The
ruler therefore had seldom any reason to assert a claim to the land
itself or to oust a cultivator from it.
ruler therefore had seldom any reason to assert a claim to the land
itself or to oust a cultivator from it.
Cambridge History of India - v5 - British India
A regulation passed
by Wellesley in 1799 gave still further powers of coercion to the
zamindars, and over them the former practice of arrest was reinstated.
The latter measure was a return to the procedure of Cornwallis, the
regulation of 1793 making the zamindar liable to arrest as well as to
the sale of his land having been amended by Shore. Now, in 1799,
the practice of personal coercion was restored, again with the object
of checking the flood of sales. Even so, Lord Minto found the same
defect, and attempted further to restrict sales by a regulation of 1807.
In fact the position was intrinsically difficult, and no mere regulation
would alter it. By Lord Minto's time the difficulties were beginning
to grow less, but this was due more to the greater goodwill of the
## p. 457 (#485) ############################################
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
457
zamindars than to the revised regulations. So long as the system was
regarded with suspicion the difficulties continued. In fact it is clear
that in the years following its establishment the Permanent Settlement
was neither profitable to government nor popular with the people.
Such advantages as it had did not begin to operate until a later time.
In his advocacy of the Permanent Settlement, Cornwallis had put
high among the advantages the freeing of the Company's servants
from their absorption in revenue matters. In fact the difficulties in
the working out of the system made the task of a collector much less
simple than had been intended. Moreover, the mass of revenue suits
filled the zillah courts beyond measure, and the old collectors who
were now judges in these courts were certainly no freer than before
to concern themselves with the interests of the people. One of the
first and most pressing changes was therefore the limitation of suits.
Various regulations with this object date from the years 1795-1802.
They start with the reimposition of a fee upon registering a suit. This
was the work of Shore, as was also the increase in the number of
courts, and of Indians qualified to settle minor suits. Then, under
Wellesley, the regulation as to appeals was stiffened, and assistant
judges were appointed. The seriousness of the pressure extended
even to the sadr court, and Lord Wellesley thought it undesirable that
the governor-general and council should continue to act as its judges.
A reorganisation therefore took place in 1805, and three judges took
over the responsibilities of the court. The reforms of Wellesley, like
those of Shore, did not stop the evil of delay. Lord Minto attempted
further to remedy it. In 1807 the number of judges in the sadr court
was increased to four : in 1811 it was enacted that the number of
district judges should be increased as necessity occurred. Another
expedient for remedying the congestion of business was the reorgani-
sation of the system of circuit. According to the regulations of 1793
the provincial court of appeal was necessarily closed while the three
judges went on circuit in their capacity of circuit judges. A regulation
of 1794 provided for the unbroken session of the court. A further
change of 1797 made possible the trial of appeal cases during the
absence of the judges on circuit. Similar congestion in the trials of
criminal cases was met by the increase in the power of magistrates
in petty cases, and by conferring on them the right of delegating
power to their assistants. Special rules for the punishment of dacoits
were enacted in 1807.
None of the changes, however, did more than palliate the evils of
the systein. These evils were still formidable when they were sub-
mitted to the clear scrutiny of the next few years.
The unhesitating acquiescence in the Cornwallis system ended in
1808, and the work of reform started in earnest five years later.
Unlike the act of 1793 the Charter Act of 1813 made important
changes in the position of the Company; and, again unlike that act,
## p. 458 (#486) ############################################
458
BENGAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM, 1786-1818
it was the result of the careful examination of several years. This new
reforin movement stated on 11 March, 1808, when Robert Dundas
moved the appointment of a select committee to enquire into the
affairs of the Company. The committee issued five reports, and the
fifth, issued in 1812, contained a detailed analysis of the Bengal
system. Together with its appendices (and with some of the material
contained in the second report of 1810), it is a valuable exposition
of the history and the results of the Cornwallis Code. Above all, it
makes clear some, if not all, of its defects.
The period of the Select Committee saw also the beginning of an
enquiry in Bengal. The defects of the early system forced themselves
especially on the judges of the courts, and in the summer of 1809
Lord Minto set on foot an enquiry as to the best lines of change. The
investigation, however, was not completed by him. In 1813 he was
succeeded by the Marquess of Hastings and it was in the ten years of
his rule that the most thorough enquiry was made. In 1813 the
Charter Act embodied one aspect of the new reform movement. On
9 November, 1814, a dispatch of the court of directors 1 emphasised
the other.
The act of 1813 abolished the Company's monopoly of trade in
India. The change in administration involved was not at first of
much importance, since the monopoly and not the trade was abolished.
The Board of Trade continued its work until 1835 : the commercial
residents remained at their factories, although their number decreased
as the trade diminished. The most immediate alteration was at the
presidency offices, for the act required a rigid separation of the
commercial and administrative accounts.
The instructions of 9 November, 1814, prescribed a far more
radical change. The pressure on the civil courts dictated a resumption
by the collector of his powers in civil justice : the difficulties found in
administering criminal justice and in the regulation of the police
demanded that the collectors should once more have magisterial
powers, and be responsible for the superintendence of the police. With
the same object of improving the administration of justice, additional
powers were to be given to Indian agents: and by increasing the
criminal jurisdiction of the zillah judges the pressure on the higher
courts would be relieved. At the same time the judicial interference
of the collector would serve to increase the protection of the ryots;
and with the latter object in view the Board of Control added a clause
to the directors' dispatch urging the observance "in all possible cases”
of "the principle of realising the revenues from the ryots themselves".
The recommendations of the dispatch were a denial of Cornwallis's
principles in several respects. If they. were carried out, the separation
11. 0. Records, Bengal Despatches, vol. LXVII, judicial Despatch of 9 Nov-
ember, 1814.
## p. 459 (#487) ############################################
FURTHER REFORMS
469
>
of revenue from judicial administration would once more disappear
The collector would resume in some measure his position of 1790 as
the bottle-neck through which all administration must pass. It was
impossible to set back the Permanent Settlement as fully as this, but
the dispatch showed at least that the authorities at home were alive
to its dangers. Even the prejudice of Cornwallis against the employ-
ment of Indians was set aside. Such revolutionary measures did not
commend themselves to the government of Bengal. The mistake of
Cornwallis in carrying out his reform without sufficient investigation
was not repeated. The new instructions were referred for opinion to
all the boards and courts in Bengal, and to the principal servants of
the Company. The repeated pressure of the court of directors did not
obtain an answer to their dispatch until 22 February, 1827, and then
in several respects the attitude of the government of India was more
conservative than that of the authorities at home.
In the meantime, however, much had been done to modify the
existing system. The period of Hastings's rule saw a number of
regulations which improved the working and loosened the rigidity
of Cornwallis's Code, while still paying rather more than lip-service
to his principles.
The first changes were already accomplished when the reforming
dispatch arrived. Regulations of 1813 and 1814 had provided a
fairly efficient police system for the large towns. In 1813, in the cities
of Dacca, Murshidabad and Patna, and in 1814 at the headquarters
of every district, police chowkidars were appointed under the control
of the superintendents of police. The system was said to be working
well in 1816. In 1817-19 the system of village watch was reformed.
These police reforms were regarded by the government as the most
urgent and the most satisfactory of the reforms.
The necessity for lessening the burden of the civil courts was met
by a series of measures. The powers of Indian munsiffs and sadar
amins in civil justice were defined in 1814 and extended in 1821. The
doctrine that no class of Indian officers should be vested with final
powers was, however, maintained, and other measures were necessary
to remedy the position. The procedure in appeal was laid down by
a regulation of 1814; and steps were taken to relieve the pressure in
the higher courts. The burden of the Calcutta appeal court was
diminished by the establishment of a separate court for the Western
Provinces, but the most important steps were the appointment of a
fifth judge and the systematic division of labour between the judges.
The difficulties of the lesser courts were met partly by the establish-
mert of special commissions to administer justice in the new parts of
the province. But the more effective measures for relief were the
increase in the number of zillah judges, and the transfer of certain
11. 0. Records, Bengal Letters Received, vol. LXX, Judicial Letter of 29
November, 1814.
## p. 460 (#488) ############################################
460
BENGAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM, 1786-1818
judicial functions to the revenue authorities. The latter expedient
was adopted very slowly, the proposal for the re-establishment of
mal adalats being disregarded. In unsettled districts the judicial
pcvvers of the collectors were fairly extensive, but they were still
slight in Bengal. There, the new powers were chiefly in connection
with the sale of liquor and the manufacture and sale of opium. Even
in Bengal, however, the collectors had some judicial business in
connection with the land revenue. In 1819 the collectors were autho-
rised to deal with cases relating to claims to freedom from assessment,
and in 1822 to rectify errors committed at the time of sales.
Closely connected with the measures to facilitate civil justice, are
those for the protection of the ryot. One of the chief reasons asserted
by the directors (and emphasised by the Board of Control) for
conferring power of civil justice on collectors had been the greater
protection that would be given to the ryot. The increased function
of the collectors would not be enough to secure this, and further
measures were urged. What was done was rather to prevent further
encroachment than to reverse what had already taken place. The
offices of kanungo and patwari were re-established in the years
1816-19, and the institution of the mufassal record committees aimed
at stabilising the position of the various classes concerned in land.
This was furthered also by the comprehensive definition of the rights
of the various classes concerned in land by regulation VIII of 1819.
That more was not lone was due to the fact that the Permanent
Settlement made a satisfactory system impossible.
The aspect of the directors' instructions to which least observance
was secured, was that which was concerned with criminal justice.
The principles of Cornwallis here died hard. As late as 1827 the
separation of the administration of criminal justice from the work of
the revenue officers was looked upon with respect as the chief
"principle on which the civil administration framed by Lord Corn-
wallis" was founded. The length of time that that system had been
in force made in itself a substantial argument against reversing it,
since the collectors of the 1820's were practically all without ex-
perience in judicial affairs. Another principle also was involved.
The collectors were assisted in most districts by Indian tahsildars,
and to entrust magisterial powers to them would be to abandon Corn-
wallis's refusal to vest real power in Indian hands. What was done
in this direction was therefore of a tentative character. In criminal
justice, as in civil, pressure of cases necessitated an increase in the
number of zillah judges and the addition of a fifth member in the
appeal court. But all that was done to meet the instructions to
reunite justice and revenue was the permissive regulation of 1821.
In 1818 the first step in this direction had been taken when three
collectors were specially empowered to act as magistrates. Now by
regulation r of 1821 such power might be granted to any collector.
at the discretion of the Supreme Government. In the following years
## p. 461 (#489) ############################################
CORNWALLIS'S WORK
461
a few collectors and sub-collectors were granted power under the
regulation.
When Hastings left India in 1823, despite his absorption in political
affairs, considerable changes had taken place in the system of Corn-
wallis. The chief need as Cornwallis estimated it was still no nearer
completion. “A good system of law” was not yet established, for
Sir William Jones had died in 1795, and little had been done to
continue his work. It is true that the code which Cornwallis had
promulgated had been simplified, and redrawn where its ambiguities
were greatest. But a vast body of new regulations had followed, and
the courts had piled up judicial precedents. No comprehensive code
had been issued : what had really been done was to follow up the
reforms of Cornwallis by further changes and experiments. In
criminal and civil justice, perhaps above all in the police system,
nd improvements had been made. The position of the collector
had once more been changed : for if he had not recovered the over-
whelming power of 1790, the degradation of 1793 had been consider-
ably mitigated. The collector was climbing back to his position as the
state's man of all work; and was well on his way to reach it in time to
be the chief instrument of the next reform movement. Yet much of
the work of Cornwallis was still standing. The building had been
extended and improved, and the original plans had been modified;
but all the early work had not been destroyed. The reforms of the
civil service had not needed to be done again. By this cleansing
of the administrative system, Cornwallis had established a lasting
tradition. After thirty years the best of his work, the result of his
uprightness and zeal for the public service, was still in being. In
spite of his mistakes, therefore, Cornwallis, like Warren Hastings,
had left a lasting impression on the system of government: and it
was one of the merits of his successors that they were slow to
experiment in change.
## p. 462 (#490) ############################################
CHAPTER XXVII
THE MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND
LAND REVENUE TO 1818
THROUGHOUT the eighteenth century up to the last decade
no power in South India felt itself secure enough to spare serious
attention for the improvement of the territories under its authority.
The more energetic rulers found their time fully occupied with the
task of suppressing rivals and rebels and raising the armies and
revenues necessary for this end. The rest were content to make hay
while the sun shone. Thus in time of peace the chief concern of every
ruler was the collection of the revenue and especially of the land
revenue, which usually produced more than nine-tenths of the total
state income. The insecurity of the ruler's position compelled him to
raise his demand as high as possible and to take the quickest and
easiest means of collecting what he claimed without thought for the
future. Checks and precautions were relaxed and abuses sprang up
on all sides. A strong ruler like Hyder of Mysore preferred to collect
through officers of his own appointment, amildars having jurisdiction
over large areas containing some hundreds of villages. The amildar
usually dealt with the village through the village headman and the
village accountant, whose records were supposed to show what the
villagers should by custom pay. As it was difficult to prevent the
village accountant from falsifying his accounts the amildar frequently
struck a bargain with the village headman, or, if he would not rise to
the amildar's terms, rented the village to a powerful outsider who
was left to collect what he could.
If the amildar could not trust the village officers, neither could
the ruler trust the amildar, who took presents and levied extra cesses
for which he rendered no account, securing the acquiescence of the
villagers partly by terror, partly by lowering the public demand on
the plea of a failure of the crop. Hyder met the difficulty by allowing
the amildars to grow rich and then fogging them till they disgorged.
Milder-mannered princes, such as the nawab. of Arcot, tended to
supplant the amildars by renting out whole districts to rich or
influential speculators. Where this was done, all the authority
formerly exercised by the amildar in practice devolved upon the
renter, since any restriction upon his proceedings was made an
excuse for withholding the sum contracted for. Neither the amildar
ncr the renter enjoyed any security of tenure. As a rule they looked
only for immediate profit regardless of longer views. 1
But South Indian rulers were not everywhere strong enough to
1 Srinivasaraghava Aiyangar, Memorandum, App. pp. xx sqq.
a
## p. 463 (#491) ############################################
THE POLIGARS
463
collect the revenue on the system which suited them best. Half the
Northern Sarkars and elsewhere many of the less accessible tracts
were under local chiefs who had never been completely subdued,
feudal nobles who had succeeded in retaining their feudal status, local
officials and adventurers with local influence who had seized power
and asserted a partial independence. These poligars and zamindars
exercised within their own territory all the functions of a sovereign,
even making war on their own account upon their peers. But they
acknowledged an obligation to pay tribute or peshkash to the sovereign
and to serve in his campaigns with a certain number of armed
retainers. The peshkash was sometimes fixed, sometimes it varied
from year to year with the state of cultivation. But its amount and
the regularity with which it was paid depended less upon the resources
of the poligar's territory than on the ease with which he could be
coerced.
Unlike the renters and the amildars the zamindars and poligars
had an hereditary interest in the territories under their control. But
their traditions and upbringing were as a rule essentially martial.
“Eat or be eaten” was the condition of their existence. Their grand
aims had always been to extend their territories at the expense of
their neighbours and to strengthen themselves to resist the central
power. Many of them were too spirited to exchange uncontrolled
if precarious authority for the assured income of a peaceful landlord,
and very few of them were capable of believing that the central power
would continue to allow them to intercept a share of the land revenue
once they had been disarmed. The central power usually aimed at
extirpating these territorial chiefs, as opportunity offered. Hyder
and Tipu of Mysore were especially active in pursuing this policy. It
is unlikely that the cultivators often regretted their poligar when he
was hanged. For he had to consider first the interests of his armed
retainers and he was often under the necessity of satisfying their
demands for arrears of pay by giving them authority to collect the
land revenue direct from the villages. 1
The workers of South India, the agriculturists and the artisans,
living for the most part in villages, hoped little and feared much from
their rulers. So narrow was the margin on which the cultivators were
living that advances of seed-grain had often to be made to enable them
to raise a crop. In many South Indian villages the land revenue
depends upon the upkeep of the irrigation works and some amildars
spent pains and money on this account. But as a rule the works seem
to have been neglected or maintained only by the villagers. Even
for protection the villagers relied chiefly on their own mud walls or
thorn fences which could be defended by stone-throwing against the
predatory horse and the camp followers of the period. Whether these
owed allegiance to an invading power or to the country's prince made
1 The Fifth Report of 1812, pp. 80 sqq.
## p. 464 (#492) ############################################
464
MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE
little difference in the feelings which they inspired among the villagers.
There were no made roads, no bridges, and no wheeled vehicles
outside a few large towns. Trade was carried on by pack cattle.
There was no code of law generally recognised as being in force; and
even where Hindu or Muhammadan law-books were supposed to have
authority, there were no regular courts in existence to interpret or
give effect to them, or to solidify custom and precedent into law.
Petty crime was dealt with by the village headman and most civil
disputes were settled in the village by the award of arbitrators or
by the decisions of village panchayats or juries. Caste offences were
punished by caste headmen or caste panchayats, the state only inter-
fering to raise revenue by leasing out the right to levy fines. Grave
crimes could be brought before the amildar, who might inflict any
punishment short of death. There were no gaols, and imprisonment
was not a recognised form of punishment. Mutilation for the poor
and fines for the rich were the order of the day. The proceedings of
the amildar were controlled not by law, but by his sense of equity.
The powers of the amildar were also exercised not only by zamindars
and poligars, but also by renters and military officers, and indeed by
any person who had at his command the force necessary to give effect
to his decision. The same authorities could sometimes be induced to
appoint arbitrators for the decision of important civil disputes. There
was always the possibility of an appeal to the sovereign, but access to
him was difficult, and the chance of a careful enquiry small. 1
For police in the more orderly tracts the villagers relied chiefly
on the hereditary village-watchman. But where criminal tribes or the
retainers of a poligar lived in the neighbourhood, they usually found
it expedient to invite one of their tormentors to become their kavalgar
or guard, and to pay him to save the village from theft, or at least to
obtain restitution of the stolen property for a reasonable consideration.
A poligar or other person of local influence often had himself recog-
nised as a head-kavalgar controlling the village kavalgars throughout
his sphere of influence and sharing their emoluments. In one or two
districts this system was reported to work well, but in general it
seems to have been a convenience to the criminal classes rather
than to the cultivators.
But if the sovereign concerned himself little with most aspects
of his subjects' lives, his interests in the produce of their agriculture
was close and persistent. Everywhere a share in the produce of the
land was claimed either by the sovereign, or by a grantee of the land
revenue deriving his right from the sovereign, or by a zamindar or
poligar who claimed this among other rights of sovereignty. In the
absence of any court of law, the nature of the sovereign's rights and
the cultivators' tenure was determined not by law but by the interplay
of three forces the power of the sovereign, the custom of the village,
1 Ct. Gleig, Munro, I. 405 sqq.
## p. 465 (#493) ############################################
POSITION OF THE RYOT
465
ana the economic condition of the district. The Hindu family system
and the lack of stock tended to divide up the land into small holdings.
In many villages, especially in the irrigated tracts, there was a tradi-
tion of a joint settlement and a common ancestry, and the whole
village was owned in shares, the lands in some of them being periodi-
cally redistributed. In such villages there was a habit of common
action which enabled the villagers to oppose a certain resistance to
the sovereign and his agents. Elsewhere rights were derived from the
individual occupation of waste land, and the power of resistance was
very small. Almost everywhere there was more cultivable land than
could be cultivated by the labour and stock of the inhabitants.
The
ruler therefore had seldom any reason to assert a claim to the land
itself or to oust a cultivator from it. His anxiety was to find cultivators
for the land and to secure the largest possible share of the product
of their industry. The share of the crop which he succeeded in
obtaining was usually so high as to leave the cultivator no more than
a bare subsistence. This, taken together with the presence of land
waiting to be brought under cultivation, prevented the land from
acquiring any saleable value except in Tanjore and in a few other
specially favoured localities. The cultivator therefore had all the
security of tenure that he desired. Hereditary rights were seldom in
question. The ryot was more concerned to assert his right to relin-
quish a holding-a right which the amildar was at pains to deny. To
the ruler's demands for an increasing land revenue the cultivator
could oppose an ill-defined village custom and sometimes the records
of an old assessment which showed what the cultivator ought to pay.
But the state's admitted share was itself very high, amounting often
to more than half the whole crop; and the cultivator was unable to
resist the imposition of all manner of extra cesses to meet the needs
of the ruler, the amildar and the village officers. It was said that in
practice the ruler and his agents took all that they could get, some-
times even the whole crop, and that the cultivator often kept no more
than he could conceal. But it must be remembered that, in the
circumstances of the time, it was easy for the cultivators to conceal
the extent of cultivation and to misrepresent the out-turn of their
crops. The village accountants and the revenue underlings who esti-
mated or measured the out-turn could usually be propitiated at no
very extravagant cost. At the opening of our period the uncertainty
and the inequality of the incidence of the demand was probably at
least as great an evil as the magnitude of the total sum collected.
To prevent fraud, it was clearly in the interest of the ruler that
his claim should be commuted for a fixed sum of money or a fixed
quantity of grain payable annually in good and bad seasons alike,
and in some districts there were in the hands of the village account-
1 Ellis, Mirassi Paper, ap: Rev. and Jud. Sel. I, 810.
2 Graeme's Report on N. Arcot, 31 March, 1818, ap. Rev. and Jud. Sel. 1, 959. ,
30
## p. 466 (#494) ############################################
466
MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE
ants records of old surveys in which the sum payable on each field or
on each holding was defined. Elsewhere attempts had been made to
fix the sum payable by each village. But so long as the state's
demand in average years left the cultivators little more than'a bare
subsistence, it could not be paid in bad years. The revenue underlings
and the village officers opposed a system which tended to curtail the
sources of illegitimate gain; and the cultivators feared that the fixed
demand might operate merely as a minimum and would not protect
them against extra cesses.
The most important crop in South India was the rice crop
cultivated on the irrigated lands. The state's share of this crop was
usually calculated each year in grain. The villagers were sometimes
required to buy back the state share at a price fixed at the discretion
of the sovereign's agent. Sometimes the state's share was stored in
granaries to be consumed by the state servants, or sold when prices
rose. To eliminate competition the villagers were often forbidden to
sell their grain till the state had disposed of its stock. The unirrigated
lands of South India were far more extensive than the irrigated. A
great variety of crops was raised and many of these crops were har-
vested piecemeal. To assess, collect, store and market the state's
share in all these crops would have been an impossible task. It was
therefore commuted for a money payment. This was sometimes
fixed on each field, sometimes for each kind of crop cultivated; and
sometimes it varied with the state of the season.
The net result was that every year saw a struggle between the
state's agent and the villagers to raise or lower the assessment, and
a good crop well cultivated might cost the village dear. When the
demand on the whole village had been fixed for the year, the appor-
tionment of it among the villagers was usually left to the discretion
of the village headmen, or other principal inhabitants, who might
or might not be charitably disposed to the poor, but were very
unlikely to encourage exceptional enterprise, industry, or thrift.
There was thus everything to discourage improvement and the
cultivator lost all interest in his land. So much was this the case that
there had grown up among the revenue officers a tradition that the
cultivator was idle, and that it was their duty to drive him and to
force him to cultivate more land than he was willing to be responsible
for. The cultivator on his side was often on the look-out for an
opportunity to relinquish old land in order to take up waste that
happened to be more leniently assessed. He would even leave his
village for this purpose. Indeed the most effective check on the
activities of the revenue officers was the readiness of the cultivator
to fly to some adjoining district where the administration was less
exacting.
1 Revenue letter from Madras, 6 February, 1810, ap. Rev. and Jud. Sel. I, 502.
2 Cf. Moreland, India at the death of Akbar, p. 97.
## p. 467 (#495) ############################################
SAIR REVENUE
467
Beside the land revenue there were a host of miscellaneous taxes,
licences and monopolies, designed to secure the sovereign a share in
the income arising from every source.
Thus there were taxes on
houses, on looms, on oil presses, on stonemasons, on dancing girls,
and on most petty industries; taxes on forest produce; monopolies
of salt, of liquor, and of ghee, and duties on the transport of goods.
The revenue derived from these sources was small, partly because
of the prevailing poverty, partly because the machinery for collection
was neither trustworthy nor efficient. By far the most important of
these miscellaneous taxes were the duties levied on the transport of
goods. The right to levy these taxes was usually farmed out. The rates
of duty and the location of the stations at which they were levied
were governed partly by custom, partly by the discretion of the
farmer. The stations were very numerous. On some routes they
were on the average not more than ten miles apart, and duties had to
be paid at each one. But trade is more easily killed or frightened
away than agriculture, and the farmers of the transit duties were
therefore less oppressive than the land revenue officials. 1
In European eyes the three radical evils in South India were
the insubordination of the zamindars and poligars, the lack of
recognised laws and law courts, and the uncertainties of the land
revenue system. Since 1775 the court of directors had been pressing
the Madras Government to take steps towards correcting these evils
in the territories under their control, that is in the Northern Sarkars
and the jagir. But when Lord Cornwallis came to India, there was
as yet little to distinguish the administration of these territories from
that of the adjoining native states. A blank ignorance of the people,
their customs, and their languages, inclined the Company's servants
to give unlimited discretion to the persons whom they chose to
exercise authority in their stead. All business was transacted through
interpreters. There was no incentive to exertion. Money was the
chief consideration, and it could only be acquired by corrupt means.
But a new spirit was soon to be infused. In 1792, the defeat of Tipu
Sultan and the annexation of the Baramahal and Dindigul to the
Madras Presidency made it plain that the administration of the
Company's territories would henceforth be the chief duty of the
Company's servants, and that there was a career for those who
equipped themselves for this work. A stimulus to industry was
supplied by the fact that for lack of civil servants with a knowledge
of the languages and customs of the people, Captain Read with three
military assistants was appointed to take charge of the land revenue
administration of the Baramahal. A central Board of Revenue had
betn set up in 1786, and the working of the new spirit led it to fall
foul of the corrupt and inefficient chiefs and councils in the Northern
1 Cf. Baramahal Records, section VII.
2 Fifth Report of 1812, pp. 78 sqq.
3 Arbuthnot, Selections, p. xxxvii.
## p. 468 (#496) ############################################
468
MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE
Sarkars, who had allowed their territories to go from bad to worse,
obstructing every effort towards reform. In 1794, the governor of
Madras, Lord Hobart, was induced to abolish, these authorities and
to substitute district collectors, subordinate to the Board of Revenue.
In the same year the whole of the jagir was put under a single
collector, Lionel Place. The district collector, having an interest in
his work and exercising a wide discretionary authority much the
same as that which was vested in the amildar under native rulers,
soon showed himself far better fitted to overawe opposition and to
obtain information than the councils and committees that had
preceded him. ” Light began to flow in on the foundations of the land
revenue system, the land tenures, and the customs of the villages.
These things had hitherto been regarded as impenetrable mysteries,
but the district officers now began to understand them, and to see
that it was possible and advantageous to work through the indigenous
institutions, reforming and adapting them to suit their ends.
In the jagir, Place found the villages owned in heritable shares
by mirasdars who exercised the right of disposing of their shares by
mortgage, gift, or sale. This discovery upset the then accepted theory
that the state was the owner of the soil
, and that the cultivator was
little more than a tenant-at-will with at most a preferential right
to cultivate on the terms which the state chose to offer. The principal
mirasdars had been accustomed to act together on behalf of the
village, and it was found convenient and profitable to abandon the
old practice of renting out the jagir in parcels to speculators, and to
settle instead with the mirasdars of each village for a lump sum
calculated to be equivalent to the state's share of the crop. Place
exerted himself to restore the efficiency of the village accountants, and
he acquired a close knowledge of the affairs of the villages under his
control. The system, therefore, worked smoothly enough and gave an
increasing revenue during the four years of his administration.
A similar system was applied in the government villages in the
Northern Sarkars. But the results there were less satisfactory, partly
because the villagers were less capable of joint action, partly because
the collectors had not Place's knowledge.
The conditions with which Read had to deal in the Baramahal
were widely different from those which Place had found in the jagir.
In the latter was a tradition of an original colonisation, and the
mirasdars of each village traced their titles to a joint-occupation of its
lands. The main crop was rice, which was threshed on a common
threshing-floor. The state's share was calculated in grain on the total
produce of the village, and its amount or its equivalent in cash was
demanded in the lump from the village, the apportionment of the
a
1 Fifth Report of 1812, pp. 89-90, and App. 14.
2 Idem, App. 16; ct. Wellesley Despatches. I, 230.
## p. 469 (#497) ############################################
ALEXANDER READ
469
demand being left entirely to the mirasdars. But in the Baramahal
the rice crop was of minor importance. The majority of the cultiva-
tors drew their living from the unirrigated lands. The population was
sparse, the waste lands extensive, and titles were derived from the
individual's occupation of waste. The ties which bound the villagers
together were therefore comparatively weak, and the habit of joint
action less highly developed. Instead of a committee of the principal
mirasdars, there was a village headman who collected the state's dues,
sometimes in his capacity as a state servant, sometimes as the renter
who had leased the village from the amildar. In either case he dealt
separately with each individual cultivator, and each cultivator's dues
were assessed and paid in cash. Read was a man of extraordinary
integrity and industry. He studied the history and the details of the
land revenue system in force in his district, and observed its effect
on the cultivators. The scheme which he devised for its reform based
itself on existing practice and deviated but little from the lines
marked out by the best Indian administrators in dealing with such
tracts. He determined to dispense with all renters and middlemen,
and to deal direct with the individual cultivator through his own
servants, among whom he included the village accountant and the
village headman. To relieve the cultivator from all uncertainty, to
give him confidence, and to protect his improvements, he wished to
fix the land revenue due from each field once for all in terms of
money, and to leave the cultivator free to take up or relinquish such
fields as he chose. For this purpose a detailed survey field by field was
necessary, and such a survey was undertaken and carried through.
Read actually published a proclamation outlining his scheme of land
revenue administration, and promising the cultivators an assessment
fixed in perpetuity. His proclamation was neither confirmed nor can-
celled by superior authority. He was left in the district and tried
to give effect to his plan. But he had made certain miscalculations.
In proposing to fix a money assessment in perpetuity he had ignored
the chance of a permanent change in the price of grain. In fact the
fall in the price of grain during the next fifty years would have con-
verted even a moderate money assessment into an intolerable
burden. But the standard of assessment which Read took for his
guidance was far too high for the success of his scheme; he took
into consideration the theoretic claim of the state, which in this
district was usually about half the crop, and the actual collections
made by Tipu; he aimed at fixing rates that would be a little below
the average collections made by Tipu. But by discovering concealed
cultivation and improving the machinery of collection he actually
drew from the country as much as Tipu and his officers had drawn
to prepare for war and to satisfy private greed. To maintain taxation
1 Arbuthnot, Selections, pp. xxxix-xl; cf. Munro to his father, 21 Septem-
ber, 1798, ap. Gleig, Munro, I, 204.
## p. 470 (#498) ############################################
470
MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE
at such a level would have been a fatal obstacle to improvement, and,
a
even if improvement had been no object, it was simply impossible to
collect such an assessment in bad seasons from cultivators who had
no capital. Again, the agency which Read had at his disposal was
neither sufficiently trustworthy, nor sufficiently experienced, to make
a survey which could be accepted as final. The assessment was very
unequal, and required to be revised as mistakes came to light. The
result was that the plan of a fixed assessment was never rigidly
adhered to. Remissions had to be allowed on account of poverty,
loss of crops, loss of cattle, death of working members of the family,
and such like reasons. Nor did Read succeed in fulfilling his inten-
tion to protect the cultivator's improvements and give him full free-
dom to relinquish the land he did not want. Half a century had to
elapse before the obvious wisdom of Read's ideas could overcome
the bad traditions of the revenue administration.
But though Read's plan could not be carried into effect in its
entirety, it was worked in a modified form and gave good results.
Among Read's assistants was another soldier, Thomas Munro, who
was Read's equal in industry and integrity, and had besides a clear
head and a reflective disposition. After the fall of Seringapatam,
Munro was transferred to the newly annexed district of Kanara to
take charge of the land revenue administration there. Kanara was in
many respects very unlike the Baramahal, but the native land revenue
system had been even more definitely ryotwari. A money assessment
had been fixed on each holding centuries before and, though extra
assessments had been superimposed upon this, the original assessment
was still known and recorded. Munro was thus confirmed in the
belief that the ryotwari system was the indigenous system of South
India, and therefore presumably the system best suited to the needs
of the country. Under his direction it gave good results in Kanara.
There, too, Munro found surviving a strong sense of private property
in land, of which he had seen no trace in the Baramahal. He traced
the existence of this sense of property to the original low level of the
land assessment. He held that the development of this sense of
property was the only road to the improvement of the country. He
argued that it could not exist where, as in the Baramahal and through-
out the Carnatic districts, the assessment was so high as to swallow up
the whole of the economic rent, and thus became a steady advocate of
a policy of lowering the assessment. But he held that it was for
government to decide whether the standard of assessment should be
lowered to promote improvement, and that his duty as collector was to
be guided by the standard set up by previous rulers, taking care only
to see that his demand was not so high as to discourage the cultivator
or encroach upon his stock, and thereby occasion a future deterioration
of the revenue. Acting on this principle, he allowed at once a small
remission on his own responsibility, and recommended government
to grant a further remission later, though he gave reason to believe
## p. 471 (#499) ############################################
THE RYOTWARI SYSTEM
471
that the government's demand in Kanara was lower than that usual
on the east coast. 1
From Kanara, Munro was transferred in 1800 to the Deccan
districts newly ceded by Hyderabad. These districts were overrun
by poligars and extraordinarily lawless, but otherwise conditions
were not unlike those with which Munro had been familiar in the
Baramahal. The ryotwari system was clearly applicable. Starting
with four surveyors, and training his men as he went along, Munro
surveyed and assessed the tract field by field. As elsewhere the
standard assessment fixed was intended to be a little below the
average actual collections made under the native rulers. But the
tract had suffered from a decade of anarchy under the Nizam, and
Munro won the Board of Revenue's applause by the patience with
which he nursed its revenue, keeping the demand low at first and
raising it gradually to the standard as the ryots accumulated stock,
gained confidence, and extended their cultivation. Munro himself
was not wholly satisfied. He still held that a general lowering of the
standard of the assessment was the crying need of the country, and
he was alarmed by the pressure from above for increased revenue.
He obeyed this pressure, but when he left the district in 1807 he put
on record a recommendation for a 25 per cent. reduction in the
standard assessment.
In 1799 Tanjore and Coimbatore, and in 1801 Malabar and the
territory of the nawab of Arcot, were annexed to the Madras Presi-
dency. The ryotwari system of management was as a rule found
easily applicable, but in some tracts, notably in Tanjore, the village
organisation resembled that which Place had found in the jagir, and
village settlements were customary. But the Board of Revenue was
at this time much impressed by the tyranny exercised by the principal
inhabitants under the village settlements. Preference was therefore
given to the ryotwari system, and in 1805 it was at least nominally
in force in all these districts, and surveys had been or were being
carried out in most of them. Many of the collectors of districts had
been trained under Read or Munro, but not all of them showed
equal discretion in adapting the system to the circumstances of their
districts. In Malabar, Macleod provoked a fresh outbreak of rebellion
by trying to raise the land assessment nearer to the standard recog-
nised on the east coast, ignoring the peculiar history of Malabar
where the land tax was an innovation introduced after the Mysore
conquest. 3 In South Arcot the Board of Revenue supported the
collector in demanding a share in the crop which the government
later condemned as "excessive beyond measure and we hope beyond
1 Cf. Munro to Cockburn, 7. October, 1800, and to Read, 16 June, 1801, ap.
Gleig, Munro, I, 288, and II, 161.
2 Munro to Board of Revenue, 30 November, 1806, and 15 August, 1807,
ap. Rev. and Jud. Sel. I, 94 sqq. , and 115 sqq.
3 Logan, Malabar Manual, p. 540.
## p. 472 (#500) ############################################
472
MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE
example in other parts of the Company's territory”. Nowhere was it
found possible to give full effect to Read's original plan. Annual
settlements had everywhere to be made not only because cultivation
extended and shrank with the rainfall, but because the survey
assessment could only be treated as a maximum. Collectors had to
exercise their discretion freely in granting remissions in view of the
property of the cultivator or the failure of his crop. Still the system
did work. If the state demand was not rigidly fixed the collector had
a standard for his guidance in making the annual settlement. The
cultivator at least knew his maximum liability before he began to
sow, and later on he could get a bill under the collector's signature
showing the details of the demand upon him for the year. It was
thus easier for him to distinguish between authorised and unautho-
rised exactions, and to explain his grievance when he had been
wronged. Above all, the system had in itself the seed of improve-
ment. The government and the collector felt a direct responsibility
for all that was done or left undone in the assessment and collection
of the land revenue. They were therefore impelled to reform abuses
rather than to treat them as inevitable. The collectors were brought
into close touch with the affairs of the village. They learnt to know
something cf the cultivator's needs, his rights, and the wrongs he
suffered. They had to make frequent reports to the Board of Revenue,
and a store of experience and information thus accumulated steadily
year after year.
Where the ryotwari system was in force, civil and criminal justice
usually continued to be administered much as it had been under the
native rulers, the collector taking the place of the amildar. But the
authority of poligars and kavalgars in police matters was no longer
recognised, and the fees formerly paid to them were claimed by
government. Reliance was placed instead on the village headman
and the village watcher, who was restored to his emoluments where
these had been encroached upon by the kavalgar. The work that could
not be done by village police was entrusted to the collector's revenue
subordinates assisted where necessary by armed irregulars locally
levied. This concentration of all authority in the collector's hands
was useful not only in enabling him to overawe poligars and protect
the cultivator against their retainers, but also because it made it easier
to brush aside a rank growth of inconvenient customs such as that
by which the same village office might be shared among different
members of a family.
But before Place, Read, and Munro had had time to show what
could be done by working along the lines of indigenous systems, the
Bengal Government was pressing for the introduction into Madras of
the exotic revenue and judicial systems it had recently planted in
Bengal. The Madras Government wished to move slowly, but in
1 Malcolm to Lord Hobart, ap.
by Wellesley in 1799 gave still further powers of coercion to the
zamindars, and over them the former practice of arrest was reinstated.
The latter measure was a return to the procedure of Cornwallis, the
regulation of 1793 making the zamindar liable to arrest as well as to
the sale of his land having been amended by Shore. Now, in 1799,
the practice of personal coercion was restored, again with the object
of checking the flood of sales. Even so, Lord Minto found the same
defect, and attempted further to restrict sales by a regulation of 1807.
In fact the position was intrinsically difficult, and no mere regulation
would alter it. By Lord Minto's time the difficulties were beginning
to grow less, but this was due more to the greater goodwill of the
## p. 457 (#485) ############################################
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
457
zamindars than to the revised regulations. So long as the system was
regarded with suspicion the difficulties continued. In fact it is clear
that in the years following its establishment the Permanent Settlement
was neither profitable to government nor popular with the people.
Such advantages as it had did not begin to operate until a later time.
In his advocacy of the Permanent Settlement, Cornwallis had put
high among the advantages the freeing of the Company's servants
from their absorption in revenue matters. In fact the difficulties in
the working out of the system made the task of a collector much less
simple than had been intended. Moreover, the mass of revenue suits
filled the zillah courts beyond measure, and the old collectors who
were now judges in these courts were certainly no freer than before
to concern themselves with the interests of the people. One of the
first and most pressing changes was therefore the limitation of suits.
Various regulations with this object date from the years 1795-1802.
They start with the reimposition of a fee upon registering a suit. This
was the work of Shore, as was also the increase in the number of
courts, and of Indians qualified to settle minor suits. Then, under
Wellesley, the regulation as to appeals was stiffened, and assistant
judges were appointed. The seriousness of the pressure extended
even to the sadr court, and Lord Wellesley thought it undesirable that
the governor-general and council should continue to act as its judges.
A reorganisation therefore took place in 1805, and three judges took
over the responsibilities of the court. The reforms of Wellesley, like
those of Shore, did not stop the evil of delay. Lord Minto attempted
further to remedy it. In 1807 the number of judges in the sadr court
was increased to four : in 1811 it was enacted that the number of
district judges should be increased as necessity occurred. Another
expedient for remedying the congestion of business was the reorgani-
sation of the system of circuit. According to the regulations of 1793
the provincial court of appeal was necessarily closed while the three
judges went on circuit in their capacity of circuit judges. A regulation
of 1794 provided for the unbroken session of the court. A further
change of 1797 made possible the trial of appeal cases during the
absence of the judges on circuit. Similar congestion in the trials of
criminal cases was met by the increase in the power of magistrates
in petty cases, and by conferring on them the right of delegating
power to their assistants. Special rules for the punishment of dacoits
were enacted in 1807.
None of the changes, however, did more than palliate the evils of
the systein. These evils were still formidable when they were sub-
mitted to the clear scrutiny of the next few years.
The unhesitating acquiescence in the Cornwallis system ended in
1808, and the work of reform started in earnest five years later.
Unlike the act of 1793 the Charter Act of 1813 made important
changes in the position of the Company; and, again unlike that act,
## p. 458 (#486) ############################################
458
BENGAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM, 1786-1818
it was the result of the careful examination of several years. This new
reforin movement stated on 11 March, 1808, when Robert Dundas
moved the appointment of a select committee to enquire into the
affairs of the Company. The committee issued five reports, and the
fifth, issued in 1812, contained a detailed analysis of the Bengal
system. Together with its appendices (and with some of the material
contained in the second report of 1810), it is a valuable exposition
of the history and the results of the Cornwallis Code. Above all, it
makes clear some, if not all, of its defects.
The period of the Select Committee saw also the beginning of an
enquiry in Bengal. The defects of the early system forced themselves
especially on the judges of the courts, and in the summer of 1809
Lord Minto set on foot an enquiry as to the best lines of change. The
investigation, however, was not completed by him. In 1813 he was
succeeded by the Marquess of Hastings and it was in the ten years of
his rule that the most thorough enquiry was made. In 1813 the
Charter Act embodied one aspect of the new reform movement. On
9 November, 1814, a dispatch of the court of directors 1 emphasised
the other.
The act of 1813 abolished the Company's monopoly of trade in
India. The change in administration involved was not at first of
much importance, since the monopoly and not the trade was abolished.
The Board of Trade continued its work until 1835 : the commercial
residents remained at their factories, although their number decreased
as the trade diminished. The most immediate alteration was at the
presidency offices, for the act required a rigid separation of the
commercial and administrative accounts.
The instructions of 9 November, 1814, prescribed a far more
radical change. The pressure on the civil courts dictated a resumption
by the collector of his powers in civil justice : the difficulties found in
administering criminal justice and in the regulation of the police
demanded that the collectors should once more have magisterial
powers, and be responsible for the superintendence of the police. With
the same object of improving the administration of justice, additional
powers were to be given to Indian agents: and by increasing the
criminal jurisdiction of the zillah judges the pressure on the higher
courts would be relieved. At the same time the judicial interference
of the collector would serve to increase the protection of the ryots;
and with the latter object in view the Board of Control added a clause
to the directors' dispatch urging the observance "in all possible cases”
of "the principle of realising the revenues from the ryots themselves".
The recommendations of the dispatch were a denial of Cornwallis's
principles in several respects. If they. were carried out, the separation
11. 0. Records, Bengal Despatches, vol. LXVII, judicial Despatch of 9 Nov-
ember, 1814.
## p. 459 (#487) ############################################
FURTHER REFORMS
469
>
of revenue from judicial administration would once more disappear
The collector would resume in some measure his position of 1790 as
the bottle-neck through which all administration must pass. It was
impossible to set back the Permanent Settlement as fully as this, but
the dispatch showed at least that the authorities at home were alive
to its dangers. Even the prejudice of Cornwallis against the employ-
ment of Indians was set aside. Such revolutionary measures did not
commend themselves to the government of Bengal. The mistake of
Cornwallis in carrying out his reform without sufficient investigation
was not repeated. The new instructions were referred for opinion to
all the boards and courts in Bengal, and to the principal servants of
the Company. The repeated pressure of the court of directors did not
obtain an answer to their dispatch until 22 February, 1827, and then
in several respects the attitude of the government of India was more
conservative than that of the authorities at home.
In the meantime, however, much had been done to modify the
existing system. The period of Hastings's rule saw a number of
regulations which improved the working and loosened the rigidity
of Cornwallis's Code, while still paying rather more than lip-service
to his principles.
The first changes were already accomplished when the reforming
dispatch arrived. Regulations of 1813 and 1814 had provided a
fairly efficient police system for the large towns. In 1813, in the cities
of Dacca, Murshidabad and Patna, and in 1814 at the headquarters
of every district, police chowkidars were appointed under the control
of the superintendents of police. The system was said to be working
well in 1816. In 1817-19 the system of village watch was reformed.
These police reforms were regarded by the government as the most
urgent and the most satisfactory of the reforms.
The necessity for lessening the burden of the civil courts was met
by a series of measures. The powers of Indian munsiffs and sadar
amins in civil justice were defined in 1814 and extended in 1821. The
doctrine that no class of Indian officers should be vested with final
powers was, however, maintained, and other measures were necessary
to remedy the position. The procedure in appeal was laid down by
a regulation of 1814; and steps were taken to relieve the pressure in
the higher courts. The burden of the Calcutta appeal court was
diminished by the establishment of a separate court for the Western
Provinces, but the most important steps were the appointment of a
fifth judge and the systematic division of labour between the judges.
The difficulties of the lesser courts were met partly by the establish-
mert of special commissions to administer justice in the new parts of
the province. But the more effective measures for relief were the
increase in the number of zillah judges, and the transfer of certain
11. 0. Records, Bengal Letters Received, vol. LXX, Judicial Letter of 29
November, 1814.
## p. 460 (#488) ############################################
460
BENGAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM, 1786-1818
judicial functions to the revenue authorities. The latter expedient
was adopted very slowly, the proposal for the re-establishment of
mal adalats being disregarded. In unsettled districts the judicial
pcvvers of the collectors were fairly extensive, but they were still
slight in Bengal. There, the new powers were chiefly in connection
with the sale of liquor and the manufacture and sale of opium. Even
in Bengal, however, the collectors had some judicial business in
connection with the land revenue. In 1819 the collectors were autho-
rised to deal with cases relating to claims to freedom from assessment,
and in 1822 to rectify errors committed at the time of sales.
Closely connected with the measures to facilitate civil justice, are
those for the protection of the ryot. One of the chief reasons asserted
by the directors (and emphasised by the Board of Control) for
conferring power of civil justice on collectors had been the greater
protection that would be given to the ryot. The increased function
of the collectors would not be enough to secure this, and further
measures were urged. What was done was rather to prevent further
encroachment than to reverse what had already taken place. The
offices of kanungo and patwari were re-established in the years
1816-19, and the institution of the mufassal record committees aimed
at stabilising the position of the various classes concerned in land.
This was furthered also by the comprehensive definition of the rights
of the various classes concerned in land by regulation VIII of 1819.
That more was not lone was due to the fact that the Permanent
Settlement made a satisfactory system impossible.
The aspect of the directors' instructions to which least observance
was secured, was that which was concerned with criminal justice.
The principles of Cornwallis here died hard. As late as 1827 the
separation of the administration of criminal justice from the work of
the revenue officers was looked upon with respect as the chief
"principle on which the civil administration framed by Lord Corn-
wallis" was founded. The length of time that that system had been
in force made in itself a substantial argument against reversing it,
since the collectors of the 1820's were practically all without ex-
perience in judicial affairs. Another principle also was involved.
The collectors were assisted in most districts by Indian tahsildars,
and to entrust magisterial powers to them would be to abandon Corn-
wallis's refusal to vest real power in Indian hands. What was done
in this direction was therefore of a tentative character. In criminal
justice, as in civil, pressure of cases necessitated an increase in the
number of zillah judges and the addition of a fifth member in the
appeal court. But all that was done to meet the instructions to
reunite justice and revenue was the permissive regulation of 1821.
In 1818 the first step in this direction had been taken when three
collectors were specially empowered to act as magistrates. Now by
regulation r of 1821 such power might be granted to any collector.
at the discretion of the Supreme Government. In the following years
## p. 461 (#489) ############################################
CORNWALLIS'S WORK
461
a few collectors and sub-collectors were granted power under the
regulation.
When Hastings left India in 1823, despite his absorption in political
affairs, considerable changes had taken place in the system of Corn-
wallis. The chief need as Cornwallis estimated it was still no nearer
completion. “A good system of law” was not yet established, for
Sir William Jones had died in 1795, and little had been done to
continue his work. It is true that the code which Cornwallis had
promulgated had been simplified, and redrawn where its ambiguities
were greatest. But a vast body of new regulations had followed, and
the courts had piled up judicial precedents. No comprehensive code
had been issued : what had really been done was to follow up the
reforms of Cornwallis by further changes and experiments. In
criminal and civil justice, perhaps above all in the police system,
nd improvements had been made. The position of the collector
had once more been changed : for if he had not recovered the over-
whelming power of 1790, the degradation of 1793 had been consider-
ably mitigated. The collector was climbing back to his position as the
state's man of all work; and was well on his way to reach it in time to
be the chief instrument of the next reform movement. Yet much of
the work of Cornwallis was still standing. The building had been
extended and improved, and the original plans had been modified;
but all the early work had not been destroyed. The reforms of the
civil service had not needed to be done again. By this cleansing
of the administrative system, Cornwallis had established a lasting
tradition. After thirty years the best of his work, the result of his
uprightness and zeal for the public service, was still in being. In
spite of his mistakes, therefore, Cornwallis, like Warren Hastings,
had left a lasting impression on the system of government: and it
was one of the merits of his successors that they were slow to
experiment in change.
## p. 462 (#490) ############################################
CHAPTER XXVII
THE MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND
LAND REVENUE TO 1818
THROUGHOUT the eighteenth century up to the last decade
no power in South India felt itself secure enough to spare serious
attention for the improvement of the territories under its authority.
The more energetic rulers found their time fully occupied with the
task of suppressing rivals and rebels and raising the armies and
revenues necessary for this end. The rest were content to make hay
while the sun shone. Thus in time of peace the chief concern of every
ruler was the collection of the revenue and especially of the land
revenue, which usually produced more than nine-tenths of the total
state income. The insecurity of the ruler's position compelled him to
raise his demand as high as possible and to take the quickest and
easiest means of collecting what he claimed without thought for the
future. Checks and precautions were relaxed and abuses sprang up
on all sides. A strong ruler like Hyder of Mysore preferred to collect
through officers of his own appointment, amildars having jurisdiction
over large areas containing some hundreds of villages. The amildar
usually dealt with the village through the village headman and the
village accountant, whose records were supposed to show what the
villagers should by custom pay. As it was difficult to prevent the
village accountant from falsifying his accounts the amildar frequently
struck a bargain with the village headman, or, if he would not rise to
the amildar's terms, rented the village to a powerful outsider who
was left to collect what he could.
If the amildar could not trust the village officers, neither could
the ruler trust the amildar, who took presents and levied extra cesses
for which he rendered no account, securing the acquiescence of the
villagers partly by terror, partly by lowering the public demand on
the plea of a failure of the crop. Hyder met the difficulty by allowing
the amildars to grow rich and then fogging them till they disgorged.
Milder-mannered princes, such as the nawab. of Arcot, tended to
supplant the amildars by renting out whole districts to rich or
influential speculators. Where this was done, all the authority
formerly exercised by the amildar in practice devolved upon the
renter, since any restriction upon his proceedings was made an
excuse for withholding the sum contracted for. Neither the amildar
ncr the renter enjoyed any security of tenure. As a rule they looked
only for immediate profit regardless of longer views. 1
But South Indian rulers were not everywhere strong enough to
1 Srinivasaraghava Aiyangar, Memorandum, App. pp. xx sqq.
a
## p. 463 (#491) ############################################
THE POLIGARS
463
collect the revenue on the system which suited them best. Half the
Northern Sarkars and elsewhere many of the less accessible tracts
were under local chiefs who had never been completely subdued,
feudal nobles who had succeeded in retaining their feudal status, local
officials and adventurers with local influence who had seized power
and asserted a partial independence. These poligars and zamindars
exercised within their own territory all the functions of a sovereign,
even making war on their own account upon their peers. But they
acknowledged an obligation to pay tribute or peshkash to the sovereign
and to serve in his campaigns with a certain number of armed
retainers. The peshkash was sometimes fixed, sometimes it varied
from year to year with the state of cultivation. But its amount and
the regularity with which it was paid depended less upon the resources
of the poligar's territory than on the ease with which he could be
coerced.
Unlike the renters and the amildars the zamindars and poligars
had an hereditary interest in the territories under their control. But
their traditions and upbringing were as a rule essentially martial.
“Eat or be eaten” was the condition of their existence. Their grand
aims had always been to extend their territories at the expense of
their neighbours and to strengthen themselves to resist the central
power. Many of them were too spirited to exchange uncontrolled
if precarious authority for the assured income of a peaceful landlord,
and very few of them were capable of believing that the central power
would continue to allow them to intercept a share of the land revenue
once they had been disarmed. The central power usually aimed at
extirpating these territorial chiefs, as opportunity offered. Hyder
and Tipu of Mysore were especially active in pursuing this policy. It
is unlikely that the cultivators often regretted their poligar when he
was hanged. For he had to consider first the interests of his armed
retainers and he was often under the necessity of satisfying their
demands for arrears of pay by giving them authority to collect the
land revenue direct from the villages. 1
The workers of South India, the agriculturists and the artisans,
living for the most part in villages, hoped little and feared much from
their rulers. So narrow was the margin on which the cultivators were
living that advances of seed-grain had often to be made to enable them
to raise a crop. In many South Indian villages the land revenue
depends upon the upkeep of the irrigation works and some amildars
spent pains and money on this account. But as a rule the works seem
to have been neglected or maintained only by the villagers. Even
for protection the villagers relied chiefly on their own mud walls or
thorn fences which could be defended by stone-throwing against the
predatory horse and the camp followers of the period. Whether these
owed allegiance to an invading power or to the country's prince made
1 The Fifth Report of 1812, pp. 80 sqq.
## p. 464 (#492) ############################################
464
MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE
little difference in the feelings which they inspired among the villagers.
There were no made roads, no bridges, and no wheeled vehicles
outside a few large towns. Trade was carried on by pack cattle.
There was no code of law generally recognised as being in force; and
even where Hindu or Muhammadan law-books were supposed to have
authority, there were no regular courts in existence to interpret or
give effect to them, or to solidify custom and precedent into law.
Petty crime was dealt with by the village headman and most civil
disputes were settled in the village by the award of arbitrators or
by the decisions of village panchayats or juries. Caste offences were
punished by caste headmen or caste panchayats, the state only inter-
fering to raise revenue by leasing out the right to levy fines. Grave
crimes could be brought before the amildar, who might inflict any
punishment short of death. There were no gaols, and imprisonment
was not a recognised form of punishment. Mutilation for the poor
and fines for the rich were the order of the day. The proceedings of
the amildar were controlled not by law, but by his sense of equity.
The powers of the amildar were also exercised not only by zamindars
and poligars, but also by renters and military officers, and indeed by
any person who had at his command the force necessary to give effect
to his decision. The same authorities could sometimes be induced to
appoint arbitrators for the decision of important civil disputes. There
was always the possibility of an appeal to the sovereign, but access to
him was difficult, and the chance of a careful enquiry small. 1
For police in the more orderly tracts the villagers relied chiefly
on the hereditary village-watchman. But where criminal tribes or the
retainers of a poligar lived in the neighbourhood, they usually found
it expedient to invite one of their tormentors to become their kavalgar
or guard, and to pay him to save the village from theft, or at least to
obtain restitution of the stolen property for a reasonable consideration.
A poligar or other person of local influence often had himself recog-
nised as a head-kavalgar controlling the village kavalgars throughout
his sphere of influence and sharing their emoluments. In one or two
districts this system was reported to work well, but in general it
seems to have been a convenience to the criminal classes rather
than to the cultivators.
But if the sovereign concerned himself little with most aspects
of his subjects' lives, his interests in the produce of their agriculture
was close and persistent. Everywhere a share in the produce of the
land was claimed either by the sovereign, or by a grantee of the land
revenue deriving his right from the sovereign, or by a zamindar or
poligar who claimed this among other rights of sovereignty. In the
absence of any court of law, the nature of the sovereign's rights and
the cultivators' tenure was determined not by law but by the interplay
of three forces the power of the sovereign, the custom of the village,
1 Ct. Gleig, Munro, I. 405 sqq.
## p. 465 (#493) ############################################
POSITION OF THE RYOT
465
ana the economic condition of the district. The Hindu family system
and the lack of stock tended to divide up the land into small holdings.
In many villages, especially in the irrigated tracts, there was a tradi-
tion of a joint settlement and a common ancestry, and the whole
village was owned in shares, the lands in some of them being periodi-
cally redistributed. In such villages there was a habit of common
action which enabled the villagers to oppose a certain resistance to
the sovereign and his agents. Elsewhere rights were derived from the
individual occupation of waste land, and the power of resistance was
very small. Almost everywhere there was more cultivable land than
could be cultivated by the labour and stock of the inhabitants.
The
ruler therefore had seldom any reason to assert a claim to the land
itself or to oust a cultivator from it. His anxiety was to find cultivators
for the land and to secure the largest possible share of the product
of their industry. The share of the crop which he succeeded in
obtaining was usually so high as to leave the cultivator no more than
a bare subsistence. This, taken together with the presence of land
waiting to be brought under cultivation, prevented the land from
acquiring any saleable value except in Tanjore and in a few other
specially favoured localities. The cultivator therefore had all the
security of tenure that he desired. Hereditary rights were seldom in
question. The ryot was more concerned to assert his right to relin-
quish a holding-a right which the amildar was at pains to deny. To
the ruler's demands for an increasing land revenue the cultivator
could oppose an ill-defined village custom and sometimes the records
of an old assessment which showed what the cultivator ought to pay.
But the state's admitted share was itself very high, amounting often
to more than half the whole crop; and the cultivator was unable to
resist the imposition of all manner of extra cesses to meet the needs
of the ruler, the amildar and the village officers. It was said that in
practice the ruler and his agents took all that they could get, some-
times even the whole crop, and that the cultivator often kept no more
than he could conceal. But it must be remembered that, in the
circumstances of the time, it was easy for the cultivators to conceal
the extent of cultivation and to misrepresent the out-turn of their
crops. The village accountants and the revenue underlings who esti-
mated or measured the out-turn could usually be propitiated at no
very extravagant cost. At the opening of our period the uncertainty
and the inequality of the incidence of the demand was probably at
least as great an evil as the magnitude of the total sum collected.
To prevent fraud, it was clearly in the interest of the ruler that
his claim should be commuted for a fixed sum of money or a fixed
quantity of grain payable annually in good and bad seasons alike,
and in some districts there were in the hands of the village account-
1 Ellis, Mirassi Paper, ap: Rev. and Jud. Sel. I, 810.
2 Graeme's Report on N. Arcot, 31 March, 1818, ap. Rev. and Jud. Sel. 1, 959. ,
30
## p. 466 (#494) ############################################
466
MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE
ants records of old surveys in which the sum payable on each field or
on each holding was defined. Elsewhere attempts had been made to
fix the sum payable by each village. But so long as the state's
demand in average years left the cultivators little more than'a bare
subsistence, it could not be paid in bad years. The revenue underlings
and the village officers opposed a system which tended to curtail the
sources of illegitimate gain; and the cultivators feared that the fixed
demand might operate merely as a minimum and would not protect
them against extra cesses.
The most important crop in South India was the rice crop
cultivated on the irrigated lands. The state's share of this crop was
usually calculated each year in grain. The villagers were sometimes
required to buy back the state share at a price fixed at the discretion
of the sovereign's agent. Sometimes the state's share was stored in
granaries to be consumed by the state servants, or sold when prices
rose. To eliminate competition the villagers were often forbidden to
sell their grain till the state had disposed of its stock. The unirrigated
lands of South India were far more extensive than the irrigated. A
great variety of crops was raised and many of these crops were har-
vested piecemeal. To assess, collect, store and market the state's
share in all these crops would have been an impossible task. It was
therefore commuted for a money payment. This was sometimes
fixed on each field, sometimes for each kind of crop cultivated; and
sometimes it varied with the state of the season.
The net result was that every year saw a struggle between the
state's agent and the villagers to raise or lower the assessment, and
a good crop well cultivated might cost the village dear. When the
demand on the whole village had been fixed for the year, the appor-
tionment of it among the villagers was usually left to the discretion
of the village headmen, or other principal inhabitants, who might
or might not be charitably disposed to the poor, but were very
unlikely to encourage exceptional enterprise, industry, or thrift.
There was thus everything to discourage improvement and the
cultivator lost all interest in his land. So much was this the case that
there had grown up among the revenue officers a tradition that the
cultivator was idle, and that it was their duty to drive him and to
force him to cultivate more land than he was willing to be responsible
for. The cultivator on his side was often on the look-out for an
opportunity to relinquish old land in order to take up waste that
happened to be more leniently assessed. He would even leave his
village for this purpose. Indeed the most effective check on the
activities of the revenue officers was the readiness of the cultivator
to fly to some adjoining district where the administration was less
exacting.
1 Revenue letter from Madras, 6 February, 1810, ap. Rev. and Jud. Sel. I, 502.
2 Cf. Moreland, India at the death of Akbar, p. 97.
## p. 467 (#495) ############################################
SAIR REVENUE
467
Beside the land revenue there were a host of miscellaneous taxes,
licences and monopolies, designed to secure the sovereign a share in
the income arising from every source.
Thus there were taxes on
houses, on looms, on oil presses, on stonemasons, on dancing girls,
and on most petty industries; taxes on forest produce; monopolies
of salt, of liquor, and of ghee, and duties on the transport of goods.
The revenue derived from these sources was small, partly because
of the prevailing poverty, partly because the machinery for collection
was neither trustworthy nor efficient. By far the most important of
these miscellaneous taxes were the duties levied on the transport of
goods. The right to levy these taxes was usually farmed out. The rates
of duty and the location of the stations at which they were levied
were governed partly by custom, partly by the discretion of the
farmer. The stations were very numerous. On some routes they
were on the average not more than ten miles apart, and duties had to
be paid at each one. But trade is more easily killed or frightened
away than agriculture, and the farmers of the transit duties were
therefore less oppressive than the land revenue officials. 1
In European eyes the three radical evils in South India were
the insubordination of the zamindars and poligars, the lack of
recognised laws and law courts, and the uncertainties of the land
revenue system. Since 1775 the court of directors had been pressing
the Madras Government to take steps towards correcting these evils
in the territories under their control, that is in the Northern Sarkars
and the jagir. But when Lord Cornwallis came to India, there was
as yet little to distinguish the administration of these territories from
that of the adjoining native states. A blank ignorance of the people,
their customs, and their languages, inclined the Company's servants
to give unlimited discretion to the persons whom they chose to
exercise authority in their stead. All business was transacted through
interpreters. There was no incentive to exertion. Money was the
chief consideration, and it could only be acquired by corrupt means.
But a new spirit was soon to be infused. In 1792, the defeat of Tipu
Sultan and the annexation of the Baramahal and Dindigul to the
Madras Presidency made it plain that the administration of the
Company's territories would henceforth be the chief duty of the
Company's servants, and that there was a career for those who
equipped themselves for this work. A stimulus to industry was
supplied by the fact that for lack of civil servants with a knowledge
of the languages and customs of the people, Captain Read with three
military assistants was appointed to take charge of the land revenue
administration of the Baramahal. A central Board of Revenue had
betn set up in 1786, and the working of the new spirit led it to fall
foul of the corrupt and inefficient chiefs and councils in the Northern
1 Cf. Baramahal Records, section VII.
2 Fifth Report of 1812, pp. 78 sqq.
3 Arbuthnot, Selections, p. xxxvii.
## p. 468 (#496) ############################################
468
MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE
Sarkars, who had allowed their territories to go from bad to worse,
obstructing every effort towards reform. In 1794, the governor of
Madras, Lord Hobart, was induced to abolish, these authorities and
to substitute district collectors, subordinate to the Board of Revenue.
In the same year the whole of the jagir was put under a single
collector, Lionel Place. The district collector, having an interest in
his work and exercising a wide discretionary authority much the
same as that which was vested in the amildar under native rulers,
soon showed himself far better fitted to overawe opposition and to
obtain information than the councils and committees that had
preceded him. ” Light began to flow in on the foundations of the land
revenue system, the land tenures, and the customs of the villages.
These things had hitherto been regarded as impenetrable mysteries,
but the district officers now began to understand them, and to see
that it was possible and advantageous to work through the indigenous
institutions, reforming and adapting them to suit their ends.
In the jagir, Place found the villages owned in heritable shares
by mirasdars who exercised the right of disposing of their shares by
mortgage, gift, or sale. This discovery upset the then accepted theory
that the state was the owner of the soil
, and that the cultivator was
little more than a tenant-at-will with at most a preferential right
to cultivate on the terms which the state chose to offer. The principal
mirasdars had been accustomed to act together on behalf of the
village, and it was found convenient and profitable to abandon the
old practice of renting out the jagir in parcels to speculators, and to
settle instead with the mirasdars of each village for a lump sum
calculated to be equivalent to the state's share of the crop. Place
exerted himself to restore the efficiency of the village accountants, and
he acquired a close knowledge of the affairs of the villages under his
control. The system, therefore, worked smoothly enough and gave an
increasing revenue during the four years of his administration.
A similar system was applied in the government villages in the
Northern Sarkars. But the results there were less satisfactory, partly
because the villagers were less capable of joint action, partly because
the collectors had not Place's knowledge.
The conditions with which Read had to deal in the Baramahal
were widely different from those which Place had found in the jagir.
In the latter was a tradition of an original colonisation, and the
mirasdars of each village traced their titles to a joint-occupation of its
lands. The main crop was rice, which was threshed on a common
threshing-floor. The state's share was calculated in grain on the total
produce of the village, and its amount or its equivalent in cash was
demanded in the lump from the village, the apportionment of the
a
1 Fifth Report of 1812, pp. 89-90, and App. 14.
2 Idem, App. 16; ct. Wellesley Despatches. I, 230.
## p. 469 (#497) ############################################
ALEXANDER READ
469
demand being left entirely to the mirasdars. But in the Baramahal
the rice crop was of minor importance. The majority of the cultiva-
tors drew their living from the unirrigated lands. The population was
sparse, the waste lands extensive, and titles were derived from the
individual's occupation of waste. The ties which bound the villagers
together were therefore comparatively weak, and the habit of joint
action less highly developed. Instead of a committee of the principal
mirasdars, there was a village headman who collected the state's dues,
sometimes in his capacity as a state servant, sometimes as the renter
who had leased the village from the amildar. In either case he dealt
separately with each individual cultivator, and each cultivator's dues
were assessed and paid in cash. Read was a man of extraordinary
integrity and industry. He studied the history and the details of the
land revenue system in force in his district, and observed its effect
on the cultivators. The scheme which he devised for its reform based
itself on existing practice and deviated but little from the lines
marked out by the best Indian administrators in dealing with such
tracts. He determined to dispense with all renters and middlemen,
and to deal direct with the individual cultivator through his own
servants, among whom he included the village accountant and the
village headman. To relieve the cultivator from all uncertainty, to
give him confidence, and to protect his improvements, he wished to
fix the land revenue due from each field once for all in terms of
money, and to leave the cultivator free to take up or relinquish such
fields as he chose. For this purpose a detailed survey field by field was
necessary, and such a survey was undertaken and carried through.
Read actually published a proclamation outlining his scheme of land
revenue administration, and promising the cultivators an assessment
fixed in perpetuity. His proclamation was neither confirmed nor can-
celled by superior authority. He was left in the district and tried
to give effect to his plan. But he had made certain miscalculations.
In proposing to fix a money assessment in perpetuity he had ignored
the chance of a permanent change in the price of grain. In fact the
fall in the price of grain during the next fifty years would have con-
verted even a moderate money assessment into an intolerable
burden. But the standard of assessment which Read took for his
guidance was far too high for the success of his scheme; he took
into consideration the theoretic claim of the state, which in this
district was usually about half the crop, and the actual collections
made by Tipu; he aimed at fixing rates that would be a little below
the average collections made by Tipu. But by discovering concealed
cultivation and improving the machinery of collection he actually
drew from the country as much as Tipu and his officers had drawn
to prepare for war and to satisfy private greed. To maintain taxation
1 Arbuthnot, Selections, pp. xxxix-xl; cf. Munro to his father, 21 Septem-
ber, 1798, ap. Gleig, Munro, I, 204.
## p. 470 (#498) ############################################
470
MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE
at such a level would have been a fatal obstacle to improvement, and,
a
even if improvement had been no object, it was simply impossible to
collect such an assessment in bad seasons from cultivators who had
no capital. Again, the agency which Read had at his disposal was
neither sufficiently trustworthy, nor sufficiently experienced, to make
a survey which could be accepted as final. The assessment was very
unequal, and required to be revised as mistakes came to light. The
result was that the plan of a fixed assessment was never rigidly
adhered to. Remissions had to be allowed on account of poverty,
loss of crops, loss of cattle, death of working members of the family,
and such like reasons. Nor did Read succeed in fulfilling his inten-
tion to protect the cultivator's improvements and give him full free-
dom to relinquish the land he did not want. Half a century had to
elapse before the obvious wisdom of Read's ideas could overcome
the bad traditions of the revenue administration.
But though Read's plan could not be carried into effect in its
entirety, it was worked in a modified form and gave good results.
Among Read's assistants was another soldier, Thomas Munro, who
was Read's equal in industry and integrity, and had besides a clear
head and a reflective disposition. After the fall of Seringapatam,
Munro was transferred to the newly annexed district of Kanara to
take charge of the land revenue administration there. Kanara was in
many respects very unlike the Baramahal, but the native land revenue
system had been even more definitely ryotwari. A money assessment
had been fixed on each holding centuries before and, though extra
assessments had been superimposed upon this, the original assessment
was still known and recorded. Munro was thus confirmed in the
belief that the ryotwari system was the indigenous system of South
India, and therefore presumably the system best suited to the needs
of the country. Under his direction it gave good results in Kanara.
There, too, Munro found surviving a strong sense of private property
in land, of which he had seen no trace in the Baramahal. He traced
the existence of this sense of property to the original low level of the
land assessment. He held that the development of this sense of
property was the only road to the improvement of the country. He
argued that it could not exist where, as in the Baramahal and through-
out the Carnatic districts, the assessment was so high as to swallow up
the whole of the economic rent, and thus became a steady advocate of
a policy of lowering the assessment. But he held that it was for
government to decide whether the standard of assessment should be
lowered to promote improvement, and that his duty as collector was to
be guided by the standard set up by previous rulers, taking care only
to see that his demand was not so high as to discourage the cultivator
or encroach upon his stock, and thereby occasion a future deterioration
of the revenue. Acting on this principle, he allowed at once a small
remission on his own responsibility, and recommended government
to grant a further remission later, though he gave reason to believe
## p. 471 (#499) ############################################
THE RYOTWARI SYSTEM
471
that the government's demand in Kanara was lower than that usual
on the east coast. 1
From Kanara, Munro was transferred in 1800 to the Deccan
districts newly ceded by Hyderabad. These districts were overrun
by poligars and extraordinarily lawless, but otherwise conditions
were not unlike those with which Munro had been familiar in the
Baramahal. The ryotwari system was clearly applicable. Starting
with four surveyors, and training his men as he went along, Munro
surveyed and assessed the tract field by field. As elsewhere the
standard assessment fixed was intended to be a little below the
average actual collections made under the native rulers. But the
tract had suffered from a decade of anarchy under the Nizam, and
Munro won the Board of Revenue's applause by the patience with
which he nursed its revenue, keeping the demand low at first and
raising it gradually to the standard as the ryots accumulated stock,
gained confidence, and extended their cultivation. Munro himself
was not wholly satisfied. He still held that a general lowering of the
standard of the assessment was the crying need of the country, and
he was alarmed by the pressure from above for increased revenue.
He obeyed this pressure, but when he left the district in 1807 he put
on record a recommendation for a 25 per cent. reduction in the
standard assessment.
In 1799 Tanjore and Coimbatore, and in 1801 Malabar and the
territory of the nawab of Arcot, were annexed to the Madras Presi-
dency. The ryotwari system of management was as a rule found
easily applicable, but in some tracts, notably in Tanjore, the village
organisation resembled that which Place had found in the jagir, and
village settlements were customary. But the Board of Revenue was
at this time much impressed by the tyranny exercised by the principal
inhabitants under the village settlements. Preference was therefore
given to the ryotwari system, and in 1805 it was at least nominally
in force in all these districts, and surveys had been or were being
carried out in most of them. Many of the collectors of districts had
been trained under Read or Munro, but not all of them showed
equal discretion in adapting the system to the circumstances of their
districts. In Malabar, Macleod provoked a fresh outbreak of rebellion
by trying to raise the land assessment nearer to the standard recog-
nised on the east coast, ignoring the peculiar history of Malabar
where the land tax was an innovation introduced after the Mysore
conquest. 3 In South Arcot the Board of Revenue supported the
collector in demanding a share in the crop which the government
later condemned as "excessive beyond measure and we hope beyond
1 Cf. Munro to Cockburn, 7. October, 1800, and to Read, 16 June, 1801, ap.
Gleig, Munro, I, 288, and II, 161.
2 Munro to Board of Revenue, 30 November, 1806, and 15 August, 1807,
ap. Rev. and Jud. Sel. I, 94 sqq. , and 115 sqq.
3 Logan, Malabar Manual, p. 540.
## p. 472 (#500) ############################################
472
MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE
example in other parts of the Company's territory”. Nowhere was it
found possible to give full effect to Read's original plan. Annual
settlements had everywhere to be made not only because cultivation
extended and shrank with the rainfall, but because the survey
assessment could only be treated as a maximum. Collectors had to
exercise their discretion freely in granting remissions in view of the
property of the cultivator or the failure of his crop. Still the system
did work. If the state demand was not rigidly fixed the collector had
a standard for his guidance in making the annual settlement. The
cultivator at least knew his maximum liability before he began to
sow, and later on he could get a bill under the collector's signature
showing the details of the demand upon him for the year. It was
thus easier for him to distinguish between authorised and unautho-
rised exactions, and to explain his grievance when he had been
wronged. Above all, the system had in itself the seed of improve-
ment. The government and the collector felt a direct responsibility
for all that was done or left undone in the assessment and collection
of the land revenue. They were therefore impelled to reform abuses
rather than to treat them as inevitable. The collectors were brought
into close touch with the affairs of the village. They learnt to know
something cf the cultivator's needs, his rights, and the wrongs he
suffered. They had to make frequent reports to the Board of Revenue,
and a store of experience and information thus accumulated steadily
year after year.
Where the ryotwari system was in force, civil and criminal justice
usually continued to be administered much as it had been under the
native rulers, the collector taking the place of the amildar. But the
authority of poligars and kavalgars in police matters was no longer
recognised, and the fees formerly paid to them were claimed by
government. Reliance was placed instead on the village headman
and the village watcher, who was restored to his emoluments where
these had been encroached upon by the kavalgar. The work that could
not be done by village police was entrusted to the collector's revenue
subordinates assisted where necessary by armed irregulars locally
levied. This concentration of all authority in the collector's hands
was useful not only in enabling him to overawe poligars and protect
the cultivator against their retainers, but also because it made it easier
to brush aside a rank growth of inconvenient customs such as that
by which the same village office might be shared among different
members of a family.
But before Place, Read, and Munro had had time to show what
could be done by working along the lines of indigenous systems, the
Bengal Government was pressing for the introduction into Madras of
the exotic revenue and judicial systems it had recently planted in
Bengal. The Madras Government wished to move slowly, but in
1 Malcolm to Lord Hobart, ap.
