No More Learning

He reached the inouth of the Tapti in September, 1611, but only to
find it occupied by a squadron of Portuguese "frigates" (light country-
built vessels, fitted to row or sail), which effectually cut off access to
the shore. After some time information was obtained from a friendly
Indian official of a pool or harbour among the sandbanks to the
northward of the river mouth, where ships might ride close to the
shore; and the discovery of this haven-known to succeeding fleets
as "Swally Hole”-enabled the English to berth their vessels where
their guns could command the shore, and to communicate freely
with the country people. Some trade resulted, and the Governor of
Surat held out hopes that a permanent settlement would be allowed;
but fresh threats on the part of the Portuguese produced a reaction,
and the English, who had meanwhile embarked Hawkins and his
companions, were roughly bidden to be gone. They sailed accordingly
in February, 1612. Middleton was not disposed to put up calmly
with this rebuff. He determined to show that the power of the English
was not less to be dreaded than that of the Portuguese, and that, if
the latter could close the Gujarat ports, the former could do equal
injury to the Red Sea traffic—the main dependence cf the Surat
merchants. Sailing to the Straits of Bab-ul-mandab, he there rounded
up the Indian trading vessels and forced them to exchange their goods
for his English commodities; while, in addition, the ships from Diu
1 His own narrative may be read in Early Travels in India, p. 60.
Patent Rulls, 7 Jac. . I pt XI. There is a contemporary copy at the India
Office (Parchment Records, No. 5).


## p. 79 (#107) #############################################

PORTUGUESE REPRISALS
79
1
and Surat were obliged to pay a heavy ransom before they were
released. He made no further attempt to trade with the Indian
ports, but proceeded straight to Sumatra.
The news of the revenge taken by Middleton produced consterna-
tion at Surat. Besides the damage likely to be done to the trade of
the port should such reprisals continue, there was a possibility that
the large pilgrim traffic to the holy places of Islam might be diverted
to other routes. When, therefore, in September, 1612, two ships from
England, under the command of Thomas Best, anchored at the bar,
unaware of what had happened in the Red Sea, they found a respect-
ful reception and were readily promised full trading privileges. The
news of this roused the Portuguese authorities at Goa to vigorous
action; and in November a strong fleet appeared to try conclusions
with Best's two vessels. The latter put boldly to sea and repelled
their assailants with heavy loss, thus greatly raising the reputation
of the English. A farman arrived from the emperor early in 1613,
confirming the agreement already concluded with the local autho-
rities, and a permanent factory (i. e. a group of merchants, living
together) was now established at Surat under Thomas Aldworth, a
merchant being also sent up to Agra with presents, to watch over
English interests at court.
Disappointed in his endeavours to destroy Best's ships, the viceroy
of Goa decided to bring fresh pressure to bear upon the Indians to
exclude the English; and with this object in view a Surat vessel of
great value, returning from the Red Sea, was captured, although she
was duły provided with a Portuguese pass. Jahangir was very indig-
nant at this affront, and dispatched a force to besiege Daman. The
arrival (October, 1614) of four ships under Nicholas Duwntôn led
the Moghul authorities to expect the active co-operation of the
English in a war largely occasioned by the favour shown to them;
and Downton's unwillingness to engage in hostilities, without express
authority from home, caused much resentment. At this point, how-
ever, the viceroy himself unwittingly helped his enemies. Gathering
together a powerful fleet which he fitted with soldiers, he sailed in
person to crush the English and then punish the Indians for having
harboured them. He found Downton's ships snugly ensconced in
Swally Hole, where his own larger vessels could not reach them; an
attack made by his frigates was smartly repulsed; and in the end he
had to retire discomfited. In March, 1615, one of Downton's vessels,
the Hope, laden chiefly with indigo and cotton goods, sailed for
England—the first vessel to be sent home from an Indian port. Not
long afterwards the Portuguese, finding their commercial interests
suffering from the war, made overtures to the Moghul emperor for
peace, offering compensation for the vessel they had seized, but
requiring the expulsion of the English as an essential condition, lo
1. See. Bestes journal. among the India Office Marine Becords (NO XV)


## p. 80 (#108) #############################################

80
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1740
1
this Jahangir replied that the latter were too powerful at sea for him
to interfere and that, if their recourse to his ports was to be prevented,
the Portuguese themselves must undertake the task. In the end,
towards the close of 1615, an agreement was reached, without any
stipulation on this point.
The position of the newcomers was, however, still precarious,
owing to the certainty that the Goa authorities would continue their
efforts to induce the emperor to forbid further trade; while, as they
well knew, mercantile interests in Gujarat were greatly disturbed
by the resultant bickerings, and the Indian officials were asking them-
selves whether it was worth while, for the sake of the small trade
brought by the English, to risk the large and well-established com-
merce between their ports and Goa. It was, therefore, with much joy
that the English factors greeted the arrival (September, 1615) of a
new fleet, bringing out an ambassador from King James, in the person
of Sir Thomas Roe. The East India Company had decided to make a
great effort to establish permanent relations with India, and the surest
way of effecting this seemed to be the dispatch of a royal envoy to the
Moghul, for the purpose of concluding a treaty which should put the
trade between the two countries on a regular footing. This plan had,
moreover, the advantage of refuting the allegations of the Portuguese
that the Company's attempts to trade in Eastern waters were not
authorised by the English sovereign, while it threw the aegis of the
latter over his subjects at Surat and thus discouraged further attacks
from Goa.
Roe reached the court, which was then at Ajmir, in December,
1615; and for nearly three years he followed in the train of the
emperor, striving diligently to carry out the objects of his mission.
He found, however, that the conclusion of any form of treaty for
commercial purposes was entirely foreign to Indian ideas. Moreover,
his demands included concessions for trade in Bengal and Sind, which
Jahangir's advisers opposed on the ground that the struggle between
the two European nations would thereby be extended to other parts
of India; while most of the remaining demands were looked upon as
matters coming under the jurisdiction of the emperor's favourite son,
Prince Khurram (Shah Jahan), who was then viceroy of Gujarat and
was not disposed to brook any interference in his administration of
that province. In the end Roe had to content himself with concluding
an arrangement with the prince, who willingly conceded most of the
privileges desired. The ambassador thus failed in achieving the
particular end for which he had been sent; yet he had done all that
was really necessary, and indirectly had contributed greatly to the
establishment of his countrymen's position. His own character and
abilities raised considerably the reputation of the English at court;
while his success in obtaining the punishment of the local officials
when guilty of oppression taught them and their successors to be
circumspect in their. dealings with the English traders. His. sage


## p. 81 (#109) #############################################

ROE'S EMBASSY
81
advice to the Company did much also in guiding the development
of its commerce along safe and profitable lines, particularly in regard
to the commerce with Mokha and Persia.
By the time Roe embarked for home (February, 1619) there were
regular English factories at Surat, Agra, Ahmadabad, and Broach.
All these were placed under the authority of the chief factor at Surat,
who was now styled the President, and who in addition controlled
the trade which had been opened up with the Red Sea ports and in
Persia. These trade developments led to trouble; the first with the
Surat merchants who had so long enjoyed this commerce; and the
second with the Portuguese, who, if now hopeless of excluding the
English from India, were determined to keep them, if possible, from
interfering with the commerce of the Persian Gulf, from which they
derived a considerable revenue. In this, however, they failed to take
sufficiently into account the attitude of the Persian monarch, Shah
Abbas, who had already extended his dominions to the sea and was
by no means pleased to find the trade of Southern Persia controlled
by the Portuguese fortress on the island of Ormuz. He was desirous
of developing the new port of Gombroon (the present Bandar Abbas),
which was situated on the mainland opposite to Ormuz; but little
headway could be made in this respect while the Portuguese com-
pelled all vessels to pay dues at the latter place. Naturally, too, he
welcomed English overtures for a seaborne trade with Europe, since
the raw silk of his northern provinces was largely in his hands and he
was anxious to divert the trade as much as possible from its ordinary
channel through the dominions of his hereditary enemies the Turks.
The Portuguese, on their side, far from endeavouring to conciliate
him, dispatched an envoy to demand the restitution of Gombroon
and other territory conquered from their vassal, the titular king of
Ormuz, together with the exclusion of all other Europeans from trade
in his country. Both demands were firmly refused, and the shah de-
clared his intention of supporting English commerce in his dominions.
The determination of the Company's factors to take full advantage
of the Persian monarch's friendship quickly led to fresh hostilities
with the Portuguese; and at the end of 1620 a fight took place off
Jask, in which the English ships gained a fresh success. Their oppu-
nents once more committed the error of driving an Asiatic power into
alliance with the English, for they now declared war against Shah
Abbas and sent a fleet to destroy his port towns. The enraged monarch
in his turn dispatched an army to turn the Portuguese out of Ormuz
and the neighbouring island of Kishm; but this was impossible without
the aid of naval power, and when in December, 1621, a strong
English fleet arrived to cover the embarkation of the Company's silk,
its commanders were practically forced, by threats of exclusion from
further trade, to take part in the operations. The Portuguese castle
1 English Factories in India, 1618-21, p. ix.
6


## p. 82 (#110) #############################################

82
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1740
.
on Kishm was easily captured, but Ormuz itself only yielded after
a siege of over two months (April, 1622). The reward of the English
was a small share in the plunder of the place and the grant for the
future of half the customs revenue of the port, the Company's own
goods being freed from toll in addition. As a matter of fact, though
the Persians garrisoned Ormuz, the trade itself was transferred to
Gombroon. However, the claim of the English to share the customs
of the latter place was recognised and, though the full amount due
to them was seldom paid, they for long drew a considerable revenue
from this source, in addition to the privilege of exemption from
customs. .
Whether an English trading company, operating from so distant
a base and governed by men who were consistently averse from using
any but peaceable methods, would ever have managed to overcome
the opposition of Portugal is, to say the least, doubtful; but, fortunately
for our fellow-countrymen, during the whole of the struggle their
opponents were being increasingly harassed by the Dutch, whose
armaments and commerce alike were on a much larger scale than
those of any of their European competitors. From the beginning of
the seventeenth century the Hollanders had determined to take full
advantage of the weakness of the Portuguese and to oust them from
their eastern trade; and this object was pursued with all the tenacity
and thoroughness of the Dutch character. Though organised, like the
English, in the form of a trading company, the Dutch merchants had
behind them practically the whole power of the state, and their com-
merce with the East was recognised as a most important national
asset; while the vigorous war which their fellow-countrymen were
waging with King Philip gave a special sanction to their attacks upon
his Portuguese subjects. These attacks were at first directed mainly
to the Spice Islands, the source of the cloves and nutmegs so much in
demand in Europe. Here, until their hands were stayed by the con-
clusion of a truce with Spain in 1609, they made great progress in
capturing the Portuguese forts and in concluding agreements with
the native chiefs, by which the latter were guaranteed protection
against the Portuguese in return for a monopoly of the trade in spices.
Naturally this policy aroused much resentment among the English,
who found themselves in danger of being excluded from a valuable
commerce with a thoroughness that would never have been attained
under the Portuguese. On the other hand the Hollanders argued that
it was unfair for the English, who contributed in no way to the defence
of the Spice Islands against the common foe, to expect a share in the
benefits of the trade, under conditions which really gave them an
advantage, since they were spared the heavy expenses of garrisons
and ships of war. The dispute led to much negotiation between
London and the Hague, and to actual hostilities in the Far East,
1 Englisi Factories, 1622-3, p 13.


## p. 83 (#111) #############################################

DUTCH CO-OPERATION
83
confined at first to the Bandas but soon extending over a wider area,
though the English settlements in India were not involved. The news
of these conflicts roused the governments of both nations to action,
and under pressure from them an agreement 1 was concluded (1619)
in London between the Dutch and English Companies, which really
pleased neither party. By its terms the two bodies were to share in
certain proportions the trade of the eastern islands and jointly to bear
the cost of defending their interests against the Portuguese; English
factors were to be admitted to the Dutch settlements, including
Batavia; and each Company was to furnish ten ships for purposes of
the common defence.
This agreement did not extend to Western India, Persia, or the
Red Sea, except as regards united naval action against the Portuguese;
but it embraced the English settlements on the east coast of India,
concerning which a few words must now be said. The first attempt
to open up communication with this part of the peninsula was made
in 1611, when the Company, acting in conjunction with two Dutch
merchants who provided a share of the capital and themselves took
part in the voyage, sent out the Globe to visit the Coromandel Coast
and the countries adjacent. An endeavour was made to settle a factory
at Pulicat (a little to the north of where Madras now stands), but this
was foiled by the Dutch, who had obtained an exclusive concession
from the king of the Carnatic for trade in his dominions. The vessel
then passed on to Masulipatam, the chief port of the Golconda king-
dom, and here a factory was established in September, 1611. The chief
object in view was the provision of chintzes and calicoes for use in the
Far Eastern trade; and, accordingly, from the beginning the factories
on the Coromandel Coast were placed under the. superintendence of
the president at Bantam, and had little in common with those in
Western and Northern India save the geographical tie.
The Dutch notion of defence proved to be much the same as
vigorous aggression; for as soon as the Truce of Antwerp had expired
(1621) they proceeded to push home their attacks on the remaining
Portuguese possessions. Accordingly, in the autumn of that year the
joint Anglo-Dutch "Fleet of Defence" left Batavia for the Malabar
Coast, to intercept the Portuguese carracks in their passage to and
from Goa. In July, 1622, they inflicted much damage on a squadron
that was bringing out a new viceroy; and they followed up this success
by blockaa ng Goa during the cold weather of 1622-3, thus preventing
all intercourse with Lisbon. Before long, however, the co-operation
of the two Protestant powers broke down. The English were by no
means pleased to find themselves dragged by their allies into a series
of warlike operations that brought them much expense and little
benefit; disputes arose as to the fairness of the financial charges and
the amenability of the English to the Dutch tribunals at Batavia and
1 Calendar of State Papers, E. Indies, 1617-21, noș. 679. 81.


## p. 84 (#112) #############################################

84
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1740
elsewhere; while soon money was lacking to pay the English share of
the military and naval charges. The result was that the English
president and council resolved to withdraw their factors from the
various Dutch settlements, since they could no longer carry out their
financial engagements. Before this could be effected occurred the
famous “Massacre of Amboina" (February, 1623), ten members of
the English factory there being tortured and put to death by the Dutch
authorities, after an irregular trial, on a charge of conspiring to-seize
the fortress. This virtually put an end to the alliance, in spite of the
fact that at home, after protracted negotiations, a fresh greement
had been concluded (January, 1623), which removed a few of the
causes of friction. Early in 1624 the English quitted Batavia and
proceeded to form a new head settlement of their own upon an unin-
habited island in the neighbouring Straits of Sụnda. This, however,
proved so unhealthy that a return had to be made (with Dutch
assistance) to their former quarters at Batavia; and there they re-
mained until 1628, when they removed once again to their old station
at Bantam, the king of which was unfriendly to the Dutch and
powerful enough to maintain his independence.
As we have seen, the treaty of 1619 did not extend to Western
India, Persia, or the Red Sea, being in fact intended only for the
regulation of the spice and pepper trade. But the Dutch had now
important interests in those parts, having established themselves at
Surat (1616), Ahmadabad and Agra (1618), Mokha (1620), and in
Persia (1623); and they were quite aware that the surest way to
inflict a damaging blow on their enemy was to attack him in Indian
and Persian waters. The war which broke out in 1625 between
England and Spain, together with the efforts the Portuguese were
making to retrieve their position in those waters, induced the Com-
pany's servants at Surat to join the Hollanders in active hostilities.
Early in 1625 an Anglo-Dutch fleet defeated a Portuguese squadron
near Ormuz, and in the following year a similar joint expedition
destroyed the small Portuguese settlement on the island of Bombay.
Some desultory fighting took place during the next few years, cul-
minating in an attack on shore at Swally (1630); but here the Por-
tuguese were easily routed by a small force of English sailors, to the
surprise of the Indians, who had hitherto deemed the former
invincible on land
In this same year peace was concluded between King Charles and
King Philip. It was expected in London that the Portuguese would
recognise the futility of their opposition to English trade in the East
and would agree to admit its continuance; but the Lisbon authorities
proved yielding on the point, and the Treaty of Madrid left matters
1 British Museum, Add. MSS, . 22866, f. 466 b; also Hague Transcripts (India
Office), series 1, vol. 57, no. 2. The version given in Cal. . S. P. , E. Indies, 1622-
24, no. 263, is incorrect.


## p. 85 (#113) #############################################

CONVENTION OF GOA
85
1
as they were in the East Indies. However, the viceroy of Goa and his
councillors soon began to listen to suggestions of accommodation.
Hard pressed by the Dutch and involved also with various Asiatic
foes, with ever-dwindling resources in Portuguese India itself, they
thought it wise to remove at least one source of difficulty and danger
by making a truce with the English. The latter, on their side, were
eager for the cessation of a warfare which hampered their commercial
operations (already suffering greatly from the effects of the severe
famine of 1630-1) and necessitated the employment of costly fleets in
maintaining communication with their other settlements and with
Europe; and, moreover, they were well aware of the advantages which
would result from the opening of the Portuguese harbours to their
ships and the Portuguese settlements to their trade. The negotiations
extended over a considerable period; but at last, in January, 1635,
William Methwold, the English president at Surat, who had been the
moving spirit, had the satisfaction. of signing at Goa (on his way
home) an accord ? with the viceroy, which established a truce for an
indefinite period—as it proved, a lasting peace. The accord was
extended by the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1642, which also provided
for the appointment of commissioners to settle outstanding questions;
but it was not until the conclusion of Cromwell's treaty in July, 1654,
that the right of the English to trade freely with the Portuguese
possessions in the East (with the exception of Macao) was formally
recognised.
The Dutch on their side continued the war with increased vigour
and almost unvarying success. Year after year they blockaded Goa
during the season for the arrival and departure of shipping; allying
themselves with the king of Kandi, they captured several of the Por-
tuguese strongholds in Ceylon; and in 1641, aided by an Achinese
force, they made themselves masters of the city of Malacca, which
controlled the traffic between India and China. By this time Portugal
had regained her independence of Spain (December, 1640) and had
opened up negotiations with Holland, which resulted in a treaty
suspending hostilities for ten years and leaving the Dutch in possession
of their conquests (June, 1641). The authorities at Batavia, however,
were unwilling to halt in their victorious career, and it was not until
sixteen months later that the truce was proclaimed there. Even then
there were disputes, and the peace did not become effective until
November, 1644. Troubles over Brazil brought about a renewal of
the war in 1652, upon the expiration of the truce. Colombo fell in
May, 1656, and Jaffna (the last Portuguese stronghold in Ceylon)
two years later; while on the coast of India Negapatam and all the
Portuguese possessions on the Malabar littoral to the southward of
Goa were taken between 1658 and 1663. Peace between the two
countries had been concluded in 1661; but the news of this did not
1 English Factories, 1634-6, p. 88.


## p. 86 (#114) #############################################

86
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1740
come in time to save Cochin and Kannanur. The only consolation
for the Portuguese was that Dutch schemes for the conquest of their
remaining settlements were thus foiled; while the danger of attacks
in the future was warded off by an English guarantee, as related below.
Meanwhile England had in 1652 become involved in a war with
Holland. At home the Commonwealth fleet proved victorious, after
a hard struggle, and Cromwell was able to dictate practically his own
terms when peace was made in 1654. In the East, however, the
interests of the English had suffered considerably, owing to the pre-
ponderance of Dutch naval power in those waters. Though the
Company's settlements were not attacked, for fear of offending the
monarchs in whose dominions they were situated, ship after ship feli
into the hands of the Hollanders, with the result that not only was
heavy loss inflicted upon the Company but English prestige suffered
greatly, both in India and in Persia. There was, however, some com-
pensation in the outcome of the war; for the commissioners appointed
under the Treaty of Westminster to assess damages awarded the
English Company £85,000 1 in settlement of its claims against its
Dutch rival, decreed the restitution of the island of Pulo Run 2 (in
the Bandas), and provided for the payment of damages to the repre-
sentatives of those Englishmen who had suffered at Amboina in 1623.
Of these decisions the most unpalatable to the Dutch was the second,
since to allow the English a footing in the Spice Islands meant a
serious breach in the Dutch monopoly of cloves. Every mode of
evasion was therefore practised; and although the surrender was again
stipulated in a fresh treaty concluded in 1662, it was not until March,
1665, that the island was actually made over-only to be retaken in
the following November, on the receipt of the news of the outbreak
of the Second Dutch War. The long-standing dispute was finally
settled by the peace of 1667, which assigned the island to Holland.
A further consequence of the hostilities with the Dutch in 1652-4
was a tendency on the part of both English and Portuguese in the
East to draw together for mutual support; and also an increased
desire on the part of the former to find some defensible spot on the
western coast of India, where they could be secure against both the
exactions of Indian officials and the attacks of European foes. The
provision of such a retreat came, however, not from any action on
the part of the East India Company but from the turn of events upon
the accession of Charles II. By a secret article of the marriage treaty
1 of tnis amount the Commonwealth government at once borrowed £50,000,
and the loan was never repaid (Court Minutes of the E. India Co. , 1655-9, p. v).
2 Thi: island had been made over to the English by its inhabitants in 1610,
in hopes of protection against the Dutch, who, however, took advantage of the
subsequent hostilities to effect its capture. By the Anglo-Dutch accord of 1623
it was recognised as English property, but the weakness of the East India Com-
pany was such that no serious attempt was made to take over so distant a
possession, though proposals to that effect were mooted from time to time:


## p. 87 (#115) #############################################

CO-OPERATION WITH THE PORTUGUESE
87
with Portugal (1661) England guaranteed the Portuguese possessions
in the East against the Dutch, and to facilitate this the island of
Bombay was included in the dowry of the new queen. Owing to
difficulties placed in the way by the local officials, to whom the
arrangement was distasteful, the island was not made over to the
king's representatives until February, 1665. Experience soon showed
that the outlay on the maintenance and development of the new
possession would make too heavy a demand upon the royal purse;
and on 27 March, 1668, in consideration of a temporary loan of
£50,000 at 6 per cent. , Charles transferred it to the Company at a
quitrent of £10 per annum. The actual date of the handing over
was 23 September in the same year.
It is time now to turn our attention to more peaceful topics and
to note the progress made by English commerce in India and the
neighbouring countries. The friendly relations established with the
Portuguese by the Convention of Goa (1635) much improved the
position of the East India Company's servants in those regions. It
became possible to dispatch ships singly to and from England and to
develop unhindered the port-to-port traffic, using for this purpose
mainly small India-built vessels in lieu of the cumbrous and expensive
ships built for the long sea-voyage out and home. The Malabar Coast,
too, was opened to English trade, with the result that saltpetre,
pepper, cardamoms, and cassia lignea (wild cinnamon) from those
parts figured largely in the cargoes of the homeward-bound vessels.
The tightening of the Dutch monopoly over the pepper and spice trade
of the Far East and Ceylon drove the English to rely chiefly on the
Malabar trade for these products. In Gujarat agriculture and the
textile industry had not yet recovered from the terrible famine of
1630-1, and the Company's factors were forced to look for fresh sources
of supply to make good the deficiency. Now that the menace of the
Portuguese flotilla at Maskat was removed, trade was extended
to Lahribandar and Tatta in the Indus delta (1635), and to Basra
(1640); while at the same time the commerce with Gombroon was
largely developed, partly owing to the eagerness with which Asiatic
merchants availed themselves of the English and Dutch vessels for
transporting their goods between India and Persia, especially during
the long war between those two countries over the possession of
Kandahar. Ventures were even made to Macao and Manilla; but
these were discouraged by the Portuguese and Spaniards respectively,
as soon as it was found that the English were not willing to risk trouble
with the Dutch by carrying contraband of war; and so no permanent
trade resulted. Further, we may reckon among the consequences of
the Anglo-Portuguese entente the establishment of an English settle-
ment at Madraspatam, on the Coromandel Coast; for, had hostilities
1 The payment of this rent has been traced down to the year 1730. After
that the treasury seems to have neglected to apply for it.


## p. 88 (#116) #############################################

88
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1740
a
continued, it would scarcely have been prudent to settle so near the
Portuguese fortress of St Thomé. Regarding this development
something must now be said.
We have already noted that as early as 1611 the English had
followed the example of the Dutch in starting a factory at Masuli-
patam, the chief port of the kingdom of Golconda. The trade here was
valuable, particularly in piece-goods, for export to Persia and to
Bantam; while the grant in 1634 of freedom from all duties gave the
Company a considerable advantage over their competitors, including
the Dutch. It had already been discovered, however, that most of
the piece-goods wanted for the trade of the Far East were procurable
at cheaper rates in the Hindu territory to the southwards, under the
dominion of the raja of the Carnatic, the shrunken remnant of the
once extensive kingdom of Vijayanagar; and in 1626 the factors at
Masulipatam established a subsidiary settlement at Armagon, a little to
the northward of the Dutch fortress at Pulicat. This place proved to
have many disadvantages, especially in the shallowness and exposed
nature of the roadstead; and so in 1639 an agreement was made with
a local ruler a little further south, by which permission was obtained
to erect a fortified factory close to the little town of Madraspatam.
Thither the English removed from Armagon in February, 1640; and
in September, 1641, Fort St George (as the new station was named)
superseded Masulipatam as their headquarters on the Coromandel
Coast. In thus acquiring. a fortified settlement-a privilege which
would never have been granted in Golconda territory—the factors
were only just in time; for the Hindu kingdom of the Carnatic was
already tottering under the attacks of its Muhammadan neighbours,
and in 1647 the district round Madras fell into the hands of Mir
Jumla, the leader of the Golconda forces. The English, however, were
on good terms with him and easily procured his confirmation of their
privileges, which included the government of Madraspatam, subject
to sharing with the royal treasury the customs paid by strangers. ?
By this time English trade on the eastern side of India had been
extended from Masulipatam to the seaports of Orissa, and factories
had been started (1633) at Hariharpur (in the Mahanadi delta) and
at Balasore. In 1650-1, following the example of the Dutch, this
commerce was carried into Bengal itself and a settlement made at
Hugli. Before long factories were planted at Patna and Kasimbazar;
but for some years little benefit resulted to the Company, owing to
the large amount of private trade carried on by its servants. However,
the commerce on the eastern side of India grew steadily in importance
>
1 This division of the customs continued until 1658, when it was agreed
that an annual sum of 380 pagodas should be paid as the royal share. After
much dispute, the agreement was revised in 1672 and the amount was raised to
1200 pagodas per annum. For righty years that sum was regularly paid, and
then it was remitted altogether by Muhammad 'Ali, nawab of the Carnatic.


## p. 89 (#117) #############################################

COROMANDEL FACTORIES
89
as the merits of the Coromandel piece-goods came to be recognised
at home and as Bengal sugar and saltpetre were likewise found to be
in demand; and a considerable trade was consequently established
between the coast and England. In 1652, under the stress of the war
with the Dutch, the seat of the eastern presidency was removed from
Bantam to Fort St George. Three years after, however, came the
partial collapse of the Company described on a later page. Orders
were sent out for the abandonment of the factories in Bengal and the
reduction of those on the coast to two, viz. Fort St George and
Masulipatam, with a corresponding diminution of staff. From a
presidency the coast became once more an agency, though Greenhill,
who had succeeded to the post of president before the Company's
orders arrived, was generally accorded the higher title until his death
at the beginning of 1659. The period of his administration was the
low-water mark of the Company's trade in those parts, owing to the
financial weakness at home and the competition of private ventures.
The revival that followed the grant by Cromwell of a new charter
will be the theme of a later page.
Meanwhile we must look back to 1635 and follow the course of
the Company's affairs at home. The Convention of Goa, which produced
such beneficial results in the East, had in England the unexpected
result of arousing a dangerous competition. Financially the success
of the Company had by no means answered expectations. The earliest
voyages, it is true, had proved very profitable; but when the full
burden of maintaining so many factories was felt, to say nothing of
the losses caused by Dutch competition and the resulting quarrels,
the profits fell off and the capital required to carry on the trade was
raised with ever-increasing difficulty. The system adopted—that of ter-
minable stocks—each of which was wounded up in turn and its assets
distributed, had many drawbacks. The plan was perhaps the only
practicable one; but it tended to prevent the adoption of any con-
tinuous 'or long-sighted policy, and it concentrated attention on
immediate profits; while, since it necessitated a fresh subscription
every few years, it exposed the Company to the effects of any string-
ency prevailing in the money market. Owing largely to political
troubles, the period from 1636 to 1660 was one of general depression
of trade, especially towards the end of the Commonwealth; and this
depression, together with the practical loss of its monopoly, went
perilously near to extinguishing the Company. During the twenty
years following 1636 the capital raised for four successive Stocks
aggregated only about £600,000, whereas in 1631 a single subscription
(that for the Third Joint Stock) had produced over £ 420,000, while
further back still (1617) no less a sum than £1,600,000 had been
subscribed for the Second Joint Stock.
These financial difficulties, and the small amount of profit earned
in comparison with the Dutch East India Company, evoked much
criticism of the Company's general policy, together with some im-


## p. 90 (#118) #############################################

90
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1740
patience that so large a sphere of possible commercial activity should
be monopolised by a body that was apparently incapable of dealing
with more than a portion of it. The colonising movement-stimulated
by the success of the plantations on the American seaboard and in the
West India islands—produced suggestions that something more was
required than the leaving of a few factors here and there in the East
Indies, and that English trade in those regions would never flourish
until it was based, as in the case of the Dutch and the Portuguese,
upon actual settlements independent of the caprice of local rulers and
strong enough to resist their attacks. The prospect of a considerable
extension of commerce as the result of the Convention of Goa, and
the apparent inability of the existing Company to take full advantage
of this opportunity, provided a plausible excuse for those who were
eager to engage in the trade on their own lines; and by the close of
the same year (1635) a rival body-commonly known as Courteen's
Association, from the name of its principal shareholder—was forme:
in London to trade with China, Japan, the Malabar Coast, and other
parts in which the East India Company had not yet established
factories. Endymion Porter, one of the royal favourites, was an active
supporter of the project, and it was doubtless owing in great part to
his influence that King Charles lent his countenance to the new asso-
ciation by issuing a royal commission for the first voyage and by
granting to Courteen and his partners letters-patent which practically
established them as a rival East India Company (1637). The pro-
moters of the new venture, however, soon found their expectations
disappointed. The result of the first voyage was a heavy loss, for the
leaders, Weddell and Mountney, disappeared with their two vessels
beneath the waves of the Indian Ocean on their homeward way in
1639. Sir William Courteen had died shortly after the departure of
that fleet, and his son had succeeded to a heritage much encumbered
by the cost of the venture; still, he struggled hard to maintain the
trade, with the assistance of friends and of other merchants anxious
to compete with the regular Company. Factories were established at
various places on the Malabar Coast–Rajapur, Bhatkal, Karwar;
and Courteen's captains did not hesitate, in spite of the limitations
in his patent, to visit Surat, Gombroon, Basra, and other places within
the sphere of the East India Company. But what was gained in one
direction was lost in another; money was wasted in ill-judged enter-
prises, such as the attempt to establish a colony at St Augustine's Bay
in Madagascar (1645-6); and supplies from home were both irregular
and inadequate, with the result that one factory after another had to
be abandoned. About 1645 Courteen himself withdrew to the con-
tinent to escape the importunities of his creditors; and although other
merchants continued to send out ships under licence from him, their
1
?
1 For this see Foster, “An English settlement in Madagascar," in the English
Historical Review, XXVII, 239.


## p. 91 (#119) #############################################

TROUBLES OF THE COMPANY
91
interference with the operations of the East India Company became
almost negligible.
However, the monopoly of the latter, once broken, was not easily
re-established; especially as, after the outbreak of the Civil War, the
Company was no longer able to invoke the protection of its royal
. charter, and the efforts made to induce the parliament to grant a
fresh one proved fruitless. An attempt in 1649 to raise capital for a
new joint stock was frustrated by the appearance of another rivai
body (consisting partly of those who had acted with Courteen),
headed by Lord Fairfax, with a scheme for establishing colonies in
the East, particularly on Assada (an island off the north-western coast
of Madagascar), on Pulo Run (when it should be recovered from the
Dutch), and on some part of the coast of India-all these being in-
tended to serve as fortified centres of commerce, after the pattern of
Goa and Batavia. Under pressure from the Council of State, both
bodies agreed to a modified scheme under which the trade was con-
tinued by a "United Joint Stock” for five years, much on the previous
lines. The attempt to colonise Assada proved an utter failure, and the
chief outcome of the new stock was the establishment of trade at
Hugli and other inland places in Bengal. In 1653-4 (as already
noted) the position of the English in the East was severely shaken by
the successes of the Dutch in the war that had broken out between
the two nations; and when the five years for which the United Joint
Stock had undertaken to send out ships came to an end, it was found
impossible, in the disturbed state of England, to raise further capital.
Private merchants took advantage of the situation to dispatch a
considerable number of ships and, although the Company did not
altogether cease its operations, they were on a much diminished scale.
The retrenchments made in consequence on the eastern side of India
have been already noted; in the Moghul's dominions Agra and other
inland stations were ordered to be abandoned; and English trade
was practically confined to a few seaports. Such was the state of things
when the grant of a fresh exclusive charter by Cromwell in 1657 put
new life into the Company and enabled an effective trading stock to
be raised.
The commerce of the English in India, though temporarily at a
low ebb, was by this time firmly established; and it may be well to
examine briefly its general character and the conditions under which
it was carried on. When the English commenced to trade in the
dominions of the Moghul, they found there a voluminous and valuable
commerce and a well-developed mercantile system. Expert mer.
chants, often commanding large supplies of capital, were established
in all the principal centres; money could be remitted readily between
1 For a detailed account see Foster, "English commerce with India 1608-58,"
in the Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, 19 April, 1918.


## p. 92 (#120) #############################################

92
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1740
the chief towns by means of bills of exchange; and marine insurance
is mentioned as early as 1622. The chief trend of trade was westwards,
either by land through Kandahar to Persia or else by sea through the
ports of Gujarat and Sind to the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf; but
there was also, until the Dutch monopolised the traffic, a considerable
commerce between. Surat and Achin and other parts of the Eastern
Archipelago. In Western and Northern India the chief areas with
which the Company's servants at first concerned themselves were
Hindustan proper (the valleys of the Jumna and of the upper Ganges)
and the fertile province of Gujarat. Bengal and Bihar were too remote
from the headquarters at Surat; and although in 1620 some factors
were dispatched from Agra to open up trade at Patna, in order to
procure the local piece-goods and Bengal raw silk, the experiment
proved a failure. The factors were withdrawn in the following year
and (as we have seen) it was not until a later period that English
trade was established in Bengal, this time by way of the Coromandel
Coast. Of the Indian products purchased in the earlier years for the
European markets the most important were indigo and cotton goods;
though from 1625 onwards we note a growing demand in England
for saltpetre and Malabar pepper. The indigo was procured mainly
from Sarkhej (near Ahmadabad) or from Biana (near Agra), and its
extensive use in Europe for dyeing purposes made it at first the most
valuable article of the Company's trade. Soon, however, cotton goods,
both the plain and the patterned, came into favour at home, the
former displacing for household use the more expensive linens
imported from Holland and Germany, the latter finding great accept-
ance for hangings and other decorative purposes; insomuch that in
1624 the governor of the Company declared that England was saved
annually a quarter of a million sterling by the substitution of Indian
calicoes for foreign linens. Of miscellaneous exports to England may
be mentioned cotton yarn (largely used for fustians and other cloth
manufactures), drugs, lac (for dyeing), carpets, and (later) sugar.
Raw silk formed also an important item in the lading of the earlier
ships; this, however, was almost entirely of Persian origin. The chief
commodities brought from England were broadcloth, which was
chiefly in demand at court; tin and lead, though after a time the
competition of supplies from the Malay Peninsula made it unprofit-
able to import the former; quicksilver and vermilion; Mediterranean
coral, for which there was a constant demand; ivory, of African
origin; tapestries; gold and silver embroideries; and other articles of
European manufacture. In the main, however, the factors were
forced to rely, for the purchase of Indian commodities, on the impor-
tation of bullion or specie, the favourite form of the latter being
the Spanish rial of eight. Most of the silver thus imported was at
once coined into rupees at the Indian mints. Gold. was occasionally
brought out, either in bar or in coin, but not at first to any great
extent. Subsidiary supplies were obtained from the Far East, and


## p. 93 (#121) #############################################

THE COMPANY'S TRADE
93
later from Guinea (in the form of gold dust). In providing funds for
lading the returning ships, the English merchants were helped by the
profits made on intermediate voyages in Eastern waters, especially
to Mokha and Gombroon; as also by the sums earned by carrying
native merchants and their goods to and from those ports. Nor did
they hesitate to borrow freely from Indian merchants and bankers to
fill their ships, though these loans went far to reduce the profits on
the
trade, owing to the high rates of interest prevailing. The volume
of English trade with India was by no means large. In the first fifteen
years (1615-29) twenty-seven vessels, averaging rather more than
500 tons apiece, were dispatched from Surat to London; while in the
next fifteen (1630-44) the number was only twenty-one. The cost of
the cargoes (which generally included goods from Persia and Bantam)
is only occasionally given, but it seems to have averaged during the
second of these two periods about £50,000 per annum. To this figure
must be added the value of the goods sent home from the Coromandel
Coast, though as regards this not even an estimate can be framed.
Obviously the commerce carried on by the English was only an in-
significant proportion of the total seaborne trade of India; and it was
not by any means equal to that of the Dutch in the same region. The
Company's servants had many difficulties to contend with, even when
the land was at peace and no extraordinary obstacle presented itself,
such as the attempt made in 1633 to constitute the indigo trade a
royal monopoly, or the embargo laid thirteen years later by Prince
Aurangzib upon the sale of saltpetre to the English, for fear lest, as
an, ingredient of gunpowder, it might be used against Muslims. In
the purchase of goods the factors were hampered by the intricacies
of the monetary system and the varying weights and measures; and
these difficulties, combined with their slight knowledge of the various
languages--in which few of them attained much proficiency-
necessitated the employment of brokers, who fleeced both sides
impartially. Again, the producers of the goods were intensely con-
servative, and when the Company wrote for piece-goods of special
sizes or indigo unmixed with sand, great trouble was experienced in
persuading the weavers or indigo-makers to depart from their cus-
tomary practices. There were also difficulties of transport. Goods
from up-country had to be carried down to the port either in ox-carts
or on the backs of camels or oxen. The roads were mostly mere
tracks, impassable in bad weather, and often infested with robbers.
The exaction of petty duties on the way, in spite of imperial farmans,
proved a constant source of dispute; while in the cities, and especially
at the ports, the officials were apt to be overbearing and extortionate.
It is true that the European trader suffered no worse treatment than
the Hindu or the Armenian; indeed, his position was often strong
enough to enable him to resist with success. It was usually easy to
make friends at court by the presentation of Western curiosities, and
the mere threat of appealing to the emperor was sometimes sufficient


## p. 94 (#122) #############################################

94
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1740
to render the local authorities compliant. Above all, the knowledge
that the English and Dutch were mighty at sea and could easily stop
the commerce of a port—thereby injuring the customs revenue-
formed a powerful restraint. As President Blackman explained in
1652 to the governor of a Malabar port that was undergoing discipli-
nary treatment in this way, “God hath given us power on the sea
that, if wee bee wronged on the land, wee may right ourselves there”;
and although such action involved serious risks, neither the English
nor the Dutch hesitated to take it when more peaceable methods
failed.
One great hindrance to the Company's trade, both outwards and
homewards, was the competition of goods brought out or taken home
by its own servants. For some time attempts were made to suppress
this private trade by requiring the factors and ships' officers to sign
penalty bonds and by confiscating their goods when they offended;
later on, lists were drawn up of commodities in which the Company's
employees might legitimately speculate, while leaving to their masters
the trade in the more valuable items. But all was in vain. The articles
which the Company wished to engross were naturally those most in
demand and yielding the highest profits. Men went to the East to
make money-for their meagre wages offered no temptation-and
though some refrained from trenching upon their employers' mono-
polies, most had no scruple in taking advantage of every opportunity
that presented itself. Capital was easily procured from friends at
home or from Indian merchants, who were only too glad to share
thus in the benefits of the privileges accorded to English goods, includ-
ing favourable terms of freight and freedom from customs at Gom-
broon, Fort St George, Masulipatam, and elsewhere. At last, finding
it hopeless to suppress such competition in the port-to-port trade
(which the factors could carry on, if necessary, under the names of
Indian merchants), the Company in 1661 resolved to confine itself to
the direct trade between England and India. Another step in the
same direction was taken in 1664, when the trade, outwards and home-
wards, in jewels, musk, civet, ambergris, etc. , was thrown open,
subject to registration and the payment of a small percentage for
"permission and freight”. After this the Company's efforts were
mainly devoted to preventing at home the exportation or importation
of forbidden goods, seizing them when found and inflicting penalties
on those responsible. Even then its success was by no means great;
and at home, as in the East, its profits suffered considerably by this
illicit traffic.
Cromwell's hesitation to grant a fresh monopoly of Eastern trade
on the lines of previous charters was largely due to an acute difference
of opinion amongst those concerned as to the advisability of continuing
the joint-stock system. A strong party, including several merchants
whose influence with the Protector was considerable, preferred the
"regulated system” followed by the Levant and certain other com-


## p. 95 (#123) #############################################

CROMWELL'S CHARTER
95
panies, permitting members to trade independently. The controversy
lasted long enough to give the system of more or less open trade a
trial; for since the United Joint Stock virtually ceased to send out
capital after 1654, while the charter restrictions were quite inopera-
tive, for about three years the markets of the East were free to all
comers. As we have seen, advantage was taken of this by a number
of merchants, including many members of the Company, to dispatch
ships to the Indies; but the results were far from satisfactory to those
responsible for the ventures. In India itself there ensued a ruinous
competition among their agents, both in the sale of their cargoes and
in the purchase of goods for the return. voyage; while at home the
rush to dispose of the latter produced a disheartening drop in prices.
The merchants concerned soon realised that after all there were
advantages in the old system, under which such competition was
eliminated. A further sobering influence was exerted by the con-
tinued successes of the Dutch and their evident intention of ousting
the Portuguese from their remaining possessions in India. The most
likely method of countering such schemes seemed to be to oppose to
them a united front such as could scarcely be expected from a
"regulated” company; and it may be added that the spectacle of
the prosperity attained by the Dutch East India Company-itself
working by means of a joint stock-probably went far to remove the
prejudice which had been inspired against the system by the poor
results secured by the English Company in recent years. It is there-
fore not surprising to find that by February, 1657, the principal
merchants engaged in the trade, including many of the chief "inter-
lopers", were agreed in desiring the continuance of the joint-stock
system. At the same time the existing Company resolved to endure
no further delay, but to dispose by auction of all its rights and privi-
leges and to withdraw from the trade. This quickly produced a
decision on the part of the Protector and his advisers to grant a charter
substantially on the lines of those of Elizabeth and James I; and on
19 October, 1657, this document passed the great seal. ' Thereupon
a new joint stock of nearly £740,000 was subscribed, though as a
matter of fact only one-half of the capital was ever called up. The
now stock, it is important to note, was to be a permanent one, with
the proviso that periodical valuations (the first being fixed for 1664)
were to be made, when shareholders were to be allowed to withdraw
their proportionate shares of the assets. For the first time, therefore,
the Company acquired a fixed capital, in lieu of successive stocks
raised and distributed at short intervals.
Cromwell's charter of course lost its validity upon the restoration
of the monarchy. King Charles, however, made no difficulty about
granting a fresh one (3 April, 1661), which repeated with certain
.
1 For its terms see Court Minutes, 1655-59, p. xvii.


## p. 96 (#124) #############################################

96
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1740
modifications and additions the grant of 1609. Power was given to
the Company to seize and send home interlopers : to wage war and
conclude peace with non-Christian princes : and to appoint governors,
who, in conjunction with their councils, were to exercise civil and
criminal jurisdiction at the various settlements. Under this authority
the agent at Madras was in 1666 created governor of Fort St George;
while on the acquisition of Bombay the Company in like manner
appointed the Surat president to be governor of that island. In view
of later controversies, it is worth noting that the Company begge
the king to get the new charter confirmed by parliament. Some steps
were taken in that direction, but nothing was achieved. Similarly,
in the case of Cromwell's charter, the Protector had promised to
obtain parliamentary sanction for the Company's privileges, but had
failed to do so.
The East India Company now entered upon a period of great
commercial prosperity, due chiefly to the increasing demand for
calicoes, tea, and coffee. Although for some years it prudently re-
frained from distributing its profits, using them instead to strengthen
its position, a dividend of 20 per cent. on the paid-up capital was
distributed in each of the years 1662-4, and one of double that amount
in 1665. The losses sustained in the two wars with Hoíland (1665-7
and 1672-4) caused a temporary set-back; but in the main a satis-
factory rate of dividend was maintained, and in 1682 the Company
was able not only to pay 50 per cent. in money but also to declare a
bonus of double that figure, crediting each shareholder with the half-
payment still due on the original subscription. John Evelyn, who
had been one of the subscribers in 1657, records in his diary that he
now sold his share of £500 (on which he had paid £250) to the Royal
Society for £750. Had he retained it until 1691, it would have given
him an annual average of nearly 22 per cent. on his original outlay.
The prosperity enjoyed by the Company throughout the reign of
Charles II excited some dissatisfaction among the general body of
English merchants, who felt themselves aggrieved that this profitable
commerce should be confined by royal charter within so narrow a
channel. In the East there were not wanting interlopers who boldly
defied the Company's authority; while at home the right of any
power other than parliament to impose such restrictions upon foreign
trade was continually questioned. Some attempts were made within
the Company itself to widen its membership and give greater elas-
ticity; but these had little result, as the majority held firmly to their
rights of monopoly. In 1683-5 the issue was fought out in the law
courts, with the result that Chief Justice Jeffreys upheld the legality
of the Company's privileges and confirmed its claim to seize inter-
lopers. The victory seemed complete. Sir Josia Child, who was the
dominant figure in the Company's administration, had secured the
favour of both King Charles and his brother James; and the latter
a year after his accession, gave the Company a fresh charter confirm-


## p. 97 (#125) #############################################

ATTACKS ON THE COMPANY
97
ing all its privileges. Then came an unexpected blow in the shape of
the Revolution. The new government was largely dependent on the
Whig party, and the hopes of the opponents of monopoly rose high.
A vigorous campaign was organised in support of the demand for a
revision of the existing system; while the press teemed with pamph-
lets for and against the Company, to whose enemies were now added
the various traders who were affected by its importation of printed
calicoes and manufactured silks. The battle was long and furious.
The Company defended itself ably and at times unscrupulously; but
the arguments of its opponents made a great impression, and public
feeling was on the whole in favour of their claims. Early in 1690 a
parliamentary committee recommended that the trade should be
granted to a new joint-stock body, to be established by act; and two
years later the House of Commons, after the failure of a bill intended
to widen the existing Company by increasing its capital to £1,500,000,
presented an address to King William, praying him to withdraw the
current charter and grant a fresh one on such terms a she might see
fit. This could not be done without three years' notice; but while
discussion was proceeding, the Company itself, by omitting to pay
punctually a tax recently imposed, forfeited its charter. A new grant
was made in October, 1693, which practically carried out the wishes
of parliament by doubling the capital, restricting the amount of stock
that could be held by any one member, and providing that any mer-
chant might join on payment of £5. This arrangement, however,
though it considerably increased the number of shareholders, did not
pacify the Company's opponents. Attempts were still made to dis-
regard the charter by sending out private ships; and, upon the Com-
pany endeavouring to stop one of these (nominally bound for a
Spanish port), the matter was carried to the House of Commons. A
committee was appointed which reported that the detention was
illegal, and in January, 1694, the House passed a resolution “that all
the subjects of England have equal right to trade to the East Indies.
unless prohibited by Act of Parliament”. This naturally caused much
exultation among the Company's enemies, who were now able to
allege parliamentary authority for trading in the forbidden area.
In 1695 competition was threatened from an unexpected quarter.
Seventy-eight years earlier James I had granted a patent for a Scottish
East India Company, but had soon cancelled it under pressure from
his English subjects. Now the project was revived, and the Scottish
Parliament passed an act incorporating a company for the purpose
of trading to Africa and the East and West Indies. By the terms of
1 Sir William Hunter has suggested (History of British India, II, 310) thi't
this was done of set purpose, Child being convinced that his lavish bribery au
court would enable him to secure a fresh charter on favourable terms. It seems.
however, unlikely that the Company would in this way put itself at the mercy
of the government, and the actual outcome was that it had to concede many
of the demands it had so long resisted.


## p. 98 (#126) #############################################

98
>
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1740
the act half the capital might be held outside Scotland; and when it
was found that £300,000 had been secretly subscribed in London, the
English Company in alarm brought the matter before both Houses
of Parliament. National jealousy came at once into play, with the
result that the Commons resolved to take drastic action against the
subscribers and to impeach the promoters of the scheme. This deter-
red the English members from paying up their subscriptions, and so
the financial position of the new venture was seriously weakened.
The dreaded competition in the East Indies never eventuated, for the
new Company's energies were exhausted in a disastrous attempt to
found a settlement at Darien, in Central America; yet the opposition
of England rankled long in Scottish breasts, despite the fact that one
of the articles for the union of the two kingdoms provided for the
repayment to the shareholders of their capital with interest.
In England the uncertainty prevailing as to the validity of the
East India Company's privileges led that body to apply in 1696 for
parliamentary sanction to its trade; but this proved unsuccessful.
However, two years later the financial needs of King William's gov-
ernment brought the matter to an issue. The monopoly was virtually
put up to auction between the contending bodies. The existing Com-
pany, which, owing to great losses during the war with France, was
not in a position to make a high bid, offered to increase its capital to
£1,500,000, and out of this to make a loan to the government of
£700,000 at 4 per cent. interest; while its competitors undertook to
form a new company which would lend £2,000,000 at 8 per cent.
The latter terms, despite the higher rate of interest, proved the more
attractive, and a bill providing for a loan on these conditions was
introduced. Thereupon the East India Company offered to find the
£2,000,000 required, since its privileges could not be saved on any
other terms; but the proposal came too late, and the bill received the
royal assent in July, 1698. It provided for a subscription of £2,000,000
sterling as a loan to the state, which in return would grant to a
"General Society”, made up of the subscribers, the exclusive right
of trading to the East Indies, with a saving clause allowing the
existing Company to continue its operations until the expiry of the
three years' notice required by its charter, i. e. until September, 1701.
The concession made to the new body was to last until the government
repaid the loan, and this was not to be done until after 1711. The
members of the “General Society” might either trade separately, to
the value each year of the amounts they had severally subscribed, or
they might unite in a fresh joint-stock company to which His Majesty
was empowered to grant a suitable charter. The great bulk of the
subscribers chose the latter alternative, and on 5 September, 1693,
they were accordingly incorporated by royal charter under the style
of "The English Company Trading to the East Indies". The manage
ment was entrusted to twenty-four directors, who were to appoint
from among themselves a chairman and deputy-chairman: and we


## p. 99 (#127) #############################################

THE UNITED COMPANY
99
may note in passing that the shareholders were not required, as in
the earlier Company, to pay a separate sum for admission to the
freedom
The new body set to work with energy. Ships and factors were
dispatched to the East; while a special ambassador, Sir William Norris,
was sent to obtain from the Moghul emperor the grant of all necessary
privileges. However, it soon became apparent that to oust the older
Company from its well-established position was a task beyond the
strength of the new corporation. Its original capital having been lent
to the government and the interest. received thereon being insufficient
to maintain the trade, fresh money had to be raised from the members,
and this proved difficult of accomplishment. Moreover, the "Old
Company" (as it was now termed) had taken the precaution to sub.
scribe, in the name of its treasurer, £315,000 to the loan, thereb:
obtaining the right to trade in his name each year to that amount,
even after the expiration of its privileges; while the difficulty that
the Company would cease to be a corporate body when its notice
expired was surmounted in April, 1700, by obtaining an act permitting
its continuance under its own name until the repayment of the
£2,000,000 loan. This astute move decided the issue. The "New
Company" had already made tentative proposals for an amalgama-
tion, and as time went on this was seen on both sides to be the only
possible solution. Under pressure from the government, an agreement
was reached early in 1702. The actual direction of the trade during
the process of amalgamation was entrusted to a body of “Managers”,
half to be appointed by each Company, the annual exports being
provided in equal proportions by the two bodies. This arrangement
was to last for seven years, during which the servants of both Com-
panies in the East were to clear all debts and wind up the separate
stocks sent out before the union. At the end of the time the Old
Company was to surrender its charter and make over the islands of
Bombay and St Helena to the New Company, the charter of which
was to be henceforth the basis of "The United Company of Merchants
of England Trading to the East Indies". Further, the Old Company
was to purchase from the New sufficient stock to equalise their
respective shares; while the latter was to pay to the former half the
difference between the values of the respective "dead stocks" (i. e.
buildings, etc. ) in the East.
This agreement still left room for disputes, to settle which an act
was passed in March, 1708, under which the Earl of Godolphin was
appointed arbitrator; the term of the Company's privileges was
extended by another fifteen years; and it was given the right of buying
out those members of the "General Society" who had elected to trade
on their own account. In return for these concessions the United
Company was required to lend the exchequer a further sum of
£1,200,000 without interest-thus reducing the rate of interest on
the whole debt to 5 per cent. Godolphins award was issued in


## p. 100 (#128) ############################################

100
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1740
September, 1708, and the union was consummated in the following
March. The struggle was now at an end; and it is interesting to note
that its result was to confirm the monopoly of the trade to a chartered
joint-stock company, though on an improved basis. The right of
parliament to control the conditions of this concession had, however,
been established; also the principle of requiring in return some
assistance towards the national finances.
Having thus reviewed the course of events at home, we must now
follow the development of English trade in India during the same
fifty years, a period which synchronised roughly with the long reign
of the Emperor Aurangzib. Soon after the Restoration the Company
withdrew from the port-to-port trade; and as the factories in Upper
India (Agra, Lucknow, etc. ) had been abandoned, the English settle.
ments were now in groups centring at Surat, Madras, and Hugli
respectively. It will therefore be convenient to deal with them more
or less as separate entities.
In Western India the outstanding feature of the period is the
gradual rise of Bombay, which had been ceded by the Portuguese to
King Charles II in 1661, taken possession of on his behalf in 1665, and
made over by him to the East India Company three years later. That
its development was slow is no matter for surprise. The island was
far from healthy; the neighbouring mainland produced little of com-
mercial value, and the barrier of the Western Ghats—to say nothing
of the insecurity resulting from the constant warfare between the
Moghuls and the Marathas--precluded any regular communication
in that direction with Indian trade centres; while the depredations
of the bold pirates of the Malabar Coast were a perpetual menace
to shipping. For nearly twenty years, therefore, Surat retained its
position as the headquarters of English commerce and the seat of
the presidency. Bombay, however, could afford to bide its time. It
possessed a magnificent harbour; its security, thanks to its position
and its fortifications, afforded a striking contrast to the experience of
Surat, which was sacked by the Maratha chief, Sivaji, in 1664 and
again in 1670; while the mild and impartial rule of the English proved
an attraction to traders who had suffered from the tyranny of the
officials on the mainland. Its potentialities did not escape the keen
eye of Gerald Aungier, who in 1669 succeeded Sir George Oxenden
as president at Surat and governor of Bombay; and he made it the
main task of his administration to put the new settlement on a satis-
factory basis. Courts of judicature were established; the local revenue
was settled on equitable.