WAVELL PLAN (1945)
On 14 June, 1945, Lord Wavell gave a broadcast to the people
of India.
On 14 June, 1945, Lord Wavell gave a broadcast to the people
of India.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
In spite
of the refusal of Churchill, Chiang Kai-Shek met Gandhiji at
Calcutta on 18 February, 1942. Another cause was the growing
frustration in India. The Indians felt happy over the reverses of
the British and seemed to take pleasure in the victories of the Axis
Powers. They listened to the broadcasts of Subhas Chandra Bose
from Berlin. Something had to be done to meet the menace. There
were men like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru who would like to bring about
a compromise between the Congress and the British Government
and the latter did respond to their efforts. They also influenced
the Congress to open its doors for negotiations. Public opinion in
England was also in favour of reconciling India. There was a de-
bate in the House of Commons on 24 and 25 February, 1942, on
war situation and 15 speakers made references to the Indian prob-
lem and impressed upon the Government the necessity of tackling
it. The Labour Party also stood for reconciling India. It was
under these circumstances that Cripps was sent to India.
The following is the text of the Draft Declaration of the British
Government:
“(a) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities, steps shall be
taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elect-
ed body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for
India.
“(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for participation
of Indian States in the constitution-making body.
"(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and imple-
ment forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to:
"(i) The right of any province of British India that is not prepar-
ed to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional
position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so
decides.
“With such non-acceding provinces, should they so desire, His
Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new consti-
tution giving them the same full status as the Indian Union and
arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.
“(ii) The signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between
His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. This
treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete
transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make
provision, in accordance with undertakings given by His Majesty's
Government, for the protection of the racial and religious minori-
## p. 667 (#707) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
667
ties, but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian
Union to decide in future its relationship to other member-States of
the British Commonwealth.
"Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the constitu-
tion, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrange-
ments so far as this may be required in the new situation.
"(d) The constitution-making body shall be composed as fol-
lows unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communi-
ties agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:
“Immediately upon the result being known of provincial elections
which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire mem-
bership of the Lower Houses of Provincial Legislatures shall as a
single electoral college proceed to the election of the constitution-
making body by the system of proportional representation. This
new body shall be in number about 1/10th of the number of the
electoral college.
"Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the
same proportion to their total population as in the case of repre-
sentatives of British India as a whole and with the same powers as
British Indian members.
“(e) During the critical period which now faces India and until
the new constitution can be framed, His Majesty's Government
must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain the control
and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war
effort but the task of organizing to the full the military, moral and
material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Gov-
ernment of India with the co-operation of the people of India. His
Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate and effec-
tive participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the
Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth
and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their
active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is
vital and essential for the future freedom of India. "
Sir Stafford had a very busy time in India. He met the leaders
of the various parties and did his level best to persuade them to
accept the proposals. His mission was a very difficult one. The
Indian leaders were prepared to accept what was being promised
to them in the future, but they were not satisfied with what was
being offered to them at once. What they wanted was a say in
the matter of the participation of India in the war. This Sir
Stafford Cripps was not able to give them and no wonder his mis-
sion failed and he had to go back empty-handed.
It is true that the proposals of Cripps were an advance on the
August Offer in many respects. They conceded to the projected
## p. 668 (#708) ############################################
668 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
Indian Union the liberty to secede from the British Commonwealth,
if so desired. The framing of the new constitution was to rest not
primarily but solely in Indian hands. However, its acceptance was
made subject to the fulfilment of British obligations. If the Indians
could not become free as a single unit, they could become free as
two or more units. Disagreement among the Indians was not to
give the British Government an excuse to perpetuate their rule in
India. The August Offer had invited the Indian leaders to start
discussing the principles of the new constitution and the method of
framing it. The Cripps Proposals contained a plan for a consti-
tution-making body to be adopted if no Indian plan was agreed
upon before the cessation of the hostilities. The Cripps Proposals
went farther than the August Offer as regards the character of the
interim system of the Government. The offer had provided for
the inclusion of a certain number of representative Indians in the
Executive Council. The Cripps Proposals invited the leaders of
the principal sections of the Indian people to participate in the
counsels of India, the Commonwealth and the United Nations.
The great merit of Cripp's proposals was their frankness and
precision. There was no hesitancy and generalities as was the case
in the declarations of 1939 and 1940. It was declared in un-
ambiguous terms that the new Constitution of India would be
framed by the Indians themselves. The right of secession was re-
cognised. The device of a bilateral treaty for implementing the
new Constitution and discharging the British obligations was intro-
duced. The Muslims were also assured that they could have
Pakistan if they so pleased.
However, the Cripps Proposals were criticized by all the interested
parties in India. Each party criticized the proposals from its own
point of view. The objection of the Congress was not so much to
the long-term arrangement as to the interim arrangement. The
Congress acted on the principle that one bird in hand was better
than two in the bush. Cripps had given an understanding to the
Congress that with the exception of the Defence Department, other
Departments would be completely in the hands of Indians and the
Governor-General would act as a constitutional head. However,
at a later stage, he withdrew that offer. That made the Congress
suspicious regarding the honesty of the British Government. The
Congress wanted the Executive Council of the Governor General to
work as a cabinet but the British Government was not prepared to
make such a concession. The Congress also objected to the veto
power of the Viceroy. It was also opposed to the acceptance of
the novel principle of the non-accession of the provinces. It ap-
## p. 669 (#709) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
669
own.
peared to them that this provision brought in Pakistan by the back-
door.
The Hindu Mahasabha opposed the Cripps proposals on two
grounds. It was opposed to the freedom given to the provinces to
leave the Indian union and set up separate governments of their
It also objected to the elections on the basis of the Communal
Award which was anti-national and un-democratic. The Sikhs
also opposed the provisions relating to the non-accession of the pro-
vinces. They declared: “We shall resist by all possible means the
separation of the Punjab from All-India Union”. The depressed
classes denounced the proposals on the ground that the necessary
safeguards were not provided for their interests.
The response of the Muslim League was a mixed one.
Its mem-
bers were happy at the prospect of realising their ambition of
Pakistan. However, Mr. Jinnah was a politician and his diplo-
macy led him to contend that the Pakistan idea as embodied in the
Cripps' proposals was nebulous and very serious impediments were
placed in the way of its realisation. In his Presidential address
delivered on 4 April, 1942, at the Allahabad session of the All-India
Muslim League, Mr. Jinnah declared: “The alleged power of the
minority in the matter of secession suggested in the document is
illusory as the Hindu India will dominate the decision in favour of
one All-India Union in all the provinces and the Muslims in Bengal
and the Punjab will be at the mercy of the Hindu minority in those
provinces, who will exert themselves to the fullest extent and length
for keeping the Musalmans tied to the chariot-wheel of Hindustan”.
The Working Committee of the Muslim League passed the follow-
ing Resolution on the 11 April, 1942: “The Committee, while ex-
pressing their gratification that the possibility of Pakistan is recog-
nised by implication by providing for the establishment of two or
more independent Unions in India, regret that the proposals of His
Majesty's Government, embodying the fundamentals, are not open
to any modification and, therefore, no alternative proposals are
invited. ” The Resolution ended by declaring that the Muslim
League would not be satisfied with anything short of what was
contained in the Lahore Resolution of March, 1940.
Mahatma Gandhi was not at all impressed by the proposals
brought by Cripps. He is stated to have told him thus: “Why did
you come if this is what you have to offer? If this is your entire
proposal to India, I would advise you to take the next plane home. ”
Sir Stafford's reply was: “I will consider that. ”
It is pointed out that there were snags in the proposals brought
by Cripps. One was the repetition of the August Offer of 1940
and the addition of the explanation that “the present declaration is
## p. 670 (#710) ############################################
670 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
intended not to supersede, but to clothe these general declarations
with precision and to convince the people of India of the War Cabi-
net's sincere resolve. " This created suspicion in the minds of the
people. It indicated a resolve on the part of the British Govern-
ment to safeguard its prestige. The second snag was that there was
no indication in the proposals that the British Government was pre-
pared to part with power. Another defect in the scheme was that
it had either to be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole. There
was no scope for any internal adjustment. Sir Stafford Cripps had
been placed in a very tight corner by Sir Winston Churchill and
his associates. The failure of his mission was a foregone conclusion.
After the failure of the Cripps Mission, there was a lot of dis-
contentment in the country. The Congress leaders were convinced
that they could not expect anything from the British Government
in the near future. Consequently, the All-India Congress Com-
mittee passed the famous Quit India Resolution on 8th August,
1942. That Resolution emphasised the necessity of immediately
ending the British Rule in India and also announced “the starting
of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale. "
The Government of India acted with promptness and arrested all
the members of the Congress Working Committee and Mahatma
Gandhi. The people of India also hit back. In various parts of
India, the Government machinery was completely thrown out of
gear. The Government used ail possible means to crush the move-
ment. Thousands of people were either mercilessly killed or put
behind the bars. The political life of India was completely sus-
pended. At this time, the Communist Party of India helped the
Government of India in its war efforts. The deadlock continued
up to 1944 when Mahatma Gandhi was released.
RAJAGOPALACHARIAR FORMULA (1944)
In March 1944, C. Rajagopalachariar put forward his formula
to solve the deadlock in the country. On 8 April, 1944, he wrote to
Mr. Jinnah a letter which embodied the terms which could form
the “basis for settlement. ” It was made clear in that letter that
the formula had the “full approval of Mahatma Gandhi. Those
terms were the following:-
“(1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitu-
tion for Free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand
for independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the
formation of a provisional Interim Government for the transitional
period.
“(2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be
## p. 671 (#711) ############################################
RAJAGOPALACHARIAR FORMULA
671
appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west
and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute
majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the in-
habitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable
franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from
Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a sove-
reign state separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given
effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border
to choose to join either state.
“(3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of
view before the plebiscite is held.
“(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreement shall be
entered into for safeguarding defence, and commerce and com-
munications and for other essential purposes.
“(5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely
voluntary basis.
“(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by
Britain of full power and responsibility of the governance of India. ”
Mr. Jinnah asked for certain clarifications from Mahatma
Gandhi. He enquired who was to frame the Constitution referred
to in the scheme. He also wanted to know the lines on which the
Interim Government was to be set up or constituted. He wanted
to know who was to appoint the Commission, whose duty was to
demarcate the contiguous areas where the Muslims had an absolute
majority. He also enquired whether the plebiscite was to be taken
districtwise or on some other basis, and whether the same was to
be based on adult franchise or some other franchise. He also
enquired who was to give effect to the verdict of the commission
and to whom the power was to be transferred and through what
machinery and when.
Mahatma Gandhi wrote back to Mr. Jinnah saying that the
Constitution was to be framed by the Provisional Government con-
templated in the formula or an authority specially set up by it after
the British power was withdrawn. The Provisional Government
was to be set up on the basis of an agreement between the Congress
and the League. The Commission was to be appointed by the
Provisional Government. The form of plebiscite could be agreed
upon between the League and the Congress. The power was to
be transferred to the nation, by the British Government, in a peace-
ful manner. To quote Mahatma Gandhi: “We reach by joint
effort independence for India as it stands, India become free will
proceed to demarcation, plebiscite and partition if the people con-
cerned vote for partition. ” Mahatma Gandhi also pointed out
that he found “no parallel in history for a body of converts and
## p. 672 (#712) ############################################
672 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent
stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must
remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of
her children. . . . . . You do not claim to be a nation by right of
conquest but by reason of acceptance of Islam. Will the two
nations become one if the whole of India accepted Islam. . . .
The only real, though awful test, of one nationhood arises out of
our common political subjection. ” The reply of Mr. Jinnah was:
“We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major
nations by any definition and test of a nation. We are a nation
of a hundred million, and what is more, we are a nation with our
own distinctive culture and civilisation, language and literature,
art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and
proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, his-
tory and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, in short, we have our
own distinctive outlook on life and of life. ” The contention of Mr.
Jinnah was that the Muslims of India as a nation had the right
of self-determination and they alone were to be entitled to vote and
not the non-Muslims. He also pointed out that “there cannot be
defence and similar matters of common concern, when it is accept-
ed that Pakistan and Hindustan will be two separate independent
sovereign States. "
In his letter dated 24 September, 1944, Mahatma Gandhi sug-
gested that the areas should be demarcated by a Commission ap-
proved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabi-
tants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the
votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equiva-
lent method.
“If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed that
these areas shall form a separate State as soon as possible after India
is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted
into two sovereign independent states. There shall be a treaty of
separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfac-
tory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communica-
tions, customs, commerce and the like, which must necessarily
continue to be matters of common concern between the contracting
parties.
"The treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights
of the minorities in the two States.
"Immediately on the acceptance of the agreement by the Con-
gress and the League the two shall decide upon a common course
of action for the attainment of independence of India.
"The League will, however, be free to remain out of any direct
## p. 673 (#713) ############################################
DESAI-LIAQAT FORMULA
673
action to which the Congress may resort and in which the League
may not be willing to co-operate. '
The negotiations were bound to fail under the circumstances.
There was no place for compromise between the Congress on the
one hand and the Muslim League on the other. The Congress
failed in its object of achieving the independence of the country
after coming to some settlement with the Muslim League. How-
ever, critics point out that thy negotiations between Mahatma
Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah had very unhappy results. To quote
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, "Gandhi's approach to Mr. Jinnah
on this occasion was a great political blunder. It gave a new and
added importance to Mr. Jinnah which the latter exploited to the
full. . . . . . Mr. Jinnah had lost most of the importance after he left
the Congress in the twenties. It was largely due to Gandhi's acts
of commission and omission that Mr. Jinnah regained his import-
ance in Indian political life. As a consequence of Gandhi's atti-
tude of running after him and entreating him, many of the Mus-
lims who were doubtful about Mr. Jinnah and his policy developed
a new respect for Jinnah. Moreover, it was Gandhi who first gave
currency to the title Quid-e-Azam or great leader, as applied to
Mr. Jinnah. By addressing him in his letter as a Quid-e-Azam, he
recognised him as a great leader and strengthened his position in
the eyes of the Indian Muslims. " (India Wins Freedom by Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad, page 93).
DESAI-LIAQAT FORMULA (1945)
Although the negotiations between Mahatma Gandhi and Mr.
Jinnah failed on the basis of the Rajagopalachariar formula, efforts
were made by Bhulabhai Desai, Leader of the Congress Party in
the Central Legislative Assembly, to solve the deadlock. That
ultimately resulted in the Desai-Liaqat formula of January 1945.
The formula contained the following terms for the formation of an
Interim Government at the Centre:-
"The Congress and League agree that they will join in forming
an Interim Government at the Centre. The composition of such
Government will be on the following lines:
“(a) Equal number of persons nominated by the Congress and
the League in the Central Executive. Persons nominated need not
be members of the Central Legislature.
“(b) Representatives of minorities (in particular Scheduled
Castes and the Sikhs).
"(c) The Commander-in-Chief.
"The Government will be formed and function within the frame-
## p. 674 (#714) ############################################
674 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
work of the existing Government of India Act. It is, however, ,
understood that if the Cabinet cannot get a particular measure
passed by the Legislative Assembly, they will not enforce the same
by resort to any of the powers of the Governor-General or the Vice-
roy. This will make them sufficiently independent of the Gover-
nor-General.
“It is agreed between the Congress and the League that if such
Interim Government is formed, their first step would be to release
the Working Committee members of the Congress.
“The steps by which efforts would be made to achieve this end
are at present indicated to take the following course. On the basis of
the above understanding, some way should be found to get the
Governor-General to make a proposal or a suggestion that he desires
an Interim Government to be formed at the Centre on the agree-
ment between the Congress and the League and when the Gover-
nor-General invites Mr. Jinnah, and Mr. Desai either jointly or
separately, the above proposals would be made, desiring that they
are prepared to join in the forming of the Government.
“The next step would be to get the withdrawal of section 93 in
the Provinces and to form as soon as possible Provincial Govern-
ments on the lines of a Coalition. ”
However, in spite of the honest efforts of Desai and Liaqat Ali
Khan, no settlement could be secured between the Congress and the
Muslim League, and the deadlock continued till the surrender of
Germany on 5 May, 1945.
WAVELL PLAN (1945)
On 14 June, 1945, Lord Wavell gave a broadcast to the people
of India. On the same day, Mr. L. S. Amery, Secretary of State
for India, made a similar statement in the House of Commons. The
thoughts and sentiments in both were practically the same. The
modus operandi consisted in calling a conference of the representa-
tives chosen by the Viceroy for the purpose of obtaining from the
leaders of various parties a joint list or separate lists of worthy per-
sons in order to constitute a new Executive Council of the Governor-
General. Lord Wavell pleaded for “men of influence and ability
to be recommended by the various parties who would be prepared
to take decision and responsibility of administration of all the port-
folios including External Affairs,” except the conduct of war which
was to be under the Commander-in-Chief. There was to be an
equal number of Muslims and Hindus other than the Scheduled
Castes. The control of the Secretary of State for India and the
Governor-General was to continue. Likewise, the veto of the Vice-
## p. 675 (#715) ############################################
WAVELL PLAN
675
roy was to continue, although the same was not to be used unreason-
ably. It was to be used not in the interests of England but those
of India. The proposals were to affect only British India and not
the Indian States. To quote Wavell, “In regard to the Indian
States, while recognising that during the interim period the powers
of the Crown representative will continue, it is clear that the
National Government will have to deal with many matters which
overlap and have concern with the states, e. g. , trade, industry,
labour etc. Further the barriers between the States people and
the princes and members of the National Government and other
associates should be removed so as to help in mutual discussion, con-
sultation and consideration of common problems and their solu-
tion. " Wavell pointed out that "If the meeting is successful, I
.
hope that we shall be able to agree on the formation of the new
Executive Council at the Centre and that Provincial Ministries in
Section 93 provinces would resume office and that these would be
Coalitions. " However, “If the meeting should unfortunately fail,
we must carry on as at present until parties come together. ”
The members of the Congress Working Committee were released
from jail and high hopes were raised on all sides. Invitations were
issued to the leaders including Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah
for the proposed Conference to be held at Simla. The Conference
met on 27 June, 1945. After three days of deliberations, it was
adjourned. On 11 July, 1945, Mr. Jinnah had a short interview
extending over 15 minutes with Lord Wavell. He seems to have
made it clear that he would not agree to the inclusion of non-League
Muslims in the list of the Governor-General on the ground that the
Muslims League alone was the sole representative of the Muslims
of India. Lord Wavell was not aware of the fact that a member
of his own Executive Council was advising Mr. Jinnah to stand
firm. However, Lord Wavell did not accept the point of view of
Mr. Jinnah. Shortly after that, Mahatma Gandhi met Lord
Wavell. On 12 July, 1945, Maulana Azad, President of the Con-
gress, was invited by Lord Wavell to see him. He was merely in-
formed that Mr. Jinnah was not agreeable to the Muslim represen-
tatives in the list prepared by Lord Wavell himself. However, Lord
Wavell did not reveal the contents of the list. On 14 July, 1945,
Lord Wavell declared that the Conference had failed. In a state-
ment, he observed thus: “The Conference has. . . . . . failed. Nobody
can regret this more than I do zyself. I wish to make it clear that
the responsibility for the failure is mine. The main idea underly-
ing the Conference was mine. If it had succeeded, its success could
have been attributed to me and I cannot place the blame for its
failure upon any of the parties. ”
## p. 676 (#716) ############################################
676 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
Critics point out that the procedure followed by Lord Wavell
was not a proper one.
He should have taken the leaders of the
other parties into confidence and revealed to them the contents of
his own list of the members of the Executive Council. It is possible
that the Congress Working Committee might have agreed to accept
his list, with or without minor alterations. He should not have
allowed the Muslim League to sabotage the whole scheme. The
responsibility for the failure must be shared by the Muslim League
and the British Government. The latter ought to have acted firmly
and fearlessly.
There is a close analogy between the Cripps Mission and the
Wavell Plan. Cripps came to India in the midst of the beating of
drums and the fanfare of trumpets. He raised high hopes and
made extravagant off-the-record promises to the Congress President
and later denied the same. In the case of the Wavell Plan also,
the Viceroy definitely stated at Simla that there was no question
of his veto being eliminated. To that extent, he was frank unlike
Cripps. Moreover, when Cripps came to India and invited
Mahatma Gandhi to meet him, the Mahatma was not at all im-
pressed by his proposals. In the case of the Wavell Plan, Mahatma
Gandhi felt that the Plan was sincere in spirit and contained the
seeds of independence. When Cripps came to India, Mahatma
Gandhi did not ask for the summoning of the Congress Working
Committee to consider the proposals. However, in 1945, he asked
for the summoning of the Congress Working Committee to consider
the Wavell Plan. Cripps came to India when there was an imme-
diate danger of the Japanese invasion of India. When the threat
of invasion passed away, the Cripps Mission came to an abrupt
end. Likewise, the Wavell Plan came to light when the Labour
Party threatened the Conservaſive Party in the elections held in
July 1945. When the elections were over, the Wavell Plan also
came to an unexpected end. It is also pointed out that the Simla
Conference was due to the Russian pressure as the Cripps Mission
was due to the American pressure. In 1942, the Mission failed as
the Congress rejected the proposals. The failure of the Wavell
Plan was due to the attitude of the Muslim League. The Cripps
proposals failed virtually on the third day of the deliberations of the
Congress Working Committee which met on 29 March 1942. The
decision was not made public on account of the special request of
Cripps. In 1945 also, the Simla Conference failed on the third day
of its meeting, i. e. , 29th June, 1945.
About the Simla Conference, Shri V. P. Menon says: “The Simla
Conference afforded the last opportunity for the forces of national-
ism to fight a rearguard action to preserve the integrity of the
1
## p. 677 (#717) ############################################
LABOUR PARTY COMES TO POWER
677
country, and when the battle was lost, the waves of communalism
quickly engulfed it. Only the Hobbson's choice of partition was
left. ” (The Transfer of Power in India, p. 215).
LABOUR PARTY IN OFFICE
The Labour Party came to power on 10 July 1945 and Lord
Pethick Lawrence, an old friend of India, was appointed Secretary
of State for India. In his speech to the new Parliament, the King-
Emperor referred to the Indian affairs in these words: “In accord-
ance with the promises already made to my Indian peoples, my
Government will do their utmost to promote in conjunction with
the leaders of Indian opinion, early realisation of full self-govern-
ment in India. ” The War with Japan ended officially on the mid-
night of 14 August 1945.
Lord Wavell was summoned to London for consultations and he
reached there on 25 August 1. 945. Before his return to India, an
announcement was made from London to the effect that fresh elec-
tions would be held both for the provincial legislatures and the
central legislature in India. Lord Wavell came back to India on
18 September 1945 and made a broadcast speech on 19 September
1945. In that broadcast, Lord Wavell told the people of India
that His Majesty's Government were determined to do their utmost
to promote the early realisation of full self-government in India.
He also declared that elections to the central and provincial legisla-
tures would be held in the coming cold weather and after that the
Government hoped that ministerial responsibility would be accept-
ed by the political leaders in all the provinces. It was the intention
of His Majesty's Government to convene as soon as possible a cons-
titution-making body and for that purpose he himself would hold,
immediately after the elections, discussions with representatives of
the provincial legislative assemblies to ascertain whether the propo-
sals contained in the Declaration of 1942 were acceptable to them
or whether some alternative or modified scheme was preferable.
He also declared that discussions would also be undertaken with
the representatives of the Indian states with a view to ascertaining
in what way they would best take their part in the constitution-
making body. His Majesty's Government was also proceeding to
the consideration of the treaty which was to be concluded between
Great in and India. He also declared that after the election
he would take steps to bring into being an Executive Council which
would have the support of the main Indian political parties. He
concluded his broadcast with these words: “It is now for the Indians
to show that they have the wisdom, faith and courage to determine
## p. 678 (#718) ############################################
678 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
in what way they can best reconcile their differences and how their
country can be governed by Indians for Indians. ” A similar state-
ment was made on the same day by Mr. Attlee, the Prime Minister
of England and that statement ended with these words: “I would
ask all Indians to follow this great example and to join together in
a united effort to work out a Constitution which the majority and
minority communities will accept as a just and fair constitution in
which both the states and provinces can find their places. The
British Government will do their utmost to give every assistance
in their power and India can be assured of the sympathy of the
British people. ”
On 4 December 1945, Lord Pethick Lawrence made a statement
in the House of Lords in which he took pains to make it clear that
there was absolutely no foundation in the propaganda in certain
quarters that the British Government intended to delay matters by
adopting the device of holding discussions with the representatives
of the people of India. He also declared that His Majesty's Gov-
ernment was arranging for a Parliamentary Delegation to go to
India under the auspices of the Empire Parliamentary Association
so that the members of the British Parliament could have an oppor-
tunity to meet leading political Indian personalities so that they
could form their own views on the spot. The Secretary of State
also made it clear that the British Government would not allow the
loyalty of the administrative services and the Indian armed forces
to be interfered with.
On 10 December 1945, while addressing the annual function of
the Associated Chamber of Commerce, Lord Wavell gave an assur-
ance that the British Government and the British people honestly
and sincerely wished the Indian people to have their political free-
dom and a government or governments of their own choice. How-
ever, he made it clear that the problem was a difficult one and
there was no magic Sesame which would open the Alibaba's cave.
The problem could also not be solved through violence and disorder.
There must be some agreement between the Congress, the Muslims
and the rulers of the Indian States and the British Government so
that the objective of freedom and welfare of India could be secur-
ed. To quote him, “I do appeal most solemnly and earnestly at
this critical moment of Indian history for goodwill on the part of
all leaders. We are going through a very difficult and testing time
and it will need coolness and wisdom if we are to avoid calamity.
in so far as I can help by personal contact, I am always prepared
to do so. ”
On 19 February 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence made a momen-
tus declaration in the House of Lords in which he announced the
## p. 679 (#719) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION
679
decision of the British Government to send a special mission of Cabi-
net Ministers to resolve the constitutional deadlock in the country.
The members of the Mission were Lord Pethick Lawrence himself,
Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade and Mr. A.
V. Alexander, First Lord of Admiralty.
THE CABINET MISSION (1946)
The Mission reached Delhi on 24 March 1946. Prolonged dis-
cussions took place between the members of the Mission and the
leaders of the Congress and Muslim League. However, the main
parties could not come to any mutual understanding. The result
was that the members of the Mission had to put forward their own
formula for solving the constitutional problem. That formula was
embodied in a joint statement issued by the Cabinet Mission and
Lord Wavell on 16 May, 1946.
After pointing out the impracticability of the Pakistan scheme,
the statement of May 16 recommended that the new constitution of
India should take the following basic form:-
"(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British
India and States which should deal with the following
subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications,
and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances
required for the above subjects.
"(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature
constituted from British India and States representatives.
Any question raising a major communal issue in the
Legislature should require for its decision a majority of
the representatives present and voting of each of the two
major communities as well as a majority of all the mem-
bers present and voting.
“(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all resi-
duary powers should vest in the Provinces.
“(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than
those ceded to the Union.
“(5) Provinces should be free to form Groups with executives
and legislatures, and each Group could determine the
Provincial subjects to be taken in common.
“(6) The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups should
contain a provision whereby any Province could, by a
majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for a re-
consideration of the terms of the constitution after an ini-
tial period of 10 years and at 10 yearly intervals there-
after. "
## p. 680 (#720) ############################################
680 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
As regards the constitution-making machinery, it was provided
that the Legislative Assemblies of the provinces would elect the
members of that body on the basis of one representative for one
million of the population. The Sikh and Muslim legislators were
to elect the quota of their communities, determined on the popula-
tion basis. Others were to elect the representatives for the rest
of the population. The representatives from the provinces were to
divide themselves into three sections, A, B and C. Section C was
to consist of the representatives of Bengal and Assam, Section B of
the Punjab, Sind and North-West Frontier Province and Section A
of the rest of the provinces of India. "These Sections shall proceed
to settle the Provincial Constitution for the Provinces included in
each Section, and shall also decide whether any Group Constitu-
tion shall be set up for these provinces and, if so, with what provin-
cial subjects the Groups should deal. ” The representatives of the
Sections of the Indian States were then to re-assemble and settle
the Union Constitution.
TABLE OF REPRESENTATION
Section A
Province
General Muslim Total
Madras
45
4
49
Bombay
19
2
21
United Provinces
47
8
55
Bihar
31
5
36
Central Provinces
16
1
17
Orissa
9
0
9
Total
167
20
187
Section B
Province
General Muslim Sikh Total
Punjab
8 16 4 28
N. -W. Frontier Province 0
3 0
3
Sind
1
3 0
4
Total
9
22
4
35
Province
Bengal
Assam
Section C
General
27
7
Muslim
33
3
Total
60
10
Total
34
36
70
Total for British India
Maximum for States
292
93
Total
385
## p. 681 (#721) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION
681
The Provinces of India were given the power to opt out of the
Groups by a decision of their Legislature after the general elections
under the new Constitution. The Resolutions of the Union Consti-
tuent Assembly regarding major communal issues were to require
a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the
two major communities. The Chairman of the Constituent As-
sembly was to decide which resolution raised major communal
issues and was to consult the Federal Court before giving his de-
cision. A plan for the interim Government was also envisaged in
the Scheme of May 16, 1946.
The Cabinet Mission declared that the British Government could
not and would not in any circumstances transfer paramountcy to
an Indian Government. However, it was made clear that when
a new self-governing Government or Governments came into being
in British India, it would not be possible for the British Government
to carry out the obligations of paramountcy. In that case, all the
rights surrendered by the states to the paramount power were to
return to the Indian states. “Political arrangements between the
states on the one hand and the British Crown and British India on
the other will thus be brought to an end. The void will have to
be filled either by the states entering into a federal relationship
with the successor Government or Goverments in British India or,
failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it
or them. ” This policy has been described as a “political scorched-
earth policy. ”
The great merit of the Cabinet Mission scheme was that the
Constituent Assembly was to be constituted on the democratic prin-
ciple of population strength. The principle of weightage was to be
discarded altogether. The democratic method of the decision of
issues by a simple majority was adopted in the case of communal
issues. However, safeguards were provided for the minorities.
The scheme also provided for an Indian Union of provinces and
states and rejected the idea of Pakistan completely. The Cabinet
Mission scheme was the last attempt made by British statesmen to
save India from division and disaster. Some of the anomalies of
the scheme were due to the desire of the members of the Cabinet
Mission to save Indian unity at any cost.
The scheme required
that all the members of the Constituent Assembly were to be
Indians. Neither the British Government nor non-official Europeans
in India were to be given any representation in the Constituent
Assembly. The European members of the Provincial Assemblies
were to absent themselves from voting. There was to be no inter-
ference with the work of the Constituent Assembly either by the
British Government or by its officials. Within the framework of
## p. 682 (#722) ############################################
682 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
the scheme, the Constituent Assembly was to be its own master.
As regards its demerits, while the scheme protected the rights of
the Muslim minority, the same principle was not applied to the
Sikhs in the Punjab. The proposals of the Cabinet Mission with
regard to the grouping of the provinces were not clear. Both the
Congress and the Muslim League interpreted the provisions differ-
ently. The Muslims regarded the compulsory grouping of the pro-
vinces as one of the cornerstones of the Cabinet Mission Scheme and
were not prepared to come to a compromise on that question. The
Congress stand was that the making of the groups was optional for
the provinces and the latter were free to join or not to join any
group. As a matter of fact, Mahatma Gandhi asked the people of
Assam not to join the group if they did not approve of it. To solve
this difficulty, it was suggested that the provinces might join provi-
sionally, but later on freedom might be given to them to leave it if
they so desired. The Congress suggested that the matter be refer-
red to the Federal Court of India for decision. However, the Bri-
tish Government gave its verdict in favour of the compulsory group-
ing of the provinces. The Muslim League won and the Congress
lost its point. Another defect of the scheme was the order in which
the Union and Sectional Assemblies were to meet and work and
draft their constitutions. It looked ridiculous first to form the
constitutions of the groups and the provinces and then to frame
the constitution of the Union. It was like putting the cart before
the horse. This practical difficulty would have been experienced
if the whole scheme would have been worked out in actual practice.
As regards the events after May 16, 1946, the All India Muslim
League passed a resolution on June 6, 1946, by which it accepted
the Cabinet Mission scheme in its entirety. On June 26, 1946, the
Working Committee of the Indian National Congress passed a reso-
lution by which it accepted the scheme partially. The part accept-
ed by it related to constitution-making. The view of the Working
Committee was that the grouping of the provinces was not to be
compulsory. The Congress rejected the interim
the interim Government
scheme on the ground that the clarifications given were not accept-
able. The resolution of the Working Committee was ratified by the
All India Congress Committee. The Sikhs rejected the scheme
.
completely on the ground that the compulsory grouping of the pro-
vinces as contemplated by the scheme was suicidal to their interests.
Before the members of the Cubinet Mission left India, they issued
a statement along with Lord Wavell in which they expressed their
satisfaction that the work of the making of the constitution would
proceed with the consent of the major political parties in India.
They regretted that an interim Government consisting of the vari-
## p. 683 (#723) ############################################
THE CALCUTTA KILLING
683
ous political parties could not be formed on account of certain diffi-
culties. It was hoped that after the elections to the Constituent
Assembly were over, negotiations would be started for the formation
of an interim Government consisting of the representatives of the
various political parties.
CALCUTTA KILLING (AUGUST 1946)
Mr. Jinnah who had accepted the scheme in its entirety, was
annoyed at the decision of the British Government to postpone the
formation of the interim Government. He accused Lord Wavell
of his having gone back on his promise. He was so much angry
that the Muslim League, under his leadership, passed another reso-
lution on July 29, 1946, by which it withdrew its former accept-
ance of the Cabinet Mission scheme. Mr. Jinnah was not content-
ed with this negative action. The Muslim League passed the fam-
ous Direct Action Resolution by which both the Congress and the
British Government were condemned for their breach of faith with
the Muslims. It was declared that the time had come for the Mus-
lim League to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan. The
resolution authorised the Working Committee of the Muslim League
to prepare a programme of direct action at once. August 16, 1946,
was fixed as the Direct Action Day.
of the refusal of Churchill, Chiang Kai-Shek met Gandhiji at
Calcutta on 18 February, 1942. Another cause was the growing
frustration in India. The Indians felt happy over the reverses of
the British and seemed to take pleasure in the victories of the Axis
Powers. They listened to the broadcasts of Subhas Chandra Bose
from Berlin. Something had to be done to meet the menace. There
were men like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru who would like to bring about
a compromise between the Congress and the British Government
and the latter did respond to their efforts. They also influenced
the Congress to open its doors for negotiations. Public opinion in
England was also in favour of reconciling India. There was a de-
bate in the House of Commons on 24 and 25 February, 1942, on
war situation and 15 speakers made references to the Indian prob-
lem and impressed upon the Government the necessity of tackling
it. The Labour Party also stood for reconciling India. It was
under these circumstances that Cripps was sent to India.
The following is the text of the Draft Declaration of the British
Government:
“(a) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities, steps shall be
taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elect-
ed body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for
India.
“(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for participation
of Indian States in the constitution-making body.
"(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and imple-
ment forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to:
"(i) The right of any province of British India that is not prepar-
ed to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional
position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so
decides.
“With such non-acceding provinces, should they so desire, His
Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new consti-
tution giving them the same full status as the Indian Union and
arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.
“(ii) The signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between
His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. This
treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete
transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make
provision, in accordance with undertakings given by His Majesty's
Government, for the protection of the racial and religious minori-
## p. 667 (#707) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
667
ties, but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian
Union to decide in future its relationship to other member-States of
the British Commonwealth.
"Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the constitu-
tion, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrange-
ments so far as this may be required in the new situation.
"(d) The constitution-making body shall be composed as fol-
lows unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communi-
ties agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:
“Immediately upon the result being known of provincial elections
which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire mem-
bership of the Lower Houses of Provincial Legislatures shall as a
single electoral college proceed to the election of the constitution-
making body by the system of proportional representation. This
new body shall be in number about 1/10th of the number of the
electoral college.
"Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the
same proportion to their total population as in the case of repre-
sentatives of British India as a whole and with the same powers as
British Indian members.
“(e) During the critical period which now faces India and until
the new constitution can be framed, His Majesty's Government
must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain the control
and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war
effort but the task of organizing to the full the military, moral and
material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Gov-
ernment of India with the co-operation of the people of India. His
Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate and effec-
tive participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the
Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth
and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their
active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is
vital and essential for the future freedom of India. "
Sir Stafford had a very busy time in India. He met the leaders
of the various parties and did his level best to persuade them to
accept the proposals. His mission was a very difficult one. The
Indian leaders were prepared to accept what was being promised
to them in the future, but they were not satisfied with what was
being offered to them at once. What they wanted was a say in
the matter of the participation of India in the war. This Sir
Stafford Cripps was not able to give them and no wonder his mis-
sion failed and he had to go back empty-handed.
It is true that the proposals of Cripps were an advance on the
August Offer in many respects. They conceded to the projected
## p. 668 (#708) ############################################
668 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
Indian Union the liberty to secede from the British Commonwealth,
if so desired. The framing of the new constitution was to rest not
primarily but solely in Indian hands. However, its acceptance was
made subject to the fulfilment of British obligations. If the Indians
could not become free as a single unit, they could become free as
two or more units. Disagreement among the Indians was not to
give the British Government an excuse to perpetuate their rule in
India. The August Offer had invited the Indian leaders to start
discussing the principles of the new constitution and the method of
framing it. The Cripps Proposals contained a plan for a consti-
tution-making body to be adopted if no Indian plan was agreed
upon before the cessation of the hostilities. The Cripps Proposals
went farther than the August Offer as regards the character of the
interim system of the Government. The offer had provided for
the inclusion of a certain number of representative Indians in the
Executive Council. The Cripps Proposals invited the leaders of
the principal sections of the Indian people to participate in the
counsels of India, the Commonwealth and the United Nations.
The great merit of Cripp's proposals was their frankness and
precision. There was no hesitancy and generalities as was the case
in the declarations of 1939 and 1940. It was declared in un-
ambiguous terms that the new Constitution of India would be
framed by the Indians themselves. The right of secession was re-
cognised. The device of a bilateral treaty for implementing the
new Constitution and discharging the British obligations was intro-
duced. The Muslims were also assured that they could have
Pakistan if they so pleased.
However, the Cripps Proposals were criticized by all the interested
parties in India. Each party criticized the proposals from its own
point of view. The objection of the Congress was not so much to
the long-term arrangement as to the interim arrangement. The
Congress acted on the principle that one bird in hand was better
than two in the bush. Cripps had given an understanding to the
Congress that with the exception of the Defence Department, other
Departments would be completely in the hands of Indians and the
Governor-General would act as a constitutional head. However,
at a later stage, he withdrew that offer. That made the Congress
suspicious regarding the honesty of the British Government. The
Congress wanted the Executive Council of the Governor General to
work as a cabinet but the British Government was not prepared to
make such a concession. The Congress also objected to the veto
power of the Viceroy. It was also opposed to the acceptance of
the novel principle of the non-accession of the provinces. It ap-
## p. 669 (#709) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
669
own.
peared to them that this provision brought in Pakistan by the back-
door.
The Hindu Mahasabha opposed the Cripps proposals on two
grounds. It was opposed to the freedom given to the provinces to
leave the Indian union and set up separate governments of their
It also objected to the elections on the basis of the Communal
Award which was anti-national and un-democratic. The Sikhs
also opposed the provisions relating to the non-accession of the pro-
vinces. They declared: “We shall resist by all possible means the
separation of the Punjab from All-India Union”. The depressed
classes denounced the proposals on the ground that the necessary
safeguards were not provided for their interests.
The response of the Muslim League was a mixed one.
Its mem-
bers were happy at the prospect of realising their ambition of
Pakistan. However, Mr. Jinnah was a politician and his diplo-
macy led him to contend that the Pakistan idea as embodied in the
Cripps' proposals was nebulous and very serious impediments were
placed in the way of its realisation. In his Presidential address
delivered on 4 April, 1942, at the Allahabad session of the All-India
Muslim League, Mr. Jinnah declared: “The alleged power of the
minority in the matter of secession suggested in the document is
illusory as the Hindu India will dominate the decision in favour of
one All-India Union in all the provinces and the Muslims in Bengal
and the Punjab will be at the mercy of the Hindu minority in those
provinces, who will exert themselves to the fullest extent and length
for keeping the Musalmans tied to the chariot-wheel of Hindustan”.
The Working Committee of the Muslim League passed the follow-
ing Resolution on the 11 April, 1942: “The Committee, while ex-
pressing their gratification that the possibility of Pakistan is recog-
nised by implication by providing for the establishment of two or
more independent Unions in India, regret that the proposals of His
Majesty's Government, embodying the fundamentals, are not open
to any modification and, therefore, no alternative proposals are
invited. ” The Resolution ended by declaring that the Muslim
League would not be satisfied with anything short of what was
contained in the Lahore Resolution of March, 1940.
Mahatma Gandhi was not at all impressed by the proposals
brought by Cripps. He is stated to have told him thus: “Why did
you come if this is what you have to offer? If this is your entire
proposal to India, I would advise you to take the next plane home. ”
Sir Stafford's reply was: “I will consider that. ”
It is pointed out that there were snags in the proposals brought
by Cripps. One was the repetition of the August Offer of 1940
and the addition of the explanation that “the present declaration is
## p. 670 (#710) ############################################
670 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
intended not to supersede, but to clothe these general declarations
with precision and to convince the people of India of the War Cabi-
net's sincere resolve. " This created suspicion in the minds of the
people. It indicated a resolve on the part of the British Govern-
ment to safeguard its prestige. The second snag was that there was
no indication in the proposals that the British Government was pre-
pared to part with power. Another defect in the scheme was that
it had either to be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole. There
was no scope for any internal adjustment. Sir Stafford Cripps had
been placed in a very tight corner by Sir Winston Churchill and
his associates. The failure of his mission was a foregone conclusion.
After the failure of the Cripps Mission, there was a lot of dis-
contentment in the country. The Congress leaders were convinced
that they could not expect anything from the British Government
in the near future. Consequently, the All-India Congress Com-
mittee passed the famous Quit India Resolution on 8th August,
1942. That Resolution emphasised the necessity of immediately
ending the British Rule in India and also announced “the starting
of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale. "
The Government of India acted with promptness and arrested all
the members of the Congress Working Committee and Mahatma
Gandhi. The people of India also hit back. In various parts of
India, the Government machinery was completely thrown out of
gear. The Government used ail possible means to crush the move-
ment. Thousands of people were either mercilessly killed or put
behind the bars. The political life of India was completely sus-
pended. At this time, the Communist Party of India helped the
Government of India in its war efforts. The deadlock continued
up to 1944 when Mahatma Gandhi was released.
RAJAGOPALACHARIAR FORMULA (1944)
In March 1944, C. Rajagopalachariar put forward his formula
to solve the deadlock in the country. On 8 April, 1944, he wrote to
Mr. Jinnah a letter which embodied the terms which could form
the “basis for settlement. ” It was made clear in that letter that
the formula had the “full approval of Mahatma Gandhi. Those
terms were the following:-
“(1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitu-
tion for Free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand
for independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the
formation of a provisional Interim Government for the transitional
period.
“(2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be
## p. 671 (#711) ############################################
RAJAGOPALACHARIAR FORMULA
671
appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west
and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute
majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the in-
habitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable
franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from
Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a sove-
reign state separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given
effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border
to choose to join either state.
“(3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of
view before the plebiscite is held.
“(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreement shall be
entered into for safeguarding defence, and commerce and com-
munications and for other essential purposes.
“(5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely
voluntary basis.
“(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by
Britain of full power and responsibility of the governance of India. ”
Mr. Jinnah asked for certain clarifications from Mahatma
Gandhi. He enquired who was to frame the Constitution referred
to in the scheme. He also wanted to know the lines on which the
Interim Government was to be set up or constituted. He wanted
to know who was to appoint the Commission, whose duty was to
demarcate the contiguous areas where the Muslims had an absolute
majority. He also enquired whether the plebiscite was to be taken
districtwise or on some other basis, and whether the same was to
be based on adult franchise or some other franchise. He also
enquired who was to give effect to the verdict of the commission
and to whom the power was to be transferred and through what
machinery and when.
Mahatma Gandhi wrote back to Mr. Jinnah saying that the
Constitution was to be framed by the Provisional Government con-
templated in the formula or an authority specially set up by it after
the British power was withdrawn. The Provisional Government
was to be set up on the basis of an agreement between the Congress
and the League. The Commission was to be appointed by the
Provisional Government. The form of plebiscite could be agreed
upon between the League and the Congress. The power was to
be transferred to the nation, by the British Government, in a peace-
ful manner. To quote Mahatma Gandhi: “We reach by joint
effort independence for India as it stands, India become free will
proceed to demarcation, plebiscite and partition if the people con-
cerned vote for partition. ” Mahatma Gandhi also pointed out
that he found “no parallel in history for a body of converts and
## p. 672 (#712) ############################################
672 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent
stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must
remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of
her children. . . . . . You do not claim to be a nation by right of
conquest but by reason of acceptance of Islam. Will the two
nations become one if the whole of India accepted Islam. . . .
The only real, though awful test, of one nationhood arises out of
our common political subjection. ” The reply of Mr. Jinnah was:
“We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major
nations by any definition and test of a nation. We are a nation
of a hundred million, and what is more, we are a nation with our
own distinctive culture and civilisation, language and literature,
art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and
proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, his-
tory and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, in short, we have our
own distinctive outlook on life and of life. ” The contention of Mr.
Jinnah was that the Muslims of India as a nation had the right
of self-determination and they alone were to be entitled to vote and
not the non-Muslims. He also pointed out that “there cannot be
defence and similar matters of common concern, when it is accept-
ed that Pakistan and Hindustan will be two separate independent
sovereign States. "
In his letter dated 24 September, 1944, Mahatma Gandhi sug-
gested that the areas should be demarcated by a Commission ap-
proved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabi-
tants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the
votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equiva-
lent method.
“If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed that
these areas shall form a separate State as soon as possible after India
is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted
into two sovereign independent states. There shall be a treaty of
separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfac-
tory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communica-
tions, customs, commerce and the like, which must necessarily
continue to be matters of common concern between the contracting
parties.
"The treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights
of the minorities in the two States.
"Immediately on the acceptance of the agreement by the Con-
gress and the League the two shall decide upon a common course
of action for the attainment of independence of India.
"The League will, however, be free to remain out of any direct
## p. 673 (#713) ############################################
DESAI-LIAQAT FORMULA
673
action to which the Congress may resort and in which the League
may not be willing to co-operate. '
The negotiations were bound to fail under the circumstances.
There was no place for compromise between the Congress on the
one hand and the Muslim League on the other. The Congress
failed in its object of achieving the independence of the country
after coming to some settlement with the Muslim League. How-
ever, critics point out that thy negotiations between Mahatma
Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah had very unhappy results. To quote
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, "Gandhi's approach to Mr. Jinnah
on this occasion was a great political blunder. It gave a new and
added importance to Mr. Jinnah which the latter exploited to the
full. . . . . . Mr. Jinnah had lost most of the importance after he left
the Congress in the twenties. It was largely due to Gandhi's acts
of commission and omission that Mr. Jinnah regained his import-
ance in Indian political life. As a consequence of Gandhi's atti-
tude of running after him and entreating him, many of the Mus-
lims who were doubtful about Mr. Jinnah and his policy developed
a new respect for Jinnah. Moreover, it was Gandhi who first gave
currency to the title Quid-e-Azam or great leader, as applied to
Mr. Jinnah. By addressing him in his letter as a Quid-e-Azam, he
recognised him as a great leader and strengthened his position in
the eyes of the Indian Muslims. " (India Wins Freedom by Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad, page 93).
DESAI-LIAQAT FORMULA (1945)
Although the negotiations between Mahatma Gandhi and Mr.
Jinnah failed on the basis of the Rajagopalachariar formula, efforts
were made by Bhulabhai Desai, Leader of the Congress Party in
the Central Legislative Assembly, to solve the deadlock. That
ultimately resulted in the Desai-Liaqat formula of January 1945.
The formula contained the following terms for the formation of an
Interim Government at the Centre:-
"The Congress and League agree that they will join in forming
an Interim Government at the Centre. The composition of such
Government will be on the following lines:
“(a) Equal number of persons nominated by the Congress and
the League in the Central Executive. Persons nominated need not
be members of the Central Legislature.
“(b) Representatives of minorities (in particular Scheduled
Castes and the Sikhs).
"(c) The Commander-in-Chief.
"The Government will be formed and function within the frame-
## p. 674 (#714) ############################################
674 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
work of the existing Government of India Act. It is, however, ,
understood that if the Cabinet cannot get a particular measure
passed by the Legislative Assembly, they will not enforce the same
by resort to any of the powers of the Governor-General or the Vice-
roy. This will make them sufficiently independent of the Gover-
nor-General.
“It is agreed between the Congress and the League that if such
Interim Government is formed, their first step would be to release
the Working Committee members of the Congress.
“The steps by which efforts would be made to achieve this end
are at present indicated to take the following course. On the basis of
the above understanding, some way should be found to get the
Governor-General to make a proposal or a suggestion that he desires
an Interim Government to be formed at the Centre on the agree-
ment between the Congress and the League and when the Gover-
nor-General invites Mr. Jinnah, and Mr. Desai either jointly or
separately, the above proposals would be made, desiring that they
are prepared to join in the forming of the Government.
“The next step would be to get the withdrawal of section 93 in
the Provinces and to form as soon as possible Provincial Govern-
ments on the lines of a Coalition. ”
However, in spite of the honest efforts of Desai and Liaqat Ali
Khan, no settlement could be secured between the Congress and the
Muslim League, and the deadlock continued till the surrender of
Germany on 5 May, 1945.
WAVELL PLAN (1945)
On 14 June, 1945, Lord Wavell gave a broadcast to the people
of India. On the same day, Mr. L. S. Amery, Secretary of State
for India, made a similar statement in the House of Commons. The
thoughts and sentiments in both were practically the same. The
modus operandi consisted in calling a conference of the representa-
tives chosen by the Viceroy for the purpose of obtaining from the
leaders of various parties a joint list or separate lists of worthy per-
sons in order to constitute a new Executive Council of the Governor-
General. Lord Wavell pleaded for “men of influence and ability
to be recommended by the various parties who would be prepared
to take decision and responsibility of administration of all the port-
folios including External Affairs,” except the conduct of war which
was to be under the Commander-in-Chief. There was to be an
equal number of Muslims and Hindus other than the Scheduled
Castes. The control of the Secretary of State for India and the
Governor-General was to continue. Likewise, the veto of the Vice-
## p. 675 (#715) ############################################
WAVELL PLAN
675
roy was to continue, although the same was not to be used unreason-
ably. It was to be used not in the interests of England but those
of India. The proposals were to affect only British India and not
the Indian States. To quote Wavell, “In regard to the Indian
States, while recognising that during the interim period the powers
of the Crown representative will continue, it is clear that the
National Government will have to deal with many matters which
overlap and have concern with the states, e. g. , trade, industry,
labour etc. Further the barriers between the States people and
the princes and members of the National Government and other
associates should be removed so as to help in mutual discussion, con-
sultation and consideration of common problems and their solu-
tion. " Wavell pointed out that "If the meeting is successful, I
.
hope that we shall be able to agree on the formation of the new
Executive Council at the Centre and that Provincial Ministries in
Section 93 provinces would resume office and that these would be
Coalitions. " However, “If the meeting should unfortunately fail,
we must carry on as at present until parties come together. ”
The members of the Congress Working Committee were released
from jail and high hopes were raised on all sides. Invitations were
issued to the leaders including Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah
for the proposed Conference to be held at Simla. The Conference
met on 27 June, 1945. After three days of deliberations, it was
adjourned. On 11 July, 1945, Mr. Jinnah had a short interview
extending over 15 minutes with Lord Wavell. He seems to have
made it clear that he would not agree to the inclusion of non-League
Muslims in the list of the Governor-General on the ground that the
Muslims League alone was the sole representative of the Muslims
of India. Lord Wavell was not aware of the fact that a member
of his own Executive Council was advising Mr. Jinnah to stand
firm. However, Lord Wavell did not accept the point of view of
Mr. Jinnah. Shortly after that, Mahatma Gandhi met Lord
Wavell. On 12 July, 1945, Maulana Azad, President of the Con-
gress, was invited by Lord Wavell to see him. He was merely in-
formed that Mr. Jinnah was not agreeable to the Muslim represen-
tatives in the list prepared by Lord Wavell himself. However, Lord
Wavell did not reveal the contents of the list. On 14 July, 1945,
Lord Wavell declared that the Conference had failed. In a state-
ment, he observed thus: “The Conference has. . . . . . failed. Nobody
can regret this more than I do zyself. I wish to make it clear that
the responsibility for the failure is mine. The main idea underly-
ing the Conference was mine. If it had succeeded, its success could
have been attributed to me and I cannot place the blame for its
failure upon any of the parties. ”
## p. 676 (#716) ############################################
676 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
Critics point out that the procedure followed by Lord Wavell
was not a proper one.
He should have taken the leaders of the
other parties into confidence and revealed to them the contents of
his own list of the members of the Executive Council. It is possible
that the Congress Working Committee might have agreed to accept
his list, with or without minor alterations. He should not have
allowed the Muslim League to sabotage the whole scheme. The
responsibility for the failure must be shared by the Muslim League
and the British Government. The latter ought to have acted firmly
and fearlessly.
There is a close analogy between the Cripps Mission and the
Wavell Plan. Cripps came to India in the midst of the beating of
drums and the fanfare of trumpets. He raised high hopes and
made extravagant off-the-record promises to the Congress President
and later denied the same. In the case of the Wavell Plan also,
the Viceroy definitely stated at Simla that there was no question
of his veto being eliminated. To that extent, he was frank unlike
Cripps. Moreover, when Cripps came to India and invited
Mahatma Gandhi to meet him, the Mahatma was not at all im-
pressed by his proposals. In the case of the Wavell Plan, Mahatma
Gandhi felt that the Plan was sincere in spirit and contained the
seeds of independence. When Cripps came to India, Mahatma
Gandhi did not ask for the summoning of the Congress Working
Committee to consider the proposals. However, in 1945, he asked
for the summoning of the Congress Working Committee to consider
the Wavell Plan. Cripps came to India when there was an imme-
diate danger of the Japanese invasion of India. When the threat
of invasion passed away, the Cripps Mission came to an abrupt
end. Likewise, the Wavell Plan came to light when the Labour
Party threatened the Conservaſive Party in the elections held in
July 1945. When the elections were over, the Wavell Plan also
came to an unexpected end. It is also pointed out that the Simla
Conference was due to the Russian pressure as the Cripps Mission
was due to the American pressure. In 1942, the Mission failed as
the Congress rejected the proposals. The failure of the Wavell
Plan was due to the attitude of the Muslim League. The Cripps
proposals failed virtually on the third day of the deliberations of the
Congress Working Committee which met on 29 March 1942. The
decision was not made public on account of the special request of
Cripps. In 1945 also, the Simla Conference failed on the third day
of its meeting, i. e. , 29th June, 1945.
About the Simla Conference, Shri V. P. Menon says: “The Simla
Conference afforded the last opportunity for the forces of national-
ism to fight a rearguard action to preserve the integrity of the
1
## p. 677 (#717) ############################################
LABOUR PARTY COMES TO POWER
677
country, and when the battle was lost, the waves of communalism
quickly engulfed it. Only the Hobbson's choice of partition was
left. ” (The Transfer of Power in India, p. 215).
LABOUR PARTY IN OFFICE
The Labour Party came to power on 10 July 1945 and Lord
Pethick Lawrence, an old friend of India, was appointed Secretary
of State for India. In his speech to the new Parliament, the King-
Emperor referred to the Indian affairs in these words: “In accord-
ance with the promises already made to my Indian peoples, my
Government will do their utmost to promote in conjunction with
the leaders of Indian opinion, early realisation of full self-govern-
ment in India. ” The War with Japan ended officially on the mid-
night of 14 August 1945.
Lord Wavell was summoned to London for consultations and he
reached there on 25 August 1. 945. Before his return to India, an
announcement was made from London to the effect that fresh elec-
tions would be held both for the provincial legislatures and the
central legislature in India. Lord Wavell came back to India on
18 September 1945 and made a broadcast speech on 19 September
1945. In that broadcast, Lord Wavell told the people of India
that His Majesty's Government were determined to do their utmost
to promote the early realisation of full self-government in India.
He also declared that elections to the central and provincial legisla-
tures would be held in the coming cold weather and after that the
Government hoped that ministerial responsibility would be accept-
ed by the political leaders in all the provinces. It was the intention
of His Majesty's Government to convene as soon as possible a cons-
titution-making body and for that purpose he himself would hold,
immediately after the elections, discussions with representatives of
the provincial legislative assemblies to ascertain whether the propo-
sals contained in the Declaration of 1942 were acceptable to them
or whether some alternative or modified scheme was preferable.
He also declared that discussions would also be undertaken with
the representatives of the Indian states with a view to ascertaining
in what way they would best take their part in the constitution-
making body. His Majesty's Government was also proceeding to
the consideration of the treaty which was to be concluded between
Great in and India. He also declared that after the election
he would take steps to bring into being an Executive Council which
would have the support of the main Indian political parties. He
concluded his broadcast with these words: “It is now for the Indians
to show that they have the wisdom, faith and courage to determine
## p. 678 (#718) ############################################
678 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
in what way they can best reconcile their differences and how their
country can be governed by Indians for Indians. ” A similar state-
ment was made on the same day by Mr. Attlee, the Prime Minister
of England and that statement ended with these words: “I would
ask all Indians to follow this great example and to join together in
a united effort to work out a Constitution which the majority and
minority communities will accept as a just and fair constitution in
which both the states and provinces can find their places. The
British Government will do their utmost to give every assistance
in their power and India can be assured of the sympathy of the
British people. ”
On 4 December 1945, Lord Pethick Lawrence made a statement
in the House of Lords in which he took pains to make it clear that
there was absolutely no foundation in the propaganda in certain
quarters that the British Government intended to delay matters by
adopting the device of holding discussions with the representatives
of the people of India. He also declared that His Majesty's Gov-
ernment was arranging for a Parliamentary Delegation to go to
India under the auspices of the Empire Parliamentary Association
so that the members of the British Parliament could have an oppor-
tunity to meet leading political Indian personalities so that they
could form their own views on the spot. The Secretary of State
also made it clear that the British Government would not allow the
loyalty of the administrative services and the Indian armed forces
to be interfered with.
On 10 December 1945, while addressing the annual function of
the Associated Chamber of Commerce, Lord Wavell gave an assur-
ance that the British Government and the British people honestly
and sincerely wished the Indian people to have their political free-
dom and a government or governments of their own choice. How-
ever, he made it clear that the problem was a difficult one and
there was no magic Sesame which would open the Alibaba's cave.
The problem could also not be solved through violence and disorder.
There must be some agreement between the Congress, the Muslims
and the rulers of the Indian States and the British Government so
that the objective of freedom and welfare of India could be secur-
ed. To quote him, “I do appeal most solemnly and earnestly at
this critical moment of Indian history for goodwill on the part of
all leaders. We are going through a very difficult and testing time
and it will need coolness and wisdom if we are to avoid calamity.
in so far as I can help by personal contact, I am always prepared
to do so. ”
On 19 February 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence made a momen-
tus declaration in the House of Lords in which he announced the
## p. 679 (#719) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION
679
decision of the British Government to send a special mission of Cabi-
net Ministers to resolve the constitutional deadlock in the country.
The members of the Mission were Lord Pethick Lawrence himself,
Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade and Mr. A.
V. Alexander, First Lord of Admiralty.
THE CABINET MISSION (1946)
The Mission reached Delhi on 24 March 1946. Prolonged dis-
cussions took place between the members of the Mission and the
leaders of the Congress and Muslim League. However, the main
parties could not come to any mutual understanding. The result
was that the members of the Mission had to put forward their own
formula for solving the constitutional problem. That formula was
embodied in a joint statement issued by the Cabinet Mission and
Lord Wavell on 16 May, 1946.
After pointing out the impracticability of the Pakistan scheme,
the statement of May 16 recommended that the new constitution of
India should take the following basic form:-
"(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British
India and States which should deal with the following
subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications,
and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances
required for the above subjects.
"(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature
constituted from British India and States representatives.
Any question raising a major communal issue in the
Legislature should require for its decision a majority of
the representatives present and voting of each of the two
major communities as well as a majority of all the mem-
bers present and voting.
“(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all resi-
duary powers should vest in the Provinces.
“(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than
those ceded to the Union.
“(5) Provinces should be free to form Groups with executives
and legislatures, and each Group could determine the
Provincial subjects to be taken in common.
“(6) The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups should
contain a provision whereby any Province could, by a
majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for a re-
consideration of the terms of the constitution after an ini-
tial period of 10 years and at 10 yearly intervals there-
after. "
## p. 680 (#720) ############################################
680 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
As regards the constitution-making machinery, it was provided
that the Legislative Assemblies of the provinces would elect the
members of that body on the basis of one representative for one
million of the population. The Sikh and Muslim legislators were
to elect the quota of their communities, determined on the popula-
tion basis. Others were to elect the representatives for the rest
of the population. The representatives from the provinces were to
divide themselves into three sections, A, B and C. Section C was
to consist of the representatives of Bengal and Assam, Section B of
the Punjab, Sind and North-West Frontier Province and Section A
of the rest of the provinces of India. "These Sections shall proceed
to settle the Provincial Constitution for the Provinces included in
each Section, and shall also decide whether any Group Constitu-
tion shall be set up for these provinces and, if so, with what provin-
cial subjects the Groups should deal. ” The representatives of the
Sections of the Indian States were then to re-assemble and settle
the Union Constitution.
TABLE OF REPRESENTATION
Section A
Province
General Muslim Total
Madras
45
4
49
Bombay
19
2
21
United Provinces
47
8
55
Bihar
31
5
36
Central Provinces
16
1
17
Orissa
9
0
9
Total
167
20
187
Section B
Province
General Muslim Sikh Total
Punjab
8 16 4 28
N. -W. Frontier Province 0
3 0
3
Sind
1
3 0
4
Total
9
22
4
35
Province
Bengal
Assam
Section C
General
27
7
Muslim
33
3
Total
60
10
Total
34
36
70
Total for British India
Maximum for States
292
93
Total
385
## p. 681 (#721) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION
681
The Provinces of India were given the power to opt out of the
Groups by a decision of their Legislature after the general elections
under the new Constitution. The Resolutions of the Union Consti-
tuent Assembly regarding major communal issues were to require
a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the
two major communities. The Chairman of the Constituent As-
sembly was to decide which resolution raised major communal
issues and was to consult the Federal Court before giving his de-
cision. A plan for the interim Government was also envisaged in
the Scheme of May 16, 1946.
The Cabinet Mission declared that the British Government could
not and would not in any circumstances transfer paramountcy to
an Indian Government. However, it was made clear that when
a new self-governing Government or Governments came into being
in British India, it would not be possible for the British Government
to carry out the obligations of paramountcy. In that case, all the
rights surrendered by the states to the paramount power were to
return to the Indian states. “Political arrangements between the
states on the one hand and the British Crown and British India on
the other will thus be brought to an end. The void will have to
be filled either by the states entering into a federal relationship
with the successor Government or Goverments in British India or,
failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it
or them. ” This policy has been described as a “political scorched-
earth policy. ”
The great merit of the Cabinet Mission scheme was that the
Constituent Assembly was to be constituted on the democratic prin-
ciple of population strength. The principle of weightage was to be
discarded altogether. The democratic method of the decision of
issues by a simple majority was adopted in the case of communal
issues. However, safeguards were provided for the minorities.
The scheme also provided for an Indian Union of provinces and
states and rejected the idea of Pakistan completely. The Cabinet
Mission scheme was the last attempt made by British statesmen to
save India from division and disaster. Some of the anomalies of
the scheme were due to the desire of the members of the Cabinet
Mission to save Indian unity at any cost.
The scheme required
that all the members of the Constituent Assembly were to be
Indians. Neither the British Government nor non-official Europeans
in India were to be given any representation in the Constituent
Assembly. The European members of the Provincial Assemblies
were to absent themselves from voting. There was to be no inter-
ference with the work of the Constituent Assembly either by the
British Government or by its officials. Within the framework of
## p. 682 (#722) ############################################
682 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
the scheme, the Constituent Assembly was to be its own master.
As regards its demerits, while the scheme protected the rights of
the Muslim minority, the same principle was not applied to the
Sikhs in the Punjab. The proposals of the Cabinet Mission with
regard to the grouping of the provinces were not clear. Both the
Congress and the Muslim League interpreted the provisions differ-
ently. The Muslims regarded the compulsory grouping of the pro-
vinces as one of the cornerstones of the Cabinet Mission Scheme and
were not prepared to come to a compromise on that question. The
Congress stand was that the making of the groups was optional for
the provinces and the latter were free to join or not to join any
group. As a matter of fact, Mahatma Gandhi asked the people of
Assam not to join the group if they did not approve of it. To solve
this difficulty, it was suggested that the provinces might join provi-
sionally, but later on freedom might be given to them to leave it if
they so desired. The Congress suggested that the matter be refer-
red to the Federal Court of India for decision. However, the Bri-
tish Government gave its verdict in favour of the compulsory group-
ing of the provinces. The Muslim League won and the Congress
lost its point. Another defect of the scheme was the order in which
the Union and Sectional Assemblies were to meet and work and
draft their constitutions. It looked ridiculous first to form the
constitutions of the groups and the provinces and then to frame
the constitution of the Union. It was like putting the cart before
the horse. This practical difficulty would have been experienced
if the whole scheme would have been worked out in actual practice.
As regards the events after May 16, 1946, the All India Muslim
League passed a resolution on June 6, 1946, by which it accepted
the Cabinet Mission scheme in its entirety. On June 26, 1946, the
Working Committee of the Indian National Congress passed a reso-
lution by which it accepted the scheme partially. The part accept-
ed by it related to constitution-making. The view of the Working
Committee was that the grouping of the provinces was not to be
compulsory. The Congress rejected the interim
the interim Government
scheme on the ground that the clarifications given were not accept-
able. The resolution of the Working Committee was ratified by the
All India Congress Committee. The Sikhs rejected the scheme
.
completely on the ground that the compulsory grouping of the pro-
vinces as contemplated by the scheme was suicidal to their interests.
Before the members of the Cubinet Mission left India, they issued
a statement along with Lord Wavell in which they expressed their
satisfaction that the work of the making of the constitution would
proceed with the consent of the major political parties in India.
They regretted that an interim Government consisting of the vari-
## p. 683 (#723) ############################################
THE CALCUTTA KILLING
683
ous political parties could not be formed on account of certain diffi-
culties. It was hoped that after the elections to the Constituent
Assembly were over, negotiations would be started for the formation
of an interim Government consisting of the representatives of the
various political parties.
CALCUTTA KILLING (AUGUST 1946)
Mr. Jinnah who had accepted the scheme in its entirety, was
annoyed at the decision of the British Government to postpone the
formation of the interim Government. He accused Lord Wavell
of his having gone back on his promise. He was so much angry
that the Muslim League, under his leadership, passed another reso-
lution on July 29, 1946, by which it withdrew its former accept-
ance of the Cabinet Mission scheme. Mr. Jinnah was not content-
ed with this negative action. The Muslim League passed the fam-
ous Direct Action Resolution by which both the Congress and the
British Government were condemned for their breach of faith with
the Muslims. It was declared that the time had come for the Mus-
lim League to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan. The
resolution authorised the Working Committee of the Muslim League
to prepare a programme of direct action at once. August 16, 1946,
was fixed as the Direct Action Day.
