No More Learning

Tout en gardant son caractere universel (? ), il tend
de plus en plus . . . a ne s'exercer qu'en faveur des
Francais et a leur benefice exclusif. " -- (Quoted by
M. A. Cheradame, " Le chemin de fer de Bagdad et
les Puissances/' 1903, p. 309. ) " C'est surtout depuis
le traite de Berlin que les droits de la France furent
contestes et battus en breche. . . . Le protectorat,
ce n'etait plus, en effet, comme jadis, la protection
des marchands et des pelerins, chaque nation se
chargeant aujourd'hui de proteger les siens. On
pouvait meme contester qu'il fut question des ordres
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
Besides, such protection was needed only
as long as Palestine was under Moham-
medan rule. The partition of Turkey will
remove this state of things purely and
simply, leaving no ground even for the
slightest fiction of ex-territorial protection.
Whichever be the State that will inherit
Palestine, it will be just as able to protect
Christians as England in Egypt or France
in Tunis.
religieux latins, des ev? ques latins, etc. , puisque
T article 62 reconnaissait a chaque puissance le droit
de prot6ger ceux de sa nationalite. On pouvait
soutenir que le protectorat ne consistait plus que
dans les prerogatives honorifiques . . . " " Dans
ces trente dernieres annees, c'est la volonte du Saint-
Siege qui empeche notre protectorat de s'effriter
sous les efforts de nos rivaux. Mais aujourd'hui
la France a rompu avec le Saint-Siege j il pent en
resulter, un jour ou 1' autre, 1' abandon formel ou
tacite des instructions de 1888 et de 1898 \ ce jour-la
le protectorat, dans sa forme ancienne, aura vecu. " --
(Rene" Pinon, " L J Europe et 1' Empire Ottoman,"
1905, PP. 553 and 568. )
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o
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
But the essential point which removes
the foundation itself of France's ideal
argument is the question of guardianship
of the Holy Places. In this matter it
would be idle and dangerous to cherish
any illusions. To avoid confusion, the
strictest distinction must be kept in mind
between Palestine as a whole, and the
Holy Places in particular. The latter in-
clude a large part of Jerusalem, Bethlehem,
Nazareth, and two or three minor locali-
ties. No arrangement is thinkable leaving
them in the hands of one Christian Power.
France in her Orient policy was and is
a Roman Catholic Power. It does not
seem that even Protestant States would
like, or simply tolerate, the establish-
ment of her one-sided control over cities
and villages considered as the common
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
property of all the Christian Churches.
But there is certainly one Power which
would oppose such a solution with all its
energy, and that is Russia. Militant Or-
thodoxy, jealously exclusive -- especially
in its relations to the Roman Church --
is an avowedly prominent factor in
Russia's inner and foreign politics. The
keen interest for the Holy Places shown
by the Russian Church is a well-known
fact, and it is supported by the unparal-
leled numbers of Russian pilgrims annually
flooding Jerusalem at Easter time. So far,
however, official Russia has shown no sign
of political intentions as regards Palestine ;
she is not one of France's competitors for
this portion of the Turkish heritage. But
any attempt to bring the Holy Places
under the rule of a Roman Catholic Power
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
would provoke very undesirable complica-
tions. We can scarcely imagine anything
so likely to imperil the harmony of the
Entente as the idea of a French Holy
Sepulchre. This idea is impracticable, and
we understand that it has already been
dropped. The Holy Places will form a
group of enclaves governed by an inter-
national commission.
Nothing remains then of the ideal value
which the possession of Palestine could
have for France. The two glorious titles
which make the fascination of the " crown
of Jerusalem " -- protector of Christians in
the Orient and defender of the Holy
Places -- have been irremediably cancelled
by time and the force of events. What
remains is the memory of the short-lived
Crusaders' kingdom of seven hundred years
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
ago. Is it enough to nourish a steadfast
enthusiasm for the idea of " Syrie inte-
grale " ? And is it enough to counter-
balance the heavy, the really vital military
reasons which force expert observers on
the English side to recognize in Palestine
the natural bulwark of the Suez Canal ?
As we said, this truth is only slowly
filtering through the minds of this country.
We remember having read, a little more
than a year ago, the following lines in the
Fortnightly : " . . . It is difficult to ima-
gine any British Government voluntarily
assuming such a burden (protectorate over
Palestine), unless as a proved military
necessity, and no one can seriously main-
tain that proposition. The desert may
not be an impregnable frontier, but it is
at least a formidable one, and the line of
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
the Suez Canal is much easier defended than
any frontier that could be drawn between
Palestine and Syria. . . . It has always
been British policy to avoid, wherever
possible, having land frontiers coterminous
with those of great military States. "*
The author expressed a view very com-
mon at that time, and not altogether
forgotten even now. It is worth closer
consideration. The Sinai campaign, though
poor in events, is rich in lessons. In the
following we quote a letter dealing with
these lessons, written by a foreign journa-
list who witnessed the engagements on
the Suez Canal in February, 1915.
"I am afraid you in England confuse
two things : the defence of Egypt and
* J. B. Firth, " The Partition of Asia Minor,"
The Fortnightly Review, April, 1915.
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
that of the Suez Canal. The former, of
course, is secure -- but not owing to the
desert. The desert did not prevent the
enemy from approaching El-Kantara and
Serapeum. But for the Canal, he could
have approached Zagazig as well. What
protects Egypt is the Suez Canal, and
not in the least the desert. I admit that
the Canal is an impregnable barrier : but
then you must consider it only as a means
of defence. That is what your generals
do. But can you forget that the Suez
Canal is by itself a value which must be
protected ? I always thought that the
Canal was the only reason why England
chose to keep Egypt -- that its value for
England is much greater than that of
Egypt. Now you treat the Canal simply
as a first-line trench, or an outpost of the
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
Egyptian fortress. First-line trenches and
advanced outposts are susceptible of being
seriously damaged even by an enemy who
is too feeble to take the fortress itself.
So it is in the case of the Suez Canal. An
enemy having Palestine for his base is
hardly likely to penetrate into Egypt ;
but are you sure he is not likely to make
your Canal useless and impracticable for
the whole time of the hostilities ?
" I fear that it is not only possible but
even easy. The depth of the Canal is
II metres (12 yards) ; its width on the
surface varies between 80 and 120 metres
(88-132 yds. ) ; but the width which is more
important is that at the bottom, and it does
not exceed 45 or 50 metres (49*5-55 yds. ).
It would be sufficient to sink in the Canal
a medium-sized warship, or even a big
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
merchant vessel, to bar the road to trade
traffic, to military transports, and to other
men-of-war. The raising of a sunk ship
is always a hard job ; even in peace time
it would take a good twelve days to lift
up a big boat ; the work is very com-
plicated, you need a lot of dredges, barges,
working men and so on. All this is abso-
lutely impracticable when your enemy
holds the approaches and is able not only
to handicap the work, but even to sink
your dredges at the side of the first vic-
tim. . . . I heard from people who know
the Canal as their own pocket that a
clever and well-equipped enemy could em-
ploy in some places a simpler and more
effective method by blowing up a part of the
eastern bank, in order to upset enormous
masses of sand and stone into the water.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
" Of course the Turk is not likely to
have at his disposal all the necessary
means to damage the Canal. But if some
day in the future Palestine should serve
as a base for a real great Power, equipped
with all the devilries of modern technique
-- then, believe me, it would be quite
another story.
" I asked your officers why they chose
the Canal as their first line of defence
instead of establishing this line just on
the frontier of Egypt, between El-Arish
and Akaba. The answer was : because
of the desert. If the defenders of Egypt
had met the enemy at El-Arish, they
would have the desert at their back.
They would suffer all the difficulties which
now paralyse the action of the Turks :
the remoteness from the base, the slow-
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
ness of transport service, the lack of
water, in one word -- the desert. Because
the desert does perhaps protect you a
little if it is before you, but it kills you
if it backs your positions. The least re-
coil, sometimes inevitable even in success-
ful campaigns, throws you then just in
the middle of sands where you get not one
tiny hamlet to give you a backing, while
your enemy has immediately behind him
a whole country full of men and supplies.
" The only logical conclusion of all that
is this : the military value of the desert
is rather negative in your case. The proper
defence of the Suez Canal cannot be
secured unless you put between this
precious strip of water and any future
enemy a strip of land, combining two
essential qualities : (i) It must be de-
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
cently spacious, so as to permit large-scale
operations ; and (2) it must be inhabited
and cultivable, fit to supply necessaries
to an army of which it forms the back-
ground. This is an exact description of
Syria, or at least of Palestine. I think
it was Nelson who said of Tangiers : ' This
port must belong to England or to nobody. '
Palestine is to the Suez Canal exactly
what Tangiers is to Gibraltar/'
We think this long quotation from an
unpublished source will not seem super-
fluous. Of course " it has always been
British policy to avoid having land frontiers
coterminous with those of great military
States. " When practicable, this is the
wisest policy. The sea is an ideal frontier,
because it allows no encroachments.
But
since the boundary between Egypt and
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
Syria is a " land frontier/ ' we cannot see
any advantage in its being a desert. Of all
possible frontiers a desert is the one which
makes encroachments easy, and more than
easy : it is a constant invitation to infringe.
It may be neighbour's land in theory, but
it looks too much like no man's land and
seems to repeat by its magnetic silence
the old dictum which expresses the psycho-
logy of all the colonial wars in history :
res nullius cedit primo occupanti. Let us
remember here what has been said before
of " the irresistible push towards culture-
less spaces/' and of the force of culture
which secures frontiers better than any wall
of bayonets.
Syria must become unquestionably
French. Palestine <an only fall within
the British sphere of influence. Luckily,
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
the line of demarcation between the two
zones has been distinctly drawn, at the
same time and in the same sense, by Nature
as well as by History. Both point at the
Lebanon. Geographically, it is the highest
elevation of the Syrian plateau, and it
cuts the coast in two like a sort of hedge.
Historically, it has been autonomous and
nearly independent since 1856 ; its in-
habitants -- Druses and Maronites -- are
distinct by race and creed from their
neighbours of both North and South, and
have developed distinct and higher stand-
ards of economic and social life. Accus-
tomed as they are to independence, they
might enjoy it still further under a treaty of
neutralization, keeping at the same time
the land-mark between French and British
dominions.
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? XIII-- THE ARABS
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? XIII
The Arabs
The Arab aspirations of national revival
and independence cannot be formulated
in a precise scheme. They are as vague
as the conception of an Arab nation, the
conception which forms their base. For
little Macchiavellis of the kind of Ned jib
Azouri, the author of " Le r6veil de la
nation arabe," the " Arab nation " means
only -- for the present at least -- the Arabs
of the Ottoman Empire. He does England
and France the courtesy of leaving Egypt
and Tunis out. But it is clear that genuine
Arab Nationalists do not stop at frontiers
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
established by foreigners, and for them
the Arab nation embraces all the peoples
speaking Arabic dialects from Morocco
to Bagdad. All these enthusiasts -- those
of Pan-Arabia as well as those of half-Pan
Arabia -- forget that mere resemblance of
languages does not form a united nation.
The mark and the tie of a nation " one
and indivisible " is consciousness of national
unity. This essential condition is far from
being fulfilled by the different tribes which
inhabit the northern coast of Africa and
Western Asia. No observer would have
the courage to affirm that people in Morocco
and Tunis, in Tripolitania and the Yemen,
Syria and the Irak, feel as members of the
same nation. So far those populations are
divided by deep distinctions of history and
custom ; left alone through some unex-
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? THE ARABS
pected withdrawal of their European pro-
tectors and Turkish rulers, they would
naturally form at least four or five States,
and even wars between them would not
be surprising. Of course the existence of
all these tribes, especially the fact that
they inhabit an uninterrupted strip of land
stretching from the Persian Gulf to the
Atlantic, might form one day the base for
an active propaganda of national unity.
This day, however, is still hidden in the mists
of the remotest future ; before it dawns
some of the members of the projected Pan-
Arabic nation will yet need to learn many
things which form the line between savagery
and the beginning of civilization. And to
learn them they will need European teachers
equipped with the necessary authority.
Certainly the different Arab agglomera-
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
tions present different degrees of cultural
development -- or, perhaps, of cultural back-
wardness. A curious thing about them is
this : whilst in Europe intensity of civiliza-
tion augments gradually from east to
west, in the Arabic world it is exactly the
other way. If we take the word " oriental "
in its old traditional sense, i. e. , as the
opposite of modern western ideas and
customs, then real " oriental " life can
be found only in the extreme west :
in Morocco. The further eastwards from
Tangiers, the more western it looks. Tunis
is even more " European " than Algiers,
and Cairo still more than Tunis. We speak
of the aspect of capitals, but the same
applies to the peoples. Morocco can un-
questionably boast an idyllic percentage
of illiteracy : almost 100%. Algeria, which
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? THE ARABS
is much more enlightened, possessed in
1913, for a Moslem population of 4,500,000,
no more than 226 Mussulman primary
schools, while about 35,000 Moslem pupils
attended French establishments. Tunis,
with 1,730,000 Arabs, has 1,320 Mussulman
primary schools. The corresponding figure
for Egypt is somewhat lower in proportion
to population -- 3,799 " muktabs " in 1914;
but 100,000 Egyptian Moslems attend
various European schools, while in Tunis
about 5,000 only follow their example.
The same scale can be applied to the
religious and social conditions of these
countries. Morocco is the land of Moslem
orthodoxy, old-fashioned and undiluted ;
the conservative influence of religious
brotherhoods, which are omnipotent in
the Maghzen's dominions, permeates every-
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
thing in family life, social relations, educa-
tion, and statecraft. The further east-
wards, the weaker become the brotherhoods,
the more pronounced the signs of beginning
modernization.
Algiers possesses already a small set of
what might be called Arab intelligentsia ;
but they are opposed on one side by the
so-called " Old Turbans," mostly rich land-
owners whose essential feature is dislike
of ideas, projects and all similar trouble ;
on the other hand, the " Young Algerians "
are estranged from the masses of the people
by their modern education and religious
liberalism ; they present only an isolated
handful of individuals without any actual
weight in the life.
Tunis is quite different. It has a
well-developed bourgeoisie, rich, organized,
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? THE ARABS
fairly educated for oriental standards,
sensible and conscious of its own dignity.
Here, too, the " Young Tunisians/' as a
party, are not very numerous, but they
have a milieu around them more or less
prepared for modern ideas. The two
academies of the Regency -- the ancient
" Olive Mosque " and the modern Khal-
dounia -- have a strong modernizing influ-
ence on thousands of students. The
vernacular press of Tunis is well edited
and well written ; but of course for leading
Nationalist inspirations the Young Tunis-
ians look to Egypt.
Egypt, whose conditions are too well
known in this country to need special
reference in this book, represents a further
step onwards in the scale.
The national aspirations along the
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
Southern Mediterranean coast follow the
same rule. Nationalism is a modern idea,
primitive peoples are not able to conceive
it ; their life is so full of genuine national
substance that they need no special pro-
grammes or parties to reaffirm their nation-
hood. The stronger the encroachments of
foreign spirit, the better the chances for
a national movement. Thus Egypt pos-
sesses a Nationalist party whose influence
cannot be overlooked ; its programme
presents the essential features of the Euro-
pean racial aspirations, containing demands
for autonomy and for recognition of Arabic
as the only vehicle of all education. The
platform of the Young Tunisians is far less
explicit, especially in dealing with the
question of language : it seems that the
Tunisian Nationalists are rather in favour
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? THE ARABS
of bi-lingual education. The programme
of the Young Algerians as expounded by
a deputation which visited some parlia-
mentarians in Paris in ic)i2,is rather a simple
plea for equal rights for natives and better
education than a display of real nation-
alism. Morocco, in its patriarchal back-
wardness, is not the soil where such
plants as programmes or parties can thrive.
Of course this scale of ours is only
approximately exact. The gradual growth
of modern spirit from west to east is
interrupted by Tripolitania, a country
wilder even than Morocco ; and the ex-
treme east of the Arab world -- the {EBB
Yemen and Mesopotamia -- represents a still
lower stage of civilization. Not so Syria.
Its condition is peculiar : on one side,
Turkish rule paralyzed its progress, leaving
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
the country far behind Egypt, Tunisia,
and Algeria in every way ; and still, on
the other hand, the town population of
Syria can be regarded as the foremost
element of the whole Arab race. This may
be partially attributed to the competition
of European Powers which invaded that
country with hordes of religious and secular
missionaries. It may also be explained
by the presence of a considerable per-
centage of Christians among the native
people. But it seems that the main cause
of the superiority of the Syrian type is a
question of race, of the powerful admixture
of European blood which so many energetic
and conquering nations left on this coveted
coast. However it be, the national move-
ment in Syria is the vanguard of Arab-
ism, and many among the leaders of
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? THE ARABS
Egyptian Nationalists are men of Syrian
extraction.
We dwelt on these features of the Arab
world in and outside Turkey not only
because of the interest they may present
in themselves. They must be kept in
mind when we discuss Arab claims in
connection with Turkey's partition. They
clearly show that it is more than premature
to speak of Arabs as of one nation stretching
from Tangiers to Bagdad ; even the Arabs
of the Turkish Empire do not form a united
nation, as Syria, the Hedjaz, the Yemen
and Mesopotamia present radical differences
which exclude any possibility of common
self-assertion. At the same time it cannot
be denied that the Arab world shows some
essential conditions which might one day
develop into national unity.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
This eventuality ought not to be over-
looked. Whether the formation of a united
Arab Empire in the remote future would
be a gain for the world's civilization is a
question which we are not prepared to dis-
cuss. But for Europe it would certainly
mean one of the greatest colonial disasters
ever known in history. France would lose
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia ; Italy would
lose Tripolitania ; England would lose
Egypt ; and we do not think the losses
would stop there.
Many hundreds of pages could be written
to show that the European rule has
accomplished a great civilizing mission
in those countries, and that its liquidation
would prove a curse, not a blessing, to the
Arabs themselves. We prefer, however,
to leave this delicate matter untouched
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