Now many have
meritorious
works, who do not obtain
perseverance; nor can it be urged that this takes place because of the
impediment of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and
thus if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not permit him to
fall into sin.
perseverance; nor can it be urged that this takes place because of the
impediment of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and
thus if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not permit him to
fall into sin.
Summa Theologica
But life everlasting is granted by God, in
accordance with the judgment of justice, according to 2 Tim. 4:8: "As
to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the
Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day. " Therefore man
merits everlasting life condignly.
I answer that, Man's meritorious work may be considered in two ways:
first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds from the
grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the substance
of the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, there can
be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But there is
congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for it would seem
congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should reward him
according to the excellence of his power.
If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds
from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is
meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its
merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life
everlasting according to Jn. 4:14: "Shall become in him a fount of
water springing up into life everlasting. " And the worth of the work
depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker
of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the
inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: "If
sons, heirs also. "
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these
sufferings.
Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the first
cause of our reaching everlasting life, viz. God's mercy. But our merit
is a subsequent cause.
Reply to Objection 3: The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at
present, although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as
the seed of a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by
grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause of
life everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the "pledge" of our
inheritance.
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Whether grace is the principle of merit through charity rather than the
other virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not the principle of merit
through charity rather than the other virtues. For wages are due to
work, according to Mat. 20:8: "Call the laborers and pay them their
hire. " Now every virtue is a principle of some operation, since virtue
is an operative habit, as stated above ([2244]Q[55], A[2]). Hence every
virtue is equally a principle of merit.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:8): "Every man shall
receive his own reward according to his labor. " Now charity lessens
rather than increases the labor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis
Dom. , Serm. lxx), "love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and
next to nothing. " Hence charity is no greater principle of merit than
any other virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the greatest principle of merit would seem to be
the one whose acts are most meritorious. But the acts of faith and
patience or fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious, as appears
in the martyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and bravely even
till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle of merit than
charity.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall
be loved of My Father; and I will love him and will manifest Myself to
him. " Now everlasting life consists in the manifest knowledge of God,
according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee,
the only true" and living "God. " Hence the merit of eternal life rests
chiefly with charity.
I answer that, As we may gather from what has been stated above
[2245](A[1]), human acts have the nature of merit from two causes:
first and chiefly from the Divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are said
to merit that good to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the
part of free-will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the
power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both these ways
does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we must bear in mind that
everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of God. Now the human mind's
movement to the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act of
charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this
end, since all the other virtues are commanded by charity. Hence the
merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and secondly, to
the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity. So,
likewise, is it manifest that what we do out of love we do most
willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness,
merit is chiefly attributed to charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for
object, moves the other virtues to act. For the habit to which the end
pertains always commands the habits to which the means pertain, as was
said above ([2246]Q[9], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways:
first, from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the
work pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not
lessen the toil---rather, it makes us undertake the greatest toils,
"for it does great things, if it exists," as Gregory says (Hom. in
Evang. xxx). Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is not
done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and this
toil lessens merit and is removed by charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of faith is not meritorious unless "faith
. . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). So, too, the acts of patience and
fortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity,
according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I should deliver my body to be burned,
and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. "
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Whether a man may merit for himself the first grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first
grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), "faith merits
justification. " Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore a
man may merit the first grace.
Objection 2: Further, God gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one
is said to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly.
Therefore we may merit the first grace condignly.
Objection 3: Further, with men we may merit a gift already received.
Thus if a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good
use of it in his master's service. Now God is much more bountiful than
man. Much more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the
first grace already received from God.
On the contrary, The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works,
according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not
reckoned according to grace but according to debt. " Now a man merits
what is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his works.
Hence a man may not merit the first grace.
I answer that, The gift of grace may be considered in two ways: first
in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all
merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Rom. 11:6), "if
by grace, it is not now by works. " Secondly, it may be considered as
regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come
under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the
proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a man in the state
of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz. sin. But when anyone
has grace, the grace already possessed cannot come under merit, since
reward is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all our
good works, as stated above ([2247]Q[109]). But of anyone merits a
further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding grace, it would not
be the first grace. Hence it is manifest that no one can merit for
himself the first grace.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was
deceived on this point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to
be from us, and its consummation to be granted us by God; and this he
here retracts. And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of
faith as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a
truth of faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from God, the
first act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of
the first grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though
man, by believing, were to merit justification, but that, he believes,
whilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is
required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above
([2248]Q[113], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: God gives grace to none but to the worthy, not
that they were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them
worthy, Who alone "can make him clean that is conceived of unclean
seed" (Job 14:4).
Reply to Objection 3: Man's every good work proceeds from the first
grace as from its principle; but not from any gift of man.
Consequently, there is no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts
of men.
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Whether a man can merit the first grace for another?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit the first grace for
another. Because on Mat. 9:2: "Jesus seeing their faith," etc. a gloss
says: "How much is our personal faith worth with God, Who set such a
price on another's faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and
outwardly! " Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a man
can merit the first grace for another.
Objection 2: Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but
efficacious, according to James 5:16: "The continued prayer of a just
man availeth much. " Now he had previously said: "Pray one for another,
that you may be saved. " Hence, since man's salvation can only be
brought about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for another his
first grace.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends
of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail they may receive
you into everlasting dwellings. " Now it is through grace alone that
anyone is received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does
anyone merit everlasting life as stated above [2249](A[2]; Q[109],
A[5]). Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel shall
stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people" ---yet they had
great merit with God. Hence it seems that no one can merit the first
grace for another.
I answer that, As shown above ([2250]AA[1],3,4), our works are
meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; and
thus we merit condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from
free-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have
congruous merit, since it is congruous that when a man makes good use
of his power God should by His super-excellent power work still higher
things. And therefore it is clear that no one can merit condignly for
another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each one of us is
moved by God to reach life everlasting through the gift of grace; hence
condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ's soul is
moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach the glory of life
everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inasmuch as He is the Head
of the Church, and the Author of human salvation, according to Heb.
2:10: "Who hath brought many children into glory [to perfect] the
Author of their salvation. "
But one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a
man in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous and in harmony
with friendship that God should fulfil man's desire for the salvation
of another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part
of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense
that the passage from Jeremias speaks.
Reply to Objection 1: A man's faith avails for another's salvation by
congruous and not by condign merit.
Reply to Objection 2: The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas
condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things
from the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice,
according to Dan. 9:18: "For it is not for our justifications that we
present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy
tender mercies. "
Reply to Objection 3: The poor who receive alms are said to receive
others into everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their
forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works,
or materially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy,
exercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting
dwellings.
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Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall?
Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself
restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he may
justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than to be
restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super Ps.
lxx. ], according to Ps. 70:9: "When my strength shall fail, do not Thou
forsake me. " Hence a man may merit to be restored after a fall.
Objection 2: Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another.
Now a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after
a fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
Objection 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life
everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above [2251](A[2];
Q[109], A[5]). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is
restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself
restoration.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man turn
himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his justices
which he hath done shall not be remembered. " Therefore his previous
merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
I answer that, No one can merit for himself restoration after a future
fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for himself
condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the motion of
Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin;
hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby he is
restored, do not fall under merit---the motion of the preceding grace
not extending to them. Again, congruous merit, whereby one merits the
first grace for another, is prevented from having its effect on account
of the impediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much more,
therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the obstacle which
is in him who merits, and in him for whom it is merited; for both these
are in the same person. And therefore a man can nowise merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
Reply to Objection 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after
a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration
is besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that
it depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.
Reply to Objection 2: Anyone may congruously merit for another his
first grace, because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of
him who merits), such as is found when anyone recedes from justice
after the merit of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that no one "absolutely" merits
life everlasting except by the act of final grace, but only
"conditionally," i. e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say
this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less
meritorious than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of
illness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal
life absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an impediment to
the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its effect; just as
natural causes fail of their effects on account of a supervening
impediment.
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Whether a man may merit the increase of grace or charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot merit an increase of grace
or charity. For when anyone receives the reward he merited no other
reward is due to him; thus it was said of some (Mat. 6:2): "They have
received their reward. " Hence, if anyone were to merit the increase of
charity or grace, it would follow that, when his grace has been
increased, he could not expect any further reward, which is unfitting.
Objection 2: Further, nothing acts beyond its species. But the
principle of merit is grace or charity, as was shown above
([2252]AA[2], 4). Therefore no one can merit greater grace or charity
than he has.
Objection 3: Further, what falls under merit a man merits by every act
flowing from grace or charity, as by every such act a man merits life
everlasting. If, therefore, the increase of grace or charity falls
under merit, it would seem that by every act quickened by charity a man
would merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he
infallibly receives from God, unless hindered by subsequent sin; for it
is written (2 Tim. 1:12): "I know Whom I have believed, and I am
certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him. "
Hence it would follow that grace or charity is increased by every
meritorious act; and this would seem impossible since at times
meritorious acts are not very fervent, and would not suffice for the
increase of charity. Therefore the increase of charity does not come
under merit.
On the contrary, Augustine says (super Ep. Joan. ; cf. Ep. clxxxvi) that
"charity merits increase, and being increased merits to be perfected. "
Hence the increase of grace or charity falls under merit.
I answer that, As stated above ([2253]AA[6],7), whatever the motion of
grace reaches to, falls under condign merit. Now the motion of a mover
extends not merely to the last term of the movement, but to the whole
progress of the movement. But the term of the movement of grace is
eternal life; and progress in this movement is by the increase of
charity or grace according to Prov. 4:18: "But the path of the just as
a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth even to perfect day,"
which is the day of glory. And thus the increase of grace falls under
condign merit.
Reply to Objection 1: Reward is the term of merit. But there is a
double term of movement, viz. the last, and the intermediate, which is
both beginning and term; and this term is the reward of increase. Now
the reward of human favor is as the last end to those who place their
end in it; hence such as these receive no other reward.
Reply to Objection 2: The increase of grace is not above the virtuality
of the pre-existing grace, although it is above its quantity, even as a
tree is not above the virtuality of the seed, although above its
quantity.
Reply to Objection 3: By every meritorious act a man merits the
increase of grace, equally with the consummation of grace which is
eternal life. But just as eternal life is not given at once, but in its
own time, so neither is grace increased at once, but in its own time,
viz. when a man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.
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Whether a man may merit perseverance?
Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit perseverance. For what
a man obtains by asking, can come under the merit of anyone that is in
grace. Now men obtain perseverance by asking it of God; otherwise it
would be useless to ask it of God in the petitions of the Lord's
Prayer, as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. ii). Therefore perseverance
may come under the merit of whoever has grace.
Objection 2: Further, it is more not to be able to sin than not to sin.
But not to be able to sin comes under merit, for we merit eternal life,
of which impeccability is an essential part. Much more, therefore, may
we merit not to sin, i. e. to persevere.
Objection 3: Further, increase of grace is greater than perseverance in
the grace we already possess. But a man may merit an increase of grace,
as was stated above [2254](A[8]). Much more, therefore, may he merit
perseverance in the grace he has already.
On the contrary, What we merit, we obtain from God, unless it is
hindered by sin.
Now many have meritorious works, who do not obtain
perseverance; nor can it be urged that this takes place because of the
impediment of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and
thus if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not permit him to
fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come under merit.
I answer that, Since man's free-will is naturally flexible towards good
and evil, there are two ways of obtaining from God perseverance in
good: first, inasmuch as free-will is determined to good by consummate
grace, which will be in glory; secondly, on the part of the Divine
motion, which inclines man to good unto the end. Now as explained above
([2255]AA[6],7,8), that which is related as a term to the free-will's
movement directed to God the mover, falls under human merit; and not
what is related to the aforesaid movement as principle. Hence it is
clear that the perseverance of glory which is the term of the aforesaid
movement falls under merit; but perseverance of the wayfarer does not
fall under merit, since it depends solely on the Divine motion, which
is the principle of all merit. Now God freely bestows the good of
perseverance, on whomsoever He bestows it.
Reply to Objection 1: We impetrate in prayer things that we do not
merit, since God hears sinners who beseech the pardon of their sins,
which they do not merit, as appears from Augustine [*Tract. xliv in
Joan. ] on Jn. 11:31, "Now we know that God doth not hear sinners,"
otherwise it would have been useless for the publican to say: "O God,
be merciful to me a sinner," Lk. 18:13. So too may we impetrate of God
in prayer the grace of perseverance either for ourselves or for others,
although it does not fall under merit.
Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance which is in heaven is compared
as term to the free-will's movement; not so, the perseverance of the
wayfarer, for the reason given in the body of the article.
In the same way may we answer the third objection which concerns the
increase of grace, as was explained above.
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Whether temporal goods fall under merit?
Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods fall under merit. For
what is promised to some as a reward of justice, falls under merit.
Now, temporal goods were promised in the Old Law as the reward of
justice, as appears from Dt. 28. Hence it seems that temporal goods
fall under merit.
Objection 2: Further, that would seem to fall under merit, which God
bestows on anyone for a service done. But God sometimes bestows
temporal goods on men for services done for Him. For it is written (Ex.
1:21): "And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses"; on
which a gloss of Gregory (Moral. xviii, 4) says that "life everlasting
might have been awarded them as the fruit of their goodwill, but on
account of their sin of falsehood they received an earthly reward. " And
it is written (Ezech. 29:18): "The King of Babylon hath made his army
to undergo hard service against Tyre . . . and there hath been no
reward given him," and further on: "And it shall be wages for his army
. . . I have given him the land of Egypt because he hath labored for
me. " Therefore temporal goods fall under merit.
Objection 3: Further, as good is to merit so is evil to demerit. But on
account of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal
punishments, as appears from the Sodomites, Gn. 19. Hence temporal
goods fall under merit.
Objection 4: On the contrary, What falls under merit does not come upon
all alike. But temporal goods regard the good and the wicked alike;
according to Eccles. 9:2: "All things equally happen to the just and
the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the
unclean, to him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth
sacrifices. " Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit.
I answer that, What falls under merit is the reward or wage, which is a
kind of good. Now man's good is twofold: the first, simply; the second,
relatively. Now man's good simply is his last end (according to Ps.
72:27: "But it is good for men to adhere to my God") and consequently
what is ordained and leads to this end; and these fall simply under
merit. But the relative, not the simple, good of man is what is good to
him now, or what is a good to him relatively; and this does not fall
under merit simply, but relatively.
Hence we must say that if temporal goods are considered as they are
useful for virtuous works, whereby we are led to heaven, they fall
directly and simply under merit, even as increase of grace, and
everything whereby a man is helped to attain beatitude after the first
grace. For God gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal goods
to enable them to attain to everlasting life; and thus these temporal
goods are simply good. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:10): "For there is
no want to them that fear Him," and again, Ps. 36:25: "I have not seen
the just forsaken," etc.
But if these temporal goods are considered in themselves, they are not
man's good simply, but relatively, and thus they do not fall under
merit simply, but relatively, inasmuch as men are moved by God to do
temporal works, in which with God's help they reach their purpose. And
thus as life everlasting is simply the reward of the works of justice
in relation to the Divine motion, as stated above ([2256]AA[3],6), so
have temporal goods, considered in themselves, the nature of reward,
with respect to the Divine motion, whereby men's wills are moved to
undertake these works, even though, sometimes, men have not a right
intention in them.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv, 2), "in
these temporal promises were figures of spiritual things to come. For
the carnal people were adhering to the promises of the present life;
and not merely their speech but even their life was prophetic. "
Reply to Objection 2: These rewards are said to have been divinely
brought about in relation to the Divine motion, and not in relation to
the malice of their wills, especially as regards the King of Babylon,
since he did not besiege Tyre as if wishing to serve God, but rather in
order to usurp dominion. So, too, although the midwives had a good will
with regard to saving the children, yet their will was not right,
inasmuch as they framed falsehoods.
Reply to Objection 3: Temporal evils are imposed as a punishment on the
wicked, inasmuch as they are not thereby helped to reach life
everlasting. But to the just who are aided by these evils they are not
punishments but medicines as stated above ([2257]Q[87], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 4: All things happen equally to the good and the
wicked, as regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as
regards the end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude
by them.
And now enough has been said regarding morals in general.
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SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (SS) (QQ[1]-189)
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TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ[1]-46)
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OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with
Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.
The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the
corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite
vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.
About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3)
the habit of faith.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i. e.
whether it is a thing or a proposition?
(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?
(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?
(5) Whether it can be anything known?
(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain
number of articles?
(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?
(8) Of the number of articles;
(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;
(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
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Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First
Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed
to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead,
i. e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also
things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the
Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith
is not only the First Truth.
Objection 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since
they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things
contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is
considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things
contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning
man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the
First Truth, but also created truth.
Objection 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above
([2258]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now by charity we love not only God, who is
the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of
Faith is not only the First Truth.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about
the simple and everlasting truth. " Now this is the First Truth.
Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.
I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things:
first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so
to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal
aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions
are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is
the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.
Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object,
it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are
speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by
God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If,
however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they
include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless,
do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation
to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine
operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God.
Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a
way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in
relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for
it considers nothing save in relation to health.
Reply to Objection 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the
sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith,
in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we
assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things
contained in Holy Writ.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of
God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show
further on ([2259]Q[25] , A[1]).
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Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something
complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First
Truth, as stated above [2260](A[1]). Now the First Truth is something
simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.
Objection 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the
symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for
it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God .
. . almighty. " Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a
thing.
Objection 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor.
13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to
face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known. "
But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is
the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.
On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the
mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and
opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about
propositions; so that its object is something complex.
I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode
of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know
the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the [2261]FP, Q[85],
A[5]. Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the
intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other
hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that
are complex in themselves.
Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First,
as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of
faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have
faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the
object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.
Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of
truth.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the object of faith on
the part of the thing believed.
Reply to Objection 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith
is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is
evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the
believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in
science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge
about things through their means, so is it in faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the
First Truth seen in itself, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: "We know that when
He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as
He is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by
way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not
apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison
fails.
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Whether anything false can come under faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith.
For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can
come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not
obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being
good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be
the object of faith.
Objection 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born,
according to Jn. 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see
My day: he saw it, and was glad. " But after the time of Abraham, God
might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He
did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false.
Therefore the object of faith can be something false.
Objection 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of
Christ, and many continued so to believe, until they heard the
preaching of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He
began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore
something false can come under faith.
Objection 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe
that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the
altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated,
and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but only bread.
Therefore something false can come under faith.
On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to
the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the
intellect, as we shall show further on ([2262]Q[4], AA[2],5). Therefore
nothing false can come under it.
I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by
means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through
the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated [2263](A[1]) that the
formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that
nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the
First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can
non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows
therefore that nothing false can come under faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but
not of the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect
the intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the
nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other
hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not
entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance
with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what one
is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and
charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails.
Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man
hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be
an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he
perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.
In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be;
so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual
whom we love for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in
itself was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it
stands in God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of
infallibility, as explained in the [2264]FP, Q[14], AA[13],15: and it
is thus that it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under
faith, it cannot be false.
Reply to Objection 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to
believe in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the
time, wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a
human conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false
opinion through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a
false opinion to be the outcome of faith.
Reply to Objection 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such
and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of
Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly
consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow
that anything false comes under faith.
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Whether the object of faith can be something seen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something seen.
For Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:29): "Because thou hast seen Me,
Thomas, thou hast believed. " Therefore vision and faith regard the same
object.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of
faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner. " Therefore what is believed is seen.
Objection 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen
under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.
Objection 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine
states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard,
according to Rom. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing. " Therefore
faith is of things seen.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
evidence of things that appear not. "
I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is
believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either
by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the
habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in
the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science).
Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being
sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an
act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to
the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite
side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear
of the other side, there will be faith.
accordance with the judgment of justice, according to 2 Tim. 4:8: "As
to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the
Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day. " Therefore man
merits everlasting life condignly.
I answer that, Man's meritorious work may be considered in two ways:
first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds from the
grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the substance
of the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, there can
be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But there is
congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for it would seem
congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should reward him
according to the excellence of his power.
If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds
from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is
meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its
merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life
everlasting according to Jn. 4:14: "Shall become in him a fount of
water springing up into life everlasting. " And the worth of the work
depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker
of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the
inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: "If
sons, heirs also. "
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these
sufferings.
Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the first
cause of our reaching everlasting life, viz. God's mercy. But our merit
is a subsequent cause.
Reply to Objection 3: The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at
present, although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as
the seed of a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by
grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause of
life everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the "pledge" of our
inheritance.
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Whether grace is the principle of merit through charity rather than the
other virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not the principle of merit
through charity rather than the other virtues. For wages are due to
work, according to Mat. 20:8: "Call the laborers and pay them their
hire. " Now every virtue is a principle of some operation, since virtue
is an operative habit, as stated above ([2244]Q[55], A[2]). Hence every
virtue is equally a principle of merit.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:8): "Every man shall
receive his own reward according to his labor. " Now charity lessens
rather than increases the labor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis
Dom. , Serm. lxx), "love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and
next to nothing. " Hence charity is no greater principle of merit than
any other virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the greatest principle of merit would seem to be
the one whose acts are most meritorious. But the acts of faith and
patience or fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious, as appears
in the martyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and bravely even
till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle of merit than
charity.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall
be loved of My Father; and I will love him and will manifest Myself to
him. " Now everlasting life consists in the manifest knowledge of God,
according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee,
the only true" and living "God. " Hence the merit of eternal life rests
chiefly with charity.
I answer that, As we may gather from what has been stated above
[2245](A[1]), human acts have the nature of merit from two causes:
first and chiefly from the Divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are said
to merit that good to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the
part of free-will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the
power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both these ways
does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we must bear in mind that
everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of God. Now the human mind's
movement to the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act of
charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this
end, since all the other virtues are commanded by charity. Hence the
merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and secondly, to
the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity. So,
likewise, is it manifest that what we do out of love we do most
willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness,
merit is chiefly attributed to charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for
object, moves the other virtues to act. For the habit to which the end
pertains always commands the habits to which the means pertain, as was
said above ([2246]Q[9], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways:
first, from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the
work pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not
lessen the toil---rather, it makes us undertake the greatest toils,
"for it does great things, if it exists," as Gregory says (Hom. in
Evang. xxx). Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is not
done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and this
toil lessens merit and is removed by charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The act of faith is not meritorious unless "faith
. . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). So, too, the acts of patience and
fortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity,
according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I should deliver my body to be burned,
and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. "
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Whether a man may merit for himself the first grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first
grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), "faith merits
justification. " Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore a
man may merit the first grace.
Objection 2: Further, God gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one
is said to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly.
Therefore we may merit the first grace condignly.
Objection 3: Further, with men we may merit a gift already received.
Thus if a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good
use of it in his master's service. Now God is much more bountiful than
man. Much more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the
first grace already received from God.
On the contrary, The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works,
according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not
reckoned according to grace but according to debt. " Now a man merits
what is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his works.
Hence a man may not merit the first grace.
I answer that, The gift of grace may be considered in two ways: first
in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all
merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Rom. 11:6), "if
by grace, it is not now by works. " Secondly, it may be considered as
regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come
under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the
proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a man in the state
of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz. sin. But when anyone
has grace, the grace already possessed cannot come under merit, since
reward is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all our
good works, as stated above ([2247]Q[109]). But of anyone merits a
further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding grace, it would not
be the first grace. Hence it is manifest that no one can merit for
himself the first grace.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was
deceived on this point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to
be from us, and its consummation to be granted us by God; and this he
here retracts. And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of
faith as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a
truth of faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from God, the
first act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of
the first grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though
man, by believing, were to merit justification, but that, he believes,
whilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is
required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above
([2248]Q[113], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: God gives grace to none but to the worthy, not
that they were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them
worthy, Who alone "can make him clean that is conceived of unclean
seed" (Job 14:4).
Reply to Objection 3: Man's every good work proceeds from the first
grace as from its principle; but not from any gift of man.
Consequently, there is no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts
of men.
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Whether a man can merit the first grace for another?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit the first grace for
another. Because on Mat. 9:2: "Jesus seeing their faith," etc. a gloss
says: "How much is our personal faith worth with God, Who set such a
price on another's faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and
outwardly! " Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a man
can merit the first grace for another.
Objection 2: Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but
efficacious, according to James 5:16: "The continued prayer of a just
man availeth much. " Now he had previously said: "Pray one for another,
that you may be saved. " Hence, since man's salvation can only be
brought about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for another his
first grace.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 16:9): "Make unto you friends
of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail they may receive
you into everlasting dwellings. " Now it is through grace alone that
anyone is received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does
anyone merit everlasting life as stated above [2249](A[2]; Q[109],
A[5]). Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel shall
stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people" ---yet they had
great merit with God. Hence it seems that no one can merit the first
grace for another.
I answer that, As shown above ([2250]AA[1],3,4), our works are
meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; and
thus we merit condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from
free-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have
congruous merit, since it is congruous that when a man makes good use
of his power God should by His super-excellent power work still higher
things. And therefore it is clear that no one can merit condignly for
another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each one of us is
moved by God to reach life everlasting through the gift of grace; hence
condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ's soul is
moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach the glory of life
everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inasmuch as He is the Head
of the Church, and the Author of human salvation, according to Heb.
2:10: "Who hath brought many children into glory [to perfect] the
Author of their salvation. "
But one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a
man in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous and in harmony
with friendship that God should fulfil man's desire for the salvation
of another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part
of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense
that the passage from Jeremias speaks.
Reply to Objection 1: A man's faith avails for another's salvation by
congruous and not by condign merit.
Reply to Objection 2: The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas
condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things
from the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice,
according to Dan. 9:18: "For it is not for our justifications that we
present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy
tender mercies. "
Reply to Objection 3: The poor who receive alms are said to receive
others into everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their
forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works,
or materially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy,
exercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting
dwellings.
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Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall?
Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself
restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he may
justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than to be
restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super Ps.
lxx. ], according to Ps. 70:9: "When my strength shall fail, do not Thou
forsake me. " Hence a man may merit to be restored after a fall.
Objection 2: Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another.
Now a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after
a fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
Objection 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life
everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above [2251](A[2];
Q[109], A[5]). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is
restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself
restoration.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man turn
himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his justices
which he hath done shall not be remembered. " Therefore his previous
merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
I answer that, No one can merit for himself restoration after a future
fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for himself
condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the motion of
Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin;
hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby he is
restored, do not fall under merit---the motion of the preceding grace
not extending to them. Again, congruous merit, whereby one merits the
first grace for another, is prevented from having its effect on account
of the impediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much more,
therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the obstacle which
is in him who merits, and in him for whom it is merited; for both these
are in the same person. And therefore a man can nowise merit for
himself restoration after a fall.
Reply to Objection 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after
a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration
is besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that
it depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.
Reply to Objection 2: Anyone may congruously merit for another his
first grace, because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of
him who merits), such as is found when anyone recedes from justice
after the merit of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that no one "absolutely" merits
life everlasting except by the act of final grace, but only
"conditionally," i. e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say
this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less
meritorious than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of
illness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal
life absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an impediment to
the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its effect; just as
natural causes fail of their effects on account of a supervening
impediment.
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Whether a man may merit the increase of grace or charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot merit an increase of grace
or charity. For when anyone receives the reward he merited no other
reward is due to him; thus it was said of some (Mat. 6:2): "They have
received their reward. " Hence, if anyone were to merit the increase of
charity or grace, it would follow that, when his grace has been
increased, he could not expect any further reward, which is unfitting.
Objection 2: Further, nothing acts beyond its species. But the
principle of merit is grace or charity, as was shown above
([2252]AA[2], 4). Therefore no one can merit greater grace or charity
than he has.
Objection 3: Further, what falls under merit a man merits by every act
flowing from grace or charity, as by every such act a man merits life
everlasting. If, therefore, the increase of grace or charity falls
under merit, it would seem that by every act quickened by charity a man
would merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he
infallibly receives from God, unless hindered by subsequent sin; for it
is written (2 Tim. 1:12): "I know Whom I have believed, and I am
certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him. "
Hence it would follow that grace or charity is increased by every
meritorious act; and this would seem impossible since at times
meritorious acts are not very fervent, and would not suffice for the
increase of charity. Therefore the increase of charity does not come
under merit.
On the contrary, Augustine says (super Ep. Joan. ; cf. Ep. clxxxvi) that
"charity merits increase, and being increased merits to be perfected. "
Hence the increase of grace or charity falls under merit.
I answer that, As stated above ([2253]AA[6],7), whatever the motion of
grace reaches to, falls under condign merit. Now the motion of a mover
extends not merely to the last term of the movement, but to the whole
progress of the movement. But the term of the movement of grace is
eternal life; and progress in this movement is by the increase of
charity or grace according to Prov. 4:18: "But the path of the just as
a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth even to perfect day,"
which is the day of glory. And thus the increase of grace falls under
condign merit.
Reply to Objection 1: Reward is the term of merit. But there is a
double term of movement, viz. the last, and the intermediate, which is
both beginning and term; and this term is the reward of increase. Now
the reward of human favor is as the last end to those who place their
end in it; hence such as these receive no other reward.
Reply to Objection 2: The increase of grace is not above the virtuality
of the pre-existing grace, although it is above its quantity, even as a
tree is not above the virtuality of the seed, although above its
quantity.
Reply to Objection 3: By every meritorious act a man merits the
increase of grace, equally with the consummation of grace which is
eternal life. But just as eternal life is not given at once, but in its
own time, so neither is grace increased at once, but in its own time,
viz. when a man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.
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Whether a man may merit perseverance?
Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit perseverance. For what
a man obtains by asking, can come under the merit of anyone that is in
grace. Now men obtain perseverance by asking it of God; otherwise it
would be useless to ask it of God in the petitions of the Lord's
Prayer, as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. ii). Therefore perseverance
may come under the merit of whoever has grace.
Objection 2: Further, it is more not to be able to sin than not to sin.
But not to be able to sin comes under merit, for we merit eternal life,
of which impeccability is an essential part. Much more, therefore, may
we merit not to sin, i. e. to persevere.
Objection 3: Further, increase of grace is greater than perseverance in
the grace we already possess. But a man may merit an increase of grace,
as was stated above [2254](A[8]). Much more, therefore, may he merit
perseverance in the grace he has already.
On the contrary, What we merit, we obtain from God, unless it is
hindered by sin.
Now many have meritorious works, who do not obtain
perseverance; nor can it be urged that this takes place because of the
impediment of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and
thus if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not permit him to
fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come under merit.
I answer that, Since man's free-will is naturally flexible towards good
and evil, there are two ways of obtaining from God perseverance in
good: first, inasmuch as free-will is determined to good by consummate
grace, which will be in glory; secondly, on the part of the Divine
motion, which inclines man to good unto the end. Now as explained above
([2255]AA[6],7,8), that which is related as a term to the free-will's
movement directed to God the mover, falls under human merit; and not
what is related to the aforesaid movement as principle. Hence it is
clear that the perseverance of glory which is the term of the aforesaid
movement falls under merit; but perseverance of the wayfarer does not
fall under merit, since it depends solely on the Divine motion, which
is the principle of all merit. Now God freely bestows the good of
perseverance, on whomsoever He bestows it.
Reply to Objection 1: We impetrate in prayer things that we do not
merit, since God hears sinners who beseech the pardon of their sins,
which they do not merit, as appears from Augustine [*Tract. xliv in
Joan. ] on Jn. 11:31, "Now we know that God doth not hear sinners,"
otherwise it would have been useless for the publican to say: "O God,
be merciful to me a sinner," Lk. 18:13. So too may we impetrate of God
in prayer the grace of perseverance either for ourselves or for others,
although it does not fall under merit.
Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance which is in heaven is compared
as term to the free-will's movement; not so, the perseverance of the
wayfarer, for the reason given in the body of the article.
In the same way may we answer the third objection which concerns the
increase of grace, as was explained above.
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Whether temporal goods fall under merit?
Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods fall under merit. For
what is promised to some as a reward of justice, falls under merit.
Now, temporal goods were promised in the Old Law as the reward of
justice, as appears from Dt. 28. Hence it seems that temporal goods
fall under merit.
Objection 2: Further, that would seem to fall under merit, which God
bestows on anyone for a service done. But God sometimes bestows
temporal goods on men for services done for Him. For it is written (Ex.
1:21): "And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses"; on
which a gloss of Gregory (Moral. xviii, 4) says that "life everlasting
might have been awarded them as the fruit of their goodwill, but on
account of their sin of falsehood they received an earthly reward. " And
it is written (Ezech. 29:18): "The King of Babylon hath made his army
to undergo hard service against Tyre . . . and there hath been no
reward given him," and further on: "And it shall be wages for his army
. . . I have given him the land of Egypt because he hath labored for
me. " Therefore temporal goods fall under merit.
Objection 3: Further, as good is to merit so is evil to demerit. But on
account of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal
punishments, as appears from the Sodomites, Gn. 19. Hence temporal
goods fall under merit.
Objection 4: On the contrary, What falls under merit does not come upon
all alike. But temporal goods regard the good and the wicked alike;
according to Eccles. 9:2: "All things equally happen to the just and
the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the
unclean, to him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth
sacrifices. " Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit.
I answer that, What falls under merit is the reward or wage, which is a
kind of good. Now man's good is twofold: the first, simply; the second,
relatively. Now man's good simply is his last end (according to Ps.
72:27: "But it is good for men to adhere to my God") and consequently
what is ordained and leads to this end; and these fall simply under
merit. But the relative, not the simple, good of man is what is good to
him now, or what is a good to him relatively; and this does not fall
under merit simply, but relatively.
Hence we must say that if temporal goods are considered as they are
useful for virtuous works, whereby we are led to heaven, they fall
directly and simply under merit, even as increase of grace, and
everything whereby a man is helped to attain beatitude after the first
grace. For God gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal goods
to enable them to attain to everlasting life; and thus these temporal
goods are simply good. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:10): "For there is
no want to them that fear Him," and again, Ps. 36:25: "I have not seen
the just forsaken," etc.
But if these temporal goods are considered in themselves, they are not
man's good simply, but relatively, and thus they do not fall under
merit simply, but relatively, inasmuch as men are moved by God to do
temporal works, in which with God's help they reach their purpose. And
thus as life everlasting is simply the reward of the works of justice
in relation to the Divine motion, as stated above ([2256]AA[3],6), so
have temporal goods, considered in themselves, the nature of reward,
with respect to the Divine motion, whereby men's wills are moved to
undertake these works, even though, sometimes, men have not a right
intention in them.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv, 2), "in
these temporal promises were figures of spiritual things to come. For
the carnal people were adhering to the promises of the present life;
and not merely their speech but even their life was prophetic. "
Reply to Objection 2: These rewards are said to have been divinely
brought about in relation to the Divine motion, and not in relation to
the malice of their wills, especially as regards the King of Babylon,
since he did not besiege Tyre as if wishing to serve God, but rather in
order to usurp dominion. So, too, although the midwives had a good will
with regard to saving the children, yet their will was not right,
inasmuch as they framed falsehoods.
Reply to Objection 3: Temporal evils are imposed as a punishment on the
wicked, inasmuch as they are not thereby helped to reach life
everlasting. But to the just who are aided by these evils they are not
punishments but medicines as stated above ([2257]Q[87], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 4: All things happen equally to the good and the
wicked, as regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as
regards the end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude
by them.
And now enough has been said regarding morals in general.
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SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (SS) (QQ[1]-189)
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ[1]-46)
__________________________________________________________________
OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with
Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.
The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the
corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite
vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.
About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3)
the habit of faith.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i. e.
whether it is a thing or a proposition?
(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?
(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?
(5) Whether it can be anything known?
(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain
number of articles?
(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?
(8) Of the number of articles;
(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;
(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
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Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First
Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed
to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead,
i. e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also
things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the
Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith
is not only the First Truth.
Objection 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since
they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things
contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is
considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things
contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning
man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the
First Truth, but also created truth.
Objection 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above
([2258]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now by charity we love not only God, who is
the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of
Faith is not only the First Truth.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about
the simple and everlasting truth. " Now this is the First Truth.
Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.
I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things:
first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so
to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal
aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions
are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is
the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.
Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object,
it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are
speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by
God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If,
however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they
include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless,
do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation
to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine
operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God.
Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a
way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in
relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for
it considers nothing save in relation to health.
Reply to Objection 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the
sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith,
in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we
assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things
contained in Holy Writ.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of
God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show
further on ([2259]Q[25] , A[1]).
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Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something
complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First
Truth, as stated above [2260](A[1]). Now the First Truth is something
simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.
Objection 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the
symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for
it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God .
. . almighty. " Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a
thing.
Objection 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor.
13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to
face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known. "
But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is
the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.
On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the
mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and
opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about
propositions; so that its object is something complex.
I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode
of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know
the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the [2261]FP, Q[85],
A[5]. Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the
intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other
hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that
are complex in themselves.
Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First,
as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of
faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have
faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the
object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.
Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of
truth.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the object of faith on
the part of the thing believed.
Reply to Objection 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith
is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is
evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the
believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in
science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge
about things through their means, so is it in faith.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the
First Truth seen in itself, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: "We know that when
He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as
He is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by
way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not
apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison
fails.
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Whether anything false can come under faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith.
For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can
come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not
obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being
good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be
the object of faith.
Objection 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born,
according to Jn. 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see
My day: he saw it, and was glad. " But after the time of Abraham, God
might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He
did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false.
Therefore the object of faith can be something false.
Objection 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of
Christ, and many continued so to believe, until they heard the
preaching of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He
began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore
something false can come under faith.
Objection 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe
that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the
altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated,
and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but only bread.
Therefore something false can come under faith.
On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to
the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the
intellect, as we shall show further on ([2262]Q[4], AA[2],5). Therefore
nothing false can come under it.
I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by
means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through
the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated [2263](A[1]) that the
formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that
nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the
First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can
non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows
therefore that nothing false can come under faith.
Reply to Objection 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but
not of the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect
the intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the
nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other
hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not
entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance
with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what one
is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and
charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails.
Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man
hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be
an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he
perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.
In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be;
so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual
whom we love for God's sake.
Reply to Objection 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in
itself was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it
stands in God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of
infallibility, as explained in the [2264]FP, Q[14], AA[13],15: and it
is thus that it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under
faith, it cannot be false.
Reply to Objection 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to
believe in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the
time, wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a
human conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false
opinion through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a
false opinion to be the outcome of faith.
Reply to Objection 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such
and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of
Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly
consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow
that anything false comes under faith.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the object of faith can be something seen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something seen.
For Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:29): "Because thou hast seen Me,
Thomas, thou hast believed. " Therefore vision and faith regard the same
object.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of
faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner. " Therefore what is believed is seen.
Objection 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen
under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.
Objection 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine
states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard,
according to Rom. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing. " Therefore
faith is of things seen.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
evidence of things that appear not. "
I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is
believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either
by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the
habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in
the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science).
Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being
sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an
act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to
the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite
side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear
of the other side, there will be faith.
