Therefore no
venereal
act can be without sin.
Summa Theologica
There is the
duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind
cannot be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by
the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding
on each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many obligations
which cannot be discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one
person doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of
natural law which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each
individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other
hand, the precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men,
which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance
spiritually. Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human
multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while
others abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of
Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus
too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and
others fight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the
multitude, although they cannot be done by one person.
Reply to Objection 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right
reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for
pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does
not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal:
and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now
the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to
right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of the
magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that "in point of quantity he goes to the
extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows the mean. "
Reply to Objection 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more
frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained
from all venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth:
as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence it was not through
thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but "because he yielded
to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen," as Augustine remarks
(De Vera Relig. iii).
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Whether virginity is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For "no
virtue is in us by nature," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now
virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born.
Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated
above ([3515]FS, Q[65], A[1]). Yet some have other virtues without
having virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom
without virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would
involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But
virginity is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii
ad Eustoch. ]: "Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the
virgin after her downfall. " Therefore seemingly virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is
lost without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and
conjugal purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of virginity
moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we
should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree. "
I answer that, As stated above [3516](A[1]), the formal and completive
element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal
pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far,
to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things:
while the material element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free
of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a
good action has a special matter through having a special excellence,
there is a special kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is
about great expenditure is for this reason a special virtue distinct
from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to
keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an
excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself
free from inordinate venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a
special virtue being related to chastity as magnificence to liberality.
Reply to Objection 1: Men have from their birth that which is material
in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal
experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely
the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake, which
purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says
(De Virgin. xi): "Nor do we praise virgins for being virgins, but,
because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy continency. "
Reply to Objection 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that
which is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as
stated above ([3517]Q[129], A[3], ad 2), but not by reason of that
which is material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from
providing the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another
virtue: thus a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of
magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues
lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the
flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity, his
mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this
same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so:
even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose of
being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so:
or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in mind as to purpose
bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the
mind no man can be virtuous.
Reply to Objection 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards
that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material
therein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does
not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person
who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of
virginity but the purpose of virginity.
As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be
miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, which
we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else
which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who has
experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For
God cannot make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in
the [3518]FP, Q[25] , A[4].
Reply to Objection 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose,
confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says
(De Virgin. viii) that "by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed,
consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and
flesh. " Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely
because it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence
attaches to it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however,
adds something to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that
which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal
pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity alone is
accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is reckoned
above liberality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than
marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): "Continence was
equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who
begot children. " Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore
virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.
Objection 2: Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his
virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence, it
would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than any
married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not
preferable to marriage.
Objection 3: Further, the common good takes precedence of the private
good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is
directed to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi):
"What food is to a man's wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse to the
welfare of the human race. " On the other hand, virginity is ordered to
the individual good, namely in order to avoid what the Apostle calls
the "tribulation of the flesh," to which married people are subject (1
Cor. 7:28). Therefore virginity is not greater than conjugal
continence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): "Both solid reason
and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful,
nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or even to
that of widowhood. "
I answer that, According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of
Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to
marriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who
both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and
by the teaching of the Apostle who (1 Cor. 7) counsels virginity as the
greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good
takes precedence of a human good, and because the good of the soul is
preferable to the good of the body, and again because the good of the
contemplative life is better than that of the active life. Now
virginity is directed to the good of the soul in respect of the
contemplative life, which consists in thinking "on the things of God"
[Vulg. : 'the Lord'], whereas marriage is directed to the good of the
body, namely the bodily increase of the human race, and belongs to the
active life, since the man and woman who embrace the married life have
to think "on the things of the world," as the Apostle says (1 Cor.
7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to conjugal
continence.
Reply to Objection 1: Merit is measured not only by the kind of action,
but still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so
disposed, that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in
keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal
continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of
John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards the
accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that both
"the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought Christ's
battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but John was
continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in habit. "
Reply to Objection 2: Though virginity is better than conjugal
continence, a married person may be better than a virgin for two
reasons. First, on the part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married
person is more prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be
expedient, than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De
Bono Conjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: "I am no better than
Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity
of marriage. " Further on he gives the reason for this: "For what I do
now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him to do it
then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved me now to do
it. " Secondly, because perhaps the person who is not a virgin has some
more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. xliv):
"Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to the Lord, however
solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account of some mental
fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this woman to whom she
delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink the chalice of
the Lord? "
Reply to Objection 3: The common good takes precedence of the private
good, if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good
is better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is
consecrated to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence
Augustine says (De Virgin. ix): "It must be confessed that the
fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those women who in these times seek
naught else from marriage but children in order to make them servants
of Christ, cannot compensate for lost virginity. "
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Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues.
For Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg. ]): "We address ourselves
now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less exalted is
their vocation. They are a flower of the Church's sowing, the pride and
ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion of Christ's
flock. "
Objection 2: Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue.
Now the greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold
fruit, according to a gloss on Mat. 13:23. Therefore virginity is the
greatest of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the
greater it is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is
declared in the Apocalypse 14:4 that virgins "follow the Lamb
whithersoever He goeth," and (Apoc. 14:3) that they sing "a new
canticle," which "no" other "man" could say. Therefore virginity is the
greatest of the virtues.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): "No one, methinks,
would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom," and (De Virgin. xlv): "The
authority of the Church informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so
that they know in what place the martyrs and the holy virgins who have
departed this life are commemorated in the Sacrament of the Altar. " By
this we are given to understand that martyrdom, and also the monastic
state, are preferable to virginity.
I answer that, A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in some
particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely in the
genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood
and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to chastity
antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is ascribed to
chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 7): "Can anyone esteem
any beauty greater than a virgin's, since she is beloved of her King,
approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God? "
Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply, and in this way
virginity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the end
always excels that which is directed to the end; and the more
effectively a thing is directed to the end, the better it is. Now the
end which renders virginity praiseworthy is that one may have leisure
for Divine things, as stated above [3519](A[4]). Wherefore the
theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion, the acts of
which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are preferable to
virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in order to cleave to
God---since for this end they hold their own life in contempt; and
those who dwell in monasteries---since for this end they give up their
own will and all that they may possess---than virgins who renounce
venereal pleasure for that same purpose. Therefore virginity is not
simply the greatest of virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Virgins are "the more honored portion of Christ's
flock," and "their glory more sublime" in comparison with widows and
married women.
Reply to Objection 2: The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity,
according to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch. ], on account of its
superiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, and
to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But according
to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), "the hundredfold fruit is given to
martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to married
persons. " Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is simply the
greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other degrees of
chastity.
Reply to Objection 3: Virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,"
because they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but also
of the flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they
follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they follow
more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more closely
by imitation of the mind. The "new hymn" which virgins alone sing, is
their joy at having preserved integrity of the flesh.
__________________________________________________________________
OF LUST (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity:
(1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of lust?
(2) Whether all copulation is unlawful?
(3) Whether lust is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether lust is a capital vice?
(5) Concerning its daughters.
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Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures?
Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal
desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "lust
affects to be called surfeit and abundance. " But surfeit regards meat
and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not
properly about venereal desires and pleasures.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:1): "Wine is a lustful
[Douay: 'luxurious'] thing. " Now wine is connected with pleasure of
meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.
Objection 3: Further, lust is defined "as the desire of wanton
pleasure" [*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton
pleasure regards not only venereal matters but also many others.
Therefore lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.
On the contrary, To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii
[*Written by St. Augustine]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the
flesh shall reap corruption. " Now the sowing of the flesh refers to
venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), "a lustful man is one who is
debauched with pleasures. " Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a
man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like
pleasures.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies
to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is
referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal
pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a
man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining
to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says "lust is any kind of
surfeit. "
Reply to Objection 2: Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the
sense in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because
the use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: Although wanton pleasure applies to other
matters, the name of lust has a special application to venereal
pleasures, to which also wantonness is specially applicable, as
Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 15,16).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether no venereal act can be without sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For
nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is
a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I
consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as
the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts. " Therefore,
seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.
Objection 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of
reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and
"deficiency" as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there
is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is
incompatible with the act of understanding," as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num. ; Cf.
Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch. ] states, rendered the hearts of the
prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy.
Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
Objection 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now
original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which
no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup.
i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a
sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin
is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a
commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between
the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every
venereal act is a sin.
I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order
of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything
to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the
dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and
order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be
something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature
of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the preservation of the
nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of
food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is
the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole
human race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is
to a man's well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the
whole human race. " Wherefore just as the use of food can be without
sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the
welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without
sin, provided they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping
with the end of human procreation.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways.
First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing
but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect
degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which
is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse casts
down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, i. e. the perfection
of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. viii): "Just as that
was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better
still that which Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we
praise the good of Susanna's conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good
of the widow Anna, and much more that of the Virgin Mary. "
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[152], A[2], ad 2; [3520]FS,
Q[64], A[2]), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on
conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure
attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not
opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with
the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this
depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the
interior appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that
the act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free
act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the
aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of
reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in
accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to
set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are not
subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the
punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling
against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the
child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence
(which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of
sin. " Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but
that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a
sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is
the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i,
18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other
superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.
Objection 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of
what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own,
except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in
venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly,
no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.
On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine
is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle
(Eph. 5:18), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay:
'luxury']. " Therefore lust is forbidden.
Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19 [Douay:
'luxury'].
I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one
to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful
it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal
acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for the
common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there
is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this
matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the
dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists
essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of
venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De
Gener. Anim. i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed. " For it is
said to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of
the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative
power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not to
be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one
observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the emission
of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end
for which it is needed.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:20) in speaking
against lust, "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God
in your body. " Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a
man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine
says (De Decem. Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp. )]): "God Who thus
governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and
commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which
thou hast begun to be. "
Reply to Objection 3: The opposite of lust is not found in many, since
men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised
under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for
sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether lust is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is
apparently the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on Eph. 5:3
(Cf. 2 Cor. 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony,
according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital
vice.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as
pride of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind
safeguard the chastity of the flesh. " Now it is seemingly contrary to
the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust
is not a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Eph.
4:19, "Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness. " But
despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of
sloth, as stated above ([3521]Q[35], A[4], ad 2). Much less, therefore,
is lust a capital vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the
capital vices.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[148], A[5]; [3522]FS, Q[84],
AA[3],4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that
through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all of
which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now
the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore
this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both
on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and because such like
concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust
is a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3523]Q[148], A[6]), according
to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a
certain uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the
point. If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply
that it is caused by gluttony materially---in so far as gluttony
provides the bodily matter of lust---and not under the aspect of final
cause, in which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the
cause of others.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3524]Q[132], A[4], ad 1), when
we were treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of
all sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures
chiefly through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by
despair, so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle
thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary
for a capital vice.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?
Objection 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly
reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy,
rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence
or despair of a future world. " For mental blindness, thoughtlessness
and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin,
even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be
reckoned especially as daughters of lust.
Objection 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as
stated above (Q[128], ad 6;[3525] Q[137], A[3]). But lust is contrary,
not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a
daughter of lust.
Objection 3: Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is
the origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).
Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.
Objection 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut. , qu. xvi] mentions four,
namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking. " There
the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their
objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and
disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that
the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent
on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the
vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the
reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.
Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is
simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act
is hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived
thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart. " In this respect we have
"blindness of mind. " The second act is counsel about what is to be done
for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence
of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. , act 1, sc. 1), speaking of
lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation,
thou canst not control it by counseling. " In this respect there is
"rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above
([3526]Q[53], A[3]). The third act is judgment about the things to be
done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful
old men (Dan. 13:9): "They perverted their own mind . . . that they
might not . . . remember just judgments. " In this respect there is
"thoughtlessness. " The fourth act is the reason's command about the
thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as
through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from
doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" must
be referred. ] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine
edition. ] Hence Terence says (Eunuch. , act 1, sc. 1) of a man who
declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear will
undo those words. "
On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is
the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which regards
the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand
there is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the desired
pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the
end. With regard to this there is "love of this world," whose pleasures
a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is "despair of a
future world," because through being held back by carnal pleasures he
cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to
him.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5),
intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices
opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal
species of intemperance.
Reply to Objection 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude
regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from
pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as
stated above ([3527]Q[143]). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed
thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the
first named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter
enfeebles a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee
4:11, "Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay:
'understanding']. " Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the
less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death. "
Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters
of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. [3528] Q[35], A[4], ad
2;[3529] Q[118], A[8], ad 1;[3530] Q[148], A[6]).
Reply to Objection 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a man
desires for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the
special point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned
a daughter of lust.
Reply to Objection 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate
external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a
fourfold inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this
we refer "obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart
the mouth speaketh" (Mat. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full
of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly,
on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and
rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or
giving a thought to his words. which are described as "scurrilous. "
Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks
pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to
"wanton words. " Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his
words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's
sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for instance, by
expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PARTS OF LUST (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are
twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Into what parts is lust divided?
(2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like
seduction?
(5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?
(6) Of seduction;
(7) Of rape;
(8) Of adultery;
(9) Of incest;
(10) Of sacrilege;
(11) Of the sin against nature;
(12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.
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Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to
lust, namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape,
and the unnatural vice. " For diversity of matter does not diversify the
species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of
matter, according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is
married or a virgin, or of some other condition. Therefore it seems
that the species of lust are diversified in this way.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not
differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does
not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man having
intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an injustice.
Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a species of
lust.
Objection 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with
a woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that
a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow.
Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as
adultery is.
Objection 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another
woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter sin
is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the
species thereof.
Objection 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): "Lest again,
when I come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them /that
sinned before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and
fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed. " Therefore it
seems that also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned
species of lust, as well as fornication.
Objection 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its
parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is
written (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are
fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']. " Therefore
it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust.
On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36,
qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].
I answer that As stated above ([3531]Q[153], A[3]), the sin of lust
consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right
reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter
wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due
matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a
circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is
derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the
species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.
duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind
cannot be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by
the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding
on each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many obligations
which cannot be discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one
person doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of
natural law which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each
individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other
hand, the precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men,
which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance
spiritually. Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human
multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while
others abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of
Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus
too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and
others fight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the
multitude, although they cannot be done by one person.
Reply to Objection 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right
reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for
pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does
not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal:
and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now
the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to
right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of the
magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that "in point of quantity he goes to the
extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows the mean. "
Reply to Objection 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more
frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained
from all venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth:
as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence it was not through
thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but "because he yielded
to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen," as Augustine remarks
(De Vera Relig. iii).
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Whether virginity is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For "no
virtue is in us by nature," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now
virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born.
Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated
above ([3515]FS, Q[65], A[1]). Yet some have other virtues without
having virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom
without virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would
involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But
virginity is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii
ad Eustoch. ]: "Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the
virgin after her downfall. " Therefore seemingly virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is
lost without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and
conjugal purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of virginity
moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we
should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree. "
I answer that, As stated above [3516](A[1]), the formal and completive
element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal
pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far,
to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things:
while the material element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free
of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a
good action has a special matter through having a special excellence,
there is a special kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is
about great expenditure is for this reason a special virtue distinct
from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to
keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an
excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself
free from inordinate venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a
special virtue being related to chastity as magnificence to liberality.
Reply to Objection 1: Men have from their birth that which is material
in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal
experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely
the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake, which
purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says
(De Virgin. xi): "Nor do we praise virgins for being virgins, but,
because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy continency. "
Reply to Objection 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that
which is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as
stated above ([3517]Q[129], A[3], ad 2), but not by reason of that
which is material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from
providing the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another
virtue: thus a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of
magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues
lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the
flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity, his
mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this
same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so:
even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose of
being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so:
or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in mind as to purpose
bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the
mind no man can be virtuous.
Reply to Objection 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards
that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material
therein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does
not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person
who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of
virginity but the purpose of virginity.
As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be
miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, which
we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else
which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who has
experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For
God cannot make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in
the [3518]FP, Q[25] , A[4].
Reply to Objection 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose,
confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says
(De Virgin. viii) that "by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed,
consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and
flesh. " Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely
because it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence
attaches to it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however,
adds something to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that
which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal
pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity alone is
accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is reckoned
above liberality.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than
marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): "Continence was
equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who
begot children. " Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore
virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.
Objection 2: Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his
virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence, it
would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than any
married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not
preferable to marriage.
Objection 3: Further, the common good takes precedence of the private
good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is
directed to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi):
"What food is to a man's wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse to the
welfare of the human race. " On the other hand, virginity is ordered to
the individual good, namely in order to avoid what the Apostle calls
the "tribulation of the flesh," to which married people are subject (1
Cor. 7:28). Therefore virginity is not greater than conjugal
continence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): "Both solid reason
and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful,
nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or even to
that of widowhood. "
I answer that, According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of
Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to
marriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who
both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and
by the teaching of the Apostle who (1 Cor. 7) counsels virginity as the
greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good
takes precedence of a human good, and because the good of the soul is
preferable to the good of the body, and again because the good of the
contemplative life is better than that of the active life. Now
virginity is directed to the good of the soul in respect of the
contemplative life, which consists in thinking "on the things of God"
[Vulg. : 'the Lord'], whereas marriage is directed to the good of the
body, namely the bodily increase of the human race, and belongs to the
active life, since the man and woman who embrace the married life have
to think "on the things of the world," as the Apostle says (1 Cor.
7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to conjugal
continence.
Reply to Objection 1: Merit is measured not only by the kind of action,
but still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so
disposed, that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in
keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal
continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of
John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards the
accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that both
"the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought Christ's
battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but John was
continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in habit. "
Reply to Objection 2: Though virginity is better than conjugal
continence, a married person may be better than a virgin for two
reasons. First, on the part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married
person is more prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be
expedient, than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De
Bono Conjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: "I am no better than
Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity
of marriage. " Further on he gives the reason for this: "For what I do
now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him to do it
then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved me now to do
it. " Secondly, because perhaps the person who is not a virgin has some
more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. xliv):
"Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to the Lord, however
solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account of some mental
fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this woman to whom she
delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink the chalice of
the Lord? "
Reply to Objection 3: The common good takes precedence of the private
good, if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good
is better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is
consecrated to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence
Augustine says (De Virgin. ix): "It must be confessed that the
fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those women who in these times seek
naught else from marriage but children in order to make them servants
of Christ, cannot compensate for lost virginity. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues.
For Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg. ]): "We address ourselves
now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less exalted is
their vocation. They are a flower of the Church's sowing, the pride and
ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion of Christ's
flock. "
Objection 2: Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue.
Now the greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold
fruit, according to a gloss on Mat. 13:23. Therefore virginity is the
greatest of the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the
greater it is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is
declared in the Apocalypse 14:4 that virgins "follow the Lamb
whithersoever He goeth," and (Apoc. 14:3) that they sing "a new
canticle," which "no" other "man" could say. Therefore virginity is the
greatest of the virtues.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): "No one, methinks,
would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom," and (De Virgin. xlv): "The
authority of the Church informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so
that they know in what place the martyrs and the holy virgins who have
departed this life are commemorated in the Sacrament of the Altar. " By
this we are given to understand that martyrdom, and also the monastic
state, are preferable to virginity.
I answer that, A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in some
particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely in the
genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood
and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to chastity
antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is ascribed to
chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 7): "Can anyone esteem
any beauty greater than a virgin's, since she is beloved of her King,
approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God? "
Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply, and in this way
virginity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the end
always excels that which is directed to the end; and the more
effectively a thing is directed to the end, the better it is. Now the
end which renders virginity praiseworthy is that one may have leisure
for Divine things, as stated above [3519](A[4]). Wherefore the
theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion, the acts of
which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are preferable to
virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in order to cleave to
God---since for this end they hold their own life in contempt; and
those who dwell in monasteries---since for this end they give up their
own will and all that they may possess---than virgins who renounce
venereal pleasure for that same purpose. Therefore virginity is not
simply the greatest of virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Virgins are "the more honored portion of Christ's
flock," and "their glory more sublime" in comparison with widows and
married women.
Reply to Objection 2: The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity,
according to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch. ], on account of its
superiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, and
to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But according
to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), "the hundredfold fruit is given to
martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to married
persons. " Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is simply the
greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other degrees of
chastity.
Reply to Objection 3: Virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,"
because they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but also
of the flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they
follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they follow
more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more closely
by imitation of the mind. The "new hymn" which virgins alone sing, is
their joy at having preserved integrity of the flesh.
__________________________________________________________________
OF LUST (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity:
(1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of lust?
(2) Whether all copulation is unlawful?
(3) Whether lust is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether lust is a capital vice?
(5) Concerning its daughters.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures?
Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal
desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "lust
affects to be called surfeit and abundance. " But surfeit regards meat
and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not
properly about venereal desires and pleasures.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:1): "Wine is a lustful
[Douay: 'luxurious'] thing. " Now wine is connected with pleasure of
meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.
Objection 3: Further, lust is defined "as the desire of wanton
pleasure" [*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton
pleasure regards not only venereal matters but also many others.
Therefore lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.
On the contrary, To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii
[*Written by St. Augustine]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the
flesh shall reap corruption. " Now the sowing of the flesh refers to
venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), "a lustful man is one who is
debauched with pleasures. " Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a
man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like
pleasures.
Reply to Objection 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies
to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is
referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal
pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a
man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining
to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says "lust is any kind of
surfeit. "
Reply to Objection 2: Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the
sense in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because
the use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: Although wanton pleasure applies to other
matters, the name of lust has a special application to venereal
pleasures, to which also wantonness is specially applicable, as
Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 15,16).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether no venereal act can be without sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For
nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is
a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I
consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as
the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts. " Therefore,
seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.
Objection 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of
reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and
"deficiency" as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there
is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is
incompatible with the act of understanding," as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num. ; Cf.
Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch. ] states, rendered the hearts of the
prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy.
Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
Objection 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now
original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which
no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup.
i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a
sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin
is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a
commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between
the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every
venereal act is a sin.
I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order
of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything
to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the
dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and
order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be
something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature
of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the preservation of the
nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of
food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is
the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole
human race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is
to a man's well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the
whole human race. " Wherefore just as the use of food can be without
sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the
welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without
sin, provided they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping
with the end of human procreation.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways.
First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing
but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect
degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which
is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse casts
down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, i. e. the perfection
of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. viii): "Just as that
was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better
still that which Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we
praise the good of Susanna's conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good
of the widow Anna, and much more that of the Virgin Mary. "
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[152], A[2], ad 2; [3520]FS,
Q[64], A[2]), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on
conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure
attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not
opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with
the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this
depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the
interior appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that
the act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free
act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the
aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of
reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in
accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to
set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are not
subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the
punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling
against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the
child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence
(which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of
sin. " Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but
that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.
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Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a
sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is
the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i,
18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other
superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.
Objection 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of
what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own,
except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in
venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly,
no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.
On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine
is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle
(Eph. 5:18), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay:
'luxury']. " Therefore lust is forbidden.
Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19 [Douay:
'luxury'].
I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one
to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful
it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal
acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for the
common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there
is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this
matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the
dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists
essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of
venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De
Gener. Anim. i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed. " For it is
said to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of
the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative
power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not to
be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one
observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the emission
of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end
for which it is needed.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:20) in speaking
against lust, "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God
in your body. " Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a
man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine
says (De Decem. Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp. )]): "God Who thus
governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and
commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which
thou hast begun to be. "
Reply to Objection 3: The opposite of lust is not found in many, since
men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised
under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for
sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.
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Whether lust is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is
apparently the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on Eph. 5:3
(Cf. 2 Cor. 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony,
according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital
vice.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as
pride of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind
safeguard the chastity of the flesh. " Now it is seemingly contrary to
the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust
is not a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Eph.
4:19, "Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness. " But
despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of
sloth, as stated above ([3521]Q[35], A[4], ad 2). Much less, therefore,
is lust a capital vice.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the
capital vices.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[148], A[5]; [3522]FS, Q[84],
AA[3],4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that
through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all of
which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now
the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore
this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both
on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and because such like
concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust
is a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3523]Q[148], A[6]), according
to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a
certain uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the
point. If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply
that it is caused by gluttony materially---in so far as gluttony
provides the bodily matter of lust---and not under the aspect of final
cause, in which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the
cause of others.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3524]Q[132], A[4], ad 1), when
we were treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of
all sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures
chiefly through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by
despair, so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle
thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary
for a capital vice.
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Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?
Objection 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly
reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy,
rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence
or despair of a future world. " For mental blindness, thoughtlessness
and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin,
even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be
reckoned especially as daughters of lust.
Objection 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as
stated above (Q[128], ad 6;[3525] Q[137], A[3]). But lust is contrary,
not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a
daughter of lust.
Objection 3: Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is
the origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).
Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.
Objection 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut. , qu. xvi] mentions four,
namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking. " There
the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their
objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and
disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that
the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent
on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the
vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the
reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.
Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is
simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act
is hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived
thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart. " In this respect we have
"blindness of mind. " The second act is counsel about what is to be done
for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence
of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. , act 1, sc. 1), speaking of
lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation,
thou canst not control it by counseling. " In this respect there is
"rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above
([3526]Q[53], A[3]). The third act is judgment about the things to be
done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful
old men (Dan. 13:9): "They perverted their own mind . . . that they
might not . . . remember just judgments. " In this respect there is
"thoughtlessness. " The fourth act is the reason's command about the
thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as
through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from
doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" must
be referred. ] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine
edition. ] Hence Terence says (Eunuch. , act 1, sc. 1) of a man who
declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear will
undo those words. "
On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is
the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which regards
the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand
there is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the desired
pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the
end. With regard to this there is "love of this world," whose pleasures
a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is "despair of a
future world," because through being held back by carnal pleasures he
cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to
him.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5),
intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices
opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal
species of intemperance.
Reply to Objection 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude
regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from
pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as
stated above ([3527]Q[143]). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed
thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the
first named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter
enfeebles a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee
4:11, "Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay:
'understanding']. " Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the
less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death. "
Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters
of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. [3528] Q[35], A[4], ad
2;[3529] Q[118], A[8], ad 1;[3530] Q[148], A[6]).
Reply to Objection 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a man
desires for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the
special point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned
a daughter of lust.
Reply to Objection 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate
external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a
fourfold inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this
we refer "obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart
the mouth speaketh" (Mat. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full
of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly,
on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and
rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or
giving a thought to his words. which are described as "scurrilous. "
Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks
pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to
"wanton words. " Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his
words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's
sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for instance, by
expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PARTS OF LUST (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are
twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Into what parts is lust divided?
(2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like
seduction?
(5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?
(6) Of seduction;
(7) Of rape;
(8) Of adultery;
(9) Of incest;
(10) Of sacrilege;
(11) Of the sin against nature;
(12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.
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Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?
Objection 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to
lust, namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape,
and the unnatural vice. " For diversity of matter does not diversify the
species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of
matter, according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is
married or a virgin, or of some other condition. Therefore it seems
that the species of lust are diversified in this way.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not
differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does
not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man having
intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an injustice.
Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a species of
lust.
Objection 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with
a woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that
a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow.
Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as
adultery is.
Objection 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another
woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter sin
is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the
species thereof.
Objection 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): "Lest again,
when I come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them /that
sinned before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and
fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed. " Therefore it
seems that also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned
species of lust, as well as fornication.
Objection 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its
parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is
written (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are
fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']. " Therefore
it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust.
On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36,
qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].
I answer that As stated above ([3531]Q[153], A[3]), the sin of lust
consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right
reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter
wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due
matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a
circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is
derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the
species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.
