No More Learning

Objection 3: Further, as is written (Ps. 24:10): "All the ways of the
Lord are mercy and truth. " But it does not seem necessary that He
should suffer on the part of the Divine mercy, which, as it bestows
gifts freely, so it appears to condone debts without satisfaction: nor,
again, on the part of Divine justice, according to which man had
deserved everlasting condemnation. Therefore it does not seem necessary
that Christ should have suffered for man's deliverance.

Objection 4: Further, the angelic nature is more excellent than the
human, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But Christ did not
suffer to repair the angelic nature which had sinned. Therefore,
apparently, neither was it necessary for Him to suffer for the
salvation of the human race.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:14): "As Moses lifted up the
serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up, that
whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life
everlasting. "

I answer that, As the Philosopher teaches (Metaph. v), there are
several acceptations of the word "necessary. " In one way it means
anything which of its nature cannot be otherwise; and in this way it is
evident that it was not necessary either on the part of God or on the
part of man for Christ to suffer. In another sense a thing may be
necessary from some cause quite apart from itself; and should this be
either an efficient or a moving cause then it brings about the
necessity of compulsion; as, for instance, when a man cannot get away
owing to the violence of someone else holding him. But if the external
factor which induces necessity be an end, then it will be said to be
necessary from presupposing such end---namely, when some particular end
cannot exist at all, or not conveniently, except such end be
presupposed. It was not necessary, then, for Christ to suffer from
necessity of compulsion, either on God's part, who ruled that Christ
should suffer, or on Christ's own part, who suffered voluntarily. Yet
it was necessary from necessity of the end proposed; and this can be
accepted in three ways. First of all, on our part, who have been
delivered by His Passion, according to John (3:14): "The Son of man
must be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but
may have life everlasting. " Secondly, on Christ's part, who merited the
glory of being exalted, through the lowliness of His Passion: and to
this must be referred Lk. 24:26: "Ought not Christ to have suffered
these things, and so to enter into His glory? " Thirdly, on God's part,
whose determination regarding the Passion of Christ, foretold in the
Scriptures and prefigured in the observances of the Old Testament, had
to be fulfilled. And this is what St. Luke says (22:22): "The Son of
man indeed goeth, according to that which is determined"; and (Lk.
24:44, 46): "These are the words which I spoke to you while I was yet
with you, that all things must needs be fulfilled which are written in
the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms concerning Me:
for it is thus written, and thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and to
rise again from the dead. "

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on the necessity of
compulsion on God's part.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument rests on the necessity of
compulsion on the part of the man Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: That man should be delivered by Christ's Passion
was in keeping with both His mercy and His justice. With His justice,
because by His Passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the
human race; and so man was set free by Christ's justice: and with His
mercy, for since man of himself could not satisfy for the sin of all
human nature, as was said above ([4227]Q[1], A[2]), God gave him His
Son to satisfy for him, according to Rom. 3:24,25: "Being justified
freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus,
whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His
blood. " And this came of more copious mercy than if He had forgiven
sins without satisfaction. Hence it is said (Eph. 2:4): "God, who is
rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, even
when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ. "

Reply to Objection 4: The sin of the angels was irreparable; not so the
sin of the first man ([4228]FP, Q[64], A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there was any other possible way of human deliverance besides the
Passion of Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no other possible way of
human deliverance besides Christ's Passion. For our Lord says (Jn.
12:24): "Amen, amen I say to you, unless the grain of wheat falling
into the ground dieth, itself remaineth alone; but if it die, it
bringeth forth much fruit. " Upon this St. Augustine (Tract. li)
observes that "Christ called Himself the seed. " Consequently, unless He
suffered death, He would not otherwise have produced the fruit of our
redemption.

Objection 2: Further, our Lord addresses the Father (Mat. 26:42): "My
Father, if this chalice may not pass away but I must drink it, Thy will
be done. " But He spoke there of the chalice of the Passion. Therefore
Christ's Passion could not pass away; hence Hilary says (Comm. 31 in
Matth. ): "Therefore the chalice cannot pass except He drink of it,
because we cannot be restored except through His Passion. "

Objection 3: Further, God's justice required that Christ should satisfy
by the Passion in order that man might be delivered from sin. But
Christ cannot let His justice pass; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:13):
"If we believe not, He continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself. "
But He would deny Himself were He to deny His justice, since He is
justice itself. It seems impossible, then, for man to be delivered
otherwise than by Christ's Passion.

Objection 4: Further, there can be no falsehood underlying faith. But
the Fathers of old believed that Christ would suffer. Consequently, it
seems that it had to be that Christ should suffer.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "We assert that the
way whereby God deigned to deliver us by the man Jesus Christ, who is
mediator between God and man, is both good and befitting the Divine
dignity; but let us also show that other possible means were not
lacking on God's part, to whose power all things are equally
subordinate. "

I answer that, A thing may be said to be possible or impossible in two
ways: first of all, simply and absolutely; or secondly, from
supposition. Therefore, speaking simply and absolutely, it was possible
for God to deliver mankind otherwise than by the Passion of Christ,
because "no word shall be impossible with God" (Lk. 1:37). Yet it was
impossible if some supposition be made. For since it is impossible for
God's foreknowledge to be deceived and His will or ordinance to be
frustrated, then, supposing God's foreknowledge and ordinance regarding
Christ's Passion, it was not possible at the same time for Christ not
to suffer, and for mankind to be delivered otherwise than by Christ's
Passion. And the same holds good of all things foreknown and
preordained by God, as was laid down in the [4229]FP, Q[14], A[13].

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord is speaking there presupposing God's
foreknowledge and predetermination, according to which it was resolved
that the fruit of man's salvation should not follow unless Christ
suffered.

Reply to Objection 2: In the same way we must understand what is here
objected to in the second instance: "If this chalice may not pass away
but I must drink of it"---that is to say, because Thou hast so ordained
it---hence He adds: "Thy will be done. "

Reply to Objection 3: Even this justice depends on the Divine will,
requiring satisfaction for sin from the human race. But if He had
willed to free man from sin without any satisfaction, He would not have
acted against justice. For a judge, while preserving justice, cannot
pardon fault without penalty, if he must visit fault committed against
another---for instance, against another man, or against the State, or
any Prince in higher authority. But God has no one higher than Himself,
for He is the sovereign and common good of the whole universe.
Consequently, if He forgive sin, which has the formality of fault in
that it is committed against Himself, He wrongs no one: just as anyone
else, overlooking a personal trespass, without satisfaction, acts
mercifully and not unjustly. And so David exclaimed when he sought
mercy: "To Thee only have I sinned" (Ps. 50:6), as if to say: "Thou
canst pardon me without injustice. "

Reply to Objection 4: Human faith, and even the Divine Scriptures upon
which faith is based, are both based on the Divine foreknowledge and
ordinance. And the same reason holds good of that necessity which comes
of supposition, and of the necessity which arises of the Divine
foreknowledge and will.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there was any more suitable way of delivering the human race than by
Christ's Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was some other more suitable way
of delivering the human race besides Christ's Passion. For nature in
its operation imitates the Divine work, since it is moved and regulated
by God. But nature never employs two agents where one will suffice.
Therefore, since God could have liberated mankind solely by His Divine
will, it does not seem fitting that Christ's Passion should have been
added for the deliverance of the human race.

Objection 2: Further, natural actions are more suitably performed than
deeds of violence, because violence is "a severance or lapse from what
is according to nature," as is said in De Coelo ii. But Christ's
Passion brought about His death by violence. Therefore it would have
been more appropriate had Christ died a natural death rather than
suffer for man's deliverance.

Objection 3: Further, it seems most fitting that whatsoever keeps
something unjustly and by violence, should be deprived of it by some
superior power; hence Isaias says (52:3): "You were sold gratis, and
you shall be redeemed without money. " But the devil possessed no right
over man, whom he had deceived by guile, and whom he held subject in
servitude by a sort of violence. Therefore it seems most suitable that
Christ should have despoiled the devil solely by His power and without
the Passion.

On the contrary, St. Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "There was no
other more suitable way of healing our misery" than by the Passion of
Christ.

I answer that, Among means to an end that one is the more suitable
whereby the various concurring means employed are themselves helpful to
such end. But in this that man was delivered by Christ's Passion, many
other things besides deliverance from sin concurred for man's
salvation. In the first place, man knows thereby how much God loves
him, and is thereby stirred to love Him in return, and herein lies the
perfection of human salvation; hence the Apostle says (Rom. 5:8): "God
commendeth His charity towards us; for when as yet we were sinners . .
. Christ died for us. " Secondly, because thereby He set us an example
of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues
displayed in the Passion, which are requisite for man's salvation.
Hence it is written (1 Pet. 2:21): "Christ also suffered for us,
leaving you an example that you should follow in His steps. " Thirdly,
because Christ by His Passion not only delivered man from sin, but also
merited justifying grace for him and the glory of bliss, as shall be
shown later ([4230]Q[48], A[1];[4231] Q[49], AA[1], 5). Fourthly,
because by this man is all the more bound to refrain from sin,
according to 1 Cor. 6:20: "You are bought with a great price: glorify
and bear God in your body. " Fifthly, because it redounded to man's
greater dignity, that as man was overcome and deceived by the devil, so
also it should be a man that should overthrow the devil; and as man
deserved death, so a man by dying should vanquish death. Hence it is
written (1 Cor. 15:57): "Thanks be to God who hath given us the victory
through our Lord Jesus Christ. " It was accordingly more fitting that we
should be delivered by Christ's Passion than simply by God's good-will.

Reply to Objection 1: Even nature uses several means to one intent, in
order to do something more fittingly: as two eyes for seeing; and the
same can be observed in other matters.

Reply to Objection 2: As Chrysostom [*Athanasius, Orat. De Incarn.
Verb. ] says: "Christ had come in order to destroy death, not His own,
(for since He is life itself, death could not be His), but men's death.
Hence it was not by reason of His being bound to die that He laid His
body aside, but because the death He endured was inflicted on Him by
men. But even if His body had sickened and dissolved in the sight of
all men, it was not befitting Him who healed the infirmities of others
to have his own body afflicted with the same. And even had He laid His
body aside without any sickness, and had then appeared, men would not
have believed Him when He spoke of His resurrection. For how could
Christ's victory over death appear, unless He endured it in the sight
of all men, and so proved that death was vanquished by the incorruption
of His body? "

Reply to Objection 3: Although the devil assailed man unjustly,
nevertheless, on account of sin, man was justly left by God under the
devil's bondage. And therefore it was fitting that through justice man
should be delivered from the devil's bondage by Christ making
satisfaction on his behalf in the Passion. This was also a fitting
means of overthrowing the pride of the devil, "who is a deserter from
justice, and covetous of sway"; in that Christ "should vanquish him and
deliver man, not merely by the power of His Godhead, but likewise by
the justice and lowliness of the Passion," as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ ought to have suffered on the cross?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought not to have suffered on
the cross. For the truth ought to conform to the figure. But in all the
sacrifices of the Old Testament which prefigured Christ the beasts were
slain with a sword and afterwards consumed by fire. Therefore it seems
that Christ ought not to have suffered on a cross, but rather by the
sword or by fire.

Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that Christ
ought not to assume "dishonoring afflictions. " But death on a cross was
most dishonoring and ignominious; hence it is written (Wis. 2:20): "Let
us condemn Him to a most shameful death. " Therefore it seems that
Christ ought not to have undergone the death of the cross.

Objection 3: Further, it was said of Christ (Mat. 21:9): "Blessed is He
that cometh in the name of the Lord. " But death upon the cross was a
death of malediction, as we read Dt. 21:23: "He is accursed of God that
hangeth on a tree. " Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ to be
crucified.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:8): "He became obedient unto
death, even the death of the cross. "

I answer that, It was most fitting that Christ should suffer the death
of the cross.

First of all, as an example of virtue. For Augustine thus writes (QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 25): "God's Wisdom became man to give us an example in
righteousness of living. But it is part of righteous living not to
stand in fear of things which ought not to be feared. Now there are
some men who, although they do not fear death in itself, are yet
troubled over the manner of their death. In order, then, that no kind
of death should trouble an upright man, the cross of this Man had to be
set before him, because, among all kinds of death, none was more
execrable, more fear-inspiring, than this. "

Secondly, because this kind of death was especially suitable in order
to atone for the sin of our first parent, which was the plucking of the
apple from the forbidden tree against God's command. And so, to atone
for that sin, it was fitting that Christ should suffer by being
fastened to a tree, as if restoring what Adam had purloined; according
to Ps. 68:5: "Then did I pay that which I took not away. " Hence
Augustine says in a sermon on the Passion [*Cf. Serm. ci De Tempore]:
"Adam despised the command, plucking the apple from the tree: but all
that Adam lost, Christ found upon the cross. "

The third reason is because, as Chrysostom says in a sermon on the
Passion (De Cruce et Latrone i, ii): "He suffered upon a high rood and
not under a roof, in order that the nature of the air might be
purified: and the earth felt a like benefit, for it was cleansed by the
flowing of the blood from His side. " And on Jn. 3:14: "The Son of man
must be lifted up," Theophylact says: "When you hear that He was lifted
up, understand His hanging on high, that He might sanctify the air who
had sanctified the earth by walking upon it. "

The fourth reason is, because, by dying on it, He prepares for us an
ascent into heaven, as Chrysostom [*Athanasius, vide A, III, ad 2]
says. Hence it is that He says (Jn. 12:32): "If I be lifted up from the
earth, I will draw all things to Myself. "

The fifth reason is because it is befitting the universal salvation of
the entire world. Hence Gregory of Nyssa observes (In Christ. Resurr. ,
Orat. i) that "the shape of the cross extending out into four extremes
from their central point of contact denotes the power and the
providence diffused everywhere of Him who hung upon it. " Chrysostom
[*Athanasius, vide A. III, ad 2] also says that upon the cross "He dies
with outstretched hands in order to draw with one hand the people of
old, and with the other those who spring from the Gentiles. "

The sixth reason is because of the various virtues denoted by this
class of death. Hence Augustine in his book on the grace of the Old and
New Testament (Ep. cxl) says: "Not without purpose did He choose this
class of death, that He might be a teacher of that breadth, and height,
and length, and depth," of which the Apostle speaks (Eph. 3:18): "For
breadth is in the beam, which is fixed transversely above; this
appertains to good works, since the hands are stretched out upon it.
Length is the tree's extent from the beam to the ground; and there it
is planted---that is, it stands and abides---which is the note of
longanimity. Height is in that portion of the tree which remains over
from the transverse beam upwards to the top, and this is at the head of
the Crucified, because He is the supreme desire of souls of good hope.
But that part of the tree which is hidden from view to hold it fixed,
and from which the entire rood springs, denotes the depth of gratuitous
grace. " And, as Augustine says (Tract. cxix in Joan. ): "The tree upon
which were fixed the members of Him dying was even the chair of the
Master teaching. "

The seventh reason is because this kind of death responds to very many
figures. For, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Passion (Serm. ci De
Tempore), an ark of wood preserved the human race from the waters of
the Deluge; at the exodus of God's people from Egypt, Moses with a rod
divided the sea, overthrew Pharaoh and saved the people of God. the
same Moses dipped his rod into the water, changing it from bitter to
sweet; at the touch of a wooden rod a salutary spring gushed forth from
a spiritual rock; likewise, in order to overcome Amalec, Moses
stretched forth his arms with rod in hand; lastly, God's law is
entrusted to the wooden Ark of the Covenant; all of which are like
steps by which we mount to the wood of the cross.

Reply to Objection 1: The altar of holocausts, upon which the
sacrifices of animals were immolated, was constructed of timbers, as is
set forth Ex. 27:, and in this respect the truth answers to the figure;
but "it is not necessary for it to be likened in every respect,
otherwise it would not be a likeness," but the reality, as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii). But. in particular, as Chrysostom
[*Athanasius, vide A, III, ad 2] says: "His head is not cut off, as was
done to John; nor was He sawn in twain, like Isaias, in order that His
entire and indivisible body might obey death, and that there might be
no excuse for them who want to divide the Church. " While, instead of
material fire, there was the spiritual fire of charity in Christ's
holocaust.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ refused to undergo dishonorable sufferings
which are allied with defects of knowledge, or of grace, or even of
virtue, but not those injuries inflicted from without---nay, more, as
is written Heb. 12:2: "He endured the cross, despising the shame. "

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xiv), sin is
accursed, and, consequently, so is death, and mortality, which comes of
sin. "But Christ's flesh was mortal, 'having the resemblance of the
flesh of sin'"; and hence Moses calls it "accursed," just as the
Apostle calls it "sin," saying (2 Cor. 5:21): "Him that knew no sin,
for us He hath made sin"---namely, because of the penalty of sin. "Nor
is there greater ignominy on that account, because he said: 'He is
accursed of God. '" For, "unless God had hated sin, He would never have
sent His Son to take upon Himself our death, and to destroy it.
Acknowledge, then, that it was for us He took the curse upon Himself,
whom you confess to have died for us. " Hence it is written (Gal. 3:13):
"Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse
for us. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ endured all suffering?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did endure all sufferings,
because Hilary (De Trin. x) says: "God's only-begotten Son testifies
that He endured every kind of human sufferings in order to accomplish
the sacrament of His death, when with bowed head He gave up the ghost. "
It seems, therefore, that He did endure all human sufferings.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Is. 52:13): "Behold My servant
shall understand, He shall be exalted and extolled, and shall be
exceeding high; as many as have been astonished at Him [Vulg.
: 'thee'],
so shall His visage be inglorious among men, and His form among the
sons of men. " But Christ was exalted in that He had all grace and all
knowledge, at which many were astonished in admiration thereof.
Therefore it seems that He was "inglorious," by enduring every human
suffering.

Objection 3: Further, Christ's Passion was ordained for man's
deliverance from sin, as stated above [4232](A[3]). But Christ came to
deliver men from every kind of sin. Therefore He ought to have endured
every kind of suffering.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 19:32): "The soldiers therefore
came: and they broke the legs of the first, and of the other who was
crucified with Him; but after they were come to Jesus, when they saw
that He was already dead, they did not break His legs. " Consequently,
He did not endure every human suffering.

I answer that, Human sufferings may be considered under two aspects.
First of all, specifically, and in this way it was not necessary for
Christ to endure them all, since many are mutually exclusive, as
burning and drowning; for we are dealing now with sufferings inflicted
from without, since it was not beseeming for Him to endure those
arising from within, such as bodily ailments, as already stated
([4233]Q[14], A[4]). But, speaking generically, He did endure every
human suffering. This admits of a threefold acceptance. First of all,
on the part of men: for He endured something from Gentiles and from
Jews; from men and from women, as is clear from the women servants who
accused Peter. He suffered from the rulers, from their servants and
from the mob, according to Ps. 2:1,2: "Why have the Gentiles raged, and
the people devised vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and
the princes met together, against the Lord and against His Christ. " He
suffered from friends and acquaintances, as is manifest from Judas
betraying and Peter denying Him.

Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the sufferings which a man
can endure. For Christ suffered from friends abandoning Him; in His
reputation, from the blasphemies hurled at Him; in His honor and glory,
from the mockeries and the insults heaped upon Him; in things, for He
was despoiled of His garments; in His soul, from sadness, weariness,
and fear; in His body, from wounds and scourgings.

Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to His bodily members. In His
head He suffered from the crown of piercing thorns; in His hands and
feet, from the fastening of the nails; on His face from the blows and
spittle; and from the lashes over His entire body. Moreover, He
suffered in all His bodily senses: in touch, by being scourged and
nailed; in taste, by being given vinegar and gall to drink; in smell,
by being fastened to the gibbet in a place reeking with the stench of
corpses, "which is called Calvary"; in hearing, by being tormented with
the cries of blasphemers and scorners; in sight, by beholding the tears
of His Mother and of the disciple whom He loved.

Reply to Objection 1: Hilary's words are to be understood as to all
classes of sufferings, but not as to their kinds.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness is sustained, not as to the number
of the sufferings and graces, but as to their greatness; for, as He was
uplifted above others in gifts of graces, so was He lowered beneath
others by the ignominy of His sufferings.

Reply to Objection 3: The very least one of Christ's sufferings was
sufficient of itself to redeem the human race from all sins; but as to
fittingness, it sufficed that He should endure all classes of
sufferings, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the pain of Christ's Passion was greater than all other pains?

Objection 1: It would seem that the pain of Christ's Passion was not
greater than all other pains. For the sufferer's pain is increased by
the sharpness and the duration of the suffering. But some of the
martyrs endured sharper and more prolonged pains than Christ, as is
seen in St. Lawrence, who was roasted upon a gridiron; and in St.
Vincent, whose flesh was torn with iron pincers. Therefore it seems
that the pain of the suffering Christ was not the greatest.

Objection 2: Further, strength of soul mitigates pain, so much so that
the Stoics held there was no sadness in the soul of a wise man; and
Aristotle (Ethic. ii) holds that moral virtue fixes the mean in the
passions. But Christ had most perfect strength of soul. Therefore it
seems that the greatest pain did not exist in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, the more sensitive the sufferer is, the more
acute will the pain be. But the soul is more sensitive than the body,
since the body feels in virtue of the soul; also, Adam in the state of
innocence seems to have had a body more sensitive than Christ had, who
assumed a human body with its natural defects. Consequently, it seems
that the pain of a sufferer in purgatory, or in hell, or even Adam's
pain, if he suffered at all, was greater than Christ's in the Passion.

Objection 4: Further, the greater the good lost, the greater the pain.
But by sinning the sinner loses a greater good than Christ did when
suffering; since the life of grace is greater than the life of nature:
also, Christ, who lost His life, but was to rise again after three
days, seems to have lost less than those who lose their lives and abide
in death. Therefore it seems that Christ's pain was not the greatest of
all.

Objection 5: Further, the victim's innocence lessens the sting of his
sufferings. But Christ died innocent, according to Jer. 9:19: "I was as
a meek lamb, that is carried to be a victim. " Therefore it seems that
the pain of Christ's Passion was not the greatest.

Objection 6: Further, there was nothing superfluous in Christ's
conduct. But the slightest pain would have sufficed to secure man's
salvation, because from His Divine Person it would have had infinite
virtue. Therefore it would have been superfluous to choose the greatest
of all pains.

On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 1:12) on behalf of Christ's
Person: "O all ye that pass by the way attend, and see if there be any
sorrow like unto My sorrow. "

I answer that, As we have stated, when treating of the defects assumed
by Christ ([4234]Q[15], AA[5],6), there was true and sensible pain in
the suffering Christ, which is caused by something hurtful to the body:
also, there was internal pain, which is caused from the apprehension of
something hurtful, and this is termed "sadness. " And in Christ each of
these was the greatest in this present life. This arose from four
causes. First of all, from the sources of His pain. For the cause of
the sensitive pain was the wounding of His body; and this wounding had
its bitterness, both from the extent of the suffering already mentioned
(A[5] ) and from the kind of suffering, since the death of the
crucified is most bitter, because they are pierced in nervous and
highly sensitive parts---to wit, the hands and feet; moreover, the
weight of the suspended body intensifies the agony. and besides this
there is the duration of the suffering because they do not die at once
like those slain by the sword. The cause of the interior pain was,
first of all, all the sins of the human race, for which He made
satisfaction by suffering; hence He ascribes them, so to speak, to
Himself, saying (Ps. 21:2): "The words of my sins. " Secondly,
especially the fall of the Jews and of the others who sinned in His
death chiefly of the apostles, who were scandalized at His Passion.
Thirdly, the loss of His bodily life, which is naturally horrible to
human nature.

The magnitude of His suffering may be considered, secondly, from the
susceptibility of the sufferer as to both soul and body. For His body
was endowed with a most perfect constitution, since it was fashioned
miraculously by the operation of the Holy Ghost; just as some other
things made by miracles are better than others, as Chrysostom says
(Hom. xxii in Joan. ) respecting the wine into which Christ changed the
water at the wedding-feast. And, consequently, Christ's sense of touch,
the sensitiveness of which is the reason for our feeling pain, was most
acute. His soul likewise, from its interior powers, apprehended most
vehemently all the causes of sadness.

Thirdly, the magnitude of Christ's suffering can be estimated from the
singleness of His pain and sadness. In other sufferers the interior
sadness is mitigated, and even the exterior suffering, from some
consideration of reason, by some derivation or redundance from the
higher powers into the lower; but it was not so with the suffering
Christ, because "He permitted each one of His powers to exercise its
proper function," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii).

Fourthly, the magnitude of the pain of Christ's suffering can be
reckoned by this, that the pain and sorrow were accepted voluntarily,
to the end of men's deliverance from sin; and consequently He embraced
the amount of pain proportionate to the magnitude of the fruit which
resulted therefrom.

From all these causes weighed together, it follows that Christ's pain
was the very greatest.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument follows from only one of the
considerations adduced---namely, from the bodily injury, which is the
cause of sensitive pain; but the torment of the suffering Christ is
much more intensified from other causes, as above stated.

Reply to Objection 2: Moral virtue lessens interior sadness in one way,
and outward sensitive pain in quite another; for it lessens interior
sadness directly by fixing the mean, as being its proper matter, within
limits. But, as was laid down in the [4235]FS, Q[64], A[2], moral
virtue fixes the mean in the passions, not according to mathematical
quantity, but according to quantity of proportion, so that the passion
shall not go beyond the rule of reason. And since the Stoics held all
sadness to be unprofitable, they accordingly believed it to be
altogether discordant with reason, and consequently to be shunned
altogether by a wise man. But in very truth some sadness is
praiseworthy, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei xiv)---namely, when it
flows from holy love, as, for instance, when a man is saddened over his
own or others' sins. Furthermore, it is employed as a useful means of
satisfying for sins, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor.
7:10): "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance, steadfast
unto salvation. " And so to atone for the sins of all men, Christ
accepted sadness, the greatest in absolute quantity, yet not exceeding
the rule of reason. But moral virtue does not lessen outward sensitive
pain, because such pain is not subject to reason, but follows the
nature of the body; yet it lessens it indirectly by redundance of the
higher powers into the lower. But this did not happen in Christ's case,
as stated above (cf. Q[14], A[1], ad 2; Q[45], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: The pain of a suffering, separated soul belongs
to the state of future condemnation, which exceeds every evil of this
life, just as the glory of the saints surpasses every good of the
present life. Accordingly, when we say that Christ's pain was the
greatest, we make no comparison between His and the pain of a separated
soul. But Adam's body could not suffer, except he sinned. so that he
would become mortal, and passible. And, though actually suffering, it
would have felt less pain than Christ's body, for the reasons already
stated. From all this it is clear that even if by impassibility Adam
had suffered in the state of innocence, his pain would have been less
than Christ's.

Reply to Objection 4: Christ grieved not only over the loss of His own
bodily life, but also over the sins of all others. And this grief in
Christ surpassed all grief of every contrite heart, both because it
flowed from a greater wisdom and charity, by which the pang of
contrition is intensified, and because He grieved at the one time for
all sins, according to Is. 53:4: "Surely He hath carried our sorrows. "
But such was the dignity of Christ's life in the body, especially on
account of the Godhead united with it, that its loss, even for one
hour, would be a matter of greater grief than the loss of another man's
life for howsoever long a time. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii)
that the man of virtue loves his life all the more in proportion as he
knows it to be better; and yet he exposes it for virtue's sake. And in
like fashion Christ laid down His most beloved life for the good of
charity, according to Jer. 12:7: "I have given My dear soul into the
hands of her enemies. "

Reply to Objection 5: The sufferer's innocence does lessen numerically
the pain of the suffering, since, when a guilty man suffers, he grieves
not merely on account of the penalty, but also because of the crime.
whereas the innocent man grieves only for the penalty: yet this pain is
more intensified by reason of his innocence, in so far as he deems the
hurt inflicted to be the more undeserved. Hence it is that even others
are more deserving of blame if they do not compassionate him. according
to Is. 57:1: "The just perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart. "

Reply to Objection 6: Christ willed to deliver the human race from sins
not merely by His power, but also according to justice. And therefore
He did not simply weigh what great virtue His suffering would have from
union with the Godhead, but also how much, according to His human
nature, His pain would avail for so great a satisfaction.
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Whether Christ suffered in His whole soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer in His whole
soul. For the soul suffers indirectly when the body suffers, inasmuch
as it is the "act of the body. " But the soul is not, as to its every
part, the "act of the body"; because the intellect is the act of no
body, as is said De Anima iii. Therefore it seems that Christ did not
suffer in His whole soul.

Objection 2: Further, every power of the soul is passive in regard to
its proper object. But the higher part of reason has for its object the
eternal types, "to the consideration and consultation of which it
directs itself," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii). But Christ could
suffer no hurt from the eternal types, since they are nowise opposed to
Him. Therefore it seems that He did not suffer in His whole soul.

Objection 3: Further, a sensitive passion is said to be complete when
it comes into contact with the reason. But there was none such in
Christ, but only "pro-passions"; as Jerome remarks on Mat. 26:37. Hence
Dionysius says in a letter to John the Evangelist that "He endured only
mentally the sufferings inflicted upon Him. " Consequently it does not
seem that Christ suffered in His whole soul.

Objection 4: Further, suffering causes pain: but there is no pain in
the speculative intellect, because, as the Philosopher says (Topic. i),
"there is no sadness in opposition to the pleasure which comes of
consideration. " Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His
whole soul.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 87:4) on behalf of Christ: "My soul
is filled with evils": upon which the gloss adds: "Not with vices, but
with woes, whereby the soul suffers with the flesh; or with evils, viz.
of a perishing people, by compassionating them. " But His soul would not
have been filled with these evils except He had suffered in His whole
soul. Therefore Christ suffered in His entire soul.

I answer that, A whole is so termed with respect to its parts. But the
parts of a soul are its faculties. So, then, the whole soul is said to
suffer in so far as it is afflicted as to its essence, or as to all its
faculties. But it must be borne in mind that a faculty of the soul can
suffer in two ways: first of all, by its own passion; and this comes of
its being afflicted by its proper object; thus, sight may suffer from
superabundance of the visible object. In another way a faculty suffers
by a passion in the subject on which it is based; as sight suffers when
the sense of touch in the eye is affected, upon which the sense of
sight rests, as, for instance, when the eye is pricked, or is
disaffected by heat.

So, then, we say that if the soul be considered with respect to its
essence, it is evident that Christ's whole soul suffered. For the
soul's whole essence is allied with the body, so that it is entire in
the whole body and in its every part. Consequently, when the body
suffered and was disposed to separate from the soul, the entire soul
suffered. But if we consider the whole soul according to its faculties,
speaking thus of the proper passions of the faculties, He suffered
indeed as to all His lower powers; because in all the soul's lower
powers, whose operations are but temporal, there was something to be
found which was a source of woe to Christ, as is evident from what was
said above [4236](A[6]). But Christ's higher reason did not suffer
thereby on the part of its object, which is God, who was the cause, not
of grief, but rather of delight and joy, to the soul of Christ.
Nevertheless, all the powers of Christ's soul did suffer according as
any faculty is said to be affected as regards its subject, because all
the faculties of Christ's soul were rooted in its essence, to which
suffering extended when the body, whose act it is, suffered.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellect as a faculty is not the
act of the body, still the soul's essence is the act of the body, and
in it the intellective faculty is rooted, as was shown in the [4237]FP,
Q[77], AA[6],8.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument proceeds from passion on the part
of the proper object, according to which Christ's higher reason did not
suffer.

Reply to Objection 3: Grief is then said to be a true passion, by which
the soul is troubled, when the passion in the sensitive part causes
reason to deflect from the rectitude of its act, so that it then
follows the passion, and has no longer free-will with regard to it. In
this way passion of the sensitive part did not extend to reason in
Christ, but merely subjectively, as was stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: The speculative intellect can have no pain or
sadness on the part of its object, which is truth considered
absolutely, and which is its perfection: nevertheless, both grief and
its cause can reach it in the way mentioned above.
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Whether Christ's entire soul enjoyed blessed fruition during the Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's entire soul did not enjoy
blessed fruition during the Passion. For it is not possible to be sad
and glad at the one time, since sadness and gladness are contraries.
But Christ's whole soul suffered grief during the Passion, as was
stated above [4238](A[7]). Therefore His whole soul could not enjoy
fruition.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii) that, if
sadness be vehement, it not only checks the contrary delight, but every
delight; and conversely. But the grief of Christ's Passion was the
greatest, as shown above [4239](A[6]); and likewise the enjoyment of
fruition is also the greatest, as was laid down in the first volume of
the [4240]FS, Q[34], A[3]. Consequently, it was not possible for
Christ's whole soul to be suffering and rejoicing at the one time.

Objection 3: Further, beatific "fruition" comes of the knowledge and
love of Divine things, as Augustine says (Doctr. Christ. i). But all
the soul's powers do not extend to the knowledge and love of God.
Therefore Christ's whole soul did not enjoy fruition.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): Christ's Godhead
"permitted His flesh to do and to suffer what was proper to it. " In
like fashion, since it belonged to Christ's soul, inasmuch as it was
blessed, to enjoy fruition, His Passion did not impede fruition.

I answer that, As stated above [4241](A[7]), the whole soul can be
understood both according to its essence and according to all its
faculties. If it be understood according to its essence, then His whole
soul did enjoy fruition, inasmuch as it is the subject of the higher
part of the soul, to which it belongs, to enjoy the Godhead: so that as
passion, by reason of the essence, is attributed to the higher part of
the soul, so, on the other hand, by reason of the superior part of the
soul, fruition is attributed to the essence. But if we take the whole
soul as comprising all its faculties, thus His entire soul did not
enjoy fruition: not directly, indeed, because fruition is not the act
of any one part of the soul; nor by any overflow of glory, because,
since Christ was still upon earth, there was no overflowing of glory
from the higher part into the lower, nor from the soul into the body.
But since, on the contrary, the soul's higher part was not hindered in
its proper acts by the lower, it follows that the higher part of His
soul enjoyed fruition perfectly while Christ was suffering.

Reply to Objection 1: The joy of fruition is not opposed directly to
the grief of the Passion, because they have not the same object. Now
nothing prevents contraries from being in the same subject, but not
according to the same. And so the joy of fruition can appertain to the
higher part of reason by its proper act; but grief of the Passion
according to the subject. Grief of the Passion belongs to the essence
of the soul by reason of the body, whose form the soul is; whereas the
joy of fruition (belongs to the soul) by reason of the faculty in which
it is subjected.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher's contention is true because of
the overflow which takes place naturally of one faculty of the soul
into another; but it was not so with Christ, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 3: Such argument holds good of the totality of the
soul with regard to its faculties.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ suffered at a suitable time?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer at a suitable
time. For Christ's Passion was prefigured by the sacrifice of the
Paschal lamb: hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:7): "Christ our Pasch is
sacrificed. " But the paschal lamb was slain "on the fourteenth day at
eventide," as is stated in Ex. 12:6. Therefore it seems that Christ
ought to have suffered then; which is manifestly false: for He was then
celebrating the Pasch with His disciples, according to Mark's account
(14:12): "On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they
sacrificed the Pasch"; whereas it was on the following day that He
suffered.

Objection 2: Further, Christ's Passion is called His uplifting,
according to Jn. 3:14: "So must the Son of man be lifted up. " And
Christ is Himself called the Sun of Justice, as we read Mal. 4:2.
Therefore it seems that He ought to have suffered at the sixth hour,
when the sun is at its highest point, and yet the contrary appears from
Mk. 15:25: "It was the third hour, and they crucified Him. "

Objection 3: Further, as the sun is at its highest point in each day at
the sixth hour, so also it reaches its highest point in every year at
the summer solstice. Therefore Christ ought to have suffered about the
time of the summer solstice rather than about the vernal equinox.

Objection 4: Further, the world was enlightened by Christ's presence in
it, according to Jn. 9:5: "As long as I am in the world I am the light
of the world. " Consequently it was fitting for man's salvation that
Christ should have lived longer in the world, so that He should have
suffered, not in young, but in old, age.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:1): "Jesus, knowing that His
hour was come for Him to pass out of this world to the Father"; and
(Jn. 2:4): "My hour is not yet come. " Upon which texts Augustine
observes: "When He had done as much as He deemed sufficient, then came
His hour, not of necessity, but of will, not of condition, but of
power. " Therefore Christ died at an opportune time.

I answer that, As was observed above [4242](A[1]), Christ's Passion was
subject to His will. But His will was ruled by the Divine wisdom which
"ordereth all things" conveniently and "sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).
Consequently it must be said that Christ's Passion was enacted at an
opportune time. Hence it is written in De Qq. Vet.