Hegel's
interpretation
of the Hindu religion remains basically the same in the different versions of his lectures, and hence we will not focus on what are, after all, minor differences between them.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
However, the reason is not that extra space is needed for a widening of the textual basis, for in this case Hegel also wholly depends on secondary sources.
in fact, the basis is now nar- rower than before.
Peter Hodgson in his introduction to the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion only lists certain reports by travellers and a general history of China.
(De Mailla's Histoire ge?
ne?
rale de la Chine, Paris, 1777-1785).
Apparently, on approaching the top Hegel prefers to travel light.
evidently, he is not interested in the history of Buddhism's indian origins and its later career in China, Japan and Korea.
His interest is rather
8 Young Kun Kim, 'Hegel's Criticism of Chinese Philosophy', in: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 28, no. 2, sinological Torque (1978), pp. 174-176.
9 see esp. Karel l. van der leeuw, Leibniz. Over de natuurlijke theologie van de Chinezen, Budel: Damon 2006, pp. 57-63; 130-136.
10 'Was die schriftsprache selbst betrifft, so ist dies herauszuheben, dass sie das gro? sste Hindernis der Befo? rderung der Wissenschaft ist. ' (Vorl. 12, 153)
11 The inflexibility of (spoken) Chinese is one of the myths debunked by John DeFrancis: The Chinese Language. Fact and Fantasy, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1984.
? hegel on chinese religion 27
to highlight what he thinks is its central concept: Substance, or rather: the notion of the one substance.
Contemporary european issues at least as much prompted the choice of this concept, as a reconstruction of the inner development of Chinese religion. The most obvious relation is with the controversies surrounding spinozism. The parallel with spinoza is present right from the outset. Just as the latter attempted to overcome Cartesian dualism by positing one substance, so Hegel places a Buddhist concept of one substance at the apex of oriental thought. Consecutively Hegel contrasts this notion with the concept of pantheism employed by the critics of spinozism. His point is that those critics have a poor understanding of the spinozist notion of the All and could learn a lot from the orient. The great achievement of the latter is to have understood the power of negation. Hegel uses the term 'idealism' as a contrast to the vulgar realism of the critics of spinozism who falsely attribute to spinoza a notion of the Divine as an Allesheit, i. e. a container in which all things of this world are dumped. To do justice to spinoza a more appropriate term than pantheism would be acosmism, since in the latter case Divine omnipotence would rightly be understood as a negation of the world. (l2 27, 574/470, note 172)
For a human being, this state of negation is the highest state: one must immerse oneself in this nothing, in the eternal tranquillity of the nothing generally, in the substantial in which all determinations cease, where there is no virtue or intelligence, where all movement annuls itself. All character- istics of both natural life and spiritual life have vanished. (l2 27, 565/462)
7. subjectivism, subjectivity and Philosophy
oriental idealism is not only contrasted to the hypostatization of finite things of which Hegel accused the opponents of spinozism, but is also pitted against Romanticist subjectivism. lecturing in 1825/26 on oriental thought Hegel uses the opportunity for a side-attack on Friedrich schlegel's subjec- tivism. The orient is praised for having discovered the self-sufficiency of pure thinking ('thought for itself '), and for having turned this into the foundation of truth. on the other hand, Romanticists indulge in a 'subjec- tive vanity' that dissolves all objectivity. The advantage of the orient is to have developed 'an intellectual substantiality' in which all 'subjective van- ity is drowned'. 12 However, as Hegel contends, the disadvantage is that the
12 'jene subjective eitelkeit darin zu ersa? ufen' Cf. Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, p. 485.
? 28 sander griffioen
orient only has a dim awareness of god as subject, and as a consequence fails to give the human person its due. (l2 27, 576/472)13 This is also why oriental thought could not evolve into a genuine philosophy.
so while opposing both objectivism and subjectivism, Hegel is at the same time concerned that objectivity and subjectivity receive their due. He also makes clear that the acknowledgment of free subjectivity is the 'to be or not to be' of philosophy. since he finds this lacking in the ori- ent, the conclusion cannot but be that we are looking here in vain for genuine philosophy. especially within the Confucian pale there is little to find. even as a moral teacher Confucius cannot measure up to Cicero. Cicero's De Officiis, Hegel suggests, is more valuable than all the works of Confucius; to which he sarcastically adds that it would have been better for the sage's reputation if these had not been translated. 14
Conclusion: Hegel's Place in the Reception History
After this survey of relevant texts, a certain disappointment is hard to avoid. The texts are not many, and nowhere witness of any mastery. inter- preters before us, of course, reached a similar conclusion. one of them, Young Kun Kim, nevertheless derives consolation by supposing that Hegel at least has left us with hard but stimulating questions: 'neverthe- less, Hegel has contributed to the study of Chinese philosophy by posing tough questions, which i am afraid, have not yet been answered. '15 Unfor- tunately, Kim does not tell us what these questions were.
is this to say that 'Hegel and China' is a subject that could just as well be passed over? This would be the case if Hegel would represent a sheer regress compared to the Jesuit fathers, leibniz, Wolff, goethe, and schelling. in fact, his position has something of a sui generis character. in order to understand his position we need to take a number of points into account.
Ex oriente lux. Hegel follows Voltaire in placing China at the beginning of history: his lectures on world history, religion and philosophy all start with China. so the Far east and no longer Asia Minor is honoured as the
13 idem, p. 484.
14 'Ciceros 'De officiis' ist vielleicht besser fu? r uns als alle Werke des Konfuzius. U? ber die U? bersetzungen urteilen die kompetenten Richter, man ha? tte fu? r Konfuzius' Ruhm besser gesorgt, ihn nicht zu u? bersetzen; es sei ganz gewo? hnliche, weitschweifige Moral. ' (Vorl. 6, 371)
15 Kim, 'Hegel's Criticism of Chinese Philosophy', p. 179.
? hegel on chinese religion 29
cradle of humanity. Herein he follows Voltaire who was the first historian to break with the older tradition of starting in one way or another with the biblical account of israel and the surrounding nations. Whereas Bossuet's Discours sur l'histoire universelle (1681) still followed the old model, Vol- taire started a revolution by letting his Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations (1756), of work of comparable ambition, open with China! 16 Hegel is a child of this revolution.
Historicism. Although the sun rises in the east, it sets in the west. With Hegel, the Western sunset is more important than the eastern sunrise. Both the east's fascination with substantiality and Western reflexivity are placed in a developmental perspective:
This oriental way of viewing things is opposed to that of the occident: just as the sun sets in the West, so it is in the West that human being descends into itself, into its own subjectivity. (l2 27, 572/469)
Therefore, in Hegel the Voltairean revolution does not give the orient a central place. With Buddhism China and india have run their historical course. The spirit then moves on to europe, leaving behind the achieve- ments of the orient as empty shells on the shores of time. For each of the participants the clock of history only strikes once. 17
Concurrence with Leibniz. only in passing is leibniz' interest in China mentioned. Yet there is congruence on an important point. leibniz' Dis- course on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716) was prompted by the criticism of an Anti-Riccian group levelled against the legacy of Ricci. The point the critics wanted to make was that Ricci and friends had been nai? ve in their attitude towards China: the so-called natural theology of the Chinese being in fact a form of pantheism, if not atheism. 18 This criti- cism is strikingly similar to the attacks on spinozism. so Hegel would have answered the anti-Riccian faction in much the same way as he answered the anti-spinozists, i. e. by arguing that the orient and spinoza developed an understanding of substantiality that as such is neither pantheistic or
16 on this revolution, see Karl loewith, Meaning in History. The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, Chicago: 1949, Chapter 5.
17 'Die Uhr der Philosophien, die bei Hegel dieselbe wie die des Weltgeistes ist, schla? gt nicht zweimal dieselbe stunde . . . ' see ernst Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt. Erla? uterungen zu Hegel, Frankfurt: suhrkamp 1962, p. 366.
18 see Van der leeuw, Leibniz, pp. 43-47; Daniel J. Cook & Henry Rosemont, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Writings on China, Chicago: open Court 1994, pp. 5-10.
? 30 sander griffioen
atheistic but adequately articulates Divine omnipotence. 19 Thus he would agree with the gist of leibniz' defence of the Riccians.
In line with the anti-Riccians. A great difference vis-a`-vis leibniz is that natural theology for Hegel has to be (negated and) further developed in order to lead to true knowledge. leibniz' rather eclectic method of looking for strong points in both cultures is anathema to Hegel. Therefore, with Hegel the distance to China vastly increases. leibniz envisaged a fruitful exchange based on a win-win situation. He argued that they are stronger in perceiving, we in thinking. 20 We may conclude that such an exchange between equals would be incongruent with Hegelian historicism. This same historicism also explains why the Voltairean revolution fails to gain momentum. Although following Voltaire in granting China a primal posi- tion in the history of civilization, he also makes clear that it represents a stage to be overcome.
? 19 Cf. Vorl. 12, 160, where Hegel deals with the state religion: 'Die gelehrten Chinesen, welche die Missionare Atheisten in der staatsreligion nennen, nehmen dieses Abstrakte Wesen als . . . . das innerste Wesen der Welt . . . '
20 From a letter to Father grimaldi, 1692, cf. Van der leeuw, Leibniz, p. 51. similar: Cook & Rosemont, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, p. 46 (Preface to the novissima sinica).
Hinduism:
a Religion of fantasy
Paul Cruysberghs
1. introduction
at the end of the 18th century, eastern religions became quite popular in the Western world. Romanticism was in search of alternatives for the typi- cally rationalistic approach of both dogmatic and natural theology by the enlightenment philosophers and theologians. in Hinduism in particular, it discovered a religion that seemed to be free from both rigid dogmatism and abstract rationalism. the very fact that this religion was older than Christianity gave it an aura of originality that made it the more attrac- tive. the sacred texts were initially translated into english and later on into other languages as well. in germany august schlegel published an Indische Bibliothek series. 1 His brother friedrich, who had learned sanskrit during his stay in Paris, wrote a book on The Language and Wisdom of the Indians to which he added a nice selection of indian texts that he had translated on his own. 2 in his most important writings Herder showed an everlasting love for what he called "dieses land der sehnsucht". georg forster translated William Jones's translation of Kalidasa's sakuntula and Wilhelm von Humboldt introduced and translated the Bhagavad-gi^ta^, a crucial episode from the maha^-Bha^rata. 3
Hegel paid close attention to the Hindu religion as well; more than to Buddhism as a matter of fact. in our survey we will refer to the four ver- sions of the lectures on the philosophy of determinate religion as they have been edited by Walter Jaeschke: the manuscript, being the basis of the 1821 lectures (l2 m), the lectures of 1824 (l2 24), those of 1827 (l2 27),
1 see in particular a. W. schlegel (ed. ), Indische Bibliothek, Bd. 2, H. 4, Bonn: 1827.
2 f. schlegel, ? ueber die sprache und Weisheit der inder. ein Beitrag zur Begru? ndung der althertumskunde. nebst metrischen uebersetzungen indischer gedichte? , Heidelberg: 1808. --Kritische friedrich schlegel-ausgabe, ed. by e. Behler, 1. abt. Bd. 8, 1975.
3 W. von Humboldt, ? U? ber die unter dem namen Bhagavad-gi^ta^ bekannte episode des maha^-Bha^rata. gelesen in der akademie der Wissenschaften am 30. Juni 1825 und am 15. Juni 1826, Berlin, 1826? . --W. von Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften, abt. 1: Werke, Bd. 5, Berlin: 1906.
? 32 paul cruysberghs
and those of 1831 (l2 31). 4 the manuscript is rather restricted as far as Hin- duism is concerned, but the student notes of the 1824 and 1827 lectures are quite extensive. the 1824 lectures are the most elaborate, stressing the metaphysical dimension of Hinduism; but they are, alas, less clear than the 1827 lectures. the 1827 lectures, while being shorter, are indeed more perspicuous and concrete. of the 1831 lectures, no complete transcript seems to be extant anymore, but we have at our disposal some excerpts passed down to us by david strauss. Considering the dominant role of cat- egories and thought determinations (Gedankenbestimmungen) in Hegel's philosophy in general and in the philosophy of religion in particular, we will focus mainly on what he called the metaphysical dimension of Hindu religion (l2 m, 100/5) and to a lesser extent on the concrete representa- tion of the gods and the cultic aspects of Hinduism.
in addition to the lectures, we must also take into consideration Hegel's extensive review of Humboldt's book about the Bhagavad-gi^ta^ (H, 19ff ). 5 in this review, published in the Jahrbu? cher fu? r wissenschaftliche Kritik, Hegel does not just refer to Humboldt, but also to august schlegel's Indian Library and to some important english sources as well. it focuses more on the (subjective) cultic and ethical aspects than on the (objec- tive) metaphysical ones and, accordingly, it shows how eager Hegel was to improve his acquaintance with the Hindu religion, wrestling with its complexities and incoherencies, and comparing it with the Christian reli- gion and, quite remarkably, with recent, romantic, tendencies in philoso- phy as well.
Hegel's interpretation of the Hindu religion remains basically the same in the different versions of his lectures, and hence we will not focus on what are, after all, minor differences between them. However, one important modification that Hegel carries out, will require our atten- tion: the treatment of Buddhism which preceded Hinduism in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, was moved in the 1831 lectures to a position following Hinduism. However, as for the internal treatment of Hinduism, Hegel's interpretations do not seem to have changed that much.
4 the english translations of the german text of the lectures are mine (PC); except for those of 1827, that refer to the translation in the Hodgson edition of Hegel's Lectures. in either case, also where my translation diverts from that of the Hodgson edition, a reference to this (standard) edition is added to the text.
5 g. W. f. Hegel, ? Humboldt-Rezension. ueber die unter den nahmen Baghavad-gita bekannte episode des mahabharata; von Wilhelm von Humboldt? , Berlin 1826. --Gesam- melte Werke, Bd. 16, Schriften und Entwu? rfe II (1826-1831), frankfurt am main: meiner, 2001, pp. 19-75 (H).
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 33
in what follows i will first introduce the general context in which Hegel dealt with the Hindu religion, then i will discuss Hegel's endeavour to interpret its basic content with the help of typically logical categories; and finally i will focus on the cultic aspects of the Hindu religion.
2. the general Context: nature Religion
in the manuscript and in the 1824 and 1827 lectures Hegel deals with Hin- duism in the context of what he terms 'immediate', or 'natural', or 'nature religion' (unmittelbare Religion, natu? rliche Religion, Naturreligion). 6 these terms refer to african and eskimo religions, but also, and even primarily to oriental religions such as the traditional Chinese, mongolian, indian, and Persian religions. all these religions, Hegel claims, present a 'natu- ral unity of the spiritual and the natural' (l2 24, 233-234/139-140). in the nature religions, indeed spirit has not yet separated itself from nature, and is still identical with it. Consequently, natural and spiritual elements are mixed up with each other. the situation can be compared to what Hegel terms the natural soul in his anthropology:7 on an elementary pre-conscious level the soul, though possessing already a certain level of ideality, is still permeated of nature, without taking a distance from it.
the basic notion in nature religion is that of (immediate) being or of substantiality (l2 m, 95/2). natural objects like the sun do not function as symbolic representations (presupposing a distinction between meaning and immediate existence) of the god; they are themselves the "immedi- ately present god" (l2 m, 106/13). in that sense, we can consider nature religions as being pantheistic: god is all things in them: ? `? ? ? ? ` ? ? ? ? . Heaven, stars, earth, plants, animals, and the human being constitute "one King- dom of Heaven". in so far as these objects merely are, they are immediate manifestations of "one single divine life" (l2 m, 100/5). of course, people do not adore finite natural things as they are as such, in the prosaic sense, but only in so far as they are the expressions of a universal power imma- nent in the things themselves, in the same sense as spinoza considered
6 strictly speaking, Hegel distinguishes 'natu? rliche Religion' and 'naturreligion', the first being identical to the latter, but only in so far as in it 'thought (der Gedanke) is brought to the fore' (144). 'natu? rliche Religion' thus refers primarily to the way religion is considered by authors like david Hume (cf. his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion). together with the english translators of the 27 lectures, we translate 'naturreligion' as 'nature religion'.
7 g. W. f. Hegel, Enzyklopa? die der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 20, ? 391 ff.
? 34 paul cruysberghs
the finite modifications to be the expressions of nature or god. in fact, Hegel interpreted nature religion as a pre-metaphysical form of spinozism (l2 m, 104/10). Just as in spinoza, there is only one substance that must be defined as nature or god. the objects of adoration are not finite things as such, but the power of nature that manifests itself as a 'natural subject' (l2 m, 105/11). only in so far as that universal power of nature integrates its other in itself and animates it, people can adore animals (elephants, apes, cows) and human beings (dalai lama, kings, Brahmans) as gods. these are not symbols in fact, they are this particular animal or human being, in its or his actuality, but that actuality is precisely conditioned by the immanent presence of the vital power in it.
in spite of Hegel appreciating the tendency of these religions to give the absolute a further determination of subjectivity, concreteness and singu- larity, he still considers them to be at quite a low level of religiosity. they recognize the presence of the absolute in singular beings, but they reduce, so Hegel says, the singularity of these beings themselves to a merely imme- diate singularity in which spirit is lacking (einer [. . . ] geistlosen Einzelheit) (l2 m, 108/14). on the one hand, Hegel applauds the fact that animals as objects of religion have drives, desires, power of life, that they have an instinct, "that secret, suitable doing from within" (l2 m, 108/14). yet the fact that the instinct exists in the form of absolute, i. e. mere singularity and finiteness, is its weakness. instead of this singularity being a point of departure for sublimation and idealisation of itself, it loses itself in its determinateness, in 'the now' of its naturality and finitude.
We mentioned already that it was part of Hegel's strategy to compare other religions with the Christian one. He did this not just because his students and readers were Christians, but also because he considered the Christian religion, both logically and historically, as the highest form of religion. Religions considered to be hierarchically lower can be made understandable not just by discerning in them the hidden dialectics of logical categories and concepts, but also by contrasting them to the higher forms. therefore, Hegel could not refrain from comparing e. g. the Hindu incarnations of the divine in human beings with the Christian incarnation. in the Christian religion, god also became man, but Jesus, so he argued, was never adored as a god when he was alive. only after he had ascended into heaven and was seated at the right hand of the father, was he adored as divine. it is only as spirit, not in his immediacy, that a human being can be considered as an incarnation of the divine. this spiritual dimen- sion, however, appears to be absent in Hinduism and in nature religions in general (l2 m, 108/15).
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 35
still, Hegel was well aware of how seductive nature religions were for a certain kind of romanticism. thanks to their primitive and immedi- ate character, the spiritual and the natural not yet having fallen apart, nature religions had the aura of being the oldest and most original ones, not yet contaminated by the influences of culture and reflection. they were considered as reminiscences of a paradisiacal situation of harmony, beauty and innocence, in which the human being, possessing a kind of wisdom, which it is suggested, is subsequently lost, was still in a natural unity with nature and with god. thus nature religion was presented as "the true, mostly outstanding, actually divine religion" (l2 24, 238/144),8 whereas Hegel himself rather considered it as "the most contemptuous of all religions" (l2 m, 108/15). With all his sympathy for the wisdom present in these forms of religion, Hegel, sticking to the superiority of the Chris- tian religion, strongly condemned any exaltation of what was presented as being 'original' or 'primitive'. a zealous enthusiasm for eastern or even more 'primitive' religions is completely foreign to Hegel.
3. the Hindu Religion: a Religion of fantasy
in the manuscript, Hegel deals with immediate religion without making any further distinctions. it is clear, however, that, for the most part, he has the Hindu religion in mind.
When discussing the immediate or nature religions in the 1824 lec- tures Hegel distinguishes: 1) the religion of magic (encompassing african (negro), eskimo, and Chinese religions, but also Buddhism), 2) the reli- gion of fantasy, which is actually the Hindu religion, 3) the religion of the good (the Persian light religion) and 4) the religion of riddle (the egyptian religion).
in the 1827 lectures the Chinese religion of the state is explicitly men- tioned as a transitional form between the religion of magic and Bud- dhism, which receives a separate treatment (presented as the religion of
8 in his commentary Jaeschke refers to both schelling (Vorlesungen u? ber die Methode des academischen Studium) and friedrich schlegel (Sprache und Weisheit der Inder) as typical devotees of such an old religion and wisdom (see note to 146, 170-172 in 4b 688). Complaining about the low level of education in 19th century germany, people critical of their own culture had a tendency to contrast the former wisdom of the indians to it (l2 24, 249/154). in l2 31, 723/612 Hegel mentions explicitly friedrich schlegel's thesis that fragments of ? this primitive, true religion of the human spirit' can be found in all other religions.
? 36 paul cruysberghs
being-within-self ), preceding the religion of fantasy which is now charac- terised as the indian religion. 9
i have already mentioned the important modification carried out in the 1831 lectures and taken up by marheineke in the first and second editions of the Werke, in which Hegel moves the Buddhist religion from its inferior position before the indian religion to a hierarchically higher position after it. the part on determinate religion is divided now in three chapters, the first of them being natural religion, which now encompasses exclusively the eskimo, mongolian and african religions (the religions of magic in l2 27). the second chapter introduces a new principle of division: 'the splitting up (Entzweiung) of the Religious Consciousness in itself '. in this chapter, both the Chinese and the indian religions find a place of their own, followed by the lamaic-Buddhist religions. the third chapter, which is not our concern here, deals with the religion of freedom, which refers to the greek and the Roman religions, but they are preceded by so-called forms of transition, to which the religions of the good (the Persian and the Jewish religions), the religion of pain (the Phoenix and adonis cults), and the egyptian religion belong.
in order to understand what happened here, we must first turn to Hegel's analysis of the religions of magic in the 1824 lectures. there are two ele- ments that Hegel considers characteristic of the religions of magic. the first element is a practical one: that of power. a magic relation to the world presupposes a spiritual self-consciousness manifesting its overall power over nature in all its concrete forms. for example, the magic practices we find in african religions, hardly merit the name of religion, since there is no explicit reference to any divinity, but the exercise of magic power is manifestly present. the second element, which Hegel distinguishes in his 1824 lectures, is a theoretical one. it can be found in the Chinese fo tradition, the tibetan lama and other Buddhist traditions. Here the god is present in human shapes like the dalai lama or the Buddha. thanks to metempsychosis however, the god shows his being-within-self, his iden- tity with himself independently of the particular human or animal bodies it reincarnates in. this absolute reflection of the divine in itself, in which all distinctions are dissolved (l2 24, 316-317/219), is considered by Hegel
9 the english edition of the 27 lectures translates 'indian religion' as 'Hindu religion'. -- it is remarkable that in the first and second editions of the Werke, edited by Hegel's friends, the Buddhist religion (religion of being-within-itself) is dealt with after the Hindu religion (religion of fantasy). marheineke, the editor of the lectures on philosophy of religion, might have found evidence for this intervention in the 31 lectures.
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 37
as the basic idea of divinity in general and thus of all religions worthy of that name. (l2 24, 316/218)
according to the 1824 lectures, the Hindu religion, qualified as the reli- gion of fantasy, brings the two moments present in the religion of magic, that of power and that of being-within-self, together. in both fo religion and Buddhism the being-within-self is indefinite and therefore qualified as nothingness (nirvana). in contrast with the essentially negative per- spective of nirvana fostered by Buddhism, Hinduism endows the divine with the determinateness that was part of the concrete exercise of magic power in merely magic religions. in the Hindu religion, Hegel contends, "divinity is objective with all its plenitude of content". (l2 24, 317/220) Whereas the Buddhist world is empty, a concrete divine world arises in Hinduism. Constituting a unity of the infinite essence and the finite shape, the divine develops into a concrete form;--and from a Hegelian point of view this is the considerable kind of progress we are supposed to encounter in all higher religions.
in comparison to the 1824 lectures, the 1827 lectures place a different accent to the treatment of Buddhism, giving it a separate treatment in the first place (cf. supra). this is quite understandable when we take into consideration that Buddhism, at least in its essence, can hardly be con- sidered as a form of magic. nonetheless, Hegel confirms that Hinduism is further developing the substantiality and the being-within-self that fo, lama and Buddhist religions stand for, "in the totality of its externality". (l2 27, 579/475) and, as in l2 24, he considers this particularisation of the universal substance, this adding of "the richness of the world" (l2 27, 581/476) as substantial progress when compared to the Buddhist position. 10 thanks to this concretisation of substantiality both natural and spiritual powers, as they manifest themselves in the concrete world, are recognized as belonging to the absolute; a belonging that has a double side: on the one hand, they appear in their particularity and independency; on the other hand, they appear as vanishing and being consumed by the univer- sal being-within-self of the first substantiality. (l2 27, 581/477)
as a matter of fact, Hegel argues, Hinduism expresses--in its own way, "according to the instinct of the concept" ("nach dem instinkt des Be- griffs") (l2 27, 586/482), the general structure of the (logical) idea: in the first place it is "one, immediate and identical with itself " (l2 27, 581/478);
10 "Here, therefore, the horizon is enlarged; we have here the totality. the viewpoint is concrete; that is the necessary progress. " (l2 27, 581/477)
? 38 paul cruysberghs
secondly, the idea differentiates itself internally, particularizes itself into different, particular shapes and powers; thirdly, the particular powers have to return to the one, to the one universal substance, insofar as they are contained by it. (l2 27, 581/478) Precisely because Hinduism makes room for the second moment of concreteness, it must be considered as a richer form of religion than Buddhism. the third moment however, is presented in a deficient way--and that is the conclusion of both the 1824 and 1827 lectures (l2 24, 326/229; l2 27, 581-584/478-479) (see infra)-- and therefore the Hindu religion itself is deficient. still, in both versions Hegel recognizes that the Hindu religion contains "the three basic deter- minations of the concept" (l2 24, 326/229), i. e. "the basics of the reason- able development, though only in its most general determinations". (l2 27, 582/478)
as for the 1831 lectures, here Hegel also recognizes the three moments of the concept, accusing especially the third moment of offering only a determination in which spirit is absent (geistlose Bestimmung). (l2 31, 734/622) more important, however, is that, as we mentioned earlier, Hegel modified quite drastically the general structure of his lectures. He reduced the natural religions to the eskimo, the mongolian and the afri- can ones, i. e. the former magic religions, which are now, more explicitly than before, denied the status of being religions in the strict sense. more important for us, however, is the introduction of a new perspective: that of the internal splitting up (Entzweiung) of the religious consciousness into a substance, on the one hand (god), and the transitory accidents (the subjects), on the other. in a way this perspective was already present in the former lectures, in which substantiality was considered as a general perspective of nature religion as such. now, the internal splitting up of the religious consciousness into a substantial and an accidental side becomes the common characteristic of the Chinese, indian, and Buddhist religions and separates them from the merely natural religions. in the Chinese reli- gion, the substance is recognized as the foundation (Grundlage) which is determined in itself. it is thought fundamentally as measure, to which human beings have to conform their actions (cf. Confucianism). the indian religion considers the substance as an abstract unity, akin to the human spirit, to which the human being has to elevate itself. the lamaic- Buddhist religion for its part is now--fundamentally different from the previous interpretations--a more concrete form of religion as compared to Hinduism, in so far as the substance becomes concrete in it: it takes the form of a particular individual (the dalai lama, Buddha gautama), to which other human beings have to raise themselves, which is supposed
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 39
to result ultimately in the complete annihilation of the self (nirvana). Concreteness remains the hierarchical criterion to evaluate the different religions of substantiality. yet instead of stressing the concreteness of the relationship to the world, as Hegel did in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, he now focuses on the concreteness of the particular individuals in which the substance finds (as in the dalai lama) or found (as in Buddha) its concrete incarnation. However, apart from the evidence that Buddhism is a histori- cally later development than Hinduism, Hegel's reasons for changing the hierarchical order of eastern religions are not very clear. His analysis of Hinduism remains substantially the same as in the former lectures and, as for the transition, Hegel just stresses the fact that "these [lamaism and Buddhism] religions are very akin to the indian one". (l2 31, 735/623) the sole argument remains the one he mentions when dealing with lamaism: "the general presence of the substance already stands down in favour of the concrete presence of the individual, which is worshipped as absolute power" (ibid. ). the incarnation of power in one (Buddha) or more (the three lamas) particular individuals, who are worshipped as such, seems to be a progress over against a worship of an endless plurality of more or less independent gods.
What might necessitate an upgrade of Buddhism is in fact that, after all, in the Hindu religion the concreteness of its form remains essentially natural: the moments of the divine fall asunder (falling asunder is typical of nature) as if they were independent entities. true religion, Hegel sug- gests, i. e. a religion of spirit in contrast to nature religion, asks for the con- crete resuming of itself into itself. it requires that the concrete not just be posited as such, but that it be posited as ideal as well--and that it be rec- ognized as such. this is not the case in Hinduism yet, whereas Buddhism, in spite of or thanks to its nirvana perspective, might be interpreted as a concrete unification of these moments. the Hindu world consists of a variegated multiplicity of gods, of powers, spiritual distinctions and sensa- tions, all of which appear as isolated and as independent, taking the form of separate human beings or even animals (l2 24, 318-319/221). 11 this mul- tiplicity of human beings and animals constitutes the "realm of fantasy" (l2 24, 319/222), in which arbitrariness appears to be the general rule: "an unrestrained flush (Taumel) of all this content" (l2 24, 323/226), a "jumble (Wirrwarr)"! (l2 24, 323/226-7) fantasy indeed can master any content
11 it might be considered as significant that the Buddha himself is worshipped as a god, as an incarnation of Vishnu in particular. (l2 31, 736/623)
? 40 paul cruysberghs
whatsoever and link freely and arbitrarily representations together. thus, the richness of fantasy has its reverse side as well: the forms appear to lose their initial independency and end up by being totally at the mercy of the arbitrariness of imagination (see also H, 74). 12
insofar as imagination is done justice to in the religion of fantasy Hegel appreciates it undeniably. still, because of the appearance of arbi- trariness and of the keeping apart of the different representations of the divine, without any definite structure, he considers it as a degradation of the basic (read: logical or conceptual) determinations instinctually and unconsciously present in Hinduism. as a consequence of these determi- nations having a "wild, disgusting shape" (l2 24, 324/228), they appear to be "baroque" (l2 24, 324/228) and even "horrifying" (greuelhaft). still, it is precisely in the conceptual determinations, and not so much in the fanci- ful shapes or representations, that Hegel as a philosopher is interested in.
4. the Conceptual determinations
in line with what we have hitherto developed, Hegel distinguishes two moments in the conceptual framework of the Hindu religion: 1) that of the substantiality of the reflection-within-self and 2) that of the form the substantiality is manifesting itself in: the determinations of the absolute. (l2 24, 325/228) We will deal with these moments first, before considering the concrete shape they take in the deities of Brahma (1) and shiva (2).
1) the moment of universal substantiality is the eternal rest of being- within-self. it is defined as a power that is not directed towards anything else, in the way that desire is, but as a power that, still and quiet, being simply reflected in itself, is enclosed in itself. (l2 24, 325/228) it thus remains isolated from the multiplicity of things, from its own concrete particularisations: "this being-within-self [. . . ] remains abstractly inward, purely by itself, as abstract power" (l2 27, 583/478). nonetheless, it needs an existence anyway, although it is supposed to have it outside the par- ticularity of the second moment. it rather takes existence in the "con-
12 Hegel thus contrasts the 'fanciful' (phantastisch) powers of the Hindu religion with the 'images of a beautiful fantasy' (einer scho? nen Phantasie) that he finds in the greek religion: "they are particular powers, although it is a wild particularity in which there is no system but only intimations of what is understandable and necessary, echoed of understood moments but still no understandable totality or systematization, much less a rational one; instead only a multiplicity in a colorful throng" (cf. infra) (l2 27, 584/479).
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 41
crete existing (daseienden),13 immediate human mind"14 (l2 27, 583/478). How this is to be understood more concretely, we will make clear below, when dealing with the concrete shape the logical determinations take in Hinduism.
2) the substantial power, even when having its existence in the con- sciousness of concrete human beings, is to be distinguished from its mani- festation, from the moments as they have been posited by the substantial power itself. these moments have a double status. they are independent beings and, at the same time, they are perishing and vanishing in the power of the one substance. on the one hand, they in fact appear as inde- pendent persons, as divine persons who are the whole itself, so that the first moment, the moment of substantiality, as a matter of fact, disappears in the particular figures (gestalten)15 in which it manifests itself. Hegel has in mind the multiplicity of natural objects and processes that are deified and personified such as "sun, moon, mountains, or rivers; or [. . . ] greater abstractions such as generation, perishing, change of shape" . . . (l2 27, 583/479). one the one hand, these gods are totalities by themselves which do not need anything beyond themselves.
8 Young Kun Kim, 'Hegel's Criticism of Chinese Philosophy', in: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 28, no. 2, sinological Torque (1978), pp. 174-176.
9 see esp. Karel l. van der leeuw, Leibniz. Over de natuurlijke theologie van de Chinezen, Budel: Damon 2006, pp. 57-63; 130-136.
10 'Was die schriftsprache selbst betrifft, so ist dies herauszuheben, dass sie das gro? sste Hindernis der Befo? rderung der Wissenschaft ist. ' (Vorl. 12, 153)
11 The inflexibility of (spoken) Chinese is one of the myths debunked by John DeFrancis: The Chinese Language. Fact and Fantasy, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1984.
? hegel on chinese religion 27
to highlight what he thinks is its central concept: Substance, or rather: the notion of the one substance.
Contemporary european issues at least as much prompted the choice of this concept, as a reconstruction of the inner development of Chinese religion. The most obvious relation is with the controversies surrounding spinozism. The parallel with spinoza is present right from the outset. Just as the latter attempted to overcome Cartesian dualism by positing one substance, so Hegel places a Buddhist concept of one substance at the apex of oriental thought. Consecutively Hegel contrasts this notion with the concept of pantheism employed by the critics of spinozism. His point is that those critics have a poor understanding of the spinozist notion of the All and could learn a lot from the orient. The great achievement of the latter is to have understood the power of negation. Hegel uses the term 'idealism' as a contrast to the vulgar realism of the critics of spinozism who falsely attribute to spinoza a notion of the Divine as an Allesheit, i. e. a container in which all things of this world are dumped. To do justice to spinoza a more appropriate term than pantheism would be acosmism, since in the latter case Divine omnipotence would rightly be understood as a negation of the world. (l2 27, 574/470, note 172)
For a human being, this state of negation is the highest state: one must immerse oneself in this nothing, in the eternal tranquillity of the nothing generally, in the substantial in which all determinations cease, where there is no virtue or intelligence, where all movement annuls itself. All character- istics of both natural life and spiritual life have vanished. (l2 27, 565/462)
7. subjectivism, subjectivity and Philosophy
oriental idealism is not only contrasted to the hypostatization of finite things of which Hegel accused the opponents of spinozism, but is also pitted against Romanticist subjectivism. lecturing in 1825/26 on oriental thought Hegel uses the opportunity for a side-attack on Friedrich schlegel's subjec- tivism. The orient is praised for having discovered the self-sufficiency of pure thinking ('thought for itself '), and for having turned this into the foundation of truth. on the other hand, Romanticists indulge in a 'subjec- tive vanity' that dissolves all objectivity. The advantage of the orient is to have developed 'an intellectual substantiality' in which all 'subjective van- ity is drowned'. 12 However, as Hegel contends, the disadvantage is that the
12 'jene subjective eitelkeit darin zu ersa? ufen' Cf. Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, p. 485.
? 28 sander griffioen
orient only has a dim awareness of god as subject, and as a consequence fails to give the human person its due. (l2 27, 576/472)13 This is also why oriental thought could not evolve into a genuine philosophy.
so while opposing both objectivism and subjectivism, Hegel is at the same time concerned that objectivity and subjectivity receive their due. He also makes clear that the acknowledgment of free subjectivity is the 'to be or not to be' of philosophy. since he finds this lacking in the ori- ent, the conclusion cannot but be that we are looking here in vain for genuine philosophy. especially within the Confucian pale there is little to find. even as a moral teacher Confucius cannot measure up to Cicero. Cicero's De Officiis, Hegel suggests, is more valuable than all the works of Confucius; to which he sarcastically adds that it would have been better for the sage's reputation if these had not been translated. 14
Conclusion: Hegel's Place in the Reception History
After this survey of relevant texts, a certain disappointment is hard to avoid. The texts are not many, and nowhere witness of any mastery. inter- preters before us, of course, reached a similar conclusion. one of them, Young Kun Kim, nevertheless derives consolation by supposing that Hegel at least has left us with hard but stimulating questions: 'neverthe- less, Hegel has contributed to the study of Chinese philosophy by posing tough questions, which i am afraid, have not yet been answered. '15 Unfor- tunately, Kim does not tell us what these questions were.
is this to say that 'Hegel and China' is a subject that could just as well be passed over? This would be the case if Hegel would represent a sheer regress compared to the Jesuit fathers, leibniz, Wolff, goethe, and schelling. in fact, his position has something of a sui generis character. in order to understand his position we need to take a number of points into account.
Ex oriente lux. Hegel follows Voltaire in placing China at the beginning of history: his lectures on world history, religion and philosophy all start with China. so the Far east and no longer Asia Minor is honoured as the
13 idem, p. 484.
14 'Ciceros 'De officiis' ist vielleicht besser fu? r uns als alle Werke des Konfuzius. U? ber die U? bersetzungen urteilen die kompetenten Richter, man ha? tte fu? r Konfuzius' Ruhm besser gesorgt, ihn nicht zu u? bersetzen; es sei ganz gewo? hnliche, weitschweifige Moral. ' (Vorl. 6, 371)
15 Kim, 'Hegel's Criticism of Chinese Philosophy', p. 179.
? hegel on chinese religion 29
cradle of humanity. Herein he follows Voltaire who was the first historian to break with the older tradition of starting in one way or another with the biblical account of israel and the surrounding nations. Whereas Bossuet's Discours sur l'histoire universelle (1681) still followed the old model, Vol- taire started a revolution by letting his Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations (1756), of work of comparable ambition, open with China! 16 Hegel is a child of this revolution.
Historicism. Although the sun rises in the east, it sets in the west. With Hegel, the Western sunset is more important than the eastern sunrise. Both the east's fascination with substantiality and Western reflexivity are placed in a developmental perspective:
This oriental way of viewing things is opposed to that of the occident: just as the sun sets in the West, so it is in the West that human being descends into itself, into its own subjectivity. (l2 27, 572/469)
Therefore, in Hegel the Voltairean revolution does not give the orient a central place. With Buddhism China and india have run their historical course. The spirit then moves on to europe, leaving behind the achieve- ments of the orient as empty shells on the shores of time. For each of the participants the clock of history only strikes once. 17
Concurrence with Leibniz. only in passing is leibniz' interest in China mentioned. Yet there is congruence on an important point. leibniz' Dis- course on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716) was prompted by the criticism of an Anti-Riccian group levelled against the legacy of Ricci. The point the critics wanted to make was that Ricci and friends had been nai? ve in their attitude towards China: the so-called natural theology of the Chinese being in fact a form of pantheism, if not atheism. 18 This criti- cism is strikingly similar to the attacks on spinozism. so Hegel would have answered the anti-Riccian faction in much the same way as he answered the anti-spinozists, i. e. by arguing that the orient and spinoza developed an understanding of substantiality that as such is neither pantheistic or
16 on this revolution, see Karl loewith, Meaning in History. The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, Chicago: 1949, Chapter 5.
17 'Die Uhr der Philosophien, die bei Hegel dieselbe wie die des Weltgeistes ist, schla? gt nicht zweimal dieselbe stunde . . . ' see ernst Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt. Erla? uterungen zu Hegel, Frankfurt: suhrkamp 1962, p. 366.
18 see Van der leeuw, Leibniz, pp. 43-47; Daniel J. Cook & Henry Rosemont, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Writings on China, Chicago: open Court 1994, pp. 5-10.
? 30 sander griffioen
atheistic but adequately articulates Divine omnipotence. 19 Thus he would agree with the gist of leibniz' defence of the Riccians.
In line with the anti-Riccians. A great difference vis-a`-vis leibniz is that natural theology for Hegel has to be (negated and) further developed in order to lead to true knowledge. leibniz' rather eclectic method of looking for strong points in both cultures is anathema to Hegel. Therefore, with Hegel the distance to China vastly increases. leibniz envisaged a fruitful exchange based on a win-win situation. He argued that they are stronger in perceiving, we in thinking. 20 We may conclude that such an exchange between equals would be incongruent with Hegelian historicism. This same historicism also explains why the Voltairean revolution fails to gain momentum. Although following Voltaire in granting China a primal posi- tion in the history of civilization, he also makes clear that it represents a stage to be overcome.
? 19 Cf. Vorl. 12, 160, where Hegel deals with the state religion: 'Die gelehrten Chinesen, welche die Missionare Atheisten in der staatsreligion nennen, nehmen dieses Abstrakte Wesen als . . . . das innerste Wesen der Welt . . . '
20 From a letter to Father grimaldi, 1692, cf. Van der leeuw, Leibniz, p. 51. similar: Cook & Rosemont, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, p. 46 (Preface to the novissima sinica).
Hinduism:
a Religion of fantasy
Paul Cruysberghs
1. introduction
at the end of the 18th century, eastern religions became quite popular in the Western world. Romanticism was in search of alternatives for the typi- cally rationalistic approach of both dogmatic and natural theology by the enlightenment philosophers and theologians. in Hinduism in particular, it discovered a religion that seemed to be free from both rigid dogmatism and abstract rationalism. the very fact that this religion was older than Christianity gave it an aura of originality that made it the more attrac- tive. the sacred texts were initially translated into english and later on into other languages as well. in germany august schlegel published an Indische Bibliothek series. 1 His brother friedrich, who had learned sanskrit during his stay in Paris, wrote a book on The Language and Wisdom of the Indians to which he added a nice selection of indian texts that he had translated on his own. 2 in his most important writings Herder showed an everlasting love for what he called "dieses land der sehnsucht". georg forster translated William Jones's translation of Kalidasa's sakuntula and Wilhelm von Humboldt introduced and translated the Bhagavad-gi^ta^, a crucial episode from the maha^-Bha^rata. 3
Hegel paid close attention to the Hindu religion as well; more than to Buddhism as a matter of fact. in our survey we will refer to the four ver- sions of the lectures on the philosophy of determinate religion as they have been edited by Walter Jaeschke: the manuscript, being the basis of the 1821 lectures (l2 m), the lectures of 1824 (l2 24), those of 1827 (l2 27),
1 see in particular a. W. schlegel (ed. ), Indische Bibliothek, Bd. 2, H. 4, Bonn: 1827.
2 f. schlegel, ? ueber die sprache und Weisheit der inder. ein Beitrag zur Begru? ndung der althertumskunde. nebst metrischen uebersetzungen indischer gedichte? , Heidelberg: 1808. --Kritische friedrich schlegel-ausgabe, ed. by e. Behler, 1. abt. Bd. 8, 1975.
3 W. von Humboldt, ? U? ber die unter dem namen Bhagavad-gi^ta^ bekannte episode des maha^-Bha^rata. gelesen in der akademie der Wissenschaften am 30. Juni 1825 und am 15. Juni 1826, Berlin, 1826? . --W. von Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften, abt. 1: Werke, Bd. 5, Berlin: 1906.
? 32 paul cruysberghs
and those of 1831 (l2 31). 4 the manuscript is rather restricted as far as Hin- duism is concerned, but the student notes of the 1824 and 1827 lectures are quite extensive. the 1824 lectures are the most elaborate, stressing the metaphysical dimension of Hinduism; but they are, alas, less clear than the 1827 lectures. the 1827 lectures, while being shorter, are indeed more perspicuous and concrete. of the 1831 lectures, no complete transcript seems to be extant anymore, but we have at our disposal some excerpts passed down to us by david strauss. Considering the dominant role of cat- egories and thought determinations (Gedankenbestimmungen) in Hegel's philosophy in general and in the philosophy of religion in particular, we will focus mainly on what he called the metaphysical dimension of Hindu religion (l2 m, 100/5) and to a lesser extent on the concrete representa- tion of the gods and the cultic aspects of Hinduism.
in addition to the lectures, we must also take into consideration Hegel's extensive review of Humboldt's book about the Bhagavad-gi^ta^ (H, 19ff ). 5 in this review, published in the Jahrbu? cher fu? r wissenschaftliche Kritik, Hegel does not just refer to Humboldt, but also to august schlegel's Indian Library and to some important english sources as well. it focuses more on the (subjective) cultic and ethical aspects than on the (objec- tive) metaphysical ones and, accordingly, it shows how eager Hegel was to improve his acquaintance with the Hindu religion, wrestling with its complexities and incoherencies, and comparing it with the Christian reli- gion and, quite remarkably, with recent, romantic, tendencies in philoso- phy as well.
Hegel's interpretation of the Hindu religion remains basically the same in the different versions of his lectures, and hence we will not focus on what are, after all, minor differences between them. However, one important modification that Hegel carries out, will require our atten- tion: the treatment of Buddhism which preceded Hinduism in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, was moved in the 1831 lectures to a position following Hinduism. However, as for the internal treatment of Hinduism, Hegel's interpretations do not seem to have changed that much.
4 the english translations of the german text of the lectures are mine (PC); except for those of 1827, that refer to the translation in the Hodgson edition of Hegel's Lectures. in either case, also where my translation diverts from that of the Hodgson edition, a reference to this (standard) edition is added to the text.
5 g. W. f. Hegel, ? Humboldt-Rezension. ueber die unter den nahmen Baghavad-gita bekannte episode des mahabharata; von Wilhelm von Humboldt? , Berlin 1826. --Gesam- melte Werke, Bd. 16, Schriften und Entwu? rfe II (1826-1831), frankfurt am main: meiner, 2001, pp. 19-75 (H).
? hinduism: a religion of fantasy 33
in what follows i will first introduce the general context in which Hegel dealt with the Hindu religion, then i will discuss Hegel's endeavour to interpret its basic content with the help of typically logical categories; and finally i will focus on the cultic aspects of the Hindu religion.
2. the general Context: nature Religion
in the manuscript and in the 1824 and 1827 lectures Hegel deals with Hin- duism in the context of what he terms 'immediate', or 'natural', or 'nature religion' (unmittelbare Religion, natu? rliche Religion, Naturreligion). 6 these terms refer to african and eskimo religions, but also, and even primarily to oriental religions such as the traditional Chinese, mongolian, indian, and Persian religions. all these religions, Hegel claims, present a 'natu- ral unity of the spiritual and the natural' (l2 24, 233-234/139-140). in the nature religions, indeed spirit has not yet separated itself from nature, and is still identical with it. Consequently, natural and spiritual elements are mixed up with each other. the situation can be compared to what Hegel terms the natural soul in his anthropology:7 on an elementary pre-conscious level the soul, though possessing already a certain level of ideality, is still permeated of nature, without taking a distance from it.
the basic notion in nature religion is that of (immediate) being or of substantiality (l2 m, 95/2). natural objects like the sun do not function as symbolic representations (presupposing a distinction between meaning and immediate existence) of the god; they are themselves the "immedi- ately present god" (l2 m, 106/13). in that sense, we can consider nature religions as being pantheistic: god is all things in them: ? `? ? ? ? ` ? ? ? ? . Heaven, stars, earth, plants, animals, and the human being constitute "one King- dom of Heaven". in so far as these objects merely are, they are immediate manifestations of "one single divine life" (l2 m, 100/5). of course, people do not adore finite natural things as they are as such, in the prosaic sense, but only in so far as they are the expressions of a universal power imma- nent in the things themselves, in the same sense as spinoza considered
6 strictly speaking, Hegel distinguishes 'natu? rliche Religion' and 'naturreligion', the first being identical to the latter, but only in so far as in it 'thought (der Gedanke) is brought to the fore' (144). 'natu? rliche Religion' thus refers primarily to the way religion is considered by authors like david Hume (cf. his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion). together with the english translators of the 27 lectures, we translate 'naturreligion' as 'nature religion'.
7 g. W. f. Hegel, Enzyklopa? die der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 20, ? 391 ff.
? 34 paul cruysberghs
the finite modifications to be the expressions of nature or god. in fact, Hegel interpreted nature religion as a pre-metaphysical form of spinozism (l2 m, 104/10). Just as in spinoza, there is only one substance that must be defined as nature or god. the objects of adoration are not finite things as such, but the power of nature that manifests itself as a 'natural subject' (l2 m, 105/11). only in so far as that universal power of nature integrates its other in itself and animates it, people can adore animals (elephants, apes, cows) and human beings (dalai lama, kings, Brahmans) as gods. these are not symbols in fact, they are this particular animal or human being, in its or his actuality, but that actuality is precisely conditioned by the immanent presence of the vital power in it.
in spite of Hegel appreciating the tendency of these religions to give the absolute a further determination of subjectivity, concreteness and singu- larity, he still considers them to be at quite a low level of religiosity. they recognize the presence of the absolute in singular beings, but they reduce, so Hegel says, the singularity of these beings themselves to a merely imme- diate singularity in which spirit is lacking (einer [. . . ] geistlosen Einzelheit) (l2 m, 108/14). on the one hand, Hegel applauds the fact that animals as objects of religion have drives, desires, power of life, that they have an instinct, "that secret, suitable doing from within" (l2 m, 108/14). yet the fact that the instinct exists in the form of absolute, i. e. mere singularity and finiteness, is its weakness. instead of this singularity being a point of departure for sublimation and idealisation of itself, it loses itself in its determinateness, in 'the now' of its naturality and finitude.
We mentioned already that it was part of Hegel's strategy to compare other religions with the Christian one. He did this not just because his students and readers were Christians, but also because he considered the Christian religion, both logically and historically, as the highest form of religion. Religions considered to be hierarchically lower can be made understandable not just by discerning in them the hidden dialectics of logical categories and concepts, but also by contrasting them to the higher forms. therefore, Hegel could not refrain from comparing e. g. the Hindu incarnations of the divine in human beings with the Christian incarnation. in the Christian religion, god also became man, but Jesus, so he argued, was never adored as a god when he was alive. only after he had ascended into heaven and was seated at the right hand of the father, was he adored as divine. it is only as spirit, not in his immediacy, that a human being can be considered as an incarnation of the divine. this spiritual dimen- sion, however, appears to be absent in Hinduism and in nature religions in general (l2 m, 108/15).
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 35
still, Hegel was well aware of how seductive nature religions were for a certain kind of romanticism. thanks to their primitive and immedi- ate character, the spiritual and the natural not yet having fallen apart, nature religions had the aura of being the oldest and most original ones, not yet contaminated by the influences of culture and reflection. they were considered as reminiscences of a paradisiacal situation of harmony, beauty and innocence, in which the human being, possessing a kind of wisdom, which it is suggested, is subsequently lost, was still in a natural unity with nature and with god. thus nature religion was presented as "the true, mostly outstanding, actually divine religion" (l2 24, 238/144),8 whereas Hegel himself rather considered it as "the most contemptuous of all religions" (l2 m, 108/15). With all his sympathy for the wisdom present in these forms of religion, Hegel, sticking to the superiority of the Chris- tian religion, strongly condemned any exaltation of what was presented as being 'original' or 'primitive'. a zealous enthusiasm for eastern or even more 'primitive' religions is completely foreign to Hegel.
3. the Hindu Religion: a Religion of fantasy
in the manuscript, Hegel deals with immediate religion without making any further distinctions. it is clear, however, that, for the most part, he has the Hindu religion in mind.
When discussing the immediate or nature religions in the 1824 lec- tures Hegel distinguishes: 1) the religion of magic (encompassing african (negro), eskimo, and Chinese religions, but also Buddhism), 2) the reli- gion of fantasy, which is actually the Hindu religion, 3) the religion of the good (the Persian light religion) and 4) the religion of riddle (the egyptian religion).
in the 1827 lectures the Chinese religion of the state is explicitly men- tioned as a transitional form between the religion of magic and Bud- dhism, which receives a separate treatment (presented as the religion of
8 in his commentary Jaeschke refers to both schelling (Vorlesungen u? ber die Methode des academischen Studium) and friedrich schlegel (Sprache und Weisheit der Inder) as typical devotees of such an old religion and wisdom (see note to 146, 170-172 in 4b 688). Complaining about the low level of education in 19th century germany, people critical of their own culture had a tendency to contrast the former wisdom of the indians to it (l2 24, 249/154). in l2 31, 723/612 Hegel mentions explicitly friedrich schlegel's thesis that fragments of ? this primitive, true religion of the human spirit' can be found in all other religions.
? 36 paul cruysberghs
being-within-self ), preceding the religion of fantasy which is now charac- terised as the indian religion. 9
i have already mentioned the important modification carried out in the 1831 lectures and taken up by marheineke in the first and second editions of the Werke, in which Hegel moves the Buddhist religion from its inferior position before the indian religion to a hierarchically higher position after it. the part on determinate religion is divided now in three chapters, the first of them being natural religion, which now encompasses exclusively the eskimo, mongolian and african religions (the religions of magic in l2 27). the second chapter introduces a new principle of division: 'the splitting up (Entzweiung) of the Religious Consciousness in itself '. in this chapter, both the Chinese and the indian religions find a place of their own, followed by the lamaic-Buddhist religions. the third chapter, which is not our concern here, deals with the religion of freedom, which refers to the greek and the Roman religions, but they are preceded by so-called forms of transition, to which the religions of the good (the Persian and the Jewish religions), the religion of pain (the Phoenix and adonis cults), and the egyptian religion belong.
in order to understand what happened here, we must first turn to Hegel's analysis of the religions of magic in the 1824 lectures. there are two ele- ments that Hegel considers characteristic of the religions of magic. the first element is a practical one: that of power. a magic relation to the world presupposes a spiritual self-consciousness manifesting its overall power over nature in all its concrete forms. for example, the magic practices we find in african religions, hardly merit the name of religion, since there is no explicit reference to any divinity, but the exercise of magic power is manifestly present. the second element, which Hegel distinguishes in his 1824 lectures, is a theoretical one. it can be found in the Chinese fo tradition, the tibetan lama and other Buddhist traditions. Here the god is present in human shapes like the dalai lama or the Buddha. thanks to metempsychosis however, the god shows his being-within-self, his iden- tity with himself independently of the particular human or animal bodies it reincarnates in. this absolute reflection of the divine in itself, in which all distinctions are dissolved (l2 24, 316-317/219), is considered by Hegel
9 the english edition of the 27 lectures translates 'indian religion' as 'Hindu religion'. -- it is remarkable that in the first and second editions of the Werke, edited by Hegel's friends, the Buddhist religion (religion of being-within-itself) is dealt with after the Hindu religion (religion of fantasy). marheineke, the editor of the lectures on philosophy of religion, might have found evidence for this intervention in the 31 lectures.
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as the basic idea of divinity in general and thus of all religions worthy of that name. (l2 24, 316/218)
according to the 1824 lectures, the Hindu religion, qualified as the reli- gion of fantasy, brings the two moments present in the religion of magic, that of power and that of being-within-self, together. in both fo religion and Buddhism the being-within-self is indefinite and therefore qualified as nothingness (nirvana). in contrast with the essentially negative per- spective of nirvana fostered by Buddhism, Hinduism endows the divine with the determinateness that was part of the concrete exercise of magic power in merely magic religions. in the Hindu religion, Hegel contends, "divinity is objective with all its plenitude of content". (l2 24, 317/220) Whereas the Buddhist world is empty, a concrete divine world arises in Hinduism. Constituting a unity of the infinite essence and the finite shape, the divine develops into a concrete form;--and from a Hegelian point of view this is the considerable kind of progress we are supposed to encounter in all higher religions.
in comparison to the 1824 lectures, the 1827 lectures place a different accent to the treatment of Buddhism, giving it a separate treatment in the first place (cf. supra). this is quite understandable when we take into consideration that Buddhism, at least in its essence, can hardly be con- sidered as a form of magic. nonetheless, Hegel confirms that Hinduism is further developing the substantiality and the being-within-self that fo, lama and Buddhist religions stand for, "in the totality of its externality". (l2 27, 579/475) and, as in l2 24, he considers this particularisation of the universal substance, this adding of "the richness of the world" (l2 27, 581/476) as substantial progress when compared to the Buddhist position. 10 thanks to this concretisation of substantiality both natural and spiritual powers, as they manifest themselves in the concrete world, are recognized as belonging to the absolute; a belonging that has a double side: on the one hand, they appear in their particularity and independency; on the other hand, they appear as vanishing and being consumed by the univer- sal being-within-self of the first substantiality. (l2 27, 581/477)
as a matter of fact, Hegel argues, Hinduism expresses--in its own way, "according to the instinct of the concept" ("nach dem instinkt des Be- griffs") (l2 27, 586/482), the general structure of the (logical) idea: in the first place it is "one, immediate and identical with itself " (l2 27, 581/478);
10 "Here, therefore, the horizon is enlarged; we have here the totality. the viewpoint is concrete; that is the necessary progress. " (l2 27, 581/477)
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secondly, the idea differentiates itself internally, particularizes itself into different, particular shapes and powers; thirdly, the particular powers have to return to the one, to the one universal substance, insofar as they are contained by it. (l2 27, 581/478) Precisely because Hinduism makes room for the second moment of concreteness, it must be considered as a richer form of religion than Buddhism. the third moment however, is presented in a deficient way--and that is the conclusion of both the 1824 and 1827 lectures (l2 24, 326/229; l2 27, 581-584/478-479) (see infra)-- and therefore the Hindu religion itself is deficient. still, in both versions Hegel recognizes that the Hindu religion contains "the three basic deter- minations of the concept" (l2 24, 326/229), i. e. "the basics of the reason- able development, though only in its most general determinations". (l2 27, 582/478)
as for the 1831 lectures, here Hegel also recognizes the three moments of the concept, accusing especially the third moment of offering only a determination in which spirit is absent (geistlose Bestimmung). (l2 31, 734/622) more important, however, is that, as we mentioned earlier, Hegel modified quite drastically the general structure of his lectures. He reduced the natural religions to the eskimo, the mongolian and the afri- can ones, i. e. the former magic religions, which are now, more explicitly than before, denied the status of being religions in the strict sense. more important for us, however, is the introduction of a new perspective: that of the internal splitting up (Entzweiung) of the religious consciousness into a substance, on the one hand (god), and the transitory accidents (the subjects), on the other. in a way this perspective was already present in the former lectures, in which substantiality was considered as a general perspective of nature religion as such. now, the internal splitting up of the religious consciousness into a substantial and an accidental side becomes the common characteristic of the Chinese, indian, and Buddhist religions and separates them from the merely natural religions. in the Chinese reli- gion, the substance is recognized as the foundation (Grundlage) which is determined in itself. it is thought fundamentally as measure, to which human beings have to conform their actions (cf. Confucianism). the indian religion considers the substance as an abstract unity, akin to the human spirit, to which the human being has to elevate itself. the lamaic- Buddhist religion for its part is now--fundamentally different from the previous interpretations--a more concrete form of religion as compared to Hinduism, in so far as the substance becomes concrete in it: it takes the form of a particular individual (the dalai lama, Buddha gautama), to which other human beings have to raise themselves, which is supposed
hinduism: a religion of fantasy 39
to result ultimately in the complete annihilation of the self (nirvana). Concreteness remains the hierarchical criterion to evaluate the different religions of substantiality. yet instead of stressing the concreteness of the relationship to the world, as Hegel did in the 1824 and 1827 lectures, he now focuses on the concreteness of the particular individuals in which the substance finds (as in the dalai lama) or found (as in Buddha) its concrete incarnation. However, apart from the evidence that Buddhism is a histori- cally later development than Hinduism, Hegel's reasons for changing the hierarchical order of eastern religions are not very clear. His analysis of Hinduism remains substantially the same as in the former lectures and, as for the transition, Hegel just stresses the fact that "these [lamaism and Buddhism] religions are very akin to the indian one". (l2 31, 735/623) the sole argument remains the one he mentions when dealing with lamaism: "the general presence of the substance already stands down in favour of the concrete presence of the individual, which is worshipped as absolute power" (ibid. ). the incarnation of power in one (Buddha) or more (the three lamas) particular individuals, who are worshipped as such, seems to be a progress over against a worship of an endless plurality of more or less independent gods.
What might necessitate an upgrade of Buddhism is in fact that, after all, in the Hindu religion the concreteness of its form remains essentially natural: the moments of the divine fall asunder (falling asunder is typical of nature) as if they were independent entities. true religion, Hegel sug- gests, i. e. a religion of spirit in contrast to nature religion, asks for the con- crete resuming of itself into itself. it requires that the concrete not just be posited as such, but that it be posited as ideal as well--and that it be rec- ognized as such. this is not the case in Hinduism yet, whereas Buddhism, in spite of or thanks to its nirvana perspective, might be interpreted as a concrete unification of these moments. the Hindu world consists of a variegated multiplicity of gods, of powers, spiritual distinctions and sensa- tions, all of which appear as isolated and as independent, taking the form of separate human beings or even animals (l2 24, 318-319/221). 11 this mul- tiplicity of human beings and animals constitutes the "realm of fantasy" (l2 24, 319/222), in which arbitrariness appears to be the general rule: "an unrestrained flush (Taumel) of all this content" (l2 24, 323/226), a "jumble (Wirrwarr)"! (l2 24, 323/226-7) fantasy indeed can master any content
11 it might be considered as significant that the Buddha himself is worshipped as a god, as an incarnation of Vishnu in particular. (l2 31, 736/623)
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whatsoever and link freely and arbitrarily representations together. thus, the richness of fantasy has its reverse side as well: the forms appear to lose their initial independency and end up by being totally at the mercy of the arbitrariness of imagination (see also H, 74). 12
insofar as imagination is done justice to in the religion of fantasy Hegel appreciates it undeniably. still, because of the appearance of arbi- trariness and of the keeping apart of the different representations of the divine, without any definite structure, he considers it as a degradation of the basic (read: logical or conceptual) determinations instinctually and unconsciously present in Hinduism. as a consequence of these determi- nations having a "wild, disgusting shape" (l2 24, 324/228), they appear to be "baroque" (l2 24, 324/228) and even "horrifying" (greuelhaft). still, it is precisely in the conceptual determinations, and not so much in the fanci- ful shapes or representations, that Hegel as a philosopher is interested in.
4. the Conceptual determinations
in line with what we have hitherto developed, Hegel distinguishes two moments in the conceptual framework of the Hindu religion: 1) that of the substantiality of the reflection-within-self and 2) that of the form the substantiality is manifesting itself in: the determinations of the absolute. (l2 24, 325/228) We will deal with these moments first, before considering the concrete shape they take in the deities of Brahma (1) and shiva (2).
1) the moment of universal substantiality is the eternal rest of being- within-self. it is defined as a power that is not directed towards anything else, in the way that desire is, but as a power that, still and quiet, being simply reflected in itself, is enclosed in itself. (l2 24, 325/228) it thus remains isolated from the multiplicity of things, from its own concrete particularisations: "this being-within-self [. . . ] remains abstractly inward, purely by itself, as abstract power" (l2 27, 583/478). nonetheless, it needs an existence anyway, although it is supposed to have it outside the par- ticularity of the second moment. it rather takes existence in the "con-
12 Hegel thus contrasts the 'fanciful' (phantastisch) powers of the Hindu religion with the 'images of a beautiful fantasy' (einer scho? nen Phantasie) that he finds in the greek religion: "they are particular powers, although it is a wild particularity in which there is no system but only intimations of what is understandable and necessary, echoed of understood moments but still no understandable totality or systematization, much less a rational one; instead only a multiplicity in a colorful throng" (cf. infra) (l2 27, 584/479).
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crete existing (daseienden),13 immediate human mind"14 (l2 27, 583/478). How this is to be understood more concretely, we will make clear below, when dealing with the concrete shape the logical determinations take in Hinduism.
2) the substantial power, even when having its existence in the con- sciousness of concrete human beings, is to be distinguished from its mani- festation, from the moments as they have been posited by the substantial power itself. these moments have a double status. they are independent beings and, at the same time, they are perishing and vanishing in the power of the one substance. on the one hand, they in fact appear as inde- pendent persons, as divine persons who are the whole itself, so that the first moment, the moment of substantiality, as a matter of fact, disappears in the particular figures (gestalten)15 in which it manifests itself. Hegel has in mind the multiplicity of natural objects and processes that are deified and personified such as "sun, moon, mountains, or rivers; or [. . . ] greater abstractions such as generation, perishing, change of shape" . . . (l2 27, 583/479). one the one hand, these gods are totalities by themselves which do not need anything beyond themselves.
