No More Learning

[The Sarvastivadins:] This is also the case for the existences of
Arupyadhatu which then are not included among the realms of
36 rebirth.
We say then that intermediate existence is so called because it is intermediate between two realms of rebirth, but it is itself not a realm of rebirth. If it were a realm of rebirth it would not be intermediate, and so it would not be called an intermediate existence.
[The Sarvastivadins:] Admitting that you have refuted the ar- gument taken from the Sutra of the Seven Existences, what do you make of the declaration of Sariputra (above, p. 372, line 20)?
Sariputra says that there is a being in hell when the retribution of hellish actions is realized; it does not say that the realm of rebirth is part retribution, part non-retribution. The text says that there does not exist any being in hell outside of these dharmas, riipa, etc. : its intention is to negate the reality of any person passing from one realm of rebirth into another, not to affirm that the skandhas (rupa9 etc) of the beings in hell are solely retribution.
*#*
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For the Vaibha? ikas, the realms of rebirth are exclusively undefiled-
neutral dharmas. Among the Vaibhasikas, some think that they are
dharmas of retribution {vipdkaja); others think that they are dharmas of 1
retribution and accumulation {aupacayika)* ***
In the three Dhatus with their five realms of rebirth, there is, in ascending order,
5a-6a. Seven abodes or types of consciousnesses (vijndnasthitis), namely: 1. beings different in bodies and ideas; 2. beings of different bodies but similar in ideas; 3. beings similar in body but different in ideas; 4. beings similar in body and ideas; and 5. -7.
38 three classes of non-material beings.
According to the Sutra (Madhyama, 24,11):
1. "Material beings different in bodies and ideas, namely humans
and certain gods, are the first vijndnasthitisy 39
What are these certain gods? The six gods of Kamadhatu (i. l) and the gods of the First Dhyana (world of Brahma) except the prathamd-
40 bhinirvrttas.
They are of different bodies, because their color, their marks
(clothes, ornaments, etc. ), and their figures (height, etc. ) are not
identical. They are of different ideas, because their ideas, ideas of
pleasure, displeasure, neither-pleasure-nor-displeasure, are not iden-
41 tical.
2. "Material beings different in bodies but of similar ideas, namely 42
the prathamdbhinirvrtta Brahmakayika gods, are the second vijna- nasthitis"
All these prathamdbhinirvrtta gods are of similar ideas, for all have
the same idea of a single and same cause, Brahma, who thinks, "They are
created by me," and the associates of Brahma who think, "We are created
43
by Brahma;" there is diversity of body, for one is Brahma, and the
others his followers through their height, their greatness, their bodies,
44 their speech, their clothing and their ornaments.
We read in the Sutra that these gods remember, "We have seen this being of great sight, who lasts so long," and so on to "when he made the
? vow, 'May other beings be born here in my company! / we were born in
45
his company. " (See iii. 90c-d). We ask then where were these gods
46 when they saw Brahma?
According to certain masters [who take their authority from the Sutra that teaches that the Brahmakayikas are reborn in the world of Brahma after dying in Abhasvara Heaven], they saw Brahma when they were in Abhasvara Heaven.
But, we would say, when they fell from Abhasvara Heaven, a heaven of the Second Dhyana, they lost the Second Dhyana, and the Second Dhyana is necessary to the memory of a past existence in the heaven of the Second Dhyana (vii. 44a). Further, they have not re-acquired the Second Dhyana since they have fallen into the erroneous view (e. g. silavrataparamarsa) of considering Mahibrahma as a creator: one cannot say that this erroneous view can accompany the Second Dhyana, since no erroneous view (or any defilement, klesa) of a certain sphere has ever had a lower, inferior sphere as its object.
According to another opinion, they saw Brahma when they were in the intermediate existence {antarabhava) which proceeded their birth in the world of Brahma.
But one would object that this intermediate existence is very short
47
for it cannot have any slowing down of birth in this world. How then
can they say, "We have seen this being of great sight, who lasts so long? " As a consequence, a third opinion, one would say: It is in the world of
Brahma itself that these gods remember the past of Brahma. At the moment when they are born there, they saw him who being born before them, who lasts a long time. Having seen him, they think: "We have seen this being . . . ;" and they know the vow that he made through memory of the sphere of the First Dhyana which they obtained through
48 the very fact of their birth; or rather because Brahma told them.
3. "Material beings similar in body but of different ideas, namely the Abhasvara gods, are the third vijndnasthiti?
The Sutra, in naming the highest gods of the Second Dhyana, the Abhasvaras, also designates the Parlttabha and the Apramanabha gods. If it were otherwise, to which vijnanasthiti would these two classes belong?
There is no difference of color, mark, or figure among them: thus
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these gods have similar bodies. They have ideas of pleasure and of neither-pleasure-nor-displeasure: thus there is diversity of ideas.
In fact, it is said (Vibhdsd, TD, p. 707b6),--wrongly according to us (kila),--that these gods, fatigued with the sensation of mental pleasure--which is the sensation proper to the Second Dhyana--pass into the threshold (samantaka) absorption of this Dhyana, an ab- sorption which allows the sensation of neither-pleasure-nor-displeasure (viii. 22). Fatigued from this second sensation, they again take up the Second Dhyana and the sensation of mental pleasure. In this same way kings fatigued with the pleasures of lust {kdmasukha) take up the pleasure of government (or of dharma), and fatigued with dharma take up again the pleasure of lust.
One would object that it should hold for a god of the Third Dhyana (Subhakrtsnas, etc: fourth vijnanasthiti) as for the gods of the Second Dhyana: yet the gods of the Third Dhyana do not pass into samantaka, and always possess the sensation of pleasure.
But this objection is in vain. The Subhakrtsnas do not become fatigued with the pleasures of the Abhasvaras, since they are calm, whereas the pleasures of the Abhasvaras, being mental pleasures, trouble the mind and are not calm.
The Sautrantikas are of a different opinion. They quote the Sutra
(Saptasuryavydkarana, Dtrgha TD1, p. 138b25, and Madhyama, TD1, 49
p. 429a22): "Beings that are born for a short time in Abhasvara Heaven know poorly the laws of the destruction of the universe. When the destruction of the universe takes place through fire, they see the flames rising and destroying the palace of the world of Brahma: they are frightened, grieved, confused, 'May these flames not rise up to here! ' But the beings who have lived for a long time in Abhasvara Heaven know of these cosmic changes and reassure their frightened companions, D o not be afraid, friend! Do not be afraid, friend! Already previously this fire, having burnt the Palace of Brahma, disappeared' Then one sees indeed how the gods of the Second Dhyana have different ideas: at the burning up of the worlds in the First Dhyana, they have ideas of the arriving or the non-arriving of the flames amongst them, and they have ideas of fear and no fear. The explanation of the Vaibhasikas then, that these gods exchange the sensation of pleasure and indifference, is not good.
4. "Material beings of similar bodies and ideas, namely the
? gubhakrtsnas, are the fourth vijndnasthiti"
They have the same ideas, because they have the sensation of
pleasure.
In the First Dhyana, there is uniformity of ideas, ideas defiled since
they are associated with filavratapardmarsa\ in the Second Dhyana, there is diversity of ideas, namely good ideas of the Dhyana proper and of its threshold absorption; and in the third Dhy? na, there is uniformity of ideas, ideas arisen from retribution.
5. - 7. The first three Arupyas are the last three vijndnasthitis as it 50
***
What are the vijndnasthitis} The five skandhas of Kamadhatu or Rupadhatu for the first ones (see iii. 7c), and four skandhas for the last three.
Why are not the rest vijndnasthiti! 6b. The rest reduce the Vijnana.
The "rest" refers to the painful realms of rebirth (durgati, apdya: hell, etc), the Fourth Dhyana, and the Fourth Arupya (=Naivasa- mjfianasamjnayatana) which is called Bhavagra or the summit of existence.
52
Here, in these realms, the Vijnana is reduced, or cut off: in the
painful realms of rebirth, painful sensation damages the vijndna\ in the Fourth Dhyana, an ascetic can cultivate asamjnisamdpatti, the ab- sorption of unconsciousness (ii. 42), and in this Dhyana there is also dsamjfiika, namely the dharma (ii. 41b) that creates the Unconcsious Gods (Asamjnisattva); in Bhavagra, the ascetic can cultivate nirodha- samdpatti (ii. 43a), the absorption of the cessation of ideas and sensations.
According to another explanation (Vibhdsa, TD 27, p. 708al4), vijUdnasthiti is "the place where those who are here desire to go, the place from whence those who are there do not desire to fall. " These two conditions are absent in the painful realms of rebirth. As for the Fourth Dhyana, all those who are in it desire to leave it: Prthagjanas desire to pass to the realm of the Asamjnisattvas; Aryans desire to pass to the
says in the Sutra.
51
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Suddhavasikas [or to the Arupyayatanas; and the Suddhavasikas desire
53 to realize the calm of extinction, sdntanirodha].
Bhavagra is not a vijndnasthiti because there is little activity of the 54
Vijnana in it.
***
The seven vijndnasthitis,
6c-d With Bhavagra and unconscious beings, are the nine
55 "dwellings of beings. "
For creatures dwell therein as they will.
7a. There are no other dwellings of beings, for elsewhere one lives without desiring it.
"Elsewhere" refers to the painful realms of rebirth. Beings are brought there by the Raksasa which is Karma and live there without desiring it. This is not one of the "dwellings" in the same way that a
56 prison is not a dwelling.
#*#
If one Sutra says that there are seven vijndnasthiti, according to another Sutra
57 7b. There are four other sthitis.
These four are: rupa as an abode of vijndna, (rupopagd vijndna- sthitih), vedand or sensation as an abode of vijndna (vedanopagd vijndnasthitih), ideas as an abode of vijndna (samjnopagd vijndna- sthitih), and the samskdras or forces as an abode of vijndna (samskd- ropagd vijndnasthitih).
7c-d. They consist of the four impure skandhasy which are of the
58 same sphere as the vijndna.
The consciousness or vijndna can grasp visible things and the other skandhas of a different sphere as its object: but it cannot grasp them as object under the impulse of craving; thus they are not considered as its
? abode or sthiti (see above, note 16).
But why is the fifth skandha, the consciousness itself (mind and
mental states), not considered as an abode of the consciousness?
The Vaibhasikas observe that the sthiti, "that upon which, or within
which one grasps" is opposed to sthdtar, "he who grasps. " Devadatta is opposed to the horse that he is sitting on. The king is not the throne. Or again vijndnasthiti signifies an abode of the mind, and the dharmas upon which the mind rides in order to move forward, are like the sailors on the ship: now the mind does not ride on the mind in order to move; hence the mind is not an abode of the mind
But another Sutra says, "There is delight (nandi-saumanasya'sms- faction) and attachment with regard to this food which is the consciousness" (iii. 40a). If there is delight and attachment with regard to
59 the consciousness then the consciousness rides in it and resides in it.
On the other hand, you teach that the five skandhas (including the consciousness) constitute the sevenfold abode of consciousness (iii. 5a); why do you not add the consciousness to the fourfold abodes of consciousness?
The Vaibhasikas answer: When we consider, without making any distinction between the skandhas, the process attached to the con- sciousness with regard to its arising which is made up of the five skandhas, then we can say that the vijnana is a vijndnasthiti. But, if we consider the skandhas one by one, we see that matter, sensation, ideas, and the samskaras--which are the support of the consciousness, and are associated or coexistent with the consciousness--are the causes of the defilement of the consciousness: but the consdousnesss is not, in this way, the cause of the defilement of the consciousness, since two consciousnesses do not coexist. Thus
7d-8a. Taken separately, the consciousness is not defined as an abode of the consciousness.
Further, the Blessed One described the four abodes of consciousness as "a field," and he describes the consciousness, accompanied by desire,
60
as "a seed. "
indeed that the dharmas that coexist with the consciousness merely serve as its field.
He does not give the seed as a field of the seed; and we see
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#*#
Do the four sthitis contain the seven, and do the seven contain the four?
No.
8b. The correspondance admits of four cases.
First case: the consciousness is included among the seven, but not
among the four.
Second case: the four skandhas (excluding the consciousness) of the
painful realms of rebirth, the Fourth Dhyana and Bhavagra, are included among the four.
Third case: the four skandhas are included among the seven, and are also included among the four.
Fourth case: the other dharmas are included neither among the seven nor among the four, [namely the consciousness of the painful realms of rebirth, etc, and the pure dharmas].
###
We have said that the three Dhatus include five realms of rebirth, etc.
8c-d There are here four "wombs" of beings, beings born from
61 eggs, etc.
Yoni or womb signifies birth. Eytmologically, yoni signifies "mixture": in birth--birth being common to all creatures--beings are
62 mixed together in confusion.
"Womb of beings born from eggs" are those beings who arise from eggs, geese, cranes, peacocks, parrots, thrushes, etc.
"Womb of beings born from wombs" are those beings who arise
63 from a womb, elephants, horses, cows, buffalos, asses, pigs, etc.
w
"Wombs of beings born from moisture"
from the exudation of the elements, earth, etc. ,--worms, insects, butterflies, mosquitos.
65
"Womb of apparitional beings" are those beings who arise all at
66
once, with their organs neither lacking nor deficient, with all their
are those beings who arise
? major and minor limbs. These are called upapaduka, apparitional, because they are skillful at appearing (upapadana), and because they arise all at once [without an embryonic state, without semen and blood];
67 such as gods, beings in hell, or beings in an intermediate existence.
**#
How are the wombs distributed among the realms of rebirth? 9a. Humans and animals are of the four types.
Humans can be born from an egg, such as Saila and Upasaila who
68
were born from the eggs of a crane; the thirty-two sons of (Visakha),
69
the mother of Mrgara; and the five hundred sons of the King of
70 Paficala.
71 Humans can be born from moisture, such as Mandhatar, Cam
72 73 Upacaru, Kapotamalini, Amrapali, etc.
Apparational humans (ii. 14) are humans at the beginning of the cosmic period (prMhamakdpika, ii. 14, iii. 97c).
Animals are also of four types. These types are known through common experience. Nagas and Garudas are also apparitional (see below, note 83).
9b-c. Beings in hell, intermediate beings, and the gods are
74 apparitional too.
These three classes of beings are exclusively apparitional. 9d Pretas are also born from a womb.
They are of two types, apparitional and born from a womb. That they are born from a womb results from a discourse that a Pretl had with Maudgalyayana, "I gave birth to five sons a night, to five sons a day: I ate
75 them and was not satisfied. "
***
What is the best womb?
The apparitional womb.
But the Bodhisattva in his last birth evidently possesses "mastery
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16
relating to arising" (upapattivaiitva). Why did he then choose to be
77 born from a womb? (See iii. 17)
There are two answers to this question. 1. The Bodhisattva sees great advantage in it: by reason of their relationship with him, the great Sakya clan enters into the Good Law; and, recognizing in him a member of the family of the Cakravartins, persons experience a great respect towards him; persons are encouraged seeing that, being a man, he has realized this perfection. If the Bodhisattva were not born from the womb, we would not know his family, and persons would say, "What is this magician, a god or a Pi? aca? " In fact non-Buddhists masters calumniously say that at the end of one hundred cosmic periods there would appear in the world such a magician who devours the world
78 through his magic
79
2. Others explain that the Bodhisattva has taken up the womb in
80
order that his body remains as relics after his Nirvana: through the
adoration of these relics, humans and other creatures by the thousands
obtain heaven and deliverance. In fact, the bodies of apparational beings,
not having any external seed (semen, blood, bone, etc. ), do not continue
to exist after their deaths, like a flame which disappears without
81
remnant. But we see indeed that this explanation cannot be admitted
82 by the masters who attribute rddhi ddhisthanikt to the Buddha.
***
One question arises from another.
If the bodies of apparitional beings disappear at their deaths, how
can the Sutra say, "The apparitional Garuda seizes the apparitional
83 Naga in order to eat it? "
The text says that he seizes the Naga in order to eat it, not that he does eat it.
Or rather he eats the Naga as long as the Naga is not dead: but he does not feast on the dead Naga.
***
What is the least desirable of the wombs?
The apparitional womb, for it embraces all hellish realms of rebirth,
? all heavenly realms of rebirth, plus one part of the three other realms of
84 rebirth, plus intermediate beings.
What is an intermediate being, and an intermediate existence?
10. Intermediate existence, which inserts itself between ex-
istence at death and existence at birth, not having arrived at the
85 location where it should go, cannot be said to be born.
Between death--that is, the five skandhas of the moment of death--and arising--that is, the five skandhas of the moment of rebirth--there is found an existence--a "body" of five skandhas--that goes to the place of rebirth. This existence between two realms of rebirth (gati) is called intermediate existence. **
This existence is produced: why not say that it arises (upapanna); why not attribute birth (upapatti) to it?
We say that it is arising (upapadyamdna); but it is not born (see iiL40c). In fact as its etymology indicates (pad-gam, upapanna-upagata), to be born is to arrive. Intermediate existence (or intermediate being), when it begins, has not arrived at the place where it should go, namely to
87 the place where the retribution of actions is manifested and achieved.
88
According to other seas,
between death and birth: but there is no intermediate existence.
This opinion is false, as reasoning and Scripture prove.
lla-b.
Being similar to the series of rice, existence does not reproduce itself after having been interrupted
The momentary dharmas exist in a series; when they appear in a
place distant from that in which they have been found, it is because they
are reproduced without discontinuity in intermediate places, such as the
series that constitutes a grain of rice and which one transports to a
distant village by passing through all the villages in the interval. In the
same way, the mental series takes up birth after being reproduced
without discontinuity (intermediate existence) from the place where
89 death took place.
there is a cutting off, a discontinuity
But, one would say, a reflection (pratibimba) arises on a mirror, on
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the water, etc. , without being continuous to the image (bimbo) with which it forms a series. Hence the elements of arising do not depend on the elements forming an uninterrupted series between the place of death and the place where they reappear.
llc-d. The existence of the refleaion is not proved; should it be proved, the refleaion is not similar; hence it does not serve as an example.
A reflection is a thing in and of itself (dravya) namely a certain type of color (varnd). The existence of the refleaion is not proved.
12a. For two things do not exist in the same spot.
a. In one and the same spot, a person placed to the side of a mirror perceives the rupa or physical matter of this mirror, matter derived from the primary elements (updddyarupa); a person placed facing (the mirror) perceives his own refleaion, which is a "certain type of color," derived matter. Now one can admit only that two derived matters exist at the same time in the same spot, for each of them should have as its support two distina groups of primary elements.
b. Two persons who both look at the same objea, a jar, etc. , see it at the same time. Now two persons placed at the two sides of a pond see the refleaion of the objea that faces them: the same refleaion is not seen at the same time by both of them.
c. Shade and sunlight do not coexist in the same spot. Now, if one places a mirror in the shade (i. lOa), in a shed situated close to a pond lit by the sun, one would see in this mirror the refleaion of the refleaion of the sun on the surface of the water.
It is thus proved, by these three observations, that a refleaion is not a real, substantial thing (dravya).
***
The Karika is liable to another interpretation. "For the two things do not exist in the same spot": the "two things" are the surface of the mirror and the refleaion of the moon. We do not see, in the same spot, the surface of the mirror and the refleaion of the moon, refleaed in the mirror: this refleaion appears recessed, at a depth, like the water in a
? 90
well. Now if a real physical matter, the reflection, should arise, it
would arise on the surface of the mirror, and would be perceived as being on the surface of the mirror. A reflection is thus only an illusory idea taking the form of the reflection (pratibimbakaram bhrantam vijndnam). Such is the power of this complex, mirror and object, that it produces the seeing of a reflection, of an image resembling the object. Incomprehensible is the power of the dharmas and the variety of this power.
***
Let us admit nevertheless the real existence of the reflection. It still cannot serve as an example in your reasoning, for it cannot be compared to arising. It is not similar to arising:
12b. For it does not form a series.
The reflection does not form a series with the object reflected, because the reflection arises supported by the mirror, and because the reflection is simultaneous to the object reflected. But on the contrary death and arising form a series, the second being later to the first and being produced in another place than the first without there being a cutting off between them [due to intermediate existence].
12b. For it arises from two causes.
It is by reason of two causes that a reflection arises, by reason of the mirror and of the object. The principal of these two causes is the cause upon which it takes its support in order to arise, namely the mirror. But it happens that arising, or birth, proceeds from only one cause; and it never has a principal cause which is not death. Arising has no external support in the case of apparitional beings, because they appear suddenly in space. And these external elements cannot be the principal cause for the beings that arise from semen, blood, or mud, since these items are absent from the mind
Reasoning thus proves the existence of an intermediate being since arising proceeds from death without there being any discontinuity between these two existences.
***
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Scripture also proves the existence of an intermediate being. 12c. The intermediate being is called by its name.
The Sutra says, "There are seven existences {bhavas)\ existence in
hell (naraka), as an animal {tiryagyoni), as a Preta, as a heavenly being
(deva)9 and as a human (manusya), as well as karmabhava and 91
If the school that we are combating does not read this Sutra, at least they read the texts pertaining to Gandharvas.
12c. It is the Gandharva.
We read in the Sutra, "Three conditions are necessary for an embryo to descend, [in order for a son or daughter to be born]: the woman must be in good health and fertile, the pair must be united, and a Gandharva
92
must be ready. " What is the Gandharva if not an intermediate being? But our opponents do not read the Sutra in these terms! They replace the third condition by a text that says, "a dissolution of the
93 skandhas [that is, one dying] must be made ready. "
sutra, which says, "This Gandharva which is made ready,--do you know if it is a Brahmin, a Ksatriya, a VaiSya, or a Sudra? Do you know if it comes from the east, the south, the west, or the north? " This expression "to come" shows that it refers to an intermediate being, not to a "dissolution of the skandhas. "
If our opponents do not read this Sutra,
12d. An intermediate being is proved by the text relative to the Five.
The Blessed One teaches that there are five types of Anagamins: one
who obtains Nirvana in an intermediate existence (antardparmirvdyin),
one who obtains Nirv&na as soon as he is reborn (upapadyapari-
nirvdyin), one who obtains Nirvana without effort (anabhisamskdra-
parinirvdyin), one who obtains Nirvana by means of effort (anabhisa-
antardbhava"
Very well, but one doubts if they could explain the Aivatdyana- 94
mskdraparinirvdyin), and one who obtains Nirvana by going higher 95
(urdvasrotas).
Certain masters (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 357b21) maintain that an
antardparinirvdyin is a saint who obtains Nirvana after having been
? reborn among some so-called Antara gods. But they should then admit the existence of Upapadya gods, etc. An absurd opinion.
12d And by the Sutra of the gatis.
96
By the Sutra of the Seven Satpurusagatis. This Sutra teaches that
one should distinguish three types oiantardparinirvdyins on the basis of their differences of duration and place: the first is similar to a spark that is extinguished as soon as it arises; the second to a fragment of reddened mental which enlarges in its flight; the third to a fragment of reddened mental which enlarges in its flight, but later, and without falling back into the sun. Given this text, it is pure fantasy to suppose that an antardparinirvdyin is an inhabitant of a heaven of the Antara gods, for these Antaras cannot be divided into three classes by reason of duration and place.
But yet other scholars--(the Vibhajyavadins as the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 357a4-358a25 testifies)--present the explanation here. An antard- parinirvdyin obtains Nirvana, that is, eliminates the defilements, either in the interval of his lifetime, or in the interval of his cohabitation with the gods. He is threefold: he is termed a dhdtugata if he obtains Nirvana having just arrived in the Dhatu [that is, in a heaven of Rupadhatu, and as a consequence if he eliminates the defilements that cause him to be reborn in Rupadhatu whereas they (the defilements) are still in a seed-like state]; he is called a samjndgata if he obtains Nirvana later, at a moment when the idea (samjnd) of the objects of Rupadhatu is active in him; and he is called a vitarkagata if he obtains Nirvana still later, at a moment when the vitarka (volitions, etc. ) produced by these objects is active. In this way we would have three antardparinirvdyins conforming to the definitions of the Sutra and who obtain Nirvana in the interval of the duration of their life, that is, without achieving the end of their life as gods of the heaven where they were rebora Or rather, the first antardparinirvdyin obtains Nirvana as soon as he has taken possession of a certain divine existence; the second after having experienced a heavenly bliss; and the third, after having entered into company or conversation with the gods.
An objection: if an antardparinirvdyin is a saint who is reborn, experiences bliss, and enters into the company of the gods, what will an upapadhyparinirvayin be, literally "one who obtains Nirvana as soon as
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he is reborn? "
We answer that an upapadyaparinirvdyin enters entirely into their
company, and, as this answer is not conclusive, we further answer that
an upapadyaparinirvdyin reduces the duration of his life by much [and
more than an antardparinirvayin]: [he is called an upapadya because he
91
obtains Nirvana dyur upahatya].
But we must observe that all these persons, the dhdtugata, etc. , go to
the same place. Thus they do not correspond to the examples of the
Sutra. On the other hand, there are saints in Arupyadhatu who obtain
98 Nirvana without having fully lived their lives to the end (iii. 85a), and
yet no antardparinirvdyins are there. This point is illustrated in the metrical formula,
By the dhydnas, four decades; by the drupyas^ three heptades; by ideas, one hexade:
thus is the group bound. "
Y et if our adversaries do not read this Sutra, what can we do about it? The Master has entered Nirvana, and the Good Law no longer has a leader. Many sects have been formed that change the meaning and the
10
letter to their fantasies. ? We say that, for the masters who admit these
Sutras, the existence of an intermediate being or the "skandhas in the interval" is proved both by Scripture and reasoning.
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Yet there are some difficulties:
a. We must reconcile the doctrine of an intermediate being with the Sutra on Mara. This Sutra says, "The Mara called Dusin, [having struck the head of Vidura, the disciple of Krakucchanda,] fell, with his own
101
body, into great Avici Hell. " Actions very grave (by intention and in
scope) and complete (that is, "accumulated," iv. 12) ripen before death itself. Mara then felt a retribution in this life before feeling a retribution in hell. The text thus means that Mara was enveloped, while still alive, by the fires of hell; that he dies; and that he then takes up an intermediate existence which leads to hell where birth in hell takes place.
? b. According to the Sutra, there are five anantarya transgressionsrhe
who commits them is immediately born in hell {samanantararh
fiarakesupapadyate, iv. 97). We hold that the expression "immediately"
signifies "without intermediary," without passing through another
realm of rebirth (gati): which is an action "retributable in the next
existence" (upapadya, iv. 50b). If you take the Sutra literally, you come to
absurd conclusions: you would have to say that one must have
committed the five crimes in order to be reborn in hell and you would
have to say that the transgressor is reborn in hell immediately after the
transgression, or that he is reborn there without dying here. Moreover,
according to our doctrine, rebirth in hell is immediate; it is not preceeded
by a "birth" as an intermediate being. We maintain that, by its nature,
the intermediate being is "arising" (upapadyamdna) because he is
turned towards the birth (upapatti) that follows death; we do not say 102
that he is born (upapanno bhavati) (iiilOd).
c. You should explain the stanza, "Your life is approaching its end,
Oh Brahmin; you are old and sick; you are in the presence of Yama; there
is not for you any intervening {antard) dwelling {vdsa) and you have no 103
provision. "
[Vasubandhu:] You think that this stanza shows that there is no
intermediate existence. But we understand the words antard vdsa in the sense of dwelling among humans: "Once dead, you shall not reappear here;" or rather, the text means that "No one can retard the progress of the intermediate being that you are going to become on the way to the place of your rebirth in hell. "
The one who denys the existence of intermediary beings asks us upon what do we base ourselves in order to for us to say that such is the intention of this text, or that such is not its intention.
We would reply with the same question.
If, in this manner, the two objections are made equal, what proof can you come to? Let us observe that for the Sutra on Mara, etc. , the explanation of the person who denies the existence of intermediate beings, and our explanation, are not contradiaed by the text itself. The texts are thus not conclusive for or against intermediate beings. Texts that are conclusive and which serve as proof are those which can be interpreted in only one way: [as we have quoted, pp. 386-387. ]
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What is the form of an intermediate being?
13a-b. Being projected by the same action that projects the purvakalabhavay an intermediate being has the form of this being, that is, the being of the realm of rebirth to come after his conceptioa
The action that projects the gati or the realm of rebirth--an existnce in hell, etc--is the same action that projects the intermediate existence
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by which one goes to this realm of rebirth. As a consequence
antarabhava or intermediate existence has the form of the future purvzkalabhava (p. 39, line 19) of the realm of rebirth towards which he is going.
Objection: In the womb of a dog, a sow, etc, there can die in its embryonic stage a being who should then be reborn in any one of the five realms of rebirth. Let us suppose then that this embryo is replaced
105
by an intermediate being destined to go to helL This intermediate
being,if he has the form of a being in hell, will burn the womb of the dog. Answer: Even in a perfect state (purvakalabhava), beings in hell are not always incadescent, for example the "annexes" (utsodas, iii. 58d). But
even if one believes that intermediate beings bound for hell are incandescent, as their bodies are "ethereal" {accha, transparent, viii. 3c), they are not any more tangible than they are visible. There is thus no
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adherence of the intermedate being. Thus the womb is not burned;
moreover the influence of actions is opposed to this.
The dimensions of an intermediate being are those of a child of five
or six years of age, but his organs are perfectly developed
The intermediate being of the Bodhisattva is similar to the Bodhisattva in the fullness of his youth; he is adorned with the major
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and minor marks; that is why, when this intermediate being comes to
enter his mother's womb, he illumines a thousand universes with their four continents.
But we know that the mother of the Bodhisattva saw in a dream a
small white elephant enter her side. This was only an "omen," because
for a long time the Bodhisattva has been disengaged from animal
108
rebirth. King Krkin also saw ten dreams: an elephant, wells, a pole,
sandalwood, a park, a young elephant, two monkeys, cloths, and
? 109
contests, which were omens. Furthermore, intermediate beings do
not enter into the womb by splitting open the side, but rather by the door of birth: this is why the eldest of twins is the one born last.
But how do you explain the stanza of the Bhadanta Dharma-
no
subhuti, "Changing his body into that of a white elephant having six
tusks and four feet, he enters the womb and lies therein in full consciousness as a Rsi entering a forest? "
There is no reason to explain this text: it is neither Sutra, nor 111
Vinaya, nor Abhidharma; it is a personal composition. But if it demands an explanation, we would say that this stanza describes the Bodhisattva just as his mother saw him in a dream.
***
An intermediate being in Rupadhatu is complete in size and is
112
dressed by reason of his great modesty (iiiJOc). The Bodhisattva in
his interdiate existence
who, through the force of her vow, was clothed in her intermediate existence: she entered the womb and left it dressed, and she remained
1B
dressed until her Nirvana and cremation. But lacking modesty, other
intermediate beings of Kamadhatu are nude.
#*#
What is the purvakdkbhava which is parallel to antarabhava} 13c-d This is before death, after conception.
Bhava is existence, the skandhas.
In intermediate existence, the five skandhas enter two realms of rebirth: upapattibhava, which is the skandhas at the moment of their entry into a realm of rebirth, at the moment of their pratisamdhi (iii. 38 and p. ); and purvakalabhava which is all the skandhas of the following moments until death, the last moment of the realm of rebirth and which
114 will be followed by a new antarabhava,
There is no antarabhava in Arupyadhatu. *#*
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Let us return to the intermediate being:
I4a-b. He is seen by the creatures of his class, and by the divine eye.
He is seen by the intermediate beings of the class,--heavenly,
etc. ,--to which he belongs. He is also seen by the pure divine eye, that is,
by the divine eye that is obtained through higher knowledge (abhijnd, 115
vii. 55d), for this eye is very pure. He is not seen by a natural divine eye or a divine eye obtained through birth, such as the divine eye of the gods.
According to other masters, a heavenly intermediate being sees all
intermediate beings; a human intermediate being sees all intermediate
116 beings with the exception of heavenly intermediate beings, and so on.
14b. He is filled with the impetus of the supernormal power of
117 action.
He is a karmarddhwegavdn: endowed (-van) with the impetus (vega) which belongs to supernatural power (rddhi)--that is, the movement through space--which issues from action (karmari) (vii. 53c). The Buddhas themselves cannot stop him because he is endowed with the force of action.
14c His organs are complete.
He is sakaldksa; aksa signifies indriya. 118
He is an apra&ighavam a pratigha is a strike that repels; an apratighavan is one in whom there is no pratigha. Even a diamond is not impenetrable to him. For, they say, when we split open a mass of red hot iron we find that some small animals are born inside it.
When an intermediate being is to be reborn in a certain realm of rebirth, from this realm of rebirth, by force,
119 I4d He cannot be turned away.
A human intermediate being, ceasing to be such, will never become a heavenly intermediate being. He will go to be born in the realm of rebirth with a view to which he has been formed.
14c. No one can resist him.
? Does an intermediate being of Kamadhatu eat, like the other beings of Kamadhatu, solid food (iii. 39)?
Yes, but not coarse food.
120 I4d It eats odors.
From whence it gets its name of Gandharva, "he who eats (arvati) odors (gandham)" The meanings of the roots are multiple: arv, if one takes it in the sense of "to go," justifies "he who goes to eat odors" {arvati gacchati bhoktum). We have gandharva, and not gandharva, as we have sakandhu, or karkandhu.
121
A Gandharva of low rank eats unpleasant odors; a Gandharva of
high rank eats pleasant odors.
***
How long does an intermediate being exist?
122
a. There is no fixed rule, says the Bhadanta. It lasts as long as it
does not encounter the coming together of the causes necessary for its rebirth. In fact an intermediate existence and the existence that follows ^ are projected by the same action and form part of the same
123
nikayasabhaga, [of the same existence, ii. 41]: it is for this reason that,
when the life (or the vital otganjtyitendriya) of an intermediate being comes to an end, there is no death.
Objection: There is a mass of meat as big as Mount Meru which, in the summer rains, changes into a mass of worms. It is in this spot that intermediate beings arrive, being reborn in these worms arising together in such a large number; or rather, from whence do these intermediate beings come?
There exists an infinite number of small animals having short life, coveters after odors and tastes; perceiving an odor, they remember the taste that was associated with it, and they eventually die, coveting these odors and tastes. When they die, they had in their minds (vibodhya) an action the nature of which was to produce an existence among worms; and, by their desire for odors and tastes, they are reincarnated among worms. Or rather it is only when the external causes necessary for the
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birth of worms (namely, a great mass of decomposition) is brought
together in a great amount that the action which should produce
existence among worms enters into activity with a view to their
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retribution. In the same way a certain being accomplishes actions
which should be remunerated as a Cakravartin: these action will not enter into activity before the moment of the comsic period has come when human life is twenty-four thousand years in length (iii. 95). It is for this reason that the Blessed One declared that the retribution of actions is incomprehensible (Samyukta, 21).
b. The Bhadanta Vasumitra says: An intermediate being lasts seven
days. If the complex of causes necessary to reincarnation has not been
125 realized, then the intermediate being dies and is reborn.
126 c.