1848 against principles that I valued'; and he
maintained that his personal political convictions coin-
cided with his official instructions in the determination
to carry out the policy outlined in his Olmiitz speech.
Prussia was to accept the presidential authority of Austria,
and to co-operate loyally on terms of equality with Austria
in all German affairs, on the basis of common Conservative
principles with common Conservative ends. The char-
acter of this union and the calculable results of its efficacy
reconciled him to the ' surrender ' involved in the Con-
vention of Olmiitz. But Bismarck in 1851 was not an
'Austrian' in the sense that he was prepared to sacrifice
the interest of Prussia to Austrian supremacy. His
Prussian Junkertum and the unlimited independence of his
own personality would have forbidden the surrender, even
if he had not clearly indicated that the egoism and interest
of Prussia must be the sole basis of her policy. Equality
with Austria within the Diet was an essential for Prussia;
she was not a Hanover, a Saxony, or a Bavaria, still less a
Baden or a Hesse-Cassel.
The eight years at Frankfurt were for Bismarck a period
of continuous disillusion and enlightenment--disillusion
as to the interpretation that Austria placed on the co-
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN
83
operation of Prussia, enlightenment as to the principles
which Austrian policy implied. The successors of
Schwarzenberg at Vienna, not unnaturally, calculated on
the humiliated Prussia of 1851. Austria lived in the past
because it was impossible to live for a new future without
jettisoning the only principles that kept the Empire of
Francis Joseph together. But the Ball-Platz did not
reckon on Bismarck. As early as 1851 a dispatch to Berlin
struck a note of warning. Bismarck was at the outset in-
ferior to the Austrian representatives in knowledge of the
ground and in technique; he had not at his disposal the
public or personal prestige, the machinery and the count-
less levers--ultramontane, dynastic, Conservative, and
social--by which Austria, entrenched in an historic ascend-
ancy, worked the middle and petty States to her will.
The two famous incidents of the cigar and the shirt-
sleeves delighted all the gossip-mongers of the higher dip-
lomacy. Hitherto, no one but 'Austria' dared smoke at
the meetings; but Bismarck lit his cigar at once, and before
long even the petty 'States followed his example. Re-
ceived by Count von Thurn in his shirt-sleeves, Bismarck
pulled off his coat. 'I agree,' he said, 'it is a hot day. '
These were trifles, but precious trifles. What was more
important was the thoroughness with which he mastered
his new profession. As with agriculture so with diplo-
macy, he was determined to penetrate to the heart of the
business. 'No human being,' he wrote to his wife, ' not
even the most malicious sceptic of a democrat, would
believe the. charlatanry and imposture hidden in this
Diplomacy. ' His power of work was inexhaustible; his
physique responded to any strain he chose to put on it,
and his brains were far superior to those of his rivals. It
is clear from his official reports, written with a verve, vivid-
ness, and command of the subject-matter that have made
them classical documents in German history, and from
his private correspondence, that he was reading, studying
and reflecting on much outside his official duties.
Frankfurt was not an education in itself; most of Bis-
marck's contemporaries there learned little that they did
not know already, and most of which was useless, or forgot
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? 8+
BISMARCK
what they had already learned; but Bismarck by self-
imposed toil turned the sand of routine into the gold
of political experience. He studied everything--men,
women, machinery. His dispatches are filled with vivid
vignettes--penetrating miniature and character sketches
of the diplomatists who made the Frankfurt world--de-
scriptions of a ball or a reception, in which he will note how
the celebrated actress, Henrietta Sontag, now the Countess
Rossi, has improved her face-powder since he saw her in
Berlin; or, with brief scorn, point out that the morals of
this or that figure in their society offends his German
standards. Bismarck knew that whatever the malicious
gossip of idle and irresponsible tongues might say of him-
self or his political methods his private life and personal
probity were invulnerable. His zeal and industry set him
tracking down Austrian intrigues in hidden bypaths and
the green-rooms of the political stage. It was at Frank-
furt that he learned to look for the ubiquitous and secret
hand of clerical and ultramontane wire-pullers, and to
understand how public opinion could be manipulated
through newspapers, if skilfully worked. This side of his
activities laid bare many sordid secrets, and the acquisition
and the experience weakened his belief--never very
strong--in human nature. The marked contempt of later
years for the sincerity of public opinion, for newspapers,
for journalists, who could always be bought, for all the
dark magic of an official press bureau, for diplomatic re-
connaissances by the circulation of lies, for lashing up
public sentiment by dictated paragraphs inserted in
avowedly independent journals--the whole sinister and
dirty stock-in-trade that exploited the servility and cun-
ning of a Busch or subsidised with appropriated funds a
Counter-Reptile-Press--all this can be traced to his
Frankfurt period. The vengeance that a policy of reality
--Realpolitik--exacts from its disciples is the necessity of
using an unclean world as it would use you, and of assum-
ing that the psychology of a nation is that of Tammany
Hall. Yet unquestionably as Bismarck was tainted and
degraded by the development of the coarser and more
brutal fibres in his autocratic personality, he never him-
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 85
self mistook intrigue for diplomacy, nor made the coining
of phrases a substitute for a policy. He evinced at Frank-
furt one of the most striking and permanent of his char-
acteristics. Passionate by nature, with a nervous system
that strung itself beyond the pitch of every affair or crisis,
he always remained uncannily cool in thought.
