The general truth of the concept of god--the proof that god is and what this means--is considered by hegel as the culminat- ing point of his
philosophy
as such and is, as the result from that course, legitimately presumed within the philosophy of religion.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
61-84.
32 maren Zimmermann, " 'nishida's 'self-identity of Absolute Contradiction' and hegel": Absolute negation and dialectics", in: J. W. heisig ed. nanzan, Frontiers of Japanese Phi- losophy, nagoya: 2006, p. 195.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 73
nothingness (mu) in the final instance is a experience of fullfilment. nishi- tani too emphasizes the embeddedness of the self: it is rather a nod of relations than a substance. other Japanese scholars have enhanced this insight by pointing at a constitutive inbetweenness of Japanese culture.
'nihilism' now is focused on insubstantial connectedness. As no-thing this becomes affirmative once in a continuity of momentary conscious selves the ephemeral 'i' is acknowledged to be the fixation of the flow of unique singular moments. in hegel's system these 'absolute' positions (an sich), posing itself initially as all there is, i. e. absolute, enrich them- selves in the process of objectification (fu? r sich) and subjectivation (an und fu? r sich), a process driven by negativity. to nishitani the nothing that haunts 'unhappy consciousness' is just a relative nothingness. the abso- lute individual--to phrase it paradoxically--that arises in an absolute present experiences an affirmative emptiness as plenitude, as being ful- filled in itself and as such being fully present to the world. of course these phrases appear non-sensical in the light of everyday existence where the 'i' is psychologically evident and pragmatic urgency demands calculated anticipations all the time.
but what is at stake here is precisely the radicality of this everyday- ness, that is devoid of Hinterwelten, as nietzsche called the totalistic mind frames that Western philosophy produced time and again to ward off the unbearable lightness of being: "ironically, it was not in his nihilistic view of buddhism but in such ideas as amor fati and the dionysian as the overcoming of nihilism that nietzsche came closest to buddhism, and especially to maha? ya? na". but in the final instance the maha? ya? na point of view on emptiness "cannot be reached even by nihilism that overcomes nihilism, even though this latter may tend in that direction. "33 Adorno acknowledges this at the end of Negative Dialectics when he comes to speak about the ineffective overcomings of nietzsche's nihilism "that was meant differently yet supplied fascism with slogans (. . . ) And yet the light- ing up of an eye, indeed the feeble tail-wagging of a dog one gave a tidbit it promptly forgets, would make the ideal of nothingness evaporate. "34
33 Keiji nishitani: The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, Albany new york: suny Press 1990, p. 180.
34 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 380.
? 74 henk oosterling
Abe: The Suchness of Things
nishida's and nishitani's expositions give us a first clue for an understand- ing of nothingness in a concrete and affirmative sense. Japanese Zen bud- dhism acknowledges, notwithstanding the primacy of appearances, the experiential 'truth' of nothingness that is grasped in a radical affirmation of these appearances. the intentional subject dissolves in 'acting-intuition' that realizes the empty mind or no-mind (mu shin). this is not a unar- ticulated immediacy, but the result of 'form'al training: Zen's active sit- ting or the unmovable movement in martial arts performs the 'essence' of nothingness. but what does this say about nirvana? in his comparative study Zen and Western Thought masao Abe focuses on three problems in buddhism: the significance of nirvana for contemporary thought and life, the idea of purity in maha? ya? na buddhism and emptiness as suchness.
Abe realizes that the negative connotation of nirvana "even occurs in the buddhist world. "35 he offers six arguments for understanding nirvana 'beyond nihilism' and the last one is, in hegelian perspective, very instruc- tive: "what significance does nirvana have in regard to understanding the meaning of history? " recalling the momentariness history has no begin and no end: "eternity manifests itself in the here and now. "36 the emphasis shifts to the now and here as "the realization of nirvana. "37
As for the purity, Abe criticizes the 'third position above and outside the process' from which purity is objectified and conceptualized. Purity is not the counter-concept of impurity. it is the ground from which an objectified opposition can arise. indirectly criticizing hegelian dialectics, Abe states that purity is not the sublated enlightenment as an end, on the contrary: it is the unsaid 'ground' of our existence as a whole. 'origi- nal purity, however, is not a state which is objectively observable, but is realization . . . "38 this is the corporeal and spatial realization of emptiness in the maha? ya? na sense that was grasped by nishida through a logic of place.
nishitani's analysis of emptiness as fullness is further specified by Abe: fullness manifests itself as the suchness (sanskrit: bhuta tathata? ; Jap. : kono no mama) of things. but "everything is just as it is" implies that "every-
35 masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, William r. lafleur (ed. ) hampshire/london: macmillam Press ltd 1985, p. 205.
36 masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, p. 215. 37 idem, p. 214.
38 idem, p. 220.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 75
thing is different from everything else. And yet while everything and everyone retained their uniqueness and particularity they are free from conflict because they have no self-nature. "39 exit dialectics. this sounds a bit weird, but this insight shows perfectly how historicity and objectifica- tion are nullified in the realization of emptiness. the fullness of emptiness realizes itself once the unique suchness--the as-it-is-ness--of things is affirmed in the non-willing of an individual. in objectifying matter West- ern thought aims at manipulating it as an object that in the very act of objectification constitutes the subject. it pretends to change things pro- gressively in order to realize completion. in doing this it instrumentalizes the suchness of things. "how can we overcome this fundamental restless- ness and return to suchness? to do so is the raison d'e^tre and essential task of religion. "40 At this point Abe reminds us of the metaphor of the snake swallowing its own tail as a symbol of eternity, of a full circle. but this image also reminds him of emptiness in as far the self tries to grasp itself, as the toe sucking buddha: "through the death of ego-self, no-self is realized". "this is because the realization of suchness is the positive aspect of the realization of emptiness. "41
in the strict sense nihilism now has to do with fullness and suchness. this is far from being the nihilist interpretation that states that the sub- ject is imprisoned in senseless nihility as to the values that regulate his behavior. Acting still has an axiological focus. even political categories as solidarity can be applied to the buddhist perspective--at least in the bud- dhism of the middle Path of nagarjuna--where enlightenment implies the salvation of all others: compassion validates actions, even after the end of history. it is the active dimension of an ontology of relations. As a radical inter-est--being in between--this action is however beyond calculation.
6. Conclusion: Avoiding the subject
of course the presentation of the Japanese hegel reception is far more complex. According to some critics, in spite of all quasi-mystical double talk Kyoto school's discourse is implicitly enacting the rupture of subjec- tivity: "nishida, by insisting on a ? contradictory identity? , has embraced the
39 idem, p. 223. 40 idem, p. 224. 41 idem, p. 226.
? 76 henk oosterling
very ? object logic? abandoned by the buddhists as well as by modern West- ern philosophers such as nietzsche, James and derrida. (. . . ) the irony is that Western figures such as nietzsche, heidegger, James and derrida have tried to develop a methodology to attain what, in effect, nishida calls a ? logic of the east? by abandoning the very categories that nishida resur- rects from more traditional Western philosophy. "42 this is an interesting observation, even more interesting once we realize that at least three of these Western thinkers were significantly influenced by eastern thought. When we also take into account that nietzsche, heidegger and derrida explicitly criticized hegel, this complex intercultural web of ideas might give us an indication of new dimensions of contemporary 'nihilism'.
While Z? iz? ek is 'tarrying with the negative' in order to reinstitute subjectivity,43 french philosophers of difference--next to derrida also michel foucault, Jean-franc? ois lyotard and gilles deleuze--revitalize nihilism from within by articulating an affirmative 'nihil' in their respec- tive oeuvres. they focus on the now here as nowhere, circumscribe the implosion of time and space in quasi-concepts as 'event' and 'singular- ity' that respectively break with the past-present-future chronology and the logic of particulars and universality. this all started by deconstruct- ing hegel's philosophical edifice, inspired by nietzsche and heidegger, in the 1960's. once sublation of contradictory forces to a higher identity is deconstructed, what is left is a field of differences and webs of relations. in deconstructing universal claims these philosophers of differences, liter- ally, a-void the subject, showing that it is a fixation within a field of forces, articulating differences and relations. they explicitly have found inspira- tion in buddhist philosophy, an inspiration that can easily be traced in their texts over the years. 44 this urged some commentators to label der- rida's deconstruction as a differential logic, comparing it with the bud- dhist logic of sunyata. 45
the most explicit affirmative presentation of the 'nihil' beyond sub- jectivity can be found in the work of philosophers that are as severely criticized by Z? iz? ek as the neo-buddhists: gilles deleuze and fe? lix guat-
42 david Putney, ? identity and the unity of experience: A critique of nishida's theory of self ? , in: Asian Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991, p. 141.
43 slavoj Z? iz? ek, Tarrying with the Negative. Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology, dur- ham: duke university Press, 1993, p. 218.
44 references to Zen-texts, Japanese culture and oriental practices vary from casual remarks to more systematic elaborations. see: henk oosterling, 'scheinheiligkeit oder heiligkeit der schein. subjektkritische bescha? ftigungen mit Japan', in: Das Multiversum der Kulturen, heinz Kimmerle (ed. ) Amsterdam/Atlanta: rodopi elementa 1996, pp. 103-122.
45 robert magliola, Derrida on the Mend, indiana: Purdue university Press, 1984, p. 89.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 77
tari. deleuze's affinity with buddhism is made explicit in Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). he redefines spinoza's immanence as praxis of expres- sion in which substance is co-existential with the actual and possible expressions of its modes. 46 this 'transcendental empiricism' is further elaborated in The Logic of Sense (1969). there the Zen riddle comes to the fore as a constituent 'superficiality' that breaks with the opposition of deep and superficial: "returned to the surface, the sage discovers objects- events, all of them communicating in the void which constitutes their substance. (. . . ) the event is the identity of form and void. (. . . ) the void is the site of sense. "47 A comparison with nishida's 'pure experience' as a constituting immanence is at hand. this 'immanence' persists in deleuze's cooperation with fe? lix guattari. in What is Philosophy? (1991) they situate "thought-nature, that logic can only show, according to a famous phrase, without ever being able to grasp it in propositions or relate it to a ref- erence. then logic is silent. Paradigm for paradigm, it is then in agree- ment with a kind of Zen buddhism. "48 there is "no doubt that the orient thought, but it thought the object in itself as pure abstraction, the empty universality identical to simple particularity. "49
is there still an all encompassing whole from which all particulars are 'sensed'? in one of his lasts last texts, deleuze refers to spinoza stating that immanence is not immanence to substance--as hegel would have it--but that substance and modes are in immanence: "We will say of pure immanence that it is A life, and nothing else". life is singularized as a life, yet this is all encompassing. "it is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life". life is a transcendental field, that can only be grasped through its immanence. "A life is the imma- nence of immanence, absolute immanence (. . . ) to the degree that is goes beyond the aporias of the subject and the object that Johann fichte, in his last philosophy, presents the transcendental field as a life, no longer dependent on a being or submitted to an Act--it is an absolute immedi- ate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life. "50
46 see: gilles deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, new york: Zone books 1997 (orig. 1968).
47 gilles deleuze, The Logic of Sense, london: Continuum 2001 (orig. 1969), p. 155.
48 gilles deleuze & fe? lix guattari, What is Philosophy? , london/new york: verso 1994 (orig. 1991), p. 140.
49 deleuze & guattari, What is Philosophy? , p. 94.
50 gilles deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on A Life, new york: Zone books 2001 (orig. 1995), p. 27. my italics.
? The religions of Persia, syria and egyPT:
The TransiTion from The naTural To The sPiriTual
herman van erp
1. introduction
hegel's philosophy of determinate religion contains the development of religions as successively more adequate conceptions of god. The essence of religion develops itself logically and historically in conformity to neces- sary moments. religion acquires in this process an increasingly adequate concept of itself as a specific form of absolute knowledge. Though the idea of the absolute spirit is present from the beginning, its presentation within the immediate religions is still unformed; their level of reflection is simple and misses the depth of speculative thought. religious thinking moves anyway in the sphere of presentation and is not aimed at rational understanding or conceptual knowledge of its content, which is the task of philosophy.
The general truth of the concept of god--the proof that god is and what this means--is considered by hegel as the culminat- ing point of his philosophy as such and is, as the result from that course, legitimately presumed within the philosophy of religion. in this chapter, i shall give a brief survey of hegel's conception of the most important religions of the ancient middle east, except the Jewish one. as i do not have much information about these religions from other sources, i cannot give a judgement concerning the adequacy of this hegelian conception from a more empirical point of view and i will not discuss whether his approach of these religions is correct. however, hegel's expositions are in themselves interesting enough for being a rich source for understanding and evaluating the meaning of religious representations of today.
2. The representations of natural or immediate religion
The subject of the philosophy of religion is how the idea of god develops itself both in respect to the content (in itself) as well to the form (for the religious conscience). "To educe the concept of religion and make it the object of consciousness has been the labour of spirit over thousands of years. " (l2 27, 514/412) logically, this development implies three stages:
80 herman van erp
a) the starting point of the process, i. e. , the not yet developed and there- fore abstract principle, which hegel indicates as the soil (Boden) of the religion, its substance or substantiality,1 b) the genuine process of the development, or the further determination of the principle, c) the result or the end to which the development is directed. The concept of god as spirit belongs to the starting point of the philosophy of religion. Therefore, the whole development is a process of gods manifestation. spirit mani- fests itself in concrete forms and reveals itself for another that can have an inner relationship with it: "spirit bears witness to spirit. This witness is spirit's own inner nature. "2 This process of becoming manifest for the human mind is the second stage of the development. it is the stage in which spirit is "activity of self-determining, of entering into existence, of being for an other, of bringing its moments into mutual distinction and spreading itself out. "3 in the Phenomenology of Spirit, hegel analyses the development of the human mind in relation to the absolute spirit. in his philosophy of religion, the subject of development is the idea of god him- self: god determines himself as the absolute spirit in the way he comes out of and returns to himself through the other (creation, human mind), that can not remain totally different from him. 4
The religions of the part Determinate Religion are the particular forms in which this development of the idea of god is present in a not only sub- stantive but also subjective way, theoretically and practically, in religious representations and cultus. The representation can be called the theoreti- cal or objective aspect of religion; cultus, as the elevation of the subject toward god, its practical or subjective aspect. 5 The determinate religions are determined as finite, transitory in principle, and ethnically bound as religion of peoples. The end or result of the progress is universality: the reconciliation of spirit with itself and the other, which will be achieved finally in Christianity. Therefore, Christianity, as The Consummate Reli- gion, is placed outside this second part of the philosophy of religion.
it is important to be aware that, according to hegel, not only the rep- resentation of the spirit and the philosophical concept of it pass through this process of development, but god himself as spirit too. spirit executes its own process of development, is essentially self-realization and takes
1 for instance: l1 24, 314/218; l1 27, 444/332. 2 l1 27, 413/307.
3 l1 27, 182/90.
4 l1 m, 228/138.
5 l1 24, 328/230, 336/237; l1 27, 396/291, 441/330.
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 81
particular shapes in this process. god does not remain closed within an abstract unity, but determines himself necessarily in relation to another, which is distinct from the abstract unity in the original being. The deter- minate religions differ in the way this otherness is determined and rep- resented. in the natural religions, nearly all natural entities can figure as immediate presentations of the divinity, without much distance or reflection. in this immediacy, there is no room for representations of a positive relationship between god and the other because such a relation presupposes the negativity of a distinction. it is a kind of natural panthe- ism without reflection concerning the distinct moments of the concept. (l2 27, 532-533/430)6 on a higher level of development, the religions become conscious of the distinction between nature and spirit and, later on, they develop representations of divine activity as being the origin of this distinction. Those latter representations imply some notion of god in the form of free activity, which is the essence of subjectivity. The idea that god determines himself in that distinction and that the relationship between god and the other originates from god himself is lacking within the natural religions. here, god is not yet represented as a free subject and spirit remains something merely substantial, something abstract like the principle of life, cosmic soul, of which particular entities (natural powers, animals, particular human beings) count as immediate representatives. a contingent natural shape is the sensible form in which that substantiality is immediately present. (l2 24, 379/280) The notion of god as not only a substance but as a free subject is arising in the transition from natural religion to the religions of spiritual individuality. 7
The idea of god as Trinity is the fundamental idea of Christianity, the consummate religion. differentiation within and through itself is, accord- ing to hegel, the most essential determination of spirit, as the absolute having a relation to itself through the other. Without this relationship, the absolute remains an empty abstraction, representation without specific content, or--because it cannot be without any content--its content is characterised as spiritless and dead. hegel criticizes the bent of his con- temporary philosophers to deism. a purely subjective religion of mere feeling and inner sensibility is accused for falling back into this empti- ness. (l2 27, 569/464-65) "as modern theology says that we cannot know
6 spinozism is also accused of pantheism, but is of an entirely different form. for a discussion on this point, see in particular l1 24, 343-344/244; l1 27, 370/269, and 373-377/272-74, also l2 27, 572/469 ff.
7 This name is used by hegel in the lectures of 1824.
? 82 herman van erp
god, that he does not have further determinations in himself, it knows only that he is, as an abstraction without content; and thus, god is faded away into this hollow abstractum. "8 We witness this empty entity in the abstract god Brahm of indian religion (identified by hegel with hindu reli- gion), although there it is still accompanied (though very inconsistently) by a motley collection of gods. We shall see that, for hegel, the religions of the transition are fundamentally different; liberated, that is, from a con- sciousness that is still captured in the opposition between abstraction and sensibility.
Within religious representations, divine spirit comes to appearance, reveals itself, bears witness of itself to another spirit, even if a particu- lar religion is not aware of this relationship and does not represent the divine as something essentially spiritual. natural religions are of this kind. The most undeveloped forms of natural religion are not aware of any distinction between the essential content of the concept of god or his substance and the representations, which religion makes thereof for itself. The moments of reflection and self-consciousness have not yet come to a positive form. Therefore, for this religious consciousness, the divinity does not have a necessary form, but may take any possible shape that can be found in nature--necessity being a category of conceptual thinking--, without any question about the adequacy between represen- tation and conceptual content. "even within natural religions, we will find an elevating of thought above mere natural powers, above the dominion of the natural. But this elevation is carried out inconsistently," the concept of god collapses in an amalgam of representations, a mixture of spiritual and natural powers. (l2 27, 521/418) The abstract and indeterminate char- acter of the notion of god makes it possible to take all kind of natural entities as an immediate expression of it.
3. The Transition from natural religion to higher levels
a fundamental proposition of hegel's philosophy of religion is that god can be known, that he has revealed himself. all religions are the actual proof of it in their representations of the absolute. on this point, hegel is engaged in a constant polemic against the agnosticism and subjectivism of contemporary philosophers and theologians. in the Encyclopedia, he
8 l1 24, 127/43 (translation h. e. ).
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 83
compares the opinion that god is unknowable with blaming him as envi- ous, and in the lectures of 1827 he says: "When the name of god is taken seriously, it is already the case for Plato and aristotle that god is not jeal- ous to the point of not communicating himself. "9 Thus, hegel's approach of religion is to a large extent nourished by a presumed a priori knowl- edge about the object and essence of religion. he tried to expound the metaphysical concept of religion in such a way that it could explain the development of the determinate religions in the form of both a strongly logical as well historical succession. This schema never succeeded com- pletely, but the theory that the development of religious consciousness passed over from east to West is a constant element in hegel's approach. The middle east is considered as the place where natural religion under- goes its transition to the higher forms of spiritual religion. Thus, hegel's considerations concerning particular religious representations and phe- nomena are repeatedly interwoven with comparisons that could support the differences in the level of development. Therefore, it is not possible to understand hegel's exposition of a particular religion without knowing something about the beginning and the end of the process that is deter- mining the development as he understands of it.
hegel thinks there is also a development at the level of natural reli- gions. important details in the parallel of the logical and historical devel- opment and in the ordering of these religions were changed during the successive lectures. in the 1831 lectures the term natural religion is con- fined to the religion of magic, of which hegel frequently noticed that it could hardly be considered as a genuine religion, although elements of magic can indeed be found in many religions. The 1831 lectures treat the religions of east asia as religions, within which the tension between the finite and infinite is represented and the movement toward the infinite of spirit has started off. 'The cleavage of the religious consciousness within itself ' (die Entzweiung des religio? sen Bewusstseins in sich) is the title, under which these religions there are subsumed and the next stage is called 'religion of freedom', a category that encompasses the religions of transi- tion. (l2 31, 725/615) notwithstanding many shifts within the classifica- tion, the general structure of a tripartite development, together with its geographic complement, has been maintained, comparable to the distinc- tion between a) natural or immediate religions--an expression used until 1827 for all religions of east asia--, b) Jewish, greek and roman religions,
9 l1 27, 382/279, cf. Enzykopa? die (1830), ? 564.
? 84 herman van erp
within which spiritual individuality and freedom are beginning to play an important role, and c) Christianity as the consummate religion.
The religions of Persia, syria and egypt, which will be treated in this chapter, belong to the first category, but in the form of a transition to the second. The lecture manuscript of 1821 treats of these religions only inci- dentally. in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the religion of light is conceived of by hegel as the first form of natural religion, worship of plants and animals as the second form; the religion of egypt is the third form, charac- terised as the religion of the artificer or foreman (Werkmeister, builder of pyramids and temples). Through his labour, the artificer brings, in stone, the external reality together with an obscure inner. Thus, he unites them both in a mixture of the natural shape and the self-conscious form. 10 in the 1824 lectures, the natural religions are distinguished in four catego- ries: a) magic, including the religions of China, Buddhism and lamaism, b) the religion of phantasy, particularly the religion of india (hinduism), c) the religion of the good or the Persian religion of light, and d) egyptian religion as the religion of the enigma (riddle, Ra? tsel). The transition from hinduism to the religion of the Parsees is broadly explained as a move- ment toward an abstract, but physical, unity: light as the representation of spirit in a natural form. The abstract notion of the good (or the light) brings together what was totally dispersed in the former religions and particularly in hinduism. (l2 24, 351-353/253-254, 381/281) But only the egyptian religion is explicitly exposed as a transition toward the religions of spiritual individuality (l2 24, 358/259), as the religion, within which substantiality and subjectivity are brought together in a mixture of them both. (l2 24, 381/281)
in the 1827 lectures, hegel chooses for another subdivision in four stages, in which the religions of China get their own place. (l2 27, 531-535/429-33) magic and the religions of China and india are character- ised as genuine natural religions. hinduism is nearly unaltered described as a motley collection of representations, in which notions of unity and universality stay in a totally external relation to concrete reality, which is disintegrating into a multitude of forms and powers. The fourth stage is for the religions of the transition toward the second level, containing the religions of freedom and subjectivity. This stage has two distinct forms in the religions of Persia and egypt, but in between there is also room for a transitional form, which connects them both: religious representations of
10 Pha? nomenologie des Geistes, Ch. Vii, a, c.
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 85
the death of god, in which the reality of negation is becoming a moment of himself. (l2 27, 621-625/514-18) The lectures of 1831 repeat this sub- division of the first level in four stages, but the last stage is now clearly composed as a group of three different religions, the religion of the good, the religion of sorrow, and the religion of the enigma, which form together the transition to the religions of freedom. Jewish religion is, remarkably, as a kind of counterpart to the Persian religion, subsumed under the reli- gion of the good. 11 We shall take the 1827 subdivision as a guideline for explaining how hegel characterises the three religions of the transition from eastern to western religion.
The identifying mark of natural religions is that they take a sensible shape as an immediate representation of the spiritual and supersensible. hegel does not deny that representations of some form of subjectivity may be found frequently in natural religions; the notion of god as spirit is indeed present, but this determination is not essential: natural things count as immediate manifestations of spirit and something divine. This means that the distinction between nature and spirit, or between the sen- sible and supersensible realm, is not yet present in a form of reflection of the understanding; it does not have yet the meaning of an inner opposi- tion, an opposition of a conceptual character. Therefore, nature and spirit do not pass over into a relationship, but stay together and are mixed in an indifferent way. in these religions, gods frequently take on a human shape, but that is more a contingent fact than a necessary element of the concept of god that they have. The distinction between the subjective consciousness, with its capricious representations, and the objectivity of the concept of god, have not yet come to awareness as well. in the cultus of east asian religions, unity with god is represented, for example, through a human person like the emperor, a Brahman, a yogi, the dalai lama, who counts as a manifestation of the divinity, but these religions lose themselves just as easily in a multitude of representations that can present the divinity without distinction. here, god himself remains indef- inite in a high degree, an abstract unity without subjectivity in and for itself. human beings can indeed appear as representatives or incarnation of god, but god himself does not have yet the definition of a person. The highest determination of the divinity in natural religion is the notion of
11 hegel had apparent difficulties in classifying Jewish religion. already in his early writ- ings, the religion of light is connected with Jewish religion, and, also in 1824, he mentions a comparison between both of them (l2 24, 389/289). strangely enough, he gives hardly attention to islam in the lectures on religion.
? 86 herman van erp
the universe as a living totality or as the universal soul of the cosmos. it is an inadequate concept because it lacks the determination of god as spirit. (l2 24, 267-271/173-76, l2 27, 571-572/468)12
4. religion of the good: The Persian religion of light
richness and depth, but also the deficiencies of natural religion achieve their climax, according to hegel, in hinduism. opposite or next to each other, we find there the motley multitude of gods in finite shapes on the one side and the idea of an indeterminate unity, of the deity as an infinite emptiness into which all finite and sensible things disappear on the other. nevertheless, there is no idea of a divine activity as subjectivity, which is itself producing the unity of this all in and for itself. Thus, only the moment of substantiality appears in this concept of god, as a pure inner substantiality that does not go in operation and, therefore, does not enter into a relationship with the other. The element of subjectivity remains totally external to it. This element is present as well in the unbridled imagination or phantasy as in the strange drive of indian yogis to escape from the concrete world and to eliminate the subject through extreme subjective performances. however, the yogi tries through complete aus- terity and extreme corporeal self-control to reduce his entire existence to a state of inward immobility and indifference toward everything and to obtain a state of mind in which he can say that he is Brahma himself. (l2 27, 595-596/490-91) This identification of the subject with the abstract and empty substance, the achievement of a holy, 'deep absorption in nothing' (l2 27, 600/495) is on the other hand from birth (von Haus aus) the status of the individuals of one particular caste: the Brahmans. "This means that when a Brahman is born, then a powerful god is born. " (l2 24, 345-347/248-49, l2 27, 599/493) The highest top is the abstract thinking, withdrawn in itself. Therefore, Brahmans constitute a class isolated from other people, in the same way as the universal unity is attained by exclud- ing all concrete particular things.
Thinking in this religion is, according to hegel, not free and does not make free either, because it does not embark on a relationship with partic- ularity, so that it also lacks the power to bring a moral and ethical order in it. (l2 24, 347-351/250-52) in addition, as beings without freedom, human
12 see also: l1 27, 430/321.
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 87
beings have no inner self-worth in this religion; they can only negatively obtain value, through negation of self. (l2 27, 602/497) The transition to the religion of the good is that this abstract emptiness of the universal and infinite is superseded. freedom of spirit means that it has the capacity to give content to itself, to take on a relationship with the particular, which it resumes in itself without destroying it or vanishing in it.
The concept of the good functions as the first form in which spirit man- ifests itself as freedom. The good is the universal determinating itself, tak- ing on a particular shape: "a form which is substantial, not only abstract power. " (l2 24, 352/254) in the 1824 lectures, hegel starts with three fur- ther characterizations of this good. firstly, it can be predicated of finite things such that it is not something from beyond ( Jenseits), like Brahma. however, on this level of natural religion the good as such does not have itself a specific, determinate content. especially, it is not a particular end or goal that must be achieved, not a criterion or norm for measuring the goodness of things, situations, events, or actions. Therefore, it must also not be conceived of as wisdom because wisdom presupposes knowledge and choice of ends. in the light of the indeterminate good, all things in their variety are good; the finite things constitute the realm of goodness, without an opposition of good and bad within this realm itself. secondly, there is an opposition, but an external and abstract one, between this realm of goodness and the realm of evil. Both realms are fighting with each other in a continuous struggle. This struggle between good and evil, therefore, is not the opposition between the infinite or universal and the finite things, but an opposition between two abstract principles. This is the dualism of this religion. although evil, as an abstract principle, can- not be sublated into something positive, the struggle has to take place. The good ought to win, but this remains only an 'ought' because it cannot succeed. (l2 24, 353-354/255) Thirdly, the good has a natural form: light, as the manifestation of spirit. (l2 24, 353-355/255-56) hegel says several times, without much explanation, that this light must not be understood as a symbol of the good because they are identical. (l2 27, 615-618/510-11) This is in any case an important difference with the representations of the egyptian religion, which turns all natural things into artistic symbols of something spiritual.
light is another, and more adequate, sensible representation of the uni- versal quality of spirit than space. space can be infinite and empty and may function in this way as a representation of pure abstract thinking (like Brahma in hinduism). light, however, is a physical universal with darkness as its opposite, in opposition with which it makes itself manifest.
88 herman van erp
it is as a universal also a unity; as such, it represents the individual uni- versality or singularity of spirit's subjectivity. Contrary to Brahma, light is not excluded from the concrete and real things, but is their soul, bringing them to appearance and life. The essence of the Persian religion of the good is described and understood in this characterisation. The fact that the Parsees give many other shapes to the deity, too, and worship a lot of other natural things, makes no difference for hegel. We will speak about those different shapes later on. Before that, we have to look at the way hegel introduces the transition to the religion of the good in the 1827 and 1831 lectures.
in these lectures, the step from the east asian religions toward the religions of middle east is treated in a more general way. (l2 27, 603-608/498-504) The essence of the asian religions was the immedi- ate unity of subjectivity and substantiality, consciousness going deeply into itself in a way that the subject was no longer needed: Brahma as 'the inwardly absorbed empirical self-consciousness. ' (l2 27, 607/501) This unity must be reached by the subject through an escape from the empiri- cal world, which is placed out of this unity. however, one can say also, that Brahma only exists in the consciousness of the yogi, who has brought himself into this state of mind. The universal lacks objectivity and exists as this finite subject that actually cannot totally empty itself. This contra- diction must be resolved. Two points concerning unification and separa- tion determine the next step in the development. firstly, the externality of the opposition between the real world, with the empirical subject, many powers and determinations on the one side and the transcendent unity on the other is sublated into a true, concrete totality, which is no lon- ger an alternation of origination and perishing. secondly, the empirical self-consciousness is separated from the absolute, its content, such that god now obtains genuine objectivity. The break between subjectivity and objectivity begins. The content becomes an independent object for the conscious self; it is the concrete totality, unity as a relationship between the finite and infinite. from now on, the objectivity deserves the name god properly. The knowledge of the objectivity of spirit is manifest in the way a people is able to bring religion and social life together into an ethi- cal world. The spirit becomes its known object. (l2 24, 379-381/280-81) There, the subject is no longer the consciousness of an isolated individual like a king, lama, yogi or Brahman, but a human being as such, as a free member of a community.
god, as the objective content of consciousness, is essentially spirit, even if he may still be represented, on this immediate level, by natural forms.
the religions of persia, syria and egypt 89
light is one of these natural forms; because of its universal, abstract and ideal character, it is a more adequate expression for spirit than particular things, animals or even an individual human being. Therefore, in com- parison with lamaism, where an individual human being from his birth is worshipped as god, Persian worship of light does not mean, for hegel, a backfall. 13 The break between objectivity and subjectivity makes god essentially to an object in front of man. however, the break is only begin- ning and not yet completed. Thus, within the religions of the transition, god can have still the shape of natural things, animals and human beings. according to hegel, these shapes do not have any longer an essential but only a superficial meaning. objectivation of spirit has started.
hegel speaks in one sentence of objectivation, distinction, differentia- tion and resumption. (l2 27, 608/503) resumption (Resumtion) means beginning again: the religious subject does not only resume its normal life, but god, too, leaves the empty space, which also means his con- traction out of the motley of representations into an objective, true and universal unity. 14 Chaos and arbitrariness are not passed away, however; the figures of the transition from natural religion to the higher level are still elements within a wild totality. (l2 27, 608/502) This totality has in general two forms: on the one hand, it is portrayed in a pure and simple way, on the other as a 'struggle, the fermenting of these distinct elements into a unity--an impure subjectivity that is the striving toward pure unity itself'. (l2 27, 609/504) fermentation is the metaphor for the first form, used by hegel for the religions of syria and egypt. The resumption in the first mode of the religions of transition, the religion of the good, is mainly characterised by the simple and pure form of the totality. its objective content is the universal, in the shape of light. The many representations of the good are harmoniously united in the concept of light.
32 maren Zimmermann, " 'nishida's 'self-identity of Absolute Contradiction' and hegel": Absolute negation and dialectics", in: J. W. heisig ed. nanzan, Frontiers of Japanese Phi- losophy, nagoya: 2006, p. 195.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 73
nothingness (mu) in the final instance is a experience of fullfilment. nishi- tani too emphasizes the embeddedness of the self: it is rather a nod of relations than a substance. other Japanese scholars have enhanced this insight by pointing at a constitutive inbetweenness of Japanese culture.
'nihilism' now is focused on insubstantial connectedness. As no-thing this becomes affirmative once in a continuity of momentary conscious selves the ephemeral 'i' is acknowledged to be the fixation of the flow of unique singular moments. in hegel's system these 'absolute' positions (an sich), posing itself initially as all there is, i. e. absolute, enrich them- selves in the process of objectification (fu? r sich) and subjectivation (an und fu? r sich), a process driven by negativity. to nishitani the nothing that haunts 'unhappy consciousness' is just a relative nothingness. the abso- lute individual--to phrase it paradoxically--that arises in an absolute present experiences an affirmative emptiness as plenitude, as being ful- filled in itself and as such being fully present to the world. of course these phrases appear non-sensical in the light of everyday existence where the 'i' is psychologically evident and pragmatic urgency demands calculated anticipations all the time.
but what is at stake here is precisely the radicality of this everyday- ness, that is devoid of Hinterwelten, as nietzsche called the totalistic mind frames that Western philosophy produced time and again to ward off the unbearable lightness of being: "ironically, it was not in his nihilistic view of buddhism but in such ideas as amor fati and the dionysian as the overcoming of nihilism that nietzsche came closest to buddhism, and especially to maha? ya? na". but in the final instance the maha? ya? na point of view on emptiness "cannot be reached even by nihilism that overcomes nihilism, even though this latter may tend in that direction. "33 Adorno acknowledges this at the end of Negative Dialectics when he comes to speak about the ineffective overcomings of nietzsche's nihilism "that was meant differently yet supplied fascism with slogans (. . . ) And yet the light- ing up of an eye, indeed the feeble tail-wagging of a dog one gave a tidbit it promptly forgets, would make the ideal of nothingness evaporate. "34
33 Keiji nishitani: The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, Albany new york: suny Press 1990, p. 180.
34 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 380.
? 74 henk oosterling
Abe: The Suchness of Things
nishida's and nishitani's expositions give us a first clue for an understand- ing of nothingness in a concrete and affirmative sense. Japanese Zen bud- dhism acknowledges, notwithstanding the primacy of appearances, the experiential 'truth' of nothingness that is grasped in a radical affirmation of these appearances. the intentional subject dissolves in 'acting-intuition' that realizes the empty mind or no-mind (mu shin). this is not a unar- ticulated immediacy, but the result of 'form'al training: Zen's active sit- ting or the unmovable movement in martial arts performs the 'essence' of nothingness. but what does this say about nirvana? in his comparative study Zen and Western Thought masao Abe focuses on three problems in buddhism: the significance of nirvana for contemporary thought and life, the idea of purity in maha? ya? na buddhism and emptiness as suchness.
Abe realizes that the negative connotation of nirvana "even occurs in the buddhist world. "35 he offers six arguments for understanding nirvana 'beyond nihilism' and the last one is, in hegelian perspective, very instruc- tive: "what significance does nirvana have in regard to understanding the meaning of history? " recalling the momentariness history has no begin and no end: "eternity manifests itself in the here and now. "36 the emphasis shifts to the now and here as "the realization of nirvana. "37
As for the purity, Abe criticizes the 'third position above and outside the process' from which purity is objectified and conceptualized. Purity is not the counter-concept of impurity. it is the ground from which an objectified opposition can arise. indirectly criticizing hegelian dialectics, Abe states that purity is not the sublated enlightenment as an end, on the contrary: it is the unsaid 'ground' of our existence as a whole. 'origi- nal purity, however, is not a state which is objectively observable, but is realization . . . "38 this is the corporeal and spatial realization of emptiness in the maha? ya? na sense that was grasped by nishida through a logic of place.
nishitani's analysis of emptiness as fullness is further specified by Abe: fullness manifests itself as the suchness (sanskrit: bhuta tathata? ; Jap. : kono no mama) of things. but "everything is just as it is" implies that "every-
35 masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, William r. lafleur (ed. ) hampshire/london: macmillam Press ltd 1985, p. 205.
36 masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, p. 215. 37 idem, p. 214.
38 idem, p. 220.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 75
thing is different from everything else. And yet while everything and everyone retained their uniqueness and particularity they are free from conflict because they have no self-nature. "39 exit dialectics. this sounds a bit weird, but this insight shows perfectly how historicity and objectifica- tion are nullified in the realization of emptiness. the fullness of emptiness realizes itself once the unique suchness--the as-it-is-ness--of things is affirmed in the non-willing of an individual. in objectifying matter West- ern thought aims at manipulating it as an object that in the very act of objectification constitutes the subject. it pretends to change things pro- gressively in order to realize completion. in doing this it instrumentalizes the suchness of things. "how can we overcome this fundamental restless- ness and return to suchness? to do so is the raison d'e^tre and essential task of religion. "40 At this point Abe reminds us of the metaphor of the snake swallowing its own tail as a symbol of eternity, of a full circle. but this image also reminds him of emptiness in as far the self tries to grasp itself, as the toe sucking buddha: "through the death of ego-self, no-self is realized". "this is because the realization of suchness is the positive aspect of the realization of emptiness. "41
in the strict sense nihilism now has to do with fullness and suchness. this is far from being the nihilist interpretation that states that the sub- ject is imprisoned in senseless nihility as to the values that regulate his behavior. Acting still has an axiological focus. even political categories as solidarity can be applied to the buddhist perspective--at least in the bud- dhism of the middle Path of nagarjuna--where enlightenment implies the salvation of all others: compassion validates actions, even after the end of history. it is the active dimension of an ontology of relations. As a radical inter-est--being in between--this action is however beyond calculation.
6. Conclusion: Avoiding the subject
of course the presentation of the Japanese hegel reception is far more complex. According to some critics, in spite of all quasi-mystical double talk Kyoto school's discourse is implicitly enacting the rupture of subjec- tivity: "nishida, by insisting on a ? contradictory identity? , has embraced the
39 idem, p. 223. 40 idem, p. 224. 41 idem, p. 226.
? 76 henk oosterling
very ? object logic? abandoned by the buddhists as well as by modern West- ern philosophers such as nietzsche, James and derrida. (. . . ) the irony is that Western figures such as nietzsche, heidegger, James and derrida have tried to develop a methodology to attain what, in effect, nishida calls a ? logic of the east? by abandoning the very categories that nishida resur- rects from more traditional Western philosophy. "42 this is an interesting observation, even more interesting once we realize that at least three of these Western thinkers were significantly influenced by eastern thought. When we also take into account that nietzsche, heidegger and derrida explicitly criticized hegel, this complex intercultural web of ideas might give us an indication of new dimensions of contemporary 'nihilism'.
While Z? iz? ek is 'tarrying with the negative' in order to reinstitute subjectivity,43 french philosophers of difference--next to derrida also michel foucault, Jean-franc? ois lyotard and gilles deleuze--revitalize nihilism from within by articulating an affirmative 'nihil' in their respec- tive oeuvres. they focus on the now here as nowhere, circumscribe the implosion of time and space in quasi-concepts as 'event' and 'singular- ity' that respectively break with the past-present-future chronology and the logic of particulars and universality. this all started by deconstruct- ing hegel's philosophical edifice, inspired by nietzsche and heidegger, in the 1960's. once sublation of contradictory forces to a higher identity is deconstructed, what is left is a field of differences and webs of relations. in deconstructing universal claims these philosophers of differences, liter- ally, a-void the subject, showing that it is a fixation within a field of forces, articulating differences and relations. they explicitly have found inspira- tion in buddhist philosophy, an inspiration that can easily be traced in their texts over the years. 44 this urged some commentators to label der- rida's deconstruction as a differential logic, comparing it with the bud- dhist logic of sunyata. 45
the most explicit affirmative presentation of the 'nihil' beyond sub- jectivity can be found in the work of philosophers that are as severely criticized by Z? iz? ek as the neo-buddhists: gilles deleuze and fe? lix guat-
42 david Putney, ? identity and the unity of experience: A critique of nishida's theory of self ? , in: Asian Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991, p. 141.
43 slavoj Z? iz? ek, Tarrying with the Negative. Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology, dur- ham: duke university Press, 1993, p. 218.
44 references to Zen-texts, Japanese culture and oriental practices vary from casual remarks to more systematic elaborations. see: henk oosterling, 'scheinheiligkeit oder heiligkeit der schein. subjektkritische bescha? ftigungen mit Japan', in: Das Multiversum der Kulturen, heinz Kimmerle (ed. ) Amsterdam/Atlanta: rodopi elementa 1996, pp. 103-122.
45 robert magliola, Derrida on the Mend, indiana: Purdue university Press, 1984, p. 89.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 77
tari. deleuze's affinity with buddhism is made explicit in Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). he redefines spinoza's immanence as praxis of expres- sion in which substance is co-existential with the actual and possible expressions of its modes. 46 this 'transcendental empiricism' is further elaborated in The Logic of Sense (1969). there the Zen riddle comes to the fore as a constituent 'superficiality' that breaks with the opposition of deep and superficial: "returned to the surface, the sage discovers objects- events, all of them communicating in the void which constitutes their substance. (. . . ) the event is the identity of form and void. (. . . ) the void is the site of sense. "47 A comparison with nishida's 'pure experience' as a constituting immanence is at hand. this 'immanence' persists in deleuze's cooperation with fe? lix guattari. in What is Philosophy? (1991) they situate "thought-nature, that logic can only show, according to a famous phrase, without ever being able to grasp it in propositions or relate it to a ref- erence. then logic is silent. Paradigm for paradigm, it is then in agree- ment with a kind of Zen buddhism. "48 there is "no doubt that the orient thought, but it thought the object in itself as pure abstraction, the empty universality identical to simple particularity. "49
is there still an all encompassing whole from which all particulars are 'sensed'? in one of his lasts last texts, deleuze refers to spinoza stating that immanence is not immanence to substance--as hegel would have it--but that substance and modes are in immanence: "We will say of pure immanence that it is A life, and nothing else". life is singularized as a life, yet this is all encompassing. "it is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life". life is a transcendental field, that can only be grasped through its immanence. "A life is the imma- nence of immanence, absolute immanence (. . . ) to the degree that is goes beyond the aporias of the subject and the object that Johann fichte, in his last philosophy, presents the transcendental field as a life, no longer dependent on a being or submitted to an Act--it is an absolute immedi- ate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life. "50
46 see: gilles deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, new york: Zone books 1997 (orig. 1968).
47 gilles deleuze, The Logic of Sense, london: Continuum 2001 (orig. 1969), p. 155.
48 gilles deleuze & fe? lix guattari, What is Philosophy? , london/new york: verso 1994 (orig. 1991), p. 140.
49 deleuze & guattari, What is Philosophy? , p. 94.
50 gilles deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on A Life, new york: Zone books 2001 (orig. 1995), p. 27. my italics.
? The religions of Persia, syria and egyPT:
The TransiTion from The naTural To The sPiriTual
herman van erp
1. introduction
hegel's philosophy of determinate religion contains the development of religions as successively more adequate conceptions of god. The essence of religion develops itself logically and historically in conformity to neces- sary moments. religion acquires in this process an increasingly adequate concept of itself as a specific form of absolute knowledge. Though the idea of the absolute spirit is present from the beginning, its presentation within the immediate religions is still unformed; their level of reflection is simple and misses the depth of speculative thought. religious thinking moves anyway in the sphere of presentation and is not aimed at rational understanding or conceptual knowledge of its content, which is the task of philosophy.
The general truth of the concept of god--the proof that god is and what this means--is considered by hegel as the culminat- ing point of his philosophy as such and is, as the result from that course, legitimately presumed within the philosophy of religion. in this chapter, i shall give a brief survey of hegel's conception of the most important religions of the ancient middle east, except the Jewish one. as i do not have much information about these religions from other sources, i cannot give a judgement concerning the adequacy of this hegelian conception from a more empirical point of view and i will not discuss whether his approach of these religions is correct. however, hegel's expositions are in themselves interesting enough for being a rich source for understanding and evaluating the meaning of religious representations of today.
2. The representations of natural or immediate religion
The subject of the philosophy of religion is how the idea of god develops itself both in respect to the content (in itself) as well to the form (for the religious conscience). "To educe the concept of religion and make it the object of consciousness has been the labour of spirit over thousands of years. " (l2 27, 514/412) logically, this development implies three stages:
80 herman van erp
a) the starting point of the process, i. e. , the not yet developed and there- fore abstract principle, which hegel indicates as the soil (Boden) of the religion, its substance or substantiality,1 b) the genuine process of the development, or the further determination of the principle, c) the result or the end to which the development is directed. The concept of god as spirit belongs to the starting point of the philosophy of religion. Therefore, the whole development is a process of gods manifestation. spirit mani- fests itself in concrete forms and reveals itself for another that can have an inner relationship with it: "spirit bears witness to spirit. This witness is spirit's own inner nature. "2 This process of becoming manifest for the human mind is the second stage of the development. it is the stage in which spirit is "activity of self-determining, of entering into existence, of being for an other, of bringing its moments into mutual distinction and spreading itself out. "3 in the Phenomenology of Spirit, hegel analyses the development of the human mind in relation to the absolute spirit. in his philosophy of religion, the subject of development is the idea of god him- self: god determines himself as the absolute spirit in the way he comes out of and returns to himself through the other (creation, human mind), that can not remain totally different from him. 4
The religions of the part Determinate Religion are the particular forms in which this development of the idea of god is present in a not only sub- stantive but also subjective way, theoretically and practically, in religious representations and cultus. The representation can be called the theoreti- cal or objective aspect of religion; cultus, as the elevation of the subject toward god, its practical or subjective aspect. 5 The determinate religions are determined as finite, transitory in principle, and ethnically bound as religion of peoples. The end or result of the progress is universality: the reconciliation of spirit with itself and the other, which will be achieved finally in Christianity. Therefore, Christianity, as The Consummate Reli- gion, is placed outside this second part of the philosophy of religion.
it is important to be aware that, according to hegel, not only the rep- resentation of the spirit and the philosophical concept of it pass through this process of development, but god himself as spirit too. spirit executes its own process of development, is essentially self-realization and takes
1 for instance: l1 24, 314/218; l1 27, 444/332. 2 l1 27, 413/307.
3 l1 27, 182/90.
4 l1 m, 228/138.
5 l1 24, 328/230, 336/237; l1 27, 396/291, 441/330.
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 81
particular shapes in this process. god does not remain closed within an abstract unity, but determines himself necessarily in relation to another, which is distinct from the abstract unity in the original being. The deter- minate religions differ in the way this otherness is determined and rep- resented. in the natural religions, nearly all natural entities can figure as immediate presentations of the divinity, without much distance or reflection. in this immediacy, there is no room for representations of a positive relationship between god and the other because such a relation presupposes the negativity of a distinction. it is a kind of natural panthe- ism without reflection concerning the distinct moments of the concept. (l2 27, 532-533/430)6 on a higher level of development, the religions become conscious of the distinction between nature and spirit and, later on, they develop representations of divine activity as being the origin of this distinction. Those latter representations imply some notion of god in the form of free activity, which is the essence of subjectivity. The idea that god determines himself in that distinction and that the relationship between god and the other originates from god himself is lacking within the natural religions. here, god is not yet represented as a free subject and spirit remains something merely substantial, something abstract like the principle of life, cosmic soul, of which particular entities (natural powers, animals, particular human beings) count as immediate representatives. a contingent natural shape is the sensible form in which that substantiality is immediately present. (l2 24, 379/280) The notion of god as not only a substance but as a free subject is arising in the transition from natural religion to the religions of spiritual individuality. 7
The idea of god as Trinity is the fundamental idea of Christianity, the consummate religion. differentiation within and through itself is, accord- ing to hegel, the most essential determination of spirit, as the absolute having a relation to itself through the other. Without this relationship, the absolute remains an empty abstraction, representation without specific content, or--because it cannot be without any content--its content is characterised as spiritless and dead. hegel criticizes the bent of his con- temporary philosophers to deism. a purely subjective religion of mere feeling and inner sensibility is accused for falling back into this empti- ness. (l2 27, 569/464-65) "as modern theology says that we cannot know
6 spinozism is also accused of pantheism, but is of an entirely different form. for a discussion on this point, see in particular l1 24, 343-344/244; l1 27, 370/269, and 373-377/272-74, also l2 27, 572/469 ff.
7 This name is used by hegel in the lectures of 1824.
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god, that he does not have further determinations in himself, it knows only that he is, as an abstraction without content; and thus, god is faded away into this hollow abstractum. "8 We witness this empty entity in the abstract god Brahm of indian religion (identified by hegel with hindu reli- gion), although there it is still accompanied (though very inconsistently) by a motley collection of gods. We shall see that, for hegel, the religions of the transition are fundamentally different; liberated, that is, from a con- sciousness that is still captured in the opposition between abstraction and sensibility.
Within religious representations, divine spirit comes to appearance, reveals itself, bears witness of itself to another spirit, even if a particu- lar religion is not aware of this relationship and does not represent the divine as something essentially spiritual. natural religions are of this kind. The most undeveloped forms of natural religion are not aware of any distinction between the essential content of the concept of god or his substance and the representations, which religion makes thereof for itself. The moments of reflection and self-consciousness have not yet come to a positive form. Therefore, for this religious consciousness, the divinity does not have a necessary form, but may take any possible shape that can be found in nature--necessity being a category of conceptual thinking--, without any question about the adequacy between represen- tation and conceptual content. "even within natural religions, we will find an elevating of thought above mere natural powers, above the dominion of the natural. But this elevation is carried out inconsistently," the concept of god collapses in an amalgam of representations, a mixture of spiritual and natural powers. (l2 27, 521/418) The abstract and indeterminate char- acter of the notion of god makes it possible to take all kind of natural entities as an immediate expression of it.
3. The Transition from natural religion to higher levels
a fundamental proposition of hegel's philosophy of religion is that god can be known, that he has revealed himself. all religions are the actual proof of it in their representations of the absolute. on this point, hegel is engaged in a constant polemic against the agnosticism and subjectivism of contemporary philosophers and theologians. in the Encyclopedia, he
8 l1 24, 127/43 (translation h. e. ).
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 83
compares the opinion that god is unknowable with blaming him as envi- ous, and in the lectures of 1827 he says: "When the name of god is taken seriously, it is already the case for Plato and aristotle that god is not jeal- ous to the point of not communicating himself. "9 Thus, hegel's approach of religion is to a large extent nourished by a presumed a priori knowl- edge about the object and essence of religion. he tried to expound the metaphysical concept of religion in such a way that it could explain the development of the determinate religions in the form of both a strongly logical as well historical succession. This schema never succeeded com- pletely, but the theory that the development of religious consciousness passed over from east to West is a constant element in hegel's approach. The middle east is considered as the place where natural religion under- goes its transition to the higher forms of spiritual religion. Thus, hegel's considerations concerning particular religious representations and phe- nomena are repeatedly interwoven with comparisons that could support the differences in the level of development. Therefore, it is not possible to understand hegel's exposition of a particular religion without knowing something about the beginning and the end of the process that is deter- mining the development as he understands of it.
hegel thinks there is also a development at the level of natural reli- gions. important details in the parallel of the logical and historical devel- opment and in the ordering of these religions were changed during the successive lectures. in the 1831 lectures the term natural religion is con- fined to the religion of magic, of which hegel frequently noticed that it could hardly be considered as a genuine religion, although elements of magic can indeed be found in many religions. The 1831 lectures treat the religions of east asia as religions, within which the tension between the finite and infinite is represented and the movement toward the infinite of spirit has started off. 'The cleavage of the religious consciousness within itself ' (die Entzweiung des religio? sen Bewusstseins in sich) is the title, under which these religions there are subsumed and the next stage is called 'religion of freedom', a category that encompasses the religions of transi- tion. (l2 31, 725/615) notwithstanding many shifts within the classifica- tion, the general structure of a tripartite development, together with its geographic complement, has been maintained, comparable to the distinc- tion between a) natural or immediate religions--an expression used until 1827 for all religions of east asia--, b) Jewish, greek and roman religions,
9 l1 27, 382/279, cf. Enzykopa? die (1830), ? 564.
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within which spiritual individuality and freedom are beginning to play an important role, and c) Christianity as the consummate religion.
The religions of Persia, syria and egypt, which will be treated in this chapter, belong to the first category, but in the form of a transition to the second. The lecture manuscript of 1821 treats of these religions only inci- dentally. in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the religion of light is conceived of by hegel as the first form of natural religion, worship of plants and animals as the second form; the religion of egypt is the third form, charac- terised as the religion of the artificer or foreman (Werkmeister, builder of pyramids and temples). Through his labour, the artificer brings, in stone, the external reality together with an obscure inner. Thus, he unites them both in a mixture of the natural shape and the self-conscious form. 10 in the 1824 lectures, the natural religions are distinguished in four catego- ries: a) magic, including the religions of China, Buddhism and lamaism, b) the religion of phantasy, particularly the religion of india (hinduism), c) the religion of the good or the Persian religion of light, and d) egyptian religion as the religion of the enigma (riddle, Ra? tsel). The transition from hinduism to the religion of the Parsees is broadly explained as a move- ment toward an abstract, but physical, unity: light as the representation of spirit in a natural form. The abstract notion of the good (or the light) brings together what was totally dispersed in the former religions and particularly in hinduism. (l2 24, 351-353/253-254, 381/281) But only the egyptian religion is explicitly exposed as a transition toward the religions of spiritual individuality (l2 24, 358/259), as the religion, within which substantiality and subjectivity are brought together in a mixture of them both. (l2 24, 381/281)
in the 1827 lectures, hegel chooses for another subdivision in four stages, in which the religions of China get their own place. (l2 27, 531-535/429-33) magic and the religions of China and india are character- ised as genuine natural religions. hinduism is nearly unaltered described as a motley collection of representations, in which notions of unity and universality stay in a totally external relation to concrete reality, which is disintegrating into a multitude of forms and powers. The fourth stage is for the religions of the transition toward the second level, containing the religions of freedom and subjectivity. This stage has two distinct forms in the religions of Persia and egypt, but in between there is also room for a transitional form, which connects them both: religious representations of
10 Pha? nomenologie des Geistes, Ch. Vii, a, c.
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the death of god, in which the reality of negation is becoming a moment of himself. (l2 27, 621-625/514-18) The lectures of 1831 repeat this sub- division of the first level in four stages, but the last stage is now clearly composed as a group of three different religions, the religion of the good, the religion of sorrow, and the religion of the enigma, which form together the transition to the religions of freedom. Jewish religion is, remarkably, as a kind of counterpart to the Persian religion, subsumed under the reli- gion of the good. 11 We shall take the 1827 subdivision as a guideline for explaining how hegel characterises the three religions of the transition from eastern to western religion.
The identifying mark of natural religions is that they take a sensible shape as an immediate representation of the spiritual and supersensible. hegel does not deny that representations of some form of subjectivity may be found frequently in natural religions; the notion of god as spirit is indeed present, but this determination is not essential: natural things count as immediate manifestations of spirit and something divine. This means that the distinction between nature and spirit, or between the sen- sible and supersensible realm, is not yet present in a form of reflection of the understanding; it does not have yet the meaning of an inner opposi- tion, an opposition of a conceptual character. Therefore, nature and spirit do not pass over into a relationship, but stay together and are mixed in an indifferent way. in these religions, gods frequently take on a human shape, but that is more a contingent fact than a necessary element of the concept of god that they have. The distinction between the subjective consciousness, with its capricious representations, and the objectivity of the concept of god, have not yet come to awareness as well. in the cultus of east asian religions, unity with god is represented, for example, through a human person like the emperor, a Brahman, a yogi, the dalai lama, who counts as a manifestation of the divinity, but these religions lose themselves just as easily in a multitude of representations that can present the divinity without distinction. here, god himself remains indef- inite in a high degree, an abstract unity without subjectivity in and for itself. human beings can indeed appear as representatives or incarnation of god, but god himself does not have yet the definition of a person. The highest determination of the divinity in natural religion is the notion of
11 hegel had apparent difficulties in classifying Jewish religion. already in his early writ- ings, the religion of light is connected with Jewish religion, and, also in 1824, he mentions a comparison between both of them (l2 24, 389/289). strangely enough, he gives hardly attention to islam in the lectures on religion.
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the universe as a living totality or as the universal soul of the cosmos. it is an inadequate concept because it lacks the determination of god as spirit. (l2 24, 267-271/173-76, l2 27, 571-572/468)12
4. religion of the good: The Persian religion of light
richness and depth, but also the deficiencies of natural religion achieve their climax, according to hegel, in hinduism. opposite or next to each other, we find there the motley multitude of gods in finite shapes on the one side and the idea of an indeterminate unity, of the deity as an infinite emptiness into which all finite and sensible things disappear on the other. nevertheless, there is no idea of a divine activity as subjectivity, which is itself producing the unity of this all in and for itself. Thus, only the moment of substantiality appears in this concept of god, as a pure inner substantiality that does not go in operation and, therefore, does not enter into a relationship with the other. The element of subjectivity remains totally external to it. This element is present as well in the unbridled imagination or phantasy as in the strange drive of indian yogis to escape from the concrete world and to eliminate the subject through extreme subjective performances. however, the yogi tries through complete aus- terity and extreme corporeal self-control to reduce his entire existence to a state of inward immobility and indifference toward everything and to obtain a state of mind in which he can say that he is Brahma himself. (l2 27, 595-596/490-91) This identification of the subject with the abstract and empty substance, the achievement of a holy, 'deep absorption in nothing' (l2 27, 600/495) is on the other hand from birth (von Haus aus) the status of the individuals of one particular caste: the Brahmans. "This means that when a Brahman is born, then a powerful god is born. " (l2 24, 345-347/248-49, l2 27, 599/493) The highest top is the abstract thinking, withdrawn in itself. Therefore, Brahmans constitute a class isolated from other people, in the same way as the universal unity is attained by exclud- ing all concrete particular things.
Thinking in this religion is, according to hegel, not free and does not make free either, because it does not embark on a relationship with partic- ularity, so that it also lacks the power to bring a moral and ethical order in it. (l2 24, 347-351/250-52) in addition, as beings without freedom, human
12 see also: l1 27, 430/321.
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beings have no inner self-worth in this religion; they can only negatively obtain value, through negation of self. (l2 27, 602/497) The transition to the religion of the good is that this abstract emptiness of the universal and infinite is superseded. freedom of spirit means that it has the capacity to give content to itself, to take on a relationship with the particular, which it resumes in itself without destroying it or vanishing in it.
The concept of the good functions as the first form in which spirit man- ifests itself as freedom. The good is the universal determinating itself, tak- ing on a particular shape: "a form which is substantial, not only abstract power. " (l2 24, 352/254) in the 1824 lectures, hegel starts with three fur- ther characterizations of this good. firstly, it can be predicated of finite things such that it is not something from beyond ( Jenseits), like Brahma. however, on this level of natural religion the good as such does not have itself a specific, determinate content. especially, it is not a particular end or goal that must be achieved, not a criterion or norm for measuring the goodness of things, situations, events, or actions. Therefore, it must also not be conceived of as wisdom because wisdom presupposes knowledge and choice of ends. in the light of the indeterminate good, all things in their variety are good; the finite things constitute the realm of goodness, without an opposition of good and bad within this realm itself. secondly, there is an opposition, but an external and abstract one, between this realm of goodness and the realm of evil. Both realms are fighting with each other in a continuous struggle. This struggle between good and evil, therefore, is not the opposition between the infinite or universal and the finite things, but an opposition between two abstract principles. This is the dualism of this religion. although evil, as an abstract principle, can- not be sublated into something positive, the struggle has to take place. The good ought to win, but this remains only an 'ought' because it cannot succeed. (l2 24, 353-354/255) Thirdly, the good has a natural form: light, as the manifestation of spirit. (l2 24, 353-355/255-56) hegel says several times, without much explanation, that this light must not be understood as a symbol of the good because they are identical. (l2 27, 615-618/510-11) This is in any case an important difference with the representations of the egyptian religion, which turns all natural things into artistic symbols of something spiritual.
light is another, and more adequate, sensible representation of the uni- versal quality of spirit than space. space can be infinite and empty and may function in this way as a representation of pure abstract thinking (like Brahma in hinduism). light, however, is a physical universal with darkness as its opposite, in opposition with which it makes itself manifest.
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it is as a universal also a unity; as such, it represents the individual uni- versality or singularity of spirit's subjectivity. Contrary to Brahma, light is not excluded from the concrete and real things, but is their soul, bringing them to appearance and life. The essence of the Persian religion of the good is described and understood in this characterisation. The fact that the Parsees give many other shapes to the deity, too, and worship a lot of other natural things, makes no difference for hegel. We will speak about those different shapes later on. Before that, we have to look at the way hegel introduces the transition to the religion of the good in the 1827 and 1831 lectures.
in these lectures, the step from the east asian religions toward the religions of middle east is treated in a more general way. (l2 27, 603-608/498-504) The essence of the asian religions was the immedi- ate unity of subjectivity and substantiality, consciousness going deeply into itself in a way that the subject was no longer needed: Brahma as 'the inwardly absorbed empirical self-consciousness. ' (l2 27, 607/501) This unity must be reached by the subject through an escape from the empiri- cal world, which is placed out of this unity. however, one can say also, that Brahma only exists in the consciousness of the yogi, who has brought himself into this state of mind. The universal lacks objectivity and exists as this finite subject that actually cannot totally empty itself. This contra- diction must be resolved. Two points concerning unification and separa- tion determine the next step in the development. firstly, the externality of the opposition between the real world, with the empirical subject, many powers and determinations on the one side and the transcendent unity on the other is sublated into a true, concrete totality, which is no lon- ger an alternation of origination and perishing. secondly, the empirical self-consciousness is separated from the absolute, its content, such that god now obtains genuine objectivity. The break between subjectivity and objectivity begins. The content becomes an independent object for the conscious self; it is the concrete totality, unity as a relationship between the finite and infinite. from now on, the objectivity deserves the name god properly. The knowledge of the objectivity of spirit is manifest in the way a people is able to bring religion and social life together into an ethi- cal world. The spirit becomes its known object. (l2 24, 379-381/280-81) There, the subject is no longer the consciousness of an isolated individual like a king, lama, yogi or Brahman, but a human being as such, as a free member of a community.
god, as the objective content of consciousness, is essentially spirit, even if he may still be represented, on this immediate level, by natural forms.
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light is one of these natural forms; because of its universal, abstract and ideal character, it is a more adequate expression for spirit than particular things, animals or even an individual human being. Therefore, in com- parison with lamaism, where an individual human being from his birth is worshipped as god, Persian worship of light does not mean, for hegel, a backfall. 13 The break between objectivity and subjectivity makes god essentially to an object in front of man. however, the break is only begin- ning and not yet completed. Thus, within the religions of the transition, god can have still the shape of natural things, animals and human beings. according to hegel, these shapes do not have any longer an essential but only a superficial meaning. objectivation of spirit has started.
hegel speaks in one sentence of objectivation, distinction, differentia- tion and resumption. (l2 27, 608/503) resumption (Resumtion) means beginning again: the religious subject does not only resume its normal life, but god, too, leaves the empty space, which also means his con- traction out of the motley of representations into an objective, true and universal unity. 14 Chaos and arbitrariness are not passed away, however; the figures of the transition from natural religion to the higher level are still elements within a wild totality. (l2 27, 608/502) This totality has in general two forms: on the one hand, it is portrayed in a pure and simple way, on the other as a 'struggle, the fermenting of these distinct elements into a unity--an impure subjectivity that is the striving toward pure unity itself'. (l2 27, 609/504) fermentation is the metaphor for the first form, used by hegel for the religions of syria and egypt. The resumption in the first mode of the religions of transition, the religion of the good, is mainly characterised by the simple and pure form of the totality. its objective content is the universal, in the shape of light. The many representations of the good are harmoniously united in the concept of light.
