No More Learning

Further, there is greater union between form and matter than between
agent and patient. Now the diversity of spiritual and corporeal nature
does not hinder the soul from being the form of the body. Therefore
neither is it an obstacle to its suffering from a body.

I answer that, Given that the fire of hell is not so called
metaphorically, nor an imaginary fire, but a real corporeal fire, we
must needs say that the soul will suffer punishment from a corporeal
fire, since our Lord said (Mat. 25:41) that this fire was prepared for
the devil and his angels, who are incorporeal even as the soul. But how
it is that they can thus suffer is explained in many ways.

For some have said that the mere fact that the soul sees the fire makes
the soul suffer from the fire: wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) says:
"The soul suffers from the fire by merely seeing it. " But this does not
seem sufficient, because whatever is seen, from the fact that it is
seen, is a perfection of the seer. wherefore it cannot conduce to his
punishment, as seen. Sometimes, however, it is of a penal or unpleasant
nature accidentally, in so far, to wit, as it is apprehended as
something hurtful, and consequently, besides the fact that the soul
sees the fire, there must needs be some relation of the soul to the
fire, according to which the fire is hurtful to the soul.

Hence others have said that although a corporeal fire cannot burn the
soul, the soul nevertheless apprehends it as hurtful to itself, and in
consequence of this apprehension is seized with fear and sorrow, in
fulfillment of Ps. 13:5, "They have trembled for fear, where there was
no fear. " Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv, 29) that "the soul burns
through seeing itself aflame. " But this, again, seems insufficient,
because in this case the soul would suffer from the fire, not in
reality but only in apprehension: for although a real passion of sorrow
or pain may result from a false imagination, as Augustine observes
(Gen. ad lit. xii), it cannot be said in relation to that passion that
one really suffers from the thing, but from the image of the thing that
is present to one's fancy. Moreover, this kind of suffering would be
more unlike real suffering than that which results from imaginary
vision, since the latter is stated to result from real images of
things, which images the soul carries about with it, whereas the former
results from false fancies which the erring soul imagines: and
furthermore, it is not probable that separated souls or demons, who are
endowed with keen intelligence, would think it possible for a corporeal
fire to hurt them, if they were nowise distressed thereby.

Hence others say that it is necessary to admit that the soul suffers
even really from the corporeal fire: wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv,
29): "We can gather from the words of the Gospel, that the soul suffers
from the fire not only by seeing it, but also by feeling it. " They
explain the possibility of this as follows. They say that this
corporeal fire can be considered in two ways. First, as a corporeal
thing, and thus it has not the power to act on the soul. Secondly, as
the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice. For the order of
Divine justice demands that the soul which by sinning subjected itself
to corporeal things should be subjected to them also in punishment. Now
an instrument acts not only in virtue of its own nature, but also in
virtue of the principal agent: wherefore it is not unreasonable if that
fire, seeing that it acts in virtue of a spiritual agent, should act on
the spirit of a man or demon, in the same way as we have explained the
sanctification of the soul by the sacraments ([5034]TP, Q[62],
AA[1],4).

But, again, this does not seem to suffice, since every instrument, in
acting on that on which it is used instrumentally, has its own
connatural action besides the action whereby it acts in virtue of the
principal agent: in fact it is by fulfilling the former that it effects
the latter action, even as, in Baptism, it is by laving the body that
water sanctifies the soul, and the saw by cutting wood produces the
shape of a house.

Hence we must allow the fire to exercise on the soul an action
connatural to the fire, in order that it may be the instrument of
Divine justice in the punishment of sin: and for this reason we must
say that a body cannot naturally act on a spirit, nor in any way be
hurtful or distressful to it, except in so far as the latter is in some
way united to a body: for thus we observe that "the corruptible body is
a load upon the soul" (Wis. 9:15). Now a spirit is united to a body in
two ways. In one way as form to matter, so that from their union there
results one thing simply: and the spirit that is thus united to a body
both quickens the body and is somewhat burdened by the body: but it is
not thus that the spirit of man or demon is united to the corporeal
fire. In another way as the mover is united to the things moved, or as
a thing placed is united to place, even as incorporeal things are in a
place. In this way created incorporeal spirits are confined to a place,
being in one place in such a way as not to be in another. Now although
of its nature a corporeal thing is able to confine an incorporeal
spirit to a place, it is not able of its nature to detain an
incorporeal spirit in the place to which it is confined, and so to tie
it to that place that it be unable to seek another, since a spirit is
not by nature in a place so as to be subject to place. But the
corporeal fire is enabled as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine
justice thus to detain a spirit; and thus it has a penal effect on it,
by hindering it from fulfilling its own will, that is by hindering it
from acting where it will and as it will.

This way is asserted by Gregory (Dial. iv, 29). For in explaining how
the soul can suffer from that fire by feeling it, he expresses himself
as follows: "Since Truth declares the rich sinner to be condemned to
fire, will any wise man deny that the souls of the wicked are
imprisoned in flames? " Julian [*Bishop of Toledo, Prognostic ii, 17]
says the same as quoted by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 44): "If the
incorporeal spirit of a living man is held by the body, why shall it
not be held after death by a corporeal fire? " and Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that "just as, although the soul is spiritual and the
body corporeal, man is so fashioned that the soul is united to the body
as giving it life, and on account of this union conceives a great love
for its body, so it is chained to the fire, as receiving punishment
therefrom, and from this union conceives a loathing. "

Accordingly we must unite all the aforesaid modes together, in order to
understand perfectly how the soul suffers from a corporeal fire: so as
to say that the fire of its nature is able to have an incorporeal
spirit united to it as a thing placed is united to a place; that as the
instrument of Divine justice it is enabled to detain it enchained as it
were, and in this respect this fire is really hurtful to the spirit,
and thus the soul seeing the fire as something hurtful to it is
tormented by the fire. Hence Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) mentions all these
in order, as may be seen from the above quotations.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there as one inquiring:
wherefore he expresses himself otherwise when deciding the point, as
quoted above (De Civ. Dei xxi). Or we may reply that Augustine means to
say that the things which are the proximate occasion of the soul's pain
or sorrow are spiritual, since it would not be distressed unless it
apprehended the fire as hurtful to it: wherefore the fire as
apprehended is the proximate cause of its distress, whereas the
corporeal fire which exists outside the soul is the remote cause of its
distress.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is simply more excellent than
the fire, the fire is relatively more excellent than the soul, in so
far, to wit, as it is the instrument of Divine justice.

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher and Boethius are speaking of the
action whereby the patient is changed into the nature of the agent.
Such is not the action of the fire on the soul: and consequently the
argument is not conclusive.

Reply to Objection 4: By acting on the soul the fire bestows nothing on
it but detains it, as stated above. Hence the argument is not to the
point.

Reply to Objection 5: In intellectual vision sorrow is not caused by
the fact that something is seen, since the thing seen as such can
nowise be contrary to the intellect. But in the sensible vision the
thing seen, by its very action on the sight so as to be seen, there may
be accidentally something corruptive of the sight, in so far as it
destroys the harmony of the organ Nevertheless, intellectual vision may
cause sorrow, in so far as the thing seen is apprehended as hurtful,
not that it hurts through being seen, but in some other way no matter
which. It is thus that the soul in seeing the fire is distressed.

Reply to Objection 6: The comparison does not hold in every respect,
but it does in some, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 7: Although there is no bodily contact between the
soul and body, there is a certain spiritual contact between them (even
as the mover of the heaven, being spiritual, touches the heaven, when
it moves it, with a spiritual contact) in the same way as a "painful
object is said to touch," as stated in De Gener. i. This mode of
contact is sufficient for action.

Reply to Objection 8: The souls of the damned are never outside hell,
except by Divine permission, either for the instruction or for the
trial of the elect. And wherever they are outside hell they
nevertheless always see the fire thereof as prepared for their
punishment. Wherefore, since this vision is the immediate cause of
their distress, as stated above, wherever they are, they suffer from
hell-fire. Even so prisoners, though outside the prison, suffer
somewhat from the prison, seeing themselves condemned thereto. Hence
just as the glory of the elect is not diminished, neither as to the
essential, nor as to the accidental reward, if they happen to be
outside the empyrean, in fact this somewhat conduces to their glory, so
the punishment of the damned is nowise diminished, if by God's
permission they happen to be outside hell for a time. A gloss on James
3:6, "inflameth the wheel of our nativity," etc. , is in agreement with
this, for it is worded thus: "The devil, wherever he is, whether in the
air or under the earth, drags with him the torments of his flames. " But
the objection argues as though the corporeal fire tortured the spirit
immediately in the same way as it torments bodies.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD (FOURTEEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the suffrages for the dead. Under this head there
are fourteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether suffrages performed by one person can profit others?

(2) Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?

(3) Whether the suffrages of sinners profit the dead?

(4) Whether suffrages for the dead profit those who perform them?

(5) Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?

(6) Whether they profit those who are in purgatory?

(7) Whether they avail the children in limbo?

(8) Whether in any way they profit those who are heaven?

(9) Whether the prayer of the Church, the Sacrament of the altar, and
almsgiving profit the departed?

(10) Whether indulgences granted by the Church profit them?

(11) Whether the burial service profits the departed?

(12) Whether suffrages for one dead person profit that person more than
others?

(13) Whether suffrages for many avail each one as much as if they were
offered for each individual?

(14) Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages
are not offered, as much as special and general suffrages together
avail those for whom they are offered?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the suffrages of one person can profit others?

Objection 1: It would seem that the suffrages of one person cannot
profit others. For it is written (Gal. 6:8): "What things a man shall
sow, those also shall he reap. " Now if one person reaped fruit from the
suffrages of another, he would reap from another's sowing. Therefore a
person receives no fruit from the suffrages of others.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to God's justice, that each one should
receive according to his merits, wherefore the psalm (Ps. 61:13) says:
"Thou wilt render to every man according to his works. " Now it is
impossible for God's justice to fail. Therefore it is impossible for
one man to be assisted by the works of another.

Objection 3: Further, a work is meritorious on the same count as it is
praiseworthy, namely inasmuch as it is voluntary. Now one man is not
praised for the work of another. Therefore neither can the work of one
man be meritorious and fruitful for another.

Objection 4: Further, it belongs to Divine justice to repay good for
good in the same way as evil for evil. But no man is punished for the
evildoings of another; indeed, according to Ezech. 18:4, "the soul that
sinneth, the same shall die. " Therefore neither does one person profit
by another's good.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:63): "I am a partaker with all
them that fear Thee," etc.

Further, all the faithful united together by charity are members of the
one body of the Church. Now one member is assisted by another.
Therefore one man can be assisted by the merits of another.

I answer that, our actions can avail for two purposes. First, for
acquiring a certain state; thus by a meritorious work a man obtains the
state of bliss. Secondly, for something consequent upon a state; thus
by some work a man merits an accidental reward, or a rebate of
punishment. And for both these purposes our actions may avail in two
ways: first, by way of merit; secondly, by way of prayer: the
difference being that merit relies on justice, and prayer on mercy;
since he who prays obtains his petition from the mere liberality of the
one he prays. Accordingly we must say that the work of one person
nowise can avail another for acquiring a state by way of merit, so
that, to wit, a man be able to merit eternal life by the works which I
do, because the share of glory is awarded according to the measure of
the recipient, and each one is disposed by his own and not by another's
actions---disposed, that is to say, by being worthy of reward. By way
of prayer, however, the work of one may profit another while he is a
wayfarer, even for acquiring a state; for instance, one man may obtain
the first grace for another [*Cf. [5035]FS, Q[114], A[6]]: and since
the impetration of prayer depends on the liberality of God Whom we
pray, it may extend to whatever is ordinately subject to the Divine
power. On the other hand, as regards that which is consequent upon or
accessory to a state, the work of one may avail another, not only by
way of prayer but even by way of merit: and this happens in two ways.
First, on account of their communion in the root of the work, which
root is charity in meritorious works. Wherefore all who are united
together by charity acquire some benefit from one another's works,
albeit according to the measure of each one's state, since even in
heaven each one will rejoice in the goods of others. Hence it is that
the communion of saints is laid down as an article of faith. Secondly,
through the intention of the doer who does certain works specially for
the purpose that they may profit such persons: so that those works
become somewhat the works of those for whom they are done, as though
they were bestowed on them by the doer. Wherefore they can avail them
either for the fulfillment of satisfaction or for some similar purpose
that does not change their state.

Reply to Objection 1: This reaping is the receiving of eternal life, as
stated in Jn. 4:36, "And he that reapeth . . . gathereth fruit unto
life everlasting. " Now a share of eternal life is not given to a man
save for his own works, for although we may impetrate for another that
he obtain life, this never happens except by means of his own works,
when namely, at the prayers of one, another is given the grace whereby
he merits eternal life.

Reply to Objection 2: The work that is done for another becomes his for
whom it is done: and in like manner the work done by a man who is one
with me is somewhat mine. Hence it is not contrary to Divine justice if
a man receives the fruit of the works done by a man who is one with him
in charity, or of works done for him. This also happens according to
human justice, so that the satisfaction offered by one is accepted in
lieu of another's.

Reply to Objection 3: Praise is not given to a person save according to
his relation to an act, wherefore praise is "in relation to something"
(Ethic. i, 12). And since no man is made or shown to be well- or
ill-disposed to something by another's deed, it follows that no man is
praised for another's deeds save accidentally in so far as he is
somewhat the cause of those deeds, by giving counsel, assistance,
inducement, or by any other means. on the other hand, a work is
meritorious to a person, not only by reason of his disposition, but
also in view of something consequent upon his disposition or state, as
evidenced by what has been said.

Reply to Objection 4: It is directly contrary to justice to take away
from a person that which is his due: but to give a person what is not
his due is not contrary to justice, but surpasses the bounds of
justice, for it is liberality. Now a person cannot be hurt by the ills
of another, unless he be deprived of something of his own. Consequently
it is not becoming that one should be punished for another's sins, as
it is that one should acquire some advantage from deeds of another.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?

Objection 1: It would seem that the dead cannot be assisted by the
works of the living. First, because the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:10): "We
must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every
one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath
done. " Therefore nothing can accrue to a man from the works of others,
which are done after his death and when he is no longer in the body.

Objection 2: Further, this also seems to follow from the words of Apoc.
14:13, "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord . . . for their works
follow them. "

Objection 3: Further, it belongs only to one who is on the way to
advance on account of some deed. Now after death men are no longer
wayfarers, because to them the words of Job 19:8, refer: "He hath
hedged in my path round about, and I cannot pass. " Therefore the dead
cannot be assisted by a person's suffrages.

Objection 4: Further, no one is assisted by the deed of another, unless
there be some community of life between them. Now there is no community
between the dead and the living, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i,
11). Therefore the suffrages of the living do not profit the dead.

On the contrary are the words of 2 Macc. 12:46: "It is . . . a holy and
wholesome thought to pray for the dead that they may be loosed from
sins. " But this would not be profitable unless it were a help to them.
Therefore the suffrages of the living profit the dead.

Further, Augustine says (De Cure pro Mort. i): "Of no small weight is
the authority of the Church whereby she clearly approves of the custom
whereby a commendation of the dead has a place in the prayers which the
priests pour forth to the Lord God at His altar. " This custom was
established by the apostles themselves according to the Damascene in a
sermon on suffrages for the dead [*De his qui in fide dormierunt, 3],
where he expresses himself thus: "Realizing the nature of the Mysteries
the disciples of the Saviour and His holy apostles sanctioned a
commemoration of those who had died in the faith, being made in the
awe-inspiring and life-giving Mysteries. " This is also confirmed by the
authority of Dionysius (Hier. Eccl. ), where he mentions the rite of the
Early Church in praying for the dead, and, moreover, asserts that the
suffrages of the living profit the dead. Therefore we must believe this
without any doubt.

I answer that, Charity, which is the bond uniting the members of the
Church, extends not only to the living, but also to the dead who die in
charity. For charity which is the life of the soul, even as the soul is
the life of the body, has no end: "Charity never falleth away" (1 Cor.
13:8). Moreover, the dead live in the memory of the living: wherefore
the intention of the living can be directed to them. Hence the
suffrages of the living profit the dead in two ways even as they profit
the living, both on account of the bond of charity and on account of
the intention being directed to them. Nevertheless, we must not believe
that the suffrages of the living profit them so as to change their
state from unhappiness to happiness or "vice versa"; but they avail for
the diminution of punishment or something of the kind that involves no
change in the state of the dead.

Reply to Objection 1: Man while living in the body merited that such
things should avail him after death. Wherefore if he is assisted
thereby after this life, this is, nevertheless, the result of the
things he has done in the body.

Or we may reply, according to John Damascene, in the sermon quoted
above, that these words refer to the retribution which will be made at
the final judgment, of eternal glory or eternal unhappiness: for then
each one will receive only according as he himself has done in the
body. Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the suffrages of the
living.

Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted refer expressly to the sequel of
eternal retribution as is clear from the opening words: "Blessed are
the dead," etc. Or we may reply that deeds done on their behalf are
somewhat their own, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Although, strictly speaking, after death souls
are not in the state of the way, yet in a certain respect they are
still on the way, in so far as they are delayed awhile in their advance
towards their final award. Wherefore, strictly speaking, their way is
hedged in round about, so that they can no more be changed by any works
in respect of the state of happiness or unhappiness. Yet their way is
not so hedged around that they cannot be helped by others in the matter
of their being delayed from receiving their final award, because in
this respect they are still wayfarers.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the communion of civic deeds whereof the
Philosopher speaks, is impossible between the dead and the living,
because the dead are outside civic life, the communication of the
spiritual life is possible between them, for that life is founded on
charity towards God, to Whom the spirits of the dead live.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether suffrages performed by sinners profit the dead?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages performed by sinners do not
profit the dead. For, according to Jn. 9:31, "God doth not hear
sinners. " Now if their prayers were to profit those for whom they pray,
they would be heard by God. Therefore the suffrages performed by them
do not profit the dead.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Pastoral i, 11) that "when an
offensive person is sent to intercede, the wrath of the angered party
is provoked to harsher measures. " Now every sinner is offensive to God.
Therefore God is not inclined to mercy by the suffrages of sinners, and
consequently their suffrages are of no avail.

Objection 3: Further, a person's deed would seem to be more fruitful to
the doer than to another. But a sinner merits naught for himself by his
deeds. Much less, therefore, can he merit for another.

Objection 4: Further, every meritorious work must be a living work,
that is to say, informed by charity. Now works done by sinners are
dead. Therefore the dead for whom they are done cannot be assisted
thereby.

Objection 5: On the contrary, No man can know for certain about another
man whether the latter be in a state of sin or of grace. If, therefore,
only those suffrages were profitable that are done by those who are in
a state of grace, a man could not know of whom to ask suffrages for his
dead, and consequently many would be deterred from obtaining suffrages.

Objection 6: Further, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cix), as
quoted in the text (Sent.
iv, D, 45), the dead are assisted by
suffrages according as while living they merited to be assisted after
death. Therefore the worth of suffrages is measured according to the
disposition of the person for whom they are performed. Therefore it
would appear that it differs not whether they be performed by good or
by wicked persons.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in the suffrages performed
by the wicked. First, the deed done, for instance the sacrifice of the
altar. And since our sacraments have their efficacy from themselves
independently of the deed of the doer, and are equally efficacious by
whomsoever they are performed, in this respect the suffrages of the
wicked profit the departed. Secondly, we may consider the deed of the
doer, and then we must draw a distinction; because the deed of a sinner
who offers suffrage may be considered---in one way in so far as it is
his own deed, and thus it can nowise be meritorious either to himself
or to another; in another way in so far as it is another's deed, and
this happens in two ways. First, when the sinner, offering suffrages,
represents the whole Church; for instance a priest when he performs the
burial service in church. And since one in whose name or in whose stead
a thing is done is understood to do it himself as Dionysius asserts
(Coel. Hier. xiii), it follows that the suffrages of that priest,
albeit a sinner, profit the departed. Secondly, when he acts as the
instrument of another: for the work of the instrument belongs more to
the principal agent. Wherefore, although he who acts as the instrument
of another be not in a state of merit, his act may be meritorious on
account of the principal agent: for instance if a servant being in sin
do any work of mercy at the command of his master who has charity.
Hence, if a person dying in charity command suffrages to be offered for
him, or if some other person having charity prescribe them, those
suffrages avail for the departed, even though the persons by whom they
are performed be in sin. Nevertheless they would avail more if those
persons were in charity, because then those works would be meritorious
on two counts.

Reply to Objection 1: The prayer offered by a sinner is sometimes not
his but another's, and consequently in this respect is worthy to be
heard by God. Nevertheless, God sometimes hears sinners, when, to wit,
they ask for something acceptable to God. For God dispenses His goods
not only to the righteous but also to sinners (Mat. 5:45), not indeed
on account of their merits, but of His loving kindness. Hence a gloss
on Jn. 9:31, "God doth not hear sinners," says that "he speaks as one
unanointed and as not seeing clearly. "

Reply to Objection 2: Although the sinner's prayer is not acceptable in
so far as he is offensive, it may be acceptable to God on account of
another in whose stead or at whose command he offers the prayer.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason why the sinner who performs these
suffrages gains nothing thereby is because he is not capable of
profiting by reason of his own indisposition. Nevertheless, as stated
above, it may in some way profit another, who is disposed.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the sinner's deed is not living in so
far as it is his own, it may be living in so far as it is another's, as
stated above.

Since, however, the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show
that it matters not whether one obtain suffrages from good or from evil
persons, we must reply to them also.

Reply to Objection 5: Although one cannot know for certain about
another whether he be in the state of salvation, one may infer it with
probability from what one sees outwardly of a man: for a tree is known
by its fruit (Mat. 7:16).

Reply to Objection 6: In order that suffrage avail another, it is
requisite that the one for whom it is performed be capable of availing
by it: and a man has become capable of this by his own works which he
did in his life-time. This is what Augustine means to say.
Nevertheless, those works must be such that they can profit him, and
this depends not on the person for whom the suffrage is performed, but
rather on the one who offers the suffrages whether by performing them
or by commanding them.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether suffrages offered by the living for the dead profit those who offer
them?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages offered by the living for the
dead do not profit those who offer them. For according to human justice
a man is not absolved from his own debt if he pay a debt for another
man. Therefore a man is not absolved from his own debt for the reason
that by offering suffrages he has paid the debt of the one for whom he
offered them.

Objection 2: Further, whatever a man does, he should do it as best he
can. Now it is better to assist two than one. Therefore if one who by
suffrages has paid the debt of a dead person is freed from his own
debt, it would seem that one ought never to satisfy for oneself, but
always for another.

Objection 3: Further, if the satisfaction of one who satisfies for
another profits him equally with the one for whom he satisfies, it will
likewise equally profit a third person if he satisfy for him at the
same time, and likewise a fourth and so on. Therefore he might satisfy
for all by one work of satisfaction; which is absurd.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 34:13): "My prayer shall be turned
into my bosom. " Therefore, in like manner, suffrages that are offered
for others profit those who satisfy.

Further, the Damascene says in the sermon "On those who fell asleep in
the faith: Just as when about to anoint a sick man with the ointment or
other holy oil, first of all he, " namely the anointer, "shares in the
anointing and thus proceeds to anoint the patient, so whoever strives
for his neighbor's salvation first of all profits himself and
afterwards his neighbor. " And thus the question at issue is answered.

I answer that, The work of suffrage that is done for another may be
considered in two ways. First, as expiating punishment by way of
compensation which is a condition of satisfaction: and in this way the
work of suffrage that is counted as belonging to the person for whom it
is done, while absolving him from the debt of punishment, does not
absolve the performer from his own debt of punishment, because in this
compensation we have to consider the equality of justice: and this work
of satisfaction can be equal to the one debt without being equal to the
other, for the debts of two sinners require a greater satisfaction than
the debt of one. Secondly, it may be considered as meriting eternal
life, and this it has as proceeding from its root, which is charity:
and in this way it profits not only the person for whom it is done, but
also and still more the doer.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first
considered the work of suffrage as a work of satisfaction, while the
others consider it as meritorious.
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Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages profit those who are in hell.
For it is written (2 Macc. 12:40): "They found under the coats of the
slain some of the donaries of the idols . . . which the law forbiddeth
to the Jews," and yet we read further on (2 Macc. 12:43) that Judas
"sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem . . . to be
offered for the sins of the dead. " Now it is clear that they sinned
mortally through acting against the Law, and consequently that they
died in mortal sin, and were taken to hell. Therefore suffrages profit
those who are in hell.

Objection 2: Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the saying of
Augustine (Enchiridion cx) that "those whom suffrages profit gain
either entire forgiveness, or at least an abatement of their
damnation. " Now only those who are in hell are said to be damned.
Therefore suffrages profit even those who are in hell.

Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ): "If here the
prayers of the righteous avail those who are alive, how much more do
they, after death, profit those alone who are worthy of their holy
prayers? " Hence we may gather that suffrages are more profitable to the
dead than to the living. Now they profit the living even though they be
in mortal sin, for the Church prays daily for sinners that they be
converted to God. Therefore suffrages avail also for the dead who are
in mortal sin.

Objection 4: Further, in the Lives of the Fathers (iii, 172; vi, 3) we
read, and the Damascene relates in his sermon [*De his qui in fide
dormierunt] that Macarius discovered the skull of a dead man on the
road, and that after praying he asked whose head it was, and the head
replied that it had belonged to a pagan priest who was condemned to
hell; and yet he confessed that he and others were assisted by the
prayers of Macarius. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit even
those who are in hell.

Objection 5: Further, the Damascene in the same sermon relates that
Gregory, while praying for Trajan, heard a voice from heaven saying to
him: "I have heard thy voice, and I pardon Trajan": and of this fact
the Damascene adds in the same sermon, "the whole East and West are
witnesses. " Yet it is clear that Trajan was in hell, since "he put many
martyrs to a cruel death" [*De his qui fide dormierunt]. Therefore the
suffrages of the Church avail even for those who are in hell.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii): "The high priest
prays not for the unclean, because by so doing he would act counter to
the Divine order," and consequently he says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that "he
prays not that sinners be forgiven, because his prayer for them would
not be heard. " Therefore suffrages avail not those who are in hell.

Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 19): "There is the same reason for
not praying then" (namely after the judgment day) "for men condemned to
the everlasting fire, as there is now for not praying for the devil and
his angels who are sentenced to eternal punishment, and for this reason
the saints pray not for dead unbelieving and wicked men, because,
forsooth, knowing them to be already condemned to eternal punishment,
they shrink from pleading for them by the merit of their prayers before
they are summoned to the presence of the just Judge. "

Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the words of Augustine (De
Verb. A post. Serm. xxxii): "If a man depart this life without the
faith that worketh by charity and its sacraments, in vain do his
friends have recourse to such like acts of kindness. " Now all the
damned come under that head. Therefore suffrages profit them not.

I answer that, There have been three opinions about the damned. For
some have said that a twofold distinction must be made in this matter.
First, as to time; for they said that after the judgment day no one in
hell will be assisted by any suffrage, but that before the judgment day
some are assisted by the suffrages of the Church. Secondly, they made a
distinction among those who are detained in hell. Some of these, they
said, are very bad, those namely who have died without faith and the
sacraments, and these, since they were not of the Church, neither "by
grace nor, by name" [*Cf. Oratio ad Vesperas, Fer. ii, post Dom. Pass. ]
can the suffrages of the Church avail; while others are not very bad,
those namely who belonged to the Church as actual members, who had the
faith, frequented the sacraments and performed works generically good,
and for these the suffrages of the Church ought to avail. Yet they were
confronted with a difficulty which troubled them, for it would seem to
follow from this (since the punishment of hell is finite in intensity
although infinite in duration) that a multiplicity of suffrages would
take away that punishment altogether, which is the error of Origen
(Peri Archon. i; cf. Gregory, Moral. xxxiv): and consequently
endeavored in various ways to avoid this difficulty.

Praepositivus [*Gilbert Prevostin, Chancellor of the See of Paris, A. D.
1205-9] said that suffrages for the damned can be so multiplied that
they are entirely freed from punishment, not absolutely as Origen
maintained, but for a time, namely till the judgment day: for their
souls will be reunited to their bodies, and will be cast back into the
punishments of hell without hope of pardon. But this opinion seems
incompatible with Divine providence, which leaves nothing inordinate in
the world. For guilt cannot be restored to order save by punishment:
wherefore it is impossible for punishment to cease, unless first of all
guilt be expiated: so that, as guilt remains for ever in the damned,
their punishment will nowise be interrupted.

For this reason the followers of Gilbert de la Porree devised another
explanation. These said that the process in the diminution of
punishments by suffrages is as the process in dividing a line, which
though finite, is indefinitely divisible, and is never destroyed by
division, if it be diminished not by equal but by proportionate
quantities, for instance if we begin by taking away a quarter of the
whole, and secondly, a quarter of that quarter, and then a quarter of
this second quarter, and so on indefinitely. In like manner, they say
by the first suffrage a certain proportion of the punishment is taken
away, and by the second an equally proportionate part of the remainder.
But this explanation is in many ways defective. First, because it seems
that indefinite division which is applicable to continuous quantity
cannot be transferred to spiritual quantity: secondly, because there is
no reason why the second suffrage, if it be of equal worth, should
diminish the punishment less than the first: thirdly, because
punishment cannot be diminished unless guilt be diminished, even as it
cannot be done away unless the guilt be done away: fourthly, because in
the division of a line we come at length to something which is not
sensible, for a sensible body is not indefinitely divisible: and thus
it would follow that after many suffrages the remaining punishment
would be so little as not to be felt, and thus would no longer be a
punishment.

Hence others found another explanation. For Antissiodorensis [*William
of Auxerre, Archdeacon of Beauvais] (Sent. iv, Tract. 14) said that
suffrages profit the damned not by diminishing or interrupting their
punishment, but by fortifying the person punished: even as a man who is
carrying a heavy load might bathe his face in water, for thus he would
be enabled to carry it better, and yet his load would be none the
lighter. But this again is impossible, because according to Gregory
(Moral. ix) a man suffers more or less from the eternal fire according
as his guilt deserves; and consequently some suffer more, some less,
from the same fire. wherefore since the guilt of the damned remains
unchanged, it cannot be that he suffers less punishment. Moreover, the
aforesaid opinion is presumptuous, as being in opposition to the
statements of holy men, and groundless as being based on no authority.
It is also unreasonable. First, because the damned in hell are cut off
from the bond of charity in virtue of which the departed are in touch
with the works of the living. Secondly, because they have entirely come
to the end of life, and have received the final award for their merits,
even as the saints who are in heaven. For the remaining punishment or
glory of the body does not make them to be wayfarers, since glory
essentially and radically resides in the soul. It is the same with the
unhappiness of the damned, wherefore their punishment cannot be
diminished as neither can the glory of the saints be increased as to
the essential reward.

However, we may admit, in a certain measure, the manner in which,
according to some, suffrages profit the damned, if it be said that they
profit neither by diminishing nor interrupting their punishment, nor
again by diminishing their sense of punishment, but by withdrawing from
the damned some matter of grief, which matter they might have if they
knew themselves to be so outcast as to be a care to no one; and this
matter of grief is withdrawn from them when suffrages are offered for
them. Yet even this is impossible according to the general law, because
as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii)---and this applies
especially to the damned---"the spirits of the departed are where they
see nothing of what men do or of what happens to them in this life,"
and consequently they know not when suffrages are offered for them,
unless this relief be granted from above to some of the damned in spite
of the general law. This, however, is a matter of great uncertainty;
wherefore it is safer to say simply that suffrages profit not the
damned, nor does the Church intend to pray for them, as appears from
the authors quoted above.

Reply to Objection 1: The donaries to the idols were not found on those
dead so that they might be taken as a sign that they were carried off
in reverence to the idols: but they took them as conquerors because
they were due to them by right of war. They sinned, however, venially
by covetousness: and consequently they were not damned in hell, and
thus suffrages could profit them. or we may say, according to some,
that in the midst of fighting, seeing they were in danger, they
repented of their sin, according to Ps. 77:34, "When He slew them, then
they sought Him": and this is a probable opinion. Wherefore the
offering was made for them.

Reply to Objection 2: In these words damnation is taken in a broad
sense for any kind of punishment, so as to include also the punishment
of purgatory which is sometimes entirely expiated by suffrages, and
sometimes not entirety, but diminished.

Reply to Objection 3: Suffrage for a dead person is more acceptable
than for a living person, as regards his being in greater want, since
he cannot help himself as a living person can. But a living person is
better off in that he can be taken from the state of mortal sin to the
state of grace, which cannot be said of the dead. Hence there is not
the same reason for praying for the dead as for the living.

Reply to Objection 4: This assistance did not consist in a diminishment
of their punishment, but in this alone (as stated in the same place)
that when he prayed they were permitted to see one another, and in this
they had a certain joy, not real but imaginary, in the fulfillment of
their desire. Even so the demons are said to rejoice when they draw men
into sin, although this nowise diminishes their punishment, as neither
is the joy of the angels diminished by the fact that they take pity on
our ills.

Reply to Objection 5: Concerning the incident of Trajan it may be
supposed with probability that he was recalled to life at the prayers
of blessed Gregory, and thus obtained the grace whereby he received the
pardon of his sins and in consequence was freed from punishment. The
same applies to all those who were miraculously raised from the dead,
many of whom were evidently idolaters and damned. For we must needs say
likewise of all such persons that they were consigned to hell, not
finally, but as was actually due to their own merits according to
justice: and that according to higher causes, in view of which it was
foreseen that they would be recalled to life, they were to be disposed
of otherwise.

Or we may say with some that Trajan's soul was not simply freed from
the debt of eternal punishment, but that his punishment was suspended
for a time, that is, until the judgment day. Nor does it follow that
this is the general result of suffrages, because things happen
differently in accordance with the general law from that which is
permitted in particular cases and by privilege. Even so the bounds of
human affairs differ from those of the miracles of the Divine power as
Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xvi).
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Whether suffrages profit those who are in purgatory?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages do not profit even those who
are in purgatory. For purgatory is a part of hell. Now "there is no
redemption in hell" [*Office of the Dead, Resp. vii], and it is written
(Ps. 6:6), "Who shall confess to Thee in hell? " Therefore suffrages do
not profit those who are in purgatory.

Objection 2: Further, the punishment of purgatory is finite. Therefore
if some of the punishment is abated by suffrages, it would be possible
to have such a great number of suffrages, that the punishment would be
entirely remitted, and consequently the sin entirely unpunished: and
this would seem incompatible with Divine justice.

Objection 3: Further, souls are in purgatory in order that they may be
purified there, and being pure may come to the kingdom. Now nothing can
be purified, unless something be done to it. Therefore suffrages
offered by the living do not diminish the punishment of purgatory.

Objection 4: Further, if suffrages availed those who are in purgatory,
those especially would seem to avail them which are offered at their
behest. Yet these do not always avail: for instance, if a person before
dying were to provide for so many suffrages to be offered for him that
if they were offered they would suffice for the remission of his entire
punishment. Now supposing these suffrages to be delayed until he is
released from punishment, they will profit him nothing. For it cannot
be said that they profit him before they are discharged; and after they
are fulfilled, he no longer needs them, since he is already released.
Therefore suffrages do not avail those who are in purgatory.

On the contrary, As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), Augustine
says (Enchiridion cx): "Suffrages profit those who are not very good or
not very bad. " Now such are those who are detained in purgatory.
Therefore, etc.

Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that the "godlike priest in
praying for the departed prays for those who lived a holy life, and yet
contracted certain stains through human frailty. " Now such persons are
detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, The punishment of purgatory is intended to supplement
the satisfaction which was not fully completed in the body.
Consequently, since, as stated above ([5036]AA[1],2; Q[13], A[2]), the
works of one person can avail for another's satisfaction, whether the
latter be living or dead, the suffrages of the living, without any
doubt, profit those who are in purgatory.

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to those who are in the
hell of the damned, where there is no redemption for those who are
finally consigned to that punishment. We may also reply with Damascene
(Serm. : De his qui in fide dormierunt) that such statements are to be
explained with reference to the lower causes, that is according to the
demands of the merits of those who are consigned to those punishments.
But according to the Divine mercy which transcends human merits, it
happens otherwise through the prayers of the righteous, than is implied
by the expressions quoted in the aforesaid authorities. Now "God
changes His sentence but not his counsel," as Gregory says (Moral. xx):
wherefore the Damascene (Serm. : De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes
as instances of this the Ninevites, Achab and Ezechias, in whom it is
apparent that the sentence pronounced against them by God was commuted
by the Divine mercy [*Cf. [5037]FP, Q[19], A[7], ad 2].

Reply to Objection 2: It is not unreasonable that the punishment of
those who are in purgatory be entirely done away by the multiplicity of
suffrages. But it does not follow that the sins remain unpunished,
because the punishment of one undertaken in lieu of another is credited
to that other.

Reply to Objection 3: The purifying of the soul by the punishment of
purgatory is nothing else than the expiation of the guilt that hinders
it from obtaining glory. And since, as stated above ([5038]Q[13],
A[2]), the guilt of one person can be expiated by the punishment which
another undergoes in his stead, it is not unreasonable that one person
be purified by another satisfying for him.

Reply to Objection 4: Suffrages avail on two counts, namely the action
of the agent [*"Ex opere operante" and "ex opere operato"] and the
action done. By action done I mean not only the sacrament of the
Church, but the effect incidental to that action---thus from the giving
of alms there follow the relief of the poor and their prayer to God for
the deceased. In like manner the action of the agent may be considered
in relation either to the principal agent or to the executor. I say,
then, that the dying person, as soon as he provides for certain
suffrages to be offered for him, receives the full meed of those
suffrages, even before they are discharged, as regards the efficacy of
the suffrages that results from the action as proceeding from the
principal agent. But as regards the efficacy of the suffrages arising
from the action done or from the action as proceeding from the
executor, he does not receive the fruit before the suffrages are
discharged. And if, before this, he happens to be released from his
punishment, he will in this respect be deprived of the fruit of the
suffrages, and this will fall back upon those by whose fault he was
then defrauded. For it is not unreasonable that a person be defrauded
in temporal matters by another's fault---and the punishment of
purgatory is temporal---although as regards the eternal retribution
none can be defrauded save by his own fault.
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Whether suffrages avail the children who are in limbo?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages avail the children who are in
limbo. For they are not detained there except for another's sin.
Therefore it is most becoming that they should be assisted by the
suffrages of others.