(2) Whether He was
predestinated
as man?
Summa Theologica
" Therefore the priesthood of Christ will not
endure for ever.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is a priest, not as God, but as man. But
at one time Christ was not man, namely during the three days He lay
dead. Therefore the priesthood of Christ endures not for ever.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 109:4): "Thou art a priest for
ever. "
I answer that, In the priestly office, we may consider two things:
first, the offering of the sacrifice; secondly, the consummation of the
sacrifice, consisting in this, that those for whom the sacrifice is
offered, obtain the end of the sacrifice. Now the end of the sacrifice
which Christ offered consisted not in temporal but in eternal good,
which we obtain through His death, according to Heb. 9:11: "Christ is
[Vulg. : 'being come'] a high-priest of the good things to come"; for
which reason the priesthood of Christ is said to be eternal. Now this
consummation of Christ's sacrifice was foreshadowed in this, that the
high-priest of the Old Law, once a year, entered into the Holy of
Holies with the blood of a he-goat and a calf, as laid down, Lev.
16:11, and yet he offered up the he-goat and calf not within the Holy
of Holies, but without. In like manner Christ entered into the Holy of
Holies---that is, into heaven---and prepared the way for us, that we
might enter by the virtue of His blood, which He shed for us on earth.
Reply to Objection 1: The Saints who will be in heaven will not need
any further expiation by the priesthood of Christ, but having expiated,
they will need consummation through Christ Himself, on Whom their glory
depends, as is written (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God hath
enlightened it"---that is, the city of the Saints---"and the Lamb is
the lamp thereof. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ's passion and death are not to be
repeated, yet the virtue of that Victim endures for ever, for, as it is
written (Heb. 10:14), "by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them
that are sanctified. "
Wherefore the reply to the third objection is clear.
As to the unity of this sacrifice, it was foreshadowed in the Law in
that, once a year, the high-priest of the Law entered into the Holies,
with a solemn oblation of blood, as set down, Lev. 16:11. But the
figure fell short of the reality in this, that the victim had not an
everlasting virtue, for which reason those sacrifices were renewed
every year.
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Whether the priesthood of Christ was according to the order of Melchisedech?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's priesthood was not according
to the order of Melchisedech. For Christ is the fountain-head of the
entire priesthood, as being the principal priest. Now that which is
principal is not . secondary in regard to others, but others are
secondary in its regard. Therefore Christ should not be called a priest
according to the order of Melchisedech.
Objection 2: Further, the priesthood of the Old Law was more akin to
Christ's priesthood than was the priesthood that existed before the
Law. But the nearer the sacraments were to Christ, the more clearly
they signified Him; as is clear from what we have said in the [4107]SS,
Q[2], A[7]. Therefore the priesthood of Christ should be denominated
after the priesthood of the Law, rather than after the order of
Melchisedech, which was before the Law.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Heb. 7:2,3): "That is 'king of
peace,' without father, without mother, without genealogy; having
neither beginning of days nor ending of life": which can be referred
only to the Son of God. Therefore Christ should not be called a priest
according to the order of Melchisedech, as of some one else, but
according to His own order.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 109:4): "Thou art a priest for ever
according to the order of Melchisedech. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 3) the priesthood of the Law
was a figure of the priesthood of Christ, not as adequately
representing the reality, but as falling far short thereof: both
because the priesthood of the Law did not wash away sins, and because
it was not eternal, as the priesthood of Christ. Now the excellence of
Christ's over the Levitical priesthood was foreshadowed in the
priesthood of Melchisedech, who received tithes from Abraham, in whose
loins the priesthood of the Law was tithed. Consequently the priesthood
of Christ is said to be "according to the order of Melchisedech," on
account of the excellence of the true priesthood over the figural
priesthood of the Law.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said to be according to the order of
Melchisedech not as though the latter were a more excellent priest, but
because he foreshadowed the excellence of Christ's over the Levitical
priesthood.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things may be considered in Christ's
priesthood: namely, the offering made by Christ, and (our) partaking
thereof. As to the actual offering, the priesthood of Christ was more
distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of the Law, by reason of the
shedding of blood, than by the priesthood of Melchisedech in which
there was no blood-shedding. But if we consider the participation of
this sacrifice and the effect thereof, wherein the excellence of
Christ's priesthood over the priesthood of the Law principally
consists, then the former was more distinctly foreshadowed by the
priesthood of Melchisedech, who offered bread and wine, signifying, as
Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan. ) ecclesiastical unity, which is
established by our taking part in the sacrifice of Christ [*Cf. [4108]
Q[79], A[1]]. Wherefore also in the New Law the true sacrifice of
Christ is presented to the faithful under the form of bread and wine.
Reply to Objection 3: Melchisedech is described as "without father,
without mother, without genealogy," and as "having neither beginning of
days nor ending of life," not as though he had not these things, but
because these details in his regard are not supplied by Holy Scripture.
And this it is that, as the Apostle says in the same passage, he is
"likened unto the Son of God," Who had no earthly father, no heavenly
mother, and no genealogy, according to Is. 53:8: "Who shall declare His
generation? " and Who in His Godhead has neither beginning nor end of
days.
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OF ADOPTION AS BEFITTING TO CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now come to consider whether adoption befits Christ: and under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons?
(2) Whether this is fitting to God the Father alone?
(3) Whether it is proper to man to be adopted to the sonship of God?
(4) Whether Christ can be called the adopted Son?
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Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting that God should adopt
sons. For, as jurists say, no one adopts anyone but a stranger as his
son. But no one is a stranger in relation to God, Who is the Creator of
all. Therefore it seems unfitting that God should adopt.
Objection 2: Further, adoption seems to have been introduced in default
of natural sonship. But in God there is natural sonship, as set down in
the [4109]FP, Q[27], A[2]. Therefore it is unfitting that God should
adopt.
Objection 3: Further, the purpose of adopting anyone is that he may
succeed, as heir, the person who adopts him. But it does not seem
possible for anyone to succeed God as heir, for He can never die.
Therefore it is unfitting that God should adopt.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5) that "He hath predestinated
us unto the adoption of children of God. " But the predestination of God
is not ineffectual. Therefore God does adopt some as His sons.
I answer that, A man adopts someone as his son forasmuch as out of
goodness he admits him as heir to his estate. Now God is infinitely
good: for which reason He admits His creatures to a participation of
good things; especially rational creatures, who forasmuch as they are
made to the image of God, are capable of Divine beatitude. And this
consists in the enjoyment of God, by which also God Himself is happy
and rich in Himself---that is, in the enjoyment of Himself. Now a man's
inheritance is that which makes him rich. Wherefore, inasmuch as God,
of His goodness, admits men to the inheritance of beatitude, He is said
to adopt them. Moreover Divine exceeds human adoption, forasmuch as
God, by bestowing His grace, makes man whom He adopts worthy to receive
the heavenly inheritance; whereas man does not make him worthy whom he
adopts; but rather in adopting him he chooses one who is already
worthy.
Reply to Objection 1: Considered in his nature man is not a stranger in
respect to God, as to the natural gifts bestowed on him: but he is as
to the gifts of grace and glory; in regard to which he is adopted.
Reply to Objection 2: Man works in order to supply his wants: not so
God, Who works in order to communicate to others the abundance of His
perfection. Wherefore, as by the work of creation the Divine goodness
is communicated to all creatures in a certain likeness, so by the work
of adoption the likeness of natural sonship is communicated to men,
according to Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable
to the image of His Son. "
Reply to Objection 3: Spiritual goods can be possessed by many at the
same time; not so material goods. Wherefore none can receive a material
inheritance except the successor of a deceased person: whereas all
receive the spiritual inheritance at the same time in its entirety
without detriment to the ever-living Father.
Yet it might be said that God ceases to be, according as He is in us by
faith, so as to begin to be in us by vision, as a gloss says on Rom.
8:17: "If sons, heirs also. "
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Whether it is fitting that the whole Trinity should adopt?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that the whole Trinity should
adopt. For adoption is said of God in likeness to human custom. But
among men those only adopt who can beget: and in God this can be
applied only to the Father. Therefore in God the Father alone can
adopt.
Objection 2: Further, by adoption men become the brethren of Christ,
according to Rom. 8:29: "That He might be the first-born among many
brethren. " Now brethren are the sons of the same father; wherefore our
Lord says (Jn. 20:17): "I ascend to My Father and to your Father. "
Therefore Christ's Father alone has adopted sons.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Gal. 4:4, 5, 6): "God sent His Son
. . . that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because you are
sons of God, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts,
crying: 'Abba' [Father]. " Therefore it belongs to Him to adopt, Who has
the Son and the Holy Ghost. But this belongs to the Father alone.
Therefore it befits the Father alone to adopt.
On the contrary, It belongs to Him to adopt us as sons, Whom we can
call Father; whence it is written (Rom. 8:15): "You have received the
spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: 'Abba' [Father]. " But when
we say to God, "Our Father," we address the whole Trinity: as is the
case with the other names which are said of God in respect of
creatures, as stated in the [4110]FP, Q[33], A[3], OBJ[1]; cf.
[4111]FP, Q[45], A[6]. Therefore to adopt is befitting to the whole
Trinity.
I answer that, There is this difference between an adopted son of God
and the natural Son of God, that the latter is "begotten not made";
whereas the former is made, according to Jn. 1:12: "He gave them power
to be made the sons of God. " Yet sometimes the adopted son is said to
be begotten, by reason of the spiritual regeneration which is by grace,
not by nature; wherefore it is written (James 1:18): "Of His own will
hath He begotten us by the word of truth. " Now although, in God, to
beget belongs to the Person of the Father, yet to produce any effect in
creatures is common to the whole Trinity, by reason of the oneness of
their Nature: since, where there is one nature, there must needs be one
power and one operation: whence our Lord says (Jn. 5:19): "What things
soever the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner. "
Therefore it belongs to the whole Trinity to adopt men as sons of God.
Reply to Objection 1: All human individuals are not of one individual
nature, so that there need be one operation and one effect of them all,
as is the case in God. Consequently in this respect no comparison is
possible.
Reply to Objection 2: By adoption we are made the brethren of Christ,
as having with Him the same Father: Who, nevertheless, is His Father in
one way, and ours in another. Whence pointedly our Lord says,
separately, "My Father," and "Your Father" (Jn. 20:17). For He is
Christ's Father by natural generation; and this is proper to Him:
whereas He is our Father by a voluntary operation, which is common to
Him and to the Son and Holy Ghost: so that Christ is not the Son of the
whole Trinity, as we are.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 2), adoptive sonship is
a certain likeness of the eternal Sonship: just as all that takes place
in time is a certain likeness of what has been from eternity. Now man
is likened to the splendor of the Eternal Son by reason of the light of
grace which is attributed to the Holy Ghost. Therefore adoption, though
common to the whole Trinity, is appropriated to the Father as its
author; to the Son, as its exemplar; to the Holy Ghost, as imprinting
on us the likeness of this exemplar.
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Whether it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the rational nature
to be adopted. For God is not said to be the Father of the rational
creature, save by adoption. But God is called the Father even of the
irrational creature, according to Job 38:28: "Who is father of the
rain? Or who begot the drops of dew? " Therefore it is not proper to the
rational creature to be adopted.
Objection 2: Further, by reason of adoption some are called sons of
God. But to be sons of God seems to be properly attributed by the
Scriptures to the angels; according to Job 1:6: "On a certain day when
the sons of God came to stand before the Lord. " Therefore it is not
proper to the rational creature to be adopted.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is proper to a nature, belongs to all
that have that nature: just as risibility belongs to all men. But to be
adopted does not belong to every rational nature. Therefore it is not
proper to human nature.
On the contrary, Adopted sons are the "heirs of God," as is stated Rom.
8:17. But such an inheritance belongs to none but the rational nature.
Therefore it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted.
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 3), the sonship of adoption is
a certain likeness of natural sonship. Now the Son of God proceeds
naturally from the Father as the Intellectual Word, in oneness of
nature with the Father. To this Word, therefore, something may be
likened in three ways. First, on the part of the form but not on the
part of its intelligibility: thus the form of a house already built is
like the mental word of the builder in its specific form, but not in
intelligibility, because the material form of a house is not
intelligible, as it was in the mind of the builder. In this way every
creature is like the Eternal Word; since it was made through the Word.
Secondly, the creature is likened to the Word, not only as to its form,
but also as to its intelligibility: thus the knowledge which is
begotten in the disciple's mind is likened to the word in the mind of
the master. In this way the rational creature, even in its nature, is
likened to the Word of God. Thirdly, a creature is likened to the
Eternal Word, as to the oneness of the Word with the Father, which is
by reason of grace and charity: wherefore our Lord prays (Jn.
17:21,22): "That they may be one in Us . . . as We also are one. " And
this likeness perfects the adoption: for to those who are thus like Him
the eternal inheritance is due. It is therefore clear that to be
adopted belongs to the rational creature alone: not indeed to all, but
only to those who have charity; which is "poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5); for which reason (Rom. 8:15) the Holy Ghost
is called "the Spirit of adoption of sons. "
Reply to Objection 1: God is called the Father of the irrational
creature, not properly speaking, by reason of adoption, but by reason
of creation; according to the first-mentioned participation of
likeness.
Reply to Objection 2: Angels are called sons of God by adoptive
sonship, not that it belongs to them first; but because they were the
first to receive the adoption of sons.
Reply to Objection 3: Adoption is a property resulting not from nature,
but from grace, of which the rational nature is capable. Therefore it
need not belong to every rational nature: but every rational creature
must needs be capable of adoption.
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Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is the adopted Son of
God. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii) speaking of Christ: "The dignity of
power is not forfeited when carnal humanity [*Some editions read
'humilitas'---'the humility or lowliness of the flesh'] is adopted. "
Therefore Christ as man is the adopted Son of God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) that "by
the same grace that Man is Christ, as from the birth of faith every man
is a Christian. " But other men are Christians by the grace of adoption.
Therefore this Man is Christ by adoption: and consequently He would
seem to be an adopted son.
Objection 3: Further, Christ, as man, is a servant. But it is of
greater dignity to be an adopted son than to be a servant. Therefore
much more is Christ, as man, an adopted Son.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarn. viii): "We do not call an
adopted son a natural son: the natural son is a true son. " But Christ
is the true and natural Son of God, according to 1 Jn. 5:20: "That we
may . . . be in His true Son, Jesus Christ. " Therefore Christ, as Man,
is not an adopted Son.
I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person,
not to the nature; whence in the [4112]FP, Q[32], A[3] we have stated
that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other
than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature
to be the Son. But it has been said above (A[1], ad 2), that the
sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship: nor
can a thing be said to participate in what it has essentially.
Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son of God, can nowise be called
an adopted Son.
But according to those who suppose two persons or two hypostases or two
supposita in Christ, no reason prevents Christ being called the adopted
Son of God.
Reply to Objection 1: As sonship does not properly belong to the
nature, so neither does adoption. Consequently, when it is said that
"carnal humanity is adopted," the expression is metaphorical: and
adoption is used to signify the union of human nature to the Person of
the Son.
Reply to Objection 2: This comparison of Augustine is to be referred to
the principle because, to wit, just as it is granted to any man without
meriting it to be a Christian, so did it happen that this man without
meriting it was Christ. But there is a difference on the part of the
term: because by the grace of union Christ is the natural Son; whereas
another man by habitual grace is an adopted son. Yet habitual grace in
Christ does not make one who was not a son to be an adopted son, but is
a certain effect of Filiation in the soul of Christ, according to Jn.
1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the
Father; full of grace and truth. "
Reply to Objection 3: To be a creature, as also to be subservient or
subject to God, regards not only the person, but also the nature: but
this cannot be said of sonship. Wherefore the comparison does not hold.
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OF THE PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We shall now consider the predestination of Christ. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ was predestinated?
(2) Whether He was predestinated as man?
(3) Whether His predestination is the exemplar of ours?
(4) Whether it is the cause of our predestination?
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Whether it is befitting that Christ should be predestinated?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be
predestinated. For the term of anyone's predestination seems to be the
adoption of sons, according to Eph. 1:5: "Who hath predestinated us
unto the adoption of children. " But it is not befitting to Christ to be
an adopted Son, as stated above ([4113]Q[23], A[4]). Therefore it is
not fitting that Christ be predestinated.
Objection 2: Further, we may consider two things in Christ: His human
nature and His person. But it cannot be said that Christ is
predestinated by reason of His human nature; for this proposition is
false---"The human nature is Son of God. " In like manner neither by
reason of the person; for this person is the Son of God, not by grace,
but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of grace, as
stated in the [4114]FP, Q[23], AA[2],5. Therefore Christ was not
predestinated to be the Son of God.
Objection 3: Further, just as that which has been made was not always,
so also that which was predestinated; since predestination implies a
certain antecedence. But, because Christ was always God and the Son of
God, it cannot be said that that Man was "made the Son of God. "
Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say that Christ was
"predestinated the Son of God. "
On the contrary, The Apostle says, speaking of Christ (Rom. 1:4): "Who
was predestinated the Son of God in power. "
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said in the [4115]FP,
Q[23], AA[1],2, predestination, in its proper sense, is a certain
Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are to be done
in time by the grace of God. Now, that man is God, and that God is man,
is something done in time by God through the grace of union. Nor can it
be said that God has not from eternity pre-ordained to do this in time:
since it would follow that something would come anew into the Divine
Mind. And we must needs admit that the union itself of natures in the
Person of Christ falls under the eternal predestination of God. For
this reason do we say that Christ was predestinated.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle there speaks of that predestination
by which we are predestinated to be adopted sons. And just as Christ in
a singular manner above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a
singular manner is He predestinated.
Reply to Objection 2: As a gloss [*From St. Augustine, De Praed. Sanct.
xv] says on Rom. 1:4, some understood that predestination to refer to
the nature and not to the Person---that is to say, that on human nature
was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God in unity of
Person.
But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be improper, for two
reasons. First, for a general reason: for we do not speak of a person's
nature, but of his person, as being predestinated: because to be
predestinated is to be directed towards salvation, which belongs to a
suppositum acting for the end of beatitude. Secondly, for a special
reason. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to human nature; for
this proposition is false: "The human nature is the Son of God": unless
one were to force from it such an exposition as: "Who was predestinated
the Son of God in power"---that is, "It was predestinated that the
Human nature should be united to the Son of God in the Person. "
Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person of Christ: not,
indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in the Divine Nature, but as
subsisting in the human nature. Wherefore the Apostle, after saying,
"Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh,"
added, "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power": so as to give
us to understand that in respect of His being of the seed of David
according to the flesh, He was predestinated the Son of God in power.
For although it is natural to that Person, considered in Himself, to be
the Son of God in power, yet this is not natural to Him, considered in
the human nature, in respect of which this befits Him according to the
grace of union.
Reply to Objection 3: Origen commenting on Rom. 1:4 says that the true
reading of this passage of the Apostle is: "Who was destined to be the
Son of God in power"; so that no antecedence is implied. And so there
would be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in the
participle "predestinated," not to the fact of being the Son of God,
but to the manifestation thereof, according to the customary way of
speaking in Holy Scripture, by which things are said to take place when
they are made known; so that the sense would be---"Christ was
predestinated to be made known as the Son of God. " But this is an
improper signification of predestination. For a person is properly said
to be predestinated by reason of his being directed to the end of
beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ does not depend on our knowledge
thereof.
It is therefore better to say that the antecedence implied in the
participle "predestinated" is to be referred to the Person not in
Himself, but by reason of the human nature: since, although that Person
was the Son of God from eternity, it was not always true that one
subsisting in human nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. xv): "Jesus was predestinated, so that He Who
according to the flesh was to be the son of David, should be
nevertheless Son of God in power. "
Moreover, it must be observed that, although the participle
"predestinated," just as this participle "made," implies antecedence,
yet there is a difference. For "to be made" belongs to the thing in
itself: whereas "to be predestinated" belongs to someone as being in
the apprehension of one who pre-ordains. Now that which is the subject
of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended either as under that
form or absolutely. And since it cannot be said absolutely of the
Person of Christ that He began to be the Son of God, yet this is
becoming to Him as understood or apprehended to exist in human nature,
because at one time it began to be true that one existing in human
nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition---"Christ was
predestinated the Son of God"---is truer than this---"Christ was made
the Son of God. "
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Whether this proposition is false: "Christ as man was predestinated to be
the Son of God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this proposition is false: "Christ as
man was predestinated to be the Son of God. " For at some time a man is
that which he was predestinated to be: since God's predestination does
not fail. If, therefore, Christ as man was predestinated the Son of
God, it seems to follow that as man He is the Son of God. But the
latter is false. Therefore the former is false.
Objection 2: Further, what is befitting to Christ as man is befitting
to any man; since He belongs to the same species as other men. If,
therefore, Christ, as man, was predestinated the Son of God, it will
follow that this is befitting to any other man. But the latter is
false. Therefore the former is false.
Objection 3: Further, that is predestinated from eternity which is to
take place at some time. But this proposition, "The Son of God was made
man," is truer than this, "Man was made the Son of God. " Therefore this
proposition, "Christ, as the Son of God, was predestinated to be man,"
is truer than this, "Christ as Man was predestinated to be the Son of
God. "
On the contrary, Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) says: "Forasmuch as
God the Son was made Man, we say that the Lord of Glory was
predestinated. "
I answer that, Two things may be considered in predestination. One on
the part of eternal predestination itself: and in this respect it
implies a certain antecedence in regard to that which comes under
predestination. Secondly, predestination may be considered as regards
its temporal effect, which is some gratuitous gift of God. Therefore
from both points of view we must say that predestination is ascribed to
Christ by reason of His human nature alone: for human nature was not
always united to the Word; and by grace bestowed an it was it united in
Person to the Son of God. Consequently, by reason of human nature alone
can predestination be attributed to Christ. Wherefore Augustine says
(De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "This human nature of ours was predestinated
to be raised to so great, so lofty, so exalted a position, that it
would be impossible to raise it higher. " Now that is said to belong to
anyone as man which belongs to him by reason of human nature.
Consequently, we must say that "Christ, as Man, was predestinated the
Son of God. "
Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "Christ, as Man, was predestinated
the Son of God," this qualification, "as Man," can be referred in two
ways to the action signified by the participle. First, as regards what
comes under predestination materially, and thus it is false. For the
sense would be that it was predestinated that Christ, as Man, should be
the Son of God. And in this sense the objection takes it.
Secondly, it may be referred to the very nature of the action itself:
that is, forasmuch as predestination implies antecedence and gratuitous
effect. And thus predestination belongs to Christ by reason of His
human nature, as stated above. And in this sense He is said to be
predestinated as Man.
Reply to Objection 2: Something may be befitting to a man by reason of
human nature, in two ways. First, so that human nature be the cause
thereof: thus risibility is befitting to Socrates by reason of human
nature, being caused by its principles. In this manner predestination
is not befitting either to Christ or to any other man, by reason of
human nature. This is the sense of the objection. Secondly, a thing may
be befitting to someone by reason of human nature, because human nature
is susceptible of it. And in this sense we say that Christ was
predestinated by reason of human nature; because predestination refers
to the exaltation of human nature in Him, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The
Word of God assumed Man to Himself in such a singular and ineffable
manner that at the same time He may be truly and correctly called the
Son of Man, because He assumed Men to Himself; and the Son of God,
because it was the Only-begotten of God Who assumed human nature. "
Consequently, since this assumption comes under predestination by
reason of its being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of God was
predestinated to be man, and that the Son of Man was predestinated to
be the Son of God. But because grace was not bestowed on the Son of God
that He might be man, but rather on human nature, that it might be
united to the Son of God; it is more proper to say that "Christ, as
Man, was predestinated to be the Son of God," than that, "Christ, as
Son of God, was predestinated to be Man. "
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Whether Christ's predestination is the exemplar of ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the
exemplar of ours. For the exemplar exists before the exemplate. But
nothing exists before the eternal. Since, therefore, our predestination
is eternal, it seems that Christ's predestination is not the exemplar
of ours.
Objection 2: Further, the exemplar leads us to knowledge of the
exemplate. But there was no need for God to be led from something else
to knowledge of our predestination; since it is written (Rom. 8:29):
"Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated. " Therefore Christ's
predestination is not the exemplar of ours.
Objection 3: Further, the exemplar is conformed to the exemplate. But
Christ's predestination seems to be of a different nature from ours:
because we are predestinated to the sonship of adoption, whereas Christ
was predestinated "Son of God in power," as is written (Rom. 1:4).
Therefore His predestination is not the exemplar of ours.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The Saviour
Himself, the Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus is the most
splendid light of predestination and grace. " Now He is called the light
of predestination and grace, inasmuch as our predestination is made
manifest by His predestination and grace; and this seems to pertain to
the nature of an exemplar. Therefore Christ's predestination is the
exemplar of ours.
I answer that, Predestination may be considered in two ways. First, on
the part of the act of predestination: and thus Christ's predestination
cannot be said to be the exemplar of ours: for in the same way and by
the same eternal act God predestinated us and Christ.
Secondly, predestination may be considered on the part of that to which
anyone is predestinated, and this is the term and effect of
predestination. In this sense Christ's predestination is the exemplar
of ours, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the good to which
we are predestinated: for He was predestinated to be the natural Son of
God, whereas we are predestinated to the adoption of sons, which is a
participated likeness of natural sonship. Whence it is written (Rom.
8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable
to the image of His Son. " Secondly, in respect of the manner of
obtaining this good---that is, by grace. This is most manifest in
Christ; because human nature in Him, without any antecedent merits, was
united to the Son of God: and of the fulness of His grace we all have
received, as it is written (Jn. 1:16).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the aforesaid act of the
predestinator.
The same is to be said of the second objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The exemplate need not be conformed to the
exemplar in all respects: it is sufficient that it imitate it in some.
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Whether Christ's predestination is the cause of ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours. For that which is eternal has no cause. But our
predestination is eternal. Therefore Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours.
Objection 2: Further, that which depends on the simple will of God has
no other cause but God's will. Now, our predestination depends on the
simple will of God, for it is written (Eph. 1:11): "Being predestinated
according to the purpose of Him, Who worketh all things according to
the counsel of His will. " Therefore Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours.
Objection 3: Further, if the cause be taken away, the effect is also
taken away. But if we take away Christ's predestination, ours is not
taken away; since even if the Son of God were not incarnate, our
salvation might yet have been achieved in a different manner, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10). Therefore Christ's predestination
is. not the cause of ours.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5): "(Who) hath predestinated us
unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ. "
I answer that, if we consider predestination on the part of the very
act of predestinating, then Christ's predestination is not the cause of
ours; because by one and the same act God predestinated both Christ and
us. But if we consider predestination on the part of its term, thus
Christ's predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by
predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it should
be achieved through Jesus Christ. For eternal predestination covers not
only that which is to be accomplished in time, but also the mode and
order in which it is to be accomplished in time.
Replies OBJ 1 and 2: These arguments consider predestination on the
part of the act of predestinating.
Reply to Objection 3: If Christ were not to have been incarnate, God
would have decreed men's salvation by other means. But since He decreed
the Incarnation of Christ, He decreed at the same time that He should
be the cause of our salvation.
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OF THE ADORATION OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider things pertaining to Christ in reference to us;
and first, the adoration of Christ, by which we adore Him; secondly, we
must consider how He is our Mediator with God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's Godhead and humanity are to be adored with one and
the same adoration?
(2) Whether His flesh is to be adored with the adoration of "latria"?
(3) Whether the adoration of "latria" is to be given to the image of
Christ?
(4) Whether "latria" is to be given to the Cross of Christ?
(5) Whether to His Mother?
(6) Concerning the adoration of the relics of Saints.
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Whether Christ's humanity and Godhead are to be adored with the same
adoration?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's humanity and Godhead are not
to be adored with the same adoration. For Christ's Godhead is to be
adored, as being common to Father and Son; wherefore it is written (Jn.
5:23): "That all may honor the Son, as they honor the Father. " But
Christ's humanity is not common to Him and the Father. Therefore
Christ's humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same
adoration.
Objection 2: Further, honor is properly "the reward of virtue," as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). But virtue merits its reward by
action. Since, therefore, in Christ the action of the Divine Nature is
distinct from that of the human nature, as stated above ([4116]Q[19],
A[1]), it seems that Christ's humanity is to be adored with a different
adoration from that which is given to His Godhead.
Objection 3: Further, if the soul of Christ were not united to the
Word, it would have been worthy of veneration on account of the
excellence of its wisdom and grace. But by being united to the Word it
lost nothing of its worthiness. Therefore His human nature should
receive a certain veneration proper thereto, besides the veneration
which is given to His Godhead.
On the contrary, We read in the chapters of the Fifth Council [*Second
Council of Constantinople, coll. viii, can. 9]: "If anyone say that
Christ is adored in two natures, so as to introduce two distinct
adorations, and does not adore God the Word made flesh with the one and
the same adoration as His flesh, as the Church has handed down from the
beginning; let such a one be anathema. "
I answer that, We may consider two things in a person to whom honor is
given: the person himself, and the cause of his being honored. Now
properly speaking honor is given to a subsistent thing in its entirety:
for we do not speak of honoring a man's hand, but the man himself. And
if at any time it happen that we speak of honoring a man's hand or
foot, it is not by reason of these members being honored of themselves:
but by reason of the whole being honored in them. In this way a man may
be honored even in something external; for instance in his vesture, his
image, or his messenger.
The cause of honor is that by reason of which the person honored has a
certain excellence. for honor is reverence given to something on
account of its excellence, as stated in the [4117]SS, Q[103], A[1]. If
therefore in one man there are several causes of honor, for instance,
rank, knowledge, and virtue, the honor given to him will be one in
respect of the person honored, but several in respect of the causes of
honor: for it is the man that is honored, both on account of knowledge
and by reason of his virtue.
Since, therefore, in Christ there is but one Person of the Divine and
human natures, and one hypostasis, and one suppositum, He is given one
adoration and one honor on the part of the Person adored: but on the
part of the cause for which He is honored, we can say that there are
several adorations, for instance that He receives one honor on account
of His uncreated knowledge, and another on account of His created
knowledge.
But if it be said that there are several persons or hypostases in
Christ, it would follow that there would be, absolutely speaking,
several adorations. And this is what is condemned in the Councils. For
it is written in the chapters of Cyril [*Council of Ephesus, Part I,
ch. 26]: "If anyone dare to say that the man assumed should be adored
besides the Divine Word, as though these were distinct persons; and
does not rather honor the Emmanuel with one single adoration, inasmuch
as the Word was made flesh; let him be anathema. "
Reply to Objection 1: In the Trinity there are three Who are honored,
but only one cause of honor. In the mystery of the Incarnation it is
the reverse: and therefore only one honor is given to the Trinity and
only one to Christ, but in a different way.
Reply to Objection 2: Operation is not the object but the motive of
honor. And therefore there being two operations in Christ proves, not
two adorations, but two causes of adoration.
Reply to Objection 3: If the soul of Christ were not united to the Word
of God, it would be the principal thing in that Man. Wherefore honor
would be due to it principally, since man is that which is principal in
him [*Cf. Ethic. ix, 8]. But since Christ's soul is united to a Person
of greater dignity, to that Person is honor principally due to Whom
Christ's soul is united. Nor is the dignity of Christ's soul hereby
diminished, but rather increased, as stated above ([4118]Q[2], A[2], ad
2).
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Whether Christ's humanity should be adored with the adoration of "latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's soul should not be adored with
the adoration of "latria. " For on the words of Ps. 98:5, "Adore His
foot-stool for it is holy," a gloss says: "The flesh assumed by the
Word of God is rightly adored by us: for no one partakes spiritually of
His flesh unless he first adore it; but not indeed with the adoration
called 'latria,' which is due to the Creator alone. " Now the flesh is
part of the humanity. Therefore Christ's humanity is not to be adored
with the adoration of "latria. "
Objection 2: Further, the worship of "latria" is not to be given to any
creature: since for this reason were the Gentiles reproved, that they
"worshiped and served the creature," as it is written (Rom. 1:25).
endure for ever.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is a priest, not as God, but as man. But
at one time Christ was not man, namely during the three days He lay
dead. Therefore the priesthood of Christ endures not for ever.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 109:4): "Thou art a priest for
ever. "
I answer that, In the priestly office, we may consider two things:
first, the offering of the sacrifice; secondly, the consummation of the
sacrifice, consisting in this, that those for whom the sacrifice is
offered, obtain the end of the sacrifice. Now the end of the sacrifice
which Christ offered consisted not in temporal but in eternal good,
which we obtain through His death, according to Heb. 9:11: "Christ is
[Vulg. : 'being come'] a high-priest of the good things to come"; for
which reason the priesthood of Christ is said to be eternal. Now this
consummation of Christ's sacrifice was foreshadowed in this, that the
high-priest of the Old Law, once a year, entered into the Holy of
Holies with the blood of a he-goat and a calf, as laid down, Lev.
16:11, and yet he offered up the he-goat and calf not within the Holy
of Holies, but without. In like manner Christ entered into the Holy of
Holies---that is, into heaven---and prepared the way for us, that we
might enter by the virtue of His blood, which He shed for us on earth.
Reply to Objection 1: The Saints who will be in heaven will not need
any further expiation by the priesthood of Christ, but having expiated,
they will need consummation through Christ Himself, on Whom their glory
depends, as is written (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God hath
enlightened it"---that is, the city of the Saints---"and the Lamb is
the lamp thereof. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ's passion and death are not to be
repeated, yet the virtue of that Victim endures for ever, for, as it is
written (Heb. 10:14), "by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them
that are sanctified. "
Wherefore the reply to the third objection is clear.
As to the unity of this sacrifice, it was foreshadowed in the Law in
that, once a year, the high-priest of the Law entered into the Holies,
with a solemn oblation of blood, as set down, Lev. 16:11. But the
figure fell short of the reality in this, that the victim had not an
everlasting virtue, for which reason those sacrifices were renewed
every year.
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Whether the priesthood of Christ was according to the order of Melchisedech?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's priesthood was not according
to the order of Melchisedech. For Christ is the fountain-head of the
entire priesthood, as being the principal priest. Now that which is
principal is not . secondary in regard to others, but others are
secondary in its regard. Therefore Christ should not be called a priest
according to the order of Melchisedech.
Objection 2: Further, the priesthood of the Old Law was more akin to
Christ's priesthood than was the priesthood that existed before the
Law. But the nearer the sacraments were to Christ, the more clearly
they signified Him; as is clear from what we have said in the [4107]SS,
Q[2], A[7]. Therefore the priesthood of Christ should be denominated
after the priesthood of the Law, rather than after the order of
Melchisedech, which was before the Law.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Heb. 7:2,3): "That is 'king of
peace,' without father, without mother, without genealogy; having
neither beginning of days nor ending of life": which can be referred
only to the Son of God. Therefore Christ should not be called a priest
according to the order of Melchisedech, as of some one else, but
according to His own order.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 109:4): "Thou art a priest for ever
according to the order of Melchisedech. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 3) the priesthood of the Law
was a figure of the priesthood of Christ, not as adequately
representing the reality, but as falling far short thereof: both
because the priesthood of the Law did not wash away sins, and because
it was not eternal, as the priesthood of Christ. Now the excellence of
Christ's over the Levitical priesthood was foreshadowed in the
priesthood of Melchisedech, who received tithes from Abraham, in whose
loins the priesthood of the Law was tithed. Consequently the priesthood
of Christ is said to be "according to the order of Melchisedech," on
account of the excellence of the true priesthood over the figural
priesthood of the Law.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said to be according to the order of
Melchisedech not as though the latter were a more excellent priest, but
because he foreshadowed the excellence of Christ's over the Levitical
priesthood.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things may be considered in Christ's
priesthood: namely, the offering made by Christ, and (our) partaking
thereof. As to the actual offering, the priesthood of Christ was more
distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of the Law, by reason of the
shedding of blood, than by the priesthood of Melchisedech in which
there was no blood-shedding. But if we consider the participation of
this sacrifice and the effect thereof, wherein the excellence of
Christ's priesthood over the priesthood of the Law principally
consists, then the former was more distinctly foreshadowed by the
priesthood of Melchisedech, who offered bread and wine, signifying, as
Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan. ) ecclesiastical unity, which is
established by our taking part in the sacrifice of Christ [*Cf. [4108]
Q[79], A[1]]. Wherefore also in the New Law the true sacrifice of
Christ is presented to the faithful under the form of bread and wine.
Reply to Objection 3: Melchisedech is described as "without father,
without mother, without genealogy," and as "having neither beginning of
days nor ending of life," not as though he had not these things, but
because these details in his regard are not supplied by Holy Scripture.
And this it is that, as the Apostle says in the same passage, he is
"likened unto the Son of God," Who had no earthly father, no heavenly
mother, and no genealogy, according to Is. 53:8: "Who shall declare His
generation? " and Who in His Godhead has neither beginning nor end of
days.
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OF ADOPTION AS BEFITTING TO CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now come to consider whether adoption befits Christ: and under
this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons?
(2) Whether this is fitting to God the Father alone?
(3) Whether it is proper to man to be adopted to the sonship of God?
(4) Whether Christ can be called the adopted Son?
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Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting that God should adopt
sons. For, as jurists say, no one adopts anyone but a stranger as his
son. But no one is a stranger in relation to God, Who is the Creator of
all. Therefore it seems unfitting that God should adopt.
Objection 2: Further, adoption seems to have been introduced in default
of natural sonship. But in God there is natural sonship, as set down in
the [4109]FP, Q[27], A[2]. Therefore it is unfitting that God should
adopt.
Objection 3: Further, the purpose of adopting anyone is that he may
succeed, as heir, the person who adopts him. But it does not seem
possible for anyone to succeed God as heir, for He can never die.
Therefore it is unfitting that God should adopt.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5) that "He hath predestinated
us unto the adoption of children of God. " But the predestination of God
is not ineffectual. Therefore God does adopt some as His sons.
I answer that, A man adopts someone as his son forasmuch as out of
goodness he admits him as heir to his estate. Now God is infinitely
good: for which reason He admits His creatures to a participation of
good things; especially rational creatures, who forasmuch as they are
made to the image of God, are capable of Divine beatitude. And this
consists in the enjoyment of God, by which also God Himself is happy
and rich in Himself---that is, in the enjoyment of Himself. Now a man's
inheritance is that which makes him rich. Wherefore, inasmuch as God,
of His goodness, admits men to the inheritance of beatitude, He is said
to adopt them. Moreover Divine exceeds human adoption, forasmuch as
God, by bestowing His grace, makes man whom He adopts worthy to receive
the heavenly inheritance; whereas man does not make him worthy whom he
adopts; but rather in adopting him he chooses one who is already
worthy.
Reply to Objection 1: Considered in his nature man is not a stranger in
respect to God, as to the natural gifts bestowed on him: but he is as
to the gifts of grace and glory; in regard to which he is adopted.
Reply to Objection 2: Man works in order to supply his wants: not so
God, Who works in order to communicate to others the abundance of His
perfection. Wherefore, as by the work of creation the Divine goodness
is communicated to all creatures in a certain likeness, so by the work
of adoption the likeness of natural sonship is communicated to men,
according to Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable
to the image of His Son. "
Reply to Objection 3: Spiritual goods can be possessed by many at the
same time; not so material goods. Wherefore none can receive a material
inheritance except the successor of a deceased person: whereas all
receive the spiritual inheritance at the same time in its entirety
without detriment to the ever-living Father.
Yet it might be said that God ceases to be, according as He is in us by
faith, so as to begin to be in us by vision, as a gloss says on Rom.
8:17: "If sons, heirs also. "
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Whether it is fitting that the whole Trinity should adopt?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that the whole Trinity should
adopt. For adoption is said of God in likeness to human custom. But
among men those only adopt who can beget: and in God this can be
applied only to the Father. Therefore in God the Father alone can
adopt.
Objection 2: Further, by adoption men become the brethren of Christ,
according to Rom. 8:29: "That He might be the first-born among many
brethren. " Now brethren are the sons of the same father; wherefore our
Lord says (Jn. 20:17): "I ascend to My Father and to your Father. "
Therefore Christ's Father alone has adopted sons.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Gal. 4:4, 5, 6): "God sent His Son
. . . that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because you are
sons of God, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts,
crying: 'Abba' [Father]. " Therefore it belongs to Him to adopt, Who has
the Son and the Holy Ghost. But this belongs to the Father alone.
Therefore it befits the Father alone to adopt.
On the contrary, It belongs to Him to adopt us as sons, Whom we can
call Father; whence it is written (Rom. 8:15): "You have received the
spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: 'Abba' [Father]. " But when
we say to God, "Our Father," we address the whole Trinity: as is the
case with the other names which are said of God in respect of
creatures, as stated in the [4110]FP, Q[33], A[3], OBJ[1]; cf.
[4111]FP, Q[45], A[6]. Therefore to adopt is befitting to the whole
Trinity.
I answer that, There is this difference between an adopted son of God
and the natural Son of God, that the latter is "begotten not made";
whereas the former is made, according to Jn. 1:12: "He gave them power
to be made the sons of God. " Yet sometimes the adopted son is said to
be begotten, by reason of the spiritual regeneration which is by grace,
not by nature; wherefore it is written (James 1:18): "Of His own will
hath He begotten us by the word of truth. " Now although, in God, to
beget belongs to the Person of the Father, yet to produce any effect in
creatures is common to the whole Trinity, by reason of the oneness of
their Nature: since, where there is one nature, there must needs be one
power and one operation: whence our Lord says (Jn. 5:19): "What things
soever the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner. "
Therefore it belongs to the whole Trinity to adopt men as sons of God.
Reply to Objection 1: All human individuals are not of one individual
nature, so that there need be one operation and one effect of them all,
as is the case in God. Consequently in this respect no comparison is
possible.
Reply to Objection 2: By adoption we are made the brethren of Christ,
as having with Him the same Father: Who, nevertheless, is His Father in
one way, and ours in another. Whence pointedly our Lord says,
separately, "My Father," and "Your Father" (Jn. 20:17). For He is
Christ's Father by natural generation; and this is proper to Him:
whereas He is our Father by a voluntary operation, which is common to
Him and to the Son and Holy Ghost: so that Christ is not the Son of the
whole Trinity, as we are.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 2), adoptive sonship is
a certain likeness of the eternal Sonship: just as all that takes place
in time is a certain likeness of what has been from eternity. Now man
is likened to the splendor of the Eternal Son by reason of the light of
grace which is attributed to the Holy Ghost. Therefore adoption, though
common to the whole Trinity, is appropriated to the Father as its
author; to the Son, as its exemplar; to the Holy Ghost, as imprinting
on us the likeness of this exemplar.
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Whether it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the rational nature
to be adopted. For God is not said to be the Father of the rational
creature, save by adoption. But God is called the Father even of the
irrational creature, according to Job 38:28: "Who is father of the
rain? Or who begot the drops of dew? " Therefore it is not proper to the
rational creature to be adopted.
Objection 2: Further, by reason of adoption some are called sons of
God. But to be sons of God seems to be properly attributed by the
Scriptures to the angels; according to Job 1:6: "On a certain day when
the sons of God came to stand before the Lord. " Therefore it is not
proper to the rational creature to be adopted.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is proper to a nature, belongs to all
that have that nature: just as risibility belongs to all men. But to be
adopted does not belong to every rational nature. Therefore it is not
proper to human nature.
On the contrary, Adopted sons are the "heirs of God," as is stated Rom.
8:17. But such an inheritance belongs to none but the rational nature.
Therefore it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted.
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 3), the sonship of adoption is
a certain likeness of natural sonship. Now the Son of God proceeds
naturally from the Father as the Intellectual Word, in oneness of
nature with the Father. To this Word, therefore, something may be
likened in three ways. First, on the part of the form but not on the
part of its intelligibility: thus the form of a house already built is
like the mental word of the builder in its specific form, but not in
intelligibility, because the material form of a house is not
intelligible, as it was in the mind of the builder. In this way every
creature is like the Eternal Word; since it was made through the Word.
Secondly, the creature is likened to the Word, not only as to its form,
but also as to its intelligibility: thus the knowledge which is
begotten in the disciple's mind is likened to the word in the mind of
the master. In this way the rational creature, even in its nature, is
likened to the Word of God. Thirdly, a creature is likened to the
Eternal Word, as to the oneness of the Word with the Father, which is
by reason of grace and charity: wherefore our Lord prays (Jn.
17:21,22): "That they may be one in Us . . . as We also are one. " And
this likeness perfects the adoption: for to those who are thus like Him
the eternal inheritance is due. It is therefore clear that to be
adopted belongs to the rational creature alone: not indeed to all, but
only to those who have charity; which is "poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5); for which reason (Rom. 8:15) the Holy Ghost
is called "the Spirit of adoption of sons. "
Reply to Objection 1: God is called the Father of the irrational
creature, not properly speaking, by reason of adoption, but by reason
of creation; according to the first-mentioned participation of
likeness.
Reply to Objection 2: Angels are called sons of God by adoptive
sonship, not that it belongs to them first; but because they were the
first to receive the adoption of sons.
Reply to Objection 3: Adoption is a property resulting not from nature,
but from grace, of which the rational nature is capable. Therefore it
need not belong to every rational nature: but every rational creature
must needs be capable of adoption.
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Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is the adopted Son of
God. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii) speaking of Christ: "The dignity of
power is not forfeited when carnal humanity [*Some editions read
'humilitas'---'the humility or lowliness of the flesh'] is adopted. "
Therefore Christ as man is the adopted Son of God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) that "by
the same grace that Man is Christ, as from the birth of faith every man
is a Christian. " But other men are Christians by the grace of adoption.
Therefore this Man is Christ by adoption: and consequently He would
seem to be an adopted son.
Objection 3: Further, Christ, as man, is a servant. But it is of
greater dignity to be an adopted son than to be a servant. Therefore
much more is Christ, as man, an adopted Son.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarn. viii): "We do not call an
adopted son a natural son: the natural son is a true son. " But Christ
is the true and natural Son of God, according to 1 Jn. 5:20: "That we
may . . . be in His true Son, Jesus Christ. " Therefore Christ, as Man,
is not an adopted Son.
I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person,
not to the nature; whence in the [4112]FP, Q[32], A[3] we have stated
that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other
than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature
to be the Son. But it has been said above (A[1], ad 2), that the
sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship: nor
can a thing be said to participate in what it has essentially.
Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son of God, can nowise be called
an adopted Son.
But according to those who suppose two persons or two hypostases or two
supposita in Christ, no reason prevents Christ being called the adopted
Son of God.
Reply to Objection 1: As sonship does not properly belong to the
nature, so neither does adoption. Consequently, when it is said that
"carnal humanity is adopted," the expression is metaphorical: and
adoption is used to signify the union of human nature to the Person of
the Son.
Reply to Objection 2: This comparison of Augustine is to be referred to
the principle because, to wit, just as it is granted to any man without
meriting it to be a Christian, so did it happen that this man without
meriting it was Christ. But there is a difference on the part of the
term: because by the grace of union Christ is the natural Son; whereas
another man by habitual grace is an adopted son. Yet habitual grace in
Christ does not make one who was not a son to be an adopted son, but is
a certain effect of Filiation in the soul of Christ, according to Jn.
1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the
Father; full of grace and truth. "
Reply to Objection 3: To be a creature, as also to be subservient or
subject to God, regards not only the person, but also the nature: but
this cannot be said of sonship. Wherefore the comparison does not hold.
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OF THE PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We shall now consider the predestination of Christ. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ was predestinated?
(2) Whether He was predestinated as man?
(3) Whether His predestination is the exemplar of ours?
(4) Whether it is the cause of our predestination?
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Whether it is befitting that Christ should be predestinated?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be
predestinated. For the term of anyone's predestination seems to be the
adoption of sons, according to Eph. 1:5: "Who hath predestinated us
unto the adoption of children. " But it is not befitting to Christ to be
an adopted Son, as stated above ([4113]Q[23], A[4]). Therefore it is
not fitting that Christ be predestinated.
Objection 2: Further, we may consider two things in Christ: His human
nature and His person. But it cannot be said that Christ is
predestinated by reason of His human nature; for this proposition is
false---"The human nature is Son of God. " In like manner neither by
reason of the person; for this person is the Son of God, not by grace,
but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of grace, as
stated in the [4114]FP, Q[23], AA[2],5. Therefore Christ was not
predestinated to be the Son of God.
Objection 3: Further, just as that which has been made was not always,
so also that which was predestinated; since predestination implies a
certain antecedence. But, because Christ was always God and the Son of
God, it cannot be said that that Man was "made the Son of God. "
Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say that Christ was
"predestinated the Son of God. "
On the contrary, The Apostle says, speaking of Christ (Rom. 1:4): "Who
was predestinated the Son of God in power. "
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said in the [4115]FP,
Q[23], AA[1],2, predestination, in its proper sense, is a certain
Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are to be done
in time by the grace of God. Now, that man is God, and that God is man,
is something done in time by God through the grace of union. Nor can it
be said that God has not from eternity pre-ordained to do this in time:
since it would follow that something would come anew into the Divine
Mind. And we must needs admit that the union itself of natures in the
Person of Christ falls under the eternal predestination of God. For
this reason do we say that Christ was predestinated.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle there speaks of that predestination
by which we are predestinated to be adopted sons. And just as Christ in
a singular manner above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a
singular manner is He predestinated.
Reply to Objection 2: As a gloss [*From St. Augustine, De Praed. Sanct.
xv] says on Rom. 1:4, some understood that predestination to refer to
the nature and not to the Person---that is to say, that on human nature
was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God in unity of
Person.
But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be improper, for two
reasons. First, for a general reason: for we do not speak of a person's
nature, but of his person, as being predestinated: because to be
predestinated is to be directed towards salvation, which belongs to a
suppositum acting for the end of beatitude. Secondly, for a special
reason. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to human nature; for
this proposition is false: "The human nature is the Son of God": unless
one were to force from it such an exposition as: "Who was predestinated
the Son of God in power"---that is, "It was predestinated that the
Human nature should be united to the Son of God in the Person. "
Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person of Christ: not,
indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in the Divine Nature, but as
subsisting in the human nature. Wherefore the Apostle, after saying,
"Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh,"
added, "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power": so as to give
us to understand that in respect of His being of the seed of David
according to the flesh, He was predestinated the Son of God in power.
For although it is natural to that Person, considered in Himself, to be
the Son of God in power, yet this is not natural to Him, considered in
the human nature, in respect of which this befits Him according to the
grace of union.
Reply to Objection 3: Origen commenting on Rom. 1:4 says that the true
reading of this passage of the Apostle is: "Who was destined to be the
Son of God in power"; so that no antecedence is implied. And so there
would be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in the
participle "predestinated," not to the fact of being the Son of God,
but to the manifestation thereof, according to the customary way of
speaking in Holy Scripture, by which things are said to take place when
they are made known; so that the sense would be---"Christ was
predestinated to be made known as the Son of God. " But this is an
improper signification of predestination. For a person is properly said
to be predestinated by reason of his being directed to the end of
beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ does not depend on our knowledge
thereof.
It is therefore better to say that the antecedence implied in the
participle "predestinated" is to be referred to the Person not in
Himself, but by reason of the human nature: since, although that Person
was the Son of God from eternity, it was not always true that one
subsisting in human nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. xv): "Jesus was predestinated, so that He Who
according to the flesh was to be the son of David, should be
nevertheless Son of God in power. "
Moreover, it must be observed that, although the participle
"predestinated," just as this participle "made," implies antecedence,
yet there is a difference. For "to be made" belongs to the thing in
itself: whereas "to be predestinated" belongs to someone as being in
the apprehension of one who pre-ordains. Now that which is the subject
of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended either as under that
form or absolutely. And since it cannot be said absolutely of the
Person of Christ that He began to be the Son of God, yet this is
becoming to Him as understood or apprehended to exist in human nature,
because at one time it began to be true that one existing in human
nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition---"Christ was
predestinated the Son of God"---is truer than this---"Christ was made
the Son of God. "
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Whether this proposition is false: "Christ as man was predestinated to be
the Son of God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this proposition is false: "Christ as
man was predestinated to be the Son of God. " For at some time a man is
that which he was predestinated to be: since God's predestination does
not fail. If, therefore, Christ as man was predestinated the Son of
God, it seems to follow that as man He is the Son of God. But the
latter is false. Therefore the former is false.
Objection 2: Further, what is befitting to Christ as man is befitting
to any man; since He belongs to the same species as other men. If,
therefore, Christ, as man, was predestinated the Son of God, it will
follow that this is befitting to any other man. But the latter is
false. Therefore the former is false.
Objection 3: Further, that is predestinated from eternity which is to
take place at some time. But this proposition, "The Son of God was made
man," is truer than this, "Man was made the Son of God. " Therefore this
proposition, "Christ, as the Son of God, was predestinated to be man,"
is truer than this, "Christ as Man was predestinated to be the Son of
God. "
On the contrary, Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) says: "Forasmuch as
God the Son was made Man, we say that the Lord of Glory was
predestinated. "
I answer that, Two things may be considered in predestination. One on
the part of eternal predestination itself: and in this respect it
implies a certain antecedence in regard to that which comes under
predestination. Secondly, predestination may be considered as regards
its temporal effect, which is some gratuitous gift of God. Therefore
from both points of view we must say that predestination is ascribed to
Christ by reason of His human nature alone: for human nature was not
always united to the Word; and by grace bestowed an it was it united in
Person to the Son of God. Consequently, by reason of human nature alone
can predestination be attributed to Christ. Wherefore Augustine says
(De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "This human nature of ours was predestinated
to be raised to so great, so lofty, so exalted a position, that it
would be impossible to raise it higher. " Now that is said to belong to
anyone as man which belongs to him by reason of human nature.
Consequently, we must say that "Christ, as Man, was predestinated the
Son of God. "
Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "Christ, as Man, was predestinated
the Son of God," this qualification, "as Man," can be referred in two
ways to the action signified by the participle. First, as regards what
comes under predestination materially, and thus it is false. For the
sense would be that it was predestinated that Christ, as Man, should be
the Son of God. And in this sense the objection takes it.
Secondly, it may be referred to the very nature of the action itself:
that is, forasmuch as predestination implies antecedence and gratuitous
effect. And thus predestination belongs to Christ by reason of His
human nature, as stated above. And in this sense He is said to be
predestinated as Man.
Reply to Objection 2: Something may be befitting to a man by reason of
human nature, in two ways. First, so that human nature be the cause
thereof: thus risibility is befitting to Socrates by reason of human
nature, being caused by its principles. In this manner predestination
is not befitting either to Christ or to any other man, by reason of
human nature. This is the sense of the objection. Secondly, a thing may
be befitting to someone by reason of human nature, because human nature
is susceptible of it. And in this sense we say that Christ was
predestinated by reason of human nature; because predestination refers
to the exaltation of human nature in Him, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The
Word of God assumed Man to Himself in such a singular and ineffable
manner that at the same time He may be truly and correctly called the
Son of Man, because He assumed Men to Himself; and the Son of God,
because it was the Only-begotten of God Who assumed human nature. "
Consequently, since this assumption comes under predestination by
reason of its being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of God was
predestinated to be man, and that the Son of Man was predestinated to
be the Son of God. But because grace was not bestowed on the Son of God
that He might be man, but rather on human nature, that it might be
united to the Son of God; it is more proper to say that "Christ, as
Man, was predestinated to be the Son of God," than that, "Christ, as
Son of God, was predestinated to be Man. "
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Whether Christ's predestination is the exemplar of ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the
exemplar of ours. For the exemplar exists before the exemplate. But
nothing exists before the eternal. Since, therefore, our predestination
is eternal, it seems that Christ's predestination is not the exemplar
of ours.
Objection 2: Further, the exemplar leads us to knowledge of the
exemplate. But there was no need for God to be led from something else
to knowledge of our predestination; since it is written (Rom. 8:29):
"Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated. " Therefore Christ's
predestination is not the exemplar of ours.
Objection 3: Further, the exemplar is conformed to the exemplate. But
Christ's predestination seems to be of a different nature from ours:
because we are predestinated to the sonship of adoption, whereas Christ
was predestinated "Son of God in power," as is written (Rom. 1:4).
Therefore His predestination is not the exemplar of ours.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The Saviour
Himself, the Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus is the most
splendid light of predestination and grace. " Now He is called the light
of predestination and grace, inasmuch as our predestination is made
manifest by His predestination and grace; and this seems to pertain to
the nature of an exemplar. Therefore Christ's predestination is the
exemplar of ours.
I answer that, Predestination may be considered in two ways. First, on
the part of the act of predestination: and thus Christ's predestination
cannot be said to be the exemplar of ours: for in the same way and by
the same eternal act God predestinated us and Christ.
Secondly, predestination may be considered on the part of that to which
anyone is predestinated, and this is the term and effect of
predestination. In this sense Christ's predestination is the exemplar
of ours, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the good to which
we are predestinated: for He was predestinated to be the natural Son of
God, whereas we are predestinated to the adoption of sons, which is a
participated likeness of natural sonship. Whence it is written (Rom.
8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable
to the image of His Son. " Secondly, in respect of the manner of
obtaining this good---that is, by grace. This is most manifest in
Christ; because human nature in Him, without any antecedent merits, was
united to the Son of God: and of the fulness of His grace we all have
received, as it is written (Jn. 1:16).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the aforesaid act of the
predestinator.
The same is to be said of the second objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The exemplate need not be conformed to the
exemplar in all respects: it is sufficient that it imitate it in some.
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Whether Christ's predestination is the cause of ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours. For that which is eternal has no cause. But our
predestination is eternal. Therefore Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours.
Objection 2: Further, that which depends on the simple will of God has
no other cause but God's will. Now, our predestination depends on the
simple will of God, for it is written (Eph. 1:11): "Being predestinated
according to the purpose of Him, Who worketh all things according to
the counsel of His will. " Therefore Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours.
Objection 3: Further, if the cause be taken away, the effect is also
taken away. But if we take away Christ's predestination, ours is not
taken away; since even if the Son of God were not incarnate, our
salvation might yet have been achieved in a different manner, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10). Therefore Christ's predestination
is. not the cause of ours.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5): "(Who) hath predestinated us
unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ. "
I answer that, if we consider predestination on the part of the very
act of predestinating, then Christ's predestination is not the cause of
ours; because by one and the same act God predestinated both Christ and
us. But if we consider predestination on the part of its term, thus
Christ's predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by
predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it should
be achieved through Jesus Christ. For eternal predestination covers not
only that which is to be accomplished in time, but also the mode and
order in which it is to be accomplished in time.
Replies OBJ 1 and 2: These arguments consider predestination on the
part of the act of predestinating.
Reply to Objection 3: If Christ were not to have been incarnate, God
would have decreed men's salvation by other means. But since He decreed
the Incarnation of Christ, He decreed at the same time that He should
be the cause of our salvation.
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OF THE ADORATION OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider things pertaining to Christ in reference to us;
and first, the adoration of Christ, by which we adore Him; secondly, we
must consider how He is our Mediator with God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's Godhead and humanity are to be adored with one and
the same adoration?
(2) Whether His flesh is to be adored with the adoration of "latria"?
(3) Whether the adoration of "latria" is to be given to the image of
Christ?
(4) Whether "latria" is to be given to the Cross of Christ?
(5) Whether to His Mother?
(6) Concerning the adoration of the relics of Saints.
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Whether Christ's humanity and Godhead are to be adored with the same
adoration?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's humanity and Godhead are not
to be adored with the same adoration. For Christ's Godhead is to be
adored, as being common to Father and Son; wherefore it is written (Jn.
5:23): "That all may honor the Son, as they honor the Father. " But
Christ's humanity is not common to Him and the Father. Therefore
Christ's humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same
adoration.
Objection 2: Further, honor is properly "the reward of virtue," as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). But virtue merits its reward by
action. Since, therefore, in Christ the action of the Divine Nature is
distinct from that of the human nature, as stated above ([4116]Q[19],
A[1]), it seems that Christ's humanity is to be adored with a different
adoration from that which is given to His Godhead.
Objection 3: Further, if the soul of Christ were not united to the
Word, it would have been worthy of veneration on account of the
excellence of its wisdom and grace. But by being united to the Word it
lost nothing of its worthiness. Therefore His human nature should
receive a certain veneration proper thereto, besides the veneration
which is given to His Godhead.
On the contrary, We read in the chapters of the Fifth Council [*Second
Council of Constantinople, coll. viii, can. 9]: "If anyone say that
Christ is adored in two natures, so as to introduce two distinct
adorations, and does not adore God the Word made flesh with the one and
the same adoration as His flesh, as the Church has handed down from the
beginning; let such a one be anathema. "
I answer that, We may consider two things in a person to whom honor is
given: the person himself, and the cause of his being honored. Now
properly speaking honor is given to a subsistent thing in its entirety:
for we do not speak of honoring a man's hand, but the man himself. And
if at any time it happen that we speak of honoring a man's hand or
foot, it is not by reason of these members being honored of themselves:
but by reason of the whole being honored in them. In this way a man may
be honored even in something external; for instance in his vesture, his
image, or his messenger.
The cause of honor is that by reason of which the person honored has a
certain excellence. for honor is reverence given to something on
account of its excellence, as stated in the [4117]SS, Q[103], A[1]. If
therefore in one man there are several causes of honor, for instance,
rank, knowledge, and virtue, the honor given to him will be one in
respect of the person honored, but several in respect of the causes of
honor: for it is the man that is honored, both on account of knowledge
and by reason of his virtue.
Since, therefore, in Christ there is but one Person of the Divine and
human natures, and one hypostasis, and one suppositum, He is given one
adoration and one honor on the part of the Person adored: but on the
part of the cause for which He is honored, we can say that there are
several adorations, for instance that He receives one honor on account
of His uncreated knowledge, and another on account of His created
knowledge.
But if it be said that there are several persons or hypostases in
Christ, it would follow that there would be, absolutely speaking,
several adorations. And this is what is condemned in the Councils. For
it is written in the chapters of Cyril [*Council of Ephesus, Part I,
ch. 26]: "If anyone dare to say that the man assumed should be adored
besides the Divine Word, as though these were distinct persons; and
does not rather honor the Emmanuel with one single adoration, inasmuch
as the Word was made flesh; let him be anathema. "
Reply to Objection 1: In the Trinity there are three Who are honored,
but only one cause of honor. In the mystery of the Incarnation it is
the reverse: and therefore only one honor is given to the Trinity and
only one to Christ, but in a different way.
Reply to Objection 2: Operation is not the object but the motive of
honor. And therefore there being two operations in Christ proves, not
two adorations, but two causes of adoration.
Reply to Objection 3: If the soul of Christ were not united to the Word
of God, it would be the principal thing in that Man. Wherefore honor
would be due to it principally, since man is that which is principal in
him [*Cf. Ethic. ix, 8]. But since Christ's soul is united to a Person
of greater dignity, to that Person is honor principally due to Whom
Christ's soul is united. Nor is the dignity of Christ's soul hereby
diminished, but rather increased, as stated above ([4118]Q[2], A[2], ad
2).
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Whether Christ's humanity should be adored with the adoration of "latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's soul should not be adored with
the adoration of "latria. " For on the words of Ps. 98:5, "Adore His
foot-stool for it is holy," a gloss says: "The flesh assumed by the
Word of God is rightly adored by us: for no one partakes spiritually of
His flesh unless he first adore it; but not indeed with the adoration
called 'latria,' which is due to the Creator alone. " Now the flesh is
part of the humanity. Therefore Christ's humanity is not to be adored
with the adoration of "latria. "
Objection 2: Further, the worship of "latria" is not to be given to any
creature: since for this reason were the Gentiles reproved, that they
"worshiped and served the creature," as it is written (Rom. 1:25).
