No More Learning

We will, therefore, enumerate some heads or points thereof,
that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.

(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical we
ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the
one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of
application only. The husbandman cannot command neither the nature of
the earth nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician the
constitution of the patient nor the variety of accidents. So in the
culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command:
points of Nature, and points of fortune. For to the basis of the one,
and the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. In these
things, therefore, it is left unto us to proceed by application:—

“Vincenda est omnis fertuna ferendo:”

and so likewise,

“Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo. ”

But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and
neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which
draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth
adverse and contrary; which is that properly which we call accommodating
or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the
exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto
which we do apply; for we cannot fit a garment except we first take
measure of the body.

(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound
and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and
tempers of men’s natures and dispositions, specially having regard to
those differences which are most radical in being the fountains and
causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture;
wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to
describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention.
For if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are
proportioned to great matters, and others to small (which Aristotle
handleth, or ought to have bandied, by the name of magnanimity), doth it
not deserve as well to be considered that there are minds proportioned to
intend many matters, and others to few? So that some can divide
themselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in
few things at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as
well as a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are proportioned to
that which may be dispatched at once, or within a short return of time;
others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of
pursuit:—

“Jam tum tenditqus fovetque. ”

So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly
also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved it to be
considered by Aristotle, “That there is a disposition in conversation
(supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man’s
self) to soothe and please, and a disposition contrary to contradict and
cross;” and deserveth it not much better to be considered. “That there
is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more
serious nature (and supposing it still in things merely indifferent), to
take pleasure in the good of another; and a disposition contrariwise, to
take distaste at the good of another? ” which is that properly which we
call good nature or ill nature, benignity or malignity; and, therefore, I
cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the
several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in
morality and policy, considering it is of so great ministry and
suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions of
astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men’s natures, according to
the predominances of the planets: lovers of quiet, lovers of action,
lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts,
lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest sort of
these relations which the Italians make touching conclaves, the natures
of the several cardinals handsomely and lively painted forth. A man
shall meet with in every day’s conference the denominations of sensitive,
dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, _huomo di prima impressione_,
_huomo di ultima impressione_, and the like; and yet, nevertheless, this
kind of observations wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry.
For the distinctions are found (many of them), but we conclude no
precepts upon them: wherein our fault is the greater, because both
history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields where these
observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands, but
no man bringeth them to the confectionary that receipts might be made of
them for use of life.

(5) Of much like kind are those impressions of Nature, which are imposed
upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and
sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent and
not extern; and again, those which are caused by extern fortune, as
sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy,
privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune,
rising _per saltum_, _per gradus_, and the like. And, therefore, we see
that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, _benignitas
hujis ut adolescentuli est_. Saint Paul concludeth that severity of
discipline was to be used to the Cretans, _increpa eos dure_, upon the
disposition of their country, _Cretensus semper mendaces_, _malæ bestiæ_,
_ventres_. Sallust noteth that it is usual with kings to desire
contradictories: _Sed plerumque regiæ voluntates_, _ut vehementes sunt_,
_sic mobiles_, _sæpeque ipsæ sibi advers_. Tacitus observeth how rarely
raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition: _solus Vespasianus
mutatus in melius_. Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and
sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men _qui magnam felicitatem
concoquere non possunt_. So the Psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a
measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of fortune;
_Divitiæ si affluant_, _nolite cor apponere_. These observations and the
like I deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in
his Rhetorics, and are handled in some scattered discourses; but they
were never incorporate into moral philosophy, to which they do
essentially appertain; as the knowledge of this diversity of grounds and
moulds doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of
complexions and constitutions doth to the physician, except we mean to
follow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines to
all patients.

(6) Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the
affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first to
know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases;
and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of
the divers characters of men’s natures, it followeth in order to know the
diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the
perturbations and distempars of the affections. For as the ancient
politiques in popular estates were wont to compare the people to the sea,
and the orators to the winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm
and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would
be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in
working and agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the
nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as
winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I
find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written divers
volumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections which is the
principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are
considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they may be moved
by speech), he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the
quantity; but where their true place is he pretermitteth them. For it is
not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this
inquiry, no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light
can be said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are to
the particular affections as light is to particular colours. Better
travails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I
can gather by that which we have at second hand. But yet it is like it
was after their manner, rather in subtlety of definitions (which in a
subject of this nature are but curiosities), than in active and ample
descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular
writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections: as of
anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance,
and other. But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors
of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth, with great life, how
affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and
how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose
themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify:
how they are enwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and
encounter one with another; and other the like particularities. Amongst
the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters; how, I
say, to set affection against affection, and to master one by another;
even as we used to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which
otherwise percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation
is erected that excellent use of _præmium_ and _pæna_, whereby civil
states consist: employing the predominant affections of fear and hope,
for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the government of
states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so
it is in the government within.

(7) Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and
have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite,
and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom,
exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company,
friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: these
as they have determinate use in moralities, from these the mind
suffereth, and of these are such receipts and regiments compounded and
described, as may serve to recover or preserve the health and good estate
of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine: of which number we
will insist upon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it
were too long to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and
habit to speak of.

(8) The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that of
those things which consist by Nature, nothing can be changed by custom;
using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up it
will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing we do not
learn to see or hear the better. For though this principle be true in
things wherein Nature is peremptory (the reason whereof we cannot now
stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein Nature admitteth
a latitude. For he might see that a strait glove will come more easily
on with use; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew; and
that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger; and that by use of
enduring heat or cold we endure it the better, and the like: which latter
sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth,
than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion,
that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to
have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many
precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of
ordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will recite a few.

(9) The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either
too high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident nature you
discourage, in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and
so a sloth; and in all natures you breed a further expectation than can
hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end: if too weak, of the other
side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task.

(10) Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two several
times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst
disposed; that by the one you may gain a great step, by the other you may
work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the
more easy and pleasant.

(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way, which
is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by
nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, or making a
wand straight by bending him contrary to his natural crookedness.

(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to anything better, and
with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not
first in the intention, but _tanquam aliud agendo_, because of the
natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint. Many other
axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and custom, which
being so conducted doth prove indeed another nature; but, being governed
by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of Nature, and bringeth forth
that which is lame and counterfeit.

(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and
operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great
caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the fathers
in great indignation call poesy _vinum dæmonum_, because it increaseth
temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the opinion of
Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, “That young men are no
fit auditors of moral philosophy, because they are not settled from the
boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time and
experience”? And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and
discourses of the ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded unto
virtue most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty, and
popular opinions against virtue in their parasites’ coats fit to be
scorned and derided), are of so little effect towards honesty of life,
because they are not read and revolved by men in their mature and settled
years, but confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true
also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy,
till they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and morality; lest
their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no
true differences of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the
verse describes it, _Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur_; and
again, _Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit_, _hic diadema_: which the
poets do speak satirically and in indignation on virtue’s behalf; but
books of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for so it pleaseth
Machiavel to say, “That if Cæsar had been overthrown, he would have been
more odious than ever was Catiline;” as if there had been no difference,
but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most
excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world? Again, is there
not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities
themselves (some kinds of them), lest they make men too precise,
arrogant, incompatible; as Cicero saith of Cato, _In Marco Catone hæc
bona quæ videmus divina et egregia_, _ipsius scitote esse propria_; _quæ
nonunquam requirimus ea sunt omnia non a natura_, _sed a magistro_? Many
other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties and
effects, which studies do infuse and instil into manners. And so,
likewise, is there touching the use of all those other points, of
company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in
the doctrine of morality.

(14) But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more
accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground; that
the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect, and at
other times in a state more depraved. The purpose, therefore, of this
practice is to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to
obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been
practised by two means, vows or constant resolutions, and observances or
exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because
they keep the mind in continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil
hath been practised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of
that which is past, and an inception or account _de novo_ for the time to
come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all
good moral philosophy (as was said) is but a handmaid to religion.

(15) Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all
other means the most compendious and summary, and again, the most noble
and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate;
which is, the electing and propounding unto a man’s self good and
virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his
compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set
before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute,
constant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould himself
into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the work of nature;
whereas the other course is like the work of the hand. For as when a
carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh; as
if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude
stone still, till such times as he comes to it. But contrariwise when
nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all
the parts at one time. So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man
practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like
but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what
virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend
unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself
thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express
himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine. His words
are these: _Immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere eam_, _quæ supra
humanitatem est_, _heroicam sive divinam virtutem_; and a little after,
_Nam ut feræ neque vitium neque virtus est_, _swic neque Dei_: _sed hic
quidem status altius quiddam virtute est_, _ille aluid quiddam a vitio_.
And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus
attributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration, where he said, “That men
needed to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue
as good lords to them as Trajan had been;” as if he had not been only an
imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be heathen
and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind,
which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting
upon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of
perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together.
And as it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a
false imitation of divine love, _Amor melior Sophista lœvo ad humanam
vitam_—that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist
or preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules
and preceptions, he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that
facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so
certainly, if a man’s mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work
him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality
can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay, further,
as Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise
the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or
excesses; but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same
instant doth settle and compose it: so in all other excellences, though
they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess. Only charity
admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to be like God in power,
the angels transgressed and fell; _Ascendam_, _et ero similis altissimo_:
by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell;
_Eritis sicut Dii_, _scientes bonum et malum_: but by aspiring to a
similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever
transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are
called: _Diligite inimicos vestros_, _benefacite eis qui oderunt vos_,
_et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos_, _ut sitis filii
Patris vestri qui in cœlis est_, _qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos
et malos_, _et pluit super justos et injustos_. So in the first platform
of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, _Optimus
Maximus_: and the sacred Scriptures thus, _Miscericordia ejus super omnia
opera ejus_.

(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the
culture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any man, considering the
arts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to
collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by
others, as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. But
as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, “You may not marvel (Athenians)
that Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink
wine;” and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of
sleep—

“Sunt geminæ somni portæ: quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:
Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,
Sed falsa ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes:”

so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim in
knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor (“of wine”) is the more
vaporous, and the braver gate (“of ivory”) sendeth forth the falser
dreams.

(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy,
which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and
spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation
or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For
as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and
pleasure, so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral
knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without
perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong and agile
for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, so in the mind,
seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to observe, that many
have strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from
perturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings; some again have
an elegancy and fineness of carriage which have neither soundness of
honesty nor substance of sufficiency; and some again have honest and
reformed minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage business;
and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure,
we have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to
stupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it,
than in the strength and vigour of it.

XXIII. (1) Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all
others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom.
Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, “That the Romans were like sheep,
for that a man were better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for
in a flock, if you could get but some few go right, the rest would
follow:” so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than
policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of
internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an external
goodness; for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore it cometh oft
to pass that there be evil times in good governments: for so we find in
the Holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, _Sed adhuc
poulus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum_. Again,
states, as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of
frame: for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so
governments for a time well grounded do bear out errors following; but
the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted. These
respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge.

(2) This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary
actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, and government.
For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection; and they be
three wisdoms of divers natures which do often sever—wisdom of the
behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.

(3) The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected, but
much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an
influence also into business and government. The poet saith, _Nec vultu
destrue verba tuo_: a man may destroy the force of his words with his
countenance; so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his
brother affability and easy access; _Nil interest habere ostium apertum_,
_vultum clausum_: it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and
to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. So we see Atticus,
before the first interview between Cæsar and Cicero, the war depending,
did seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his
countenance and gesture. And if the government of the countenance be of
such effect, much more is that of the speech, and other carriage
appertaining to conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well
expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose: _Ne aut arrogans
videar_, _aut obnoxius_; _quorum alterum est àlienæ libertatis obliti_,
_alterum suæ_: the sum of behaviour is to retain a man’s own dignity,
without intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if
behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass
into affectation, and then _Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam
transferre_—to act a man’s life? But although it proceed not to that
extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And
therefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by
saying, _Amici fures temporis_: so certainly the intending of the
discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as
are accomplished in that form of urbanity please themselves in it, and
seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do
seek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything
becometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by _puntos_ and
compliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an
over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is
time and season. For as Solomon saith, _Qui respicit ad ventos_, _non
seminat_; _et qui respicit ad nubes_, _non metet_: a man must make his
opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as
a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it
ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to
be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind and hide any
deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait or restrained for
exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly
handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.

(4) The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto
collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning and the
professors of learning. For from this root springeth chiefly that note
or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect, that there
is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom. For of the three
wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of
behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an
inferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of government,
they acquit themselves well when they are called to it, but that
happeneth to few; but for the wisdom of business, wherein man’s life is
most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered
advertisements, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject.
For if books were written of this as the other, I doubt not but learned
men with mean experience would far excel men of long experience without
learning, and outshoot them in their own bow.

(5) Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should
be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less
infinite than science of government, which we see is laboured and in some
part reduced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient Romans in
the saddest and wisest times were professors; for Cicero reporteth, that
it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general
wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to walk at
certain hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use
their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them,
and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing
of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and every
other occasion incident to man’s life. So as there is a wisdom of
counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out of a universal
insight into the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon
particular causes propounded, but is gathered by general observation of
causes of like nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth
to his brother, _De petitione consulatus_ (being the only book of
business that I know written by the ancients), although it concerned a
particular action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of
many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a
perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But chiefly we may
see in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed
by Solomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was as
the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly matters, we
see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts,
positions, extending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay
a while, offering to consideration some number of examples.

(6) _Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam_,
_ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi_. Here is commended the
provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: as it
was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’
papers unperused.

_Vir sapiens_, _si cum stulto contenderit_, _sive irascatur_, _sive
rideat_, _non inveniet requiem_. Here is described the great
disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than
himself; which is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the matter to
jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways
quit himself well of it.

_Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum_, _postea sentiet eum
contumacem_. Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in
his favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and unthankfulness.

_Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo_? _coram regibus stabit_, _nec erit
inter ignobiles_. Here is observed, that of all virtues for rising to
honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many times love
not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and
diligent.

_Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole_, _cum adolescente secundo
qui consurgit pro eo_. Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla
first, and after him by Tiberius. _Plures adorant solem orientem quam
occidentem vel meridianum_.

_Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te_, _locum tuum ne
demiseris_; _quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima_. Here caution
is given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the
unfittest; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of
means to make them better.

_Erat civitas parva_, _et pauci in ea viri_: _venit contra eam rex
magnus_, _et vallavit eam_, _instruxitque munitones per gyrum_, _et
perfecta est obsidio_; _inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens_, _et
liberavit eam per sapientiam suam_; _et nullus deinceps recordatus est
huminis illius pauperis_. Here the corruption of states is set forth,
that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of it.

_Millis responsio frangit iram_. Here is noted that silence or rough
answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.

_Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum_. Here is lively represented how
laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred till the
last instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth a briar
or impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.

_Melior est finis orationis quam principium_. Here is taxed the vanity
of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, than
upon the conclusions and issues of speech.

_Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem_, _non bene facit_; _iste et pro
buccella panis deseret veritatem_. Here is noted, that a judge were
better be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge
offendeth not so lightly as a facile.

_Vir pauper calumnians pauperes simils est imbri vehementi_, _in quo
paratur fames_. Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous
extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry
horseleech.

_Fons turbatus pede_, _et vena corrupta_, _est justus cadens coram
impio_. Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the
face of the world doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many
particular injuries passed over by connivance.

_Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre_, _et dicit hoc non esse
peccatum_, _particeps est homicidii_. Here is noted that, whereas men in
wronging their best friends use to extenuate their fault, as if they
might presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate
their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety.

_Noli esse amicus homini iracundo_, _nec ambulato cum homine furioso_.
Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do
principally avoid those which are impatient, as those that will espouse
us to many factions and quarrels.

_Qui conturbat domum suam_, _possidebit ventum_. Here is noted, that in
domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves quieting
of their mind and contentment; but still they are deceived of their
expectation, and it turneth to wind.

_Filius sapiens lætificat patrem_: _filius vero stultus mæstitia est
matri suæ_. Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the
good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill
proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune.

_Qui celat delictum_, _quærit amicitiam_; _sed qui altero sermone
repetit_, _separat fæderatos_. Here caution is given, that reconcilement
is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that which is past,
than by apologies and excuses.

_In omni opere bono erit abundantia_; _ubi autem verba sunt plurima_,
_ibi frequenter egestas_. Here is noted, that words and discourse
aboundeth most where there is idleness and want.

_Primus in sua causa justus_: _sed venit altera pars_, _et inquiret in
eum_. Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth
much; in sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed,
except some abuse or falsity in the information be detected.

_Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia_, _et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora
ventris_. Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation, which
seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth deep which
hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity.

_Qui erudit derisorem_, _ipse sibi injuriam facit_; _et qui arguit
impium_, _sibi maculam generat_. Here caution is given how we tender
reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem
it for contumely, and accordingly to return it.

_Da sapienti occasionem_, _et addetur ei sapientia_. Here is
distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verbal
and swimming only in conceit; for the one upon the occasion presented is
quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and confused.

_Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium_, _sic corda hominum
manifesta sunt prudentibus_. Here the mind of a wise man is compared to
a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures and customs are
represented; from which representation proceedeth that application,

“Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit. ”

(7) Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences politic of
Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led with a
desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as
deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also attended them with
brief observations, such as to my understanding offer no violence to the
sense, though I know they may be applied to a more divine use: but it is
allowed, even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea, and some
writings, have more of the eagle than others; but taking them as
instructions for life, they might have received large discourse, if I
would have broken them and illustrated them by deducements and examples.

(8) Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is generally to
be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that as men found out
any observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it
and express it in parable or aphorism or fable. But for fables, they
were vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now that the times
abound with history, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And
therefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for this
variable argument of negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel
chose wisely and aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories
or examples. For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of
particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again. And it hath much
greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example,
than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point
of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance. For when the example
is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down with
all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon
made, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern for action; whereas the
examples alleged for the discourse’s sake are cited succinctly, and
without particularity, and carry a servile aspect towards the discourse
which they are brought in to make good.

(9) But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as history of
times is the best ground for discourse of government, such as Machiavel
handleth, so histories of lives is the most popular for discourse of
business, because it is more conversant in private actions. Nay, there
is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is
discourse upon letters, such as are wise and weighty, as many are of
Cicero _ad Atticum_, and others. For letters have a great and more
particular representation of business than either chronicles or lives.
Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of civil
knowledge, touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient.

(10) But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much
from that whereof we have spoken as _sapere_ and _sibi sapere_, the one
moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre. For
there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a
man’s own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often sever. For many
are wise in their own ways that are weak for government or counsel; like
ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but very hurtful for the
garden. This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: _Nam pol
sapiens_ (saith the comical poet) _fingit fortunam sibi_; and it grew to
an adage, _Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ_; and Livy attributed it to Cato
the first, _In hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat_, _ut quocunque
loco natus esset sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur_.

(11) This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and professed,
hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed in
Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many great services to the state
in his government, and giving an account thereof to the people as the
manner was, did conclude every particular with this clause, “And in this
fortune had no part. ” And it came so to pass, that he never prospered in
anything he took in hand afterwards. For this is too high and too
arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, _Dicis_,
_Fluvius est neus et ego feci memet ipsum_; or of that which another
prophet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and
that which the poet expresseth,

“Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint! ”

For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed; and,
therefore, those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their
successes to their felicity and not to their skill or virtue. For so
Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus. So Cæsar said to the master of
the ship, _Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus_.

(12) But yet, nevertheless, these positions, _Faber quisque fortunæ suæ_:
_Sapiens dominabitur astris_: _Invia virtuti null est via_, and the like,
being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to
insolency, rather for resolution than for the presumption or outward
declaration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are no question
imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion as
they can scarce contain it within. As we see in Augustus Cæsar (who was
rather diverse from his uncle than inferior in virtue), how when he died
he desired his friends about him to give him a _plaudite_, as if he were
conscious to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage.
This part of knowledge we do report also as deficient; not but that it is
practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And,
therefore, lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible by
axiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some
heads or passages of it.

(13) Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument to
teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein every
man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till he see the
difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is
as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, as to be truly moral.
But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and
in substance. In honour, because pragmatical men may not go away with an
opinion that learning is like a lark, that can mount and sing, and please
herself, and nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the
hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey.
In substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that
nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the
globe of crystal or form; that is, that there be not anything in being
and action which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and
doctrine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of
fortune otherwise than as of an inferior work, for no man’s fortune can
be an end worthy of his being, and many times the worthiest men do
abandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but nevertheless
fortune as an organ of virtue and merit deserveth the consideration.

(14) First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary
towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus
did require; who seeing in the frame of man’s heart such angles and
recesses, found fault there was not a window to look into them; that is,
to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their
natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps
and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand, so again their weaknesses
and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and obnoxious, their
friends, factions, dependences; and again their opposites, enviers,
competitors, their moods and times, _Sola viri molles aditus et tempora
noras_; their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and this
not only of persons but of actions; what are on foot from time to time,
and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and
the like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in
itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous:
for men change with the actions; and whilst they are in pursuit they are
one, and when they return to their nature they are another.
These
informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the
minor propositions in every active syllogism; for no excellency of
observations (which are as the major propositions) can suffice to ground
a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.

(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety, who saith,
_Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda_; _sed vir prudens
exhauriet illud_. And although the knowledge itself falleth not under
precept because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the
obtaining of it may.

(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to the
ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and
distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to
words; and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to
set and purposed words. Neither let that be feared which is said,
_Fronti nulla fides_, which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and
not of the private and subtle motions and labours of the countenance and
gesture; which, as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is _Animi janua_, “the gate
of the mind. ” None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of
Gallus, _Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat_. So again, noting the
differing character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in
the Senate, he saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech
of Germanicus, thus: _Magis in speciem adornatis verbis_, _quam ut
penitus sentire crederetur_; but of Drusus thus: _Paucioribus sed
intentior_, _et fida oratione_; and in another place, speaking of his
character of speech when he did anything that was gracious and popular,
he saith, “That in other things he was _velut eluctantium verborum_;” but
then again, _solutius loquebatur quando subveniret_. So that there is no
such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance
(_vultus jussus_), that can sever from a feigned tale some of these
fashions, either a more slight and careless fashion, or more set and
formal, or more tedious and wandering, or coming from a man more drily
and hardly.

(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may be trusted
without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: _Fraus
sibi in parvis fidem præstruit ut majore emolumento fallat_; and the
Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is
better used than he was wont to be without manifest cause. For small
favours, they do but lull men to sleep, both as to caution and as to
industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, _Alimenta socordiæ_. So
again we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular
which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and
unfaithful reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus
advanced many of the friends of Antonius, _Simul amicis ejus præfecturas
et tribunatus largitur_: wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he
did desolate him, and won from him his dependents.

(18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full of
flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised specially with
the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a
stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his
dissimulation when he said, “You are hurt because you do not reign;” of
which Tacitus saith, _Audita hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere_:
_correptamque Græco versu admonuit_, _ideo lædi quia non regnaret_. And,
therefore, the poet doth elegantly call passions tortures that urge men
to confess their secrets:—

“Vino torus et ira. ”

And experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves and so
settled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes
upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open
themselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation,
according to the proverb of Spain, _Di mentira_, _y sacar as verdad_:
“Tell a lie and find a truth. ”

(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from reports:
men’s weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their
virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from
their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends,
with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and the opinions
conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such men are more
masked: _Verior fama e domesticis emanat_.

(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their
natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by
their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both pleasantly
and wisely said (though I think very untruly) by a nuncio of the Pope,
returning from a certain nation where he served as lidger; whose opinion
being asked touching the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished
that in any case they did not send one that was too wise; because no very
wise man would ever imagine what they in that country were like to do.
And certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to
suppose deeper ends and more compass reaches than are: the Italian
proverb being elegant, and for the most part true:—

“Di danari, di senno, e di fede,
C’è ne manco che non credi. ”

“There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith than men
do account upon. ”

(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by their
natures, and private persons by their ends. For princes being at the top
of human desires, they have for the most part no particular ends whereto
they aspire, by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of
the rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes that
maketh their hearts more inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to inform
ourselves in men’s ends and natures of the variety of them only, but also
of the predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is
principally sought. For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself
outstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero’s humours of pleasures,
_metus ejus rimatur_, he wrought upon Nero’s fears, whereby he broke the
other’s neck.

(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way resteth in
three things; the first, to have general acquaintance and inwardness with
those which have general acquaintance and look most into the world; and
specially according to the diversity of business, and the diversity of
persons, to have privacy and conversation with some one friend at least
which is perfect and well-intelligenced in every several kind. The
second is to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy; in
most things liberty; secrecy where it importeth; for liberty of speech
inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to
a man’s knowledge; and secrecy on the other side induceth trust and
inwardness. The last is the reducing of a man’s self to this watchful
and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every conference and
action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus would have a
philosopher in every particular action to say to himself, _Et hoc volo_,
_et etiam institutum servare_; so a politic man in everything should say
to himself, _Et hoc volo_, _ac etiam aliquid addiscere_. I have stayed
the longer upon this precept of obtaining good information because it is
a main part by itself, which answereth to all the rest. But, above all
things, caution must be taken that men have a good stay and hold of
themselves, and that this much knowing do not draw on much meddling; for
nothing is more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in many
matters. So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but
only to this, to make a better and freer choice of those actions which
may concern us, and to conduct them with the less error and the more
dexterity.

(23) The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men to take
good information touching their own person, and well to understand
themselves; knowing that, as St. James saith, though men look oft in a
glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein as the divine
glass is the Word of God, so the politic glass is the state of the world,
or times wherein we live, in the which we are to behold ourselves.

(24) For men ought to take an impartial view of their own abilities and
virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting these with
the most, and those other with the least; and from this view and
examination to frame the considerations following.

(25) First, to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with
the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable and fit,
then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty; but if
differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to be
more close retired, and reserved; as we see in Tiberius, who was never
seen at a play, and came not into the senate in twelve of his last years;
whereas Augustus Cæsar lived ever in men’s eyes, which Tacitus observeth,
_alia Tiberio morum via_.

(26) Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with professions and
courses of life, and accordingly to make election, if they be free; and,
if engaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity; as we see was
done by Duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal
profession, but quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and
inclination; being such, nevertheless, as a man cannot tell well whether
they were worse for a prince or for a priest.

(27) Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they are like to
have competitors and concurrents; and to take that course wherein there
is most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent; as Cæsar Julius
did, who at first was an orator or pleader; but when he saw the
excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others for eloquence, and
saw there was no man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom
the state was forced to rely, he forsook his course begun towards a civil
and popular greatness, and transferred his designs to a martial
greatness.

(28) Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependents, to proceed
according to the composition of their own nature; as we may see in Cæsar,
all whose friends and followers were men active and effectual, but not
solemn, or of reputation.

(29) Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves by examples,
in thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas perhaps their
natures and carriages are far differing. In which error it seemeth
Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith that he was wont often to say, _Sylla
potuit_, _ego non potero_? Wherein he was much abused, the natures and
proceedings of himself and his example being the unlikest in the world;
the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn,
and full of majesty and circumstance, and therefore the less effectual.

But this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves hath many
other branches, whereupon we cannot insist.

(30) Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man’s self, there
followeth the well opening and revealing a man’s self; wherein we see
nothing more usual than for the more able man to make the less show. For
there is a great advantage in the well setting forth of a man’s virtues,
fortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial covering of a man’s
weaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the one, sliding from the
other; cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing the other by
exposition, and the like. Wherein we see what Tacitus saith of Mutianus,
who was the greatest politique of his time, _Omnium quæ dixerat
feceratque arte quadam ostentator_, which requireth indeed some art, lest
it turn tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation (though it be to
the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than
in policy; for as it is said, _Audacter calumniare_, _semper aliquid
hæret_; so, except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity, _Audacter
te vendita_, _semper aluquid hæret_. For it will stick with the more
ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and rank do smile
at it and despise it; and yet the authority won with many doth
countervail the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and
government, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; or at
times when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety (as in military
persons); or at times when others are most envied; or with easy and
careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being
too serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a man’s self, as well as
gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling or putting down others’
injury or insolency; it doth greatly add to reputation: and surely not a
few solid natures, that want this ventosity and cannot sail in the height
of the winds, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by their
moderation.

(31) But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they are not
perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue be not
disvalued and embased under the just price, which is done in three
manners—by offering and obtruding a man’s self, wherein men think he is
rewarded when he is accepted; by doing too much, which will not give that
which is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety; and
by finding too soon the fruit of a man’s virtue, in commendation,
applause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let
him hear what is truly said: _Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris_,
_si hæc te res parva sicuti magna delectat_.

(32) But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the
valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners—by
caution, by colour, and by confidence. Caution is when men do
ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for which
they are not proper; whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will
thrust themselves into matters without difference, and so publish and
proclaim all their wants. Colour is when men make a way for themselves
to have a construction made of their faults or wants, as proceeding from
a better cause or intended for some other purpose. For of the one it is
well said,

“Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni,”

and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he pretend the
virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must affect gravity; if a
coward, mildness; and so the rest. For the second, a man must frame some
probable cause why he should not do his best, and why he should dissemble
his abilities; and for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities
which are notorious in him, to give colour that his true wants are but
industries and dissimulations. For confidence, it is the last but the
surest remedy—namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man
cannot attain; observing the good principle of the merchants, who
endeavour to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat down
the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth this other,
which is to face out a man’s own defects, in seeming to conceive that he
is best in those things wherein he is failing; and, to help that again,
to seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in those
things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in poets,
that if they show their verses, and you except to any, they will say,
“That that line cost them more labour than any of the rest;” and
presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which
they know well enough to be the best in the number. But above all, in
this righting and helping of a man’s self in his own carriage, he must
take heed he show not himself dismantled and exposed to scorn and injury,
by too much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some
sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified carriage,
with a ready rescussing of a man’s self from scorns, is sometimes of
necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune; but it
ever succeedeth with good felicity.

(33) Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeavour to
frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing
hindereth men’s fortunes so much as this: _Idem manebat_, _neque idem
decebat_—men are where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to
Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth that he
had _versatile ingenium_. And thereof it cometh that these grave solemn
wits, which must be like themselves and cannot make departures, have more
dignity than felicity. But in some it is nature to be somewhat vicious
and enwrapped, and not easy to turn. In some it is a conceit that is
almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe
that they ought to change their course, when they have found good by it
in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely how Fabius Maximus
would have been temporising still, according to his old bias, when the
nature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other it
is want of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not
discern when things have a period, but come in too late after the
occasion; as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country
fellows, when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then
they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some other it
is a lothness to lose labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring
about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no other
remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave
for the third part of Sibylla’s books the treble price, when he might at
first have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or
cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most
prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our
mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with
that we last spoke of, but with difference, is that which is well
expressed, _Fatis accede deisque_, that men do not only turn with the
occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit
or strength to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions
that which is most passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not
occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please
the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake:
which cannot but mightily increase reputation.

(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with
the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that which
Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: _Et quemadmodum receptum est_, _ut
exercitum ducat imperator_, _sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ ducendæ_;
_ut quæipsis videntur_, _ea gerantur_, _et non ipsi eventus persequi
cogantur_. For if we observe we shall find two differing kinds of
sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly
and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own
plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of which is very
imperfect without the other.

(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in
the declaring or not declaring a man’s self: for although depth of
secrecy, and making way (_qualis est via navis in mari_, which the French
calleth _sourdes menées_, when men set things in work without opening
themselves at all), be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet many
times _dissimulatio errores parit_, _qui dissimulatorem ipsum
illaqueant_. And therefore we see the greatest politiques have in a
natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been
reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a
kind of profession, “that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they
stood his friends or enemies. ” So Cæsar, when he went first into Gaul,
made no scruple to profess “that he had rather be first in a village than
second at Rome. ” So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what
Cicero saith of him, _Alter_ (meaning of Cæsar) _non recusat_, _sed
quodammodo postulat_, _ut_ (_ut est_) _sic appelletur tyrannus_. So we
may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Cæsar, in his
very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in
his harangues to the people would swear, _Ita parentis honores consequi
liceat_ (which was no less than the tyranny), save that, to help it, he
would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of Cæsar’s that was erected
in the place: and men laughed and wondered, and said, “Is it possible? ”
or, “Did you ever hear the like? ” and yet thought he meant no hurt; he
did it so handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous:
whereas Pompey, who tended to the same ends, but in a more dark and
dissembling manner as Tacitus saith of him, _Occultior non melior_,
wherein Sallust concurreth, _Ore probo_, _animo inverecundo_, made it his
design, by infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute
anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for
necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon him, and
he never seen in it: and when he had brought it (as he thought) to that
point when he was chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could
make no great matter of it, because men understood him not; but was fain
in the end to go the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by
colour of the doubt of Cæsar’s designs: so tedious, casual, and
unfortunate are these deep dissimulations: whereof it seemeth Tacitus
made this judgment, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in
regard of true policy; attributing the one to Augustus, the other to
Tiberius; where, speaking of Livia, he saith, _Et cum artibus mariti
simulatione filii bene compostia_: for surely the continual habit of
dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly
politic.

(37) Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to accustom our
minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they conduce and
are material to our particular ends; and that to do substantially and not
superficially. For we shall find the logical part (as I may term it) of
some men’s minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they
can well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparison,
preferring things of show and sense before things of substance and
effect. So some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular
fame and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase, when in
many cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. So some
measure things according to the labour and difficulty or assiduity which
are spent about them; and think, if they be ever moving, that they must
needs advance and proceed; as Cæsar saith in a despising manner of Cato
the second, when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to
no great purpose, _Hæc omnia magno studio agebat_. So in most things men
are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best,
when it should be the fittest.

(38) As for the true marshalling of men’s pursuits towards their fortune,
as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus. First the
amendment of their own minds. For the removal of the impediments of the
mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune than the obtaining fortune
will remove the impediments of the mind. In the second place I set down
wealth and means; which I know most men would have placed first, because
of the general use which it beareth towards all variety of occasions.
But that opinion I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that
other, that moneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the
true sinews of the wars are the sinews of men’s arms, that is, a valiant,
populous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority of
Solon, who, when Crœsus showed him his treasury of gold, said to him,
that if another came that had better iron, he would be master of his
gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed that it is not moneys that
are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men’s minds,
wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In
the third place I set down reputation, because of the peremptory tides
and currents it hath; which, if they be not taken in their due time, are
seldom recovered, it being extreme hard to play an after-game of
reputation. And lastly I place honour, which is more easily won by any
of the other three, much more by all, than any of them can be purchased
by honour. To conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in
matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of
the commonest errors: while men fly to their ends when they should intend
their beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they come
on, but marshal them according to greatness and not according to
instance; not observing the good precept, _Quod nunc instat agamus_.

(39) Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any matters
which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding
in a man’s ears, _Sed fugit interea fugit irreparabile tempus_: and that
is the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions
of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the like, are not
commonly so politic for their own fortune, otherwise than in their
ordinary way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait
occasions, and to devise plots.

(40) Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature, which doth
nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do well interlace his
business, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally
intendeth. For a man ought in every particular action so to carry the
motions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he
cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a
second, or so in a third; and if he can have no part of that which he
purposed, yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; and if he cannot
make anything of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat
in time to come; and if he can contrive no effect or substance from it,
yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like. So that he should exact
an account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand
amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is
more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that doth
so loseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many times more
proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards, than
for that which he urgeth for the present; and therefore men must be
perfect in that rule, _Hæc oportet facere_, _et illa non imittere_.

(41) Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a man’s self
peremptorily in anything, though it seem not liable to accident; but ever
to have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire: following the wisdom
in the ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash
was dry whither they should go; and the one moved to go down into a pit,
because it was not likely the water would dry there; but the other
answered, “True, but if it do, how shall we get out again? ”

(42) Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of Bias,
construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but to caution and
moderation, _Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus et odi tanquam amaturus_.
For it utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark themselves too far
into unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and
humorous envies or emulations.

(43) But I continue this beyond the measure of an example; led, because I
would not have such knowledges, which I note as deficient, to be thought
things imaginative or in the air, or an observation or two much made of,
but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is more hardly made than a
beginning. It must be likewise conceived, that in these points which I
mention and set down, they are far from complete tractates of them, but
only as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no man I suppose will
think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without all this ado; for I
know they come tumbling into some men’s laps; and a number obtain good
fortunes by diligence in a plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping
themselves from gross errors.

(44) But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect orator,
doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a
prince or a courtier hath been described by such as have handled those
subjects, the mould hath used to be made according to the perfection of
the art, and not according to common practice: so I understand it, that
it ought to be done in the description of a politic man, I mean politic
for his own fortune.

(45) But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts which we
have set down are of that kind which may be counted and called _Bonæ
Artes_. As for evil arts, if a man would set down for himself that
principle of Machiavel, “That a man seek not to attain virtue itself, but
the appearance only thereof; because the credit of virtue is a help, but
the use of it is cumber:” or that other of his principles, “That he
presuppose that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by fear;
and therefore that he seek to have every man obnoxious, low, and in
straits,” which the Italians call _seminar spine_, to sow thorns: or that
other principle, contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, _Cadant
amici_, _dummodo inimici intercidant_, as the triumvirs, which sold every
one to other the lives of their friends for the deaths of their enemies:
or that other protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble
states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their
fortunes, _Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium_, _id non
aqua sed ruina restinguam_: or that other principle of Lysander, “That
children are to be deceived with comfits, and men with oaths:” and the
like evil and corrupt positions, whereof (as in all things) there are
more in number than of the good: certainly with these dispensations from
the laws of charity and integrity, the pressing of a man’s fortune may be
more hasty and compendious. But it is in life as it is in ways, the
shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer way is not
much about.

(46) But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and sustain
themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of
ambition, ought in the pursuit of their own fortune to set before their
eyes not only that general map of the world, “That all things are vanity
and vexation of spirit,” but many other more particular cards and
directions: chiefly that, that being without well-being is a curse, and
the greater being the greater curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded
and all wickedness most punished in itself: according as the poet saith
excellently:

“Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri pro laudibus istis
Præmia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum
Dii _moresque_ dabunt vestri. ”

And so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to look up to the
Eternal Providence and Divine Judgment, which often subverteth the wisdom
of evil plots and imaginations, according to that scripture, “He hath
conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing. ” And although
men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this
incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man’s fortune leaveth not tribute
which we owe to God of our time; who (we see) demandeth a tenth of our
substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of our time: and it is to
small purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, and a perpetual
grovelling spirit upon earth, eating dust as doth the serpent, _Atque
affigit humo divinæ particulam auræ_. And if any man flatter himself
that he will employ his fortune well, though he should obtain it ill, as
was said concerning Augustus Cæsar, and after of Septimius Severus, “That
either they should never have been born, or else they should never have
died,” they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their
greatness, and so much good when they were established; yet these
compensations and satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be
purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss for men, in their race towards
their fortune, to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is
elegantly expressed by the Emperor Charles V. , in his instructions to the
king his son, “That fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that
if she he too much wooed she is the farther off. ” But this last is but a
remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: let men rather build upon
that foundation which is as a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy,
wherein they join close, namely that same _Primum quærite_. For divinity
saith, _Primum quærite regnum Dei_, _et ista omnia adjicientur vobis_:
and philosophy saith, _Primum quærite bona animi_; _cætera aut aderunt_,
_aut non oberunt_. And although the human foundation hath somewhat of
the sands, as we see in M. Brutus, when he broke forth into that speech,

“Te colui (Virtus) ut rem; ast tu nomen inane es;”

yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve for a
taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.

(47) Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired
in both these respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things
are secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are not
fit to utter. We see all governments are obscure and invisible:

“Totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet. ”

Such is the description of governments. We see the government of God
over the world is hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to participate of much
irregularity and confusion. The government of the soul in moving the
body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be
reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity (the shadows
whereof are in the poets) in the description of torments and pains, next
unto the crime of rebellion, which was the giants’ offence, doth detest
the offence of futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant
of particulars: nevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses
of policy and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling.

(48) But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed, all things
ought as far as the frailty of man permitteth to be manifest and
revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the
government of God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and shady
body, is in the view of God as crystal: _Et in conspectu sedis tanquam
mare vitreum simile crystallo_. So unto princes and states, and
specially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions
of the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions and
combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard
of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations,
and the height of their station where they keep sentinel, in great part
clear and transparent. Wherefore, considering that I write to a king
that is a master of this science, and is so well assisted, I think it
decent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the
certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being
silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by
speech, desired it might be certified for his part, “That there was one
that knew how to hold his peace. ”

(49) Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is
laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all those
which have written of laws have written either as philosophers or as
lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make
imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as
the stars, which give little light because they are so high. For the
lawyers, they write according to the states where they live what is
received law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of a law-maker
is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain
fountains of justice whence all civil laws are derived but as streams;
and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through
which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and
governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same
fountains. Again, the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a
platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into
consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are the
causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty of law; by what
means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are the
impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws
touching private right of _meum_ and _tuum_ have into the public state,
and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and
delivered, whether in texts or in Acts, brief or large, with preambles or
without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time, and
what is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volume, or too
full of multiplicity and crossness; how they are to be expounded, when
upon causes emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon responses
and conferences touching general points or questions; how they are to be
pressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity
and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to be
mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts; again, how
the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to be censured and
governed; and many other points touching the administration and (as I may
term it) animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, because I
purpose (if God give me leave), having begun a work of this nature in
aphorisms, to propound it hereafter, noting it in the meantime for
deficient.

(50) And for your Majesty’s laws of England, I could say much of their
dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they cannot but excel the
civil laws in fitness for the government, for the civil law was _nonhos
quæsitum munus in usus_; it was not made for the countries which it
governeth. Hereof I cease to speak because I will not intermingle matter
of action with matter of general learning.

XXIV. Thus have I concluded this portion of learning touching civil
knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; and
with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And being now at some
pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth
to me (_si nunquam fallit imago_), as far as a man can judge of his own
work, not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while
they are in tuning their instruments, which is nothing pleasant to hear,
but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards. So have I been
content to tune the instruments of the Muses, that they may play that
have better hands. And surely, when I set before me the condition of
these times, in which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit
in all the qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits
of this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of
ancient writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books to men of
all fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, which hath
disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the
leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so generally in
civil business, as the states of Græcia did, in respect of their
popularity, and the state of Rome, in respect of the greatness of their
monarchy; the present disposition of these times at this instant to
peace; the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of
religion, which have so much diverted men from other sciences; the
perfection of your Majesty’s learning, which as a phœnix may call whole
volleys of wits to follow you; and the inseparable propriety of time,
which is ever more and more to disclose truth; I cannot but be raised to
this persuasion, that this third period of time will far surpass that of
the Grecian and Roman learning; only if men will know their own strength
and their own weakness both; and take, one from the other, light of
invention, and not fire of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition
of truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament; and
employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to
things vulgar and of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man
shall please himself or others in the reprehension of them, they shall
make that ancient and patient request, _Verbera_, _sed audi_: let men
reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them. For the appeal is lawful
(though it may be it shall not be needful) from the first cogitations of
men to their second, and from the nearer times to the times further off.
Now let us come to that learning, which both the former times were not so
blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and port of
all men’s labours and peregrinations.

XXV. (1) The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the
will of man: so that as we are to obey His law, though we find a
reluctation in our will, so we are to believe His word, though we find a
reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that which is
agreeable to our sense we give consent to the matter, and not to the
author; which is no more than we would do towards a suspected and
discredited witness; but that faith which was accounted to Abraham for
righteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein
was an image of natural reason.

(2) Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it is to
believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man’s mind
suffereth from sense: but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such one as
it holdeth for more authorised than itself and so suffereth from the
worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man glorified; for then
faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are known.

(3) Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in our idiom we
call divinity) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not
upon the light of nature: for it is written, _Cæli enarrant gloriam Dei_;
but it is not written, _Cæli enarrant voluntatem Dei_: but of that it is
said, _Ad legem et testimonium_: _si non fecerint secundum verbum istud_,
&c. This holdeth not only in those points of faith which concern the
great mysteries of the Deity, of the creation, of the redemption, but
likewise those which concern the law moral, truly interpreted: “Love your
enemies: do good to them that hate you; be like to your heavenly Father,
that suffereth His rain to fall upon the just and unjust. ” To this it
ought to be applauded, _Nec vox hominem sonat_: it is a voice beyond the
light of nature. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a
libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities, as if
they were opposite and malignant to nature: _Et quod natura remittit_,
_invida jura negant_. So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander’s
messengers, that he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other of
the wise men of Græcia, and that he held them for excellent men: but that
they had a fault, which was that they had in too great reverence and
veneration a thing they called law and manners. So it must be confessed
that a great part of the law moral is of that perfection whereunto the
light of nature cannot aspire: how then is it that man is said to have,
by the light and law of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and
vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus, because the light of
nature is used in two several senses: the one, that which springeth from
reason, sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven and
earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an
inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle
of the purity of his first estate: in which latter sense only he is
participant of some light and discerning touching the perfection of the
moral law; but how? sufficient to check the vice but not to inform the
duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as well moral as mystical, is
not to be attained but by inspiration and revelation from God.

(4) The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, and the
latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not for nothing
that the apostle calleth religion “our reasonable service of God;”
insomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law were full of
reason and signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and
magic, that are full of non-significants and surd characters. But most
specially the Christian faith, as in all things so in this, deserveth to
be highly magnified; holding and preserving the golden mediocrity in this
point between the law of the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which have
embraced the two extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no
constant belief or confession, but left all to the liberty of agent; and
the religion of Mahomet on the other side interdicteth argument
altogether: the one having the very face of error, and the other of
imposture; whereas the Faith doth both admit and reject disputation with
difference.

(5) The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the former, in
the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed;
the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction
thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by
way of illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter consisteth
indeed of probation and argument. In the former we see God vouchsafeth
to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of His mysteries in sort as
may be sensible unto us; and doth graft His revelations and holy doctrine
upon the notions of our reason, and applieth His inspirations to open our
understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the
latter there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and
respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles
and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of
reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences
from and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction. In
nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by
induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those
principles or first positions have no discordance with that reason which
draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not
in religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller
nature, namely, wherein there are not only _posita_ but _placita_; for in
such there can be no use of absolute reason. We see it familiarly in
games of wit, as chess, or the like. The draughts and first laws of the
game are positive, but how? merely _ad placitum_, and not examinable by
reason; but then how to direct our play thereupon with best advantage to
win the game is artificial and rational. So in human laws there be many
grounds and maxims which are _placita juris_, positive upon authority,
and not upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed: but what is most
just, not absolutely but relatively, and according to those maxims, that
affordeth a long field of disputation. Such therefore is that secondary
reason, which hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the
_placets_ of God.

(6) Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not been, to
my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true limits and
use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: which
for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of
true conceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into that
which is not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and
contradictories, to examine that which is positive. The one sort falling
into the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more sensible
than it pleaseth God to reveal them, _Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit
senex_? The other sort into the error of the disciples, which were
scandalised at a show of contradiction, _Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis_?
_Modicum et non videbitis me_; _et iterum_, _modicum_, _et videbitis me_,
&c.

(7) Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great and
blessed use thereof; for this point well laboured and defined of would in
my judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of
curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the fury of
controversies, wherewith the Church laboureth. For it cannot but open
men’s eyes to see that many controversies do merely pertain to that which
is either not revealed or positive; and that many others do grow upon
weak and obscure inferences or derivations: which latter sort, if men
would revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the Gentiles,
would be carried thus, _ego_, _non dominus_; and again, _secundum
consilium meum_, in opinions and counsels, and not in positions and
oppositions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the style, _non ego_,
_sed dominus_; and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and
denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those which have
not sufficiently learned out of Solomon that “The causeless curse shall
not come. ”

(8) Divinity hath two principal parts: the matter informed or revealed,
and the nature of the information or revelation; and with the latter we
will begin, because it hath most coherence with that which we have now
last handled. The nature of the information consisteth of three
branches: the limits of the information, the sufficiency of the
information, and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Unto the
limits of the information belong these considerations: how far forth
particular persons continue to be inspired; how far forth the Church is
inspired; and how far forth reason may be used; the last point whereof I
have noted as deficient. Unto the sufficiency of the information belong
two considerations: what points of religion are fundamental, and what
perfective, being matter of further building and perfection upon one and
the same foundation; and again, how the gradations of light according to
the dispensation of times are material to the sufficiency of belief.

(9) Here again I may rather give it in advice than note it as deficient,
that the points fundamental, and the points of further perfection only,
ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished; a subject tending to
much like end as that I noted before; for as that other were likely to
abate the number of controversies, so this is likely to abate the heat of
many of them. We see Moses when he saw the Israelite and the Egyptian
fight, he did not say, “Why strive you? ” but drew his sword and slew the
Egyptian; but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he said, “You are
brethren, why strive you? ” If the point of doctrine be an Egyptian, it
must be slain by the sword of the Spirit, and not reconciled; but if it
be an Israelite, though in the wrong, then, “Why strive you? ” We see of
the fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, “He that is
not with us is against us;” but of points not fundamental, thus, “He that
is not against us is with us. ” So we see the coat of our Saviour was
entire without seam, and so is the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself;
but the garment of the Church was of divers colours and yet not divided.
We see the chaff may and ought to be severed from the corn in the ear,
but the tares may not be pulled up from the corn in the field. So as it
is a thing of great use well to define what, and of what latitude, those
points are which do make men mere aliens and disincorporate from the
Church of God.

(10) For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true and
sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains of the
water of life.